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1983 ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT

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(U) Pictured on the front and back covers is a segment of the barrier fence near the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone. The Zone, which constitutes the de facto frontier between North and South Korea, is a 4,000-meter-wide strip of land that runs along the 27 July 1953 cease-fire line, from the east to the west coast for a distance of 241 kilometers. It serves as a tenuous buffer between the world's sixth largest and seventh largest land combat forces, each maintaining a posture of readiness for war.



GEN. ROBERT W. SENNEWALD
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ROK/US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
COMMANDING GENERAL, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA/EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301

1983

The Year in Review

At the end of his highly successful visit to Korea in mid-November 1983, our Commander in Chief, President Reagan, joined with ROK President CHUN Doo Hwan in reaffirming the importance of maintaining deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula. President Reagan added that "the security of the ROK is pivotal to the peace and stability of the entire Northeast Asia region and in turn vital to the security of the United States." He noted the success of the ROK-US mutual defense alliance in preventing aggression for more than 30 years and emphasized that "the United States would continue to maintain US forces in Korea and to strengthen their capabilities."

Centering on that dynamic framework of defense obligations and objectives, US Forces Korea and Eighth Army registered significant accomplishments during 1983 in furtherance of United States military and foreign policy goals in the Pacific area. It was a year aimed at consolidating past achievements, updating and coalescing battle doctrine, and planning and implementing improvements in such key areas as force modernization, logistics sustainability, living and working conditions, and interoperability with ROK forces. Operating with a full plate of requirements, most of them unique to the Korean theater, the command's "main business" was focused constantly on one overarching concern--readiness to fight.

Our strategy and commitments fully recognized that the Korean peninsula remained unstable and potentially one of the most volatile areas in the world. Given the peninsula's location at the confluence of three major world powers--the Soviet Union, China, and Japan--any hostilities erupting in Korea clearly held the possibility of wider escalation. Viewed from that perspective, the Korean Demilitarized Zone which separates the North and South was the "front line" for all of East Asia and the Pacific.

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There were no signs that the regime in the North had in any way altered its avowed goal of communizing the entire peninsula. On the contrary, North Korea's hostility and determination in pursuing its objectives through aggression were reemphasized this past year by the reprehensible Rangoon bombing incident in October and several attempts at armed infiltration into the ROK. Reliable research indicated that the North invests nearly 25 percent of its annual gross national product in military spending. This level of expenditure gave rise to a curious anomaly: a nation ranked well back at fortieth place in population had armed forces that were the sixth largest in the world. North Korea had a decided numerical superiority over the ROK in the overall military balance on the peninsula, with nearly twice as many ground force maneuver battalions and significantly greater inventories in most ground, air, and naval weapons categories.

The risk of overt aggression by the North should diminish, however, as the defense capabilities of both US and ROK forces continue to improve and the message of the US commitment remains strong. Evidence of the close cooperation between the US and ROK governments was ample at the 15th annual Security Consultative Meeting held in Washington in mid-April. The ROK Minister of National Defense and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger agreed, pursuant to their respective legislative processes, to augment stockpiles of war reserve materiel, particularly munitions, for enhancing the combat readiness and war sustaining capabilities of the combined ROK-US forces. They also concurred in giving priority to improving the combined ROK-US logistic support system for the rapid and uninterrupted supply of essential war materiel in the event of hostilities. Other agreements reached dealt with improving early warning capabilities, broadening the exchange of strategic information, and exploring means to expand the use of Korean industrial facilities for maintaining US military equipment.

A notable example of ROK government support to US Forces Korea was the Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP) program. Cost savings or avoidances accruing to the United States as a result of ROK CDIP contributions equated to approximately \$970 million annually. Through a ROK government-funded CDIP program, Korean logistic support units stored, maintained, and transported war reserve munitions which were vital for sustaining combat operations in the event of hostilities. Under the same program, the ROK allocated funds for constructing additional ammunition storage facilities. Other significant CDIP support continued in 1983 included ROK manpower augmentations totaling over 10,000 personnel, providing lease-free real estate throughout the ROK for USFK's exclusive use, granting tax exclusions, and reducing electricity rates for USFK installations.

The US forces in Korea had the singular distinction of being the most forward deployed American units in the Pacific area of operations. This forward defense posture dictated urgent requirements for training programs that would ensure the practical application of tactics and doctrine and emphasize our interoperability with ROK forces in the conduct of coalition warfare. One of this year's major tasks, well begun, was to "fix" the US AirLand Battle doctrine to the unique environment and actual capabilities existing in Korea. Combined ROK-US exercises scheduled throughout 1983

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generated valid evidence that we could conduct an integrated AirLand Battle on the Korean peninsula. I will comment on only two of the largest exercises since they were most representative of the training objectives on which we concentrated.

Conducted from early February to mid-April, TEAM SPIRIT 83 was the largest field training exercise conducted in the free world this year with over 192,000 participants. Some 76,000 US personnel from all services took part, including approximately 45,600 who deployed from the continental United States and bases in the Pacific area to augment the in-place ROK-US forces in Korea.

American ground augmentation units included a division headquarters element and a brigade-size task force from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division, a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord, and an element of HQ, I Corps from Fort Lewis. ROK and US ground forces were integrated into combined three-division corps for two-sided, opposing force maneuvers. Two carrier task groups from the US Seventh Fleet conducted combined exercises with the ROK Navy and supported a major amphibious landing made by integrated ROK-US marine forces on the peninsula's southeast coast, the largest beach assault made in the ROK since the Korean War. US Air Force augmentations included elements of three fighter wings and two tactical airlift wings from the continental United States, as well as special operations and supporting aircraft. Air Force commands at various Pacific area bases provided additional fighter aircraft, airlift assets, B-52 bomber support, and airborne warning and control systems. In all, over 600 ROK and US tactical aircraft--air force, navy, and marine--participated in the exercise, with close air support for ground forces constituting nearly half of the 7,400 missions flown.

TEAM SPIRIT 83, the eighth in the annual series, served as a viable test bed to evaluate the development and refinement of operational procedures we would use to fight the Korean AirLand battle successfully. Often overlooked in the extensive publicity surrounding the exercise was one of USFK's major missions: to receive, beddown, stage, and provide all support services for, and finally redeploy US multi-service out-of-country augmentation forces. The outstanding fulfillment of those taskings contributed immeasurably to the success of the exercise.

The major annual command post exercise, ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 83, was held in the latter part of August. Its principal purpose was to enhance ROK-US interoperability by training commanders and staffs from both nations, down to brigade level, in contingency planning, development of wartime operational procedures, and employment of communications systems required for the successful defense of Korea. Held in coordination with ROK government agencies, ULCHI-FOCUS LENS involved the participation of some 6,000 USFK members, as well as a number of out-of-country US military headquarters and other US government elements.

A critical factor in Eighth Army's readiness posture was its force structure, which had to contain the wherewithal for fast-paced combat operations,

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particularly in the first few days of hostilities. By the year's end, EUSA had received 24 of the 100 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters earmarked for replacing UH-1 aircraft. Employment of the UH-60s would more than double troop and equipment payloads for EUSA's airmobile operations. In September the 4th Chemical Company was activated in the 2d Infantry Division to increase forward area CBR defense capabilities. Final planning was under way to convert the armor and mechanized battalions to the "Division 86" structure in FY 1984 and to add a multiple-launch rocket battery to the division's general support artillery battalion.

In February the final increment of A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft arrived in Korea, marking the completion of a tactical air upgrading program begun last year. Assigned to the 25th Tactical Fighter Squadron, an element of USFK's air component, the A-10s provided crucial antiarmor support and constituted a significant combat multiplier for ROK and US ground forces. In August the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron completed the replacement of its OV-10 turboprop forward-air-control aircraft with OA-37 jet models, which had greater survivability and could be employed in close air support roles.

Progress was made during the year toward overcoming severe operational shortfalls in tactical intelligence and communications capabilities. The 501st Military Intelligence Group received additional manpower and equipment to support its collection and analysis functions. Plans were nearing completion for the FY 1984 deployment of a tactical satellite communication company to Korea.

Considerable progress was achieved during 1983 in upgrading the entire spectrum of command and control communications systems. These vital networks had to satisfy the requirements of the binational ROK/US Combined Forces Command and meet wartime survivability criteria. The development and refinement projects, some of which were cost shared with the ROK government, were formalized and consolidated in the annually updated Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea.

Increases in military manpower authorizations for US Army and Air Force organizations in Korea resulted in marked improvement in their training capabilities and readiness status. The augmentations provided additional, critically needed supervisory and hard-skill personnel. Eighth Army's first three "Cohort" units--two infantry companies and a field artillery battery--were assigned this year to the 2d Infantry Division. They arrived from Fort Ord, California, for the final 12-month overseas portion of their three-year unit life cycle under the Army's new unit replacement system.

