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1978 ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT

USFK/EUSA.

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
**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301**

FOREWORD

The HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report is the only continuing record of significant developments within this command. It is designed to satisfy requirements from Department of Army and Commander in Chief, Pacific, providing a primary source document for those headquarters in the preparation of their official military histories. It also aids commanders and staff to plan and act, and is of value and use to anyone interested in the operations of a major overseas joint headquarters. Through this report newly arrived key personnel in Korea will obtain a comprehensive overview of the problems and accomplishments of this headquarters without detailed research into other records.

As with all military history, this compilation has as its ultimate objective the improvement of doctrine, training, procedures and equipment.

The report is prepared by the Command Historian's Office with support from each joint and special agency to include Joint US Military Advisory Group-Korea. It does not cover in detail the activities of component commands which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Suggestions for the improvement of this command history are welcome and should be addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: SJS-MH.



JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief

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GEN JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
COMMANDING GENERAL, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY



REPUBLIC OF KOREA

BASIC INFORMATION (As of 31 Dec 78)

LAND AREA.	38,000 square miles
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS	12 nautical miles
POPULATION	36,636,000
Annual Growth.	2.1 percent
Literacy Rate.	90 percent
Life Expectancy.	66.1 years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.2 acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	\$45.98 billion
Per Capita	\$1,242
DEFENSE BUDGET	\$2.7 billion
Percent GNP.	5.8 percent
Percent of Government Budget	35.6 percent
CURRENCY	Won: 484=\$1
TYPE GOVERNMENT.	Republic (power centralized in a strong executive)

President.	PARK Chung Hee
Prime Minister	CHOI Kyu Hah
Defense Minister	RO Jae Hyun
Minister of Foreign Affairs.	PARK Tong Jin
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff	GEN KIM Chong Hwan
Army Chief of Staff.	GEN LEE Sae Ho
Chief of Naval Operations.	ADM HWANG Chong Yon
Air Force Chief of Staff	GEN CHOO Young Bock

US COUNTRY TEAM PRINCIPALS

US Ambassador.	HON William H. Gleysteen, Jr
US AID Director.	MR. William E. Paupe
COMUSKOREA	GEN John W. Vessey, Jr, USA
Chief, JUSMAG-K.	MG Harry A. Griffith, USA

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(U) COMUSKOREA functions as the Single Military Representative of the United States in Korea, responsible for coordinating activities of all US forces in the ROK; exercises operational control over Eighth Army; reports to CINCUNC when US forces are placed under the UNC (see page 31); reports to CINCPAC in the event hostilities are not prosecuted under UN aegis; and acts as SECDEF representative for military assistance programs in the ROK under operational control of CINCPAC and coordinates US security assistance to Korea.

(U) CG, EUSA reports to COMUSKOREA for operational control; exercises command over all US Army units in Korea to include organizing, equipping, training and employing forces assigned to insure optimum readiness for combat operations; provides combat-ready air defense artillery units to Cdr, Korean Air Defense Sector; and reports to CINCUNC in the exercise of operational control over the ROK Army (ROKA).

(U) Command and Staff

(U) HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA was staffed as follows during period 1 Jan-6 Nov 78:¹

CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA/CG, EUSA: GEN J. W. Vessey, Jr (USA).
Deputy CINCUNC/Deputy Commander, USFK: LTG C. A. Gabriel (USAF).
(Deputy CINCUNC position established by SECDEF authority eff 7 Nov 78.)
Chief of Staff: MG R. C. Kingston (USA).
Deputy Chief of Staff-Joint: COL A. L. Villaret (USAF). (Position abolished 1 Oct 78.)
Deputy Chief of Staff-Army: COL W. M. Skidmore II (USA) replaced COL T. E. Fitzpatrick (USA) on 23 Jul 78.
Secretary Joint Staff: COL T. H. Spence (USA) replaced COL F. S. Nelson (USA) on 4 May 78.
Command Sergeant Major: CSM W. B. Tapp (USA).
ACofS, J1: COL H. L. Daniel (USAF) replaced COL P. E. Raabe (USAF) on 30 Jun 78.
ACofS, J2: COL J. A. Dodds (USA).
ACofS, J3: MG R. L. Prillaman (USA).
ACofS, J4: BG F. J. Toner (USA).
ACofS, J5: CAPT S. W. Turner (USN).
ACofS, J6: COL W. R. Crawford (USA) replaced COL J. L. Young (USA) on 22 Jun 78.
ACofS, Comptroller: COL J. M. Brown (USA).

1. (U) Effective 7 Nov 78, concurrent with formal activation of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), HQ UNC was reestablished as a separate entity, collocated with HQ CFC (see page 32). Headquarters structure and command relationships of UNC/USFK/EUSA are shown on charts at pages 18 and 19; those of CFC are at pages 20 and 21.

Adjutant General: COL C. H. Woliver (USA) replaced COL W. E. Hornish (USA) on 18 Jul 78.
 Chief, Armistice Affairs Division: COL K. A. Kleypas (USA).
 Chaplain: COL C. N. Walker (USA) replaced COL J. J. Kowsky (USA) on 31 Jul 78.
 Civilian Personnel Director: Mr. G. A. Blakeslee.
 Command Historian: Mr. H. M. Katz.
 Engineer: COL H. Johnstone (USA).
 Headquarters Commandant: COL M. E. Morrison (USA).
 Inspector General: COL W. C. Chamberlain (USA).
 Director, Joint Command Information Systems: CAPT H. J. Beeton (USN).
 Judge Advocate: COL R. J. Bednar (USA).
 Asst to the CofS, Management Information Systems: COL J. O. Forgy (USA) replaced COL J. D. Shumway III (USA) on 22 Jul 78.
 Protocol Officer: LTC J. P. Coughlin (USA) replaced LTC P. A. Lee (USA) on 21 Jun 78.
 Provost Marshal: COL A. O. Hall, Jr (USA).
 Public Affairs Officer: COL R. C. Reid (USA).
 Special Adviser to the CINCUNC: Mr. J. H. Hausman.
 Surgeon: COL G. L. Turner (USA) replaced BG B. T. Mittermeyer (USA) (promoted 24 Feb 78) on 24 Mar 78.
 Commander, HQ UNC (Rear): COL J. F. Rutkowski (USA) replaced COL W. W. Woodside (USA) on 10 Feb 78.
 Senior Member, UNC Military Armistice Commission: RADM W. C. Hamm (USN).
 Sp Asst for ROK Mil Affairs/Chief, JUSMAG-K: MG H. A. Griffith (USA).

(U) Following is a listing of USFK component commanders as of 31 Dec 78:²

Eighth United States Army: GEN J. W. Vessey, Jr.
 I Corps (ROK/US) Group: LTG M. C. Ross replaced LTG J. H. Cushman on 27 Feb 78.
 2d Infantry Division: MG D. E. Grange, Jr, replaced MG M. J. Brady on 19 Jan 78.
 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade: BG W. J. Mehl.
 19th Support Command: BG E. D. Pendleton, Jr, replaced BG T. D. Ayers on 11 Sep 78.
 4th US Missile Command: COL M. Rhode, Jr. (Unit inactivated 30 Jun 78.)
 US Army Garrison-Yongsan: COL A. Bassham.
 US Naval Forces, Korea: RADM W. C. Hamm.
 US Air Forces, Korea/314th Air Division: MG G. A. Edwards, Jr, replaced MG R. C. Taylor on 27 Jul 78.
 8th Tactical Fighter Wing: COL C. M. Summers replaced COL T. S. Swalm on 18 Mar 78.
 51st Composite Wing (Tactical): COL F. B. Hoenniger.

2. (U) Component structure is shown on chart at page 19.

(U) Distinguished Visitors

(U) During 1978 there were 223 official visits, involving 1,115 individuals who were in Korea for a total of 1,080 days. At Appendix 1 is a list of distinguished visitors for the year.

(S) Establishment of ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) (U)

(U) A new phase in American-Korean military cooperation occurred on 7 Nov this year when the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was formally activated.³ This military milestone recognized the maturity of ROK forces and their capability to provide an equal voice in their nation's defense. Establishment of the binational headquarters alliance is the culmination of a 30-year defense relationship between the US and the ROK. Here, in chronological form, are the historic highlights which led to development of a combined command structure in Korea.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
8 Sep 45	Elements of 7th US Inf Div arrive in Korea to accept surrender of Japanese forces south of 38th Parallel.
15 Aug 48	Republic of Korea established. US occupation ends; advisory/assistance phase begins.
29 Jun 49	US 5th RCT departs, leaving only the US Military Advisory Group to Korea (KMAG), with under 500 men.
25 Jun 50	North Korea launches a full-scale invasion of the South.
27 Jun 50	US air and naval forces begin combat operations in support of ROK.
5 Jul 50	Task Force Smith, first US ground unit committed to Korea, engages enemy near Osan.
14 Jul 50	Taejon Agreement. ROK President Syngman Rhee places all his forces under OPCON of GEN MacArthur, then Far East Commander.
24 Jul 50	United Nations Command is formed to stop NK aggression. US is appointed executive agency for UNC; GEN MacArthur is named CINCUNC.
10 Jul 51	Truce negotiations open at Kaesong.

3. (U) For additional details see (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 7.

DATEEVENT

27 Jul 53 Armistice signed at Pammunjom ends shooting war. US suffers 142,091 casualties, including 33,629 KIA.

17 Nov 54 ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty becomes effective; by a simultaneous agreement CINUNC retains OPCON of ROK forces (ROKF).

28 Jan 55 I US Corps, which was assigned OPCON over VI ROK Corps on 22 May 54, is redesignated I Corps (Gp).

Mid 1955 Two US Army corps and seven divisions (including the 1st Marine Div) depart Korea leaving a 50,000-man US force comprised of HQ I Corps (Gp), two infantry divisions, artillery, air defense, support units and air elements.

1 Jul 57 HQ UNC moves from Tokyo to Seoul (Yongsan). Concurrently, HQ USFK is formed.

19 Apr 60 Student uprising topples President Syngman Rhee's 12-year regime.

16 May 61 Bloodless military coup brings President (then MG) PARK Chung Hee to power.

Mid 1965 A study is begun to determine the form in which the ROK should be represented in HQ UNC/USFK. 101

1 Sep 65 Korea begins eight-year participation in Vietnam War. The 50,000-man ROKF-V is credited with 41,000 enemy dead, 3,800 losses--an 11 to 1 kill ratio. The ROK sent 320,000 men to RVN, more per capita than did the US.

Oct 66 NK initiates a campaign of infiltration and violence along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and subsequently along both coastlines. More than 40 Americans and hundreds of Koreans from both sides will be killed over next five years.

9 Feb 67 US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is promulgated.

21 Jan 68 NK attempts a commando raid on the Blue House (presidential mansion in Seoul).

23 Jan 68 NK seizes the USS Pueblo in international waters, 25 miles off Wonsan port.

27 May 68 First annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) is held in Washington, D.C.

15 Oct 68 ROK/US Operational Planning Staff formed with 24 members 101

DATEEVENT

(17 ROK--7 US). ~~This is first official voice the ROK has in planning for defense of Korea.~~

- 15 Apr 69 NK shoots down an unarmed USN reconnaissance plane (EC-121) with 31 men aboard. There are no survivors.
- 1 Apr 71 7th US Inf Div departs; 2d Div is relieved on line and goes into reserve in 7th Div positions N of Seoul. Only US troops left on DMZ are a small element guarding access to Joint Security Area (JSA), Panmunjom.
- 1 Apr 71 A Joint US Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K) is formed, consolidating separate advisory/assistance groups.
- 1 Jul 71 I Corps (ROK-US) Gp becomes operational. The first combined headquarters in Korea, it guards the critical Western Sector which includes major invasion routes leading from NK to Seoul.
- 4 Jul 72 South and North Korea initiate dialogue after 25 years of bitter hostility. NK unilaterally discontinues meetings on 18 Aug 73.
- 23 Oct 73 NK lays claim to territorial waters surrounding UNC-controlled Northwest Islands (NWI) and commences deliberate air and naval provocations in vicinity of NWI chain.
- 1 Jan 74 ROK, with financial and technical assistance from US, begins production of M-16 rifles; start of growing defense industry which now embraces local manufacture of ammunition, vehicles, missiles, artillery, helicopters and tank rebuild.
- 14 Jan 74 I Corps (Gp) Artillery discontinued; plans formulated for inactivation of 4th US Msl Comd.
- 1 Jul 74 Separate staffs serving HQ UNC/USFK and HQ EUSA are integrated into a single joint staff.
- 15 Aug 74 Assassination attempt on President Park results in death of Korea's First Lady.
- 15 Nov 74 An enemy-built tunnel under the DMZ is discovered near Korang-po, 40 miles N of Seoul.
- 19 Mar 75 Second NK-built tunnel located at Sobang-san in DMZ, 63 miles NNE of Seoul.

DATEEVENT

- 5-14 May 75 Exercises ULCHI (ROK) and FOCUS LENS (US) are merged for first time, testing proficiency of a ROK-US Combined Battle Staff. CINCUNC recommends a joint Korean-American command structure.
- 18 Aug 76 Panmunjom tree incident. NK guards axe to death two USA-JSA officers. Aftermath puts both sides on increased alert simultaneously for first time since Armistice was signed.
- 31 Jan 77 In Tokyo VP Mondale reaffirms newly-elected President Carter's campaign promise to withdraw Korea-based US ground troops (less intelligence, communications and logistics support personnel) by 1981 or 1982. This move, which would reduce the 40,000 US forces in Korea by two-thirds, would be accompanied by a build-up and indefinite retention of US air force units and compensatory US military aid for ROK forces.
- 26 Jul 77 A joint communique at close of Tenth ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul reveals agreement on departure of 6,000 Korea-based US ground troops by end CY 78 and establishment of a combined ROK-US command in that timeframe.
- 21 Apr 78 President Carter, unable to obtain congressional approval of compensatory package under which most of 2d Inf Div's equipment would be turned over to ROKA, limits departures of US troops in 1978 to one infantry battalion plus support elements--about 3,400 men.
- 12 May 78 Symbolic ground breaking is held for a new ROK/US Combined Forces Command headquarters building on Yongsan Main Post in Seoul.
- Jul 78 Eleventh ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting closes in San Diego with agreement on adjusted pullout schedule and reaffirmation of US security commitment. Terms of reference are signed for CFC. Immediately after, Military Committee in Plenary Session is convened and issues first strategic directive to CFC. Historic document defines CFC's mission and broad concept of operations.
- 17 Oct 78 A third NK secret corridor under the DMZ is intercepted 2.4 miles S of Panmunjom, about 27 miles NW of Seoul.

DATEEVENT

7 Nov 78 ROK/US Combined Forces Command is formally activated. Incumbent CINCUNC, GEN John W. Vessey, Jr, will also serve as CINCCFC. The 500-man binational headquarters is separate and distinct from UNC.

(FOUO) 1978 CFC Developments. Activation plans were accelerated in early 1978 when ROK participants unilaterally established a provisional CFC headquarters and initiated personnel assignment actions to man key positions. The ROKG had rented an office building near the Yongsan Military Reservation in Seoul to house the provisional staff, and by Mar 78 the headquarters nucleus had moved in and was organized for work. It was soon recognized, however, that space available in that building was not sufficient to accommodate all assigned personnel. Additional space was allocated for ROK CFC members by collocating them where possible with their US counterparts in HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA buildings. This arrangement helped achieve phased integration of ROK/US staffs during the pre-activation period.

(FOUO) Offsetting advantages of integration to large extent were problems of overcrowding as well as difficulties encountered in maintaining security of classified US-only documents and in following standardized administrative procedures. Furthermore, in most cases ROK personnel were prepared to devote full-time efforts to CFC planning problems but found their US counterparts deeply involved with USFK/EUSA projects not related to CFC tasks. Nevertheless, marginally satisfactory arrangements resulted as additional US officers were designated for CFC staff and commenced addressing issues relevant to the forthcoming binational command.

(FOUO) The combined staff's first substantive effort came in Mar when the provisional headquarters assembled in one place for the first time to provide management for TEAM SPIRIT 78, the largest combined field training exercise ever conducted in the ROK (see page 141). ROK officers and men were at a distinct disadvantage in this exercise, having no institutional experience in planning and directing a joint/combined maneuver of TEAM SPIRIT's magnitude, and not being familiar with US staff procedures that were used. Nevertheless, Korean personnel gained valuable insights into complexities of command and control at theater level and personal working relationships evolved with US counterparts which would contribute greatly to success of later combined staff efforts.

(FOUO) By mid-Apr 78 planning milestones had been established and requirements assigned to each CFC provisional staff section. Monthly briefings were held for CINCCFC designate and his ROK deputy which described progress toward attainment of milestone objectives. Such matters as administrative procedures, language use policy, cost sharing,

Most important action accomplished during this period was completion of a new draft OPLAN 5027 (Defense of Korea) under CFC heading, to become effective on CFC activation date. Basic responsibility for defending the Republic was thereby transferred from COMUSKOREA to CINCCFC on 7 Nov 78. Additional refinements were made to operational procedures and a comprehensive Combined Information Security Program directive was developed in coordination with USFK J2 specialists. On 5 Sep 78 CINCPAC confirmed that CINCCFC had been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority.

(U) On 7 Nov 78, ceremonies inaugurating the ROK/US CFC were held in front of its new headquarters building on Yongsan Post. Featured were addresses by ROK President PARK Chung Hee and US SECDEF Harold Brown (texts of which appear in App 2). After the activation order was read, President Park presented the newly designed CFC colors (see following topic) to Gen John W. Vessey, Jr, the first CINCCFC. Following the ceremony, a tour of the newly constructed headquarters was conducted and a reception held in CINCCFC's offices for the ROK President and visiting dignitaries, which included the ROK MND and JCS Chairman, US Ambassador to the ROK, ASD(ISA), and Asst SECSTATE for East Asian & Pacific Affairs.


(FOUO) Planning for CFC headquarters building size and layout had been initiated in Jan 78, design was completed in Apr and construction commenced on 12 May. The CFC command group and staff occupied the new structure in early Dec 78. Although they found it to be a well-built and adequately appointed facility, some inevitable operational shortcomings soon became apparent. One example was need for exclusive use of US-owned secure communications systems since ROK equipment does not meet required US security standards. Systems presently used in HQ CFC (US resources) must be in custody of and maintained solely by US personnel. Consequently, only two automatic secure voice communications sets were installed in the new building, one available to US command group members and the other to US personnel in ACofS, C3. The Deputy CINCCFC and other ROK staff principals, in order to use secure communications, must request permission from US officers who are subordinate in rank. Special intelligence also remains a US-owned and operated capability; the ROK ACofS, C2 as well as the Deputy CINCCFC must visit the US-maintained All Sources Intelligence Room to receive pertinent enemy information or intelligence products. Sensitivity of many US NOFORN classified documents requires that US CFC members must work with such materials at HQ USFK.¹²

(FOUO) Not all problems facing the new binational organization are internal. Many US headquarters/organizations are having considerable difficulty in grasping unique implications of CFC's command relationships. Both US JCS and Pacific Command, for instance, have

12. (U) Coord, Mr. H. M. Katz, USFK/EUSA Command Historian, with G Prillaman, CFC C3, 28 Dec 78.



ROK President PARK Chung Hee presents official colors of CFC to its first commander, GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. Ceremony, held on 7 Nov 78, marks turning point in military cooperation between the US and ROK.



Designed, built and funded by ROKG, the CFC's modern two-story headquarters building faces the USFK/EUSA Command Building across Yongsan's Knight Field.

exposed in ad fairly
difficulty in recognizing that CFC is not immediately subordinate to them alone. Since HQ CFC operates bilaterally in most respects, US services and command authorities must make a conscious decision as to which functional area is involved in each action dealing with the US presence in Korea. Otherwise, they risk having a ROK staff section chief making recommendations on a purely US unilateral issue. The problem for the ROK JCS is just the opposite. Whereas previously they had very little influence over UNC/USFK/EUSA commands, they now have an active part in overseeing an organization which, by charter, must be responsive to desires of US national command authorities as well as their own.¹³

(FOUO) Although complex planning and operational problems in large measure have continually surfaced during CFC's formative stages, most have been or are being resolved. There has been remarkable improvement in coordination between the command charged with South Korea's defense and ROKG agencies responsible for support of that command. Both ROK and US personnel, physically located desk-to-desk in the new headquarters, have gained a deeper appreciation of strengths and weaknesses of each other's modus operandi; most compromises resulted in procedures which appeared to be distinct improvements. The most significant command and control deficiency, the language barrier (which has likewise dogged the UNC throughout its existence), was largely overcome through integration of Korean officers into the senior command structure. One of the greatest single benefits derived from the new command can be attributed to its novel character; because of its newness it is unencumbered by a business-as-usual syndrome. In particular, the energy and enthusiasm of ROK officers has been contagious and their proclivity for actively seeking rationales at every turn has generated continual re-examination and frequent changes to long-standing policies bordering on obsolescence. Many problems being encountered by CFC are not genuinely new; they are simply being recognized for the first time. In the words of MG Prillaman, C3, CFC is proving to be a cathartic which is sometimes difficult to swallow but which is destined to produce needed results.

(U) Outline of communications support planned for CFC is at page 253. Funding responsibilities and cost-sharing arrangements are discussed on page 285.

(U) HQ ROK/US CFC Distinctive Insignia

(U) Emblem. Designed partially by the US Army's Institute of Heraldry at Cameron Station, Va, a command emblem suitable for logo, badge and flag purposes was approved by CINCCFC designate on 25 Sep 78, and endorsed by the ROK-US Activation Committee and became effective on 7 Nov 78. The design shown on next page incorporates symbolism from both allies; the 13 stars represent the US while the centerpiece is the unique symbol of Korea. Laurel wreath depicts unity and peace. The red, white and blue colors are those in the flags of both nations.

Ibid.




(U) Metal Identification Badge. Affixed to a 5/8 inch wide black leather strap that suspends from left breast pocket button, the 2½ x 3½ inch shield-like badge is for use by assigned personnel. Authority to wear terminates when individual is transferred from the headquarters. CFC badge will be centered on right breast pocket if any other emblem (except UNC's) is worn on left side; use is optional if other badges are worn on both uniform breast pockets. Those serving both the CFC and UNC staffs wear the CFC device on left pocket, UNC on right. No shoulder sleeve insignia was prescribed.¹⁴

(U) Flag Display. At the 7 Nov 78 activation ceremony, the CFC's banner was formally presented to GEN Vessey by President Park in presence of SECDEF Brown and Defense Minister Ro. The flag's design is same as emblem and badge, except the laurel branches are extended on a ribbon creating a wider base. Displays conform to provisions of ROK, US and UN flag codes.

14. (U) Coord, Mr. H. M. Katz, USFK/EUSA Command Historian, with COL A. Villaret, CFC SCS and COMO KIM Heun Tak, CFC ACofS, Cl.


UNC/USFK/EUSA
HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE
(AS OF 6 NOV 78)



COORDINATION
STAFF SUPERVISION

- (1) POSITION ESTABLISHED BY SECDEF AUTHORITY EFFECTIVE 7 NOV 78
(2) UNDER OPCON OF COMUSKOREA
(3) POSITION ABOLISHED 1 OCT 78
(4) REPORTS TO COMUSKOREA (TO CINCCFC EFF 7 NOV 78) & CHMN, ROK JCS
(5) UNDER STAFF SUPERVISION OF ACofS, J1
(6) ALSO SERVES AS PERSONAL STAFF OFFICER


UNC/USFK/EUSA
US COMPONENT STRUCTURE
(As of 6 Nov 78)



————— COMMAND
 - - - - - COMMAND LESS OPCON
 OPCON
 / / / / / SUPPORT & COORDINATION

(1) UNDER OPCON OF 314TH AIR DIV
 (2) UNDER COMMAND OF PACFLT
 (3) UNDER COMMAND OF FIFTH AF

(As of 31 Dec 78)



Note (1) Serves concurrently as UNC staff member.

Note (2) Deputy serves concurrently as UNC staff member.

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(U) US Force Reductions

(U) Historian's Note. In terms of national security, 1978 was another eventful year for the Republic of Korea. The year encompassed TEAM SPIRIT 78, the largest joint, combined exercise held in the ROK since the 1953 Armistice; discovery of a third NK-built tunnel under the DMZ; the historic formation of a ROK-US Combined Forces Command; and deployment to Korea of an additional USAF F-4 squadron to bolster air defenses. Also in this timeframe, the ROK ordered or received \$457 million worth of military equipment and weapons from the US, and developed its own domestic missile and rocket weapons systems. But perhaps the major military development of calendar year 1978 was departure of a 2d Div infantry battalion--the first manifestation of President Carter's early 1977 decision to phase out American tactical troops in South Korea. The pros and cons of the US Administration's plan to reduce the 40,000-man US military presence in the ROK to 16,000 by 1982 are better understood when evaluated against the overall US military involvement in Korea. Highlights follow.

(U) Pre-Korean War Period. US forces have been in Korea for more than 30 years. Our military position can be said to have had its beginnings in the 1943 Cairo Declaration where the US, China and Great Britain agreed that when the war with Japan was won, Korea, which had been under Japanese domination for 40 years, should become free and independent. The Soviet Union also agreed to this in Aug 45 when she declared war on Japan.

(U) The war in the Pacific ended on 2 Sep 45. Since the 38th Parallel roughly divides the Korean Peninsula, it was determined by mutual consent that American troops would accept the surrender of the Japanese south of the parallel, and the Russians would receive the surrender of those to the north. Three days after VJ Day, elements of the 7th US Inf Div left Okinawa to carry out that decision, arriving at Inchon on 8 Sep 45. These first US troops in Korea were part of the US XXIV Corps, an occupation force. To handle civil affairs a US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was formed, headed by the CG, 7th Inf Div. Collectively, the American military presence was known as US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK).

(U) Establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 Aug 48 led to a shift from military to civilian control and realignment of the US command structure in Korea. USAMGIK came to an end and plans were made for the gradual withdrawal of USAFIK units. Concurrently, advisory

personnel were organized into a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG). This small assistance unit was the forerunner of the US Military Advisory Group to Korea (KMAG) which, in turn, was the major element in the formation of today's Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K). USAFIK units began to leave the peninsula in late 1948; the last increment, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, departed on 29 Jun 49. From then until the North Korean invasion in mid-1950, the only US unit in South Korea was KMAG with a strength of under 500 men.

(U) Although USSR occupation troops withdrew in 1948, Soviet influence did not. Before the elections in South Korea, North Korea's KIM Il Sung was established in power and his "Democratic People's Republic" declared itself the only government on the peninsula. The UN passed a resolution in Dec 48 recognizing the ROK as the only legal government. NK was in violent disagreement with the UN's policy of recognition. Then came the war.

(U) The Korean War. On 25 Jun 50 NK launched a coordinated full-scale assault on the Republic. The UN condemned this action and called on member nations for assistance. Within a few days, President Truman committed US air, naval and ground forces. Fifteen other nations also sent combat contingents to help the young Republic defend itself against the invaders. Thus was born the United Nations Command, the first UN force in history formed to stop aggression. The UN appointed the US as the executive agency for the UN Command. The US still represents UN peacekeeping efforts in Korea.

(U) For three years the fighting raged up and down the peninsula. In that period more than two million men, women and children lost their lives. US casualties numbered 142,091, of whom 33,629 were killed in action. It was, at the time, the fourth largest war in America's history. US forces comprised more than 90 percent of the UN commitment. Major units were: Eighth Army with three corps and nine divisions (including the 1st Marine Div); Seventh Fleet with three task forces; and the Far East Air Forces with 20 groups and 70 squadrons. The Marines had both a division and an air wing. Average US strength during the Korean War was over 250,000 with peak (in Jul 53) at 302,000, about 70 percent Army.

(U) The war in Korea ground to a halt when, after two long years of difficult negotiations, the Military Armistice was signed on 27 Jul 53. This was an agreement between the military commanders to stop all hostile acts pending a political settlement. The world powers, after talks at Geneva in Apr 54, were still unable to reach an understanding and Korea remained divided by the military demarcation line. This situation has not changed, and the Military Armistice in Korea is now the longest armed truce in history.

(U) At the time of the Korean Armistice, there were about 932,000 UNC ground forces in Korea, including 591,000 ROK and 39,000 other allied forces. All ROK forces were under OPCON of CINCUNC per a 14 Jul 50 decree by President Syngman Rhee, which was confirmed by a 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty still in force. All foreign elements, the bulk of which were in a British Commonwealth Division, were attached to US units. In addition to the UK these were: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and Luxemburg. Other than small liaison and honor guard contingents, all were withdrawn from Korea by mid-1955 except a Turkish element which departed in 1966 and a company of Thai troops which was withdrawn in 1971. UNC member nations which sent combat forces to aid Korea signed a "Declaration of the 16 UNC Allies" dated 7 Aug 53, which stated in part "...If there is a renewal of the armed attack...we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the Armistice would be so grave that in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea...."

(U) The Post-War Era. The reduction of US forces in Korea after the war was relatively rapid and within two years of the Jul 53 Armistice, US ground forces had been cut back to two divisions plus support units. Two Army corps headquarters and seven divisions (including the 1st Marine Div) along with numerous nondivisional Army units departed the ROK throughout 1954 and early 1955.

(U) The Eighth Army configuration by the spring of 1955 was I Corps (Gp), the "Shield of Seoul" responsible for defending the critical western sector of the ROK; the 24th US Inf Div on line in the 18½-mile western sector of the Demilitarized Zone; and the 7th US Inf Div in I Corps Gp reserve. (The 24th was replaced by the 1st Cav Div in Oct 57. The 1st Cav was transferred to Vietnam in Jul 65 and replaced by the 2d US Inf Div.) The balance of the 50,000-man force structure in 1955 was a corps artillery element, an air defense brigade, a missile command, a logistical command and area support and service units.

(U) HQ UNC moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 Jul 57 in conjunction with an overall reorganization of US military forces and command structures in the Pacific. Concurrent with this move was the formation of US Forces Korea (USFK), a planning headquarters which coordinates matters of joint concern in the ROK. Eighth Army headquarters was served by a general or G staff while UNC/USFK was served by a joint or J staff. The senior Army officer in Korea has commanded all three headquarters, serving as CINCUNC, COMUSKOREA and CG, EUSA.

(U) In ensuing years, US ground forces in Korea continued their defense readiness mission, helped modernize the ROK armed forces and

added a significant measure of stability that has enhanced the ROK's remarkable economic progress. The next major changes in the US force structure in Korea took place in Apr 71 when the 7th Inf Div was withdrawn. Simultaneously the 2d Inf Div was relieved on line by the 1st ROKA Div and went into reserve north of Seoul. This left the US with no ground troops deployed along the DMZ, except for a small element guarding the Panmunjom truce area. The 2d Inf Div thus became the last remaining US division on the mainland of Asia. Predominantly a bachelor unit, it has an authorization of over 16,000 including the integration of 2,000 Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) troops.

(U) The partial withdrawal in the spring of 1971 was accompanied by increased US military aid to ROK forces and was part of a general policy for US troop reduction in Asia introduced in the Nixon Doctrine. It involved a drawdown of 20,000 American troops, mostly from the departing 7th Inf Div, and necessitated numerous base closures and unit reorganizations and consolidations.

(U) It was also in Apr 71 that KMAG was eliminated as a subordinate command of Eighth Army and redesignated Army Section, JUSMAG-K. Prior to that time the military assistance program had been administered by PROVMAAG-K and three separate service advisory groups (KMAG--the largest in mission and size, 6145th AF Advisory Gp and Naval Advisory Gp) each reporting through its own service chain of command. Establishment of JUSMAG-K simplified command relationships by consolidating organization and effort, with the Chief, JUSMAG-K reporting directly to COMUSKOREA. This restructuring also recognized the lessened need for direct advisory efforts as ROK forces matured.

(U) Meanwhile, the post-war US Army logistical infrastructure in the ROK had been undergoing numerous changes in concept, realignment, reorganization and redesignation--all aimed at providing optimum supply and maintenance to US and ROK forces. The present system evolved in 1972 when EUSA decided to consolidate its support activities on a

1. (U) KATUSA program was initiated in 1950 upon agreement of ROK President, US Ambassador to Korea and CINCUNC. At its 1952 peak, KATUSA strength amounted to over 20,000. KATUSAs not only bolstered wartime US units, but improved combat operations in areas of local language ability, identification of friend or foe, enemy intelligence, knowledge of local terrain, continuity, etc. KATUSA strength declined after the Armistice and in Jul 71, following a reduction of US ground forces in the ROK, stabilized at about 7,000. Replacements, who are selected by ROK Army, receive on-the-job training in a variety of much needed skills of benefit to the US and ROK. KATUSAs serve primarily in combat units but support virtually all Eighth Army organizations.

functionalized-area basis. As a result, the huge ASCOM complex at Bupyong, one of the most active installations of its kind in the US Army, was closed in Jun 73. Missile/aviation support operations were established chiefly around Camp Humphreys at Pyongtaek and heavier maintenance support further south, primarily at Camp Carroll, near Waegwan. The 19th Support Command, headquartered at Taegu, is the control element.

(U) The USAF in Korea experienced its first buildup after the Korean War as a result of the abortive NK commando raid on the Blue House (ROK Presidential Mansion in Seoul) and the capture of the USS Pueblo. Following those incidents, both of which occurred in Jan 68, there was a significant increase in tactical Air Force units in Korea with greater emphasis on air-ground operations training. The number of US air personnel doubled to around 10,000.

(U) The US Navy has had no ships or planes homeported in the ROK and Navy/Marine strength has been negligible, less than 500, except during major Seventh Fleet exercises.

(U) After the Vietnam War ended in 1973 DOD decided to eliminate 60,000 noncombatant spaces worldwide through consolidation, reduction or elimination of management or support type headquarters. Eighth Army, a tactical field headquarters, was not subject to that policy but in response to a feasibility study requested by JCS, the staffs serving HQ Eighth Army and HQs UNC/USFK were integrated into a single joint staff on 1 Jul 74. Twelve of the 20 HQ EUSA special and personal staffs also served HQ UNC/USFK and were only slightly affected by establishment of HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA. The reorganization, a workable arrangement, saved considerable spaces and operational funds. Executive agent for the tri-headquarters is the Department of Army.

(U) Following discontinuation of I Corps (Gp) Artillery in Jan 74, the US military posture in the ROK remained fairly constant although plans were being formulated for inactivation of the 4th Missile Command, the last unit of its kind in the US Army.

(U) The post-war era has been marked by NK belligerence and periods of open violence as the enemy built up its war potential in contravention of the Armistice. Those years of uneasy peace have witnessed, in addition to the commando raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul and the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of an unarmed USN reconnaissance plane, major infiltration attempts across the DMZ and along both coasts, firefights on the high seas, an assassination attempt on President Park's life which resulted in the death of Korea's first lady, discovery of secret underground tunnel complexes extending from the North into the UNC side of the DMZ, and the brutal bludgeoning of two US Army officers in the Panmunjom truce area.

(U) To the Koreans, the reassuring presence of US troops has been a "comrade-in-arms, forward together" association, a helping hand for their armed forces, communities and morale. There have been no "Yankee Go Home" signs in the Republic of Korea. For the US, our military involvement has important strategic value. GEN Fred C. Weyand, when he was Army Chief of Staff, put it this way:

"America's military presence in Korea provides a uniquely stabilizing element on a peninsula where the interests of four major powers converge by operating as a restraint on North Korean provocations, a brake on Sino-Soviet adventurism, and a reassurance to US allies, particularly Japan, of American commitment to their security."

(U) The Carter Plan. It was against this backdrop that Vice President Mondale, on 31 Jan 77, reaffirmed the President's pledge to withdraw US ground troops (less intelligence, communication and logistics support personnel) by 1981 or 1982. This move, which would reduce the 40,000 US forces in Korea by two-thirds, would be accompanied by a build-up and indefinite retention of US air force units and compensatory US military aid for ROK forces. The plan was formalized at the Tenth US/ROK Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul in Jul 77. A reduction of 6,000 men was ordered by end of 1978, a timeframe which would also see the establishment of a combined (US-ROK) forces command.

(U) On 18 Feb 77, President Carter invited GEN John W. Vessey, Jr, CINCUNC, to the White House to discuss his decision. GEN Vessey was assured that his concerns would be thoroughly considered and that the drawdown would be accomplished in a manner which would not upset the military balance or contribute to instability on the Korean peninsula, and that he would be consulted on form and timing before reduction of Korea-based US troops began.²

(U) The withdrawal plan met with immediate approval in some circles and sharp criticism in others. Among those voicing concern was MG John K. Singlaub, UNC/USFK/EUSA CofS, who was recalled by President Carter for publicly taking issue with stated national security policy. On 21 May 77, Singlaub had told a Washington Post interviewer that he agreed with Korean leaders that "if US ground troops are withdrawn on the schedule suggested it will lead to war." The President, after meeting with the general, decided not to reprimand or admonish him but approved a SECDEF recommendation for reassignment as FORSCOM's CofS, a position comparable to the one he held in Korea.

2. (U) Coord, Mr. H. M. Katz, UNC/USFK/EUSA Command Historian, with GEN Vessey, CINCUNC, 12 Jun 78.

(U) As 1977 wore on, the planned pullout continued to generate controversy and was exacerbated by the PARK Tong Sun case. Park, a wealthy Washington-based rice broker and socialite, was accused of trying to buy US congressional support for Korea through improper political contributions. The so-called bribery case received much unfavorable publicity and became an important diplomatic issue between the US and Korea, one that threatened the traditional friendly relations between the two countries.

(U) By mid-year, the US military command in Korea had assessed courses of action for dealing with reductions in US conventional ground forces. Plans and committees were formed to insure orderly withdrawal of targeted troops and coordinate formation of a combined ROK/US headquarters. Care was taken to insure that US soldiers in the field remained fully informed and motivated.

(U) Agreements between the ROK and US governments on the reduction of US ground troops included a tentative timetable, assurances that the headquarters and two brigades of the 2d US Inf Div would remain in place until the final phase, and an arrangement whereby ROK armed forces would be bolstered in advance or parallel with actual withdrawals. This last amounts to transfer of \$800 million worth of US military equipment now in Korea. There were indications, however, that a reluctant Congress might not act on the Administration's request for the compensatory arms package, thus blocking or delaying deployments from Korea. At end CY 77, EUSA force reductions, under the Administration's plan, remained in a programmed stage with the 40,000-man US military presence in the ROK unchanged.

(U) By early 1978 there was mounting opposition to the US force reduction plan in Korea. Foremost among those taking exception were congressional defense committees, the news media and veteran's groups. Consensus was that the President's unilateral decision was made without prior consultations with the Congress, had no support from free Asian nations and would neither save money nor prevent US involvement in any new conflict.³

(U) In April, President Carter sharply modified the withdrawal schedule. Citing congressional uncertainty and delays in pledged American compensatory aid to the ROK, the US chief executive reduced 1978's scheduled pullout of three infantry battalions to one battalion of 800 men. The US Senate then proposed an amendment to the Mutual Security Act, passed in Sep, which read in part, "It is the sense of

3. (U) For selective articles illustrative of reasons for and against withdrawal and the dispute surrounding the issue, see (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report, 1977 (U), App 2A & 2B.

the Congress that future withdrawals of ground forces of the United States from the Republic of Korea may seriously risk upsetting the military balance in that region and requires full advance consultation with the Congress."

(U) Reaffirmation of America's military commitment to South Korea's security was further evidenced during the year by culmination of two basic agreements reached during the 1977 SCM. These were:

-- Activation of a ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). This merger, described in detail on page 8, took place on 7 Nov and marked a turning point in military cooperation between the two countries. Shortly thereafter, the major headquarters in Seoul were functionally realigned into two commands, HQ UNC/CFC and HQ USFK/EUSA.

-- Retention and expansion of USAF units in Korea to compensate for planned reduction of American ground forces. This was realized on 8 Nov when 14 F-4 Phantoms arrived at Taegu AB. Augmentation aircraft, which formed the 497th Tactical Ftr Sqdn, represented a 20 percent increase in USAF tactical air power in the ROK. (See page 117.)

(U) On 14 Dec, members of the 2/9th Inf (Manchus) became the first ground combat troops to depart Korea under the US pullout plan when their unit, an element of the 2d Div's 3d Bde, redeployed for temporary stationing at Ft Riley, Kansas. As shown on page 118, ten other EUSA units were inactivated or withdrawn during CY 78, but these actions were planned well before President Carter's decision.

(U) In sum, while EUSA force reductions are still programmed, there was no major exodus from the ROK during 1978. In fact, the pace of President Carter's phaseout plan, which originally called for redeployment of 6,000 American troops this year, has been slowed down to a projection of 6,000 by end CY 79. No firm schedule has been set beyond 1979. For USFK members in the field, 1978 was another year of intensive training in combat tactics, service and support. For command and staff personnel, it was a year of added dimensions as they dealt with the mechanics of withdrawal and combined headquarters operation. At year's end it was clear that the US Administration was still pursuing a policy of phased redeployment for the Korea-based 2d Inf Div and its supporting units, but that the withdrawal plan was subject to changing circumstances and flexible as to incremental implementation.

(U) The UNC additionally provides the legal foundation for retention of base areas in Japan (discussed on page 45) and for the fundamental concept of an armed force established under international law to resist aggression and to enforce the law. It remains a significant symbol of the essential lawfulness of the shared US/ROK defense relationship and purposes vis-a-vis NK and its allies.

(U) On 7 Nov 78, simultaneous with CFC activation, CINCCFC directed nine staff officers of that headquarters (six US, three ROK) to serve concurrently as members of CINCUNC's staff. Those designated were CFC CofS, C2, Dep C2, C3, Dep C3, C4, C5, Dep C5 and PAO.

(U) Organization and Missions of Armistice Affairs Agencies

(U) The 27 Jul 53 Korean Armistice Agreement established a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to supervise its implementation and to negotiate any violations. The MAC is composed of ten members--five appointed by the UNC and a like number by the Communist side. The UNC Senior Member position is presently an additional duty for a US major general or flag rank equivalent; until Jan 74 it was a primary duty position rotated every six months among the three US military departments. Other members of the UNC component include two ROK general officers, one British general officer, and one officer selected from the UNC Advisory Group on a rotational basis. Four officers of the North Korean People's Army (NK or KPA) and one officer of the Chinese People's Volunteers (PRC or CPV) represent the Communists. MAC meetings are held at request of either side in the Joint Security Area, commonly known as Panmunjom, in the DMZ. Opposing Senior Members are the only spokesmen for their sides at commission meetings.

(U) To assist the MAC in fulfilling its mission, the Armistice Agreement provides for a joint Secretariat which maintains 24-hour telephonic contact between Joint Duty Officers (JDO) of each side. The JDOs also meet daily and serve as the basic channel of communication for the two opposing delegations. Secretaries meetings, like MAC sessions, can be called by either side. The UNC has continually strived to limit Secretaries meetings to discussions of appropriate administrative matters, their intended primary purpose. The KPA/CPV, however, habitually uses the sessions to pass charges of minor Armistice violations and for propaganda tirades. The truce machinery calls for Joint Observer Teams (JOT) to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement that occur within the DMZ. The Communist side, however, has frustrated the mission of this primary inspection arm of the MAC by refusing the last 77 JOT investigations proposed by UNC.

7. (U) Ltr, CFCD, HQ ROK/US CFC, 7 Nov 78, Subj: Dsg of Certain CFC Staff Mbrs to Serve on UNC Staff. Filed in CFC C3.

(U) Another Armistice affairs agency is the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), composed of senior officers from Sweden and Switzerland (UNC choice) and Czechoslovakia and Poland (Communist choice). The NNSC was to act as an independent fact-finding body for monitoring troop levels and military equipment throughout North and South Korea, but it has never been able to function effectively due to NK obstructive tactics. The NNSC meets weekly in the JSA to evaluate reports submitted by the UNC and Communist components of the MAC.

(U) Key personnel engaged in Armistice activities were:

UNC COMPONENT OF THE MAC

Senior Member:

RADM W. C. Hamm, Jr (USN).

Other Members:

MG Ahn J. H. (ROKA).

Brigadier B. J. Harrold (British Army).

BG Choi Y. S. (ROKA).

COL S. Sugaraserani (Thai Army) replaced COL O. N. Bilgicler (Turkish Army) on 15 May 78.

Secretary:

COL K. A. Kleypas (USA).

KPA/CPV COMPONENT OF THE MAC

Senior Member:

MG Han J. K. (KPA).

Other Members:

MG Kim G. R. (KPA).

Sr COL Kim D. H. (KPA).

Sr COL Pak W. S. (KPA).

Comrade Niu K. L. (CPV) replaced Comrade Chen J. W. (CPV) on 15 Jun 78.

Secretary:

Sr COL Choi W. C. (KPA).

NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

MG S. Torfgard (Swedish Member) replaced MG S. Fornwall on 31 Oct 78; MG Fornwall had replaced MG J. Beckman on 25 Apr 78.

MG C. van Muyden (Swiss Member).

MG A. Golik (Polish Member).

MG F. Suchanek (Czech Member).

(U) Armistice Meetings

(U) In 1978 there were six MAC meetings and six Secretaries meetings conducted at the Panmunjom truce site. The longest interval between MAC meetings in Armistice history, 298 days, occurred between

16 Jul 77 and 11 May 78.⁸ This general lull in activity represented a deviation from the previous pattern of routine "monthly" MAC meetings called by the KPA to habitually charge the UNC with various Armistice violations and to dispense irrelevant anti-US/ROK propaganda. It appeared likely that the KPA was calling MAC meetings less frequently in order to (1) avoid confrontation type dialogues that might generate heightened tensions/incidents and thereby cause disruption/delay of current US troop withdrawal plans, (2) achieve a "more reasonable image" as negotiators, and (3) foster an impression worldwide that no tension exists on the Korean peninsula.⁹

(U) The UNC called three MAC meetings to protest three separate NK naval attacks in ROK waters which occurred within a span of two months. One other MAC session and three Secretaries meetings dealt with return of 12 crewmen aboard two NK vessels sunk in those clashes. (Historical background information on NK violations of UNC territorial waters is at page 71.) At the 391st MAC Meeting the UNC exposed NK construction of a tunnel which had penetrated into the UNC side of the DMZ--the third underground invasion route discovered since Nov 74. Accounts of these meetings and incidents which generated them follow.

(U) 386th MAC Meeting, 11 May 78. At approximately 0600 hours, 28 Apr 78 a ROKN S-2E aircraft discovered an unidentified vessel near Ku-do (Island) off the ROK's southwest coast. When the S-2E made a low pass over the craft, the crew members hoisted fishing nets in the air. Immediately thereafter the vessel was observed getting underway at high speed, leaving a distinctive fan-shaped wake, unlike that made by fishing boats. The ROKN aircraft then notified two nearby naval patrol craft of the suspicious boat and requested that they investigate. As the ROKN patrol boats approached to challenge, the unidentified vessel suddenly opened fire with rockets and automatic weapons, killing one ROK sailor and wounding four others. The ROKN craft returned fire and the hostile boat burned and sank at 0913 hours about 60 nautical miles east of initial air sighting. All evidence picked up at the scene bore NK markings; items included two 7.62mm pistols along with five magazines and 82 rounds of ammunition, 307 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, plus two hand grenades and a commando dagger. Clothing, medicine, food and other items found on four bodies recovered over a period of several days were also of NK make.