Continuing efforts to improve living and working conditions for USFK personnel and their families showed positive results during the year. Approximately \$113 million was expended in 1983 on Eighth Army's new construction projects and for renovation of existing facilities. The bulk of those funds was allocated for replacement and upgrading of structures such as troop living quarters, dining halls, and maintenance facilities essential to both readiness and quality of life. Projects in forward areas and other isolated locations were assigned the highest priority. At the year's close,

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an agreement had been signed with the ROK government for replacement of 372 leased family housing units presently occupied by USFK families in Seoul and Taegu. Construction of the new apartment buildings was expected to commence in mid-1984.

In sum, 1983 marked a year in which the US military presence on the Korean peninsula was justified in large measure. The readiness efforts and force improvements I have noted helped materially in deterring a formidable enemy deployed in an offensive posture hard by the Demilitarized Zone, only 4,000 meters north of Republic of Korea soil. During his visit in November, President Reagan gave solid reinforcement to our command's charter mission when he told 2d Infantry Division soldiers at a guard post inside the DMZ: "You stand between the free world and the armed forces of a system hostile to everything we believe in as Americans." That observation served as a stark reminder of the fundamental rationale which drives our initiatives to increase USFK preparedness.

Having touched on some of USFK's historical accomplishments in 1983 and a few of the major issues faced by the command, I would like to turn to the importance of history to the US military establishment in Korea. The volume you are now reading is the only continuing, comprehensive record of significant developments within this command and constitutes the institutional memory of the headquarters. The Annual Historical Review serves as a primary source for official histories published by the US Army Center of Military History and is submitted through the US Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It can be used to good advantage within our own command as a convenient reference guide for current and future planning and operations, as a briefing resource, and as a valuable medium for orienting newly assigned key personnel to USFK's missions, recent activities, accomplishments, and problems.

Finally, it is appropriate to recognize all those who, through their performance and dedication, have made possible the accomplishments recorded in the following chapters--the rank and file from all elements of US Forces Korea.



ROBERT W. SENNEWALD
General, USA
Commander

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LOCATIONS OF MAJOR HEADQUARTERS




Figure 1

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Table 1--(U) Republic of Korea Basic Information
(As of 31 December 1983)

Land Area	38,175 square miles
Limits of Territorial Waters	12 nautical miles
Population	approx. 40 million
Annual Growth Rate	1.57 percent
Literacy Rate	90 percent
Life Expectancy	men, 64.2 years; women, 70.6 years
Arable Land Per Capita	0.2 acre
Gross National Product	\$73.0 billion
GNP Per Capita	\$1,880
Defense Budget	\$4.75 billion
Percent of GNP	6.5 percent
Percent of Government Budget	32.8
Currency	Won: 801=\$1
Type of Government	Republic (power centralized in a strong executive)
President	Chun Doo Hwan
Prime Minister	Chin Iee Chong
Defense Minister	Yoon Sung Min
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Lee Won Kyung
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	GEN Lee Ki Baek
Army Chief of Staff	GEN Chung Ho Yong
Chief of Naval Operations	ADM Oh Kyung Hwan
Air Force Chief of Staff	GEN Kim Sang Tae

US Country Team Principals

US Ambassador	HON Richard L. Walker
Commander, US Forces, Korea	GEN Robert W. Sennewald, USA
Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea	MG Hugh J. Quinn, USA

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(U) The senior US Army officer in Korea directed all four commands, serving as CINCUNC, CINCCFC, COMUSKOREA, and CDREUSA. GEN Robert W. Sennewald functioned in those capacities throughout 1983.

Missions (U)

(U) As directed by the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), COMUSKOREA integrated planning among US component commands in Korea and exercised OPCON over US forces assigned;² functioned as US Defense Representative in Korea, responsible for US governmental administrative coordination as specified in DOD and USCINCPAC directives; provided support for UNC and ROK/US CFC; and coordinated US military assistance to the ROK. COMUSKOREA would coordinate with CINCUNC/CINCCFC when US forces were placed under UNC/CFC control.

(U) CDREUSA was responsible for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces assigned, to insure optimum readiness for ground combat operations; provided logistical and administrative support of forces, including HQ UNC, to fulfill operational requirements of CINCCFC and COMUSKOREA; and provided support to other commands, agencies, services, non-assigned US Army organizations, and ROK forces as directed by higher authority.

Command and Staff (U)

(U) HQ USFK/EUSA was staffed as follows during the period 1 January-31 December 1983:³

COMUSKOREA/CDREUSA: GEN R. W. Sennewald (USA).

Deputy Commander, USFK: LTG J. L. Pickitt (USAF) replaced LTG W. W. Scott, Jr., (USAF) on 27 May.

Chief of Staff, USFK/EUSA: MG J. W. Hudachek (USA).

Deputy Chief of Staff: COL G. M. Hunt (USA) replaced COL J. S. Peppers (USA) on 29 March.

Secretary Joint Staff: COL R. A. Neitzke (USA) replaced COL G. M. Hunt (USA) on 6 April.

Command Sergeant Major: CSM L. J. Hampton (USA) replaced CSM R. Martain (USA) on 10 August.

ACofS, J1: COL B. D. Francis (USAF).

ACofS, J2: BG L. D. Church (USAF) replaced BG J. C. Pettyjohn (USAF) on 26 June.

ACofS, J3: MG K. C. Leuer (USA) replaced MG W. C. Moore (USA) on 30 August.

ACofS, J4: BG J. Piner, Jr., (USA) replaced BG R. W. Pointer, Jr., (USA) on 16 June.

ACofS, J5: BG C. H. Pitman (USMC).

ACofS, J6: COL P. A. Kind (USA).

2. (U) Annual histories published by the 314th Air Division (classified SECRET) contain detailed accounts of significant developments in that command.

3. (U) Headquarters organization is shown on Figure 2.

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ACofS, Comptroller: COL T. A. Gray (USA) replaced COL L. Boyd (USA) on 11 July.
ACofS, Acquisition Management (Prov): Mr. W. J. Curley (Position established on 5 September).
Inspector General: COL G. E. Webb (USA) replaced COL R. D. Alhouse (USA) on 5 July.
Judge Advocate: COL J. R. Thornock (USA) replaced COL T. T. Andrews (USA) on 22 June.
Public Affairs Officer: COL R. J. Aars (USAF).
Special Asst to Dep Cdr, USFK, for SOFA/Intl Relations: Dr. C. B. Hodges.
Adjutant General: COL E. C. Cummings, Jr., (USA).
Engineer: COL M. D. Remus (USA).
Provost Marshal: COL J. H. Blewett (USA).
Surgeon: COL R. Travis (USA) replaced COL G. Seitter III (USA) on 29 July.
Chaplain: COL A. E. Brough (USA).
Asst to CofS, Automation Management: COL G. L. Kosmider (USA).
Director, Joint Command Information Systems: COL J. G. Griffith, Jr., (USAF) replaced COL R. W. Simmons (USAF) on 1 July.
Headquarters Commandant: COL J. L. Haupt (USA).
Civilian Personnel Director: Mr. H. L. Shirley replaced Mr. T. M. Brison on 26 August.
Protocol Officer: LTC E. T. Aberg (USA) replaced MAJ B. E. Wedding (USA) on 6 June.
Command Historian: Mr. J. P. Finley.
Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea: MG H. J. Quinn (USA) replaced MG J. W. Sharp (USA) on 15 July.

(U) Following is a listing of USFK component and major subordinate commanders as of 31 December 1983:⁴

Eighth US Army: GEN R. W. Sennewald.
Combined Field Army (ROK/US): LTG L. C. Menetrey replaced LTG J. B. Vaught on 21 January.
2d Infantry Division: MG H. Doctor, Jr., replaced MG J. H. Johnson on 22 July.
19th Support Command: BG F. E. Elam.
US Army Garrison-Yongsan: COL G. B. Dalglish replaced COL G. O. Green, Jr., on 8 June.
8th Medical Command (Prov): COL R. Travis replaced COL G. Seitter III on 29 July.
8th Personnel Command (Prov): COL E. C. Cummings, Jr.
US Air Forces Korea: MG C. C. Rogers replaced MG F. A. Haeffner on 17 June.
US Naval Forces Korea: RADM F. W. Kelley replaced RADM J. G. Storms III on 15 July.

Distinguished Visitors (U)

(U) A list of ranking visitors to USFK/EUSA during 1983 is at Appendix A. An account of President Reagan's visit to the ROK appears on pages 7-14.

4. (U) USFK command relationships and EUSA force structure are shown on Figures 3 and 4.

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USFK/EUSA HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION




Figure 2

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USFK/EUSA COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS





Figure 3

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EUSA FORCE STRUCTURE



1) UNDER OPCON OF US ARMY ELM, COMBINED FIELD ARMY (ROK/US)

2) ADMIN HQ ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY FOR ALL EUSA UNITS DURING CONTINGENCIES

3) UNDER OPCON OF UNC MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION SECRETARY

Figure 4

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Visit of the Commander in Chief, President Ronald W. Reagan (U)

(U) On 12 November 1983 President Reagan arrived in Korea for a three-day state visit, following a four-day stay in Japan. The official party included Secretary of State George P. Shultz, US Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker, the Counsellor and nine Assistants to the President from the White House Office, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

(U) President Reagan addressed the South Korean National Assembly on the day of his arrival, emphasizing the US commitment as an ally to the ROK. "Let me make one thing very plain," he asserted, "You are not alone, people of Korea. America is your friend, and we are with you." Noting that 1983 marked the 30th anniversary of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, he reminded the Assembly members that "the preamble to that treaty reaffirms the determination of our two countries to oppose aggression." He further remarked that the best way to develop "true security" was by "development of democratic political institutions" and went on to praise ROK President Chun Doo Hwan's "far-sighted plans for a constitutional transfer of power in 1988" in South Korea. He added: "The US welcomes the goals you have set for political development and human rights."

(U) The highlight of the visit was a trip on 13 November to the 2d Infantry Division's Camp Liberty Bell and Guard Post (GP) Collier. The President first attended a worship service conducted by the USFK/EUSA Command Chaplain in the motor pool at Camp Liberty Bell, located about 500 yards south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the ROK from North Korea. Accompanied by a small official party, he next visited GP Collier, a 2d Infantry Division outpost located within the UNC-controlled (southern) half of the DMZ, thus becoming the first US President to go inside the 4,000-meter-wide zone.⁵ During his 25-minute stay, he received a DMZ briefing, toured the GP's underground facilities, and viewed North Korean Army positions only 1,100 yards distant.


(U) Returning to Camp Liberty Bell, President Reagan briefly addressed 2d Infantry Division troops assembled at the mortar bunker area. "You are on the front lines of freedom," he remarked, "You stand between the free world and the armed forces of a system hostile to everything we believe in as Americans You in the 2d Infantry Division and in the other branches of the Armed Forces are our shield against the tyranny and deprivation that engulfs so much of the world." After joining division troops for lunch at the Camp Liberty Bell mess hall, the President visited HQ 1st ROK Army Corps where he watched a Korean taekwondo (martial arts) demonstration before returning to Seoul.

(U) President Chun Doo Hwan told President Reagan afterwards that he had ordered ROK forces "to be prepared at all times to place an artillery barrage


5. (U) Presidents Eisenhower (1960), Ford (1974), and Carter (1979) had visited US Army installations close to the DMZ but did not actually go into the zone itself.

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(U) "You are on the front lines of freedom," President Reagan tells 2d Infantry Division soldiers at Camp Liberty Bell. MG Henry Doctor, Jr., division commander, is at the President's left.




(U) COL Thomas P. Carney, Cdr, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, conducts a DMZ mission briefing for the President at Guard Post Collier.

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
(U) The first US President to enter the DMZ, President Reagan queries 2LT Charles A. Preysler, Guard Post Collier commander, at an observation bunker.



(U) The Commander in Chief views North Korean Army positions and Propaganda Village, a false-front supposed town about 1,100 yards distant.

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(U) The President (left center) attends worship services at Camp Liberty Bell conducted by Ch (COL) Alfred E. Brough, USFK/EUSA Command Chaplain.



(U) The Chief dines with 2d Infantry Division troops at the Camp Liberty Bell mess hall.

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(U) The fighting on the Korean peninsula continued unabated for three years. US casualties numbered 142,091, of whom 33,629 were killed in action or died as a result thereof. It was, at the time, the fourth largest war in America's history. ROK Army casualties totaled over 400,000, and those suffered by the South Korean civilian population were estimated at about one million.

(U) More than 90 percent of the external forces committed under the United Nations Command banner were furnished by the US. The major US combat elements were: Eighth Army, with three corps and nine divisions (including the 1st Marine Division); three task forces of the Seventh Fleet; and the Far East Air Forces, with 20 groups and 70 squadrons. The Marines deployed both a ground division and an air wing. The average US strength in Korea during the war was approximately 250,000, of which about 70 percent were Army troops. A peak strength of 302,000 was reached in July 1953.

(U) The war in Korea ground to a halt when, after two years of difficult negotiations, the Military Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. This was an agreement between the opposing military commanders to cease all hostile actions pending a political settlement. The major powers involved, after talks at Geneva in April 1954, were unable to reach an understanding and Korea remained divided by the Military Demarcation Line. This situation has not changed, and the Military Armistice in Korea is now the longest armed truce in recorded history.

(U) At the time of the Korean armistice, there were about 932,000 UNC ground forces in Korea, including 591,000 ROK and 39,000 from other allied countries. All ROK forces were under the operational control of the US CINUNC in accordance with a 14 July 1950 decree by President Syngman Rhee. Other non-US allies, the largest contingent of which was the British Commonwealth Division, were attached to US commands. In addition to the United Kingdom, these were: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and Luxembourg. Other than small liaison and honor guard contingents, all were withdrawn from Korea by mid-1955 except for a Turkish element which departed in 1966 and a company of Thai troops which was withdrawn in 1971.

(U) The Post-War Era. A Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the US became effective on 17 November 1954. Under its provisions, both parties would act to meet a common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. The ROK granted the US "the right to dispose US land, air and sea forces in and about the Republic as determined by mutual agreement." In an agreed minute to the treaty, the ROK Government announced that it would keep its armed forces under operational control of the United Nations Command as long as the UNC was responsible for the defense of Korea. The US Government agreed to carry out an extensive program of economic and military assistance.

(U) Reduction of US forces in Korea after the war was relatively rapid and within two years of the July 1953 Armistice, US ground forces strength had been reduced to two divisions plus support units. The Eighth Army forward area configuration by mid-1955 comprised I Corps (Group), the "Shield of

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Seoul," responsible for defending the critical western corridors into the ROK. One US infantry division was deployed along an 18 1/2-mile front immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone in the I Corps (Group) sector, and another division constituted the corps group reserve. The balance of the 50,000-man ground force structure in 1955 comprised a corps artillery element, air defense units, a logistical command, and area support and service units.

(U) HQ United Nations Command moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 July 1957 in conjunction with the overall reorganization of US military forces and command structures in the Pacific. Concurrently, US Forces Korea (USFK) was formed as a subordinate unified command of the Hawaii-based Pacific Command. USFK's major missions were to coordinate joint Service activities in the ROK and exercise operational control of its component commands--Eighth Army, US Air Forces Korea, and US Naval Forces Korea. The senior US Army officer in Korea commanded three headquarters, serving as CINCUNC, COMUSKOREA, and CDREUSA.

(U) In the ensuing years, US Army forces in Korea continued their defense readiness mission, helped modernize the ROK armed forces, and added a significant measure of stability that enhanced the ROK's remarkable economic progress. The next major change in US force structure in Korea took place in April 1971 when the 7th Infantry Division was withdrawn. This left the US with no ground troops deployed along the DMZ except for a small element guarding the Panmunjom truce area. The 2d Infantry Division thus became the last remaining US Army division deployed in the strategic Northeast Asia region.

(U) The withdrawal in the spring of 1971, which was part of a general US troop reduction policy in Asia enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, involved a drawdown of 20,000 American troops, mostly from the departing 7th Infantry Division, and necessitated numerous base closures and unit reorganizations and consolidations. The withdrawals, however, were accompanied by increased US military aid for the modernization of ROK forces.

(U) In April 1971, KMAG was eliminated as a subordinate command of Eighth Army and redesignated as Army Section, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K). Previously, the military assistance program had been administered by three separate Service advisory groups, each reporting through its own Service channels. The establishment of JUSMAG-K simplified command relationships by consolidating multi-Service organizational efforts, with the Chief, JUSMAG-K, reporting directly to COMUSKOREA. The restructuring also recognized the lessened need for direct advisory efforts as ROK forces matured.

(U) Meanwhile, the post-war US Army logistics infrastructure in the ROK had been undergoing numerous changes in concept and reorganization, aimed at providing optimum supply and maintenance to US forces. The present systems evolved in 1972 when EUSA decided to consolidate its support activities on a functionalized-area basis. As a result, the huge ASCOM logistics complex near Inchon, one of the most active installations of its kind in the US Army, was closed in June 1973. Missile and aviation maintenance support operations were re-established chiefly around Camp Humphreys; and heavier maintenance support, further south, primarily at Camp Carroll near Waegwan. The 19th Support Command, headquartered at Taegu, evolved as EUSA's principal logistics control organization.

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(U) The US Air Force in Korea experienced its first buildup after the Korean War as a result of the abortive North Korean commando raid on the Blue House (the ROK Presidential residence in Seoul) and the capture of the USS Pueblo. Following those incidents, both of which occurred in January 1968, there was a significant increase in tactical air units in the ROK, with greater emphasis on air-ground operations training. US Air Forces Korea personnel strength doubled to around 10,000.