(U) The UNC called for a MAC meeting (held 11 May) to charge the NK with infiltrating an armed vessel into ROK waters and launching an unprovoked attack on two ROKN ships. Equipment taken from the sunken

8. The longest recesses heretofore were 211 days in 1976-77 and 188 days in 1957.

9. (U) AAD Hist Sum 1978.

boat and items found on the recovered bodies were introduced as evidence of the intrusion. The UNCMAC Senior Member concluded that (1) the armed vessel came from North Korea; (2) it intruded into waters contiguous to the ROK in violation of the Armistice Agreement; and (3) its crew members further breached Armistice provisions by opening fire on ROK vessels without warning or provocation. The KPA/CPV Senior Member flatly denied the charges and claimed the UNC had fabricated the incident. In response the UNCMAC Senior Member charged his counterpart with compounding the lawless nature of the intrusion by trying to evade the issue at the MAC meeting. He further noted that the KPA/CPV had declined to accept the UNC's humanitarian offer to return the four bodies recovered for burial in the North. The KPA/CPV then presented routine charges of alleged Armistice violations by the UNC, including weapons firings, and construction of fortifications in the DMZ, helicopter overflights, and introduction of unauthorized military personnel and equipment into the ROK for participation in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 78.

(U) 387th MAC Meeting, 27 May 78. At about 0940 hours, 19 May 78 another unidentified vessel intruded into ROK waters, two and one-half nautical miles off the northeast coast near Kangnung. When detected by radar, the craft had ventured some 39 nautical miles south of the MDL Extended (see map, page 72) and was approaching the South Korean shoreline. As ROKN patrol ships were approaching to investigate and identify the vessel, it turned and fled northeast. At 1130 hours ROKN ships intercepted the intruder and, when it ignored both visual and voice signals to stop, fired warning shots well forward of its bow. Instead of heaving to, the unidentified vessel countered with small arms and automatic weapons fire. After a running gun battle lasting three and one-half hours ROKN sank the NK boat at 1455 hours in an area approximately five nautical miles south of the MDLX. By 1515 hours eight surviving crewmen had been rescued by ROKN.

(U) On 27 May the UNC called the second MAC meeting in three weeks to again charge NK with intrusion of an armed vessel into South Korean waters. To preclude similar sea incidents the UNCMAC Senior Member demanded that NK vessels be instructed (1) not to transgress ROK waters, (2) to stop and identify themselves when properly challenged and (3) not to fire upon UNC ships. He further informed his KPA counterpart that the eight NK survivors were being detained in connection with a continuing UNC investigation. The KPA/CPV Senior Member claimed the intruding vessel was a disabled fishing boat that had drifted close to the MDLX and demanded immediate return of the surviving crew members. The UNC rejected this contention by introducing a photograph in which the wake and bow wave of the NK boat showed it was underway. Also cited by the UNC were international drift computations used worldwide in search and rescue operations which showed the NK vessel would have drifted southeast if disabled and not west toward the ROK mainland, as was its course before attempting to escape northward. The UNCMAC Senior Member also denied that the NK vessel gave any distress signal.

(U) The UNC then turned to its main topic, the 28 Apr 78 naval incident (see preceding account), for which this meeting was initially called. The NK boat sunk on 28 Apr had been raised by ROKN salvage operations on 14 May and was positioned outside the MAC conference room as prima-facie evidence to support UNC charges. The vessel, 31 feet long and 5.5 tons in weight, was powered by three Belgian manufactured 225 horsepower inboard/outboard V-8 engines with high-speed propellers, giving it a 40-plus knot speed and a cruising range of approximately 400 nautical miles. It was equipped with two forward firing rocket launchers (modified from PRC type 63), a PRC-manufactured radio, radar, and long range navigation equipment. Also displayed were an AK-47 rifle and ammunition found on board the boat, as well as a 1978 tidal chart published by the NK Hydrographic Bureau. (See page 75 for additional intelligence aspects of this incident.) The KPA/CPV Senior Member ignored an invitation to inspect the vessel, stating he had already rejected the UNC charge as a fabrication. On that note the meeting was concluded by the UNC side.

(U) 388th MAC Meeting, 7 Jun 78. KPA/CPV called the session to request return of eight surviving crewmen from the NK vessel sunk on 19 May 78. UNC then presented results of a thorough investigation which included admissions of hostile and improper actions by the enemy crew and confirmed NK responsibility for the incident. The UNCMAC Senior Member then stated that for humanitarian reasons, and in contrast to continued NK detention of many innocent ROK citizens, the UNC would return the eight crewmen to NK control at the JSA. Both sides agreed to convene a Secretaries meeting at 1300 hours on same day to arrange details for repatriation.


(U) 451st Secretaries Meeting, 7 Jun 78. UNC proposed procedures for return of NK crewmen similar to those used in Jul 77, after a US Army helicopter had crash landed in NK and a survivor was released to UNC custody along with bodies of three deceased crew members.¹⁰ Essentially, the exchange called for both Secretaries to meet along the MDL immediately adjacent to the MAC conference building; the KPA/CPV Secretary, with not more than five assistants, would then cross the MDL, proceed to area in front of Freedom House¹¹ and identify survivors.

10. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 28.

11. (U) Situated approximately 25 yards south of MAC conference building in the JSA, Freedom House was erected in 1965 by the ROKG, with UNC support, to symbolize the South's hopes for peaceful reunification of the divided Koreas. The handsome structure with attached ornamental pagoda serves as an exhibit hall for displaying Korean cultural/historical objects as well as locally produced modern consumer items. The building has become a primary attraction for groups visiting the JSA. Working level talks between North and South Korean officials regarding reunification efforts have been held intermittently in Freedom House since 1974; no productive results ever ensued (see page 96).



Panmunjom, 27 May 78. UNC spokesman RADM Hamm (far right) protests NK's infiltration of an armed vessel on 28 Apr. Spy boat, sunk by ROKN counterfire, was salvaged and on display at conference site during the session (below). Incident was first of three N-S naval confrontations in ROK waters within 60 days.



Thereafter, KPA/CPV Secretary would accept each man individually at the MDL after publicly confirming his identity. Following transfer of 11 eight NK crew members, the KPA/CPV Secretary would furnish UNC a signed receipt. The UNCMAC Secretary informed his Communist counterpart that survivors would be returned at a Secretaries meeting to be held on 13 Jun 78. KPA Secretary objected, insisting that crew members be handed over immediately. After some four hours of discussions and KPA/CPV counter proposals, the latter agreed to the 13 Jun release date set by UNC.

(U) 452d Secretaries Meeting, 13 Jun 78. Following scenario established at 451st Secretaries Meeting six days earlier, eight NK crewmen were delivered by UNC to KPA/CPV Secretary's control. Immediately after transfer was completed, a NK officer assigned to the MAC Secretariat instigated an unruly demonstration by the returnees. As soon as the repatriates had crossed the MDL into the northern portion of the JSA they threw presents given them in the ROK back across the line. Stripping to undershorts, they hurled whatever was in reach--clothes, shoes, wristwatches, and loose soil. No injuries occurred during the turmoil which lasted about five minutes. The UNC officially protested this chaotic behavior which was in violation of a specific agreement that disorderly conduct by either side would not be tolerated.



(U) 389th MAC Meeting, 27 Jun 78. The KPA/CPV¹² opened by presenting routine charges of UNC firings across the MDL, construction of fortifications, introduction of crew-served weapons in the DMZ, and ROKA aircraft overflights. Complaints were also registered regarding the ROKF modernization program, deployment of advanced weapons systems to the ROK, and large-scale "war exercises" conducted by UNC such as TEAM SPIRIT 78. UNCMAC Senior Member rejected the Communist side's allegations as perennial NK propaganda themes, not the proper business of the MAC. The UNC questioned validity of firing incident charges since KPA/CPV would not agree to have them jointly investigated. The UNC reiterated its long-standing proposal for destruction of all DMZ fortifications on both sides of the MDL, along with development of mutual inspection/verification procedures to insure compliance.¹³

(U) 390th MAC Meeting, 3 Jul 78. The year's third and most serious naval confrontation occurred on 27 Jun 78, taking place only hours after conclusion of the 389th MAC Meeting. At 1828 hours, 27 Jun, an unidentified vessel intruded across the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea to a point approximately 1,000 yards west of Paengnyong-do (see map, page 72). As ROKN patrol craft were dispatched to investigate, two NK patrol ships entered UNC waters in an apparent attempt to intercept and rescue the unidentified vessel. When ROKN craft fired warning shots toward the NK ships, they fled north; the unidentified vessel, which was left behind, did not respond to ROKN challenges and got underway. This boat then collided with one of the pursuing ROKN craft in adverse weather, capsized and sank. Five surviving NK crew members were rescued by ROKN. Approximately one hour later, while proceeding south in UNC waters, ROKN patrol ships were fired upon by another NK patrol craft; no engagement resulted.

(U) At the 3 Jul MAC session the Communist spokesman claimed that the unidentified vessel sunk by ROKN on 27 Jun was a NK fishing boat which had lost its bearings in dense fog and was attempting to return north. He demanded an immediate return of survivors who were "abducted by ROKN," an apology from UNC and assurances that such "piracy" would not recur. The UNCMAC Senior Member refuted the KPA/CPV version of the incident by presenting the facts outlined in the previous paragraph and charged the Communist side with full responsibility for the confrontations. He further stated that the incident could have been prevented had the unidentified ship complied with internationally recognized challenging procedures, which the UNC had explained in detail while

12. (U) This was first MAC conference attended by new Chinese member NIU Ke Lum.

13. (U) At 16 MAC and seven Secretaries Meetings since 1971 the UNC has offered to conduct a joint survey of the DMZ as a first step in carrying out this intention. The Communist side declined in each instance.

discussing an earlier naval intrusion at the 387th MAC Meeting on 27 May 78. The UNCMAC Senior Member advised his counterpart that surviving NK crewmen, with exception of one who chose to remain in the ROK, would be returned to KPA/CPV custody. Session terminated after both sides had agreed that a Secretaries meeting would be held one hour later to complete procedures and effect repatriation.

(U) 453d Secretaries Meeting, 3 Jul 78. Four NK survivors of the 27 Jun 78 naval incident were returned to KPA/CPV control, following same transfer arrangements used at 452d Secretaries Meeting. Despite assurances provided by KPA/CPV Secretary that disruptive behavior would not take place, the four returnees staged a frenzied demonstration when released from UNC custody, stripping to their underwear and throwing away new clothing given them in the South.

(U) 454th Secretaries Meeting, 19 Jul 78. On 7 Jul 78 a small, unarmed US Army motorboat (M2 type) broke free of its mooring on ROK side of Han River's northern reaches and drifted to the NK bank. Boat was used for UNC patrol and utility functions in the Han River estuary. UNC reported the boat's loss to KPA/CPV on same day and requested its return. The Communist side replied on 8 Jul that NK forces had recovered the craft and were investigating the incident. On 18 Jul the KPA sent UNC another message proposing return of the boat at a MAC Secretaries meeting on following day. UNC agreed and on 19 Jul 78 the craft was transferred to UNCMAC Secretary's control in the JSA; no procedural difficulties arose.

(U) 391st MAC Meeting, 27 Oct 78. UNC forces, on 17 Oct 78, had intercepted an NK-built tunnel located under the MDL leading into southern (UNC) portion of the DMZ--the third such underground passage found since Nov 74. Background historical information, descriptions of tunnels, evaluations of their intended use, and outline of detection efforts prior to discovery commence on page 59, this report. In protest, the UNC called the 391st MAC Meeting to formally charge the Communist side with constructing an illegal invasion tunnel within the DMZ, violating five separate provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

(U) The UNCMAC Senior Member pointed out that the latest tunnel discovered was less than three miles from the JSA where the MAC meeting was being held. He noted that a former NK agent escort who worked in tunnels before his defection to the ROK in Sep 74 had provided information which was instrumental in UNC's detection efforts.¹⁴ The UNCMAC Senior Member charged that the secret passageway dug by NK extended 460 yards into the southern sector of the DMZ. Positive evidence introduced at the MAC session included videotapes and photographs taken from inside the tunnel. The UNCMAC Senior Member proposed that his NK counterpart accompany him on a visit to the tunnel site. The Communist representative

14. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1974 (U), p. 23.

not only refused this request but also rejected a subsequent proposal to dispatch a Joint Observer Team to investigate the serious violation as required by the Armistice Agreement.

(U) The KPA/CPV spokesman claimed the tunnel charge was false so far as NK was involved; he remarked that the underground passageway must belong to UNC since it was found in southern portion of the DMZ. The KPA/CPV Senior Member then accused UNC of constructing fortifications in the DMZ and complained of sophisticated modern weapons being introduced into the ROK in violation of the Armistice Agreement. The UNCMAC Senior Member concluded the meeting by warning his counterpart that NK's illegal tunneling under the DMZ represented extremely dangerous acts of aggression and that UNC would continue to search for additional NK-built corridors, exposing all discoveries to world attention.

(U) Armistice Violations

(U) During the past year the UNC charged the KPA/CPV with 2,259 Armistice violations, 85 percent of which involved identification infractions within the DMZ, i.e., failure to wear armbands. A summary of additional charges includes:

Sea Violations.....	3
Weapons Firings in DMZ.....	1
Crew-Served Weapons in DMZ.....	20
Automatic Weapons (AW) in DMZ.....	82
Fortifications (Ftn) and Trenches in DMZ.....	234
Military Training in DMZ.....	5
Unauthorized MDL Crossings in JSA.....	1

(U) Violations charged in 1977 totaled 3,039, of which 478 were AW in DMZ and 403 were Ftn & Trenches in DMZ. Since the Armistice was signed in 1953, the KPA/CPV has been charged with 107 air, 89 sea, and 43,789 ground violations. They have admitted to only two, both minor, in the early days of the truce.

(U) In 1978 the KPA/CPV charged the UNC with 23,233 violations, 68 percent of which involved identification infractions. Remaining charges were:

Air Violations.....	58
Sea Violations.....	2
Weapons Firings in DMZ.....	400
Intrusions Across MDL.....	7
Tanks and Armored Vehicles in DMZ.....	1
Crew-Served Weapons in DMZ.....	369
Automatic Weapons in DMZ.....	5,602
Fortifications in DMZ.....	837
Unauthorized Entry into DMZ.....	31
Military Training in DMZ.....	30
Incendiarism.....	8

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detachment from Japan the following month. Such action, if carried out as initially announced, would have placed UNC status under the UN SOFA in severe jeopardy. The US Dept of State, after approaches to several UNC allies, was successful in obtaining assignment of a British officer to HQ UNC (Rear) on a rotational basis effective Jul 76. This UK commitment retained the multinational image of HQ UNC (Rear) and thus satisfied minimum requirements of the GOJ. On 26 Jul 76 the Royal Thai AF Det in Japan redeployed to Thailand, terminating its assignment to the UNC which had commenced on 23 Jun 51.

(U) On 25 Jul 78 the UK Government terminated its assignment of a British officer to HQ UNC (Rear). A Philippine officer had been assigned to the headquarters in Mar 78, however, on a one-year rotational basis; UN SOFA provisions discussed above thereby remained satisfied. At end of reporting period UNC (Rear) comprised a headquarters staff of 1 USA O-6, 1 Philippine Army O-3, and 1 USN E-6, and six liaison groups attached from UNC member nations (see following topic).

2 (U) At end CY 78 the following seven installations in Japan/Okinawa were certified for unrestricted use by UNC nations which signed the 1954 UN SOFA: Camp Zama, Yokota and Kadena Air Bases, Yokosuka Naval Base, Naval Ordnance Facility Sasebo, Futema Air Station and the White Beach (Okinawa) Area. In 1978, 63 personnel, 14 aircraft, and six ships representing eight UNC member nations other than the US entered or departed Japan via these bases.²⁰

(U) UNC Liaison Group Activities

(U) Shortly after hostilities erupted in Korea in 1950, a liaison staff was established at UNC headquarters in Japan in order to formulate policies and procedures for the integration of national contingents into the UNC and to maintain liaison among the various governments, field forces, and CINCUNC. Initial policy limited official accreditation to UN countries which sent combat forces to Korea; this was later extended to include all nations which contributed to the Korean War effort. Under this latter provision, a ROK liaison group was attached to UNC headquarters in Dec 52. Eventually, all 16 nations which joined the US in forming the UNC fighting team were represented on the liaison staff, as were Denmark, India, Italy, and Norway which furnished medical personnel and supplies.

(U) When UNC headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 Jul 57, those nations which continued their support to the UNC split their liaison groups, retaining representation in Japan at HQ UNC (Rear) and establishing liaison in Korea. The group in Tokyo satisfied requirements of the GOJ and helped assure continuance of the UN SOFA (see preceding topic). At

20. (U) HQ UNC (Rear) Hist Sum 1978.

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end of reporting period, the following nations maintained liaison groups in Japan: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the Philippines; at UNC headquarters in the ROK, liaison groups were assigned from Australia, Canada, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Senior representatives assigned to Korea are accredited as members of the UNCMAC Advisory Group; most of the liaison group members also serve as military attaches for their governments.

(U) In Aug 78 the Turkish Liaison Officer serving at HQ UNC departed the ROK with no replacement assigned by the Turkish Government. At year's end the future of Turkish representation to the UNC was unclear. In early Sep 78 France withdrew its liaison group from HQ UNC (Rear) in Japan. Possibilities for continuing French accreditation to UNC were being explored at year's end.

(U) Thailand, Great Britain and the Philippines retain token forces in Korea in the form of contingents to the UNC Honor Guard Company (see page 344). These forces are assigned to their respective country's liaison groups, but are under operational control of the UNC.


(U) During the year liaison officers hosted three large groups visiting the ROK from UNC-represented countries: 17 Royal Thai National Defense College members on a five-day field trip in May; the Canadian Minister of Veterans Affairs and 67 Canadian Korean War veterans who commemorated 25th anniversary of war's end in Jul; and 14 members of the UK Royal College of Defense Studies on a seven-day visit in Sep 78.

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


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A view of US-ROK drilling operations which located Sobang-san tunnel in Feb 75.



Interior of NK built Sobang-san tunnel, drilled through 2,500 yards of solid granite.

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
Eighty yards beneath the surface, Tunnel #3 would have provided for rapid insertion of troops and weapons into NW sector of ROK, less than a day's march to Seoul. UNC intercept passage is on right.



After GEN John W. Vessey, Jr, CINCUNC, inspected Tunnel #3, he termed it an "idiotic activity," adding, "we will not permit North Korea to achieve its objective militarily with or without tunnels."


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help determine proper use of aerial reconnaissance platforms, aid in weapon selection and maneuver decisions, and influence risk assessments.

(U) No USAF Air Weather Service (AWS) system exists in immediate DMZ areas; fixed sites are a considerable distance south. USFK's Forward Area Limited Observing Program (FALOP) is designed to obtain simple weather observations from data-sparse areas near the DMZ using trained and equipped ROK/US personnel stationed at OPs and radar sites. FALOP became operational in I Corps (ROK/US) Gp area (western DMZ) on 15 May 78 with 17 observing sites; by 1 Sep the system was fully established in FROKA zone (eastern DMZ) with 16 positions. Readings gathered by FALOP participants are passed over intelligence communication nets to collection points at major CCC centers; area data is also available to field commanders.

(U) To insure uniform procedures at all FALOP sites, staff weather officers from USAF Det 18, 30th Wea Sqdn provided training for participants based on locally developed instructional material.³⁸ Each site was issued a lightweight, inexpensive, easy to use weather instrument kit for measuring wind speed/direction, temperature/humidity and precipitation. FALOP sites in western DMZ area are monitored by 30th Wea Sqdn specialists, those in eastern (FROKA) zone by ROKAF weather officers.

(U) A long-standing problem confronting USFK weather service planners has been vulnerability of the communications system over which weather information is dispatched across the ROK. Teletype and facsimile circuits used for data transmission/relay, which originate at Fuchu, Japan, are integrated in a combination of microwave and land line networks that are susceptible to degrading by either natural causes or enemy action in wartime. Complete interface with Korean communications nets is impractical because of system incompatibility and different data transmission rates. A backup system was planned in 1977 which would employ high frequency radio systems transmitting from Japan directly to key USFK CCC centers in the ROK. In late 1977 concept was approved in form of a readiness initiative by CINCPAC. In mid-1978, however, decision was made to incorporate USFK weather communications requirements in the Telecommunications Plan for Improved Communications in Korea (TPICK) being developed by the tri-headquarters ACofS, J6 (see page 255). Four alternatives for upgrading weather systems were identified in the TPICK.

(U) Artillery meteorological (ARTYMET) soundings have been routinely made for a number of years on a twice-daily basis at Camp Pelham, a 2d

38. (U) 30th Wea Sqdn Pam 105-1, FALOP Tng and Ref Handbook, 1 May 78, with Ch 1. Governing directive for FALOP is UNC/USFK/EUSA Reg 381-26, 16 Oct 78. The squadron's Det 18 provides weather support for USFK chiefly in form of forecasts and analyses; USFK ACofS, J2 exercises staff supervision over the detachment.

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Inf Div Arty installation. Commencing 18 Dec 78 these observations were integrated into the USAF AWS data base by Det 18, 30th Wea Sqdn, making them available to USFK command centers throughout the ROK. ARTYMETS, recorded on a free, unmanned balloon carrying a radiosonde to sound the upper air, can serve as useful supplements to other accumulated weather information.

(U) Weather satellite imagery, a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) product, is collected by a readout site at Osan AB and distributed electronically to all weather units in the ROK. On 3 Nov 78 replacement of obsolete Muirhead facsimile equipment with Harris laser apparatus was completed at all locations. System upgrading permitted daily issue of accumulated satellite imagery to ROKAF's weather organization. Products were also furnished American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) for use in weather portion of television news programs; 21 Dec 78 was first broadcast utilizing satellite photography.

(FOUO) Operations Security (OPSEC) Support Program (U)

(FOUO) During 1978 the 501st MI Gp's 209th Det increased number and scope of OPSEC surveys performed for selected USFK/EUSA installations and headquarters staff elements. Surveys were designed to assist commanders/staffs in determining security measures required to protect against possible espionage, sabotage, subversion and unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, sensitive information. Vulnerability analyses/estimates were performed on an all-source, multi-discipline (HUMINT, PHOTINT, SIGINT) basis during the year at USA Field Sta-Korea, USA Mat Spt Cen-K, USA Petrl Distr System-K, UNC Fwd Comd Cen, HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA, and at critical TEAM SPIRIT and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 78 exercise locations. Principal OPSEC vulnerabilities identified which could lead to hostile exploitation were poor communications discipline, insufficient emphasis on security aspects of contingency planning, and inadequate control measures for access to sensitive areas.

(U) Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

(U) On 17 Jul 78 staff responsibility for this command's PSYOP was transferred from ACofS, J5 to J2 in order to achieve closer integration of USFK and ROK PSYOP activities. When the ROK-US Combined Forces Command was activated in Nov 78, a PSYOP Div was established in the ACofS, C2 element of that headquarters. USFK's PSYOP missions were reviewed to determine division of responsibility between its operations and those of CFC; fundamental criteria used was releasability of information to the ROK. In general, it was decided that any PSYOP function which could be performed in a combined ROK/US environment would be accomplished in CFC.

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(U) Subsequently, on 22 Nov 78 the ACoFS, J2 approved following mission statements as definition for USFK/EUSA PSYOP responsibility: (1) Coordinate and implement a Foreign Military Communications Program based on objectives and guidance from CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA; (2) in support of USFK I&W mission, provide trend analysis of NK PSYOP activities; (3) perform US-only PSYOP planning functions, to include preparing PSYOP annexes for non-releasable USFK OPLANS, EXPLANS, SOPs and other documents; and (4) maintain liaison with CFC's C2 PSYOP Div. Planning was underway at end of reporting period to fulfill foregoing missions.

(U) EUSA Personnel Security Initiatives

(U) On 1 Jan 78 DA assigned responsibility for adjudication and granting of all interim and final security clearances for US Army personnel to the recently activated Central Clearance Facility (CCF) at Fort Meade, Md. Concurrently, this authority was withdrawn from major Army commands (MACOM) both in CONUS and overseas. CCF is also responsible for denial, revocation or reinstatement of clearances. The centralized system created excessive delays (at least four months) in obtaining clearances for EUSA personnel, resulting in restriction of access and consequent under-employment of individuals assigned to sensitive positions during their normal one-year tours with EUSA.

(U) Throughout the year this command submitted proposals to CCF to alleviate the problem of personnel under-employment. On 27 Jan 78 DA approved use of individuals with interim SECRET clearances in controlled nuclear weapons positions within EUSA (prior policy required final clearance). Authority was delegated to EUSA on 7 Jul for granting interim SECRET clearances of 120 days duration to DA civilian employees, pending final CCF adjudication. On 8 Dec 78 this latter policy was extended by DA to all MACOMs Army-wide and made applicable to all military/civilian members. Although time required to complete background investigations and grant final clearances has not been lessened appreciably, this command, with its authority to grant interim clearances, is now able to more expeditiously fulfill requirements for access to sensitive material.

(U) Revised USFK Polygraph Policy

(U) During 1978 ROK objections to use of polygraph examinations in connection with personnel security investigations of Korean nationals (KN) employed in sensitive DOD positions resulted in revision of USFK polygraph policy. Under provisions of AR 604-5, this headquarters grants limited access authorizations to local nationals who need access to classified information releasable to the ROK. Regulation was interpreted

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to provide authority for use of polygraph examinations to supplement background investigations which could not be completed because of geographical or political considerations. Additionally, periodic re-examinations of KN employees were conducted to determine if the individual had been contacted by hostile intelligence services. Although this policy had been controversial for a number of years, and exceeded DA requirements in some respects, security benefits accrued were believed to outweigh other considerations. Of all KN employees examined since 1975, an annual average of 29 percent have indicated deception on questions of security significance, resulting in some 30 employees being denied access to classified information.

(U) In Jan 78 a former employee of 501st MI Group sent a letter to President Carter appealing his dismissal from employment which he claimed was based on a polygraph examination. Subsequently, a thorough review of his case indicated that the dismissal was proper and was based on applicable regulations, and that the polygraph examination was only incidental to the overall investigation and adjudication process. By late Apr a series of "letters to the editor" from former Korean employees of US MI units began appearing in local widely circulated English-language newspapers; writers alleged personal bias, repeated US harassment, and misinterpreted polygraph test results had caused their dismissal. This command's Public Affairs Office submitted rebuttals to the newspapers; these were misquoted in many instances, in ways that tended to show deception on the part of USFK. Subsequently, on 8 Jun the tri-headquarters Judge Advocate recommended that the command make no further public statements concerning polygraph use and this policy was adopted. On 29 Jun the ROK SOFA Secretary complained informally to his US counterpart regarding polygraph tests given KN employees; he indicated that the Minister of Justice considered results of such tests to be invalid and that ROKG viewed polygraph examinations for pre-employment purposes as a violation of human rights. Unofficial ROK accusations persisted through end of Aug, with implications that ROKG was considering making a formal complaint concerning continued polygraph use.

(U) Throughout this period USFK J2 was reviewing current polygraph policy--identifying minimum security needs and assessing requirements against benefits accrued from relaxed application of polygraph tests. A revised command policy was approved on 20 Sep 78 which authorized pre-employment polygraph examinations only in those instances where derogatory information had been uncovered by other means or where gaps existed in an applicant's background that could not be investigated using other methods. Periodic tests conducted on current employees were restricted to cases where sufficient cause existed. New policy was designed to insure that USFK's security requisites will be met but places greater responsibility on US supervisors of KN employees to detect their potential recruitment by foreign intelligence services.

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constituted a primary obstacle to national unification. No progress has been made to date to resume full dress talks despite repeated proposals to that end by ROKG officials both in the press and at infrequent meetings of SNCC liaison representatives. Periodically during 1978 the ROK SNCC co-chairman, MIN Kwan Sik, called for normalizing operation of the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline, but all requests were rejected by the North.

(U) North-South Korean Red Cross Talks

(U) In Aug 71 Red Cross officials of both Koreas agreed to discuss means to unite families separated by the Korean War. Thereafter seven plenary conferences were held but no progress was made. On 28 Aug 73 NK unilaterally terminated plenary Red Cross talks, simultaneous with cessation of SNCC dialogue discussed in previous topic. Working level meetings resumed on 10 Jul 74, however, and 25 sessions were held prior to their suspension by NK on 19 Mar 78, thus closing the last remaining avenue of dialogue between North and South Korea.

(U) Visits to the ROK by Chosen Soren Members

(U) In Sep 75 the ROKG began allowing members of the Chosen Soren (pro-NK General Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan) to visit relatives in South Korea and pay homage to ancestral tombs. Trips were arranged by the Mindan, a pro-Seoul group in Tokyo. An ancillary purpose of the program was to counter anti-ROK propaganda in Japan by showing the expatriated Koreans the industrial and social gains made by South Korea in recent years. The ROK also hopes that Chosen Soren visitors returning to Japan will provide the seeds for dissent and division within the pro-NK federation. ROKG officials are aware that the program has intelligence undertones and that it is a conduit for NK agent recruitment (see page 76).

(U) During 1978 some 6,000 overseas Koreans affiliated with the Chosen Soren visited the ROK, bringing total number of visits to 22,000 since the humanitarian effort was initiated. Groups were taken on sightseeing tours which included industrial and cultural centers after which they visited their native homes. While initial visitors were primarily older generation males, an increasing number during the past two years have been offspring, both male and female, who had never seen their homeland. These included family members and children of those Chosen Soren members who had earlier participated in the visit programs. Prominent among 1978 visitors were former leaders of a Chosen Soren "task force" whose mission was to dissuade organization members from visiting the Republic.

(U) ROK Economic Developments

(U) The ROK economy, which has changed from an agrarian to a

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manufacturing/export posture in recent years, continued its remarkably strong growth during 1978. After an unexpectedly high 15.8 percent growth rate achieved in first quarter, real GNP growth for the entire year was estimated to be 12.5 percent, compared to the 10-11 percent originally targeted. Per capita GNP reached \$1,242, an increase of \$378 from 1977. A brisk export performance and striking gains registered in the construction and investment sectors were major contributory factors which led to the relatively high GNP growth rate. Increased production in the heavy and chemical industries and expansion projects in the transportation, electricity and construction fields largely accounted for growth rates of 19.7 and 23.2 percent in manufacturing and infrastructure sectors respectively. Agriculture, however, declined 2.3 percent due to sluggishness in grain production and fishery activity, which offset a substantial boost in livestock production.

(U) Total demand recorded a rise of 9.9 percent in 1978, reflecting increased spending by both government and family households. Extensive private construction and machinery installation activity resulted in a 31.7 percent increase in fixed domestic investment, compared to 27.9 percent registered in 1977. As a result of increased disposable income, private consumption rose dramatically (8.9 percent through Oct) and new consumption patterns emerged as sales of so-called "luxury" items spiraled.

(U) Exports continued to provide a significant stimulus in 1978 for ROK economic growth and development. Despite increased protectionism in the overseas market, higher manufacturing and shipping costs, and a tight energy situation, 1978 exports from the ROK totaled approximately \$12.5 billion, surpassing by a sizable margin the \$10.046 billion record mark set in 1977. The US and Japan, as in previous years, were the largest buyers of South Korean products; exports to US amounted to \$4.06 billion while Japan purchased commodities worth \$2.63 billion. Dollar value of ROK exports to various geographic areas and percent of market shares for each were (dollars in billions, percents in parentheses): North America, \$4.31 (34.5); Asia, \$3.79 (30.3); Europe, \$2.34 (18.7); Middle East, \$1.43 (11.4); Latin America, \$0.24 (1.9); Africa, \$0.20 (1.6); and Oceania, \$0.19 (1.5).

(U) Imports in 1978 demonstrated an accelerated growth rate with monthly totals reaching consecutive new highs. Although some of the increase was attributable to liberalization, a significant amount was due to purchases from Japan, which rose 51.8 percent in 1978. Japan's import market share increased from 34.6 percent in 1977 to 41 percent in 1978, resulting in a ROK-Japan trade imbalance of 1 to 2.3, the most unfavorable since 1973. In terms of dollars, 1978's trade deficit with Japan was calculated at \$3.34 billion, compared with \$1.78 billion the previous year. Imports from the United States increased only 10.4 percent and its market share dropped slightly from 22.6 to 21 percent. Other principal import sources, with market share percentages, were:

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Saudi Arabia (9.6); Kuwait (5.7); Indonesia (3.2) and Australia (3). Declines were noted in imports of US electrical machinery/equipment, iron and steel products, and transport equipment, while significant gains were registered for American agricultural products. Although total imports for the year were projected at a new all time high of \$13.9 billion, with a resulting \$1.4 billion trade deficit, continued strength in the invisible sector (services and private fund transfers from overseas) held the current account deficit to a moderate \$445 million. Net services remained strong due to substantial inflows from Middle East construction projects and improved tourism receipts. Net capital inflows calculated to reach \$1.22 billion, combined with measures to diminish short-term capital outflows, were expected to generate foreign exchange reserves in excess of \$5 billion by end CY 78.

(U) Inflation remained the country's principal domestic economic problem, with hefty price increases in food items (especially meats, fish and certain preferred condiments) as rising incomes led to an upgrading in diets and placed pressure on supply which would have caused even higher prices had government controls not been applied. In 1978 consumer prices showed a 19.6 percent overall gain on the official indices while wholesale prices rose 15.5 percent.

(U) The 1979 budget passed by the National Assembly on 14 Nov 78 provided for a total of W4,533.8 billion (about \$9.37 billion),⁴³ an increase of 28.9 percent over the 1978 budget. Defense expenditures, set at 34.4 percent of total budget (7.8 percent of GNP), were up 24.6 percent from previous year. The special defense tax will provide revenue for 12.1 percent of the defense budget. Social development obligations and economic development funds accounted for 24.5 and 20.1 percent of the overall budget respectively. Individual tax burden ratio was 18 percent, up slightly from previous year's 17.8 percent.

(U) ROKG plans for 1979 call for placing greater emphasis on domestic economic stability, including normalization of price structures, effective management of the money supply and control of wage increases. To help achieve sustained economic growth based on stability, 1979's growth rate target was set at nine percent, down from 1978's 12.5 percent, and the commodity price increase rate will be pegged below ten and 12 percent for wholesale and retail goods respectively. Monopoly/oligopoly items, which are under tight price regulation by the government, are planned to be gradually reduced in number. The ROKG will reinforce its administrative guidance for wage and benefits adjustments to workers through close consultations between labor and management. In the financial sector, the government intends to siphon off some 300 billion won (roughly \$620 million) in excessive liquidity by restraining the total money supply increase rate at 25 percent. The government will seek 10.7 percent investment increases in 1979, a substantial decrease

43. Official exchange rate is US \$1.00=Korean won 484.

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from 1978's 31.7 percent, and the merchandise export target is set at \$15.5 billion, 22 percent over 1978's \$12.5 billion. Import scale for 1979 was established at \$18 billion, \$2.5 billion more than the export target. The ROKG claimed it would furnish loans totaling 300 billion won (about \$620 million) in CY 79 for small and medium industries, which represents a 26.7 percent increase over previous year's loans despite the government's stringent financial policy. Some 245 billion won (approximately \$506 million) will also be extended on a deferred basis to heavy industry and chemical concerns to facilitate their exports of plants and other products.

(U) Listed below are the ROK's major economic indicators for 1977-78 (\$ in millions):

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978 (Est)</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<u>INCOME, PRODUCTION, EMPLOYMENT</u>			
GNP at Current Prices	\$31,488	\$41,438	31.6
GNP at Constant (1970) Prices	16,933	19,134	13.0
Per Capita GNP, Current Prices	864	1,242	43.8
Machinery & Equipment Investment,			
Current Prices	2,136	2,990	40.0
Personal Income, Current Prices	24,566	31,444	28.0
Indices: (1975=100)			
Industrial Production	155.6	194.0	24.7
Avg Labor Productivity	118.7	129.3	8.9
Avg Industrial Wage	117.5	221.9	88.9
Labor Force (Thous)	13,440	14,000	4.2
Avg Unemployment Rate (%)	3.8	3.5	-7.9
<u>MONEY AND PRICES</u>			
Money Supply	4,489	5,836	30.0
Interest Rates (Commercial Banks)	16.2	17.0	4.9
Indices: (1975=100)			
Wholesale Price	122.2	141.2	15.5
Consumer Price, all cities	127.0	151.9	19.6
<u>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND TRADE</u>			
Gold & For Exch Reserves	4,306	5,081	18.0
External Debt	8,810	10,270	16.6
Annual Debt Service	1,322	1,745	32.0
Annual Debt Service Ratio (%)	10.0	10.0	-
Balance of Payments	1,325	1,176	11.2
Balance of Trade (FOB)	-477	-1,400	-
Exports, FOB	10,046	12,500	24.4
U.S. Share (%)	31.0	31.9	-
Imports, GIF	10,811	13,900	28.6
U.S. Share (%)	22.6	21.0	-

Source: US Embassy/Seoul

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(U) ROK Self-Help Programs

(U) The national self-help program, Saemaul Undong or New Village Movement, continued to produce significant results during the past year. Initiated in 1970 as a spiritual and educational renovating campaign for rural communities, the movement by 1973 had begun to stress projects which contributed to raising farmers' income throughout the ROK. New Saemaul Undong programs were designed to promote self-reliance by fostering both national and local community pride, with attainment of economic self-sufficiency in non-urban areas as the ultimate goal. The movement's success was reflected in sharply rising average rural household incomes, which prior to 1970 were roughly 60 percent of average urban earnings. By end CY 78 average rural household income had reached \$3,678, showing a \$718 increase over 1977 and surpassing urban sector average household revenues by a comfortable margin. Since inception of rural Saemaul programs, over 26,000 miles of new farm roads have been constructed and approximately the same mileage improved or rebuilt, irrigation and flood control projects completed for 2.4 million acres of rice paddy, rural electrification extended to virtually all of the ROK countryside, and traditional thatched roofs replaced with tile in the Republic's 12,000 villages.

(U) In recent years the Saemaul concept was expanded to include urban and factory level programs. Business and industrial firms were encouraged to: create in-house consultative bodies to shift the nature of labor-management relations from confrontation to one of cooperation; build or expand dormitories, dining facilities and medical care centers; organize Saemaul consumer cooperatives to provide employees with living necessities at low cost; and establish management-labor stock sharing systems. Many enterprises also built their own schools or offered special classes in factory areas to provide young workers the opportunity to further their education while developing new skills which would help further national economic goals. In 1978 the factory-level Saemaul program extended to 3,500 plants throughout the ROK. In addition, a total of 962 social and business organizations with some 850,000 members actively participated in over 12,000 urban Saemaul projects funded at over W8.29 billion (\$17.1 million).

(U) Accomplishments of the Saemaul movement have attracted a considerable number of economic policy makers from other nations. By year's end a total of 9,623 foreign government officials, community development specialists and journalists had visited the ROK to observe processes and techniques used in the Saemaul system.

(U) To supplement Saemaul programs, the ROK Federation of National College Students Defense Corps in Jul 78 undertook a large-scale public service project involving more than 27,000 students and 977 faculty advisors to perform volunteer service in 749 remote villages. For a two-week period the students experienced farm life and obtained first hand knowledge of rural problems while constructing roads, disseminating

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family planning information, providing basic medical treatment, and teaching modern agricultural techniques.

(U) ROK Social Welfare Programs

(U) In the social welfare field, major emphasis was placed on expansion of medical facilities and higher quality health services in rural areas. To administer medical aid and health insurance programs more effectively, 16 hospitals were scheduled for construction in industrial zones and in rural areas with poor medical facilities. Six of the hospitals will be funded by civilian organizations while government assets and foreign loans will be used in ten. The Health and Social Affairs Ministry also announced plans to expand 24 existing government operated hospitals and modernize equipment and facilities at 618 health centers. In Jan 78 five additional hospital ships were launched from Masan port to join the fleet of ten which commenced service the previous year. The ships, operated by the provincial governments, provide free medical care to some 740,000 citizens living on 600 islands off the ROK coast.

(U) As early as Mar 78 more than 3,600,000 ROK citizens had received treatment or benefits under (1) the public medical care program for low income groups and welfare beneficiaries, and (2) the low cost medical insurance plan extended to workers in firms with 500 or more employees; both programs were introduced in 1977. The public medical care program appears to have been the more successful, with some 77 percent of the more than two million persons entitled to free or low cost treatment actually receiving medical benefits. Results of the medical insurance plan were much less satisfactory, as the government reported those covered by the plan received only negligible benefits in comparison to their insurance premiums. The report indicated that through Sep 78, 508 medical cooperatives had collected over 5.9 billion won (\$12.1 million) from 1,178,640 insured members while outlays for treatment amounted to only 600 million won (\$1.2 million). Plans for extending the medical insurance plan to cover civil servants, private school teachers and clerks and their dependents were completed during 1978; implementation is expected in early 1979. It is expected that general hospitals, especially in the Seoul area, will experience severe overcrowding when the expanded coverage becomes effective.

(U) Also scheduled for implementation during 1979 is a comprehensive program to provide increased government support in education/rehabilitation of mentally and physically handicapped children. The initial five year plan calls for reinforcing remedial services by establishing 76 new facilities for vocational training, physiotherapy and language guidance in 49 existing public and private institutions at a total cost of 2.66 billion won (\$5.5 million).

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relationship, along with proposals for compensatory weapons/equipment acquisitions for ROKA and assurances that US in-country tactical air, logistic, communications and intelligence support plus off-shore naval reinforcement would remain available to the ROK. Original plan called for 6,000 American troops, including one brigade from 2d Inf Div, to be withdrawn by end CY 78. Balance of ground combat and associated supporting forces were incrementally scheduled for redeployment/inactivation by Jun 82, with understanding that HQ 2d Inf Div and two remaining brigades would be retained in Korea until final phase of withdrawal.¹⁵


(U) On 21 Apr 78 President Carter announced modification of the withdrawal schedule. Revision affected first phase (increment) of force reduction plan, requiring only 800 2d Inf Div troops (one battalion) and 2,600 nondivisional support personnel to be withdrawn from Korea by 31 Dec 78. Balance of first increment (2,600 men) would be redeployed/inactivated in 1979, including a brigade headquarters plus one infantry and two artillery battalions from 2d Inf Div. Subsequently, the first withdrawal phase was realigned accordingly by this command and split into Increments IA (1978) and IB (1979), totaling 6,000 personnel.

(U) The 2d Bn, 9th Inf was designated the 2d Inf Div combat element to be withdrawn in 1978. On 15 Dec the 570-man battalion departed Korea for temporary stationing at Ft Riley, Kan, pending final DA determination on permanent CONUS location(s) for 2d Inf Div. Leaving same date for reassignment to Seneca Army Depot, NY was 833d Ord Co (Sp Ammo), a 19th Spt Comd unit. (Replacement for this unit is discussed on page 125.) Majority of 2,600 nondivisional space reductions prescribed for Increment IA were achieved through unit inactivations planned prior to President Carter's withdrawal decision. Following major nondivisional EUSA organizations were inactivated/discontinued during CY 78 on dates indicated: 51st Sig Bn (Corps), 19 Jan; 4th Msl Comd, 30 Jun (see page 130); CS/CT #3, 30 Sep (see page 129); 2d Trans Gp, 30 Sep (see page 192); 83d Ord Bn (Ammo, 30 Sep; and 6th Ord Bn (Ammo), 15 Dec. (Listings of all EUSA organizational changes are at page 160.) Also applied against Increment IA reduction objective were approximately 1,000 spaces deleted in Sep 77 when 4th Msl Comd's HERC and HJ battalions were inactivated.


(U) As noted previously, Increment IB represents a force reduction of 2,600 personnel during CY 79--approximately 2,000 from 2d Inf Div and remainder comprising EUSA non-divisional units. In Dec 78 JCS approved for planning purposes following timetable for Increment IB redeployments: Nov 79--one engineer, maintenance and medical company (brigade support slice) from 2d Inf Div; Dec 79--HHC 3d Bde, along with 1st Bn, 38th Inf and 1st Bn, 15th FA (105) from 2d Inf Div, plus

15. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 100.

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
Implementation of US force reductions in Korea begins. At top, 2/9th Inf (Manchus), first Indianhead Div unit to redeploy to CONUS, prepares to depart from Osan AB. Below, among six major EUSA nondivisional organizations deleted in CY 78 was the 6th Ord Bn (Ammo) shown casing its colors during inactivation ceremonies at Camp Ames.



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anti-armor capability. Planning efforts began in early part of year for conversion of 1st Bn, 32d Inf to an armored configuration. Training programs for 1/32 Inf personnel commenced in Jul when first shipment of M-60A2 tanks for projected armor battalion arrived. A cadre of key personnel underwent intensive training at Fort Knox, Ky, and experienced crews from the division's 1st Bn, 72d Armor provided instructional support. On 21 Oct 78 the 2d Bn, 72d Armor was reactivated, replacing the 1st Bn, 32d Inf on 2d Inf Div troop list.



The first of the 2/72d Armor's tanks to arrive at Camp Casey is greeted with champagne by MG David Grange, Jr, 2d Div CG.

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conducted to determine the form in which the ROK should be represented in HQ UNC/USFK. The next year US JCS approved concept of a separate US/ROK Operational Planning Staff (OPS), and CINCPAC forwarded a request for USFK JTD augmentation. DEPSECDEF approved the plan in principle but deferred a decision on manpower increases pending formal government-to-government negotiations. A formal request for increased participation in the planning effort was received from the ROKG in 1967; in Feb 68 SECDEF authorized COMUSKOREA to initiate discussions with ROK officials for establishment of a US/ROK OPS. Through exchange of letters between COMUSKOREA and ROK MND, formation of a combined element was proposed and accepted, and the OPS was officially activated 15 Oct 68. Its basic function was to serve as an organizational planning link between HQ UNC/USFK and ROK MND/JCS on matters concerning combined operations, policy and doctrine. During its early years the OPS staff was directed by USFK ACoFS, J3 with a ROK BG as his Deputy. Staff activities dealt primarily with operational considerations, since both ROK and US information release limitations prevented the combined team from becoming fully effective in its planning role. Meanwhile, a number of questions were surfacing in the early 1970s relative to ROK defense vulnerabilities, the optimum mix of available combat troops, and ROK logistics system capabilities. These issues required quantitative solutions which could be most easily provided utilizing operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) methods/techniques. OPS, which had an ORSA capability, was selected as the most appropriate agency to serve combined ROK/US interests. The staff was relatively independent, reporting to COMUSKOREA through the CofS, and could therefore examine and evaluate assigned problems from both ROK and US points of view without bias. By 1974 OPS had evolved into an operational analysis study group; a Science Advisor (US GS-15) was added to the JTD to enhance in-house ORSA expertise. COMUSKOREA recommended in Jul 74, and ROK JCS concurred, that US/ROK OPS be redesignated ROK/US OPS and that the 24-man staff (17 ROK/7US) be headed by a ROK BG with a US COL as Deputy Director.