(U) The US Navy has had no ships or planes homeported in the ROK, and Navy/Marine strength has stood at approximately 400. US Naval Forces Korea provides liaison and support to offshore Seventh Fleet and Marine Corps units during major combined ROK-US exercises.

(U) In response to a feasibility study requested by the JCS, staffs serving HQ Eighth Army and HQ UNC/USFK were integrated into a single joint staff on 1 July 1974. The Department of the Army was designated as the executive agent for the consolidated HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA. Following the discontinuance of the US Army Pacific command in Hawaii, Eighth Army was designated as a major Army command effective 1 January 1975.

(U) In mid-1977, the 4th Missile Command--the last organization of its kind in the Army--was inactivated. EUSA combat support organizations were also inactivated or redeployed from Korea in 1978-79 as the ROK Army increasingly assumed additional communications and logistics support functions. Beginning in 1980, all three HAWK battalions of EUSA's 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade were inactivated and their missions, launchers, and missiles transferred to the ROK Army.

(U) The post-war era has been marked by North Korean belligerence and periods of open violence as the North has built up its war potential. These years of uneasy peace have witnessed, in addition to the commando raid on the Presidential residence in Seoul and seizure of the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of an unarmed USN reconnaissance plane, major infiltration attempts across the DMZ and along both coasts, firefights on the high seas, an assassination attempt on former President Park's life which resulted in the death of his wife, discovery of secret underground tunnel complexes extending from the North into the UNC side of the DMZ, and the brutal axe murders of two US Army officers in the Panmunjom truce area. The most recent addition to the list of violent episodes was the October 1983 bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma, summarized on pages 25-27.

(U) To the Koreans, the reassuring presence of US troops has been a "comrade-in-arms, forward together" association, a helping hand for ROK armed forces, communities, and morale. For the US, our military involvement has been rooted in important strategic considerations. Then-Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand gave the following clear-cut appraisal in 1976:

America's military presence in Korea provides a uniquely stabilizing element on a peninsula where the interests of four major powers converge by operating as a restraint on North Korean provocations, a brake on Sino-Soviet adventurism, and a reassurance to US allies, particularly Japan, of American commitment to their security.

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(U) It was against this backdrop that President Carter, in early 1977, directed the withdrawal of all US ground combat elements from South Korea over a five-year period. Planning for the drawdown included measures to strengthen and modernize South Korean forces as well as a marked increase in US Air Forces Korea's tactical aircraft assets. Because of congressional delays in authorizing compensatory equipment transfers from US to ROK Army units, the original drawdown schedule was modified in April 1978. By the end of that year, only 3,400 personnel, including one of the 2d Infantry Division's maneuver battalions, had been deployed from the ROK. Other EUSA units were inactivated or redeployed during the 1977-78 period and in subsequent years, as noted previously; but those actions had been planned well before President Carter's withdrawal decision.

(U) At the annual ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting in July 1977, US and South Korean defense officials had agreed that a combined command would be established before the first phase of the US withdrawal was completed. Activation of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command on 7 November 1978 at Yongsan Garrison in Seoul was hailed as a major milestone in military cooperation between the two countries and added concrete evidence of American commitment to defense of the Republic. On 8 November 1978 an additional F-4 fighter squadron arrived at Taegu AB for assignment to the 314th Air Division, thereby increasing USAF tactical air power in the ROK by 20 percent.

(U) On 20 July 1979, following his visit to the ROK and after personally reviewing the implications of revised intelligence estimates which reflected a drastically increased North Korean threat, President Carter suspended further withdrawals of 2d Infantry Division elements from Korea pending a reassessment of the military balance. This decision, while welcomed, generated extensive redirection of EUSA's fiscal and manpower programming efforts and major modifications to force structure and stationing plans, all of which had been based on anticipated implementation of the phased withdrawal program.

(U) Results of the intelligence studies which had such a strong influence on the President's decision to postpone US troop withdrawals added an urgent impetus to force readiness upgrading in the ROK. The analyses confirmed that North Korea's ground force strength, armor and artillery firepower, mobility assets, and special warfare capabilities were of a magnitude considerably greater than previously estimated.

(U) When ROK President Park Chung Hee was slain by one of his close associates in October 1979, the steadfastness of the US security commitment made an important contribution to stability in the Republic during the difficult period following the assassination. Steady improvement of combat capabilities and readiness posture continued to be the most prominent USFK/EUSA objectives in the following years.

(U) During 1981-82, US Air Forces Korea added significant combat multipliers to its tactical air inventory. Deployment of an A-10 Thunderbolt squadron markedly improved close air support for ground forces, and more advanced F-16 aircraft replaced F-4 models in the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. In the 2d Infantry Division, delivery of new-model, self-propelled 155mm howitzers and TOW-equipped assault helicopters represented a quantum increase

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in fire support capabilities. At the end of 1982, US Army and US Air Force strength levels in Korea stood at approximately 27,000 and 11,000, respectively.

(U) Summaries of major developments in which HQ US Forces Korea and Eighth Army played significant roles in 1983 comprise the remaining chapters of this volume.

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CHAPTER III: THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (U)¹

The ROK on the World Scene (U)

(U) Two catastrophies, occurring barely a month apart, jolted the South Korean nation in 1983, both of them incredible in their suddenness and violent intensity. The Soviet downing of a Korean Air Lines (KAL) passenger jet on 1 September and the North Korean terrorist bombing attack in Rangoon, Burma, on 9 October generated vehement condemnation throughout the Western world. Summarized accounts of the two tragedies appear below.

(U) Soviet Downing of KAL Flight 007. On 1 September a ROK commercial airliner enroute from New York to Seoul was shot down after overflying strategically sensitive Soviet territory. All 240 passengers and 29 Korean crew members were assumed killed when the plane, a Boeing 747, disappeared in the Sea of Japan after being struck by a heat-seeking missile launched by a Soviet jet fighter. According to KAL, the dead passengers included 76 South Koreans, 61 Americans, 28 Japanese, 23 Taiwanese, 15 Filipinos, 12 residents of Hong Kong, and lesser numbers of nationals from nine other countries. Among the US passengers were Rep. Larry P. McDonald (D-Ga.) and four dependents of US Forces Korea personnel.

(U) The incident aroused an international outcry pointed toward the Soviet Union's reprehensible response to a civilian aircraft's infringement of its territory. In April 1978 a Soviet plane had shot down another KAL jetliner, killing two passengers and forcing it to land on a frozen lake near Murmansk after the aircraft had strayed from its Paris-to-Seoul polar course.

(U) Following a refueling stop in Anchorage, Alaska, KAL Flight 007 departed for Seoul at 0300 Alaska time on 31 August, on the northernmost of three established flight routes. Approximately four hours after leaving Anchorage, the KAL jetliner deviated from its assigned flight path and overflew the Kamchatka Peninsula, where the Soviets commenced tracking it (see Figure 5). The plane then apparently flew a westward course toward Sakhalin Island instead of along its scheduled route further south.

(U) At 0312 Korea time, 1 September, a Soviet SU-15 fighter pilot reported visual contact with the South Korean plane near Sakhalin Island, according to recordings made by Japanese ground sites of the Soviet pilot's radio transmissions to his own ground control. At 0318, according to the tapes, the SU-15 reported that the plane's strobe light was flashing and that its navigation lights were on. In the next few minutes, the fighter apparently approached to within 1.2 miles of the KAL plane, referred to as "the target." At 0323, Flight 007 radioed Tokyo air control to report its position as being east of Hokkaido, Japan. The aircraft, however, was actually north of Hokkaido and more than 100 miles off course.

1. (U) (1) An account of President Reagan's state visit to the ROK appears in Chapter I, pages 7-14. (2) Sources used in compiling Chapter III were news media reference files maintained in SJS Hist Branch,

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


Figure 5

(U) According to the Japanese tapes, at 0326 the Soviet pilot fired one or possibly two missiles at the airliner and reported it destroyed; and at 0338, Flight 007 disappeared from radar screens, apparently crashing into the Sea of Japan. Tokyo air traffic controllers tried to locate the missing plane for nearly two hours but finally informed the ROK that the airliner had disappeared. Because the ROK did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Japan inquired whether the plane had landed on Soviet territory, specifically Sakhalin Island; the Soviets responded that it had not. Through routine electronic monitoring, US and Japanese intelligence services definitively established that evening that Flight 007 had been shot down.

(U) US Secretary of State George Shultz issued a statement the same day charging the Soviets with shooting down the unarmed civilian airliner, noting that an hour after the plane's downing, Soviet controllers had ordered search and rescue aircraft to the vicinity of Flight 007's last known position as reflected by Soviet radar tracking. The Secretary acknowledged that the Korean jet had flown over Soviet territory but offered no explanation for the deviation so far from its scheduled route. A Soviet statement issued the same day in Tass, the official Soviet press agency, claimed that an "unidentified plane" had entered USSR airspace without navigation lights, had failed to respond to signals and warnings from Soviet interceptors, and had instead continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan.