(U) Planned establishment of the ROK/US CFC in Nov 78 (see page 8) provided impetus for further realigning OPS. It was determined that the ORSA organization should be assigned to HQ CFC, retaining its status as an independent staff agency and reporting to CINCCFC through the combined command's CofS. To more accurately reflect its actual and intended functions, the OPS element was redesignated ROK/US Operational Analysis Group (OAG). The HQ CFC JTD, published in Oct 78, authorized the OAG a 30-man staff (18 ROK members--12 officers, six enlisted; and 12 US--eight officers, two enlisted, two civilian). (OAG Director is a ROK BG with a US O6 as his deputy, unchanged from previous OPS structure.) All officer and civilian spaces were designated analyst positions, requiring ORSA skills and background as assignment prerequisites. Administrative/clerical support was provided for in the enlisted spaces. The OAG became effective 7 Nov 78, concurrent with CFC activation. In early 1979 OAG's mission, specific

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(U) Exercise CAPSTAN DRAGON 78

(U) CAPSTAN DRAGON, an annual joint/combined FTX, was conducted 21-25 Aug 78 by 2d Inf Div. Objectives were to plan and execute an aerial deployment/redeployment of an infantry battalion task force, improve combined ROK/US operational planning capabilities, and conduct joint/combined tactical maneuvers. Also to be tested were PACAF capabilities to coordinate and conduct aerial troop movements using ROKAF facilities. Elements of the Pohang-based 1st ROKN Marine Div participated with US 2d Inf Div's 1st Bn, 9th Inf. Airlift support was provided by 345th Tac Air Spt Sqdn from Yokota AFB, Japan, plus 374th Aerial Port Sqdn and 21st Mat Spt Sqdn stationed at Clark AFB, Philippines.

(U) On first two days of exercise, eight PACAF C-130 transports airlifted the 2d Inf Div battalion (750 troops and 103 vehicles) from K-16 Airfield outside Seoul to the ROKN Marine AB near Pohang on ROK east coast. Following movement from assembly areas, the US battalion, augmented with ROKN marine elements, conducted tactical maneuvers which included a battalion-size combined ROK/US airmobile assault, night and day attacks, passage by US units through ROKN marine lines, delaying actions and patrolling. After termination of tactical exercises 2d Inf Div units completed a 12-mile road march to the Pohang staging area for redeployment by air to K-16 Airfield.

(U) Exercise CAPABLE EAGLE IV

(U) During period 9-25 Oct 78, the annual CAPABLE EAGLE exercise was conducted by 17th Avn Gp's 19th Avn Bn (Cbt) to (1) provide aviation units an opportunity to conduct realistic day and night tactical training and (2) exercise capability of the logistics system to support Army aviation elements operating from forward locations where no land lines of communication exist.

(U) Prior to the exercise, the 19th Avn Bn (Cbt) had coordinated a plan with HQ FROKA for pre-winter aerial resupply of selected out-posts along the DMZ during CAPABLE EAGLE IV. Unit had also arranged to airlift a ROKA infantry regiment as a major part of the exercise. In that connection, reconnaissance of all proposed pick-up/landing zones and flight routes was completed, hazards and control measures were reviewed, and a detailed air movement table was prepared.

(U) On 11 Oct 78 the ROK 11th Inf Regt with two supporting artillery battalions was airlifted to its new tactical location in the forward area. The 19th Avn Bn (Cbt), using 24 CH-47 helicopters, completed the movement in six hours, transporting 2,023 combat equipped troops, 24 howitzers (18-105 and six-155mm), and associated support equipment. Winter resupply of ROKA outposts was accomplished during entire 17-day span of CAPABLE EAGLE. During the operation helicopter crews logged 108 CH-47 hours in

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units received their FY 79 allocations under the new system, which is based on dollar costs of ammunition items rather than on common table of allowance (CTA) authorizations previously used. Goal of TAMS is to provide more intensive management of training ammunition resources while allowing commanders down to battalion level greater flexibility in selecting appropriate mixes of ammunition to support changing unit training requirements. Implemented concurrently with TAMS was the associated Training Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS), a computerized data base maintained at DA which is activated by single source input documents (DA Form 581). TAMIS enables commanders to monitor ammunition expenditures by type, quantity, unit usage and training events, furnishing information for effective management of assets at any point in the FY allocation period. At theater level, TAMIS provides a usage basis upon which to forecast future training ammunition allocations for budgeting purposes. On 1 Nov 78 DA authorized a EUSA Tng Ammo Mgt Off and NCO to implement and manage TAMS and TAMIS. Korea-based US Army units supporting EUSA will remain under the CTA system until conversion to TAMS in FY 80.

--(U) In 1978 approximately 6,000 EUSA soldiers were administered examinations under the DA-prescribed Skill Qualification Test (SQT) Program. Testing was conducted during designated periods throughout the year to measure proficiency in nine career management fields (51 MOS's): Maneuver Combat Arms, Air Defense Artillery, Law Enforcement, Ammunition, Automatic Data Processing, Mechanical Maintenance, Field Artillery Cannon, Transportation and Medical. Personnel in first three fields listed were initially tested in 1977; other examinations, involving 38 MOS's, were administered in EUSA for first time in 1978. Overall EUSA-wide SQT failure rate in CY 78 was approximately 30 percent. Identified as principal cause of SQT deficiencies was failure of first line supervisors to effectively carry out their training responsibilities, coupled with inadequate supervision of training activities by unit commanders at all levels. Some "hands-on" testing requirements in various MOS's had to be waived due to geographical dispersion of EUSA's units, equipment shortages and delays in distribution of individual study materials. To insure uniformity of testing within the command, approval authority for granting waivers of any examination requirements was restricted to USFK ACofS, J3 (EUSA Tng Br). Principal factor which caused an insufficient supply of Soldier's Manuals (primary self-study guide used in preparing for SQT) in Korea was failure of overseas-bound troops to retain their personal copy of the manual issued at basic training centers in CONUS. Problem was alleviated in Oct 78 when EUSA received a special allocation of approximately 22,000 manuals which were quickly distributed throughout the command. On 1 Dec, at EUSA's instigation, DA adopted a new policy of distributing SQT training materials directly to using units, with commanders assuming responsibility for control of publications. On 1 Oct 78 the EUSA non-Divisional Test Control Office (TCO), with a network of 14 subsidiary TCOs in subordinate units, became fully operational under OPCON of ACofS, J3. The 2d Inf Div maintains its own control office as part of the Army-wide TCO organization.

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UNIT ACTIVATIONS

	<u>DATE</u>
Btry E, 25th FA (Target Acq)	20 Mar 78
38th Inf Co (Anti-Armor)	1 Oct 78
78th Ord Det	1 Oct 78
2d Bn, 72d Armor	21 Oct 78
23d Inf Co (Anti-Armor)	1 Dec 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

2d Inf Div
2d Inf Div
19th Spt Comd
2d Inf Div
2d Inf Div

UNIT ORGANIZATIONS

	<u>DATE</u>
EUSA Non-Div TCO Net-K	1 Feb 78
Korean Ammo Mgt System	1 Oct 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

J3 (EUSA Tng Br)
19th Spt Comd

UNIT INACTIVATIONS

	<u>DATE</u>
4th Cbt Spt Co (Msl)	28 Feb 78
226th Sig Co (Msl Comd)	28 Feb 78
43d Trans Co (Lt-Mdm Trk)	31 May 78
28th Trans Co (Mdm Trk)	30 Jun 78
HHC, 4th Msl Comd	30 Jun 78
HHC, 2d Trans Gp	30 Sep 78
HHC, 83d Ord Bn (Ammo)	30 Sep 78
55th Ord Co (Ammo)	30 Sep 78
609th Ord Co (Ammo)	30 Sep 78
696th Ord Co (Ammo)	30 Sep 78
1st Bn, 32d Inf	21 Oct 78
HHC, 6th Ord Bn (Ammo)	15 Dec 78
110th MP Co (Phys Scty)	15 Dec 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

4th Msl Comd
4th Msl Comd
2d Trans Gp
2d Trans Gp
4th Msl Comd
2d Trans Gp
19th Spt Comd
19th Spt Comd
19th Spt Comd
19th Spt Comd
2d Inf Div
19th Spt Comd
19th Spt Comd

UNIT DISCONTINUANCES

	<u>DATE</u>
Cbt Spt/Coord Team #3	30 Sep 78
USA Scty Co, Cp Ames	15 Dec 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

EUSA
19th Spt Comd

UNIT REDEPLOYMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>
2d Bn, 9th Inf	15 Dec 78
833d Ord Co (Sp Ammo)	15 Dec 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

2d Inf Div
19th Spt Comd

UNIT REDUCED TO ZERO STRENGTH

	<u>DATE</u>
51st Sig Bn (Corps)	19 Jan 78

COMMAND OF ASSIGNMENT

I Corps (ROK/US) Gp

UNIT REDESIGNATION

	<u>DATE</u>
3d Avn Det	1 Mar 78

TO

201st Aslt Hel Co

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<u>UNIT REASSIGNMENTS</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
69th Trans Bn (Trk)	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	19th Spt Comd
46th Trans Co (Med Trk)	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	19th Spt Comd
60th Trans Co (Lt-Med Trk)	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	19th Spt Comd
25th Trans Cen (Mov Con)	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	HQ USFK/EUSA (J4)
USA Port Opns, Pusan	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	19th Spt Comd
389th Trans Det	1 Sep 78	2d Trans Gp	19th Spt Comd

(U) Korean Service Corps (KSC) Strength and Organizational Changes

(U) Background. The KSC is a civilian indirect hire labor force. Organized during the 1950-53 Korean War as a paramilitary labor force, the KSC reached a peak strength of 100,000. KSC members supported UN forces by transporting ammunition and supplies, evacuating sick and wounded, constructing field fortifications, building and maintaining roads, and operating supply points. In the post-war period, the KSC was reduced in strength and assigned labor support tasks at US installations. The corps also constructed the barrier fence that runs the length of the DMZ, the military fuel pipeline between Pohang and Seoul, and most prefabricated buildings on US compounds. In 1967 the KSC was reorganized as an indirect hire civilian work force administered by Eighth Army. In May 72 OPCON of KSC was assigned to EUSA ACofS, G3 (now USFK/EUSA ACofS, J3), thus consolidating under one office the force development requirements for all categories of manpower assets, i.e., military, civilian, KSC and KATUSA.

(U) Overall strength remained stable during 1978; at year's end assigned personnel numbered 3,279 versus an authorized strength of 3,339. The KSC organization comprises 21 companies stationed at USFK installations throughout the ROK, controlled by a small headquarters near Seoul. Significant organizational changes were as follows:

--(U) Two EUSA mobile labor force platoons, comprising 37 spaces each, were organized in early CY 78 and attached to KSC companies stationed at Pusan Storage Fac and Camp Henry, Taegu. The mobile workers have primarily been supporting EUSA-directed Fac Engr Actv-Korea projects.

--(U) In Feb 78, 54 KSC personnel generated excess as a result of Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea implementation (discussed on page 171) were reassigned against unsupported corps-wide approved requirements. Contractor personnel at Camp Thompson, an ammunition facility near Seoul, were replaced in Oct 78 by 44 KSC members assigned to Fac Engr Actv-Yongsan.

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(FOUO) In fall 1977 this headquarters' ACoFS, J4 had been tasked with overall responsibility for developing EUSA policies/guidelines applying to equipment transfer planning and actions. A Withdrawal Sec was provisionally organized in Oct 77 as an operating element of J4's Plans and Readiness Branch; section staffing at end CY 78 was four field grade officers, one NCO, and one US civilian clerk-typist. On 18 Apr 78 the Central Withdrawal Coordinating Committee (CWCC) was formed to manage and monitor all equipment transfer and related actions; committee is chaired by ACoFS, J4, with representatives from all concerned EUSA commands/agencies, JUSMAG-K, and affected withdrawing and support units.³ By late Oct 78 DA had approved concepts of EUSA's equipment transfer program; detailed guidance was thereafter published by this headquarters and distributed command-wide.⁴

(U) During first half of year the Withdrawal Sec reviewed equipment status reports of all EUSA units scheduled for incremental redeployment/inactivation to determine types and quantities of each major item available for turnover. JUSMAG-K then developed a support package listing for each item, which was keypunched by J4 Withdrawal Sec into a data base established for each increment. Final listings for Increments IA, IB and II were submitted through CINCPAC to JCS for approval by Nov 78; listings for Increment III will be forwarded in Jan 79. Military Assistance Program orders for Increment's I and II, which are the formal transfer authority documents, were received at this headquarters in mid-Dec 78.

(U) Based on the detailed equipment listings, 19th Spt Comd⁵ developed repair parts packages of specific authorized stockage/prescribed load lists necessary to support equipment being transferred. Since support packages are subject to modification due to equipment gains/losses, stock number changes, etc, ACoFS, J4 was investigating at year's end using ADP as a means for rapid updating, an innovation which should result in considerable manpower savings.

(U) Throughout the year a field team from the Withdrawal Sec informally audited, inspected and provided guidance for each withdrawing unit during its standdown period. Units were advised of corrections required and follow-up visits were made to insure that strict standards of property accountability were followed. Just prior to redeployment or inactivation, units underwent a comprehensive formal audit by EUSA J4 and Comptroller inspectors. It is planned to continue this procedure, adjusted as necessary, for remainder of withdrawal period.

3. (C) EUSA LOI 4-1, 18 Apr 78, Subj: CWCC (U). Filed in J4 Withdrawal Sec.

4. (U) EUSA LOI 10-4, 26 Oct 78, Subj: Equip Trf, Retrograde, Unit Withdrawal and Inactivation. Filed in J4 Withdrawal Sec.

5. (U) Successor to 15 earlier logistical commands in Korea, see App 3.

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being performed by ROKA personnel. With turnover of AD 051 (Masan) and ASP 082 (Camp Thompson) in Nov 77, ROKA became operationally responsible for five of the seven US ammunition facilities programmed for integration under SALS-K.

(U) 1978 Developments. On 1 Oct 78 EUSA activated the Korean Ammunition Management System (KAMS) to maintain mandated US surveillance/accountability of munitions stored at ROKA facilities, replacing 6th and 83d Ord Bn (Ammo) units inactivated during 4th Qtr, CY 78. Four Surveillance and Accountability Control Teams (SAACT) were organized as KAMS operating elements, located at Uijongbu, Camp Howard, Camp Thompson and Hialeah Compound. A fifth SAACT was activated on 6 Nov 78 and collocated with KAMS headquarters at Camp Ames. Organization of KAMS with four subordinate SAACTs had been planned prior to announcement of US ground combat force withdrawals; the fifth SAACT, however, was formed as a direct result of nondivisional personnel reductions associated with first increment of the withdrawal program (redeployment of 833d Ord Co (Sp Ammo) from Camp Ames in Dec 78).

(U) On 20 Nov 78 ROKA assumed responsibilities at Chinhae Ammo Port for terminal service functions and shipment to first inland destination of all munitions received at that facility. Before release, ammunition operations at Chinhae were performed by a US-contracted local national labor force under jurisdiction of US Army Port, Pusan. At Camp Ames, conventional ammunition functions were undertaken by ROKA on 20 Dec 78, thus completing all planned transfers under SALS-K. Although bulk of land area and storage structures were released to ROKA, this command retained control of helipads, maintenance areas and six storage buildings. (Upgrading of ammunition and related facilities at Camp Ames is discussed on next page.)

(U) In conformance with the SALS-K agreement, the US reimbursed ROKA for all services performed at a rate of \$15.00 per STON per annum for US intended munitions, based on a fixed level of 48,000 STONs. On 21 Dec 78 ROKA proposed increase of annual reimbursement rate to \$18.00 per STON; negotiations with US authorities were in progress at year's end. ROKA performs support functions for US-owned WRSA ammunition (discussed on page 166) at no cost to USG.

(U) Under SALS-K, requests for deviations from explosive safety criteria are recommended to ROK/US operating units by EUSA ammunition inspectors. Requests are submitted through separate ROK and US munitions supply channels to the CACG for approval. This procedure had been authorized by Central Ammunition Management Office-Pacific (CAMO-PAC) for 1978 implementation at the six ammunition installations formerly occupied by US Army elements (discussed above). Same process will be extended in 1979 to all 36 ROKA facilities which store or handle US owned ammunition, including Chinhae Ammo Port and all in-country railheads used for munitions shipments.

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(U) In FY 79 EUSA will participate for first time in USA Armament Materiel Readiness Command's (ARRCOM) centralized ammunition renovation program. In Nov 78 approximately \$205,000 was received from ARRCOM to perform maintenance on 18 different ammunition items under terms of the SALS-K agreement. In-country munitions renovation program changes which in the past had been sent to Central Ammunition Management Office-Pacific will be forwarded to HQ ARRCOM for approval.¹²

(FOUO) EUSA Munitions Facilities Upgrade (U)

(FOUO) In 1975 a comprehensive plan was submitted to DA for upgrading EUSA munitions facilities; total cost was estimated at \$10 million. Rapid progress of SALS-K implementation during 1976-78 (see page 170), however, allowed decrease in scale of construction initially planned at US installations.

(FOUO) The following OSD-approved upgrading projects were completed or in progress during CY 78:

(FOUO) Camp Ames. The missile maintenance facility at this installation was destroyed by an explosion in Jun 73 and reconstruction plans were submitted to DA shortly thereafter. Due to necessity for special legislative action, funds for project implementation (\$372,000) were not received until May 76. Construction commenced in Aug 76, but financial difficulties experienced by original contractor delayed progress.¹³ In Apr 78 Camp Ames' new missile maintenance facility was completed for operational use. Construction was started in Sep 78 for relocation of the present helipad to fully satisfy explosive safety requirements. Work also began on a warehouse for storage of inert components and missile testing/handling equipment; these items are presently kept in premium explosives storage space. Target date for completion of helipad and warehouse is May 79; estimated total cost is \$900,000. A project was initiated to convert an existing warehouse into a facility for controlling, storing and maintaining all in-country ammunition peculiar equipment (APE) on a centralized basis. US Army elements at Camp Ames are scheduled to occupy the remodeled building in Jan 79, and negotiations with ROKA will begin later in the year for combined ROK/US operation of the APE center.

(FOUO) Camp Howard. Construction commenced in Sep 78 on a new 12,000 sq ft ammunition maintenance building, along with upgrading of an existing building for use as an additional ammunition maintenance line. Project completion date is May 79; estimated cost is \$766,000.

12. (S) J4 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

13. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 156.

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processing times was inadequate receiving space and personnel shortages in SSAs. Concentrated logistics management efforts by support unit commanders produced a favorable downward trend by year's end, when EUSA receipt processing time averaged 7.4 days; DA objective of five days was expected to be achieved in early 1979. An additional factor contributing to improved DSS-K receipt performance was Dec 78 ALOC-K implementation, which allowed more consistent deliveries to SSAs and a reduction in multi-pack van shipments. A program was ongoing at end of reporting period to improve flow of advance shipment information from CONUS so that more lead time would be available for planning receipt of voluminous DSS-K cargoes shipped on an irregular basis.

(U) Unduly long intransit times for DSS-K shipments between port of debarkation (Pusan) and SSAs had been reported during most of CY 78; Jul-Sep average was 8.8 days compared to DA standard of one day. Analysis revealed that principal cause was improper recording of intransit times by SSAs rather than a transportation delay in movement of cargo. Effective 1 Dec 78 documentation responsibilities for DSS-K intransit shipment identification were transferred from the 32 SSAs to Pusan Port Facility for centralized control; intransit times, correctly recorded, were shown as averaging one day by end CY 78.

(U) ACofS, J4 logistics managers intensified efforts in Dec 78 to lower requisition processing times for both DSS-K and ALOC-K systems. Year-end statistics showed DSS-K requisitioning times to be 9.7 days, against a DA target of seven days; ALOC-K shipments were consuming 10.6 days, with DA objective set at five days. To define specific document processing problems, an in-depth study of all requisitioning procedures used by EUSA's SSAs was under way at year's end. Results of study, expected in early 1979, should enable J4 logistics planners to establish time standards for each segment of the requisitioning process. Additionally, measures will be implemented to increase monthly SAILS-ABX cycles (discussed on page 182) for achievement of shorter requisitioning times.

(U) During the year EUSA's initial fill rate (percent of unit requisitions immediately filled by SSAs) averaged 54 percent, failing to meet DA objective of 65 percent.¹⁷ Substandard fill rate was primarily caused by large volume of requests by customer units for items not included on authorized stockage lists (ASL). Actions were initiated by SSAs in Dec 78 to assist all customer units in correct computation and maintenance of prescribed load lists (PLL). Thereafter, ASLs at support activities will be updated to include demand support requirements at using unit level. Increased emphasis was also placed on timely requisitioning of replenishment stock by SSAs, which should help improve initial fill rate performance.

17. Ibid., p. 41.

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(U) Equipment Serviceability Management. During 1978 ACofS, J4 maintenance materiel analysts continued to examine and identify both real and potential ES shortfalls after which recommendations were prepared for unit level corrective action to improve materiel readiness. The following key equipment status indicators and criteria were established in Jun 78 as analytical guidelines for determining causes of substandard ES ratings reflected on monthly materiel readiness reports (discussed on page 159): (1) Zero balances on unit PLLs should not exceed 19 percent; (2) Class IX (repair parts) reconciliation rates in both using organizations and direct support units (DSU) should be 90 percent or higher; (3) Time lapse between date equipment becomes inoperable and date corrective action is initiated should not exceed three days; for items evacuated to DSUs, action must commence within seven days from breakdown date; and (4) Units must submit accurate Materiel Assistance Designation (MAD) II reports in accordance with revised AR 700-98, which became effective in Aug 78 simultaneous with new materiel readiness reporting procedures. Results of analyses were disseminated command-wide by a variety of means including visits to units, monthly J4 "Round Table" conferences (discussed previously), and direct coordination with unit maintenance personnel. It was found that units which attained key indicator criteria for three-four successive months were very likely to achieve an ES REDCON rating equivalent to their assigned ALO. By year's end the number of units meeting PLL stockage criteria had increased from 30 to 59 percent. Significant improvements were not realized, however, in Class IX reconciliation rates, time delays for actions on inoperable equipment, and completeness of MAD II reports; particular emphasis will be placed on deficiencies in those areas during CY 79.¹⁸

(U) To accelerate analysis of equipment readiness data and enhance materiel maintenance management, an automated reports system was instituted in Oct 78. The Automated Materiel Readiness Report Subsystem I (AMRRS I) provides data on condition of all reportable EUSA equipment in machine prepared formats sorted by equipment type, reporting unit, and supporting DSU. Previous time-consuming manual method allowed evaluation of only selected items. Computer printouts will indicate for each EUSA DSU and maintenance battalion the updated status of equipment they support, identified by using unit. This will permit timely recognition of deficiencies at the support level best able to take prompt corrective action. A critical operational review of AMRRS I performance led to identification of desired improvements; at year's end the basic specifications for refinements had been developed. The improved AMRRS II program will be operational in early CY 79, providing faster outputs with greater accuracy; new system will have capability of producing an executive summary of equipment readiness for use by major subordinate commanders and ACofS, J4.

18. (S) J4 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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(U) EUSA's general/direct support (2C) maintenance program is designed to fulfill coordinated needs of major subordinate commands for upgrading equipment assigned to their units. The FY 78 2C program was funded within the Command Operating Budget for a total of \$18.9 million, of which \$10.9 million was allocated to GS level maintenance performed at Camp Carroll's USA Materiel Support Command-Korea (MSC-K). Components of the 2C program are: Repair and return to user (DS and GS); major assembly repair to support GS direct exchange program; equipment refurbishment; filling of 6th Spt Cen (Mat Mgt) dues-out for war reserve and decrement stock requirements; calibration service; quality control activities; and some 20 projects for maintenance/repair/servicing of EUSA equipment contracted out to ROKF and local Korean firms. A successful project in the latter category involved contracting with ROKA to rebuild selected track components (shoes and road wheels) for EUSA's combat vehicles. Accomplished at ROKA's Consolidated Maint Depot at Pusan, the program achieved a \$744,000 savings for EUSA during FY 78. Actual cost of completed work was \$592,000; new procurement cost of track component items would have totaled \$1,336,000. Required installation of rollover protective structures and noise abatement kits on 191 designated construction equipment items in EUSA's inventory (tractors, graders, loaders and forklifts) is being performed onsite by a Korean contractor who has welder certification and other requisite skills.

(U) The 2C program's flexibility allows expeditious response to changes in customer requirements and overall command operational priorities. For example, the refurbishment of M60A1 tanks at MSC-K, however, failed to meet production schedules in several equipment categories during last half CY 78.¹⁹ Significant shortfalls developed in Combat Vehicles and Armament/Chemical overhaul schedules due primarily to non-receipt of repair parts. FY 79 funding for EUSA's 2C maintenance program totaled \$20.6 million. MSC-K received \$12.3 million of that amount for programmed upgrading of combat vehicles (tanks, recovery vehicles and self-propelled 8-inch howitzers) and wheeled vehicles (trucks, trailers and fork lifts); major assembly rebuild; and overhaul of decrement stocks/war reserves.

(U) Dedicated Airline of Communication (ALOC) for Korea

(U) Background. During initial test phase of ALOC-Europe in 1976, DA DCSLOG conducted a study to determine feasibility of establishing a dedicated ALOC to support USFK. In early 1977 a working group composed of representatives from DA, DARCOM, DSA, USAF and EUSA started developing an implementation plan to commence ALOC service for Korea in Oct 77. Modifications and refinements to initial proposal resulted in a concept envisaging two or three round trip MAC channel (common user) flights per week between Travis and Osan Air Bases. Workload was quantified for

19. (U) USFK/EUSA R & A, 4th Qtr FY 78, p. 31; 1st Qtr FY 79, p. 38. Filed in Comptr Mgt Br.

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Class VIII medical supplies and high priority Class IX repair parts, and for retrograde shipment of aviation, missile, communications-electronics, and other materiel categories. Program's estimated cost was set at \$6 million per year. This, however, would be offset by a one-time \$12.5 million savings in pipeline and stockage reductions. ALOC would provide considerable supply support not only for in-country USFK elements, but also for US augmentation forces deployed to the ROK for contingencies and for high priority needs of ROKF. The program would enhance peacetime readiness posture by sharply decreasing order ship times (OST)²⁰ and permitting rapid return to CONUS of excesses and repairables. Inventories at intermediate storage facilities, both in Korea and CONUS, would be reduced, lowering loss factor and stockage costs. Experience gained by USFK infrastructure created in peacetime could speed expansion of flights to meet wartime support requirements of US/ROK forces. Target date for implementation of ALOC-K (Oct 77) was delayed by DA, however, until ALOC performance in Europe could be fully evaluated. At end CY 77 ALOC-K service was further postponed due to shortage of funds.

(U) 1978 Developments. In Jan a DCSLOG DA team re-evaluated the ALOC-K concept and recommended that a one-year test period begin on 1 Oct 78. Late passage of the FY 79 Defense Appropriations Act caused ALOC-K service to be delayed until Dec 78. Meanwhile, detailed preparations for implementation were completed during fall 78, including briefing of all in-country participants on ALOC-K processes, publication of an interim procedures guide, and preliminary action to identify the initial logistics data base. A joint Army/Air Force training program was conducted to familiarize system users with documentation, cargo handling, pallet control, and ground transportation procedures. EUSA units which will benefit most from ALOC-K include the 2d Inf Div, 28th ADA Bde, 19th Spt Comd, USA Medical Comd-Korea and 2d Engr Group.

(U) The first ALOC-K shipment of repair parts and medical supplies arrived at Osan AB on 4 Dec 78. Under the ALOC-K system, throughput pallets are consolidated at Sharpe Army Depot, Cal, for shipment on MAC channel flights from Travis AB to Korea. Once the cargo arrives at Osan AB, EUSA's 25th Trans Center Freight Office processes necessary documentation and commits trucks from 69th Trans Bn to deliver incoming items to seven distribution drop points (DDP) located throughout the command. The DDPs service 16 customer units which account for approximately 80 percent of Class VIII and IX requisitions from EUSA to CONUS. During Dec 78, ALOC-K's first month of operation, 112 air pallets weighing approximately 220 STON were received and distributed to DDPs.

20. (U) OST is number of days elapsed from date of EUSA requisition to date item is posted to direct support unit stock record after receipt from CONUS.

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(U) Statistics accumulated by end CY 78 showed that use of ALOC-K service reduced total order ship time by 55 percent. OST averaged 74 days for non-backordered high priority requisitions shipped by surface means under Direct Support System-Korea (DSS-K) during Dec 78 while OST for ALOC-K was 33 days, two days less than DA objective. Requisition processing time²¹ was slightly longer, however, under the ALOC-K system, averaging 10.6 days (about twice as long as DA objective) compared with 9.7 days achieved by DSS-K. Actions were ongoing at year's end to improve procedures for preparation of ALOC-K requisitions as well as processing techniques at 6th Spt Center (Mat Mgt). Port processing time was considerably reduced by advent of ALOC-K; cargo arriving at Osan AB moved through the port in less than one day, contrasted with four-day average at Pusan and Inchon ports receiving DSS-K surface shipments. Time required to move ALOC-K cargo from Osan AB to DDPs averaged four hours, far less than the two-day objective. Receipt processing time at DDPs averaged 4.1 days; objective set was five days.²²

(U) An additional benefit of ALOC-K service is retrograde space made available on return flights to CONUS. Planned use for this capacity in 1979 includes evacuation of high priority items and movement of household goods.

(U) EUSA Property Accountability (Proper Count) Program

(U) EUSA's special emphasis Proper Count Program was developed in late Oct 77 to adequately respond to CSA's increased concern with management and accountability of Army materiel. A EUSA Proper Count Task Force was established to serve as a focal point for implementation of DA recommendations and to solicit and consolidate property accountability inputs from EUSA's major subordinate commands. Task force, chaired by a senior J4 logistics officer, is composed of ranking representatives from each major subordinate element and from all interested EUSA HQ staff agencies. The Proper Count program comprises a wide range of property accountability measures and procedures, all of which need improvement to meet DA goals. Elements selected by DA for more intensive scrutiny include inventory and adjustment reporting, improvement of Army master data file (AMDF), logistics baseline curriculum development for commanders, personnel management controls for supply specialists, security of US Army property, accounting for lost/damaged/destroyed property, distribution of supply publications, turn-in of excess materiel, establishment of consumption standards, and development/use of property accountability training materials.

21. (U) Number of days from date requisition is prepared in EUSA unit/activity to date requisition is received at NICP in CONUS.

22. (U) USFK/EUSA R & A, 1st Qtr FY 79, pp. 42-51. Filed in Comptr Mgt Br.

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(U) By end CY 78 EUSA had responded to 11 DA Proper Count action requirements. Those of particular significance were:

(U) Recommendations for improvement of physical security and crime prevention measures.²³

(U) Analysis of personnel distribution procedures used by EUSA to insure proper assignment of supply specialists.²⁴

(U) Recommendations for upgrading the AMDF.²⁵

(U) Comments on revision of AR 735-11 (Lost, Damaged and Destroyed Property).²⁶

(U) DA advised all MACOMs in Aug 78 that the Proper Count Program would continue until Mar 79. By that date this command will have completed implementation of all DA-directed property accountability improvement actions.

(U) EUSA Command Logistics Review Team (CLRT)

(U) EUSA's CLRT, operating under guidance specified in AR 11-14, has proven to be a highly effective vehicle for identifying and correcting significant logistics readiness problems in battalion and company-size units. Logistics specialists from ACoFS, J4 Readiness Sec form the CLRT nucleus, with augmentation from other J4 sections, MILPERCEN-K and 19th Spt Comd as appropriate; total team strength is ordinarily five-ten members. Units selected for CLRT visits are generally those which have experienced low logistics readiness ratings or are in a degraded status. Both divisional and non-divisional organizations are normally included in each annual CLRT schedule. During team visits, usually five days in length, all facets of unit logistics readiness requirements are examined; i.e., property accountability, equipment maintenance management, supply operations, ammunition procedures, and utilization of supply personnel. CLRT visits are not designed primarily as formal inspections. The team's findings are briefed to the unit commander at conclusion of visit; copies also are furnished ACoFS, J4 for analysis of command-wide weaknesses and to

23. (U) Msg, EUSA PMJ-S 130754Z Dec 77 and 310230Z Jan 78, Subj: Scty of Army Prop at Instl/Org level. Filed in PMO Scty Br.

24. (U) Ltr, EUSA DJ-MS-SM, 3 Jan 78, Subj: Pers Distr Procedures. Filed in J4 Sup Sys Mgt Sec.

25. (U) Msg, EUSA DJ-MS-SM 240850Z Feb 78, Subj: Need to Improve AMDF. Filed in J4 Sup Sys Mgt Sec.

26. (U) Msg, DJ-MS-SM 170502Z Apr 78, Subj: Lost, Damaged and Destroyed Prop. Filed in J4 Sup Sys Mgt Sec.

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EUSA IG for follow-up action. In addition, findings are sent to US Army Logistics Evaluation Agency, which administers the worldwide CLRT program for DA DCSLOG. During CY 78 the CLRT visited nine EUSA non-divisional units with widely diverse logistics responsibilities--a HAWK ADA battalion; three aviation, two supply & service, and two military police companies; and USA Port Pusan. At year's end, EUSA's CLRT program was being strengthened with additional staffing and increased funding.

(U) Standard Army Intermediate Logistics System-Expanded (SAILS-ABX)

(U) Background. SAILS is a standard Army automated data processing system developed by the US Army Computer Systems Command (USACSC). Basic SAILS was designed to accomplish all stock control, supply management and reporting, and related financial management functions between the CONUS wholesale level and direct support or separate unit level in CONUS. SAILS-ABX, an expansion of the system worldwide, had been under development since 1973 and was to be implemented in Korea in Jul 75, replacing the Standard Supply System (3S) and Medical Unique Supply System used by EUSA. When developmental problems were encountered in Basic SAILS, however, CONUS assets had to be diverted and local establishment of the system was postponed. During 1976 SAILS-ABX implementation requirements and impacts were determined and training needs identified. A Systems Integration Test was successfully completed in Dec 76 at Ft Shafter, Hawaii. In early 1977, however, excessive run times were experienced during a Prototype Evaluation Test conducted in Hawaii, causing further postponement of system introduction in the ROK. In Jun 77 DA directed reduction of system run times by approximately 50 percent. Applying Systems Change Packet (SCP) 03 rendered inconclusive results in an Aug 77 Field Validation Test. Installation of SCP 04 in Nov 77, however, yielded sufficient decrease in run times to plan for EUSA implementation of SAILS-ABX in mid-1978.

(U) 1978 Developments. During early 1978 extensive logistical planning, training and files purification efforts within EUSA were centered on transforming the command's Standard Supply System to SAILS-ABX configuration. Conversion was accomplished during period 14 May-7 Jun 78, one week ahead of schedule. Assisting EUSA logistics/operations staffs during conversion were representatives from USACSC, USA Log Cen, Fin and Acctg Cen, and Forces Comd. SAILS-ABX is operated by the 19th Spt Comd's Automatic Data Processing Center (ADPC) at Taegu. System users include 6th Spt Cen (Mat Mgt), Taegu; USA Mat Spt Cen, Camp Carroll; 6th Med Sup, Optical & Maint Unit, Yongsan; and the Pusan Storage Fac. DA-directed conversion of EUSA's Msl Spt Elm, Cp Humphreys, originally scheduled for Aug 78, had to be postponed until Apr 79 due to system deficiencies encountered in initial EUSA SAILS-ABX operations.

(U) Since SAILS-ABX implementation in Jun 78, numerous problem areas have surfaced. Most prominent were hardware failures, excessive operating errors made by functional users and ADP personnel, software (program)

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discrepancies, difficulties involved in SCP installation, and inability to provide timely transmitting and processing of medical materiel data outputs between the Taegu ADPC and Yongsan's 6th Med Sup, Optical & Maint Unit. Basic cycles achieved during Jun through Dec 78 period ranged from a low of seven to a high of 11 per month.²⁷ (Objective established for early 1979 is 20 basic cycles monthly.) During same period 74 SAILS-ABX incident reports/system change requests were submitted by EUSA in accordance with AR 18-1. Actions taken to improve SAILS-ABX operations within the command include:

--(U) Application of system performance indicators to measure progress in accomplishment of error reduction objectives; indicators selected were (1) hardware downtime; (2) no of programs run; (3) no of basic cycles run; (4) multiprogramming factor; (5) no of hours in actual production; and (6) cycle runtimes.

--(U) Post-conversion assistance visits by specialists from USACSC, ²⁸ USA Log Cen and USA Fin and Acctg Cen.

--(U) Establishment of a SAILS-ABX Control Group at Taegu ADPC to coordinate efforts of the system operator and functional users in development of processing schedules.

--(U) Preparation of a USFK/EUSA regulation outlining policies and responsibilities for SAILS-ABX operations, to be published in early 1979.

--(U) Initiation of procurement action for new tape drives to be installed at the Taegu ADPC.

--(U) Scheduling of training in early CY 79 for personnel maintaining new micromation equipment received at the ADPC. Use of this equipment will help reduce long print times associated with SAILS-ABX cycles.

--(U) Planning of additional training to be conducted in Feb 79 for functional users of the system.

(U) EUSA Operational Readiness Float (ORF)

(U) The ORF is a quantity level of selected "move, shoot and communicate" end items and major equipment components stocked at maintenance support activities (both in and out-of-country) for response to material readiness requirements of combat units. Prior to 1 Sep 78 quantities of

27. (U) SAILS-ABX SITREPs - Jun-Dec 78. Filed in J4 Resource Sys Mgt Br.

28. (U) USACSC, Rpt of Fld Assistance Visit to EUSA Covering SAILS-ABX, 12 Oct 78.

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this backlog by rescinding MWOs of marginal benefit and deferring others to a later implementation date. In Jul 75 DA instructed commodity commands to drastically reduce number of MWOs developed in the future and to eliminate remaining backlog no later than Sep 78. This has substantially been accomplished with the help of special teams sent from CONUS to apply MWOs on site. Publication of AR 750-10 in Jun 77 established firm controls necessary to prevent further proliferation of product improvement programs and MWOs of questionable value. Primary responsibility for application of any future modifications was assigned to proponent commodity commands.

(U) Major modifications performed on EUSA materiel assets during CY 78 included the following:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PURPOSE/COMPLETION DATE</u>
M551 (Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Assault Vehicle)	Improve safety and RAM* Jul 78.
HAWK Missile System (approximately 30 MWOs involved)	Improve accuracy, safety and RAM. Cont into CY 79.
TOW Missile System	Improve combat effectiveness, test capability and RAM. Aug 78.
645M Scoop Loader and 440HA Grader	Improve operator safety by installing rollover protective structures. Cont into 1979.
M578 Armored Recovery Vehicle	Improve safety and RAM. Cont into 1979.

*RAM - reliability, availability and maintainability

(U) Above modifications were accomplished by CONUS teams except last two items listed. MWOs for 645M Scoop Loaders/440HA Graders are being performed by a Korean contractor; EUSA's MSC-K at Camp Carroll is applying modifications to M578 Armored Recovery Vehicles.

(U) EUSA Lead Acid Battery Consumption

(U) In Mar 78 EUSA initiated a program in support of DA DCSLOG objectives to reduce consumption of 12-volt lead acid batteries.³⁰ Objective set was to lower annual EUSA consumption of 2HN and 6TN batteries to one-third of authorized density. Specific goals were established for each direct support unit (DSU), and intensive upgrading actions began at battery maintenance and reclamation shops. Special emphasis was placed on battery shop operations during Command Logistic Review Team and Inspector General visits. ACofS, J4 commenced closer monitoring of DSU battery

30. (U) Ltr, EUSA DJ-MS-MC, 24 Mar 78, Subj: Automotive Battery Consumption. Filed in J4 Mat Spt Br.

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usage data to promptly identify high consumption trends; frequency of monitoring was increased from quarterly to monthly in Oct 78. Newly issued DA and locally prepared publications which describe methods for prolonging battery life and vehicle operator preventive maintenance procedures were promptly distributed throughout the command.³¹ Significant results were achieved by year's end; 2HN battery consumption rate, 33 percent at mid-year, was reduced to seven percent, while 6TN rate decreased from 83 to 19 percent during same six-month period. Program emphasis in 1979 will focus on achieving lower consumption level for 6TN batteries.

(U) General Support (GS) Maintenance Capability for Electronic Components

(U) In Feb 75 DA directed that all major commands achieve an organic GS maintenance capability for repair of electronic system boards, cards and modules. DA approved in Nov 76 an EUSA plan for establishing a centralized Special Repair Activity (SRA) at USA MSC-K, Camp Carroll for servicing electronic components. Project development commenced in Mar 77, with extensive support from US Army Electronics Comd, and EUSA's SRA became operational in Dec 77 with capability of repairing selected cards, boards and modules for communications equipment.

(U) During 1978 studies disclosed that expansion of the SRA at Camp Carroll to include other electronic materiel, particularly low-altitude air defense and ground surveillance radar sets and avionics components, would duplicate equipment and personnel resources already existing in other EUSA GS maintenance activities. Consequently, in Nov 78 this headquarters requested authority from DA to establish two additional SRAs in lieu of enlarging the Camp Carroll SRA into a fully centralized facility; a proposed SRA at 2d Inf Div's 702d Maint Bn would service radar equipment and another at 45th Trans Co (Acft Spt), Camp Humphreys would handle avionics components. Establishment of multiple SRAs would also significantly improve responsiveness of support provided by having repairs performed as near as possible to units which generate repair requirements. On 14 Dec 78 DA approved EUSA's request.³² By year's end EUSA had assigned a GS mission to 2d Inf Div for all tactical radars in the division inventory, including low-altitude air defense, ground surveillance, counterfire, and artillery velocity sets, plus associated computers. Avionics components for all EUSA aircraft assets were being serviced by 45th Trans Co (Acft Spt).

31. (U) Ltr, EUSA DJ-MS-MC, 5 Oct 78, Subj: Lead Acid Battery Consumption. Filed in J4 Mat Spt Br.

32. (U) Msg, DA DALO-SMI 142040 Dec 78, Subj: Field Versus Depot Repair of Boards, Cards and Modules in Electronic Systems/Equip. Filed in J4 Mat Spt Br.

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(U) Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) in EUSA

(U) The AOAP was established in early 1970s as a coordinated Army-wide effort to detect impending equipment component failures through careful testing of oil samples. Originally adopted from commercial airline companies, program was initially directed only at Army aviation equipment. It was expanded in 1975 to include Army ground equipment in CONUS, and in Jul 76 this phase of the procedure was extended to overseas commands. Specific objectives were to (1) enhance flight safety by recognition of imminent equipment defects, (2) reduce maintenance costs through preventive techniques, (3) improve operational readiness of military equipment, and (4) conserve energy resources. Oil analysis for EUSA's aviation assets is performed by AFK at its Osan AB nondestructive inspection laboratory. Support has been furnished under a tri-service agreement and is limited to spectrometric analysis.

(U) Efforts to expand the AOAP in EUSA to include ground combat equipment were initiated in Aug 76 and actively pursued through CY 78 with negative results. Principal deterring factors were insufficient manpower resources and lack of adequate facilities to house physical property testing equipment necessary for complete oil analysis on ground combat vehicle components. On 16 Feb 78 this headquarters proposed to AFK that EUSA's AOAP requirements be met by enlarging scope of existing inter-service support agreement or by developing a separate understanding for servicing ground materiel items. AFK response indicated that expanded oil analysis support could not be provided unless additional Army technicians were made available to augment the laboratory staff. Subsequent attempts through DA to resolve the manpower constraint were unsuccessful.³³ Action was under way at year's end to validate requirement for three additional KN oil analysis technicians to conduct testing on EUSA's ground equipment (one KN analyst was assigned to Osan AB laboratory in Oct 77 to accomplish workload on EUSA aircraft components). Suitable space to accommodate physical property testing equipment (received in Jul-Aug 78 and stored at an EUSA supply facility in Seoul since then) is expected to be available at Osan AB in Jan 79.

(U) EUSA Tire Retread Program

(U) AR 750-36 established an Army-wide program for maximum use of retreaded tires with objective of obtaining at least 75 percent of tire replacements from retreads. An EUSA supplement to the AR was consequently developed to implement the program locally. Significant results were achieved within EUSA through extensive command-wide publicity, special classes in tire care and inspection, a simplified direct exchange program, and a cost effective local tire retread contract with Hankook (Korea) Tire Company. Increased use of retreads resulted in saving of \$355,298 for

33. (U) Msg, EUSA to DA DCSLOG 190600Z. Filed in J4 Mat Spt Br.

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CY 78; total saving accrued since program's inception in mid-1975 amounted to approximately \$785,000. Percent of retread utilization has fluctuated from a low of 45 to a high of 83 percent. Variations were caused primarily by availability of retreadable tires versus seasonal demands for replacements, as well as necessary replenishment of new tire stocks to replace older casings removed from the supply system.

(U) In Feb 78 Hankook Tire Company advised this headquarters that the tire retread contract would not be renewed after its expiration date on 30 Apr 78. Reasons given were Hankook's need to utilize facilities devoted to tire retreading for more pressing commitments, and the ROKG's desire that tire retreading be done only by small business concerns. EUSA was unable to locate another local retreading source because potential contractors were reluctant to procure expensive equipment that could not be converted to indigenous needs after planned US ground force withdrawals from Korea. A review of Japanese/Okinawan retreading costs revealed that services available would not be cost effective for this command. Consequently, on 1 May 78 the EUSA tire retread program was discontinued. All tire replenishments are now obtained through normal US Army supply channels.

(U) Improved Calibration Service in EUSA

(U) Studies conducted by the US Army Metrology and Calibration Center in 1976-77 indicated need for standardized calibration policies/procedures worldwide which would provide required service with maximum efficiency and cost effectiveness and would be capable of adapting to wartime conditions with minimum disruption. Fundamental precepts derived from studies included merging of level A and C calibration programs and combining calibration and repair of test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) at centralized installations. (TMDE repair function was being performed independently by DSUs.)

(U) During period Feb-Jun 78 EUSA's 19th Spt Comd developed a plan for implementing the new TMDE calibration/repair concepts. Effective 15 Aug 78 level A and C calibration and TMDE repair services were consolidated under 19th Spt Comd control at five fixed facilities: SP-51B (Seoul) and Camps Carroll, Humphreys, Kyle and Casey; latter two centers primarily service 2d Inf Div TMDE. Of the five mobile level A calibration sets previously employed, one was retained in mobile configuration to provide designated support for ADA and special weapons units. The USA Mat Spt Cen-Korea's secondary reference laboratory at Camp Carroll continued to function in that capacity, serving all EUSA calibration facilities. In Nov 78 DA approved centralized TMDE calibration/repair concepts for Army-wide use; reorganization initiatives undertaken by EUSA helped establish benchmarks for other MACOMs.