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(U) Commencing about 1100 Korea time, 1 September, US 5th Air Force search-and-rescue planes based in Japan, along with Japanese aircraft and patrol boats, conducted search operations covering some 3,000 square miles but found no evidence of the plane's disappearance. The Soviet Union consistently rejected requests to search its territorial waters. On the same day, the Soviet ambassador to Japan reported that "traces" of a plane crash had been found near Moneron Island, 30 miles southwest of Sakhalin Island, but he did not specify whether the finding was related to the ROK aircraft.

(U) On 3 September, Tass publicly admitted for the first time that the previously "unidentified intruder plane" had been KAL Flight 007 when it charged the US with "feverishly covering up traces of the provocation against the Soviet Union with the utilization of the South Korean plane." The statement accused the US of failing to explain why US and Japanese air controllers apparently had not attempted to correct the airliner's flight in its "rude violation of Soviet sovereignty."

(U) In a 4 September statement, the chief of the Soviet air defense forces asserted that the South Korean plane "flew with extinguished lights, and its outlines resemble much those of the American reconnaissance plane RC-135." He added that a Soviet fighter had made "repeated attempts" to direct the jetliner to a Soviet airfield using internationally recognized signals. He claimed that the warnings proved futile and that the aircraft's "strange behavior" indicated it was engaged in an intelligence mission. The air defense chief, however, did not acknowledge that the plane had been shot down.

(U) The White House on 4 September disclosed that an RC-135 on a routine mission had flown in the vicinity of the KAL jet but that the closest point of approach for the two aircraft was approximately 75 nautical miles (see Figure 5). In a clarification issued on 5 September, the White House said that the US aircraft later "crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner, but by then it was almost 300 miles away." President Reagan, in a nationally televised speech later that day, said the RC-135 had returned to its base in Alaska an hour before the KAL jet was shot down.

(U) In his 5 September speech, President Reagan vehemently condemned the Soviet Union for what he termed as the "Korean Air Line massacre." He said the shooting down of Flight 007 had arraigned "the Soviet Union against the world and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. From every corner of the globe, the word is defiance in the face of this unspeakable act and defiance of the system which excuses it and seeks to cover it up." The President demanded that the victims' families receive just compensation and said he would request that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency, investigate means for preventing future violations of Soviet airspace.

(U) On 6 September the USSR admitted for the first time that a Soviet fighter had "stopped the actions of the intruder plane" but denied that Soviet pilots had known the plane was a civilian airliner. "It was flying without navigation lights, at the height of night, in conditions of bad visibility and was not answering signals," the Soviet Government said. President Reagan, in

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his speech the day before, had described visibility on the night of the shootdown as "clear and with a half-moon."

(U) The United Nations Security Council had convened on 2 September to demand explanations for the destruction of the ROK plane. At the 6 September council session, the US played Japanese tape recordings of the two Soviet pilots' radio transmissions, including those of the SU-15 pilot who downed the KAL jet. US delegate Jeane Kirkpatrick noted that the tape contained no reference to any warning shots and indicated that the only Soviet effort to identify the plane was by means of an identification, friend or foe (IFF) communications signal used only by military aircraft.

(U) Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a speech on 7 September before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Madrid, repeated accusations that the Korean plane was on an intelligence mission for the US. Gromyko charged the US with "persistently trying to evade" the "legitimate question" of "why and how" the plane flew over Soviet territory. US Secretary of State Shultz, after a private meeting with Gromyko the following day, told reporters: "Falsehoods have been continuous, and juggling of the facts is too mild a word for the way in which the Soviet Union has responded to this Korean plane shootdown."

(U) At a press conference in Moscow on 9 September, Marshal Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet general staff, said the incident had been investigated by a "special highly competent state commission," and that it had been "proved irrefutably that the intrusion of the plane of the South Korean airlines into Soviet airspace was a deliberate, thoroughly planned intelligence operation . . . directed from certain centers in the territory of the United States and Japan." Ogarkov also claimed that the KAL plane and the US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft "rendezvoused" and "approximately for 10 minutes in that region, they were flying side by side."

(U) The general staff chief said the decision to shoot down the airliner was taken only after warning attempts failed and the Korean plane "tried to escape" orders to land. On 10 September the Soviet pilot who shot down the Korean airliner appeared on Soviet television and said that he had fired "four tracer shells right next to him, but there was no reaction."

(U) On 11 September the US State Department issued a revised version of the Soviet pilot's radio transmissions, based upon further study and electronic enhancement. According to the modified report, the pilot reported to his ground control that he had fired "cannon bursts" as warning shots approximately six minutes before launching the missiles which downed the Korean plane. The State Department explained, however, that Flight 007 made a routine radio report to Tokyo air control (at 0323, noted earlier) two minutes after the cannon bursts reportedly were fired, and "the evidence indicates that the (Korean) pilot was totally unaware of the fact that he was off course, that he was intercepted by Soviet fighters, or that any warnings--visual, radio, gunfire--were given."

(U) The Soviet Union on 12 September used its veto power to block a UN Security Council resolution which "deeply deplored the destruction of the

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Korean airliner and the tragic loss of life therein." On 14 September both chambers of the US Congress unanimously passed a resolution sharply condemning the Soviet Union, but attempts by some legislators to include specific sanctions were not successful.

(U) Beginning on 9 September, the Japanese recovered some debris and parts of bodies presumed to have come from the downed plane. Portions of the aircraft's tail and fuselage also were found, along with clothing items and other personal effects. US Seventh Fleet ships had been conducting salvage operations in the area to retrieve fragments of the plane, particularly its two flight recorders which could provide data on Flight 007's course.

(U) On 26 September the Soviet Union transferred to US and Japanese authorities 76 items, mostly clothing and other debris from the Korean airliner, reportedly found floating near Moneron Island (see Figure 5) or washed up on Soviet beaches. By that time, five bodies and several body parts had been found on Japanese beaches. On 20 December the USSR turned over 83 additional items of debris and clothing. The US Seventh Fleet had terminated its salvage operations on 5 November, after extensive searches for the planes's flight recorders had proved fruitless.

(U) A draft report issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization on 13 December concluded that KAL Flight 007 had not been engaged in an intelligence-gathering mission and that the crew had not been aware that the plane had deviated from its assigned flight route and was under Soviet radar surveillance. One of the principal theories considered to explain the airliner's straying off course held that the crew could have entered the wrong coordinates in the plane's navigational computer.

(U) The report noted that Soviet authorities had assumed that the KAL airliner was being used for intelligence purposes "and therefore did not make exhaustive efforts to identify the aircraft through in-flight visual observations." The report also found that despite Soviet claims that its interceptors had fired warning shots, the KAL crew gave no indication of being pursued. In addition, the report pointed out that Soviet allegations that the airliner was flying without lights were directly contradicted by radio reports made by the Soviet fighter pilots before Flight 007 was downed.

(U) Rangoon Bombing Incident. On 9 October a powerful bomb exploded at the Martyrs' Mausoleum in Burma's national cemetery in Rangoon, killing four ROK cabinet ministers and two key advisers to President Chun Doo Hwan. Ten other South Koreans and three Burmese journalists also were killed and 48 persons were injured. Another ROK Government cabinet minister and a Burmese photographer later died of their wounds.

(U) President Chun had arrived in Rangoon on 8 October. Burma was the first stop of a planned six-nation tour of Southeast Asia and Oceania aimed at widening diplomatic and economic ties. The following day, ROK and Burmese officials arrived at the cemetery to prepare for a wreath-laying ceremony commemorating Burmese patriots. President Chun's motorcade, however, was delayed by traffic; and the remote-controlled bomb, hidden in the mausoleum roof, went off while Chun was less than a mile away. The ROK Ambassador to

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Burma, Lee Kye Chul, had arrived at the site shortly after a trumpeter unexpectedly rehearsed a requiem dirge which originally was scheduled to be played as President Chun paid tribute to Burmese heroes. That sequence of events led to a supposition that whoever detonated the bomb mistook the Ambassador for Chun.

(U) The dead included leading ROK economic planners as well as experienced diplomats who had significant associations with the US. Among them were: Suh Suk Joon, Deputy Prime Minister and Director, Economic Planning Board; Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk; Minister of Commerce and Industry Kim Dong Whie; Minister of Energy and Resources Suh Sang Chul; Presidential Secretary General Hahm Pyong Choon; Senior Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs Kim Jae Ik; and Lee Kye Chul. Other South Koreans killed included lower-ranking government officials, Chun's personal physician, two security agents, and a reporter.

(U) President Chun returned to Seoul on 10 October, cancelling the remainder of his scheduled 18-day trip. In the wake of the incident, ROK armed forces and police were placed on special alert status. An investigative team headed by Sports Minister Lee Won Kyung was sent to Rangoon.

(U) On 10-11 October, Burmese police captured two suspects and killed a third, all of whom were later identified as North Korean Army officers. All three attempted to commit suicide by detonating hand grenades as police closed in on them. Explosive items found in the possession of the two wounded survivors, as well as on the one killed, matched evidence discovered at the mausoleum.