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(U) USFK Milk Plant Upgrade

(U) Serving all authorized US consumers in the ROK, USFK's dairy facility at Camp Baker near Seoul is operated under contract awarded to Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc in 1976. Initial contract was for one year, with option to renew annually for four additional years. Constructed during mid-1950's, the large quonset buildings utilized by the facility have deteriorated to the point where it is uneconomical to repair the complex for extended long-term usage. In mid-1977 DOD approved a Military Construction, Army (MCA) project amounting to \$1.9 million for building a new USFK Milk Plant in FY 79. Appropriations for construction were disapproved on 1 Aug 78, however, by congressional action. Thereafter, several alternatives were investigated by ACoFS, J4, including ROKG construction of a milk plant to support USFK, service from local Korean dairies, and feasibility of a US firm building and operating a plant which would meet USFK needs. All efforts to develop substitute dairy service were unsuccessful and in Sep 78 this command submitted a request for authorization in the FY 80 MCA budget of a new dairy facility to be located at K-16 AB near Seoul. DA endorsed the proposal for congressional consideration.

(U) To satisfy sanitation standards and replace badly worn equipment in the interim, FY 77 Other Procurement, Army funds totaling \$325,000 were obligated during CY 78 to procure new equipment, all of which can be transferred to a new milk plant facility when construction is authorized. Items ordered included a high temperature short time pasteurizing system (approximately \$150,000), vat processors, rotary cup filling/capping system, homogenizer, and a blender system; delivery of all equipment is expected in 1979. On 4 Dec 78, a request was submitted to DA for an additional \$450,600 to purchase other essential production equipment planned for FY 81 installation. To provide more adequate delivery service, 14 new refrigerator trucks were added to the milk plant's fleet during 1978. Numerous physical improvements were accomplished during the year within capabilities of area engineer and dairy contractor personnel. In Oct 78 an \$85,000 contract was awarded to a local firm for upgrading the plant's electrical system and other structural renovation; work was in progress at year's end.

(U) EUSA Energy Conservation Program

(U) In its Feb 78 Army Energy Plan, DA established goals for FY 85 which require reductions in mobility fuels/utilities consumption by ten and 25 percent respectively from FY 75 baseline year consumption. During FY 78 this command experienced its first reduction in energy use since FY 75; mobility fuels consumption was lowered approximately five percent while utilities usage decreased one percent. EUSA's FY 79 objectives are to further reduce mobility fuels consumption by one percent below FY 78 expenditures and utilities by three percent. Variables are unpredictable, but if reductions of that size can be accomplished annually, EUSA's total

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fuel usage will be well within DA FY 85 objectives. A Joint Energy Conservation Committee was formed in Nov 78 to explore additional means for improving EUSA's program without adversely affecting readiness posture. Chaired by ACoIS, J4 and including senior representatives from all major subordinate commands, area engineer activities, and interested EUSA staff agencies, the committee will serve as a forum for disseminating and determining command-wide applicability of energy conservation actions/proposals initiated by subordinate units.

(U) Stock Fund Operations

(U) In Jul 74 a Home Office, EUSA Division, Army Stock Fund was established in Korea. Terms of the Home Office charter called for consolidated and proper managing, controlling, financing, accounting for, and reporting all stock fund inventories. These terms have since been carried out effectively. This was accomplished in a climate of fiscal constraint as well as widespread inflation which tended to erode the supported customers' purchasing power.

(U) Sales for FY 78 were \$81.5 million with obligations of \$86.8 million, representing an approximate 20 percent decrease from FY 77 totals. Reduction was primarily due to shifting of bulk POL product costs from stock fund sales to direct Operation and Maintenance, Army funding. For FY 79 DA approved sales/obligations in amounts of \$87.2/87.6 million, respectively.³⁴

(U) Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Supply Funding

(U) OMA obligations for supplies purchased from the stock fund for CY 78 were \$51.7 million. This reflected a substantial decrease from excessive FY 77 obligations of \$87.2 million, which precipitated OMA funding shortage during latter half FY 77.³⁵ As a result of Jun 78 SAILS-ABX implementation in EUSA (see page 182), a different method of obligating funds for supply usage had to be initiated. Under the standard 3S supply system, OMA funds were automatically obligated upon receipt of the stock fund bill from CONUS, whereas SAILS-ABX procedures specify that obligation becomes effective only after item has been received by the supply point or DSU and a receipt card has been returned to the 6th Spt Center (Mat Mgt) for processing. Turbulence from this changeover was still being experienced at year's end and was expected to continue until mid-1979.

34. (S) J4 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

35. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 242.

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(U) To more effectively identify budget requirements at the supply point and DSU levels, an automated command-unique Budget Inventory Control Management Information System (BICMIS) was developed during 1978. Operated by 19th Spt Cmd's ADP Center at Taegu, BICMIS will provide necessary stock status data not available from other sources, and should help prevent recurrence of OMA funding shortages experienced during FY 77. The system was modified at year's end to provide access to SAILS-ABX files; BICMIS is planned to be fully operational in spring 1979.

(U) Reorganization of Transportation Functions in EUSA

(U) In consonance with this command's FY 78 Program Analysis and Resource Review submission and related ground combat force withdrawal plans, transportation units and functions within EUSA underwent major reorganization/realignment during the year. HQ 2d Trans Gp was inactivated on 30 Sep 78 after its three major subordinate units were reassigned on 1 Sep 78 to other commands/activities in Korea. Two of the units, the 69th Trans Bn (Trk) and USA Port Opns, Pusan were transferred to 19th Spt Comd jurisdiction; the 25th Trans Center (Movement Control), which performs theater management of all common user land transportation, became a separate unit in HQ USFK/EUSA under OPCON of ACofS, J4.³⁶ The latter's Trans Branch was reorganized to incorporate the command's transportation policy, plans and operations missions previously performed by HQ 2d Trans Gp. As most of the 2d Trans Gp's 1,500 personnel were reassigned to other USFK/EUSA elements, inactivation of the headquarters did not constitute a significant reduction of US troop strength in the ROK.

(U) Two of the 69th Trans Bn's organic truck companies were inactivated during first half 78, the 43d Trans Co (Lt-Mdm Trk) on 31 May and the 28th Trans Co (Mdm Trk) on 30 Jun.³⁷ For more efficient accomplishment of the theater line haul mission, the remaining 69th Trans Bn elements were relocated as follows: the 60th Trans Co (Lt-Med Trk) transferred from Camp Eiler to Camp Humphreys, with one platoon stationed at Camp Market (near Inchon), and the 46th Trans Co (Lt-Med Trk) relocated from Pusan Storage Fac to Camp Carroll. On 6 Nov 78 two ROKA truck companies, the 702d and 881st, were released from their attachment to 69th Trans Bn at Camp Eiler. Equipped and trained by US truck companies, the ROK units had been operating under the 69th Trans Bn control since 1960,

36. (U) 25th Trans Center comprises following elements: HHD, Area Trans Movement Office (ATMO) I, Trans Movement Office (TMO), and Passenger Travel Office at Seoul; USA Elm, Army/Navy Air Traffic Coord Office and USA Freight Office at Osan AB; ATMO II at Pusan; and TMOs at Inchon, Chunchon, Kumchon, Pyongtaek, Tongduchon, Uijongbu, Pusan, Kunsan, Taegu and Waegwan.

37. (U) Both units had served continuously in the ROK since early part of the Korean War. The 43d arrived in-country on 9 Oct 50 and was credited with nine campaigns; the 28th's war service (eight campaigns) commenced on 1 Jan 51.

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providing dependable transportation support for EUSA elements command-wide. Both companies accumulated enviable safety records during their 18 years of service with this command.

(U) The overall reorganization of EUSA transportation functions appears to be a workable arrangement with no significant reduction in mission accomplishment.

(U) Improved Management of EUSA's Administrative Use Vehicle (AUV) Fleet

(U) During 1978 AUV management programs were intensified to achieve maximum authorized vehicle use at minimum operating costs. External DOD and GAO audits performed in mid-year disclosed that numerous AUVs were underutilized primarily because they were dispatched on a recurring/dedicated (Class B) basis to the same unit/activity each day. Actions were taken to curtail these practices by returning AUVs to general purpose use under control of transportation motor pools and by effecting in-country redistribution of assets where possible. Progress by year's end was slow but evident; reduction of Class B dispatches will receive increased attention during 1979. Emphasis was also placed on precluding issue of dispatches which exceed established permissible operating distances. Planning was in process at end CY 78 to eliminate, through consolidation, overlapping areas of responsibility for maintenance and operation of the command's AUV resources. Benefits expected from proposed realignments are: enhanced vehicle control and utilization, increased standardization of maintenance management procedures, and more efficient staffing of maintenance activities. Major objective of consolidation actions is to decrease AUV fleet operating costs by one cent per mile during first year of program implementation; EUSA would thereby accrue a total annual saving estimated at \$200,000. Consolidation plan will be initiated by developing a pilot project at Camp Humphreys during CY 79.

(U) In Jun 78 DA announced new criteria for AUV replacement which tightened vehicle age/mileage standards on which turn-ins are based. Under the revised formula, EUSA's CY 78 replacement requirements (approximately 600 vehicles) were reduced by about 25 percent. By year's end 303 new AUVs had been delivered, with an additional 134 due-in. The command expects to receive only 11 percent (73 vehicles) of its AUV replacement needs in FY 79. Analysis revealed that 38 percent of EUSA's sedans and 24 percent of other light AUVs (station wagons, carryalls and small trucks) will qualify for replacement by Sep 79 under new criteria. In order to fill gaps caused by unavailable AUVs, commercial contract bus operations were expanded to provide service for 2d Inf Div elements; year-end planning was underway to extend commercial bus routes to other EUSA units. Also initiated was a feasibility study for furnishing contracted bus support from housing areas throughout Seoul to the DOD dependent school complex on Yongsan South Post.

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(C) Trans-Korea Pipeline (TKP) Operations (U)

(U) Background. Requirement for petroleum pipeline delivery was recognized early in the Korean War when assault pipelines were used to augment the totally inadequate rail and highway delivery systems. Studies in 1968 revealed that the petroleum distribution system in Korea could not support wartime requirements for a sufficient period to allow construction of facilities stated in contingency plans. Therefore, construction of the 258-mile underground high pressure TKP, completed in 1970, was justified solely as a contingency requirement.³⁸ Since peacetime delivery requirements were less than the throughput capacity of 40,000 barrels (barrel=31.5 gallons) per day from Pohang to Seoul, two domestic companies (Honam Oil and Korea Oil Corporations) signed agreements with the US Government in mid-1971 to lease portions of this excess. By Sep 72 the latter had constructed a pipeline joining its refinery in Ulsan to the TKP, the two pipelines intersecting at Taegu. Previously, products had been transported by tanker from the refinery to Pohang and then pumped into the TKP.

(U) During 1978 the pipeline operated by USA Petroleum Distribution System-Korea (USAPDSK), transported 2,182,057 barrels of petroleum for military use and 9,428,805 barrels of commercially owned product. (Amounts moved in CY 77 were 2,513,800 and 7,941,600 barrels respectively.) Revenue from commercial throughput agreements totaled approximately \$2.5 million). In Aug 78 a 33 percent throughput rate increase was negotiated with TKP commercial users, effective for period 1 Aug 77-30 Dec 78; tariffs were set at 14.3 cents per barrel from Pohang to Taegu and 13.7 cents per 100 barrel mile moved between Taegu and Seoul. A new five-year agreement became effective 31 Dec 78, under which CY 79 rates were raised to 21.9 cents per barrel between Pohang and Taegu and 21.0 cents per 100 barrel mile moved from Taegu to Seoul.

(U) The pipeline sustained major damage on 7 Sep 78, when an unexplained pressure build-up at the beginning of a JP4 fuel pumping operation for Osan AB resupply caused a two-foot rupture midway between Taejon and Pyongtaek. Service was interrupted for approximately 19 hours while line was repaired. An estimated 500 barrels of JP4 fuel was lost due to the break; no injuries or fire occurred. Two pilferage taps were discovered during 1978 in the Waegwan-Taejon section; extent of product loss was unknown and no apprehensions resulted.³⁹

(U) Negotiations were continuing at year's end between this headquarters and the ROK MND on moving the TKP terminus (SP 51A) from the densely populated area in Seoul where it is presently situated. On 1 Nov 78 this command submitted a proposed MOA to the MND for ROKG construction

38. (U) A map depicting the TKP is at Appendix 4.

39. (S) J4 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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(U) De Long Pier Barges for Contingencies

(U) During period Dec 74-Sep 76 six type A De Long pier barges were delivered to the ROK for support of OPLAN 5027. Previous surveys had determined that four ports in South Korea were suitable for utilization of De Long piers.⁴⁰ For contingency purposes, the six barges would be used to erect three piers for accomodating deep draft ammunition ships. Since all barges and ancillary equipment were received in unserviceable condition, approximately \$1 million in FY 78 funds was made available for repairs. By end CY 78 all had been rehabilitated except for decking on four barges. Approximately half of the 40 air jacks and six of eight air compressors necessary for barge deployment had been overhauled; repairs on remaining system components are scheduled for completion by Aug 79. Thereafter, the pier barges will be placed in elevated storage at Chinhae Port; associated equipment will be held in Pusan Storage Facility after preservative treatment is applied.

(U) Optional Personal Property Shipment Program

(U) On 15 Apr 78 this command initiated, with DA approval, an option for EUSA unaccompanied enlisted personnel (grade E-4 or above with two years service) departing Korea on PCS to ship 600 pounds of personal property as household goods by surface transportation in lieu of 400 pounds unaccompanied baggage air shipment. By selecting the new option with its increased weight allowance, service members are able to ship furniture-type items that are not authorized for air shipment as unaccompanied baggage. In addition to tangible member benefits and associated morale implications, the program generated savings to the US government of an estimated \$32,000 during its first four months of operation. Based on those factors, this headquarters forwarded a recommendation to DA in late 1978 for raising the 600-pound surface mode option to 700 pounds for unaccompanied EM and for initiating a similar program authorizing 1,500 pounds for departing unaccompanied officers. EUSA personal property shipment initiatives were under evaluation by DA at year's end for possible worldwide implementation.⁴¹

(U) USAKPA Contract Execution and Administration

(U) EUSA's in-country procurement mission is tasked to USAKPA. The agency began operations in 1957 by letting \$6 million in contracts to the ROK economy. In 1978 purchases from Korean suppliers totaled \$72.9 million

40. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 168.
41. (S) J4 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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for 43,444 procurement actions. (1977 figures were \$98.5 million for 49,638 actions.) A delineation follows (\$ in millions/1977 figures in parentheses):⁴²

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Dollar Amount</u>		<u>Number of Actions</u>	
Facility Engineering	32.0	(52.4)	315	(348)
Services	22.4	(18.9)	3,329	(4,124)
Supplies	9.1	(10.9)	4,983	(6,254)
Subsistence	2.9	(6.9)	1,585	(2,166)
Government Bills of Lading	2.5	(2.8)	29,104	(31,795)
NAF	2.4	(4.5)	3,937	(4,690)
Construction	1.6	(2.1)	191	(261)

(U) Effective 1 Oct 78, US Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, Ft Shafter, HI was designated Head of Procuring Activity (HPA) for USAKPA, replacing HQ DARCOM in Washington, D.C. This change should shorten response time for USFK procurement actions requiring HPA approval.

(U) USFK Controlled Single Source Selection Procedures

(U) Background. Since 1967 there had been strong and convincing evidence of collusive bidding practices among Korean contractors doing business with USFK. Contractors performing recurring type service work for USFK had retained their contracts for an average of 8.5 consecutive years. USAKPA records were replete with instances which showed that a competitive bidding system had not functioned effectively in the ROK. A Jun 75 letter from the US Representative on the SOFA Joint Committee to his ROK counterpart protested the host government's failure to stop collusive bidding among Korean contractors.⁴³ The matter was referred to the SOFA Commerce Subcommittee in Jul 75 for study and recommendations.⁴⁴ Following extensive consultations the subcommittee reaffirmed in Jan 76 that USFK procurement/contracting should be undertaken without interference by outside agencies. In 1976 criticism by Senator Proxmire (D-Wis) concerning the lack of competition in USFK procurement generated intensive internal and external reviews of concepts and methods employed in this command's

42. (U) USAKPA Hist Sum 1978.

43. (U) The Korea Military Contractors Association (KMCA), representing over 500 member firms, had been continually instructed on correct procurement policies/procedures and had denied all allegations of impropriety.

44. (U) USAKPA, the CID and OSI also monitored the problem to take action where necessary.

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contracting activities. A special study group from HQ DARCOM, representing the ASA (I&L), visited the ROK in Oct 76 to further analyze the problem and search for possible solutions. After examining a variety of alternatives, the study group concluded that adoption of a single source procurement method (essentially noncompetitive) would eliminate collusion, achieve the best performance at lowest or most reasonable cost, and protect integrity of US contracting officials. In Dec 76 ASA (I&L) approved the recommendations and authorized USFK use of a Controlled Single Source Selection Procedure (CSSSP) for a three-year test period.

(U) Current Developments. In Mar 77 the new procedure was instituted simultaneously in all three DOD procurement agencies in Korea: USAKPA, Korea Regional Exchange, and Far East District Engineer. Concurrently two new overseeing elements were established: USFK Source Selection Board (SSB) and Command Procurement Policy Board (CPPB). Primary SSB function is selection of Korean contractors to be solicited for USFK contracting requirements; operational CSSSP implementation is accomplished during this process. The SSB is normally chaired by the USFK/EUSA Deputy ACofS, J4 and includes representatives from JA, Comptr, USAKPA, Far East Dist Engr, Korea Area Exchange and 314th Air Div. During CY 78 the Board met 50 times and made 380 source selection decisions. The CPPB is responsible for monitoring SSB operations; providing policy guidance for improvement of USFK contracting activities in cost estimating, price/cost analysis, quality assurance and inspection; and for assuring that procurement operations and policies under the CSSSP concept maintain consistency with service component responsibilities. A quarterly report on CSSSP progress is submitted to ASA (RD&A). In May 78 an automatic data processing program was instituted which summarizes SSB actions and provides a useful statistical tool for measuring and evaluating procurement operations.

(U) Collusive practices may have resurfaced during 1st Qtr FY 79 as evidenced by bids received in response to USAKPA solicitations for continuation of five security guard service contracts. In each case, solicitations had been issued to incumbent contractors based upon a satisfactory performance record and reasonable price for FY 78 services. The new proposals each reflected a 37 percent increase over FY 78 contracted prices. USAKPA estimates derived from ROKG data, however, indicated an inflation factor ranging from 12.7 to 21.7 percent as an appropriate guideline for determining increases. Decision was made by the SSB to offer one of the contract requirements on an open competitive basis to test validity of the proposed price hikes. Overall effect on all security guard contractors' pricing inclinations was immediately noticeable--average rate of increase over FY 78 prices amounted to only 19 percent for all five requirements when negotiations were concluded (incumbent in test case retained his contract through subsequent price reductions during negotiations). Similar results were obtained on other USAKPA contract actions where initial prices proposed were unreasonably high. When faced with

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prospect of competition on a selective basis, incumbent bidders reduced their price offers to a justifiable amount. Judicious use of competitive bidding procedures was endorsed by a DARCOM team visiting the ROK in Oct 78, and the term CSSSP was changed to Controlled Source Selection Procedure (CSSP).

(U) Obstructions of USFK Procurement Process

(U) In Jan 78 action was initiated by this headquarters to reduce the in-house work force and US-owned equipment levels at USA Port, Pusan and establish a predominantly contractual operation. USAKPA was tasked with contracting out selected port services including cargo checking, gear locker operation, privately owned vehicle processing, certain materials handling equipment and watercraft functions. Approximately 180 Korean national direct hire (KNDH) positions would have been eliminated as a result of planned restructuring. Shortly after its announcement, KNDH employees held demonstrations in Pusan protesting the plan. The Foreign Organization Employees Union (FOEU), which represents the port's KNDH employees, and the ROK Administration of Labor Affairs requested EUSA to refrain from contracting port services. On 4 Apr 78 USAKPA received an acceptable bid from a qualified contractor to provide required services beginning in May; realignments were to be completed by 30 Sep 78. The contractor withdrew his proposal on 8 Apr, however, citing pressure and threats from the FOEU. The labor controversy, unresolved at year's end, was the major factor in the postponement of a long-planned extensive reorganization of USA Port, Pusan. DA approved continuation of port operations with present KNDH work force during FY 79.

(U) A similar labor relations difficulty involving the FOEU surfaced in Jul 78. In response to a 1st Sig Bde request, USAKPA had solicited a contractor to perform operations/maintenance functions at all of EUSA's dial central offices and other telephone exchange facilities. A total of 262 KNDH positions would have been deleted from EUSA manning strength. Employees concerned were expected to be retained by the successful contract bidder to perform essentially the same type work. It was estimated that the contractor would require at least 340 KN employees to perform telephone services and related tasks as US military personnel positions were reduced due to manpower restrictions imposed by the US Army Communications Command. Thus, changing to the contracting out staffing method would eventually result in employment of approximately 80 additional KNs to accomplish vital communications functions for EUSA. The affected employees and the FOEU, moreover, voiced strenuous opposition to the proposed personnel realignment and 1st Sig Bde KN workers staged protest rallies on EUSA installations, contending that contracting out their services would degrade established employment conditions. On 7 Sep 78 the intended

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contractor notified USAKPA that he would not submit a bid since he feared that severe labor repercussions would be sponsored by the FOEU against his company. As a result, this headquarters postponed implementation of the contracting out plan pending development of an alternate version that would achieve required work force adjustments with a minimum of adverse employee reactions. Comprehensive review of the disputed issues were underway at year's end.

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costs only. Number of students from each service and corresponding costs follow:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>US COST</u>
ROKA	102	
ROKAF	48	\$567,775
ROKN	47	234,215
ROK Naval Marine Force	14	276,179
		62,391

(U) FY 78 IMET funds were also used to procure training aids/devices for two ROKA schools as follows: \$274,131 to purchase an AH-1Q armaments system maintenance trainer, a UH-1H multi-purpose engine trainer, three AH-1Q composite trainers for the Transportation School; and \$71,869 for Aviation School UH-1H electrical systems trainer plus two AH-1Q composite trainers. Those expenditures raised total US cost of FY 78 IMET program to \$1,486,560.

(U) Value of FMS training implemented in CY 78 was \$567,709, well below the \$2.4 million FY 77 outlay. (All FMS training costs are paid by the ROK.) FMS training by implementing agency follows.⁴

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>ROK COST</u>
ROKA	2	
ROKAF	45	\$ 60,352
ROKN	3	416,947
MND	35	12,738
		77,672

(U) US Security Assistance Plans and Reports

(U) The primary planning document for long-range security assistance to the ROK is Table B of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). Following receipt of CINCPAC guidance, JUSMAG-K prepared and submitted on 25 Mar 78 this command's recommendations on ROKF levels and security assistance projections for the FY 81-88 time frame. This most recent JSOP Table B submission did not include security assistance dollar levels as in the past; planned materiel acquisitions were grouped by weapons/equipment categories showing amounts and procurement schedule.

(U) Five-year Military Security Assistance Projections (MSAP) submitted in previous years were replaced in 1978 with two annual reports to be prepared jointly by JUSMAG-K and US Embassy, Seoul. The initial Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance to the ROK was forwarded on 24 Jul 78 to SECSTATE/SECDEF. First submission of the newly prescribed Consolidated Data Report, for incorporation in the annual Congressional Presentation Document, was transmitted to SECSTATE on 15 Dec 78 by the

4. Ibid.

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Assistance Service Funded drawn from budgets of individual US services, \$1.15 billion; and Excess Defense Articles provided under special legislation, \$938 million.

(U) On 30 Jun 76 an important milestone in security assistance to the ROK was reached when the declining grant aid programs were terminated (except for military education/training programs discussed below). A relatively small amount (about \$20.5 million) remained at end CY 78 to ship MAP materiel funded but not delivered when the program was in effect. (Non-reimbursable transfer of approximately \$800 million worth of US equipment to compensate for withdrawal of US ground forces is discussed on page 163.)

(U) Other forms of assistance rendered were Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits (\$859 million) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs (\$154 million) under which 32,500 ROKF members have been trained at CONUS installations. (Specifics of FY 78 FMS and IMET programs are in following topics.)

(U) During same period (1949-78) the ROKG, through FMS cash procedures, purchased defense items/services from the US totaling approximately \$1.5 billion (\$425 million in FY 78 alone). These sales were primarily for maintaining spare parts support for ROKF inventories; investment cash purchases were also made for force improvement projects and training for which FMS credits were not available.

(U) FY 78 Foreign Military Sales Credits

(U) FMS credits for the ROK, initially established with a \$15 million authorization in FY 71, have been significantly increased in recent years as a replacement for grant aid funding terminated in 1976. The FY 78 FMS credit allocation totaled \$275 million, equaling the level established for FY 77. Projects funded by FY 78 credits and amounts scheduled for each are listed below (\$ in millions):³

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>FY 78 CREDITS</u>
F-4E Aircraft	\$76.91
F-5E/F Aircraft	39.98
F-5F Aircraft	22.90
Air Interceptor Missile (AIM-9) Modification	5.75
Smart/Maverick Missiles	3.59
Radar Homing and Warning System	2.00
Electronic Countermeasures Equipment	1.17
M48 Tank Upgrade	53.65

3. (S) JUSMAG-K Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>FY 78 CREDITS</u>
*ROK Indigenous Tank (ROKIT)	\$ 0.18
TOW Missile Systems	1.74
Improved HAWK Missile Systems	25.32
HERC Missiles	0.01
*Low Altitude Air Defense System	0.71
Missile Maintenance Depot (Silver River)	0.96
Survey & Target Acquisition Equipment	0.45
*Airmobile Brigades Equipment	6.51
*Maint & Ammo Units Equipment	0.17
Small Arms Arsenal Expansion	0.30
Harpoon Missile Systems (ROKN)	18.11
Funds Committed But Not Obligated By End CY 78	14.59

*New projects established in FY 78. All others were ongoing programs approved in prior years.

(U) Life-of-Type and Major Items of Military Excess (MIMEX) Purchases

(U) Life-of-Type (or One-Time Buy) purchases for US service-supported equipment are normally offered to all countries participating in MAP or FMS programs approximately two years prior to US service termination of support for the item. They are offered when the US service is considering a last-time procurement or upon notification that a manufacturer is ceasing business operations or closing down a production line. Of the items offered, the ROKG elected to purchase the following:

IN CY 79

HERC Conventional Warheads and
Component Parts
M115 8-inch Howitzers (Towed)
MK 44 Torpedoes
M18 57mm Recoilless Rifles
M123A1C 10-ton Tractor Trucks

IN CY 80

Basic HAWK Modules
M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
30 Cal Machine Gun Barrels
Electronic Components

(U) During 1978, 51 MIMEX offers (47 USA, two USAF, and two USN) were extended to the ROKG; only one was selected, 30 caliber ammunition worth \$274,000.

(U) FY 78 Security Assistance Training Program

(U) By year's end JUSMAG-K had concluded the FY 78 IMET program for ROKF after processing a total of 211 students for CONUS training at a US cost of \$1,140,560. (FY 77 trainees numbered 173, costing US \$881,733.) The ROKG assumed all costs for ROK-CONUS international transportation, intra-CONUS travel, and student living allowances; the US paid course

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17 years of progress in the ROKAF calibration program. The laboratory facility was constructed to implement a MND directive assigning ROKAF overall responsibility for managing the ROK forces calibration program and designating the PMEL as primary reference point for all ROK forces. After completion of ROKG-funded evaluations by USAF Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) inspectors in May 75 and Oct 76, the PMEL was issued a Type IIA certificate with no restrictions or limitations for depot-level calibration.

(U) In Jun 78, under an FMS case, the PMEL was again inspected and recertified; a fourth evaluation was scheduled for May 80. The Kimhae laboratory's working area was expanded from 12,000 to 20,000 square feet during the year, making it the largest military calibration facility (US or foreign) in the Pacific area. Construction of a base-level PMEL at Suwon AB, begun in 1977, was suspended until Aug 78 because of budget constraints; new facility should be operational by Apr 79. ROKAF also programmed PMELs for Kangnung and Kwangju ABs in 1981/82 respectively.

(U) Acting on a JUSMAG-K recommendation, the ROK MND tasked ROKAF in early 1977 to provide calibration support for ROKG defense agencies and Korean defense industries. By end CY 78, 12 industrial firms and two government agencies had negotiated contracts with ROKAF for calibration assistance.

(U) During the year ROKA improved its metrology program by implementing in Oct 78 an Automated Calibration Recall System to improve calibration management and insure accuracy of records. The system, which encompasses an automated suspense file, was considered necessary for monitoring required calibration of high technology equipment to be acquired as a result of FIP implementation and the US compensatory equipment transfer program. In Nov 78 ROKA began construction of an electronic/mechanical maintenance and testing facility at Pusan; target date for completion is Feb 79. JUSMAG-K had suggested, as early as 1975, that ROKA transfer its gage calibration support to the ROKAF PMEL at Kimhae, but ROKA opted to incorporate its small arms/ammunition gage shop within the new Pusan facility. New shop, providing calibration support already available from ROKAF, will cost ROKA approximately \$300,000.

(U) In 1977 ROKN allocated \$700,000 for construction of a PMEL at Chinhae NB and for purchase of additional working standards. Construction commenced in Oct 78; operational starting date was set as Jul 79. New facility will be 14,000 sq ft in size (existing shop is 3,500 sq ft) and staffed with 135 personnel. When completed, it will furnish at least half of all calibration support required by ROKN fleet; present shop is able to supply only 14 percent. ROKN also programmed 1979 procurement of

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calibration equipment for its S2-E aircraft maintenance complex at Pohang AB. The shop will also provide calibration services for naval Marine forces located in the Pohang area and for communications/radar stations on the ROK's east coast.¹⁷

(U) ROKF Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program (SOAP)

(U) Since 1972 ROKAF has been tasked by MND with providing aviation oil analysis for all ROK services; laboratories are located at Taegu, Sachon, Kwangju, Suwon and Kangnung Air Bases. In mid-1977 MND, considering economic advantages and available support resources, expanded the ROKAF SOAP to include all ROK services' diesel-operated equipment. Planned 1 Jan 78 starting date could not be met, however, due to lack of vehicle oil sampling kits. Procurement actions were ongoing at year's end.

(U) Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Within ROK Defense Establishment

(U) ROKA. The Korean Army began planning for resource management automation in 1968. Initial programs were designed to facilitate machine processes for all supply management at base depot level. Progress and expansion during early stages were limited since only automatic and punch card machine equipment were available to ROKA. In Jan 74 an IBM 370-135 system was received and installed at Pusan. Force modernization support planning, coupled with expanded requirement analysis and financial accounting emphasis, dictated system memory expansion and faster peripheral tape drive equipment. Consequently, in Oct 76 ROKA replaced its IBM 370-135 Computer with an IBM 370-125. In mid-1977 three UNISCOPE 100 intelligent terminals were acquired and installed at ROKA's three logistics support commands, networked to the Army Logistics Comd's computer. Four additional UNISCOPE 100 terminals were placed in major military district command headquarters during CY 78.

(U) ROKAF. The ROKAF has made considerable progress in developing ADP systems since automation of its supply management in Mar 73. Realizing the need for system expansion, a master plan for automating the entire ROKAF logistics system was prepared in mid-75. Later that year a ROKAF Systems Group was established, composed of systems analysis, operations research, and ADP divisions. During 1976 the ROKAF Air Materiel Command computer center replaced its IBM 370-135 equipment with a UNIVAC 90/30 system, and installed nine on-line terminals at six bases. In early 1978 an additional UNIVAC 90/30 computer was installed at HQ ROKAF; an initial project developed for the new system was automation of a flight crew currency program.

17. (S) JUSMAG-K Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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(U) ROKN. Automation of ROKN logistics began in Mar 75 at the Logistic Control Group's (LCG) Chinhae facility after procurement of an IBM-3 system in fall 1974. By end CY 77 workload requirements had exceeded capabilities of ADP equipment. On 9 Feb 78 the IBM-3 computer was replaced with an IBM 370 model that has approximately five times greater capacity. A terminal was installed on 1 Dec 78 which linked the ROKN Shipyard (Chinhae) and the Fleet Air Wing at Pohang to the LCG facilities, providing more timely logistics support for those major ROKN commands. During the year the LCG added the following eight additional ADP programs to its basic data file: Allotment Fund, Supply Source Fund, Shop Store Item, Procurement Fund, Critical Item, Mandatory Turn-In, Report of Item Discrepancy, and Ammunition Master Files; under test was a Coordinated Ship's Allowance List program. On 13 Dec 78 the IBM 370's memory capacity was increased by over 50 percent and two additional disk storage drives were installed. At year's end 143,000 line items were being managed/processed by the LCG ADP system.

(U) In mid-1978 the MND approved a Five-Year ADP Plan for the entire ROK defense establishment. Major components of the plan were directed toward centralizing ADP management, related policy formulation, and equipment selection/acquisition at MND with a view toward establishing a National Defense Management Information System; developing standardized hardware requirements and common software programs which will meet needs of multiple functional users within ROKF and defense agencies; establishing a centralized personnel management program for selection, placement and training of ADP technicians and managers; and forming an ADP User's Group to review all major hardware/software requirements.

(U) Quality Control Improvement Programs

(U) US assistance to the ROK in the area of quality control (QC) began in 1973. QC orientation classes for Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) and ADD executives/managers were initiated by JUSMAG-K as well as on-the-job training sessions for QC specialists in defense industries. As inspectors' skill improved, advanced QC techniques were suggested in statistical, organization, procedures, and specifications areas.

(U) During 1978 the ROK MND completed major organizational realignments for enhancement of QC in defense industry production programs. A Quality Assurance Group was established in MND, headed by a BG who reports directly to the Asst Minister for Defense Industry. Both ADD and DPA increased their QC staffs and elevated QC functions to higher level organizational status in their agencies. Detailed MND guidance on QC requirements, procedures, and program implementation was provided to other ROKG agencies and all firms manufacturing defense articles.

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(U) Training in QC methods received high priority throughout the year. Selected personnel from ROKG ministries and private industry were sent to quality assurance courses in CONUS. A QC curriculum was established at the ROK Bureau of Standards facility and Seoul National University initiated a masters degree program in Quality Assurance Engineering. MND, ADD and DPA conducted formal training courses and quarterly seminars on a regional basis throughout the ROK. DPA began negotiations with US TRADOC on a QC training package which would include instruction on evaluation of contractors' QC programs and in statistical QC analysis techniques. MND authorized and encouraged defense industries to have their testing, measurement and diagnostic (TMDE) calibrated by the ROKAF Precision Measurement Equip Lab (discussed on page 221).

(U) In spring 1978 MND conducted a survey of all defense industries to determine their compliance with QC requirements issued earlier in the year; participating were QC specialists from MND, ADD, DPA, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ROK military services, and JUSMAG-K. At each plant, QC organization/functions and procedures were evaluated, including non-destructive testing; material receipt, in-process and final inspection; TMDE and calibration thereof; and inspection/test methodology. Each industry was provided a report of the team's findings and recommendations. In fall 1978 MND conducted a follow-up survey to ensure that corrective actions had been accomplished. Although considerable progress had been achieved in defense-related QC efforts, two major shortfalls still existed at end CY 78--a shortage of qualified inspectors and inadequate TMDE. MND is expected to place additional emphasis on those problem areas in 1979.

(S) ROK Ground Forces Development Section (U)

(U) Korean Armor/Anti-Armor Analysis (4A Study)

(U) Conducted 1 May-30 Sep 78 by JUSMAG-K, the Korean Armor/Anti-Armor Analysis was designed for following purposes: To provide quantitative data for battalion level anti-armor battle planning, determine requirements for advanced APFSDS ammunition, develop operational criteria for design of Korean armored vehicles, and to select the best anti-armor force mixes; ancillary objective was to transfer study methodology to ROKA. The Korean 4A study was sponsored by ROK MND, ROKA, and the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); funding was provided by DARPA, who contracted with (US) Braddock-Dunn-McDonald Corporation to furnish study methodology, digitized terrain data, and most of the analytical effort. Methodology used was Dynamic Combat Analysis, a map-based, real time loss exchange portrayal of a battalion combat scenario. Four battalion level defensive battles and a counterattack were formulated for three possible NK armored assault corridors in the I Corps (ROK/US) Group area. Actual ROKA defensive deployments and realistic intelligence estimates of NK attacking units were used during the analysis.

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(S) ROKAF Depot-Level Maintenance Capability Expansion (U)

(U) In 1975 ROKAF initiated a program to expand its depot-level aircraft maintenance facilities.³² Purposes were to improve overall maintenance effectiveness, reduce reliance on foreign depot-level overhaul, and achieve capability for performing depot maintenance on USAF and USN aircraft.

(U) By end CY 78 ROKAF had full depot-level capability for overhauling following major assemblies at its Taegu facility: Airframes--A-37B, C-54, C-11A, C-123K, ED-47, F-5A/B, O-1G, O-2A, RF-86F, S-2A/E/F, T-28A, T-33A, T-41B, and UH-1H/N; and Engines--A-37, C-46D, C-123J/K, O-1G, O-2A, RF-5A/B, RF-86F, T-28A, T-33A, T-37 and T-41B. Limited capability (minor repair) exists for F-4Ds. The depot is able to process some 1,500 line items through the complete overhaul cycle. About 5,000 items of shop equipment are maintained and operated by a combined military/civilian work force of approximately 1,350. Expansion of ROKAF's depot-level maintenance operations begun in 1976 will continue through 1979 at a total investment cost of about \$35.5 million. Proposed funding includes approximately \$12 million from the ROK budget for facilities/installations; \$7.8 million in FMS credits for purchase of special test equipment; and \$15.7 million from other commercial credit sources for shop equipment and tooling costs (Project PEACE DEPOT).

(U) The ROKG had contracted for 1,122 additional shop equipment items under a Nov 77 case. Deliveries were in progress during the year, but numerous problems were encountered since ROKAF lacked sufficient technical data and some items ordered were no longer being manufactured or had excessively long lead times. It was expected that ROKAF would not receive all equipment required for planned expansion goals until 1981. Other FMS cases initiated in Nov 77 provided for CONUS training in following maintenance specialties (numbers of ROKAF trainees in parentheses): F-4 aircraft (16), F-4 components (5), J85 engine (7), and R2000/2800 engines (7). Training in F-4 component repair was completed in late 1978; other courses were in progress and scheduled for completion by Jul 79. Graduates will be assigned as shop supervisors and OJT instructors at ROKAF's Taegu depot.

(U) During 1975-76 depot-level corrosion control maintenance was contracted for and performed by ROKAF on 16 USAF OV-10 aircraft. Another contract was negotiated in Sep 77 for similar maintenance on seven USAF T-39s. Work commenced in Jan 78; at year's end corrosion control treatment had been applied to five aircraft, with remaining two scheduled for completion by Apr 79.³³

32. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 203.

33. (S) JUSMAG-K Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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sent to San Antonio Air Logistics Center throughout the year for evaluation. Recorders will continue to collect strain data until end CY 79. In Jun 78 ROKAF technicians received training in CONUS on non-destructive inspection procedures related to the service life extension program. During latter half CY 78 ROKAF performed extensive analytical condition inspections on nine F-5 aircraft which had each accumulated close to 4,000 hours. No significant structural deficiencies were found, and ROKAF extended the unrestricted use of those nine F-5s to 4,400 hours. Data collected during these inspections were furnished to USAF Systems Comd's Aerospace Div. ROKAF planned to inspect seven additional F-5s in 1979. After program's completion, USAF is expected to announce in Jan 80 the inspection criteria for possible further extensions of F-5 aircraft service life.³⁷

(U) ROKAF Aircraft Not Mission Capable Supply (ANMC) Status

(U) In 1978 operational readiness of ROKAF aircraft continued to be hindered by untimely supply of replacement and spare parts. Considering aircraft age, however, and their diminishing supportability by the USAF supply system, ROKAF's performance in maintaining aircraft mission capable status was commendable. ROKAF's ANMC rates decreased in 1978 for most aircraft types as indicated in table below. No particular materiel item(s) consistently contributed to grounding of aircraft.

<u>AIRCRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>ANMC RATE(%)</u>		<u>AIRCRAFT TYPE</u>	<u>ANMC RATE(%)</u>	
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1977</u>		<u>1978</u>	<u>1977</u>
F-4D	1.7	1.8	C-46D	3.9	21.3
F-4E	1.9	0.0	C-54D	12.9	14.7
F/RF-5A/B	1.1	1.9	C-123J/K	8.5	7.2
F-5E/F	0.5	7.0	UH-1H/N	1.1	0.1
F/RF-86F	0.1	4.1	UH-1B	2.8	1.1
T-28	10.2	17.1	O-1G	0.3	1.1
T-33A	0.1	0.4	O-2A	0.02	9.2
T-37C	1.7	2.0	EC-47Q	0.0	0.0
T-41B	1.9	2.9			

(U) ROKAF/USAF Supply Support Arrangement (SSA)

(U) In 1975 ROKAF became a participant in the US AFLC Cooperative Logistics Program (CLP) by accepting a supply support arrangement FMS case. Previously ROKAF had obtained spare parts for weapons and support systems via blanket open end requisitioning cases. Under that procedure, ROKAF was lead time away from needed spares unless a USAF excess condition existed. In the CLP, predetermined spares are purchased by USAF for ROKAF

37. (S) JUSMAG-K Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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by FY 78, 79 and 80 US Army fund allocations.² Major components of the SPP include installation of an administrative communications system and audio-visual facilities at CFC's Yongsan (Seoul) headquarters for use during normal readiness conditions, and provision of additional C3 assets necessary to sustain CFC operations during crisis periods or hostilities. In Jul 78 DA approved funding of \$184,500 for procurement and installation costs necessary to provide administrative telephone support for HQ CFC. The CFC SPP was validated by CINCPAC on 26 Aug 78 and forwarded to JCS for review and approval; formal sanction is expected in Jan 79. Following installations were completed and in service on 1 Dec 78 (three weeks after CFC activation):³

--(U) A 600-line dial exchange to support the administrative telephone system; fixed value was estimated at \$180,000 (not including installation/procurement costs). At end CY 78, 366 individual telephones were in use.

--(U) Ten key telephone systems to permit inter-office communication between principal staff elements without need for external linkage.

--(U) An external cable system to link HQ CFC with Yongsan Tel Exch, UNC/CFC CP Seoul (Yongsan), HQ USFK/EUSA, ROK MND and HQ ROKA.

--(U) Two automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminals in CINC and C2 offices which provide direct access to essential worldwide communications interface points.

(U) Planned for FY 79 installation in order of priority are (costs shown are \$ in thousands): Audio-visual facilities for two conference rooms in HQ CFC building, with simultaneous interpreting capability in one (\$322); Yongsan-TANGO CP cable upgrade and transmission subsystem (\$419.1); bulk encrypted CFC C3 system (\$300.1); integration of CFC into the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (\$813); wideband secure voice networks (\$61.5); secure facsimile services at Seoul and TANGO CPs (\$82.4); and secure closed circuit black/white televisions systems for Seoul and TANGO CPs (\$674).

(U) On 15 Sep 78 CINCPAC forwarded to JCS a proposed US/ROK MOA prepared by this headquarters for telecommunications services/equipment addressed in the SPP. MOA was being staffed in JCS at close of reporting period.

2. (U) During 1977-78 ROK/US SCM discussions it was determined that US equipment would be required to provide reliable command/control and administrative telecommunications systems for HQ CFC; US Army would retain ownership of assets furnished.

3. Ibid.

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(U) 1978 Developments. The US Congress, in its FY 79 Appropriations Report, redirected basic configuration of the WBSV program from proposed hybrid system to a narrowband network. Rationale was that use of regular commercial and DCS assets already available would result in lower costs and increased flexibility/survivability. Consequently, projected Korean WBSV circuits were discontinued and USFK J6 staff began developing new plans for an expanded and improved secure voice capability utilizing the existing automatic voice network (AUTOVON) system. Project was redesignated as Secure Voice Improvement Program.

(U) Redirected program encompasses three distinct phases. Since new terminal equipment capable of integration with AUTOVON will not be available in production quantities until 1983, Phase I of the plan calls for providing interim upgrading with assets drawn from other USFK communications programs. During Phase II (commencing in 1983) the command's HY-2 and HY-11 terminals will be replaced by new equipment previously mentioned. Phase III calls for replacing existing KY-3 terminals and incorporating evolutionary improvements applied to the AUTOVON system. Secure voice terminals to be installed will be modified for four-wire operation over the Autovon and will resemble the model presently being developed by National Security Agency for Executive Secure Voice Network.

(U) Forward Area Communications Upgrade

(U) The 18 Aug 76 incident involving the axe murders of two UNC officers by NK attackers in the Joint Security Area (Panmunjom) highlighted the need for improving communications facilities between Yongsan Forward Command Post (later designated UNC/CFC CP Seoul), 2d US Inf elements, and the US Army JSA Spt Gp. The US Army Communications System Agency was designated by JCS as project manager for the upgrading. Specific improvements include: (1) installation of new microwave radio and multiplex equipment for a Camp Casey-Papoyongsan (FCC Warrior)-Camp Dodge link; (2) expansion, by 60 additional channels, of multiplex equipment connecting the Yongsan CP and Camp Casey; (3) installation of patch and test facilities at each of these sites; and (4) upgrading of AUTOVON trunking access equipment at JSA-Panmunjom and Camps Dodge and Casey. Initial operational capability (IOC) date, originally set as 1 Jan 78, had to be postponed because of delays in site preparation and equipment procurement; some items received did not meet required specifications.

(U) By end CY 78 all site installations had been completed for the radio/multiplex upgrading projects; however, defective components were discovered during final testing and evaluation, delaying IOC date until replacements are received and installed. Testing/evaluation of completed installations at patch and test facilities revealed that line conditioning modules did not conform to established standards; reevaluation was in

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(U) Rehabilitation of ground control approach and remote transmitter/receiver facilities.

(U) Installation of voice transmission recorders, emergency (crash) telephone nets and telephone key systems.

When completed, the project will significantly improve reliability of and lessen maintenance requirements for Army air traffic control (ATC) facilities.

(U) The following 11 sites were included in the local C-E upgrade program: Camps Page (A-306), Humphreys (A-511), Stanley (H-207), and Casey (H-220). Also, LaGuardia (H-210); Papyongsan, FCC Warrior (H-173); Yongsan, Seoul (H-201); Concord FOC North (H-247); Evenreach, Hwaaksan (H-310); Taegu (H-805); and Namsan FOC South. By end CY 78 planned improvements at all sites had been finished except LaGuardia Airfield and Camp Stanley; upgrading at those locations is programmed for completion during CY 79. ATC equipment was installed and site acceptance tests performed by military teams from US Army C-E Engr Instl Det-Korea (specialized in-country unit supporting 1st Sig Bde). Site operation and maintenance of upgraded facilities throughout the ROK is responsibility of 1st Sig Bde's Fwd Area Spt Cen; operator personnel for installations in Korea are provided by the 125th ATC Bn (Corps), a newly organized 1st Sig Bde element. Transfer of EUSA ATC equipment to ROKA is outlined in following topic.

(U) Transfer of Air Traffic Control Equipment to ROKA

(U) Initial DOD planning in 1977 for transfer of EUSA equipment to ROKA as compensation for projected withdrawal of US ground combat forces (outlined on page 163) called for one ATC battalion set to be included in the turnover program. In Jul 78 a Korean Army Air Traffic Study was initiated by an ad hoc committee composed of representatives from US Army ATC Actv, Ft Huachuca, Ariz; 1st Sig Bde (USACC); US Army ATC Bn-Korea (Prov); and ROKA. Purpose of study was to prepare a concept plan which would identify/quantify ROKA's ATC equipment requirements, both fixed station and tactical, for the post-1982 period. Also developed was a logistical support plan, recommendations for upgrading existing facilities/equipment, and a training program. In Dec 78, after completion of study, COMUSKOREA approved transfer to ROKA of equipment necessary to operate ten mobile and five fixed ATC facilities. Follow-on planning actions will be pursued by ROKA and 1st Sig Bde staffs in 1979.

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(U) English-Hangul Teletype System

(U) To provide the command with a needed bilingual communications capability, CINCUNC tasked the 1st Sig Bde in mid-1976 to procure special teletypewriters capable of interchangeable English and Hangul (Korean language) operation. Intent was to install the machines, on a loan basis, in major ROKF headquarters and elements of their combined command/control centers. The Siemens Mfg Co of Munich, Germany was determined to be best equipment source; that company's model FS-100(K) teleprinter was selected because of its overall operational characteristics and compatibility with US COMSEC devices. In Oct 76, 1st Sig Bde (USACC) allocated \$230,000 for purchase of 30 machines. Teleprinters were delivered to the ROK in Nov 77 and a local electronics firm, Gold Star Tele-Electric Company, Ltd, was selected as contractor for their installation at Seoul CP (Yongsan), TANGO CP, ROK JCS, and headquarters of I Corps (ROK/US) Gp, ROKA and FROKA. Action was suspended in late 1977, however, when a recent change to a security assistance FMS regulation indicated that, unlike COMSEC equipment, loan of these particular machines to ROKF must be approved by the US National Command Authority. This headquarters requested policy guidance from CINCPAC since teleprinters had been procured under provisions of a previous directive. CINCPAC responded that English-Hangul teletypewriters should be considered as ancillary equipment for SW-15 cryptographic devices loaned to ROKF under a MOU signed in Feb 77 (see preceding topic). ROKF could not, however, acquire Siemens machines on an extended loan basis; 1st Sig Bde (USACC) would retain property accountability and issue them on hand receipts to appropriate ROKF elements. Equipment was installed in Feb 78 at designated command centers mentioned previously.

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and Japan-based US Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity (NAVSEEA) elements for electronic installation and security support; the in-country 1st Sig Bde (USACC) and 2146th Comm Gp (USAF) furnish communications assistance.

(U) The local WWMCCS ADP System has been designed to provide two major functional capabilities for USFK and component commands. First is a Command Information System (CIS); i.e. automated storage, update and retrieval of data. Second is the Command and Control Message Processing System (CCMPS), i.e. drafting, storage and retrieval of selected command/control messages for transmission between command centers in and out of Korea via AUTODIN. The CCMPS has a direct interface linking the mainframe computer and the AUTODIN Switching Center at Taegu. In Dec 76 ACofS, J3 was assigned staff functional user coordination responsibilities for the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS CCMPS.

(U) The ease with which foregoing capabilities are realized is based largely upon the physical configuration of COMUSKOREA's WWMCCS ADP System. The H6060 mainframe computer--upgraded to 384,000 work memory core capacity in 1978--controls information input, processing and output for all system components. It also stores the system data files. It is equipped with seven disk storage units which offer rapid data access and large storage capacity, enabling achievement of the remote processing capability described below. Associated hardware installed at the mainframe facility includes: eight tape drives, a high-speed printer (1150 lines per minute), a card reader (1050 cards per minute), card punch equipment (100-400 cards per minute), and a Datanet 355 processor which provides communications between the central computer and remote terminals, and a H716 message processor serving as the ADP link with AUTODIN. For system users, data communications is accomplished through two basic methods. First is a high-volume Remote Batch Terminal Processing System (RBTPS) which is van mounted and normally located at HQ USFK/EUSA; van is relocated to TANGO CP for major exercises or during crisis periods. Major hardware installed in the van includes a H716 message processor (mini-computer), 450 line per minute printer, two tape drives, one disk unit, and card reader/punch equipment. The second means of communicating with the mainframe computer is through remote terminals located in command/control centers throughout the ROK. The COMUSKOREA WWMCCS ADP System had to be uniquely designed to permit integration of numerous widely separated terminals into the central processing unit. These Visual Information Projector (VIP) terminals permit processing, dispatch and receipt of messages/data from the mainframe computer and allow exchange of command/control information between command centers via both the CIS and CCMPS. On-line near real time processing capabilities permit job initiation at all terminal sites, with hardcopy output produced by page printers. To support high volume US AFK requirements, a model 300 remote line printer was installed at Osan AB in 1976 and another at AFK's Yongsan headquarters in CY 78; these units provide bulk printing capability for VIP users.

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(U) Current Developments. By end 1978, 18 remote terminals were operational at following locations: Yongsan UNC/CFC CP Seoul (two), HQ AFK/314th Air Div (three), ACoFS J3 (one), JCIS (two), and RBPTS Van (one); TANGO CP (two); Osan AB (three), all relocatable to K-2 AB at Taegu; Kunsan AB (one); Chinhae NB (one); and Taegu Mainframe Computer Facility (two). Office of Sp Adviser to CINCUNC has access to the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS via a connection with one of AFK's terminals at Yongsan. Two terminal sets are on hand at Taegu to be installed in EUSA Rear CP when activated.¹

(U) At close of reporting period a total of 34 software application systems were operational on the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS computer. Seven were standard WWMCCS systems, ten were imported from other commands, and 17 were COMUSKOREA WWMCCS developed. High priority standard systems used most extensively by action officers at command/control centers included: Force Status and Identity Information Processing, which provided operational readiness and location information on more than 400 EUSA units; Joint Operations Planning System, used to develop force lists, movement schedules and related contingency OPLAN requirements; and the Computer Directed Training System, which provides all users access to a series of 13 WWMCCS student-paced training courses. The Fragmentary Order Preparation system was regularly employed by AFK/314th Air Div to generate and disseminate daily fragmentation orders and reports required in command/control of operational flight missions. A JCIS/J3 developed system, designated COMCON, provided automated updating of approximately 90 command briefing formats required by principal USFK/EUSA staff agencies during periods of increased DEFCON.

(U) The following locally designed software application systems became operational during 1978: Military Armistice Commission Incident Report which accumulates data on alleged violations in the DMZ; Merchant Shipping System to maintain information on merchant ships arriving and departing NK ports; and a Special Security Officer Billet Access Roster designed to provide automated lists of sensitive compartmented intelligence information.

(U) Systems under development by JCIS at year's end were: Side Looking Airborne Radar Mission Data System to expeditiously process intelligence data collected by aerial surveillance platforms; EUSA Master Stationing Plan which is being revised to include five year projections based on planned US force reductions and correlated station closures in the ROK; Ammunition Management and Analysis System for Korea which will assist EUSA logistics planners in monitoring munitions stock levels; ROK/US Combined Forces Command Headquarters Readiness Planning System to provide comprehensive personnel status reports on all forces assigned to CFC; and an Army Emergency Movement Plan for controlling tactical supply

1. (U) JCIS Hist Sum 1978.

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operations throughout the command during contingencies. In addition, the Convoy Routing and Scheduling System utilized in EUCom is undergoing evaluation by JCIS for possible implementation in Korea.

(U) COMUSKOREA WWMCCS Support to COMUSJAPAN

(U) In Nov 75 COMUSJAPAN indicated a requirement for an interface with CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA via WWMCCS. A JCIS assistance team from this headquarters determined COMUSJAPAN's functional requirements for software and the hardware necessary to support appropriate ADP service. In Mar 76 the team prepared a Justification, Approval and Acquisition Document (JAAD) and forwarded it through CINCPAC and USN CNO to JCS, which approved the JAAD in Nov 76. Thereafter a WWMCCS ADP Support Agreement was initiated by CINCPAC, setting forth tasks and responsibilities of the three commands involved (PACOM, USFK and USFJ) in areas of operation, budgeting, program support, documentation and information exchange. Agreement was signed by representatives of all three commands in Dec 77 and NAVSEEACT Japan elements commenced site preparation for COMUSJAPAN's WWMCCS facility.

(U) Following installation of essential cryptographic/communications equipment, USFJ's WWMCCS interface became operational on 23 Jan 78. Principal component of the system is a H716 mini-computer located at Yokota AB, Japan hosted by COMUSKOREA's H6060 mainframe computer at Taegu. The mini-computer serves as a message concentrator linking four VIP user terminals, a 300 line per minute printer, card reader/punch and tape drive to the host computer.²

(U) Management Information Systems (MIS)

(U) The command's MIS/ADP activities encompass both Standard Army Multi-Command Management Information Systems and local command unique applications.³ Twelve data processing installations (DPI) are assigned to EUSA major subordinate commands; Yongsan Data Processing Center-Korea (USAYDPC-K), 19th Spt Comd's ADPC at Taegu, and USA Pusan Port's facility are fixed site installations while the other nine DPIs are van mounted. (Types of automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) utilized at each DPI are indicated in following topic.) These DPIs are totally Army funded (FY 78 ADP budget was \$3.03 million) and process primarily EUSA requirements except USAYDPC-K which provides ADP support for USFK headquarters and elements in the Seoul area. The USAYDPC-K and the 19th Spt Comd ADPC are augmented by computer output microform equipment capable of providing customers with ADP products in microfiche media.

2. Ibid.

3. (U) A major command unique ADP system (CUPIDS), designed primarily for USFK ration control purposes, is discussed on page 293.

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(U) The Asst to the CofS for MIS, whose office is organized as a separate staff element within HQ USFK/EUSA, advises the CofS on all matters related to planning, controlling and coordinating MIS/ADP activities and equipment procurement actions within the command, except those pertaining to JCIS (discussed in preceding topics). He also exercises OPCON over USAYDPC-K and is responsible for technical staff supervision of the other 11 EUSA DPIS.

(U) ADP Equipment Utilization

(U) A comparison of CY 78 against CY 77 statistics reflects the following changes in ADPE utilization as percent of available staffing hours (command objective was 70 percent):

<u>ADPE TYPE</u>	<u>DPI</u>	<u>PERCENT UTILIZATION</u>	
		<u>CY 78</u>	<u>CY 77</u>
NCR 500	348th S&S Co	87	83
	45th Trans Co	78	68
	USAMSC-K	95	83
	305th S&S Co	84	76
	USAG-Pusan	79	77
	595th Maint Co	80	80
	61st Maint Co	84	80
	520th Maint Co	92	76
	2d Inf Div	84	76
	USAYDPC-K	54*	64
IBM 360/30	USA Pusan Port	87	75
UNIVAC 1005	19th Spt Comd ADPC	91	88
UNIVAC 70/15	USAYDPC-K	88	90
UNIVAC 70/60			
UNIVAC 70/60			

*Low utilization attributed to bulk of workload being reprogrammed and processed on the UNIVAC 70/60 at USAYDPC-K. UNIVAC 1005 system is scheduled for operational phaseout by May 79.

SOURCE: RCS MIJ-A1 Report, ADPE Utilization, Recording and Reporting. Filed at ACofS, MIS.

(U) Upgrading of 2d Inf Div Data Center

(U) The US Army Computer Systems Command (USACSG) developed five improvements for disk operating systems (DOS) used on IBM 360/370 computers. During period Sep-Dec 78 three increments of the enhanced DOE package were installed at 2d Inf Div's Data Center--(1) a sort/merge program (SYNCSORT) with capability of handling entire range of those tasks, (2) a sub-system

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(U) CHAPTER XI: ENGINEER

(U) Master Planning Program

(U) In light of EUSA ground combat force withdrawals scheduled during 1978-82 (see page 117), the command's on-going master planning program required extensive realignment. (Installations identified for closure following planned troop withdrawal increments are listed on page 123.) Master planning documents for the orderly development of facilities to effectively and economically support EUSA's current and planned future missions are prepared by the Seoul-based Far East District Engineers. As a result of programmed troop reduction actions, 1978 installation master planning was concentrated on key facilities planned for US Army residual force (post-1982) use. At end of reporting period, master planning for K-16 Airfield (Seoul) had been completed; comprehensive master planning projects for Yongsan Garrison, Camps Humphreys and Kittyhawk (JSA), and Taegu Garrison (Camps Henry, Walker and George) were targeted for completion in mid-1979.¹

(U) EUSA's current command-wide Master Stationing Plan (App 7, this report) will be replaced by a five-year version reflecting troop withdrawal actions through 1983; revised document is scheduled for publication in May 79.

(U) Military Construction, Army (MCA) Programs

(U) EUSA's MCA programs have been directed at improving the command's operational and living standards by replacing inadequate troop barracks (see following topic), tactical equipment maintenance facilities, utility systems, warehousing, POL facilities, and substandard buildings necessary for administrative support and community activities. Under construction during 1978 were the following FY 77 MCA projects (not including relocatable troop housing): Improved Ammunition Storage Facilities at Camps Ames, Howard and Thompson for the Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea program (outlined on page 170) (\$2.36 million) two 500-man Dining Facilities at Camp Casey (\$1.3 million), and Dining Facility Modernization at Camp Coirer (\$628,000). All the above projects are scheduled for completion in CY 79.

(U) Following early 1977 announcement on removal of US ground combat forces from Korea, the Congress deferred in its entirety EUSA's FY 78 MCA program, which had been submitted in Nov 75 and supported by DA at a total value of \$27.5 million.²

1. (U) Engr Hist Sum 1978.

2. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 231.

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(U) EUSA's FY 79 MCA program was scaled down considerably before reaching the Congress. Initially forwarded to DA in Jun 77, it encompassed 26 projects with an estimated cost of \$55.6 million. Citing the projected EUSA realignment, DA deferred action and instructed this headquarters to resubmit its requirements based on developing withdrawal and restationing plans. Accordingly, a revised FY 79 program for eight projects valued at \$31.1 million was returned to DA in Aug 77. After review by DA, OSD and Office of Management and Budget, only the following four projects were supported: Airfield Improvements at Camp Humphreys (\$4,235,000), Upgrade of Sewer Systems at Yongsan and Camp Humphreys (\$2,467,000), Construction of new Milk Plant at either Camp Baker or K-16 (\$1,910,000), and Upgrading of Water System at Yongsan (\$878,000). Although Congress authorized funding in mid-1978 for the foregoing Camp Humphreys and Yongsan improvements, it disapproved construction of a new USFK Milk Plant (see page 171).

(U) The command's FY 80 MCA program, submitted to DA in Aug 77, consisted of 22 projects, all at EUSA residual force installations, with an approximate cost of \$21.4 million. Only the following three projects, however, are currently supported by DA: USFK Milk Plant (resubmitted from FY 79 program), construction of new Fire Station at Camp Walker (\$316,000) and a QM Gas Station at Camp Humphreys (\$140,000). In Jun 78 EUSA's FY 81 MCA program was forwarded, comprising 26 projects at residual force locations with a projected cost of \$30.2 million. Principal categories included construction or rebuild of warehouses, storage and maintenance facilities, a new headquarters building for 19th Spt Comd (Camp Henry), and garrison recreational/community support facilities. Program was under DA review at close of reporting period.

(U) Relocatable Housing Program

(U) At the 1974 Army Commanders' Conference in Washington, D.C., the EUSA CG suggested an alternative to rising costs of concrete block construction in Korea would be use of panelized buildings available in the Army Facilities Components System. The DA Engineer concurred. Panelized structures have the added feature of recoverability, a valuable asset considering that relocation of military units would cause unprogrammed building requirements. Unlike former preengineered building systems used by the Army, the panel system is a bonded wall component which is complete with an exterior finish, insulation, and interior finish. Options which are also fully recoverable include partitioning, heating, lighting and ceilings.

(U) EUSA's relocatable troop barracks project was initiated in FY 75. It combined \$4.9 million in Other Procurement, Army and \$1.1 million in MCA funds for 106 H-shaped billets at Camps Casey, Castle, Hovey, Nimble and A-220 Airfield. A troop billet consisted of two 24x48-foot buildings

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with a common latrine. Each building complex provided adequate housing for 8-24 men, depending upon grade mix. EUSA engineer troops prepared sites, constructed concrete pads, installed water and sanitary sewage lines (including large septic tanks), and erected the buildings. Upgraded housing for approximately 2,000 soldiers at the five 2d Inf Div installations indicated began in Jul 75 and was completed by Mar 76. Although a great improvement over the quonset structures they replaced, the 106 H-shaped relocatable billets had numerous design deficiencies resulting from their "off-the-shelf" procurement. Accordingly, DA provided approximately \$725,000 to correct the shortcomings. Nearly half this amount was utilized to provide vinyl floor coverings plus landscaping and erosion control; remainder was used to improve building durability and ease of maintenance.

(U) The FY 76 MCA Relocatable Barracks Program (120 H-shaped buildings to accommodate 3,000 troops) was planned so that deficiencies noted in the first year's program would be corrected. Scheduled Dec 76 completion date could not be met, however, due to manufacturing defects found when buildings were erected in Korea; building panels were not properly laminated, causing them to split. The US Army Engr Div, Pac Ocean approved refurbishment of defective exterior panels by a local Korean fabricator. Rebuilt panels have four light-gauge steel channels covered with plywood facings; exposed surface is covered with aluminum skin salvaged from the US-manufactured panels. To further improve structural soundness, concrete block walls were added in hallways and in connecting corridors between barracks and latrine buildings. In mid-1978 EUSA's 2d Engr Group completed construction of all 120 FY 76 relocatable troop billets at Camps Casey, Stanley, Red Cloud and Humphreys.³

(U) Subsequent barracks programs utilize a more durable two-story structure which has additional advantage of conserving scarce real estate. The FY 77 relocatable model is steel-framed with concrete block interior walls. This design meets building relocatability requirements, and lower maintenance costs should be achieved as well. The FY 77 MCA program authorized contract construction of 50 two-story relocatable BOQ/BEQs. However, when decision was made to phase-out Korea-based combat troops, OSD suspended all FY 77 projects until they were revalidated by EUSA. In late 1977 DA/OSD approved this command's resubmission and authorized construction of 50 buildings at the following long-term EUSA installations: Yongsan Garrison (18); K-16 Airfield (three); Camp Humphreys (six); Camp Walker (nine); Camp Henry (six); and Camp George (one). Seven units were also programmed for USA Field Station-Korea (501st MI Gp element) located at Camp Humphreys. During CY 78 eight two-story billets were erected by local contractors at Yongsan and four at USA Field Station-Korea. Remaining 38 buildings are scheduled for completion by end 1979.

3. Ibid.

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(U) EUSA Facilities Plan

(U) To complement the ongoing relocatable barracks program described in preceding topic, a comprehensive five-year EUSA Facilities Plan for upgrading troop living conditions throughout the ROK was submitted to DA by this command in Dec 76. Dual purpose of the program was (1) to provide essential short-term maintenance and repair of troop billets, dining facilities and latrines using Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds, and (2) couple this with long-term MCA modernization and replacement of facilities where required. The OMA portion constitutes minimum necessary emergency repairs/improvements required to establish a safe and healthful environment for troops; specific upgrading projects are designed to correct many years of neglect caused by inadequate manning and funding levels of EUSA facility engineering activities. The entire program has been reviewed in light of planned EUSA reductions so that upgrading will be accomplished only at those installations which will be retained for a reasonable period to justify fund expenditures.

(U) Phase I of the FY 77 OMA program, priced at \$9.4 million and completed by mid-1978, provided living improvements at ten 2d Inf Div installations. Phase II includes upgrading at remaining seven 2d Inf Div camps and 33 other installations Korea-wide; DA furnished approximately one-half of total \$18.3 million funding required, with balance drawn from EUSA resources. At year's end, all Phase II projects had been contracted out locally and renovation work was well under way. In general, Phases I and II provided upgrading at temporary locations while Phase III is planned for rehabilitating semi-permanent and permanent installations earmarked for use by the EUSA post-withdrawal residual force (see page 121). Phase III will cost approximately \$30 million, encompassing work at 43 installations. In late CY 78 DA set aside \$5 million for Phase III renovation expenses; in addition, \$1.8 million was made available for survey and design requirements at all Phase III projects. At year's end, the first four installations were being surveyed to determine scope of improvements needed.

(U) 2d Engineer Group Troop Construction Program

(U) During 1978 Eighth Army's 2d Engr Gp continued to be engaged in a wide variety of construction and maintenance/repair projects at numerous EUSA installations throughout the ROK. Major tasks assigned the Group's two heavy combat battalions (44th and 802d, stationed at Camps Mercer/Humphreys, respectively) included: construction of 78 relocatable barracks (discussed on preceding page); erection of 13 prefabricated PASCOE and five concrete modulux unit structures for use as warehouses, offices, training facilities, and temporary troop housing; and paving projects in which approximately ten miles of access roads and hardstands were completed at 18 different locations, with 8,941 metric tons of asphalt placed. Value of new facilities and improvements, involving 103 projects, was set at \$3.66 million.

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(U) Protective Construction

(U) In Nov 78 this headquarters published guidance to all subordinate commands outlining protective construction measures that must be considered for all EUSA facilities/installations, both existing and proposed.⁴ Program's primary purpose is to evaluate and improve EUSA's passive defense posture command-wide. Major thrust is to identify deficiencies and program protective construction that will enhance defense of critical facilities/equipment against surprise artillery or aerial attack. Two types of protective measures, revetments and tonedown painting, are specifically mandated by the directive. Acceptable forms of revetments prescribed are steel bin aircraft type, sand filled 55-gallon drums, and standard sandbags. Tonedown painting will be required on all facilities as they become due for normal repainting; special out-of-cycle projects solely for tonedown are prohibited. Also addressed were preliminary surveys for a long-range program of hardening key command/communications centers by either physical strengthening of present structures or underground construction.

(U) Upgrading of USFK Family Housing and Bachelor Quarters

(U) In FY 78 approximately \$1.35 million was obligated for maintenance and improvement of USFK's 506 US Government-owned family housing units. Principal upgrading project accomplished during the year was replacement of ceiling insulation in Yongsan (Seoul) family quarters; total expenditure was \$348,523. In first half CY 78 a comprehensive survey was made of US military housing units at Yongsan, Taegu and Pusan to identify repairs/improvements needed for modernization. Survey results were used to develop a Line Item Improvement Program for all family quarters. Program documentation was forwarded to DA in Jul 78, where it was under active consideration at year's end.

(U) Following DA removal in 1977 of a long-standing moratorium on replacement of bachelor housing furniture, this command was able to complete procurement actions in CY 78 for furniture items totaling \$2.74 million, with deliveries to be made in 1979. In addition, requisitions amounting to \$1.1 million were processed for initial issue furnishings in newly constructed relocatable barracks (see page 273). Total FY 78 acquisition of \$3.84 million was processed under central procurement procedures, with 100 percent obligation of available funds. Requisitions for FY 79 replacement furnishings (\$1.2 million) will be made through normal supply channels so as to fully utilize input and monitoring capabilities of EUSA's existing logistics support/materiel management systems.

4. (U) UNC/USFK/EUSA Reg 415-1, 6 Nov 78, Subj: Protective Construction.

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(U) USFK Exclusive Use Economy Housing

(U) A serious shortage of reasonably priced western style housing for USFK personnel in the Seoul area, which developed in early 1977, persisted throughout CY 78.⁵ Factors contributing to the worsening situation included a sizable population influx into the capital city, increasing numbers of relatively affluent Koreans, and stricter enforcement of housing tax laws. Compounding the problem was long-term leasing of modern residences and apartments by foreign business and diplomatic agencies whose personnel had heretofore utilized hotel accommodations. USFK controls only 600 family units in the Seoul area, comprising 300 US Government-owned quarters on Yongsan Military Reservation and 300 leased rental guarantee units located nearby. Evictions from privately owned housing resulting from changes of ownership as well as drastic rent increases caused many USFK personnel to seek Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC) apartments, which were designed and built primarily for foreign residents. Approximately 600 KNHC apartment units were being rented to USFK personnel at end CY 78. This type housing is in high demand because of convenience and price and waiting periods range from four to six months. Primarily because of housing problems, more than 800 USFK members authorized command sponsorship in the Seoul area have elected not to bring their dependents to Korea.

(U) In Dec 77 the USFK Deputy Cdr sent a letter to the KNHC President expressing the command's need for ROK-constructed family housing in Seoul for exclusive use of authorized USFK personnel. Extensive discussions followed between KNHC officials and Engr/J5 staffs from this headquarters. An evaluation of USFK's needs in the Seoul area revealed a requirement for approximately 700 apartment units. It was also determined that about 20 acres of land would be required to best site a high-rise complex of this magnitude plus appropriate support facilities. Because of prohibitive land cost in urban areas, KNHC initially maintained that housing units would necessarily need to be built south of Seoul across the Han River. To locate the proposed family quarters in close proximity to Yongsan Garrison as well as to Seoul city utilities systems and to keep construction costs within reasonable bounds, this command offered the USFK-controlled Niblo Barracks (situated one mile east of Yongsan in southern suburbs of Seoul) as a preferred site for the housing complex.⁶ Additionally, KNHC was requested to provide 200 similar apartments at Osan AFB for USAF personnel assigned two-year tours.

5. (U) A special DOD-directed Station Housing Allowance Survey for period Feb-Oct 78 conducted by ACofS, J1 disclosed that average rent and utility costs for two/three bedroom economy housing units were \$391/494 respectively.

6. (U) In a 17 Sep 48 Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement between US and ROK governments, the US acquired certain defense-oriented properties (formerly Japanese occupied) in return for basic necessities and other considerations. Niblo Barracks was one such property in Seoul area (along with Yongsan Garrison and other large installations). USFK-controlled land refers to free leasehold property utilized by US units and agencies under terms of cited agreement.

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(U) In Apr 78 KNHC submitted a draft concept proposal for the Niblo Barracks housing project which was generally acceptable to USFK. In essence, the ROKG would finance construction of three 15-story buildings to accommodate 700 apartments. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) procedures would be used for property transfer of 14.7 acres of land, constituting the major portion of Niblo Barracks, to ROKG with agreement that released land will be utilized solely for construction by KNHC of housing units for exclusive occupancy by USFK personnel. Construction will be phased to allow incremental evacuation of Niblo Barracks by US tenant units and to allow gradual assignment of housing units as they are completed. Housing will be furnished to command-sponsored USFK personnel on a private lease basis; Cdr, USAG-Yongsan will be responsible for providing KNHC with lists of USFK members authorized to enter into a lease.

(U) On 11 Oct 78 USFK representatives met with KNHC and ROK Ministry of Construction (MOC) officials to investigate possible cost saving measures for the projected Niblo Barracks complex. It was agreed that mix of apartment sizes would be adjusted as follows: two- and three-bedroom - 45 percent each; and four-bedroom - ten percent. Original plans called for a 25/50/25 percent ratio for two/three/four-bedrooms, respectively. Additionally, the proposed net apartment areas (floor space) could be reduced by approximately ten percent to conform with sizes of Namsan Apartments (a modern KNHC housing complex near Yongsan occupied by foreigners as well as numerous USFK families). It was further agreed that final design changes might result in a slightly lesser number of apartments built, but reduction must not exceed five percent of original 700 units programmed.

(U) Based on foregoing policy adjustments, ROK MOC forwarded a revised construction estimate to President Park, who approved the Niblo Barracks project on 27 Oct 78. First 200 units were scheduled to be occupied in late CY 79, 250 additional units in CY 80, and remaining 250 in CY 81. (Earlier plans called for occupancy in 1980-82 time frame).

(U) The 200 apartment units intended for Osan AB personnel will be located immediately adjacent to the base on land acquired by the ROKG; no siting problems were encountered since availability of land for construction purposes is not as critical in the Osan vicinity as in the highly congested Seoul area. Size and design of family units at Osan will be exactly the same as in the Niblo Barracks complex; however, apartment buildings will be four stories in height rather than high-rise configuration. USAF will rent all available units from KNHC on an annual basis and assign them to command-sponsored personnel, unlike Niblo Barracks renting arrangements where individual occupants will enter into private leases with KNHC. Completion of first 100 targeted for summer 1980 occupancy.

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(U) Real Estate Actions

(U) In Sep 77 EUSA aviation planners identified a requirement for additional helicopter parking pads at K-16 Airfield (near Seoul) to support 55th Avn Co operations. (K-16 is classified as a post-withdrawal EUSA residual force installation.) Acquisition request was submitted by this headquarters to ROK MND for 2.9 acres of existing ROKA aircraft parking ramp space in area immediately adjacent to K-16 to be designated for ROK/US joint use. Shortly thereafter, proposed acquisition was accepted for formal tasking by the US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee. In late 1977 MND suggested an alternate site due to critical shortage of parking space for ROKA aircraft in K-16 area. USFK agreed to new location (5.1 acres) and presented its request for construction to MND in Dec 77 in form of an urgent minor MCA project. Following ROK MND's endorsement on 12 May 78, acquisition was approved by the SOFA Joint Committee on 20 Jul 78.

(U) Two other acquisitions in CY 78 were significant due to the amount of arable land transferred. USFK obtained two tracts of exclusive use real estate adjacent to Osan AB for construction of ammunition storage facilities and an antenna system; total land area acquired was 23 acres. The SOFA Joint Committee sanctioned both acquisitions on 9 Mar 78. Notwithstanding critical need for agricultural land in Korea, ROKG approved these transfers of property to USFK. In so doing, host government acknowledged legitimacy of the US military requirement and fully recognized its obligation under the SOFA to provide this command, on a cost-free basis, use of facilities/areas to accomplish its defense mission. As a related development, ROK emphasis on intensive use of all available land has, to some extent, compounded the problem of frequent encroachments on unfenced USFK real estate by unauthorized farming activities. Prompt action to thwart such intrusions is essential since illegal farming endeavors may quickly become assimilated into the local economy under color of squatters rights. When this occurs, the ROK MND has manifested a disinclination to summarily evict the encroachers since their removal would lower overall agricultural production and cause hardship for farming families involved.

(U) In Nov-Dec 78 substantial portions of Chinhae Ammo Depot and Camp Ames were released to ROKG under provisions of Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea implementing directives (discussed on page 171). The Chinhae release action comprised 2,900 acres of land and 26 buildings/facilities, the latter having an estimated value of \$5.2 million. Transfer action at Camp Ames, which completed SALS-K turnover program, resulted in release of 821 acres and 129 buildings/facilities valued at \$4.4 million. Since SALS-K inception in Aug 75, a total of 9,366 acres at seven USFK munitions installations has been transferred to the ROKG, along with 700 buildings/facilities appraised at approximately \$18.92 million. On 15 Dec 78 Camp Eiler (near Kimpo International Airport) was released to the ROKG as a result of functional/organizational realignments of EUSA's transportation resources (discussed on page 192). Release included 36 acres of real estate and 146 buildings/facilities valued at \$1 million.

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(U) In 1974 this command agreed to relocate all USFK units/activities occupying the 124-acre EUSA installation at Kimpo International Airport and release the area to permit airport expansion by the ROK Ministry of Transportation (MOT). Suitable facilities for displaced USFK units would be built by ROKG at other EUSA installations at no cost to the US. The ROKG subsequently awarded pertinent contracts, and construction commenced at Camp Carroll to house the 304th Sig Bn, which was largest US Army element occupying the Kimpo installation. Although some major facilities were not yet completed at Camp Carroll, the battalion moved to its new location in late Aug 78; 30 acres of former USFK holdings at Kimpo were formally released to ROK MOT on 10 Oct. ROKG-funded construction was in progress at Camp Market for accomodating Area Fac Engr elements and a dispensary presently located at Kimpo; target date for completion was mid-1979. New facilities at Camp Humphreys for a branch post office displaced from Kimpo are also expected to be ready by mid-CY 79. The ROK MOT will build a new consolidated Army/Air Force Aerial Mail Terminal at a different location at Kimpo to replace existing USFK postal facilities which, in their present position, interfere with airport expansion projects. Terminal construction is scheduled to commence early in 79, with completion planned for late in the year (see page 333).

(U) The Korea Maritime and Port Administration (KMPA) has a major project under way to modernize and expand the commercial port at Pusan. Plan necessitates relocation of US Army Port Opns facilities to alternate sites on opposite side of harbbr. The SOFA Joint Committee, in Apr 77, approved the repositioning with essentially no cost to USFK. Construction of replacement port facilities began in Sep 78; target date for completion was set for Oct 79. The KMPA program for commercial port improvements also requires release of waterfront areas presently utilized by EUSA's Pusan Storage Facility. Release negotiations between USFK and KMPA authorities commenced in Dec 78; building of substitute facilities is scheduled to start in Mar 79 and be completed by mid-1980. ROKG will provide a suitable site to construct a replacement United Seamen Service (USS) Club in the commercial port area. New structure, to be designed and built at USS expense, should be finished by mid-1980.

(U) In mid-1978 Seoul city officials requested this command to release approximately one-half acre of the US Army Naija Hotel/R&R Center in center city to facilitate widening of an adjacent main thoroughfare which leads from downtown Seoul to Kimpo International Airport. Fulfillment of request would entail demolishing one building which would delimit vehicle access and exacerbate parking problems. This headquarters notified the Seoul city government that, on a quid pro quo basis, it would release the entire Naija Hotel/R&R Center compound if the city would provide an appropriate replacement facility at another site. Seoul city authorities indicated willingness to construct a new hotel center on existing USFK real estate, claiming that costs of acquiring new property

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elsewhere would be prohibitive. USFK was negotiating with city representatives regarding the request for release at close of reporting period. (Transfer of Niblo Barracks property for construction of a ROKG-funded family housing complex for USFK personnel is outlined in preceding topic.)

(U) Major leasing actions during CY 78 included continuation of leases through Sep 79 for rental guarantee housing (RGH) units occupied by USFK personnel; 300 units are located near Seoul and 72 in Taegu. A new lease was initiated to provide a recreational facility for the Taegu RGH compound.

(U) In mid-1978 a command-wide survey was conducted which disclosed that 114 US Army buildings were being used on a full-time basis by other US agencies and private organizations. To insure that proper accountability and reimbursement for support services provided by EUSA were appropriate, an outgrant system was developed whereby the EUSA Engr would execute proper documentation for occupation of US Army real property by non-military activities/organizations. Completion of this program, covering all applicable EUSA property in the command, was projected for mid-1979.

(U) ROK/US Mapping Conference

(U) In accordance with the Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) Arrangement of 1976 between the US Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) and the ROK MND J2 an annual meeting is hosted alternately by EUSA/DMA and ROKA to coordinate MC&G activities. The 1978 conference, held at HQ DMA in Washington, D.C. on 12-17 Nov, was attended by delegates from ROK MND and MOC, USFK/EUSA, PACOM and US Army CINCPAC Spt Gp.

(U) Agenda items included updates on revisions of various map series in Korea and associated city plans, gazetteers and trig lists. Summaries were presented on status/scope of hydrographic surveys in Korea, ROK National Geographic Institute projects, and Bureau of Forestry mapping programs. A presentation by ROKA Map Service representatives outlined planning efforts to establish terrain analysis map production programs within Korea based on previous US DMA studies. DMA agreed to provide ROKA with reproducible descriptive materials that will enable its mapping technicians to perform in-country terrain analysis. The ROK delegates were briefed on progress of an ongoing terrain study of western Korea being conducted by the US Army Engr Topo Lab, Fort Belvoir, Va. USFK/EUSA agreed to continue acting as primary interface between DMA and ROKA on all matters pertaining to improvement of the latter's MC&G capabilities.

(U) Fire Losses

(U) The command's fire losses for CY 78 totaled \$4,210,000 involving 12 reportable incidents. (CY 77 figures were \$1,244,000 and 22 incidents.)

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--(U) The largest single property loss occurred on 3 Jul 78 when a fire gutted a warehouse at Camp Carroll. There were no deaths or injuries; damage was assessed at \$3,898,000. Cause was attributed to careless handling of smoking materials.

--(U) On 31 May 78 a fire at Masan Ammo Depot caused approximately \$84,000 in damage (no casualties). The fire necessitated shut-down of a US-owned munitions maintenance line for six weeks. Exact cause was not determined, but investigations indicated that fire started in a pile of empty styrofoam containers in the maintenance building's receiving bay.

--(U) Other fires were relatively minor.

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(U) CHAPTER XII: COMPTROLLER

(U) FY 78 Command Budget Performance

(U) This command's Operation and Maintenance, Army budget execution for FY 78 (1 Oct 77-30 Sep 78) reflected a highly efficient allocation of assets. Against the \$281.25 million OMA program, obligations totaling \$280.5 million were recorded, resulting in a 99.73 percent fund utilization ratio. The only significant lag in obligations occurred in 3d Qtr, FY 78 when computer hardware failure at 6th Spt Cen (Mat Mgt) during initial SAILS-ABX implementation (see page 182) prevented EUSA stock fund obligations from being recorded. The separately managed Family Housing Management Account of \$4.91 million achieved obligations of \$4.89 million for a 99.6 percent utilization rate.¹

(U) To a considerable degree, FY 78 budget expenditures were based on the national policy decision specifying phased withdrawal of US ground combat forces from the ROK (discussed on page 117). Budget dollars were allocated to emphasize sustained combat readiness during the initial force reduction process. Through prudent resource management, the command was able to maintain a high level of materiel readiness and introduce significant logistical support improvements (outlined on page 174). Funding was also provided, to greatest extent possible, for upgrading quality of support services and living standards for EUSA personnel, particularly in the area of troop housing facilities (see page 274).

(U) FY 79 Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE)

(U) The FY 79 COBE was forwarded to DA in late Jun 78. Key issue addressed in the estimate was fiscal and manpower resources needed to support the increased readiness level EUSA must maintain throughout the ground force withdrawal period. Major areas of concern included acquisition of resources required for modification (delay) of the force reduction plan's first phase (see page 118), support for the newly established ROK/US Combined Forces Command (discussed in subsequent topic, this chapter), increased scope of field training in 2d Inf Div, and allocations for sustaining equipment maintenance and logistics readiness posture. Following a thorough review of programmed EUSA residual (post-withdrawal) force structure, the command identified funding requirements to accomplish troop facilities upgrade and real property maintenance programs; to offset military personnel reductions, increased reliance was placed on civilian manpower to perform required work under contract.

1. (U) Comptr Hist Sum 1978.

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(U) In conformance with DA's Program and Budget Guidance, an EUSA OMA budget was developed which totaled \$233.453 million, augmented by \$29.5 million in unfinanced requirements (90 percent of which were applied to Subprogram P2 accounts). COBE fund distributions, in priority order, are shown below (\$ in thousands):

<u>SUBPROGRAM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
P2 Gen Purpose Forces (Mission)	\$ 70,347
P2 Gen Purpose Forces (Base Opns)	147,855
7S Central Supply Actv	3,755
8M Medical Actv	3,803
80 Other Gen Pers Actv	4,895
95 Army Admin & Assoc Actv	137
10 Support of Other Nations	2,661

(U) Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR)

(U) During 1978 EUSA participated in DA's outyear PARR process for the third consecutive year. Unlike previous submissions, when this command was able to fully articulate its resource needs and new management initiatives, the 1978 PARR represented in most respects a predetermined response to DA and OSD policy direction for gradual withdrawal of Korea-based US ground combat forces. Consequently, the document dealt almost exclusively with manpower programming and attendant cost savings associated with the three force reduction program phases (increments) and the residual force structure scheduled to remain beyond 1982.

(U) On 21 Apr 78, two months after the command had submitted its 1978 PARR, President Carter announced a one-year delay in withdrawal of most troops originally scheduled to depart during 1978. The postponement had significant resource planning implications, in that lesser support requirements projected in the PARR had to be temporarily restored to their former levels. The considerable and successful efforts of the command's Comptroller and J3 staffs in addressing this need became known as "funding the withdrawal disconnect" and were recognized in Aug 78 by a commendation from the Director of the Army Staff.

(U) In Oct 78 EUSA's Program Development Group² commenced work on the 1979 PARR. DA's preparation instructions indicated a shift in emphasis away from detailed cost displays in favor of narrative descriptions; full justification is essential for resource requirements beyond an established basic or minimum funding level. Statements of these requirements, known as Program Development Increment Packages, were in final stages of preparation at year's end.

2. (U) Chaired by the USFK/EUSA CofS, the Program Development Group includes representatives from USFK Comptr, J1, J2, J3, J4, J6, Engr, Surg, AG, PM and Asst CofS for MIS; Far East Dist Engr also participates.

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(U) Commitment Accounting and Management of Unit Supplies (CAMUS)

(U) The CAMUS ADP system was developed by US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) for division level use in controlling unit requisitions for stock-funded items. CAMUS was designed to interface with and use data generated from the existing automated Division Logistics System. In Oct 78 a CAMUS system was installed at 2d Inf Div, with technical assistance furnished by a FORSCOM team. CAMUS will provide 2d Inf Div commanders at all levels with financial data necessary to effectively manage supply expense ceilings issued by HQ EUSA. Such information should materially assist commanders in developing bases for equitable distribution of funds within their organizations. The system will provide increased visibility of unit requisitions and help insure their accuracy and timeliness.

(U) Interservice Review of US Force Reduction in Korea

(U) In Mar 78 the Defense Audit Service (DAS) commenced coordinating comprehensive audit coverage of the US ground force drawdown in Korea and the related compensatory equipment transfer program then under congressional consideration (see page 163). Primary objective was to assist DOD managers in evaluating soundness of procedures/controls developed for planning and execution phases of the mandated force reduction and ROKF improvement programs. A secondary goal was to minimize piecemeal and redundant audits by separate DOD audit organizations and the General Accounting Office (GAO).

(U) The first DAS summary report, dated 20 Jun 78, dealt with Phase I (CY 78-79 increments) of the troop withdrawal plan. Two principal issues addressed to OSD level were: (1) the need for program flexibility to insure that projected US force withdrawals are accomplished in a manner consistent with ROKF capabilities to assimilate transferred EUSA equipment without serious degradation of overall defense posture, and (2) the necessity for guidance on justification for transfer of specific equipment line items, and quantities thereof, (see page 163), that should be included in the compensatory program. A second DAS summary report concerning similar issues and problems expected during Phase II (CY 80 increment) was published on 6 Nov 78. Audit work was in progress at year's end on actions necessary to implement final phase (CY 81-82 increment) of the scheduled US force reduction program in Korea.

(U) ROK/US Combined Forces Command Cost Sharing Arrangements

(U) A principal issue requiring resolution in conjunction with establishing the ROK/US CFC was the division of responsibility for providing funds to operate the new binational command headquarters. In Dec 77 a

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committee co-chaired by the ROK JCS J5 and the USFK J3 drafted a proposal for activating a CFC in 1978. In the committee's terms of reference it was stipulated that budgeting and cost sharing methods would be determined by mutual agreement between the two nations. The USFK Comptroller, in close coordination with the USFK Judge Advocate, was responsible for overseeing preparation of Memoranda of Agreement³ and determining cost sharing arrangements.

(U) In early Jun 78 the Comptroller assembled a task force of US/ROK action officers to reach a consensus on which types of costs, by mission and function, would be shared and which others would be borne separately by each nation. A single master agreement was considered but rejected because (1) it was subject to frequent changes, and (2) the US funding approval level varied according to the type of activity being considered for cost sharing. Consequently, six separate agreements were developed for recurring administrative costs.⁴ These spanned four distinct cost sharing bases as follows (examples in parentheses):⁵

--(U) Each nation to bear own costs (individual pay/allowances, medical, subsistence, billeting).

--(U) Costs to be shared according to personnel density, floor space, or a combination thereof (printing/reproduction services, interior modifications to CFC headquarters building).

--(U) Direct services furnished by US for which ROK will reimburse (troop messing support, ROK CFC staff's use of dining and recreational facilities).

--(U) Reciprocal services provided on equal basis without charge (Army aviation support, telecommunications services).

(U) Overriding concerns of USFK was that US financial support of CFC should be commensurate with defense benefits derived, that funding actions be accurately recorded and accountability maintained, and that all US resources be provided in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and precedents. To that end, the USFK Comptroller initiated a number of inquiries to higher headquarters' legal staffs, security assistance agencies, and international military organizations in which the US participates.

3. (U) On permanent file in USFK Judge Advocate Int'l Law Br.

4. Ibid.

5. (U) USFK communications support for CFC is discussed on page 253.

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Results of this extensive investigation led to conclusion that CFC is a singular organization, without precedent insofar as cost sharing arrangements are concerned. At year's end, ROK and US officials were pursuing alternative means by which CINCCFC's objective of a consolidated budget for the binational command could be feasibly attained.

(U) Fiscal Operations In Absence of FY 79 Appropriations

(U) On 30 Sep 78 DA advised this command by immediate messages that disbursements against FY 79 appropriations were prohibited until specific authority was received from DA. The stop-payment order resulted from Congress not completing action on a new defense appropriations bill before 1 Oct 78 (start of FY 79). The disbursement freeze continued until 13 Oct when DA authorized release of mid-month military pay checks and resumption of normal pay activities. US Army finance offices throughout the command remained open during evening hours 13 Oct to provide service for soldiers affected by the funding moratorium; all withheld payments were made by 15 Oct 78. During period 1-12 Oct, when disbursements were suspended, EUSA finance offices were compelled to deny 1,126 payments in following categories: advance travel (315); advance pay (229); PCS travel settlements (203); TDY travel settlements (130); TDY travel advances (51); local payments/casual pay (82); reenlistment/anniversary bonuses (68); and temporary lodging allowances (48).

(U) Management Studies

(U) Management studies of import conducted by ACofS, Comptroller during 1978 included the following:

--(U) USFK Family Housing. During Aug-Nov 78 Comptroller conducted a comprehensive review, as directed by COMUSKOREA, of all feasible avenues of increasing USFK family housing availability in the Seoul area. Study efforts were concentrated on providing sufficient living accommodations for immediate future to ease the current critical need, since it was determined that by 1982 requirements would be reduced significantly with opening of 700 ROK-built family apartments at Niblo Barracks dedicated for leasing to USFK personnel (discussed on page 276). A corollary purpose of study was to analyze USAG-Yongsan family housing management policies/practices and recommend improvements. Alternatives examined for increasing available housing included: (1) requesting Korea National Housing Corporation to provide additional units for exclusive use of USFK members in its existing foreigners' apartment complexes;⁶ (2) recommending

6. (U) In Dec 78 KNHC informed this headquarters that it would extend priority to USFK personnel in 575 of its apartments in Seoul area and agreed to increase that number to 675 by fall 1979.

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to ROKG that it extend tax relief to landlords renting to USFK personnel; (3) seeking DOD authorization to offer advance pay to military/civilian members for meeting extraordinary security deposit/advance rent requirements imposed by landlords; (4) lengthening tours of duty for command-sponsored personnel; converting the US Army's Naija Hotel/R&R Center in downtown Seoul into a BOQ/BEQ facility if an alternate hotel center can be obtained by contract with a Korean enterprise; (5) acquiring dedicated USFK housing from private Korean sources; and (6) developing a MCA family housing construction or leasing program for DA consideration. By year's end, these conceptual alternatives/recommendations had been briefed to COMUSKOREA and tasked to Cdr, USAG-Yongsan and appropriate USFK staff agencies for follow-up action. Specific recommendations for correcting deficiencies and improving referral services of USAG-Yongsan's Family Housing Office were incorporated in the study report.