(U) Meanwhile, large crowds at nationwide rallies in Korea, some government-sponsored, fiercely denounced North Korea for the heinous bombing attack. The ROK Government leadership, however, showing considerable restraint, elected not to retaliate by force but instead urged international diplomatic and trade sanctions against the Pyongyang regime. On 4 November, Burma severed diplomatic relations with North Korea and ordered its embassy in Rangoon closed within 48 hours.

(U) To demonstrate US resolve and support for the ROK, a Seventh Fleet battle group led by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson remained in or near ROK waters until 20 October. The carrier group previously had been scheduled to leave the South Korean area of operations ten days earlier. On 10 October the ROK/US Combined Forces Command took heightened defense measures to guard against any North Korean provocations along the Demilitarized Zone. The added precautions included upgrading the readiness of air defense forces and surveillance resources. The overall ROK/US CFC alert posture (DEFCON), however, was not changed.

(U) An estimated one million people attended joint funeral services on 13 October at Seoul's Yoido Plaza for the 17 victims of the bombing incident. US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger led the US delegation to the funeral which also included Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam and General John A. Wickham, Jr., US Army Chief of Staff.

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(U) The trial of the two surviving North Korean suspects, MAJ Zin Mo and CPT Kang Min Chul, began in Rangoon on 22 November. Kang pleaded guilty on 6 December to charges of murder, attempted murder, and illegal possession of firearms. Zin refused to cooperate with the court and did not enter a plea. On 9 December both officers were sentenced to death and their appeals for clemency rejected. CPT Kang had claimed during the trial that North Korean Army General Kang Chang Su ordered the three officers on the mission to Burma to assassinate President Chun. He testified that they disembarked from a North Korean freighter and had awaited the day of the attack in the Rangoon residence of a North Korean embassy counselor.

North Korean Infiltration Activity (U)

(U) ROK security forces thwarted four North Korean infiltration attempts in 1983. At least 11 North Korean agents were killed and two captured during the incidents.

(U) On 19 June, ROK Army guards intercepted and shot dead three heavily armed NK commando frogmen attempting to cross the Imjin River into the South near Munsan, 20 miles northwest of Seoul. Their equipment included combat fatigue uniforms similar to those worn by South Korean soldiers, civilian clothes, and a sophisticated silencer-equipped pistol used by NK agents on assassination missions. The abortive infiltration was the 35th initiated by North Korean armed agents since 1954, and the ninth since 1980.

(U) ROK Army and coastal guard police forces sank an armed NK spy boat after an exchange of fire on 5 August in waters off the southeastern town of Wolsong, where a nuclear power plant is located. Five agents in scuba gear were killed on the beach and much of their equipment recovered, including a variety of photo reconnaissance equipment.

(U) Eight days later, on 13 August, a ROK Navy helicopter sank a North Korean spy boat in waters near Ullung Island, approximately 100 miles off the southeast coast. The 60-ton vessel was disguised as a Japanese fishing boat and was equipped as a "mother ship" from which smaller boats could be launched. The bodies of three crewmen, underwater gear, three machine guns, and reconnaissance equipment were recovered from the scene of the sinking.

(U) On 3 December, two armed NK infiltrators were captured and their boat sunk near the southern port of Pusan in a joint operation of ROK Army, Air Force, and Navy units. Over 400 items of equipment were seized from the agents including pistols, hand grenades, and a night-sight telescoping device.²

2. (U) Accounts of Military Armistice Commission meetings held as a result of NK hostile actions are included in annual histories published by the United Nations Command.

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Republic of Korea-Peoples Republic of China (PRC) Relations (U)

(U) On 7 May, government representatives of South Korea and the Peoples Republic of China made the first official contact between the two countries since the Communists took power in China in 1949.

(U) A PRC airliner, on a domestic flight to Shanghai from Shenyang in Manchuria, had been seized on 5 May by six hijackers who, after shooting and wounding two crew members, forced the pilot to fly to the ROK. After flying over North Korea, apparently without incident, the plane landed at the Camp Page airfield in Chunchon, 45 miles northeast of Seoul, where the hijackers, five mainland Chinese men and one woman, requested political asylum in Taiwan.

(U) Peking sent a 33-member delegation to Seoul on 7 May, led by the Director General of the PRC's Civil Aviation Administration, to negotiate the return of the airliner and its crew and passengers. On 10 May the ROK and PRC signed an agreement for sending back to mainland China the plane, crew, and passengers, with the stipulation that the hijackers would remain in South Korean custody to stand trial. Under the terms of the 1970 Hague Convention governing airliner hijackings, the ROK had the option either of returning the hijackers to China, as Peking had earlier demanded, or of prosecuting them under South Korean law. The two nations had no bilateral extradition treaty.

(U) The government of Taiwan insisted that the hijackers be granted asylum in that country. The ROK had been the only Asian nation to recognize the Taiwan regime as the sole legitimate government of all China.

(U) On 18 August the Seoul District Criminal Court sentenced the six Chinese hijackers to prison terms of four to six years, despite a provision in the ROK's air safety code which called for the death sentence in hijacking incidents where casualties were involved. The PRC responded the same day that the six should have received "severe penalties."

(U) The PRC's announced objective of maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula was a principal agenda item during Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Yaobang's eight-day visit to Japan in late November. In discussions with Japanese leaders on 24 November, Hu declared that North Korean President Kim Il Sung had assured him that Pyongyang would not invade the South and did not have the power to do so.

Historic Visit of Japanese Premier (U)

(U) Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made a visit to Seoul on 11-12 January, marking the first official trip of an incumbent Japanese premier to the ROK since its founding in 1948.

(U) On the second day of the visit, Japan agreed to provide over \$4 billion in loan credits to South Korea over a five-year period beginning in April 1983. The aid package comprised \$2.5 billion in credits from the Japanese Export-Import Bank and \$1.85 billion in yen-denominated low interest loans for development projects. The ROK had been requesting loans totaling

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\$6 billion, contending that its sizable military outlays, amounting to 6 percent of its gross national product, benefited Japan while weakening the South Korean economy.

(U) In a joint communique issued after conferences with President Chun, Prime Minister Nakasone avowed that the "maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is of vital importance to the peace and stability of Japan and East Asia." The communique also expressed Japanese support for the ROK's initiatives to resume a dialogue with North Korea on the political unification of the peninsula.

(U) Nakasone unequivocally dismissed the possibility of a military alliance between Japan, South Korea, and the US, pointing out that the Japanese constitution "allows the right to defend the nation, but rules out the right to collective defense." He asserted that Japan would continue to limit its military activities to "cooperation with the United States under the 32-year-old security treaty between the two countries."

(U) The Prime Minister promised to improve the status of 700,000 South Koreans residing in Japan, who complained of discrimination and violations of their civil liberties. Nakasone also agreed to establish discussions on expanding the transfer of Japanese industrial technology and opening Japanese markets to more ROK products. The talks would have the primary objective of alleviating South Korea's trade deficit with Japan, which has averaged approximately \$3 billion annually since 1978.

(U) North Korea vociferously protested the visit, labeling it a scheme to establish a military pact against the Pyongyang regime. The North also warned that Nakasone's links with the Seoul government would significantly reduce the chances for reopening talks between North and South Korea on unification possibilities.

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US-ROK Annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) (U)

(U) Background. As part of the increased defense awareness resulting from the January 1968 North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the abortive Communist commando attack on the Blue House (the ROK Presidential residence in Seoul), the US and ROK Governments agreed to conduct annual meetings for top-level security discussions. In those two- or three-day consultations, held alternately in the US and Korea, key military and cabinet-level government officials from both nations presented their respective positions on the threat to the South and endeavored to implement common objectives to insure its security in accordance with the 1954 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), or the Deputy SECDEF, headed the US delegation to each SCM, while the ROK Minister of National Defense (MND) led the Korean conferees at every annual meeting.²⁰

(U) 15th Annual SCM. In early January, after receipt of DOD taskings, USFK staffs and JUSMAG-K developed background and tentative issue papers, under ACoFS, J5 monitorship, to support the US delegation's participation in the SCM. A pre-SCM working conference convened during 14-19 February at PACOM headquarters in Hawaii, where USFK planners (senior officers from ACoFS, J4, J5, and JUSMAG-K) met with OSD, JCS, and PACOM representatives to review and finalize position papers and recommend courses of action for the SECDEF's consideration. The conferees coordinated proposed SCM agenda items in three major areas of ROK-US collaboration--security assistance, logistics, and technological cooperation. Following the Hawaii conference, USFK staff members conferred with their ROK counterparts to develop common positions on intended SCM issues. After further refinement, issue papers and proposed briefings for use by the US delegation were forwarded to OSD for approval.