--(U) Centralized Accounting for Nonappropriated Funds. As a result of continuing DA emphasis on improving financial management of non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (NAFI), the Comptroller initiated a study in Aug 78 for implementing more effective NAFI operations within EUSA. Considered as a high priority measure for achieving desired improvements was establishment of central accounting offices (CAO) throughout the command which would provide uniform and more professional accounting services for EUSA's NAFIs, reduce costs, and separate accounting/management functions. Following EUSA CofS approval in Oct 78, Comptroller analysts developed a plan to establish three CAOs in following order of priority: Yongsan Garrison (to service NAFIs at Area III installations); Taegu Garrison (Areas V, VI and VII); and Camp Casey (Area I). Yongsan and Taegu CAOs are scheduled to become operational by end CY 79, Camp Casey's in 1980. Current plans envision installing manual systems in CAOs initially, with automated facilities to follow approximately six months later.

--(U) Ration Control System. During 1978 the Comptroller staff completed the first comprehensive study ever undertaken to determine total cost of administering USFK's ration control system. Annual costs totaled more than \$2 million, were identified as follows: Personnel (direct) - \$1,530,000; supplies (control forms) - \$108,000; and equipment (ADP) - \$408,000. Also investigated during the year were adequacy of aggregate purchase monthly dollar limitations in view of recent sharp rises in the US Consumer Price Index; limitations, based on family size, were set in 1975. Comptroller analysts adapted US consumer market-basket prices established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to current price levels in Korea Area Exchange (KOAX) and USFK commissary facilities. As a result of this survey, an 11 percent increase in dollar spending limits for all but single personnel was approved in Sep 78. This was first known instance in which USFK had interpolated US inflation rates and statistics for application to the KOAX/commissary environment in the ROK.

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--(U) Cash Management. First phase of this study was conducted during 1977 with primary purpose of identifying excesses that existed in authorizations for EUSA disbursing officers to hold cash on hand at personal risk, and to achieve savings where possible. As a result of the study, a command-wide reduction of \$3.6 million in cash holdings was effected. A GAO survey in Dec 77 had concluded that EUSA was actively seeking to minimize unnecessary cash balances, thus reducing US Govt interest costs, but recommended following actions to further improve cash management in the command: (1) replenish US Army FAO-K's Central Funding Office (CFO) cash requirements twice monthly through in-country recoupment, (2) increase frequency of retrograde from disbursing offices to CFO and the Federal Reserve, and (3) improve coordination of cash holding procedures between US military banking facilities and EUSA disbursing offices. Coordination actions in consonance with the latter recommendation yielded significant results, as the military banking facilities were able to reduce their cash holdings by \$1 million during CY 78. This resulted in additional cash available to EUSA disbursing offices for meeting mid-month payrolls. A follow-on study to determine feasibility of recouping US currency from the Korea Exchange Bank met with negative results since that institution could not support CFO requirements. Procedures were implemented for increasing retrograde from disbursing offices to the CFO; a requirement that unfit/mutilated cash must be exchanged in 100-note increments was rescinded.

--(U) Management of Korean Employee Tours of Duty and Extended Work Week (EWW)/Premium Pay. In Jun 78 the Comptroller initiated a study based upon internal review report findings which indicated that subordinate commanders and major activity directors (MAD) were not fully complying with command EWW/premium pay policies. Initial study objectives were to establish a control system for EWW/premium pay at either the MAD or subordinate command level, to determine scope of data available to commanders for monitoring Korean civilian pay administration, and to incorporate corrective measures in pertinent command regulations. An intensive examination of existing control measures revealed that MADs or subordinate commands could not effectively monitor EWW/premium pay usage because automated reports in current use did not produce required data. At year's end a system was under development to furnish necessary summary data on a periodic basis. Commencing in mid-1979, EWW/premium pay practices will be monitored through the formal Command Review and Analysis process.

--(U) US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea (USAMSC-K) Procedures. Two significant studies were undertaken during the year at 19th Spt Comd's USAMSC-K (Camp Carroll) to identify areas for improvement in materiel maintenance and documentation processing. In Feb-Mar 78 Comptroller analysts critically examined equipment turn-in operations at USAMSC-K's Storage Division, since records indicated only 60 percent of all turn-ins were being processed in allowable nine-day period because customers were not

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complying with established procedures. The on-site study showed that improperly prepared or missing documents and misshipment of items were principal causes of processing delays. Action by 19th Spt Comd was ongoing at year's end to complete a comprehensive SOP on turn-in procedures for distribution to all USAMSC-K customers. In May 78 a Comptroller methods and standards team commenced reviewing/updating work procedures and time standards developed in 1976 for USAMSC-K's major maintenance activities. By close of reporting period a Labor and Performance Reporting System had been developed and instituted in the support center and revision/update work had been completed in several divisions.

--(U) Method and Standards Program. This two-year study is responsibility of HQ USAFE which had been tasked to develop DOD-wide manpower staffing standards for American Forces Radio and Television Facilities. Lead team for the four-phase study is at Torrejon AB, Spain. Korean portion, detailed to Det 4, 6004th Mat Eng Sq, Osan AB, was to participate in first two phases: Preliminary and Measurement. Comptroller analysts assisted the AF detachment and findings, in the form of workload data study packages, were completed in Sep 78 and forwarded to the project director at Torrejon AB, Spain.

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<u>CATEGORY</u>	1977		1978	
	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>KN</u>
Appropriated Fund	1,505	15,806	1,396	15,573
Nonappropriated Fund	169	5,787	150	5,757
Contract Hire	123	682	158	607
Personal Hire	-	5,413	-	4,894
TOTAL	1,797	27,688	1,677	26,831

(U) USFK Dependents in the ROK

(U) The number of USFK dependents in the ROK was at a manageable level (approximately 4,000) prior to 30 Jul 73. On that date, DA implemented this command's proposal to lift the restricted area designation (locations in which dependents are forbidden due to dangerous and/or primitive conditions) for Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Chinhae. Rationale was that removal of the restriction would permit establishment of two-year command sponsored tours, thereby enhancing combat readiness by increasing continuity, improving morale, reducing personnel turbulence, and providing a more stable and desirable tour for personnel in Korea. Thereafter, many individually sponsored dependents converted to command sponsorship. By Jan 76 their number had increased to about 8,000; simultaneously, the individually sponsored rolls unexpectedly rose to an all-time high of slightly over 10,000. Effective 1 Jul 76 this command was directed, by congressional mandate, to deny support services (post/base exchanges, commissaries and Class VI facilities) to all non-command sponsored dependents in the ROK when the sponsor's tour remained in the "all others" (unaccompanied) category; medical support would continue to be provided under existing law.⁵ Principally because of the foregoing restrictions, the number of individually sponsored dependents decreased to 5,351 by Jul 77; those who were command sponsored also declined to 5,639.

(U) A major study in Nov 75 had stressed COMUSKOREA's desire to accommodate the maximum number of command sponsored dependents that could be adequately supported. Recommendations to DA pointed out that combat readiness would be improved by the added continuity, increased morale and reduced personnel turbulence derived from two-year "with dependents" tours. For command sponsorships (military and civilian) the standard used to determine an acceptable dependent population was the optimum student level of DOD dependent schools. Strength objectives for command sponsored dependents were set at 6,840 minimum and 7,600 maximum. To counter the downward trend noted above and to establish additional control over dependent strength, this headquarters in May 77 authorized 3,150 USFK command sponsored positions. They were subsequently distributed on an assigned strength basis to staff agencies and troop units in Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan/Chinhae areas.

5. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1976 (U), p. 242.

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(U) At end CY 78 the command sponsored dependent population had risen to 7,239 and appeared to be stabilizing within the acceptable range. These dependents were sponsored by 1,869 USFK military members and 1,094 civilian employees; of the 3,150 USFK duty assignments designated as command sponsored, 1,187 were filled by personnel serving in an unaccompanied status (including more than 800 in Seoul area). Primary reason was a severe shortage of suitable, reasonably priced economy housing, particularly in vicinity of Seoul (discussed on pages 276 and 287).

(U) The non-command sponsored dependent population, totaling 9,197 at year's end, represented a 72 percent increase from Jul 77 (command sponsored group rose only 28 percent during same period). Individually sponsored dependents were not entitled to exchange/commissary privileges, in accordance with the 1 Jul 76 restriction; many were experiencing considerable difficulty in maintaining an adequate standard of living due to escalating rental costs for family quarters on the local economy. A survey completed in mid-1978 revealed that principal rationales for non-command sponsored dependents residing in Korea were sponsor's desire to retain family integrity, spouse having relatives in the ROK, and in-country marriages between USFK personnel and Korean nationals.⁶

(U) Ration Control Program and Command-Unique Personnel Information Data System (CUPIDS)

(U) Background. Over a 26-year period this command has operated various types of ration control programs applying to US forces in Korea. A computer assisted system was introduced in 1971 along with a plastic ration control plate (RCP), similar to commercial credit cards, for issue to authorized exchange/commissary patrons. Embossed on the RCP is the individual's name, rank, social security number (SSN), family status, and a code line indicating privilege entitlements (exchange, commissary, Class VI, and baby items). Procedurally, the customer completes a purchase and presents his RCP to the clerk who places it in a data recorder (anvil) which records the sale, customer's name, sales outlet, cashier and date on a standard IBM card. Accumulated cards are then sent to ACofS, J1's Data Mgt Branch for screening and batching, after which they are delivered to Yongsan Data Processing Center where purchase information is transferred to a computer which maintains a numbered account on each individual/family based on the sponsor's SSN. Though this initial computerized system was a great improvement over previous

6. (U) USFK personnel stationed in the ROK who desire to marry a Korean National must first submit an application to their service component headquarters in Korea for processing and approval. Marriage statistics for 1978 follow (1977 figures in parentheses); total number approved was 3,619 (3,267); figures for the various services were US Army--2,961 (2,451), USAF--621 (799), USN/USMC--37 (37).

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card/book procedures, a comprehensive study in 1974 by ACofS, J1 disclosed that data base was inaccurate and incomplete. The CUPIDS program, placed in effect on 15 Dec 75, thereafter resulted in a system that was self-editing and provided a larger, more accurate data base while also reducing RCP production time and multi-program redundancy.⁷ CUPIDS application forms, completed on each USFK member (military and civilian), furnish non-combatant, medical, religious and other command-unique personnel management data as well as ration control information; forms are controlled and safeguarded at unit level and are serially numbered for accountability purposes.

(U) 1978 Developments. Major ration control policy changes were:⁸

--(U) Effective 1 Sep the monthly collective (exchange and commissary) dollar limit for command sponsored families was raised approximately 11 percent to compensate for cost of living increases (see page 288). New limits established were: family of two - \$350; of three - \$450; of four - \$560; of five - \$670; of six - \$710; and family of seven or more - \$760. Monthly dollar limitation for single personnel was left unchanged (\$200 if authorized commissary privileges, \$160 if not). USFK members with non-command sponsored dependents in the ROK are restricted to same dollar limits authorized for single (unaccompanied) individuals.

--(U) On 1 Apr the ration control system was modified to monitor all purchases of items costing more than \$35 in order to assist law enforcement authorities in investigating potential abuses of exchange privileges.⁹ A new form, on which item description and customer's signature appears, was introduced for this purpose.¹⁰

--(U) A simplified method of obtaining approval to purchase controlled items was initiated effective 1 May. Individual purchaser is no longer required to submit formal written request to his unit commander. Revised procedure features a reusable Letter of Authorization Purchase Record (LOAPR) which reflects all sales of controlled items and is made available to purchaser on verbal request; LOAPR is maintained and monitored by unit commander.

7. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1975 (U), p. 209.

8. (S) J1 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

9. (U) Such items are not charged against monthly dollar limitations.

10. (U) Of particular concern to the command was high incidence of ration control violations. More than 1,800 per month, mostly inadvertent, were being reported to commanders for necessary action. See page 321.

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(U) Furnishing orientation on those programs, activities and functions that provide personnel services for EUSA members, a J1 team visited 17 installations throughout the ROK and held extensive discussions on quality of life improvements with commanders, staff officers and soldiers in all grades. During this initial assessment, which spanned a six-week period in Sep-Oct 78, it was determined that most personnel are able to adapt favorably to restrictive conditions generally associated with a tour in Korea. The J1 staff interviewers found that a large majority of soldiers view their assignments as rewarding and that most quality of life problem areas result from fund constraints. After being briefed in early Dec 78 on initial findings/conclusions, COMUSKOREA issued guidance specifying increased emphasis on development/maintenance of job satisfaction, need for an effective monitoring system which facilitates measurement of progress in quality of life areas, and necessity for adequately informing all soldiers on resource limitations faced by this command.

(U) By year's end a number of short term (FY 79-80) and long range (FY 81-85) goals for improvements in quality of life were established. Short term objectives were: Upgrading troop facilities (see page 274); increasing available Korea National Housing Corporation apartment units (see page 287); raising total of high school completions (see page 300); improving maintenance of morale/welfare/recreation facilities (see page 339); expanding Army Community Service activities; increasing laundromat facilities; offering more cultural tours and Korean home visits (see page 326); and expanding scope of Korean language training (see page 301). Additional quality of life improvements planned for FY 81-85 time frame included: Upgrading BOQ/BEQs (see page 273); modernizing existing USG-owned family housing and constructing 200 additional on-post quarters; hiring 15 local civilian physicians to alleviate shortages at the Seoul Military Hospital (121st Evac Hosp), renovating hospital facilities; and enhancing religious activities (see page 338).

(U) Family Housing Assignment Policy

(U) Recent DAIG findings indicated that this command's policy governing assignment of family housing contributed to a below-standard occupancy rate and was inequitable for some USFK members. In early 1978 an ad hoc committee chaired by ACofS, J1 conducted a study to thoroughly review existing procedures and recommend changes where feasible. Substantive revision of policy for assigning USFK-controlled family quarters in the Seoul area was approved by COMUSKOREA on 21 Apr 78. In essence, family housing on Yongsan Garrison's South Post (300 USG-owned units) and near-by Friendship Village (300 rental guarantee housing units)¹³ would

13. (U) Apartment complex five and one-half miles south of Yongsan Military Reservation, more popularly known as RGH.

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henceforth be assigned on basis of a waiting list established and maintained by the USAG-Yongsan commander, instead of by duty position designation as in the past. Housing on South Post was authorized for families of all officers in grade O-6 or above, enlisted grade E-9, and civilian employees GS-15 or above, as well as all JUSMAG-K military personnel. Officers in grade O-5 would be furnished quarters at either South Post or Friendship Village, depending upon availability at time of arrival. Members in the foregoing categories are authorized concurrent travel of dependents to Korea. All other command sponsored personnel would be offered housing at Friendship Village according to their position on the waiting list.

(U) Family housing assignments at Taegu (168 units, including 72 rental guarantee) and Pusan (110 units) are delegated to Cdr, 19th Spt Comd; those at Chinhae NB (50 units) to Cdr, USNFK; and 11 units at Osan AB are apportioned by Cdr, USAFK. Basic policy at those installations is to provide family quarters for personnel serving in designated duty positions.

(U) Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Program in EUSA

(U) During 1978 this command continued efforts initiated the previous year to accomplish its goal of institutionalizing OE concepts at all levels of leadership.¹⁴ In Jan 78 EUSA received five additional OE staff officers (OESO) who had graduated from the US Army OE Trng Center at Fort Ord, Calif. Their arrival brought OESO strength to nine, which filled EUSA's staffing requirements. OESOs are assigned as follows: HQ EUSA-2, 2d Inf Div-2, 19th Spt Comd-2, 38th ADA Bde-1, USAG-Yongsan-1, and MILPERCEN-K-1; in addition, an OESO was assigned in CY 78 to 1st Sig Bde (USACC), primary in-country communications unit supporting this command.

(U) In 1978 OE staff at this headquarters completed work on program planning/budgeting documents, established policy guidelines for implementation and conduct of command-wide OE activities, and developed a Professional Development Training Plan for EUSA's OESOs. During the year OESOs consulted with and furnished valuable assistance to commanders and principal staff officers at all levels in their efforts to improve human resource management, enhance interpersonal communications within their units, and to apply refinements to organizational structures and processes which would contribute to maximum combat readiness.

(U) Safety Program

(U) In 1978 EUSA experienced a total of 504 reportable accidents (527 in 1977), resulting in decreases in both Army motor vehicle and

14. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 258.

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aircraft accident rates; however, number and rate of injuries incurred by EUSA members reflected an average 21.5 percent rise. A lesser increase was recorded for KATUSA/Korean civilian employee category. No occupational injuries to DACs were reported.

(U) There were 258 Army motor vehicle accidents in 1978, contrasted with 298 in CY 77. The rate of vehicle accidents per million miles driven was reduced to 5.05; CY 77 rate was 5.76. Also decreased was number of Army aircraft accidents; only three occurred in 1978, compared with six in CY 77. (A summary of 1978 aircraft accidents appears on page 155.) A significant reduction was also recorded in rate of aircraft accidents per 100,000 flying hours; 1978 rate was 3.80, down considerably from CY 77's 8.26 rate.¹⁵

(U) Number of reportable US military personnel injuries increased to 197 in 1978; 164 were experienced in CY 77. Rate of these injuries per million man-days also reflected a rise to 18.89, from 15.40 in CY 77. Although number and rate both increased, there were fewer US military fatalities from accident-related causes; nine deaths occurred in 1978, contrasted with 14 in previous year. Two resulted from Army aircraft accidents, two from Army motor vehicle accidents, three from drowning during boating/swimming activities, one from individual being struck by a railway train, and one death was directly attributable to carbon monoxide poisoning from a Korean home heating system (discussed on page 335). Most injuries sustained by EUSA personnel occurred during recreational activities, military motor vehicle accidents, maintenance/material handling activities, tracked vehicle operations, and construction work.

(U) To assist USFK commanders in carrying out US statutory safety standards applied to the military services, a visiting team from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Training Institute, Chicago, Ill presented 40 hours of safety and industrial health instruction in Aug 78. Attended by 30 Army/Air Force civilian safety officers/specialists, the course provided practical training exercises in enforcement of OSHA regulations pertaining to walking/working surfaces, emergency routes and exits, fire extinguisher systems, machine guarding, welding operations, compressed gases, hand and portable tools, cranes and other lifting devices, and spray painting operations.

(U) Education Programs

(U) EUSA's continuing education system is staffed with 52 professional civilian Education Services Officers (ESOs) and counselors. The system embraces 16 Army Education Centers which provide full educational services paralleling those available in CONUS and other major commands, from

15. (S) J1 Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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remedial instruction to graduate level degree programs. US schools operating programs in Korea during the year were the University of Maryland, Central Texas College, University of Southern California, Los Angeles Community College, University of Oklahoma, and Saint Louis High School of Hawaii. The chart below shows course enrollment figures for major EUSA education programs during latter half 1978:¹⁶

<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>3d QTR CY 78</u>	<u>4th QTR CY 78</u>
Basic Skills Education (On-Duty)	1,748	1,321
MOS Dev, Voc/Tech (On/Off-Duty)	2,847	2,447
High School Completion*	0	23
College Level (Off-Duty)	3,986	3,486
Foreign Language (On/Off-Duty)	650	565
TOTAL	9,231	7,842

*Reverted to an off-duty program effective 1 Jul 78.

Percent of participation in EUSA's continuing education programs during CY 78 was recorded as enlisted members-18, warrant officers-seven, and officers-six.

(U) Congressional directives announced in Aug 77 specified that (1) education programs for active duty service members conducted during normal duty hours would be directly related to military requirements, (2) courses offered for sole purpose of obtaining high school credits would be held during off-duty hours, and (3) a Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP) was to be established to provide on-duty remedial instruction for those soldiers classified as deficient (below ninth grade level) in reading comprehension, mathematics and the language arts. In Oct 77 Saint Louis High School of Hawaii (SLHS) under contract with EUSA commenced BSEP courses using following enrollment criteria: personnel with GT score below 90; those scoring lower than 80 on the SQT; and soldiers specifically referred by their unit commander. A new contract was awarded to SLHS effective 1 Jan 78 for providing command-wide BSEP and High School Completion Program (HSCP) instruction at rate of \$84 per course enrollment. EUSA intends to exercise its option to renew the SLHS contract through FY 79 under same terms.

(U) Although it was planned to conduct the HSCP on an off-duty basis commencing Oct 77, this headquarters was notified by DA to delay implementation until 1 Jul 78. Rationale was that major revisions to the HSCP required advance notice because of implied obligations to service member participants and to civilian schools supporting the on-duty HSCP. The contract with SLHS was subsequently modified to conform with the Jul 78 reversion of HSCP to an off-duty mode. HSCP enrollments, however, dropped

16. Ibid.

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abruptly from 277 to zero when the program was shifted to an off-duty offering, even though soldiers were authorized under existing DA policy to receive 75 percent tuition assistance for each course taken (cost to HSCP enrollee is \$21 per course). On 14 Nov 78 the SLHS contract was modified to permit off-duty high school classes with as few as five students (previous requirement had been minimum of ten). By end CY 78 23 individuals were participating in EUSA's HSCP. Commanders and Army education program counselors will intensify efforts in 1979 to boost enrollments in the program.

(U) Staff positions in this headquarters which require Korean language skills have been coded/designated as such since 1976; latest updating, to include HQ CFC, EUSA subordinate command, and USAFK/NFK requirements, was completed in Jul 78. Nine 100-hour on-duty Korean Language courses have been conducted since Nov 76 under contract with University of Maryland at Yongsan Education Center for designated USFK officers and NCOs, of whom 123 have graduated. In late 1978 this academically oriented language training program was suspended pending completion of ACoS, J3 review of its applicability for a military headquarters environment. In Sep 78 course materials were received for a Korean Headstart Language and Culture Program developed by the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, Calif. Headstart is a 40-hour self-study course in printed and taped format, intended for stocking at all education centers in this command and at 55 selected locations in CONUS for use by personnel under assignment to Korea. At year's end DLI representatives were field testing the newly developed Headstart materials at five EUSA installations. In Oct 78 DA agreed to fund an eight-week DLI-conducted Gateway to Korea Program which will be mandatory for general officers, brigade/battalion commanders, and designated CFC and USFK staff officers enroute to assignment in the ROK; first class is scheduled to commence at DLI on 9 Jan 79.

(U) There are four DOD Dependent Schools in Korea, located at Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Chinhae. All provide both elementary and high school programs, except Chinhae which has only elementary. At end CY 78 enrollments were Seoul-1,897, Taegu-436, Pusan-206, and Chinhae-26. All enrollments were very close to optimum with none exceeding maximum capacity. Visiting DOD Dependent Schools System representatives confirmed in fall 1978 that funds would be available for construction of a new high school at Seoul in FY 80. Also programmed for same time frame is an elementary school at Osan AB to accommodate dependents who will occupy new family housing planned for that base; high school students from Osan will be bused to Seoul.

(U) Human Relations Programs

(U) At end 1978 racial composition of the command's military personnel compared to service-wide tabulations was as follows (in percentages):

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	<u>CAUCASIAN</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>OTHER*</u>
EUSA	60	30	10
ARMY-WIDE	72	25	3
AFK	81	17	2
AIR FORCE-WIDE	85	13	2

*Includes Oriental, Hispanic and American Indian. (EUSA personnel in this category are predominately Oriental.)

(U) Training continued to be the foundation for this command's successful human relations/equal opportunity (EO) programs. In addition to five hours of human relations orientation presented upon their arrival in the command, EUSA personnel also receive a minimum of one hour training in EO subject areas each month. Topics include DOD EO goals/policies, Korean culture and customs, the KATUSA program, racism/sexism, and other related human relations themes. KATUSA personnel assigned to EUSA units are required to attend seven hours of EO training annually, presented by ROKA officers and KATUSA EO representatives.¹⁷ To enhance EO program viability, EUSA's major subordinate commands conducted nine 80-hour Discussion Leaders Courses during 1978 for selected officers and NCOs. The first Discussion Leaders Course for full-time KATUSA EO representatives was conducted in May 78 by 2d Inf Div.

(U) Significant events highlighting the Human Relations Program during 1978 were observance of National Black History Week (5-11 Feb), National Hispanic Heritage Week (11-16 Sep), and the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (15 Jan). Programs and activities were structured to give USFK personnel opportunities to attend racial awareness seminars, movies, commemorative services and a wide variety of cultural events.

(U) Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP)

(U) Periodic surveys have shown that widespread drug abuse has not been a prevalent problem within this command. Incidence of minor offenses, averaging about 225 annually, has not noticeably affected USFK combat readiness posture. This low abuse rate is ascribed, in large part, to stringent ROKG laws and severe punishments associated with illegal use, possession, sale and trafficking of dangerous drugs. Apprehensions for drug abuse, however, showed a steady rise during CY 78 (see page 315).

(U) During 1977 six EUSA service members died from alcohol related causes. Four deaths apparently resulted from asphyxiation; intoxicated individuals suffocated from vomitus while asleep. The other two deaths

17. (U) EA Suppl 1 to AR 600-21, 17 Mar 78, Subj: EO Prog in the Army.

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were attributed to alcohol poisoning. To prevent recurrence of these unfortunate incidents, this command published guidance in Jan 78 requiring commanders to specifically educate their personnel on dangers of alcohol, encourage use of buddy systems for escorting and monitoring condition of inebriated individuals, consider placing off-limits those local business establishments which followed practice of serving USFK members who were obviously intoxicated, and to insure that military/civilian community relations agencies were fully appraised of the command's concern in this problem area. Additionally, provost marshals were to intensify screening of individuals who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol at installation entry/exit points. Unit commanders were required to establish provisions for keeping watch on inebriated service members until effects of overconsumption abated.¹⁸ In mid-year the USFK Surg promulgated general medical guidelines for handling/monitoring intoxicated personnel.¹⁹ Despite these concerted preventive health efforts, six members of this command died during CY 78 from effects directly related to overconsumption of alcohol.

(U) During period 5-8 Nov 78, representatives from Office of Asst SECDEF for Health Affairs, Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention visited the command to observe USFK ADAPCP activities and to provide assistance where necessary. Specific inquiries were made relating to extent of alcohol/drug abuse by civilian employee and dependent populations and availability of ADAPCP services for those groups, adequacy of alcohol/drug abuse orientations for supervisors, professional qualifications of ADAPCP staffs, overall effectiveness of treatment and rehabilitative efforts, and impact of alcohol/drug abuse on command readiness posture.

(U) Emphasis continued throughout the year on EUSA's Teen Involvement Program (TIP) activities. Under sponsorship of major subordinate command ADAPCPs, special classes were conducted to provide USFK dependents of junior/senior high school age with knowledge of alcohol/drug abuse effects. To enhance development of helping relationships within this age group, training in techniques of peer counseling was initiated. Planning was under way at year's end for holding a third Korea-wide TIP training workshop in late 1979.

(U) Club System Activities

(U) As of 31 Dec 78 EUSA supported 108 clubs: 25 officers, 78 NCO, and five consolidated club branches. The club system continued operating

18. (U) Ltr, AJ-HAB-D, HQ EUSA, 18 Jan 78, Subj: Alcohol Related Deaths. Filed in J1 Human Affairs Br.

19. (U) Ltr, MDJ-PM, HQ EUSA, 19 Jun 78, Subj: Gen Med Guidelines for Handling and Monitoring Alcohol Intoxicated Persons. Filed in Surg PVNTMED Unit.

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in a profitable status during CY 78. Total revenue recorded was \$30,199,000 representing an 18 percent increase over CY 77. Net income, however, decreased slightly to \$1,033,000; CY 77 net was \$1,162,000. Decline was due in large part to significant (25 percent) wage increases granted to Korean employees on 1 Jul 78. Subsequent price increases and a sharp upturn in sales during year-end holidays helped offset higher labor costs. Intensive application of cost management procedures enabled EUSA's club system to reach a 7.6 percent net income/sales ratio for CY 78 operations, exceeding DA's five percent minimum objective.

(U) The EUSA Central Locker Fund also operated profitably during 1978. Statistics follow (CY 77 figures in parentheses): dollar sales - \$5,691,000 (\$4,744,000); liquor/wine case sales - \$299,000 (\$233,000); international balance of payments assessments - \$839,000 (\$869,000); and profits - \$1,133,000).

(U) Reduction of EUSA Average DAC Grade

(U) On 16 Jan 78 DA suspended requirement for EUSA to achieve previously assigned FY 78 average General Schedule (GS) grade ceiling of 9.9686. Unwarranted grade escalation remained a matter of serious concern to the command, however, and a 9.9686 average grade, based on filled US citizen positions only, was retained as a EUSA manpower management target for FY 78-79. Meanwhile, DA identified occupational series that have experienced highest rates of grade escalation; four were selected for increased attention in EUSA--Clerk Typist (GS-322); Computer Specialist (GS-334); Office Services Manager/Supervisor (GS-342); and Supply Clerk/Technician (GS-2005). To achieve maximum feasible grade reductions in these series, EUSA commanders were tasked with assuring intensified management of all positions within the designated series. Specific actions directed included reviewing position vacancies for possible grade reductions, identifying variations from normal grading patterns, and conducting frequent position classification audits to insure job description accuracy and adequacy.²⁰ Managers at all levels were urged to continue using sound position management techniques to create leaner organization structures which minimize manpower costs, achieve balanced grade distribution, improve supervisor/employee ratios and decrease number of high grade positions.

(U) At end CY 78 EUSA's average GS grade level was computed at 10.0936 (based on 652 filled positions), reflecting a gradual rise from 10.0165 average grade (based on 666 positions) recorded at end CY 77. Increase

20. (U) Ltr, CPJ-CEM, HQ EUSA, 2 Feb 78, Subj: Reduction of EUSA Average GS Grade. Filed in OCPD Compensation & Employee Mgt Div.

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was due primarily to addition of nine higher grade and loss of 11 lower level employees in Dec 78; upgrading of occupied positions contributed only negligibly to the rise. As lower level vacancies are filled, the average grade is expected to decline significantly in 1979.²¹

(U) DAC Recruitment Problems

(U) Historically, recruitment of qualified US civilian employees for duty in Korea has been difficult. In the past many positive efforts have been made; however, little improvement has been realized. Following requests by this headquarters in early 1977 for streamlined recruitment procedures, DA advised in Sep 77 that records of career employees in CONUS who apply for overseas vacancies in WESTPAC area would thereafter be maintained in a central inventory at the Civ Career Mgt Office, Hawaii for referral to WESTPAC commands, including Korea. To further expedite referrals for vacancies in the Pacific area, the newly established DA Civilian Personnel Center in Washington, D.C. directed that, effective 15 Dec 78, requisitions for all WESTPAC non-career program positions, other than physicians or attorneys, would be submitted directly to the Civ Pers Cen, WESTPAC Spt Ofc in Honolulu.²²

(U) As of 31 Dec 78 a total of 83 Department of Army Civilian (DAC) positions were under recruitment, 47 of which had been on recruitment status for 90 days or longer. Measured on a yearly average basis, however, a considerable reduction occurred during 1978 in number of days US civilian career positions remained unfilled; CY 78 average was 95 days, while recruitment time in 1977 averaged 136 days. Still considered as exerting a negative impact on EUSA's recruitment efforts were uncertainties associated with the 1977 announcement that US ground combat forces would be withdrawn from Korea on a phased basis.

(U) Standard Civilian Personnel Management Information System (SCIPMIS)

(U) SCIPMIS is a DA system which provides automated support for civilian personnel management functions at the installation level. In Mar 78 SCIPMIS became fully operational at Seoul Civilian Personnel Office, providing a comprehensive data bank of all DACs serviced by that activity. Installation of the system eliminated manual preparation of most personnel action documents, recurring reports, and special purpose compilations. In addition, SCIPMIS allows prompt retrieval of essential personnel data to meet specific staffing needs of commanders and managers.

21. (U) OCPD Hist Sum 1978.

22. (U) Msg, DA PECC-CMS 221210Z Nov 78.

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(U) Foreign Post Differential (FPD) for US Civilian Employees

(U) On 17 Jul 78 DA advised this command that effective 27 Aug 78 the long-established ten percent FPD pay set by Dept of State for civilian employees stationed in the Seoul area would be discontinued, and that the 15 percent FPD rate paid at most other duty locations in Korea would be reduced to ten percent. Effective date was subsequently postponed at USFK's request to allow time for submission of a reclama. Detailed justifications for continuance of present FPD rates were incorporated in EUSA's reclama under following topic headings: Employee Recruitment/Retention, Threat of War, Health/Sanitation, Housing, Logistical Support, Security, and Ration Control.²³ Primary purpose of reclama presentation was to objectively characterize the extraordinarily difficult living conditions presently encountered by DOD civilian employees in Korea. As a result of USFK's reclama, which was fully supported by the US Ambassador to the ROK, the Dept of State established an inter-agency task force in Oct 78 to conduct a thorough review of current FPD authorizations. At year's end, action to eliminate/reduce FPD in Korea was being held in abeyance pending completion of the task force report.

(U) Living Quarters Allowances (LQA) for US Civilian Employees

(U) On 26 May 78 the Annual Living Quarters Allowance Report reflecting expenditures incurred by US civilian employees residing on the local economy was forwarded to DA for submission to Dept of State for review and possible adjustment of authorized LQA.²⁴ Due date for the 1978 report was advanced from 31 Aug to 31 May to permit earlier crediting of substantial rent/utility increases. The report showed that allowances were not adequate for many employees residing in quarters rented from local landlords, particularly in the Seoul area. Allowances for employees residing in Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC) apartments (see page 276), were generally sufficient; however, rent for KNHC units will be increased 25 percent when current leases are renewed in 1979.

(U) Effective 27 Aug 78 LQA rates were increased approximately 16 percent for all employees living in Seoul and Pusan areas and four percent for those in Taegu. Increases for 1978 were effective two months earlier than in previous years due to submission of annual LQA report in May instead of in Aug.

23. (U) Ltr, CPJ-PM, HQ EUSA, 29 Aug 78, Subj: Post Differential. Filed in OCPD Prog Mgt Div.

24. (U) LQA in Korea is based on family size, grade, length of service, location and rental/utilities costs. In Seoul, the average 1978 rate for those with families was about \$6100 annually; for single employees living off-post, \$5,600.

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(U) Dependent Hire Program

(U) This command implemented an expanded DOD Dependent Hire Program in Apr 76 which quickly proved successful for economically filling US civilian vacancies at grade GS-8 and below. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) subsequently notified DOD, however, that it would withdraw Schedule A appointing authority for the program effective 31 Dec 76. Ruling was prompted by a number of complaints filed with CSC by veterans living overseas, who charged that long-existing veterans preference rights were being ignored. The implementation order was delayed twice during 1977 to allow DOD officials time for reclama; meanwhile, a ruling was sought from the Justice Dept on legality of DOD dependents receiving preference over veterans in overseas hiring. On 23 Jun 78 the Justice Dept gave its decision that the 1944 Veterans Preference Act applies to DOD positions overseas. The SECDEF, however, in Jul 78 authorized continuation of the dependent hire program using present procedures pending outcome of a CSC follow-on study.²⁵

(U) In response to a DA query in Jul 78, this headquarters proposed that excepted appointment authority be granted for all dependent hire positions, and that all candidates should be considered on an equitable basis with two provisos: (1) that veterans preference must be honored when making Schedule A appointments, and (2) that dependents of US military and DOD civilian employees be given employment priority over other non-veteran applicants.

(U) Local hire of dependents curtails retainability to duration of spouse's tour and occasionally results in lack of fully qualified applicants but, on balance, the program is considered advantageous to both the command and the dependents employed. As of 31 Dec 78 there were 159 dependents, amounting to 23 percent of EUSA's US work force, occupying positions in grade GS-8 and below; end CY 77 figure was 112, which constituted 16 percent of total strength.

(U) Summer Employment Program

(U) The 1978 Summer Employment Program for unmarried students age 16 to 23 years was conducted during period 1 Jun-30 Sep 78.²⁶ The primary purposes of this annual program were to accomplish needed tasks in support of command mission requirements, provide students with practical experience

25. (U) Msg, SECDEF 172315Z Jul 78, Subj: Dependent Hire Program. Filed in OCPD Prog Mgt Div.

26. (U) Ltr, CPJ-PM, HQ EUSA, 20 Mar 78, Subj: 1978 Summer Employment Program. Filed in OCPD Prog Mgt Div.

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in the world of work, and to acquaint them with the USG's defense activities. A total of 317 summer hires, nearly all of whom were DOD dependents, served in designated positions at USFK installations in Seoul, Taegu and Pusan. A summer youth employment counselor was hired in Seoul, along with an assistant at Taegu, for the program's duration. Responses from employing organizations, participating students, and parents were highly favorable.

(U) Wage and Benefits Adjustment for Korean National (KN) Employees

(U) The 1978 USFK Locality Wage Change and Benefit Summary was conducted during period 3 Apr-5 May to adjust pay and fringe benefits for this command's KN employees. Ninety-one commercial/industrial firms in Seoul, Inchon, Pusan and Taegu areas were contacted to determine amounts of wages/benefits paid and policies used in administration of compensation systems. Joint US/KN survey teams obtained specific information on 21,744 job matches in 93 occupations which are represented in USFK's KN work force. In addition to basic pay comparisons, analyses were made of various fringe benefits offered by local companies, including bonuses, allowances, payments-in-kind, holiday and premium pay, emoluments for long-term service, and dependent educational assistance.²⁷ Visiting representatives from PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) in Hawaii assisted in analysis of survey data. Subsequently, the JLPC authorized an average 25.7 percent increase in total compensation²⁸ for the command's nearly 22,000 direct hire KN employees effective 1 Jul 78. Pay hike raised the mean monthly salary for the KN work force to about 155,000 won (\$320). Also authorized was an additional half month bonus to be paid at either Chusok (Korean Thanksgiving season) or with year-end bonus payments at management option.

(U) Prior to submission of USFK's wage/benefit survey plan to CINCPAC for approval, it was presented to the Foreign Organizations Employees Union for its comments/recommendations. This procedure was in accordance

27. (U) Benefits currently extended to USFK KN employees include severance pay (a lump sum given at separation or retirement that equates to one month's pay for each year worked), four annual bonuses that amount to five and one-half months additional pay, 12 paid holidays per annum, premium pay of 150 to 200 percent for overtime, nights or holidays worked, and small allowance payments for special categories of workers. (A controller study on KN extended work week/premium pay policies is discussed on page 289.)

28. (U) Total compensation is combination of hourly wages and Consolidated Allowance Payment; the latter amounts to about 11 percent of hourly pay.

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with an agreement signed with the FOEU at conclusion of difficult wage negotiations in Nov 77.²⁹ The FOEU did not comment on the proposed survey plan until the day it was to be dispatched; consequently, its input was not considered by USFK. On 7 Apr 78 the FOEU filed a formal dispute action with the ROKG Administration for Labor Affairs. Since that agency did not act on the dispute, the survey was conducted as originally planned and the FOEU later withdrew its complaint.

(U) In a related action, the 1975 basic labor management agreement between USFK and the FOEU, last amended in Dec 77, was formally renewed on 28 Nov 78 after detailed review. Extended agreement will remain in effect until 29 Nov 79, subject to further modification and renewal at that time.

(U) Severance Pay for KN Nonappropriated Fund Employees

(U) Effective 1 Apr 78 this command instituted a new standardized severance pay plan for all full-time KN nonappropriated fund (NAF) employees of USFK, except for USAF workers whose participation will begin 1 Apr 79.³⁰ New arrangement was agreed to by the FOEU and ROKG Administration for Labor Affairs (ALA) following negotiations which had begun in Jun 77. Covering more than 5,700 employees (including 2,200 of Korea Area Exchange), the new scheme replaced four KN severance pay plans formerly administered separately by USFK components. Plan was designed to eliminate alleged "unequal treatment" within the KN NAF work force which had been basis for numerous employee and union complaints. (Severance pay entitlement equates to one month's pay for each year worked.)

(U) Under the new policy, accrued severance pay is initially deposited each quarter in a 24-month variable installment savings account maintained at a designated bank selected by employee.³¹ At end of two-year period, the aggregate amount is redeposited to a 24-month special term account. At maturity of this latter account, proceeds may be withdrawn at employee's option. Early withdrawal of severance pay is permitted only for bona fide emergency needs. This deposit/redeposit/maturity cycle is repeated continuously during employee's term of service. Prevailing rates of interest are paid on both accounts; currently, rates are about 14/18 percent per annum on variable installment/special term accounts, respectively. Upon conversion to the new plan, eligible employees received all severance pay

29. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 270.

30. (U) UNC/USFK/EUSA CPR 690-11, 1 Apr 78, Subj: NAF Severance Pay.

31. (U) Six Korean banks are participating in the USFK NAF severance pay plan--four in Seoul, one in Tongduchon (2d Inf Div area), and one in Pyongtaek (near Camp Humphreys).

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accrued under previous systems. Revamped procedure is expected to achieve savings in excess of \$400,000 annually for USFK NAF activities since it will permit liquidation of severance pay obligations on a quarterly basis rather than upon termination when grades and pay scales are higher.

(U) Korean Nationals Outplacement Program (KNOP)

(U) KNOP was established in Sep 70 by USFK in coordination with the ROKG and FOEU. Program was established to minimize impact of force reductions and to enhance USFK's image as a responsible employer. Objectives are: (1) to provide vocational training aimed at developing additional skills, (2) enable employees to qualify for and obtain ROKG licenses or skills certificates, thereby enhancing their eligibility for positions in the private sector, and (3) to provide outplacement assistance for employees who are subject to involuntary separations. The ROKG pays costs for vocational training instructors while USFK provides necessary materials, facilities and administrative support.

(U) During CY 78 a total of 1,220 employees completed vocational training under the KNOP in 11 separate job categories: Radio/Television Repairman, Auto Mechanic (Engine and Chassis), Forklift Operator, Refrigeration/Air Conditioning Mechanic, Heating Equipment Operator, Electrician (Interior Wiring), Tractor/Trailer Operator, Welder (Electrical and Gas), and Crane Operator. ROKG skills certification tests were administered to 438 employees, of whom 387 (83 percent) were issued licenses based on successful completion. A total of 859 former USFK workers were placed in new jobs within USFK or in the Korean economy. Since the program's establishment in 1970, some 14,483 KN employees have been trained in 29 different job skill categories; 4,455 received occupational licenses or certificates; and 7,915 have been placed in new jobs.

(U) A survey of all USFK KN employees was conducted during 1977 to determine scope of placement assistance required in event of future force reductions. Survey results for 12,518 employees who responded were furnished to the ROKG Office of Labor Affairs for its use in planning a government-sponsored Outplacement Assistance Center.³²

(U) Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program

(U) A continuing area of concern in 1978 with respect to this command's EEO objectives was failure of present recruitment sources to yield an adequate number of qualified minority and female applicants to correct identified imbalance within the USFK civilian work force. During a thorough

32. (U) Ltr, CPJ-TCM, HQ EUSA, 23 Mar 78, Subj: Placement Assistance Survey-KNOP. Filed in OCPD Tng & Career Mgt Div.

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review of qualification requirements and Civilian Personnel Office hiring procedures no barriers to EEO goals were discovered. Recruitment efforts were coordinated across organizational and agency lines and recruiting literature reflected the command's honest desire to attract all segments of the potential work force. Despite these efforts to achieve more racial and gender balance in USFK civilian employee rolls, the command was noticeably underrepresented at end CY 78 in two major categories: Women, by 9.2 percent; and Black, by 8.5 percent. (1977 imbalances were 8.4 and 8.1 percent, respectively.) Major reasons for these disparities were failure of higher headquarters to include on their referral lists an adequate number of female and minority group members to correct disproportionate levels, and secondly, the apparent unwillingness of female/minority candidates to apply for employment in Korea. This hesitation is believed caused in part by lack of reasonably priced western style housing in the ROK, particularly in Seoul area (discussed on page 276).

(U) USFK's Upward Mobility Program for lower level employees (GS-9 and below) has not yielded desired results. Five upward mobility positions were identified in 1977; none were added in CY 78, but during 1979 three additional positions will be designated and announced for recruitment. Principal factor which prevents expansion of the program is configuration of USFK's US civilian work force, characterized by a limited number of DAC positions in widely dispersed organizations staffed predominately with US military and Korean civilian employees. Efforts will be intensified in 1979 to overcome these limitations.³³

(U) Federal Women's Program (FWP)

(U) During 11-17 Jun 78 USFK held its fourth annual observance of Federal Women's Week. Highlighting the period were two days of FWP training conferences encompassing topics on personal growth, assertiveness, and management skills. Special workshops on development of writing skills and public speaking were presented by recognized language arts practitioners from CONUS. At a banquet concluding the activities five USFK women employees were presented awards by the DA General Counsel and COMUSKOREA. Recipients had displayed leadership and professionalism which contributed significantly to the mission of their activity and thereby upgraded the image and status of women employed by this command.

(U) Fund Campaigns

(U) The 1979 DOD Combined Federal Campaign was conducted during period 6 Sep-1 Nov 78. All military and government employees were afforded

33. (U) EEO Ofc Hist Sum 1978.

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the opportunity to contribute with donations accepted in cash or through the payroll deduction plan. Campaign was the most successful ever held in Korea as receipts totaled \$634,892, an increase of nearly \$20,000 over the 1977 fund drive. Participation rate was 99 percent, with an average donation of \$18.77.

(U) The annual Army Emergency Relief Fund Campaign was held on 1 May-16 Jun 78 and raised \$46,782; previous year's drive netted \$50,025. Participation rate was 87 percent, with an average contribution of \$1.68.

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--(FOUO) Approved two recommendations from its Finance Subcommittee, one of which established procedures for exempting USFK local POL procurements from the ROKG's value added tax and for exempting imprest fund purchases from the special excise tax effective 4 May 78.² The other approval authorized procedure whereby this command's procurement officers will certify to the ROKG that goods imported duty-free by Korean contractors for USFK projects will be used for that sole purpose; implementation date was 4 May 78.

--(FOUO) Approved a Utilities Subcommittee recommendation for increases in Korean railroad freight and passenger rates charged USFK; effective 21 Jun 78 tariffs for freight services were raised 15 percent and passenger rates increased an average 21 percent (new rates were same as those assessed ROKF).

(U) Civil Administration of Taesong-dong (Freedom Village)

(U) Taesong-dong, a farming community of 226 people noted for its considerable economic progress during the past several years, is the only inhabited village located in the UNC-controlled portion of the DMZ. Geographically unique, it is close by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) separating South and North Korea. Other singular features of Freedom Village follow:

--The ROKG, which was not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, does not control Taesong-dong; the UNC exerts full authority over village administration.

--Males are not subject to ROKG military draft or other compulsory service, although some volunteer.

--Villagers pay no ROK income tax, nor do they vote in national elections.

--Annual income averages per household have long exceeded the national average which, in 1978, was \$3,950.

--Land for development is limited only by interference with military security and by village proximity to North Korea.

2. (U) Initial Jul 77 agreement to exempt USFK procurements from the ROKG's special excise and value added taxes levied on local commercial commodity purchases is outlined in (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 175.

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(U) In Apr 76 responsibility for civil administration of Freedom Village was assigned to AAD and delegated to Cdr, US Army Spt Gp, Joint Security Area. This headquarters ACoFS, J5 was charged with general monitorship of the hamlet and coordination with ROKG elements as required.³

(U) Under Spt Gp guidance, and with considerable assistance from the ROKG's Saemaul Undong community development program (discussed on page 100), significant progress was realized during 1978 in agricultural mechanization and reconfiguration of rice paddies. The CY 78 rice crop, however, was slightly less than previous year's, due partially to forced cessation of farming in areas which had been expanded dangerously near the MDL and out of view of UNC guardposts. At year's end, planning was underway on Saemaul Undong projects for riceland realignment, construction of new homes and an extension to the school, and development of a more efficient irrigation system.

(U) Judge Advocate

(U) SOFA Criminal Jurisdiction

(U) In 1978 the USFK/EUSA Judge Advocate continued supervision over all cases and actions in order to insure fair trials for all US personnel tried by the ROK under Article XXII (Criminal Jurisdiction) of the US-ROK SOFA. A total of 2,391 incidents involving US personnel were reported to the ROKG during the year, a slight increase over the 2,194 cases recorded in 1977. Apprehensions for offenses involving use, possession, sale and trafficking of dangerous drugs increased steadily during CY 78, from 23 in 1st Qtr to 75 in final quarter; drug law violations for entire year totaled 188, compared with CY 77 figure of 103. This rise was largely attributed to increased detection efforts by law enforcement personnel. Economic offenses (primarily black marketing) registered a sharp upturn, with 428 incidents reported, contrasting to 219 in 1977. Larceny/robbery cases totaled 154, 29 more than in previous year. Although there was a marked increase in number of vehicles on Korean streets and highways, SOFA traffic violations declined from 951 during 1977 to 875 in CY 78.

(U) The number of incidents wherein ROK courts assumed their legal right to exercise criminal jurisdiction dropped from 100 in the previous year to 94 in CY 78 (eight military, 46 civilian employees, 40 dependents). The command continued to take jurisdiction in over 99 percent of SOFA offenses where US military personnel were involved. ROK court proceedings during the reporting period resulted in three sentences to confinement, seven suspended sentences and 74 fines/reprimands. Twenty appeals were in progress at close of 1978.⁴

3. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1976 (U), p. 268.

4. (U) JA Hist Sum 1978.

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(U) Government Claims

(U) During 1978 the US Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea (USAFCS-K) settled a total of 392 foreign claims amounting to \$525,585. Of these, nine arose as a result of fires which damaged four Korean structures, with settlements totaling \$91,320. One major maritime claim, investigated and adjudicated in 1977 by USAFCS-K at US Navy request, was settled on 2 Aug 78 by USN for \$58,756; claim involved damage to a Korean commercial fishing net system near Pohang by the USS DUBUQUE in Dec 76. There were 1,009 personal property claims received from USFK members; 682 of these were paid in amount of \$199,536. Under the Military Claims Act, 50 claims were settled for \$11,061. USAFSC-K recovered \$43,981 for the US Government under applicable statutes; 85 percent was regained under the Medical Care Recovery Act.

(S/FRD) Inspector General (U)

(FOUO) DA Inspector General Team Visit (U)

(FOUO) During period 5 Nov-1 Dec 78 a DAIG team conducted a general inspection in this command which included selected elements of HQ EUSA, USAG-Yongsan, 19th Spt Comd, USA MILPERCEN-K, USA RSAK, and USA Fac Engr Actv-Korea. Final inspection summary identified 47 discrepancies which required a report of corrective action to DA. Twenty additional deficiencies found were beyond EUSA's ability to correct; these were forwarded by DAIG to the appropriate US Army supporting activity for action. Some of the more significant deficiencies noted were: inadequate contingency planning at EUSA staff level; unsatisfactory condition of war reserve stocks maintained by 19th Spt Comd; recurring deficiencies in combined ROK/US ammunition operations resulting from insufficient Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea regulatory guidance (see page 170); improper SQT program procedures; training shortfalls in nuclear, biological and chemical operations partially caused by closing of EUSA NBC Defense School; ineffective supply management within US Army Fac Engr Actv-Korea; imbalance between number of command sponsored positions authorized and availability of USFK-controlled family housing in Seoul area (see page 297); and failure to meet DA occupancy rate objectives in Yongsan's distinguished visitors quarters.⁵

5. (S) Ltr, EUSA IG, 31 Jan 79, Subj: Corrective Action on DAIG Report of Gen Insp FY 79 of EUSA (U). Filed at EUSA IG Insp Div.

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(FOUO) General Inspections of EUSA Subordinate Units (U)

(FOUO) During 1978 the EUSA Inspector General conducted 58 general inspections of subordinate units. Organizations were inspected in garrison activities and at field locations during exercises and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tests. Assignment of overall "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" ratings was discontinued in CY 78 primarily because such evaluations usually involved highly subjective judgments. Units in which severe deficiencies were found in selected areas were scheduled for reinspection three months later. Although most units showed improvement when compared with observations made in 1977, a need for increased emphasis was manifested in the following significant areas:⁶

--(FOUO) Materiel Readiness Reporting. In numerous instances commanders were not checking reports for accuracy and completeness. Most common deficiencies found were: vehicle-mounted communications equipment not included in unit communications system evaluations, and supply/maintenance shortfall data on DA Forms 2406 not correlated with information recorded on DD Forms 314 (Preventive Maintenance Schedule and Record) source documents and DA Forms 2407 (Maintenance Request).

--(FOUO) Accountability of Army Materiel. Most frequent deficiencies were found in maintenance of organizational/installation property books. Among discrepancies noted were: quantities on reverse side of property book pages not in agreement with current balance on hand on front side of page, documents required to support entries not available, and property serial numbers not entered. In many cases property and equipment found on hand in units was not recorded in the property book, therefore accountability had not been assumed. Excesses were in some instances identified by units but no action had been taken to request authority for retention or turn-in to the appropriate supply support activity. Hand receipts were not updated and properly adjusted prior to change of receipt holders. Required annexes for overages/shortages were not established, and quantities on hand receipts did not coincide with balances recorded on reverse side of property book pages. (EUSA-wide initiatives to improve equipment on hand and servicability management are discussed on page 174.)

--(FOUO) Training. Decentralization of training in accordance with applicable directives was not being accomplished in some units. First line supervisors were not sufficiently aware of their subordinates' deficiencies in critical tasks required by MOS descriptions. Required SQT training for personnel in support skills was not conducted effectively. Physical training programs lacked adequate supervision and were not up to desired standards in numerous support/maintenance type units.

6. (S) IG Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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(U) During CY 78, DA announced major changes in NSI policies. NSI certification inspection interval was extended from 12 to 18 months. Eliminated from NSI procedures were inspector-injected simulations designed to control scenarios and operational actions. NSIs were discontinued for non-custodial nuclear capable units which undergo an approved ARTEP; for such organizations, NSIs are replaced by a Technical Validation Inspection for evaluating nuclear operations not included in ARTEPs.

(FOUO) Requests for Inspector General Assistance (U)

(FOUO) Inspectors General at this headquarters, at major subordinate commands, and Acting IGs at group and battalion levels received 2,805 requests for assistance during 1978; of these, 37 percent were justified. (Figures for preceding year reflected 2,487 requests, with 39 percent justified.) Requests for information, traditionally the highest volume category in IG assistance activities, accounted for 15 percent of the total; however, 29 percent of these were justified. Most active complaint (action request) categories were those that affect the soldier directly--discipline, conduct of individuals, administration, transfer/reassignment, and assignment/utilization. Summaries follow:

--(FOUO) Discipline cases reflected a sharp increase in CY 78, following a steady decline during the past three years; 376 action requests were investigated, compared with 152 in 1977. Unfair or improper punishment was charged in most of the complaints. Of total cases in discipline category, 25 percent were found to be justified.

--(FOUO) Harassment by superiors was principal basis used for complaints in the conduct of individuals category. Only 28 percent, however, were considered justified. Chief reason for these cases appeared to be unjustified perceptions formed by soldiers seeking redress that many necessary and legal administrative requirements imposed routinely on them constituted personal harassment rather than constructive mission-related actions by their commanders or supervisory NCOs.

--(FOUO) In the administration category, a significant number of complaints were received alleging unjust denial of leaves/passes and inequities in procedures for authorizing absences; volume of such action requests reached an unusually high level during year-end holiday period. Delayed or lost personnel actions and ration control complaints constituted bulk of remaining administration cases. Of total complaints in this area, 42 percent were determined to be justified.

--(FOUO) Transfer/reassignment cases were primarily generated by delayed or incorrect port calls, particularly during last quarter CY 78. A smaller number were received concerning lost/damaged/delayed hold baggage shipments. Nearly half of all complaints in this category were valid.

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--(FOUO) Most assignment/utilization cases, 27 percent of which were justified, involved improper utilization in duties outside scope of primary MOS. Complaints relative to working conditions increased slightly during the year.

(FOUO) Significant because of their low number during 1978 were racial and sex discrimination complaints. Nine of the former were filed, of which only one was a justified allegation. There were three sex discrimination cases opened during the year (none were registered in CY 77); two of the 1978 cases were considered justified.

(U) Provost Marshal

(U) EUSA PADLOCK⁷ Team Activities

(U) In order to achieve effective implementation of the command's Asset Control and Security Program, a seven-man PADLOCK Team has operated since Oct 72 as a staff element within the USFK/EUSA Provost Marshal Office. The unit consists of a Team Chief plus Physical Security, Movement, Logistics, Stock Control and Accounting, and Supply Inspectors. During 1978 the team made assistance visits to 26 diversified elements throughout the command, performing accountability audits and reviewing unit control measures for black marketing activities, physical security, illegal diversion of assets, and crime prevention. Visits were scheduled to coincide with EUSA IG general inspections. Common deficiencies found by the PADLOCK team were: misuse of inventory adjustment reports, inadequate accountability records, outdated or missing physical security plans/SOPs, inadequate key control procedures, excess equipment on hand, and incomplete inventories. Major contributing factors to these discrepancies were failure to comply with established policies/regulations, shortage of qualified supply personnel and supervisors, and lack of continuity in logistics/supply activities due to short (one year) tours by key personnel. The team also continued to operate a 24-hour "hotline" as a ready means for all USFK personnel to actively participate in the effort to control theft and black marketing. Many "hotline" tips contained sufficient information to permit referral to appropriate investigative agencies, resulting in identification of theft/black marketing offenders, discovery of ration control system/procedure deficiencies, and detection of attempted customs frauds.

7. (U) Acronym for "Prevent Access Diversion and Losses Occurring in Korea".

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(U) To reinforce USFK's law enforcement efforts in the ROK, the PADLOCK team sponsored the second annual command-wide Crime Prevention Week in Apr 78. Special activities designed to increase public awareness of and interest in crime prevention included the following: patrol/security dog demonstrations; free engraving of personal high value items by military police; a crime prevention poster contest for DOD school students; overprinting of commissary/exchange shopping bags and distribution of free pens, combs, balloons and calendars embossed with crime prevention slogans; equipment displays by military police/criminal investigation units; and intensified use of local newspaper, radio and television media for special crime prevention articles/programs.

(U) Ration Control Enforcement

(U) CUPID statistics compiled for CY 78 revealed that a total of 21,290 ration control violations were detected and reported to commanders during the year; 1977 figure was 25,820. (See page 293 for description of CUPIDS and the USFK's ration control system.) Of the total violations, 457 were considered sufficiently flagrant to warrant referral to appropriate law enforcement agencies for investigation as suspected black market activity; only 354 were so referred in 1977. The balance (20,833) were attributed to faulty record keeping by individual system users.⁸ On 1 Apr 78 new emphasis was placed on monitoring purchases costing more than \$35 which do not require a letter of authorization from the unit commander (see page 294). Surveillance measures were also increased on receipts of voluminous exchange mail order shipments which might indicate black marketing activities. The PMO continued to operate a follow-up system whereby completed reports of investigation on gross violations who have departed Korea are forwarded to the gaining commanders for disciplinary action.

(U) US Military Police Highway Patrol (USMPHP)

(U) By US-ROK agreement, the USMPHP was established in 1974 with authority to direct and supervise USFK vehicles or POVs registered under the SOFA, and to carry out the following functions: maintain order and discipline among USFK personnel, provide for administrative control over civilians covered by the SOFA and KATUSA/Korean Service Corps personnel operating USFK vehicles, conduct asset control inspections, and render aid to injured and stranded motorists. Additionally, the USMPHP notifies ROK authorities, as appropriate, and provides traffic control when necessary.

8. (U) PM Hist Sum 1978.

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In 1978 the patrol continued to operate on the Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Inchon Expressways and Seoul-Chunchon/Seoul-Tongduchon Main Supply Routes (latter MSR extends through 2d Inf Div area). The patrols investigated 410 traffic accidents during the year, issued 1,256 Armed Forces traffic tickets, processed 229 military police reports, medically evacuated 25 persons, conducted 2,970 asset control inspections, rendered aid to 110 accident victims, and assisted 978 stranded motorists. Quarterly USMPHP activity reports were provided the ROKG in accordance with SOFA provisions.

(U) Arms Room Upgrade

(U) In 1976 this headquarters' Provost Marshal surveyed all 275 arms storage facilities in EUSA to determine whether physical security standards were being met; requirement was identified for 130 new structures and renovation of an additional 69. An arms room upgrade program was developed and submitted to DA for funding from FY 78 monies; estimated cost was approximately \$4.2 million. In early 1977 all MCA projects for arms storage facilities in Korea were canceled by congressional action following announcement of US ground combat force withdrawal from the ROK. In light of budgetary restraints, DA granted EUSA authority in Oct 77 to modify standards prescribed in AR 190-11 pertaining to arms room structural specifications. During CY 78 the USFK/EUSA Provost Marshal staff, in coordination with US Army Fac Engr Actv-Korea, developed attainable standards for this command's arms storage facilities.⁹ Future upgrading of existing arms room areas will be in conformance with these minimal security standards; new arms rooms construction, when approved, must meet AR 190-11 specifications. (A related development follows.)

(U) Joint Services Interior Intrusion Detection Systems (J-SIIDS) for Arms Rooms

(U) AR 190-11 requires that all US Army arms storage facilities be provided continual surveillance by either a guard, on-duty personnel, intrusion detection device, or closed-circuit television. J-SIIDS, developed by the US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, provides 24-hour intrusion protection for arms rooms and is the most efficient and economical means of accomplishing the security requirement. The J-SIIDS three basic components are: (1) a control unit located in the arms room which controls all components installed therein, processes and relays status of all components to a monitor, and provides power for operation of all components within the arms room; (2) sensors placed in

9. (U) EA Suppl 1 to AR 190-11, 28 Nov 78, Subj: Phys Scty of Wpns, Ammo and Explo.

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the arms room which detect unauthorized entry into and movements within the facility; and (3) a monitor unit, normally located in a military police station, battalion headquarters, or guard house which receives transmitted signals from the control unit and registers the status and/or alarm condition of all components in the arms room. The J-SIIDS are designed to provide total intrusion protection by detecting attempts to penetrate the storage structure, movement inside, and any efforts to short-circuit the system, tamper in any way with the three basic components, interrupt AC power, or sever the system wiring. Component effective life is estimated at ten years; it is anticipated that present system will be replaced with more advanced equipment by end of that period.

(U) A total of 238 EUSA arms rooms were designated as requiring J-SIIDS and installations commenced in Jun 76, with completion date set as Sep 77. Delays were experienced, however, due to late arrival of initial components, nonavailability of replacements for defective items, and insufficient skilled manpower for installing the systems. At end CY 78, J-SIIDS had been installed in 136 arms room facilities; of these, 103 were operational. Planning for a possible redistribution of the systems within the command was under way at close of reporting period.

(FOUO) Public Affairs (U)

(U) Foreign Press Visits to ROK

(U) During 1978 more than 1,000 international news media representatives visited the ROK for direct reporting of significant occurrences on the peninsula. HQ USFK/EUSA's press liaison staff coordinated visits of and escorted correspondents from 47 countries.¹⁰

(U) A major media event which attracted considerable attention from the international press was discovery of a third NK-built tunnel under the DMZ near the Joint Security Area (see page 59 for detailed discussion). Shortly after UNC decision in Jun 78 to dig an intercept shaft to verify NK underground construction, CINCUNC authorized disclosure of counter-tunnel plans on a close hold, embargoed basis to three press observers--two from the Korean media selected by ROK MND and one American representing US News and World Report. The three newsmen were provided on-site updates as work on the UNC intercept tunnel progressed. Following intersection with the NK passageway on 17 Oct 78, this command placed an embargo on all press announcements of the discovery, to be lifted immediately after the 391st Military Armistice Commission meeting on 27 Oct when the UNC would charge the Communists with a gross violation (see page 41).

10. (FOUO) PAO Hist Sum 1978 (U).

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Meanwhile, on 26 Oct some 90 correspondents were taken to the tunnel site under UNC escort and allowed to enter despite knee-deep water; they were thus afforded an advance opportunity for gathering background material and photographs of tunnel's interior for worldwide release the following day when news embargo was removed. Follow-up press visits to the tunnel site continued thereafter under arrangements coordinated between this headquarters, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, ROK MND and the Korean Overseas Information Service.



Mr. B. Fullerton, Chief of PAO's Public Info Div, leads media representatives into Tunnel #3.

(U) Other significant local reporting efforts in CY 78 included extensive coverage of: inauguration of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and related visit of US SECDEF in early Nov (pages 14 and 117); Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 78 in Mar (page 141); and MAC meetings held during May-Jul 78 to present UNC charges of NK naval attacks (page 35). In addition to in-country press visitors, some 25 newsmen in CONUS were assisted by PAO in covering the 11th annual ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting in late Jul 78 held at San Diego, Calif (see page 113). Support ranged from providing an interview with CINCUNC to presenting individual and group briefings on the prevailing military situation in Korea.

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(U) Revisit Korea Program

(U) NK invaded the ROK on 25 Jun 50. To commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Korean War, the Korean Veterans Association (KVA) and the Korea National Tourism Corporation (KNTC) co-sponsored a Revisit Korea Program which began in Jun 75 and will continue through 1979. Purpose is to show ROK gratitude for past military contributions and to allow participants to view the considerable progress made in Korea since the war ended on 27 Jul 53.

(U) Korean war veterans from the 16 nations that joined the ROK in forming the UNC fighting team and selected members of the five countries that furnished wartime medical units were invited to Korea with their spouses for five nights and six days. Special package tour rates were offered to include free accommodations and meals during their stay in the ROK. Under the VIP portion of the program, US Medal of Honor recipients and all retired general/flag officers were extended special invitations with all expenses borne by the sponsors. A total of 2,091 US (525 VIPs) and 1,575 allied veterans and dependents participated during 1975-78.

(U) Through coordination with PAO, arrangements were made for Revisit veterans to visit this headquarters for greetings and remarks by a senior USFK/EUSA representative, an unclassified Threat/Counterthreat briefing, and viewing of the ROK-produced film "Secret Tunnel Under Panmunjom". Groups also visited Panmunjom Joint Security Area. In recognition of Korean War service by USFK personnel presently serving in the ROK on active duty or in a civilian capacity, KVA and KNTC co-hosted a reception and special entertainment program on 4 Dec 78 at a leading hotel in Seoul. Some 152 Korea-based wartime veterans and their spouses were guests of honor at the function.

(U) ROK MND Orientations for US Personnel

(U) During Mar-Oct 78 the ROK MND conducted 12 one-day orientation tours for some 300 enlisted members and company grade officers selected by USFK commands. Inaugurated in 1972, tours are designed to provide an introductory overview of the ROK environment for US personnel and to enhance Korean-American relations. This PAO-coordinated program consists of briefings at the ROK defense ministry, visits to educational, cultural and industrial institutes in the Seoul area. Included also is a complimentary lunch at a Korean-style restaurant and a dinner at a Western-style supper club. Participant reaction was overwhelmingly favorable.

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(U) Korea National Tourism Corporation Goodwill Tour Program

(U) KNTC continued their complimentary goodwill capital city tour program initiated in 1976. The tours are intended primarily for USFK troops serving in forward or remote areas, but personnel in the Seoul area could also participate on a stand-by basis. Highlights included visits to a national palace, museum, university, television station and industrial plant in the Seoul area with a traditional Korean lunch, and a Western-style dinner at a local theater-restaurant. A total of 52 one-day tours were conducted by PAO during period Mar-Nov 78 for 3,449 officers, enlisted members and dependents. KNTC intends to continue this well-received program in 1978 for about 4,000 selected USFK personnel and their spouses.

(U) Korean-American Friendship Association (KAFA) Home Visit and Tour Programs

(U) In Jul 75 the KAFA commenced a Home Visit Program, purposes of which were to extend friendship and appreciation to USFK members for American support of the ROK during and since the Korean War and to enhance cross-cultural understanding. Through this program, businessmen and ROKG officials invite USFK personnel and dependents into their homes for dinner and entertainment. This headquarters' ACoFS, J1 coordinates these home visits through US project officers in USFK's major subordinate commands. In 1978, 2,430 American guests were accommodated by 564 Korean hosts bringing total participants since program's inception in 1975 to 12,295 and 2,581, respectively.

(U) KAFA also continued its program of two-three day cultural and industrial tours for USFK personnel and dependents. During 1978 the association sponsored seven tours with 171 officers, enlisted members and spouses participating. Program included visits to Kyungju, the ancient capital of Korea; industrial centers at Pohang and Ulsan; and other scenic/cultural attractions in southern part of the ROK. These tours are provided free of charge to USFK participants; program is supported financially by dues assessed KAFA members. This command's PAO assisted in coordinating the KAFA goodwill project by conducting pre-tour briefings and maintaining lists of participants nominated by major USFK commands. KAFA plans to continue the tour program in 1979.

(U) People-to-People (PTP) Activities

(U) Then President Dwight Eisenhower originated the PTP movement in 1956 to promote international peace and harmony through person-to-person contacts. The Korea National Headquarters (KNH) of PTP International was chartered in Jan 72, and has placed priority on establishing PTP clubs in

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cities and towns near US military installations. In fact, the first PTP chapter to be formed outside the US was in Chunchon, where Camp Page is located. Many USFK members, military and civilian, have joined the 12 local PTP clubs to foster better relations and mutual understanding. Club activities included American-Korean goodwill sports meets, home visits, and cultural/entertainment programs.

(FOUO) American Forces Korea Network (AFKN) Radio and Television Service (U)

(U) AFKN is one of the world's largest military radio and television networks. Its missions are to provide information and entertainment for all US personnel serving in the ROK, and to provide commanders with a reliable and responsive means for disseminating information throughout their local areas. Operated under staff supervision of this command's PAO, AFKN is a far-flung and diverse activity with approximately 150 military/civilian broadcasters, engineers and support personnel operating and maintaining 45 radio/television transmitters strategically located country-wide. (A map showing the AFKN system is at App 6.)

(U) AFKN's first radio station was activated in Seoul on 4 Oct 50, shortly after outbreak of the Korean War. Radio broadcast vans followed the rapidly changing front lines, making AFKN a vitruual "network on wheels" during the first two years of fighting. In 1954 the network's central radio station in Seoul was converted to a permanent facility. Steady expansion of the system through the years resulted in an extensive radio broadcast network serving USFK listeners in all areas of the Republic. AFKN commenced FM broadcasting in 1964 from Seoul; FM stereo was added in 1971. At end CY 78, there were 15 AM and 11 FM radio transmitters (eight stereo and three monoraul) operating 24 hours daily in the AFKN system. Seven of the AM stations have studio-originating capability and eight are rebroadcast/relay outlets; all FM programming, primarily recorded music, originates at key station in Seoul with ten rebroadcast transmitters in outlying areas. Air time on AM radio is divided between news and music broadcasts by local AFKN announcers and packaged special event/feature programs received from the Los Angeles-based American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS).

(U) AFKN's earliest television broadcasts in 1957 were restricted to film showings in the Seoul area. By 1959 studio facilities for live productions became operational at the network's Yongsan headquarters. Television service for remote areas was gradually increased by deployment of microwave relay equipment and transmitters/translators located throughout the ROK. At end CY 78, 19 AFKN television transmitters were serving the prime USFK troop concentration centers. A major milestone was achieved

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in Jul 77 when new cameras and associated equipment were installed in AFKN's newly renovated Yongsan studios to provide live and videotape color television capability over the entire network. Concurrently, the Seoul transmitter was relocated closer to Yongsan Garrison to improve television and FM radio reception for USFK viewers.¹¹ AFKN's television network broadcasts approximately 100 hours per week, of which 12 hours, including two daily comprehensive newscasts, are produced locally in the Yongsan studios; balance of program material is received in film and videotape shipments from AFRTS.

(FOUO) Since advent of AFKN color telecasts in Jul 77, ROKG authorities have registered several complaints through the SOFA Joint Committee concerning the color programming, maintaining that AFKN should not continue color broadcasting until local Korean TV systems have been granted ROKG approval for conversion to color (projected for 1980-81 time frame). Meanwhile, AFKN has limited its color programming to evening and weekend prime time shows and live satellite coverage of US sports and news events, which constitute about 45 percent of the network's total TV broadcast time. In Dec 78 this headquarters granted approval for AFKN to gradually increase color telecasts to 60 percent of total programming.

(U) The network's live satellite television coverage of major US sports and news events increased substantially during 1978; AFKN carried more satellite telecasts than any other AFRTS outlet worldwide. A total of 57 live events were broadcast for USFK viewers, compared to 25 in previous year. Satellite coverage included NFL and college football, World Series and All-Star baseball, and key professional basketball games, as well as the President's State of the Union address, two hours of US national election coverage, and enthronement of Pope John Paul I. The additional live programming became possible primarily because of increased DOD funding for satellite telecasts to overseas commands; use of local USFK funds permitted some extra live viewing hours not included in DOD allocations.

(U) In Jul 78 the AFKN News Center moved into new facilities in the network headquarters building at Yongsan. The center receives 24-hour teletype service from UPI, AP and the Korean Hapdong News Agency. AFKN also has a teletype link and satellite voice circuit from AFRTS-Washington. To support television news, the network obtains daily, via airmail, ABC and CBS video cassette news service. Additionally, the News Center receives numerous satellite transmissions of major news events relayed to Tokyo by US commercial networks; coverage is converted to video cassette format and flown overnight from Tokyo to Korea, allowing USFK viewers to watch events within 30 hours after they had been telecast in the US.

11. (S) UNC/USFK/EUSA Annual Historical Report 1977 (U), p. 289.

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(U) During latter half CY 78 this headquarters' PAO conducted a media survey of a representative USFK population group to measure effectiveness and popularity of the command's information programs; a significant portion of the review dealt with AFKN services. Results indicated that USFK members listen an average 2.3 hours daily to the network's radio stations. The newscast presented at 0700 hours daily was found to be the most popular; 20 minutes was considered as sufficient length. Respondents indicated a desire for programming of more high-rated musical and special feature programs during evening hours on AFKN-Radio. Average television viewing times were 2.6 hours daily, with weeknights between 1900-2200 hours recorded as most popular viewing periods. Favorite programs were live US sports events, with feature-length movies a very close second preference. Among sports programs, football games were most popular by a wide margin. Daily newscasts shown at 1800 hours also attracted a large number of viewers; present coverage, 30 minutes in length, was considered adequate by bulk of respondents.

(U) Significant equipment/facility upgrading projects completed during CY 78 included the following:

--(U) An additional production studio for AFKN-Radio was established in the network headquarters building at Yongsan. In the master AM studio, logging recorders were placed in operation in Dec 78 which provide tapes of all AM and FM broadcasts from Seoul as well as return signals from the six network affiliate stations.

--(U) Two new microwave links were added to the system--one from the Yongsan studios to transmitter on Namsan Hill 3 (about one mile northeast), and the other from Changsan relay station on ROK southeast coast to Chinhae transmitter.

--(U) An FM radio transmitter was installed to provide service for USFK personnel at Kwangju AB. Additionally, FM outlets in the Pusan and Kunsan areas were converted to stereo mode, and a new AM radio antenna tower was erected at Camp Humphreys to improve reception.

--(U) Twelve AFKN AM radio outlets were assigned new frequencies in late CY 78 to comply with International Telecommunications Union decisions.

(U) AFKN television and AM radio transmitters were inactivated at Masan on Korea's southern coast upon departure of US Army troops from that area.

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(U) Adjutant General

(U) DA Survey of Records Management Requirements

(U) During periods 10-26 Apr and 15-29 Sep 78 representatives from The Adjutant General's Office, DA conducted a records management fact finding survey of 101 separate EUSA units/activities. Emphasis was placed on providing guidance for elements scheduled to be inactivated or withdrawn from Korea during CYs 1978-79. Some 5,000 linear feet of records were reviewed in 76 units during Apr visit, and 1,000 linear feet in 25 units during Sep.¹² The computerized National Archives and Records Service (NARS 5) system is not feasible for EUSA implementation due to small volume of files accumulated by tactical units. Consequently the Overseas Command Records Holding Area (OCRHA), Pusan had not shipped any records to an out-of-country repository since 1975. In Jul 78, at DA direction, OCRHA Pusan shipped 250 linear feet to the PACOM OCRHA in Japan. On 21 Nov, however, DA notified this headquarters that functions at PACOM's facility had been curtailed indefinitely and that records at OCRHA Pusan scheduled for permanent retention should be shipped directly to the Washington National Records Center.

(U) To increase overall storage capacity and provide adequate space for sorting/packing, an additional building was acquired for use by OCRHA Pusan. When renovation was completed in Sep 78, storage capability at the records holding area was raised to 4,326 linear feet.

(U) As a result of previous DA recommendations, Memoranda of Agreement were effected during early 1978 with 1st Sig Bde (USACC) and Logistics Assistance Office-Korea (DARCOM) to provide those tenant organizations with records management support from EUSA resources.

(U) Microforms Management

(U) TAG is responsible for policy and development of microforms systems worldwide. This headquarters' AG, working in close conjunction with the Asst to CofS for Mgt Info Sys, is manager for Army microforms programs in the ROK. Responsibilities include review of proposed microforms systems and issuance/control of readers and printers. In Jan 75 a complete microform document/information system, termed MICRODIS, was instituted in the Yongsan Data Processing Center (YDPC), employing computer output microfilm (COM) equipment funded by the Army Materiel Command's Capital Investment Opportunity Program. On-going conversion of reports required for command programs from hardcopy to microfiche film

12. (U) DA Ltrs, DAAG-AMR, 14 Jun and 20 Nov 78, Subj: Records Mgt Fact Finding Survey of EUSA Activities.

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is estimated to save this headquarters at least \$150,000 annually in paper costs. By end CY 78, 186 of the 852 reports processed by YDPC were being produced in microfiche form.

(U) In Dec 76 DA had approved a MICRODIS capability for the 19th Spt Comd's ADP Center at Taegu, and in Mar 77 micrographics specialists from TAGCEN visited the ROK to advise on system installation. A COM recorder was purchased from Quantor Corporation; however, a major problem arose when NCR Company declined to furnish maintenance service for Quantor equipment, a provision stated in the latter's contract proposal. DA thereafter offered to provide Taegu with a Data Graphix COM recorder identical to equipment operated by YDPC, but Cdr, 19th Spt Comd decided to retain the Quantor system and maintain it with in-house resources. Production at the MICRODIS facility is expected to commence in May 79. To increase COM production at YDPC, funds were requested from TAG in Jan 78 for purchasing an autofiche duplicator. After TAG refused to bear cost, funds for duplicator procurement were included in EUSA's FY 79 budget. Requisitioning actions were in progress at end of reporting period.

(U) Maximum command utilization of MICRODIS had been hampered since 1975 by shortages of readers and reader/printers. Availability of FY 77 year-end funds permitted requisitioning of 500 additional readers and 100 reader/printers. Equipment was received in Jan 78 and distributed to all EUSA major commands.¹³

(U) USAAG Printing and Publications Center-Korea (PPCK) Activities

(U) In Jun 75 SECDEF granted approval to relocate the US Army Printing and Publications Center, Honshu (Japan) to Korea. Decision was based on 1974 studies which noted that (1) more than 75 percent of publications and forms support and approximately 45 percent of the center's printing workload were for Korea-based units, and (2) savings would be realized not only through reduction in shipping and handling expenditures but also through lower labor costs. An existing building at Camp Market, near Inchon, was selected to house the facility. Since extensive renovation/construction was required, a temporary plant was established nearby; during latter half 1975 all printing equipment and the publications inventory were shipped from Japan to the ROK and recruitment of Korean nationals to man PPCK was initiated. Four DAC supervisors, including the Center Director, transferred from Japan to Korea to direct PPCK operations. In Apr 76 the plant's Publications Center Div became fully operational in temporary facilities and assumed the task of processing tri-headquarters publications and blank forms. To carry out this additional function,

13. (U) AG Hist Sum 1978.

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Supply Point 23 was relocated from Niblo Barracks in Seoul and consolidated with the PPCK at Camp Market. During last Qtr 76, the newly established Center had commenced processing major printing requirements from commands on the Japanese mainland, Okinawa and Taiwan on an in-house basis. By Jun 77 building rehabilitation was completed and printing/processing equipment (including 59 press units) had been installed at PPCK's permanent structure. Full personnel staffing was achieved by end CY 77 (five US military, four DACs, five KATUSAs and 65 local national employees), and printing production rate at the Camp Market plant had risen to 16 million units per month. Included was classified and unclassified reproduction which exceeds capability of AG's Duplication Facility.¹⁴

(U) Printing production rate for 1978 increased to nearly 17 million units per month. Approximately 15 percent of PPCK's total output during the year was devoted to fulfilling requirements from major commands on Japan and Taiwan. Printing support for plant's Pub Center Div was expanded during CY 78; 36 percent of the command's blank forms requirements were printed at the Camp Market facility, resulting in significant reduction of shipping costs from CONUS. Throughout the year PPCK printed seven USFK unit newspapers/periodicals as well as two newspapers for Yongsan's DOD elementary and high schools. Contracts for printing these publications had previously been made with Pacific Stars and Stripes in Japan or with a local Korean firm. By using PPCK services, units not only realized substantial monetary savings but could more effectively coordinate their printing requirements.

(U) Two mutual support agreements were concluded in 1978 to provide contingency support for printing/publications services. In Feb an agreement was signed by this headquarters and USARJ for insuring that emergency levels of mission essential publications and blank forms would be available in Japan if PPCK facilities are compromised by hostile action/subversion, natural disaster or labor disputes. The other agreement, concluded in Oct 78, enables this command to rely on US Navy printing services in WESTPAC in event of PPCK compromise.

(U) USA Postal Group-Korea Activities

(U) EUSA's postal system comprises 12 Army post offices and a military mail terminal which serve a minimum of 65,000 military members, DOD employees, invited contractors, and their dependents in the ROK. Major developments during CY 78 included:

14. (U) Single copies in excess of 5,000; multiple copies of 25,000 or more.

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--Final engineer design criteria for a new Army/Air Force Aerial Mail Terminal was submitted to Far East Dist Engr for review and approval. Present facility's location at Kimpo International Airport (serving Seoul) interferes with ROKG runway expansion projects. New terminal will be built by the ROK Ministry of Transportation, at no expense to US, in a more suitable area at Kimpo; cost was estimated at approximately \$900,000. Construction was scheduled to begin in Feb 79, with completion planned for mid-1979. New facility will allow consolidation of US Army and Air Force mail terminal activities at Kimpo; it will be jointly operated by USA 66th AG Det (Postal) and USAF Det 1, 6005 Air Postal Sqdn. Design of new terminal will permit more efficient use of mail handling equipment, reducing processing time. Implementation of physical security measures will also be enhanced.

--1978 Christmas mail was air delivered by 17th Avn Group helicopters to seven outlying troop installations, insuring receipt by addressees before 25 Dec.

(U) Surgeon

(U) Command Health/Medical Services

(U) USAH-S, (The US Army Hospital, Seoul-121st Evac), is largest and most complete US military medical facility in the ROK, with a 250 bed capacity capable of expansion to a 400-bed evacuation hospital. In CY 78 average number of beds occupied daily by active duty military personnel was 88; those occupied by all others entitled to care (principally retired military and dependents) averaged 41 daily. Average number of active duty military personnel noneffective because of hospitalization and convalescent leave during CY 78 was 2.3 per thousand. Total outpatient clinic visits to all US Army medical treatment facilities,¹⁵ including USAH-S, averaged 1,449 per day during the year.

(U) A \$1.5 million renovation of the USAH-S physical plant was completed by end CY 78. Improvement projects, which began in early 1977, included: repainting interior and exterior of entire facility; mechanical upgrading of air conditioning and heating system, including new boilers; installing a piped-in oxygen system; and replacing sprinkler equipment components.

15. (U) Presently there are 21; one hospital and 20 clinics/dispensaries. Additionally, USFK operates two base hospitals and one clinic, while USNFK has one dispensary.

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(U) Medical Service Augmentation and Training

(U) At end CY 78 EUSA had 65 US physicians assigned command-wide, against 101 authorized, to provide complete health services for all US military and others authorized care in the ROK; understaffing was particularly critical in general medical officer, internist, and orthopedic surgeon categories. The Army-wide physician shortage has been partially circumvented in Korea by greater use of physician's assistants and nurse practitioners to provide primary care. In the larger clinics at USAH-S, specially trained medical technicians are employed as "screeners" who evaluate patients with minor illnesses and treat them under supervision of a physician. Furthermore, every US Army Medical Corps officer, regardless of rank or position, is directly involved with patient care. Other means of alleviating the physician shortage have included rearrangements of schedules and consolidation of services and clinics. To supplement USAH-S professional resources, five additional KN doctors from staffs of major hospitals in Seoul area were selected as consultants; appointees from this local medical specialist program, initiated in 1975, totaled 23 at end of reporting period. In addition, during CY 78 the DA Surgeon General provided support for two USAH-S specialty clinics by TDY assignments of a CONUS-based orthopedic surgeon (six months) and radiologist (four months).

(U) Several continuing medical/nursing training programs were underway at USAH-S in cooperation with local universities and ROKA. Six senior-year medical students from Seoul National University College of Medicine acquired practical experience in surgery and medical specialties by working for three-week periods with US Army physicians. Two groups of six students each from ROKA Nurse Corps' officer candidate program received six months of advanced clinical training at USAH-S. Ewha University School of Nursing also sent senior student nurses for one-month tours in USAH-S wards; groups of eight trainees each rotated during period Mar-Dec 78. These programs were mutually advantageous, providing USAH-S with medical service augmentation and the student doctors/nurses an enriched educational experience.¹⁶

(U) Aeromedical Evacuation Services

(U) USAMEDCOM-K's 377th Med Co (Air Amb) provides aeromedical evacuation support to USFK military and civilian personnel and their authorized dependents within the ROK. Additionally, the unit provides emergency movement of medical personnel and accompanying equipment/supplies, whole blood, biologicals, etc. to meet critical requirements command-wide.

16. (U) Surg Hist Sum 1978.

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The company, equipped with 18 UH-1H helicopters, has elements deployed at following locations: unit headquarters at Yongsan Garrison with up to eight operationally ready helicopters at Yongsan's H-201 heliport; service platoon at Seoul's K-16 AB where aircraft undergo aviation unit maintenance; a flight platoon of three helicopters permanently stationed at Taegu's Camp Walker; and one aircraft each at Camp Casey's H-252 and Osan AB. At latter two sites, air crews rotated from Yongsan on a non-TDY basis.

(U) During 1978 the unit evacuated 658 emergency patients to Seoul when air transport was deemed necessary due to severity of illness or time-distance factors. (Total for CY 77 was 793.) Patient categories were 443 US military members, nine US civilian employees, 124 US military dependents, 45 ROK military members, 28 KATUSAs, seven ROK civilians, and two US K-9 security dogs. Four inflight birth deliveries were performed by 377th Med Co flight personnel during the year. The platoon operating from Taegu provided twice-weekly flights to Yongsan for dependents residing in the ROK's southern regions who required non-emergency medical consultation services at USAH-S.

(U) Hot Floor Heating Systems and Carbon Monoxide Poisoning

(U) The most significant environmental health hazard encountered during the year was carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning attributed to traditional Korean compressed coal home heating systems. These ondol (hot floor) heating methods are potentially hazardous due to generation of CO when incomplete combustion of compressed coal occurs. Hundreds of CO deaths among the Korean population are reported annually. One USFK death resulting from overexposure to CO occurred in CY 77. During 1978 CO poisoning increased; it was an identifiable contributing cause in deaths of four USFK servicemen (drug/alcohol overdoses were other factors involved).

(U) Prior to start of heating season in Oct 78, emphasis was again placed on publicizing the dangers inherent in Korean ondol heating systems. Information means used included frequent spot announcements on AFKN radio and television; command-wide dissemination of warnings and basic precautions through Troop Topics, weekly bulletin announcements, Pacific Stars and Stripes, and unit newspapers; periodic scheduling of CO poisoning prevention as a high priority subject in unit training programs; and visits by EUSA preventive medicine and safety specialists to provide comprehensive instruction in troop units. Medical inspection and evaluation of economy housing remained a key factor in minimizing exposure to hazardous environments. Living quarters utilizing compressed coal heating systems were not approved for occupancy by USFK personnel,

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unless an alternate safe system was provided and the ondol arrangement made inoperable. USAMEDCOM-K's preventive medicine personnel furnished qualified assistance by means of home visits to all USFK members requesting their services.

(U) Predominant Diseases in Korea

(U) Currently, there is a relatively high incidence of two diseases among the US military troop population in the ROK. Both are debilitating but neither are fatal. The first of these is viral hepatitis, usually caused by poor hygiene in off-post areas. The 1978 rate of incidence for hepatitis cases requiring hospitalization, four per thousand per year, continued a downward trend noted in recent years. This tendency was probably due to improved sanitation practices in the local environment and implementation of a command-wide gamma globulin program. A collaborative study with Walter Reed Army Institute of Research begun in 1978 is helping to characterize prevalence of various viral hepatitis subtypes. Results should materially assist future disease control efforts. The other predominant medical concern, venereal disease, is far more widespread, affecting 48 US military members per thousand per month. Unlike hepatitis, which can cause absences from duty of up to three months, VD does not result in an appreciable loss of man-days. Both diseases are the subject of frequent health lectures and command information bulletins and articles.

(U) EUSA Dental Activities

(U) Some 17 clinics operated by 10th Med Det (DS) with 38 dental officers (42 authorized) provided a full range of oral health services for USFK members, their dependents and others entitled to care. Patient treatments performed during CY 78 totaled 490,994, reflecting a 30.8 percent increase in productivity over previous year when approximately same number of dentists were assigned. Average number of treatments per patient also rose, from 3.4 in CY 77 to 4.6 in 1978. Improved performance was attributed partly to emphasis placed on reduction of non-clinical activities during time available for patient treatment, e.g., dental personnel engaging in continuing education programs, teaching at civilian institutions and lecturing to non-military groups during duty hours.

(U) Veterinary Activities

(U) EUSA's 53-man 106th Med Det (VS) provides inspection services for all USFK subsistence items arriving in the ROK from CONUS sources as well as those procured locally from the Korean economy. During the

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year approximately 450 million pounds of foodstuffs were examined for compliance with health/sanitation standards; 1.06 million pounds were rejected as not conforming with contractual requirements or as inedible. (1977 figures were 599.86 and 1.21 million pounds, respectively.) The sanitation inspection program for the USFK Milk Plant was widened in scope during 1978. More intensive sampling of both raw ingredients and end products was instituted, as well as daily checks of processing and sanitation procedures. Upgrading of physical plant in CY 78 (discussed on page 190) eliminated many sanitation deficiencies; however, a number of potential health hazards still existed due primarily to antiquated facilities and equipment. The FY 79 MCA project for construction of a new milk plant was disapproved by the US Congress in Aug 78.

(U) The detachment's inspection teams continuously sample produce and soil for presence of parasites on those Korean farms which provide fresh fruits and vegetables for USFK consumption. Only products which are likely to present a health hazard are required to come from an approved farm; hard-skinned fruits/vegetables which are easily cleaned or those which are normally cooked prior to eating are procured without regard to source. During CY 78 extensive aerial and ground surveys were conducted in the ROK's major agricultural areas. Purpose was to identify four or five centralized growing areas as USFK procurement sources, so as to replace small widely-dispersed farms where produce is now obtained. Implementation of veterinary inspection/control programs would thereby be facilitated, and transportation/handling requirements would be reduced resulting in a wider variety of wholesome quality products at competitive prices for military commissaries. By year's end three areas were selected in southern and eastern portions of the ROK, and Korean vendors were being encouraged to pool resources for their development.

(U) Medical support for the command's military working dogs steadily improved during CY 78 when Yongsan's Small Animal Clinic was upgraded with additional medical equipment. Field training exercises involving deployments of working dogs were increased in size and scope. The detachment continued to operate an animal hospital at Yongsan for pets of USFK members plus two animal clinics at Taegu and Pusan.¹⁷

17. Ibid.

NOTE: Other activities of Surgeon, HQ USFK/EUSA, and of USAMEDCOM-K, appear in detail in Annual Report; Army Medical Department Activities (RCS Med-41 (R4)), submitted to Surgeon General, DA in Feb 79 under provisions of AR 40-226.

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(U) Chaplain

(U) Religious/Spiritual Activities

(U) During 1978 the USFK/EUSA Staff Chaplain increased or introduced new spiritual guidance programs. Among them:¹⁸

--(U) The 54 Army chaplains, mostly in field units, concentrated their activities primarily in the important area of troop guidance.¹⁹ Responsiveness was noted by increased attendance at both religious and social/welfare sessions and by the support and favorable comment of unit commanders. This marked improvement in troop participation is attributed in large part to an influx of energetic chaplains whose modern training and sensitivity to people's needs allows them greater rapport with military personnel.

--(U) More than 10,000 USFK military and civilian members attended 275 retreats conducted during the year at the EUSA Retreat Center. Located on Namsan Hill near Yongsan Garrison, the Center schedules retreats, normally 3-4 days in length, for all faiths. Billeting is available for 65 in double rooms; other facilities include a dining hall, outdoor recreational areas, TV room, a library and classrooms. Tours to local cultural attractions and social activities with Korean student groups add variety to the religious retreat programs.

--(U) The Staff Chaplain obtained services of several specialized religious resource organizations from CONUS during the year. From 18 Jun-10 Jul Operation Appreciation, presented by a spiritual revival group based at Louisville, Ky, was enthusiastically received at USFK installations country-wide. The programs, designed to show the American people's appreciation for military personnel stationed overseas, included musical performances, devotional services, and counseling sessions. During 22-26 Sep a noted liturgical folk musician group conducted music workshops at Yongsan Garrison and Osan/Kunsan ABs. In addition, a liturgical resource leader from Florida was contracted to present Christmas theme seminars throughout 2d Inf Div area during period 21 Dec 78-3 Jan 79.

--(U) An average of 12 pre-marriage clinics were conducted monthly by EUSA chaplains at installations throughout the ROK for service members and their Korean fiancées. (Marriage statistics for CY 78 are in footnote 6, page 293.) Attendance at the clinics averaged 250 monthly.