(U) The ROK-US Senior Level Working Group provided overall guidance and direction for the selection of SCM agenda items based on their relevance and urgency. ROK members were the 1st Asst Minister, MND; the Asst Minister, Planning and Management, MND; the Director, Policy and Plans Bureau, MND; and the Director General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The US was represented by the Chief, JUSMAG-K; USFK ACoFS, J5; and the Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Seoul. In addition to its SCM preparatory functions, the working group also monitored follow-up actions generated from prior SCMs. By design, no formal agreement or mechanism governed the procedures or functioning of the group. Meetings were hosted alternately by the ROK MND and USFK components.²¹

20. (U) Comprehensive accounts of prior SCMs, including agenda items, issues, and proposals, appear in previously published USFK/EUSA command histories.

21. (1) Intvw, J. C. Barnhart with LTC C. T. Guthrie, J5 SCM Off, 29 Mar 84. (2) DF, ACoFS, J5, 22 Feb 83, subj: Pre-SCM Results (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). Filed in J5 Strat & Plcy Div.

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Defense Treaty.²⁹ Secretary Weinberger and Minister Yoon reconfirmed that the continuing, offensively oriented North Korean military buildup posed a major threat to the ROK's security, as well as to the peace and stability of the entire Northeast Asia region. The two delegations expressed satisfaction with progress in implementing plans for improving both US and ROK military capabilities to deal with the NK threat.

(U) Secretary Weinberger reiterated the firm commitment of the US to render prompt and effective assistance to repel any armed attack against the ROK in accordance with the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. He also reconfirmed that the US nuclear umbrella would continue to provide additional security to the ROK. Both officials declared that they would continue to improve their early warning capabilities and broaden the exchange of strategic information. Secretary Weinberger assured Minister Yoon that the US Administration would seek to improve the terms for provision of FMS credit guarantees to the ROK.

(U) Both defense chiefs agreed, pursuant to their respective legislative processes, to augment stockpiles of war reserve materiel for enhancing combat readiness and war sustaining capabilities. They also concurred in giving priority to improving the US-ROK combined logistic support system for the rapid and sustained supply of essential war materiel in the event of hostilities in Korea. Both shared the view that means should continue to be explored for expanding the use of Korean facilities to maintain US military equipment.³⁰

(U) The ROK-US Senior Level Working Group held two meetings, on 8 June and 19 September, to monitor post-SCM follow-up actions and develop common ROK-US positions on unresolved issues.³¹

USFK Participation in the Korea Review Group (KRG) (U)

(U) Background. The KRG was established by DOD in November 1978 to recommend and coordinate policy related to the planned withdrawal of US ground combat forces from the ROK as directed by then-President Carter. In September 1981 the KRG was reconstituted to serve as a high-level forum for following up on past US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting actions and identifying and recommending issues and agenda items to be addressed at the next SCM.

(U) The group's membership included flag officer or equivalent civilian representatives of: the Service secretaries; Chmn, JCS; Under SECDEF for Policy (USD/P); Under SECDEF for Research and Engineering (USD/R&E); Asst SECDEF for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA); Asst SECDEF for Manpower,

29. (U) The treaty was signed on 1 October 1953, about two months after the end of the Korean War. The pact was ratified by the US Senate on 26 January 1954 and became effective on 17 November 1954.

30. Annex G, Record of Proceedings, 15th Annual US-ROK SCM (U), OASD/ISA, 16 Apr 83. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy filed in J5 Strat & Plcy Div.

31. ACoFS, J5 Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD/MR&L); Dir, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E); Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA); and senior representatives of USCINCPAC, COMUSKOREA, and Chief, JUSMAG-K. Meetings are chaired by the Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, OASD/ISA. The KRG's charter authorized it to "deal with SCM-related issues, to include technology transfer, security assistance, US strategic interests in Korea, efforts to improve the military balance on the peninsula, and responses to legislative concerns and inquiries."³²

(U) 1983 KRG Meetings. On 13-14 June, USCINCPAC J5 hosted a working-level conference for selected KRG action officers representing ASD/ISA, JCS J5, USFK J5, JUSMAG-K, and PACOM. The principal conference objective was to determine means for improving the SCM's organizational structure and operating procedures. Primary recommendations were:³³

--Consolidate Logistical Cooperation and Security Cooperation Committees into a single panel since the two committees had traditionally addressed subjects which overlapped and SCM preparation taskings required close and continuous integration of both security and logistics issues.

--SCM agenda items for consideration by the Technological Cooperation Committee (TCC) should be determined by a Korea-based, operations-oriented group to more effectively address deficiencies from a combined ROK-US force viewpoint. Requirements for technical improvements were identified and considered in the past as country-unique issues, applying separately to either ROK or US force weaknesses in combat capability. Furthermore, many TCC actions were based upon scientific desires rather than valid requirements because of a lack of operational input.

--Asst SECDEF (Public Affairs) should control US coordination of the finalized joint communique prior to its presentation to the SECDEF and the ROK MND at the SCM's conclusion.

--Conduct Combined ROK-US Preliminary SCM Meeting (CPSM) in early December each year to develop the agenda and initiate administrative planning for the next SCM. Meeting in the country which hosted the forthcoming SCM, CPSM participants would include representatives from OASD/ISA, OJCS, USCINCPAC, and USFK, along with their ROK counterparts. A follow-up Pre-SCM Meeting hosted by USCINCPAC for US participants to finalize background papers would be conducted six-eight weeks before the SCM Plenary Session.

--Compress schedules of the SCM Plenary Session and ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (held the day before the SCM) and reduce the level of social activities to make maximum use of the available time and lower costs.

32. Under SECDEF (Policy) Memo, 16 Sep 81, subj: KRG. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy filed in J5 Strat & Plcy Div.

33. MFR, OASD (ISA), 15 Jun 83, subj: Mini-KRG Meeting (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). Copy filed in J5 Strat & Plcy Div.

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Table 6--(U) Eighth Army Organizational Changes-198322

Activations/Organizations	Date	Command Assignment
US Army Combat Support Coordination Team #3 (Prov) (see page 117)	1 Jun	EUSA
4th Chemical Company (NBC Defense) <	16 Sep	2d Inf Div <
8th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery ^a	1 Oct	2d Inf Div
Augmentation (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery ^b	1 Oct	2d Inf Div
US Army Intelligence Support Detachment ^c	1 Oct	EUSA Sp Trp
6th Ordnance Battalion (Prov) ^d	1 Nov	Comd (Prov) 19th Spt Comd
Inactivation		
1st Battalion, 38th Artillery ^a	1 Oct	2d Inf Div
Redesignation		
US Army Area II Support Activity-Korea	23 Mar	To US Army Garrison-Camp Page
Relocation		
74th Maintenance Battalion (TMDE), Camp Henry ^e	31 Oct	To Camp Market

^aIn line with DA's Regimental Implementation Plan, the 8th Bn, 8th FA was activated and replaced the 1st Bn, 38th FA, with no change in organizational structure, equipment, or mission.

^bElement attached to Tng Comd Bn, US Army FA Center, Fort Sill, Okla.

^cOrganized to provide automated intelligence data support to HQ USFK/EUSA and ROK/US CFC and subordinate units and operate the Korean Intelligence Support System (see pages 46-47).

^dReplaced the US Army Korea Ammunition Management System to align the 19th Spt Comd organizational structure with echelons-above-corps doctrine.

^eRelocated to place the unit nearer to the majority of its supported organizations, most of which are located north of Seoul. The unit, one of two maintenance battalions of its type worldwide, was charged with calibration and repair of TMDE throughout the Pacific Area.

22. ACoES, G3 Force Dev Div Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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(see page 69). The group supported the need for additional ROK funding of CDIP construction and placed the topic as an issue for the 1984 ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting.³⁵

(U) Descriptions of all CDIP programs and their year-end status appear in Appendix E.

35. ACoFS, G3 Force Dev Div Hist Sum 1983. SECRET (info used CONF).

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Table 9--(U) Participating Forces in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 83

Element	ROK	US	Total
ROK/US CFC Ground Component Command	60,853 ^a	22,195	83,048
ROK/US CFC Air Component Command	25,306	15,268	40,574
ROK/US CFC Naval Component Command	17,076	3	17,079
ROK/US CFC Combined UW Task Force	5,782	176	5,958
US Navy/Marine Corps Forces	--	35,386	35,386
Units Not OPCON to ROK/US CFC	7,217	3,028	10,245
Total	116,234	76,056	192,290

^aIncludes 4,801 ROK Naval Marine Corps personnel.

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Table 10--(U) Location of US Personnel Participating in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 83

Service	In-Country	WESTPAC	CONUS	Total
Army	19,214	5,126 ^a	1,059 ^b	25,399
Air Force	10,749	3,389	1,130	15,268
Navy	380	26,273	90	26,743
Marine Corps	40	8,606	--	8,646
Total	30,383	43,394	2,279	76,056

^aFrom 25th Inf Div, Hawaii.

^bFrom 7th Inf Div, Fort Ord, Calif.