18. (U) Chaplain Hist Sum 1978.

19. (U) Currently, 13 other American military chaplains serve in Korea; 12 with USAFK, one with USNVK.

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Programs centered on wide differences in Korean and American cultures/life styles and resulting problems of marital adjustment.

--(U) EUSA chaplains coordinated support and assistance offered voluntarily by US personnel at 32 Korean orphanages country-wide. Support was extended in a variety of forms, including financial donations, food/clothing distributions, hosting of picnics, and construction work on orphanage facilities performed by EUSA members during off-duty time.

--(U) In mid-1978 a new Religious Activities Center was opened at USAG-Pusan to accommodate religious classes, meetings and social gatherings. Final plans were approved by year's end for construction of a religious activities building at Camp Walker (Taegu) under the FY 81 MCA program.

--(U) Through the foresight of the command, 11 senior members of the 77 visiting denominational representatives in CY 78 received the Threat/Counterthreat briefing which provided official answers to their questions regarding the presence and continued need of American armed forces in Korea.

(U) Morale and Welfare

(U) US Army Recreation Services Agency-Korea (RSAK) Highlights

(U) RSAK assets comprise 257 sports and athletic training facilities, 42 libraries and two bookmobiles, 34 arts and crafts and two auto craft shops, 18 recreation centers and three annexes, five music/theatre centers, five dependent youth activities centers, a library service center, and a supply depot. Command-wide recreational services participation throughout CY 78 exceeded DA objectives by a wide margin in every core program except libraries. Because numerous small installations rely on bookmobile services, library usage was slightly below DA standard.

(U) Major developments in RSAK programs during 1978 included the following:²⁰

--(U) EUSA Unit Recreation Requirements. In early 1978 EUSA CG directed RSAK to develop and provide guidance for commanders which could be used as basis to improve recreation programs in all EUSA units. Basic requirements and equipment lists were prepared with considerations made for unit strengths, scope of existing morale support activities, degree of isolation from established recreation programs/facilities, planned

20. (U) RSAK Hist Sum 1978.

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unit inactivations/withdrawals, equipment usage experience and budgetary limitations. It was established that requirements for the many different types of EUSA units had wide variance, depending on size and location of element to be served. Necessary supplies and equipment were to be made available, where possible, for maintaining five RSAK core programs--Arts & Crafts, Libraries, Music/Theatre, Recreation Centers, and Sports & Athletic Training. Recommended equipment packages were designed with provisions for flexibility, so that they could be modified at time of issue to allow for changes in personnel strength or unit capabilities to properly supervise equipment use. Requisitions were submitted for recreational items valued at approximately \$300,000. By year's end, nearly half of package components had arrived and were being issued to EUSA elements, with tactical and combat support units in remote areas receiving priority.

--(U) Libraries. In mid-1978 a field collection library (1,700 volumes) was established at 1st Bn, 2d ADA's Btry A position, located in an isolated area approximately ten miles SW of Osan AB. The Yongsan Library in Seoul underwent extensive rehabilitation during Mar-Nov 78; a new concrete floor with tile covering was installed and the facility repainted at a cost of \$50,000. During entire renovation period, full reference and limited circulation service was maintained. (Yongsan is RSAK's largest library, with slightly more than 100,000 volumes.)

--(U) Sports & Athletic Training. Upgrading of facilities at several installations continued throughout the year. At 2d Inf Div's Camp Casey the main athletic field and gymnasium were rehabilitated and a new tennis court was constructed at a total cost of \$145,000. Some \$125,000 was programmed to replace floors in two gymnasiums at Yongsan Garrison (Seoul). A multi-purpose outdoor court (tennis, basketball and volleyball) costing \$51,000 was built at 2d Inf Div Arty's Camp Stanley.

--(U) Recreation Centers. To provide more adequate off-duty facilities for troops at Camp Stanton, an isolated 2d Div air cavalry base, a new recreation center annex was opened there in Dec 78. Recreation Center Directors from larger division installations provide program guidance and support. At Camp Kitty Hawk, where the JSA Spt Gp is billeted, construction of a new recreation center was underway at year's end; \$71,200 was programmed for the facility.

--(U) Arts & Crafts. The annual ROK/US Goodwill Model Airplane Meet was held on 15 Oct 78 at the ROKAF Academy in Seoul. Jointly sponsored by RSAK and the Republic of Korea's "Student Science Magazine", the contest attracted US/ROK military and civilian model plane enthusiasts from all over Korea. Over 100 hobbyists entered competitive events conducted for a wide variety of aircraft; introduced this year was a contest for scale model radio-controlled helicopters. Spectators numbering approximately 5,000 attended the family-oriented event. The meet received

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extensive media coverage in local newspapers and on television/radio outlets. On 19 Dec 78 judging was completed for the annual command-wide KAFA Photo Contest. Coordinated by RSAK, the competition encourages American community members to observe and photographically record the Korean people and their unique scenic/cultural environment. A total of 245 entries were evaluated in three categories--black and white, color prints and color slides; cash awards amounting to \$1,600 were distributed to 22 winners. RSAK's popular auto craft program will be expanded when construction is completed in early 1979 on a \$51,000 shop at Camp Henry (Taegu). Some \$30,000 was also programmed to upgrade Yongsan's auto craft shop; improvements include construction of a secure tool room, and steam and wash racks.

--(U) Music/Theatre. For fourth consecutive year the Korean-American Friendship Association (KAFA) sponsored a musical variety production entitled "Operation Stars '78". The troupe toured USFK installations country-wide, including those in remote areas, giving 27 performances during period 14 Apr-12 May 78. The 36-member company included some of Korea's outstanding television and stage personalities. (Other ROK-sponsored goodwill programs coordinated by PAO and ACofS, J1 are described on page 325.) An additional highlight of 1978's performing arts activities was the EUSA Talent Showcase held in May. Competitive entries from throughout the ROK were judged in a variety of music/theatre areas including acting, stage and music direction, lighting and set design/construction. Some 18 prizes were awarded for outstanding accomplishment by participating casts and crews.

--(U) Dependent Youth Activities. During 1978 RSAK assumed responsibility for recreation centers located at Yongsan and Taegu's rental guarantee housing areas. Previously, these centers were operated by the garrison commands in each area; supervisory staffs were primarily volunteers and no assured funding for desired activities was available. Under RSAK control, morale support funds were allotted for appropriate youth center programs and full-time professional staffs were provided. In Aug 78 winners of RSAK-sponsored command-wide youth league competition participated in intra-Pacific swimming meets and baseball tournaments in Japan; first place teams in RSAK programs hosted the Yokota/Korea All-Star Baseball Game and Korean/American Soccer Fest, both held in Nov 78 at Yongsan Garrison.

(U) Korea Area Exchange (KOAX) Operations

(U) KOAX is the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) element providing goods and services for all US military/civilian personnel and their dependents in the ROK. (Effective 26 Jan 78, exchange systems in the Pacific area previously classified as regions according to geographic location were redesignated area exchanges; Korea Regional Exchange thus

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became known as Korea Area Exchange, with no change in support mission or facility operations.) The system operates eight main stores located on Yongsan in Seoul, Pusan's Hialeah Compound, Camps Casey, Red Cloud, Humphreys and Walker (Taegu), Osan AB and Kunsan AB; 99 smaller retail stores (annexes) serve USFK personnel at other installations country-wide. Other KOAX facilities include 159 food outlets ranging from restaurants/snack bars to fast food stands, two bakeries, a food holding plant, five automobile repair garages, two gasoline stations, a centralized merchandise repair facility, and 832 concessions (88 contracts) offering barber/beauty shop, laundry/dry cleaning and a wide variety of repair services, as well as Korean general merchandise and handicrafts. A total of 126 motion picture theaters, 45 paid and 81 admission free, are under KOAX jurisdiction. Some 138 US personnel (45 career, 93 temporary hire) and 2,254 Korean nationals work directly for KOAX, which also indirectly supervises approximately 3,800 concession employees.

(U) KOAX FY 79 (26 Jan 78-25 Jan 79) total projected sales of \$139.5 million (a 32 percent increase over previous period) comprised: retail--\$107.0 million, food--\$23.2 million, vending--\$6.3 million, and services--\$3.0 million. Concession services, commodity and automotive operations totaled \$24.6 million and generated \$2.0 million in FY 79 income for KOAX. FY 79 net earnings, which represent KOAX's portion of the AAFES contribution to Army and Air Force welfare funds, were \$20.5 million as compared to \$15.0 million in FY 78.²¹

(U) FY 79 KOAX losses through inventory shortages increased substantially, while losses from in-transit diversions declined markedly. A yearly comparison of major loss areas follows:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Inventory					
Shortages	\$437,043	\$726,656	\$492,694	\$375,569	\$687,527
In-Transit					
Diversions	<u>154,419</u>	<u>192,605</u>	<u>22,167</u>	<u>8,000</u>	<u>--*</u>
TOTAL	\$591,462	\$919,261	\$519,861	\$367,569	\$687,527

*Negligible

(U) In 1978 AAFES continued to authorize and fund local procurement of Korean manufactured export quality clothing for sale in KOAX retail outlets at bargain prices. Approximately \$300,000 was committed for delivery of men's and women's garments, including fur-lined leather sports coats/jackets. Customer reaction to these superior lines of merchandise

21. (U) KOAX Hist Sum 1978.

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was very favorable, and an approximate \$100,000 purchase of other export quality-controlled items, including bicycles and crystal, was planned for inclusion in the program.

(U) Throughout the year KOAX provided exchange services at field locations during major exercises. Prime example was support of participating tactical units in TEAM SPIRIT 78, largest joint/combined military maneuver ever held in the ROK. Camouflaged KOAX retail mobile vans and food outlets were deployed with troops in forward bivouac areas. Tent retail exchanges, including concession outlets offering Korean handicrafts, barber shops and laundry pick-up service, were established at Osan AB, Pohang, Kimhae and Yechon staging areas to serve out-of-country augmentation forces. KOAX courier vehicles distributed Pacific Stars and Stripes newspapers at all major troop concentrations throughout the exercise. Sixteen tent theaters were set up in bivouac and staging areas for showing 16-mm feature movies on a free admittance basis.

(U) Headquarters Commandant

(U) HQ COMDT provides support for the headquarters of USFK/EUSA in garrison and during field operations, less installation and facilities engineer assistance. Units assigned to HQ COMDT are: HHC EUSA, EUSA Band, USA Elm, Honor Guard Co, USA MP Det-K, 21st Trans Co (Car), 38th Chem Det, Sp Forces Det-K, and the EUSA Wightman NCO Academy (see page 158).

(U) In 1978 the HQ COMDT successfully fulfilled the following tasks during Exercises TEAM SPIRIT and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS:²²

--(U) Prepared and published Administrative Instructions for use by players at TANGO and Rear Command Posts.

--(U) Provided transportation for player/controller personnel and equipment to TANGO and Rear CPs.


--(U) Maintained physical security of TANGO and Rear CPs through use of TANGO Security Force and Honor Guard Co. Access control was established at both locations by issuing an exercise pass, valid at either site, to individuals identified by their staff elements as requiring entrance to a facility. Access to staff section areas was a control responsibility of the section itself. Visitors were provided temporary passes and were escorted by members of the section to be visited. HQ COMDT furnished US security personnel to accompany Korean national maintenance and janitorial workers.

22. (U) HQ COMDT Hist Sum 1978.

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--(U) Operated dining facilities for individuals at TANGO CP, including a General Officers' Mess. Four meals were provided daily at each mess.

(U) The UNC Honor Guard and the EUSA Band provided this headquarters and other units throughout the ROK with professional ceremonial support during 1978. The Band performed 76 commitments for both military and civilian audiences throughout the ROK (not including weekly retreats and other ceremonies at Yongsan Garrison); the Honor Guard participated in 61 ceremonies. Unlike the Band, which is comprised of 40 US male and female members, the Honor Guard is composed of one platoon from the US Army, one from each of the three ROK services, and a composite UN platoon consisting of elements from the United Kingdom, Thailand and the Philippines--a total of 165 male personnel.



The UNC Honor Guard--a one of a kind unit.

The Thailand and Philippine contingents consist of five men each who serve a one-year tour with the Honor Guard. The 30-man UK contingent is unique. Rotating from Hong Kong every two months, it furnishes both ceremonial support at Yongsan and security augmentation for Military Armistice Commission meetings at Panmunjom. Parent units of UK contingents in the ROK during the reporting period were:²³

23. (U) UNC Ln Gp Hist Sum 1978.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT</u>
10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles ²⁴	Jan-Mar 78
1st Bn, Royal Green Jackets	Mar-May 78
2d Bn, 2d King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles	May-Jul 78
7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles	Jul-Sep 78
10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles	Sep-Nov 78
1st Bn, 2d King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles	Nov 78-Jan 79

Visiting the ROK during May-Jun 78 was the Bank of Pipes and Drums from the 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles. This internationally famous marching band presented 27 complimentary formal parades for both military and civilian audiences throughout the Republic.

24. (U) Gurkhas are Nepalese members of the UK's Armed Forces.

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APPENDIX 1

List of Distinguished Visitors
to the Command
1978

(Refer to page 4)

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LIST OF DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO THE COMMAND

(1 Jan - 31 Dec 78)

<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
Rep Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY) 4-8 Jan	13	House Armed Services Investi- gations Committee
VADM Robert B. Baldwin 9-13 Jan	9	Cdr, Seventh Flt
Mr. Ray Thorkildsen (GS-16) 16-21 Jan	13	Staff Spec, Research and Engineering, OSD
RADM John D. Johnson 17 Jan	4	Cdr, Military Sealift Comd
GEN William G. Moore, USAF 17-19 Jan	15	CINCMAC
Mr. Ivan W. Jennings (GS-17) 17-20 Jan	2	Deputy Chief, USAAA
Mr. John W. Perry (GS-17) 19-20 Jan	4	Deputy for Trans and Comm, Ofc of SAF, R&D and Log
Mr. Wayne A. Smith (GS-16) 19-25 Jan	5	Asst Dir Sup Mgmt, HQ DA
Cardinal Medeiros (GS-18E) 20-22 Jan	3	Archbishop of Boston
LTG John J. Burns, USAF 22-28 Jan	2	Deputy Cdr, USREDCOM
MG Noah C. New 23-25 Jan	4	CG, 1st Marine Air Wing
MG Herbert E. Wolff 24-26 Jan	2	Cdr, USA CINCPAC Spt Gp
BG Keith A. Smith, USMC 26-27 Jan	3	CG, Ninth Amphibious Bde
BG William R. Yost 27 Jan - 1 Feb	6	Vice Cdr, AF Comm Svc

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
BG Kenneth D. Burns 28-31 Jan	5	Cdr, USAF Scty Svc
BG Herman O. Thomson 28 Jan - 2 Feb	4	DCS Plans, HQ PACAF
RADM Allen E. Hill 30 Jan - 1 Feb	2	Cdr, Training Pacific
Dr. Jay P. Sanford (GS-18E) 31 Jan - 5 Feb	8	Dean, School of Medicine, Uniform Svc Health Sciences Univ
Dr. Richard S. Solomon (GS-17) 2-5 Feb	2	Head, Social Science Dept Rand Corporation
BG Frank P. Ragano, USA 2-5 Feb	3	Proj Mgr, Roland Sys, MIRADCOM
MG William P. Nelson 7-10 Feb	2	Dir, Log, Plans and Prog HQ USAF
BG Thomas C. Pinckney, USAF 7-11 Feb	2	Dir, East Asia Pacific Region, ASD/ISA
Dr. William J. Perry 8-11 Feb	4	Undersecy of Def for Research and Engineering
BG Nathaniel R. Thompson 8-12 Feb	3	Dir of Trans, Energy and Troop Spt, HQ DA
MG Charles K. Heiden 11-16 Feb	3	CG, USAMILPERCEN
Bishop Robert M. Blackburn (GS-16E) 18-20 Feb	5	Div of Chaplains, United Methodist Church
GEN Richard G. Stilwell (Ret) 18-23 Feb	2	Stanford Research Institute
RADM Lowell F. Eggert 21-23 Feb	4	Cdr, Fleet AF, WESTPAC
Mr. Charles Lehner (GS-16E) 21-25 Feb	2	Def Advance Proj Rsch Agcy, Research and Engineering
LTG John Q. Henion 22-24 Feb	4	Cdr, USARJ/CG, IX Corps

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
BG Thomas G. Murnane 22-25 Feb	2	Chief, USA Veterinary Corps
BG Richard Carr 22-26 Feb	2	Deputy Chief of Chaplains USAF
MG James M. Rockwell, USA 23-27 Feb	2	Vice Dir, DCA
MG Thomas A. Aldrich 2-3 Mar	16	Cdr, 22nd Air Force
GEN William G. Moore 5-6 Mar	3	CINCMAC
BG T. R. Morgan 9-10 Mar	3	Asst Div Cdr, 3d Marine Div
LTG Leslie E. Brown 10-13 Mar	12	CG, FMFPAC
MG Charles C. Pattillo 10-15 Mar	4	Vice CINCPACAF
MG A. G. Schwenk 11-14 Mar	5	CG, III MAF/CG, 3d Marine Div
Hon Charles W. Duncan, Jr. 11-14 Mar	30	Deputy SECDEF
LTG George G. Loving, Jr. 13-14 Mar	7	Cdr, USAF Japan/5th Air Force
MG Willard W. Scott, Jr. 14-18 Mar	2	CG, 25th Inf Div
Hon William H. Cook 16-19 Mar	7	Judge, US Court of Military Appeals
MG Freddie L. Poston 17-18 Mar	7	Cdr, 13th Air Force
LTG Jorma Jarventaus (Ret) 18-25 Mar	2	Def Correspondent, Finland Newspaper - Helsingin Sandmat
Mr. Joe Carniglia 20-23 Mar	2	Natl Dir, Svc to Armed Forces, American Natl Red Cross

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
RADM James W. Moreau 21-22 Mar	2	Cdr, Fourteenth Coast Guard District
GEN Bernard W. Rogers 23-27 Mar	5	CSA
BG William D. Lewis, USA 23-27 Mar	6	DCG, Comm and Elct Mat Readiness Command
MG Orris E. Kelly 23-27 Mar	2	Chief of Chaplains, DA
BG Donald W. Connelly 27-31 Mar	4	DCG, TAGCEN
Hon Fred P. Wacker 29 Mar - 1 Apr	6	Asst SECDEF, Comptroller
Mr. Kernith H. Speierman (GS-18) 2-5 Apr	4	Asst Deputy Dir for Telecomm and Comptr Svc, NSACSS
MG Oren E. DeHaven 2-9 Apr	5	Dir, Prop Accountability TF, DCSLOG, DA
BG Donald J. Bowen, USAF 2-14 Apr	5	Deputy Dir, Plans and Programs DCA
Mr. Charles R. Lehner (GS-16E) 3-16 Apr	4	Def Advance Proj Rsch Agcy, Research and Engineering
RADM Charles O. Prindle 8 Apr	12	Cdr, Patrol Wgs Pacific
BG James J. Young, USA 8-12 Apr	2	Chief, Medical Svc Corps
VADM Robert B. Baldwin 9-11 Apr	7	Cdr, Seventh Fleet
Mr. Ray Thorkildsen (GS-16) 9-13 Apr	5	Staff Spec, Research and Engineering, OSD
BG K. A. Smith 12-14 Apr	3	Asst Wg Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wing
MG Homer D. Smith 14-19 Apr	5	Cdr, USALOG, Fort Lee

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
LTG Bryan M. Shotts 15-17 Apr	14	Cdr, 15th Air Force
Mr. Herbert G. Goertzell (GS-17) 16-21 Apr	4	WWMCCS Proj Mgr, J3, JCS
Hon Antonia Chayes 18-20 Apr	5	Asst SAF Mpr Reserve Affairs & Installations
LTG John R. Thurman, III 22 Apr - 1 May	3	CG, CAC, Fort Leavenworth
RADM George E. Gorsuch 23-26 Apr	3	CINCPAC Surgeon
GEN John R. Guthrie 23-27 Apr	19	Cdr, DARCOM
MG James K. Davis 24-27 Apr	3	CG, 1st Marine Air Wing
MG Winfield W. Scott, Jr. 24-27 Apr	4	Asst DCS Plans & Operations, HQ USAF
Elder Clark Smith (GS-16E) 24 Apr - 1 May	3	Dir, Natl Svc Organization, Seventh Day Adventist
BG Robert F. McCarthy 25-28 Apr	2	J-6, CINCPAC
Mr. William F. Mills (GS-16) 26-29 Apr	4	Comptroller, USACC
Mr. Harry M. Bunting (GS-16) 30 Apr - 3 May	2	Chief, NSACSS, J-3
Pastor Victor P. Schroeder 30 Apr - 7 May	2	Asst Exec Dir, Div of Svc to Mil Pers, Lutheran Council
BG Tom H. Brain 30 Apr - 5 May	31	Cdr, USA Scty Asst Comd
MG Gerd S. Grombacher 7-11 May	4	CG, USACC
ADM Maurice F. Weisner 12-15 May	22	CINCPAC

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
BG Walter H. Baxter 14-15 May	4	Cdr, 313th Air Division
Brig Carleton Smith 16-19 May	2	Cdr, Gurkha Field Force Hong Kong
Mr. Frank C. Conahan (GS-17) 16-20 May	4	Dir, Intl Division, GAO
BG John V. Cox 17-20 May	5	Asst Wg Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wing
RADM A. S. Moreau 22-25 May	13	J-4, PACOM
LTG John Q. Henion 22-26 May	5	Cdr, USARJ/CG, IX Corps
LTG Lee M. Paschall, USAF 23-26 May	5	Dir, DCA
Hon Zbigniew Brzezinski 24-25 May	9	US Presidential Asst for National Security
VADM Bobby R. Irman 25-28 May	2	Dir, NSACSS
RADM W. A. Gureck 26-29 May	5	Cdr, Carr Gp SEVEN
MG Earl Anderson, USAF (Ret) 31 May - 4 Jun	2	President, Res Officers Association
Mrs. Minnie M. Kenny (GS-16) 4-11 Jun	1	Chief, Language Spt Div, NSACSS
LTG John W. Morris 6-7 Jun	3	Chief of Engineers, DA
BG Maurice D. Roush 5-7 Jun	2	Div Engr, USAEDPO
Mr. Michael Pillsbury 7-10 Jun	1	Staff Del, US Senate Budget Committee
Hon R. James Woolsey 12-13 Jun	10	Under Secretary Navy

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
BG Wesley H. Rice 12-16 Jun	6	CG, Ninth Amphibious Bde/ Asst Div Cdr, 3d Marine Div
Ms. Jill Wine-Volner (EL-4) 13-17 Jun	4	Army General Counsel, HQ DA
MG A. G. Schwenk 19-21 Jun	3	CG, III MAF
BG Jack L. Watkins 19-21 Jun	10	Asst DCS Ops, HQ SAC
ADM Donald C. Davis 21-23 Jun	9	CINCPACFLT
MG William J. White, USMC 9-12 Jun	3	Dir, Operations, J-3 PACOM
Mr. Robert E. Droppa (GS-16E) 10-13 Jun	4	Chairman, Intl Food Service
VADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr. 26-29 Jun	4	Cdr, Seventh Fleet
RADM Donald S. Jones 30 Jun - 4 Jul	3	Cdr, TF 76
BG Walter O. Bachus, USA 8-13 Jul	8	Dir, Fac Engineering, CE
LTG James D. Hughes 9-13 Jul	10	CINCPACAF
MG Daniel L. Burkett 11-14 Jul	3	Cdr, AF Commissary Svc
SMA William G. Bainbridge 11-18 Jul	1	Sergeant Major of the Army
MG Andrew Pringle, Jr. 18-21 Jul	6	Cdr, 3d Air Division
MG Emmett W. Bowers 22-25 Jul	2	Cdr, USATSA
BG David E. Rippetoe, USAF 25-31 Jul	1	Cdr, Pacific Communications Area

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
LTG George G. Loving, Jr. 27-29 Jul	4	Cdr, USAF Japan/5th Air Force
MG Calhoun J. Killeen 27-29 Jul	3	CG, III MAF
Father Joseph C. Martin (GS-16E) 29 Jul - 5 Aug	1	Consultant on Alcoholism
BG Edward M. Browne, USA 31 Jul - 5 Aug	1	Proj Mgr, Advanced Attack Helicopter Program
Mr. O. John Nille (GS-16) 3-6 Aug	1	Comptroller, HQ AAFES
LTG M. L. Boswell, USAF 4-7 Aug	3	CofS, PACOM
Mr. William Semkow (GS-16) 7-12 Aug	1	USO Pacific Area Exec
Mr. Marcus C. Hansen (PL-313) 10-11 Aug	4	Exec Dir, Undersea Warfare Sys Gp, Naval Sea Systems Comd
Mr. Victor Lindner 11 Aug - 11 Sep	1	Sys Dev and Engr, Army Armament Research and Development Comd
VADM Robert D. Coogan 20-23 Aug	8	Cdr, Naval Air Forces Pacific
LTG Philip D. Shutler, USMC 20-23 Aug	7	Dir Operations, J-3, JCS
Mr. George Allen (GS-18E) 23-29 Aug	1	Minority Staff Asst to Chmn, House Appropriations Com
BG Roderick D. Renick 28 Aug - 1 Sep	2	Deputy Dir, Ops and Readiness Ofc of DCSOPS, HQ DA
Mr. Francis V. Yanak (GS-17) 30 Aug - 2 Sep	1	Dir, San Francisco Regional Ofc, US CSC
RADM M. S. Holcomb 1-4 Sep	2	Cdr, Carr Gp ONE
BG Vincent M. Russo, USA 3-6 Sep	2	Cdr, MTMC, Western Area

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
BG Claire M. Garrecht 5-7 Sep	1	Chief, AF Nurse Corps
GEN Lew Allen, Jr. 10-13 Sep	19	CSAF
MG Edward J. Nash 14 Sep	7	DCS Ops, HQ MAC
Rev Ralph R. Monsen (GS-16E) 16-20 Sep	1	Dir of Chaplaincy Svc, Con- servative Baptist Assoc
Rev S. David Chambers (GS-16E) 16-21 Sep	1	Asst Dir, Presbyterian Coun- cil for Chaplains & Mil Pers
Mr. Francis Smead (GS-16) 17 Sep - 2 Oct	1	Deputy Chief, NSACSS, Pacific
MG John K. Davis 18-20 Sep	3	CG, 1st Marine Air Wing
RADM John C. Dixon 18-20 Sep	1	DCS Ops & Plans, CINCPACFLT
MG W. J. White, USMC 18-20 Sep	2	Dir, Ops, CINCPAC
Dr. James A. Painter (PL-313) 18-21 Sep	3	Asst Deputy Dir, WWMCCS ADP Directorate
RADM Lando W. Zech, Jr. 20-23 Sep	4	COMNAVFOR-Japan
Mr. M. J. Raffensburger (GS-17) 21-25 Sep	3	Assoc Dir, Technology, DCA
Mr. Sheldon S. Blitzblau (GS-16E) 24-26 Sep	6	Asst to AAFES Cdr, Pacific
BG Male Vojvodich 26-27 Sep	2	DCS, Technical Training, ATC
BG Robert F. McCarthy, USAF BG Alfred M. Miller, USAF 26 Sep - 3 Oct	6	IG, CINCPAC IG, PACAF
MG Richard Carr 27-30 Sep	5	CCH, USAF

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
Mr. Michael H. Armacost 28 Sep - 1 Oct	1	Deputy Asst SECDEF for E Asia and Pacific Affairs
MG Andrew Pringle, Jr. 28 Sep - 2 Oct	13	Cdr, 3d Air Division
VADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr. 28 Sep - 7 Oct	4	Cdr, Seventh Fleet
LTG James D. Hughes 29 Sep - 3 Oct	5	CINCPACAF
ADM Donald C. Davis 29 Sep - 2 Oct	7	CINCPACFLT
MG C. J. Killeen 29 Sep - 3 Oct	2	CG, III MAF
BG Duane H. Stubbs, USA 29 Sep - 3 Oct	2	Deputy Cdr, AAFES
LTG George G. Loving, Jr. 30 Sep - 3 Oct	4	Cdr, USAF Japan/5th Air Force
ADM Maurice F. Weisner 30 Sep - 1 Oct	8	CINCPAC
BG R. V. Secord 30 Sep - 5 Oct	5	Dir, Mil Asst and Sales, Ofc of DCS Log & Engr, HQ USAF
Dr. Frank Culpepper (GS-16E) 30 Sep - 4 Oct	2	Exec Dir, Church of God Servicemens Work
BG Duard D. Ball 1-7 Oct	6	Comdt, USA Ord Chem Center School
Mr. Patrick R. Gallagher, Jr. (GS-16) 3-7 Oct	2	NSACSS Rep Japan
Mr. Bryant R. Dunetz (GS-16) 3-7 Oct	1	Asst Deputy Dir, Intl R&D HQ DARCOM
RADM Charles D. Prindle 4 Oct	12	Cdr, Patrol Wings Pacific
Mr. Leonard J. Mabijs (PL-313) 4-8 Oct	1	Sr Technical Dir/Chief Engr USACC

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
RADM M. Staser Holcomb 4-8 Oct	2	Cdr, Carr Gp ONE/Cdr, Task Group 77.4
BG L. J. Riley 9-11 Oct	2	Cdr, USA Computer Sys Comd
Mr. James W. Jamieson (GS-18E) 9-28 Oct	2	General Mgr, San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union
BG James E. Freeze 10-14 Oct	3	Deputy Cdr, USAINSCOM
RADM David M. Altwegg 11-14 Oct	4	Dir, Security Asst Div, Ofc of Ch of Naval Ops
RADM Eugene A. Grinstead 12-14 Oct	1	Ch of Sup Corps/Cdr Naval Sup Sys Comd
Mr. Valcris D. Ewell (GS-16) 11-17 Oct	2	Assoc Dir, PMR, HQ DARCOM
BG H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA 12-15 Oct	2	Deputy Dir for Plans, HQ PACOM
BG Patrick J. Halloran 12-15 Oct	50	IG, SAC
Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer (PL-313) 16-22 Oct	5	Ch, PACOM Research and Analysis Ofc
Mr. Donald P. Smith (GS-18) 17-20 Oct	3	Staff Mbr, House Appropria- tions Subcom on Mil Const
Mr. Wayne M. Allen (GS-16) 17-20 Oct	1	Dir, Cost Analysis, Ofc of Comptr, HQ DA
Dr. Edward C. Killin (GS-16) 17-20 Oct	2	Dir, DOD Schools - Pacific Region
Mr. Eugene H. Mach (GS-17) 18-22 Oct	3	Dir, Insp and Control Div, HQ US Customs Svc
Hon Edward Hidalgo 21-23 Oct	8	Asst SECNAV for Mpr, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
MG Gerd Grombacher 22-27 Oct	2	CG, USACC

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
RADM D. Earl Brown, Jr. 22-29 Oct	2	PACOM Surgeon
Mr. James R. Fairchild 23-26 Oct	2	Minority Staff Asst, House Committee on Appropriations
MG Andrew Pringle, Jr. 28 Oct - 1 Nov	47	Cdr, 3d Air Division
MG Jas. L. Brown 29 Oct - 1 Nov	2	Asst CofS, Intelligence HQ USAF
Mr. William H. Jordan (GS-18E) 30-31 Oct	2	Staff Mbr, Senate Committee on Appropriations
MG James C. Smith 30 Oct - 4 Nov	4	CG, Ft Rucker
GEN Bryce Poe 1-3 Nov	13	Cdr, AFLC
RADM Donald S. Jones 1-4 Nov	5	Cdr, TF 76/Amphibious Gp One
Hon Albert B. Fletcher, Jr. 1-6 Nov	7	Chief Justice, US Court of Military Appeals
Mr. Richard Thomas (GS-16) 5-10 Nov	3	Dir, Policy and Plans, MARAD
Hon Harold Brown Hon Thomas B. Ross Hon David E. McGiffert Mr. John G. Kester LTG Eugene F. Tighe, Jr. Mr. Michael H. Armacost RADM Thor Hansen 6-8 Nov	24	SECDEF ASD(PA) ASD(ISA) Spec Asst to SECDEF Dir, DIA Deputy ASD, E Asia & Pac Mil Asst to SECDEF
Mr. Nathaniel B. Thayer (GS-17E) 7-15 Nov	1	Natl Intel Off, E Asia & Pac Natl Foreign Assessment Cen
BG Joseph B. Dodds 8-11 Nov	2	USAF Auditor General
Mr. Britt Snider (GS-17) 8-12 Nov	5	Dir, Counterintel and Scty Pol Ofc Deputy Undersecy of Def

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA 9-16 Nov	3	TIG
MG Louis Rachmeler 11-16 Nov	3	CG, USA Missile Mat Readiness Command
Mr. CHEUNG Ki Suk (GS-16) 11-16 Nov	1	Chief, USAEDPO
GEN Robert H. Barrow 12-15 Nov	9	Asst Comdt of Marine Corps
MG C. J. Killeen 12-16 Nov	2	CG, III MAF
RADM Donald S. Jones 12-17 Nov	2	Cdr, TF 76/Amphibious Gp One
VADM Sylvester R. Foley 13-16 Nov	3	Cdr, Seventh Fleet
RADM J. D. Johnson 14-15 Nov	5	Cdr, Mil Sealift Command
BG J. V. Cox 15-16 Nov	2	Asst Wg Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wg/CG, Ninth Amphibious Bde
MG Francis A. Ianni, USA 15-18 Nov	8	Delaware National Guard
MG Paul M. Timmerberg 15-19 Nov	3	Cdr, USACIDC
MG William E. Eicher, USA 15-21 Nov	3	CG, Armament Mat Readiness Command
Mrs. Arlene McDermott (GS-16E) 16-20 Nov	2	Natl Pres Ladies Auxiliary Veterans of Foreign Wars
MG Lucien E. Bolduc 19 Nov - 1 Dec	1	Deputy IG, HQ DA
MG Robert E. Sadler 21-24 Nov	4	Cdr, AFCS
LTG James D. Hughes 23-26 Nov	5	CINCPACAF

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
MG J. K. Davis 23-27 Nov	4	CG, 1st Marine Air Wing
Mrs. Eloise B. Waite (GS-16E) 25 Nov - 1 Dec	1	Vice Pres, American Red Cross
MG Robert L. Thompson, Jr. 26-29 Nov	1	Asst Surg Gen for Dental Svc, HQ USAF
GEN William G. Moore, Jr. 28 Nov - 1 Dec	12	CINCMAC
BG W. H. Rice 28 Nov - 1 Dec	5	Asst Div Cdr, 3d Marine Division
Mr. Richard A. Pierce (GS-18E) 29 Nov - 3 Dec	2	Staff Mbr, Senate Committee on Appropriations
MG C. J. Killeen 2-9 Dec	4	CG, III MAF
BG J. V. Cox 3-7 Dec	2	Asst Wg Cdr 1st Marine Air Wg/CG Ninth Amphibious Bde
BG Andrew H. Anderson, USA 3-9 Dec	10	Deputy CG, TARCOM
Mr. John M. Carey (GS-16E) 7-9 Dec	5	Natl Cdr, American Legion
BG David E. Rippetoe, Jr. 8-11 Dec	1	Deputy CofS, Comm & Elct/ Cdr, Pac Comm Area, HQ PACAF
Mr. T. C. Selman (GS-16E) 11-14 Dec	2	Junior Vice Cdr, VFW
Mr. Richard H. Giza (GS-18E) 11-15 Dec	4	Staff Mbr, House Permanent Select Committee on Intel
RADM W. J. Ryan 12-13 Dec	3	Cdr, Navy Resale Sys Ofc
Mr. William Semkow (GS-16E) 12-15 Dec	1	USO Pacific Area Coord
BG Kermit D. Johnson 12-17 Dec	1	Deputy Chief of Chaplains, DA

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<u>Name/Date</u>	<u>Total Number In Party</u>	<u>Position</u>
Mrs. Maxine Bigalow (GS-16E) 13-17 Dec	2	Natl Pres, American Legion Auxiliary
BG J. V. Cox 26-29 Dec	2	Asst Wg Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wg/CG, Ninth Amphibious Bde
RADM M. Staser Holcomb 28-30 Dec	5	Cdr, Carr Gp ONE/Cdr Task Gp 77.4

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APPENDIX 2A

ROK/US Combined Forces Command
Activation Ceremony
7 Nov 78

(Refer to page 14)

Remarks by:

US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

Yongsan (Seoul) Korea

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President Park, Minister Ro, honored guests, and gentlemen. It is a great privilege for me to return to this beautiful country and to take part in the formal inauguration of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command. This organization is a logical extension of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954; it demonstrates very clearly that external aggression against the Republic of Korea will be met by the combined forces of both our nations.

A little more than one year ago, at the Tenth Security Consultative Meeting, our governments authorized the formation of a combined command designed to control US and Republic of Korea forces in the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. We agreed to form a headquarters composed of approximately equal numbers of Americans and Koreans. In peacetime, this command would plan for the defense of the Republic of Korea; should war occur, it would direct the combat operations.

At the Eleventh Security Consultative Meeting, American and Korean officers presented a detailed plan for the formation of the Combined Forces Command. That plan, which was promptly approved, gave the Command a mission which is brief but unmistakably clear: First, to maintain defenses sufficient to deter war; second, if deterrence fails, to repel aggressors promptly and soundly.

I would like to emphasize the importance of the first aspect of that primary goal. It can only be achieved if we match strength with vigilance. I am confident that we will be successful. The courage, discipline, and the programs you have undertaken, to strengthen these forces by modernizing their equipment and weapons are sound and they are being implemented with vigor and skill.

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We recognize our own responsibilities for deterring war on the Korean peninsula. You may be assured that we will continue to shoulder them. We shall couple the phased withdrawal of US ground combat troops with efforts to strengthen ROK forces, thereby preserving a favorable balance of power on the peninsula. We will continue to station Air Force squadrons in Korea — indeed we are augmenting their strength this week — and we will be prepared to provide additional support to the Combined Forces Command as needed. Our combined military capabilities, when linked with the rapidly growing economic and industrial strength of the Republic of Korea, and the unity, patriotism and diligence of the South Korean people, should discourage any potential aggressor.

The Combined Forces Command will of course assist the United Nations Command, which continues to be charged with maintaining the Military Armistice Agreement. This relationship between the UNC and CFC will continue the historical roles of our two nations supporting the peace keeping function of the United Nations Command. This will be needed until a more permanent arrangement for maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula is established.

This command provides renewed testimony to the intimate cooperation which has existed between the armed forces of the US and the Republic of Korea since the Korean War. In that conflict, our forces fought side by side so that Korea would remain free. Our relationship is sealed in the blood of our men and women who gave their lives for freedom. It is also linked by the bonds of friendship and respect which continue to grow during years of peace. Important as are the documents associated with this command — the Mutual Defense Treaty, the terms of re-

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ference, the strategic directive — it is upon these historical memories and experiences that our relationship is truly built.

Mr. President, we are gathered here today to mark the establishment of a military command. We are prepared to fight because we cherish peace. Yet we shall not limit our quest for peace to the preservation of military strength. On the contrary we have regularly affirmed our desire to see north Korea resume a serious and substantive dialogue with the Republic of Korea. We have affirmed our interest in reducing tensions on the peninsula.

While pursuing those objectives with you, we are determined to remain strong. We have once suffered the consequences of being insufficiently prepared, and we shall not do so again.

As we establish this new command and open this fine new headquarters building you have provided, I would like to leave behind a memento to mark this occasion and my participation in this impressive ceremony.

General Vessey, I turn over to you as the first commander of the Combined Forces Command this plaque which says "To mark the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command — a symbol of the strong bond existing between our two countries in the common pursuit of peace and freedom."

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APPENDIX 2B

ROK/US Combined Forces Command
Activation Ceremony
7 Nov 78

(Refer to page 14)

Remarks by:

ROK President PARK Chung Hee

Yongsan (Seoul) Korea

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Secretary Brown, General Vessey, Officers and Men of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,

On the significant occasion of the inauguration of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command, I render my heartfelt compliments to the government officials and military officers of our two countries for their endeavors, through close cooperation, to solve the difficult problems attendant on the formation of this command.

I wish to join the Korean people in extending our warm encouragement and the assurance of our complete confidence in you, the officers and men of the Combined Forces. We stand in the firm belief that, from now on, the armed forces of our two nations will be able to carry out their assigned duties in closer solidarity and with greater efficiency and more effectiveness.

At the outset, the United States Forces came to this land during the Korean War as the backbone of the United Nations Forces for the purpose of safeguarding our free Republic of Korea against the north Korean Communist invasion.

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Following the armistice, and in spite of continuous aggressive provocations by the north Korean Communists, the U.S. Forces in Korea have also made a great contribution in deterring the recurrence of war on the peninsula and in maintaining the security of the Northeast Asian and Pacific region.

However, in consideration of recent developments in U.S. domestic affairs, the United States Government recently decided on a policy to gradually withdraw its ground troops from Korea, and in fact some of them have already started to be withdrawn.

This Combined Forces Command is being inaugurated today under such condition and circumstance. It clearly demonstrates that, in spite of this partial phase-out of the U.S. ground forces, our two countries are firmly determined to deter another war on the Korean peninsula no matter how adverse the situation and conditions are.

We proudly uphold the memory of the close cooperation between the armed forces of Korea and the United States which was forged into a deep mutual understanding and close companionship-at-arms on countless battle-grounds during the Korean War and the war in Vietnam.

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I am confident that the warm friendship thus consolidated between the armed forces of our two countries will provide the precious groundwork for the successful fulfillment of the duties imposed on this Combined Forces Command.

Officers and men.

International society today is increasingly becoming complex and variable amidst the trends to seek reconciliation and coexistence. Likewise, considerable changes are also taking place in the international environment surrounding this country.

Nevertheless, there still remains one thing unchanged even with the lapse of 30 years. It is the sinister ambition of the north Korean Communists to communize the south by force of arms.

To date, they have committed no less than 40,000 violations against the Armistice Agreement since its conclusion. Furthermore, on the 27th of last month we found near Panmunjom a third underground tunnel dug by the north Korean Communists in preparation for a southward

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invasion. This is a plain proof of the delusion of the aggressive maniac who intends to use any means to overthrow the Republic of Korea.

It is really regrettable that, despite this obvious evidence, some people persist in making misguided assertions that there exists no tension on the Korean peninsula.

We should bear in mind once again that only our invincible power and firm unity can effectively persuade the north Korean Communists to abandon their bellicose dream.

Thanks to the arduous efforts that our people have made in unity and harmony, the Republic of Korea has recorded remarkable progress during the last several years and we are also building, step by step, a self-reliant defense which is one of the most ardent aspirations of the nation.

We, the Korean people, always appreciate the friendly cooperation and assistance which have been provided us by the American Government and people.

In the not too distant future, we will be able to undertake on our own an important role in the maintenance of peace, security and progress in Northeast Asia, as well as

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in the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

Until then, I hope that the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command, maintaining the current mutual cooperative system, will make the nation doubly secure by building up an impregnable defense that permits no slight weak point to be penetrated by the aggressors. That alone is the only short-cut to establishing peace on the Korean peninsula which is then directly linked to the peace and stability of all of Asia.

Firmly confident that future historians will hand down to our posterity the record of the accomplishments of you who have devoted yourselves to the cause of keeping the peace, I join the rest of the nation to pray that success and glory lie ahead of you, the officers and men of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command.

I attach much significance to and tender my gratitude for the fact that Secretary Brown and his associates have come a long way to attend today's ceremony on behalf of the United States Government.

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APPENDIX 5

Map of Defense Communications System


Map of ROKAF Microwave System (PEACE FORTUNE)

(Refer to page 256)

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
DCS BACKBONE WITH SPURS



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ROKAF MICROWAVE SYSTEM
(PEACE FORTUNE)



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APPENDIX 7

Eighth US Army
(C) Master Stationing Plan (U)
1 Feb 78

(Refer to page 122)

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EIGHTH UNITED STATES MASTER STATIONING PLAN (U)
FEB 1978

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(U) CHRONOLOGY

(U) The HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA Chronology is an unclassified adjunct to the command's annual historical report. It is produced and distributed separately to allow the widest possible dissemination to interested recipients.

(U) The chronology is comprised of entries on historic firsts, key changes of command, anniversaries, protocol visits, and significant military, political and economic developments in Korea. It provides a handy reference document of the day-by-day sequence of events affecting local US forces.

(U) Recipients of this history who have not received copies of the supplemental chronology or desire additional copies may contact the Command History Branch, SJS, HQ USFK, APO San Francisco 96301.

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(U) GLOSSARY

(U) This compilation contains a selected listing of abbreviations and acronyms used in this report.

<u>TERM</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
AAD.....	Armistice Affairs Division
AAFES.....	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
ACW.....	aircraft control and warning
AD.....	air defense; ammunition depot
ADA.....	air defense artillery
ADD.....	Agency for Defense Development (ROK)
ADIZ.....	air defense identification zone
ADP.....	automatic data processing
AFK.....	Air Forces Korea
AFKN.....	American Forces Korea Network
AFRTS.....	American Forces Radio and Television Service
AGE.....	aerospace ground equipment
ALO.....	authorized level of organization
ALOC.....	airline of communication
AOAP.....	Army Oil Analysis Program
ARM.....	antiradiation missile
ARNG.....	Army National Guard
ARTEP.....	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASA(I&L)....	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Logistics)
ASD(ISA)....	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(PA)....	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
ASP.....	ammunition supply point
ATC.....	air traffic control
AUTODIN.....	automatic digital network
CFC.....	Combined Forces Command
CIC-K.....	Combined Intelligence Center-Korea
COMINT.....	communications intelligence
CP.....	command post
CPIC.....	coastal patrol and interdiction craft
CPV.....	Chinese People's Volunteers
CPX.....	command post exercise
CSC.....	Civil Service Commission
CS/CT.....	Combat Support/Coordination Team
CUPIDS.....	Command-Unique Personnel Information Data System
CUWTF.....	Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force
DCA.....	Defense Communications Agency
DCS.....	Defense Communications System
DEFCON.....	defense readiness condition
DMZ.....	Demilitarized Zone
DPI.....	data processing installation
DRP.....	Democratic Republican Party

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TAGCEN.....US Army Adjutant General Center
TKP.....Trans-Korea Pipeline
TNT.....Tunnel Neutralization Team
TOC.....Tactical Operations Center
TPFDL.....Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TROKA.....Third Republic of Korea Army
UNC.....United Nations Command
USAFIK.....US Army Forces in Korea
USAHS.....US Army Hospital Seoul (121st Evac)
USAKPA.....US Army Korea Procurement Agency
USAMGIK.....US Army Military Government in Korea
USFK.....US Forces, Korea
USMPHP.....US Military Police Highway Patrol
UW.....unconventional warfare
UWOA.....unconventional warfare operations area
WBSV.....wideband secure voice
WPRG.....Worker Peasant Red Guard (NK)
WRM.....war reserve munitions
WRSA.....War Reserve Stock for Allies
YDPC.....Yongsan Data Processing Center
₩ or Won.....Korean currency (W/484=\$1 as of 31 Dec 78)

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