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Training Management (U)

(U) Special emphasis was placed on a number of diverse EUSA training management efforts in 1983. Summaries follow.

--Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training (RCODT). Under DA's RCODT Program, US Army Reserve and Army National Guard units projected for dispatch to the ROK in support of contingency OPLANs were authorized to conduct their annual two-week active duty training in Korea. Program participation had grown from ten reserve component (RC) units taking part in 1981 to 53 units or organizational cells deployed in 1983. A large number of the participating units were used during major exercises such as TEAM SPIRIT. Managed by FORSCOM, the program provided unique mission-oriented training with in-place EUSA organizations to prepare the RC units for their wartime missions. To assist both active and reserve components in RCODT coordination, EUSA conducted pre-annual training conferences in October and February each year. Attendees included representatives from participating RC units, FORSCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and the Office, Chief, Army Reserve. A total of 74 RC units and 113 organizational cells were scheduled for RCODT participation in Korea during 1984.

--Effective 10 October 1983, a Senior USAR Staff Officer (O-6) position was established in EUSA ACofS, G3 with the following major functions assigned: Provide advice and assistance in the formulation, coordination, and administration of policies, plans, and programs concerning USAR units and individual mobilization augmentees operating in Korea during peacetime; maintain liaison between EUSA agencies and USAR command and control elements in CONUS to assist in the effective integration, coordination, training, administration, deployment, and employment of USAR units in the defense of Korea; and maintain contact with USAR units programmed for wartime employment in the ROK to assist in overseas deployment planning and training, readiness assessments, in-country coordination, and development and exercising of command and control systems from a peacetime to wartime configuration in concert with applicable Time-Phased Force Deployment Data. In December, approval was granted for the establishment of a RCODT Liaison Officer (USAR) position in HQ 19th Support Command.⁹

--Range Upgrade Initiatives. Momentum for the long-term development of EUSA firing range improvements continued throughout 1983. Emphasis was placed on regaining EUSA priorities which had been lost as a result of the 1977 Presidential decision to withdraw US Army ground combat forces from the ROK. DA-approved construction projects for FY 1985 included a multi-purpose range complex at Camp Casey and a defense test range and modified field fire range collocated at Camp Greaves to support 2d Infantry Division training requirements. A 25-meter range at Camp Humphreys was programmed for FY 1986 construction. The EUSA Range Development Plan for FY 1987-89 included 14 special purpose firing facilities and range expansions at Camps Casey and

9. (1) ACofS, G3 RC Advr Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Point Paper, ACofS, G3, 17 Jan 84, subj: Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training (RCODT). UNCLASSIFIED.

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Instruction costs estimated at approximately \$36 million. The personnel and equipment resources to operate and maintain the ge facilities continued to be a matter of concern. Actions ess at year's end to obtain DA support for appropriate s.10

Training Ammunition Management. EUSA's FY 1983 training ammunition on amounted to approximately \$23 million, of which about \$4.1 was allocated to the 2d Infantry Division. Actual expenditures, however, were only 93 percent of the total authorization because of a variety of contributing factors. Usage rates were affected by the late receipt of some munitions which forced the rescheduling of major training activities, adjustments to unit training schedules because of operational commitments, and a 20-30 day lag in the data reporting system. Actions taken to improve the usage rate included holding quarterly ammunition managers conferences to better monitor expenditures and the selective cross-leveling of authorized munitions within the command. Authorizations for FY 1984 would total about \$24.3 million, a slight increase over the FY 1983 level.11

--Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). The BTMS was a workshop approach designed to train leaders from battalion to squad levels on how to plan, prepare, obtain resources for, conduct, and evaluate performance-oriented training. A program for training BTMS cadre to conduct Training Workshops and Platoon Trainer Workshops commenced in May 1982. Los Angeles Metropolitan College provided contract instructors until October 1983 when Central Texas College assumed the contract. Training Manager and Training Supervisor Workshops were conducted by the EUSA G3 Training Division staff and major subordinate command cadre personnel. The EUSA program was intended to fill the gap between soldiers in the field who had not been exposed to the BTMS and those who received BTMS instruction routinely in the Army's formal school system. Efforts were directed toward making units self-sufficient by using their own Army Training Board-certified workshop facilitators. Instructors at EUSA's Wightman NCO Academy were certified in late 1983. During the year, the EUSA G3 Training Division also sponsored a facilitator training program which augmented subordinate units' efforts to obtain the certified instructors necessary to conduct higher level workshops.

--Training Management Control System (TMACS). FORSCOM developed the TMACS mini-computer to assist battalion and higher level commanders in estimating, allocating, and tracking available resources in support of annual training plans. The system was designed for operation by personnel without specialized computer training. EUSA received 13 TMACS sets in March 1982 and distributed them to brigade (or equivalent level) organizations. In October 1983 a new TMACS software program was introduced that corrected

10. (1) ACoFS, G3 Tng Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, G3, 11 Jan 84, subj: Range Development. UNCLASSIFIED.

11. (1) Point Paper, ACoFS, G3 Tng Div, 12 Jan 84, subj: Training Ammunition Management. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUSA R&A, 3d and 4th Qtr, FY 83. UNCLASSIFIED.

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UH-60A fielding plan called for EUSA to receive a total of 100 BLACK HAWKS, of which five would be operational readiness float (ORF) aircraft. The distribution schedule adopted was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Aircraft</u>	<u>Fielding Period</u>
4th Sqdn, 7th Cava	25	Nov 83-Feb 84
A Co, 2d Avn Bn ^a	15	Feb 84-Jun 84
201st Avn Co	15	Oct 83-Feb 84
128th Avn Co	15	Apr 84-Jun 84
377th Med Co	25	Jul 84-Oct 84
C Co, 2d Avn Bn (ORF) ^a	2	Jun 84
45th Trans Co (ORF)	3	Jul 84

^a2d Inf Div unit

(U) The fielding plan provided for the simultaneous issue of UH-60As to two different units, one divisional and one nondivisional, over the span of the distribution period to allow adequate time for training air crews and maintenance personnel. Initial support packages were received for those units currently receiving the new helicopters, and new equipment training was completed in all units except the 377th Medical Company by year's end. Plans called for displaced UH-1 aircraft, excess to EUSA requirements, to be retrograded to CONUS, except for ten aircraft to be shipped to the Philippines for foreign military sales.

(U) In April, DA approved a TOE change for the 17th Aviation Group's 55th Aviation Company under which 15 OH-58A observation helicopters assigned to the company would be replaced by ten UH-1H utility aircraft. The change would enhance the company's mission performance by providing an additional lift capability for both passengers and cargo. The 15 OH-58A's were exchanged for ten UH-1H helicopters from the 45th Transportation Company (AVIM), which subsequently retrograded the OH-58's to CONUS. Since the five OH-58's still assigned to the 45th Company represented an unusually low density of observation helicopters in a nondivisional unit, the five aircraft were transferred to the 2d Infantry Division's aviation battalion. All transfer and retrograde actions were completed by October.

(U) To preclude exceeding budgetary and fuel allocation constraints, annual flying hour authorizations were allocated for all EUSA aviation units in accordance with a DA objective ceiling. The program was developed from input by aviation commanders and staffs based upon operational and training mission requirements. DA approved an allocation of 65,933 flying hours for FY 1983. EUSA exceeded the authorization by only 20 hours, which represented a major accomplishment in effective aviation resource management. A total of 63,791 hours were allocated for FY 1984 flight activities. The authorization reflected a 27 percent shortfall of UH-60A hours, from 12,659 required to 9,220 programmed. A DA response to EUSA's request for an increased UH-60A allocation was pending at the close of the reporting period.

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completed 65,953 flight hours without a
ident rate. The flying safety record,
past decade, constituted a significant
14

ation Teams (CSCT) (U)

ary 1975 under an agreement between the
CSCT #1 became operational at HQ FROKA,
SA ACoFS, J3 supervision. The rationale
in the need to strengthen command and
A and enhance ROK-US interoperability in
ies. The assigned missions of CSCT #1
support of the ROK/US Combined Forces
link between FROKA staffs and CFC/USFK/
nd service support in the areas of army
, fire support coordination, logistics,
dition, combined all-source intelligence

activities were coordinated with the FROKA staff to include management,
collection analysis, dissemination, and electronic warfare support. The
team's current staffing structure comprised 13 officers, 28 enlisted
personnel, five ROK liaison officers, 13 KATUSA soldiers, and an attached
liaison section from Weapons Support Detachment-Korea of one officer and two
enlisted personnel. Major activities during 1983 included the following:15

--Coordinated extensively with FROKA during CROSSTRAIN WARRIOR,
a joint airlift/airmobility tactical training exercise conducted on
11-13 January. A total of 28 sorties were flown, 18 USAF C-130 and ten ROKAF
C-123, to airlift 625 troops and 148.5 tons of equipment and vehicles.

--Assisted in the deployment, site preparation, and training of US
out-of-country augmentation forces participating in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 83.
During the ground maneuver phase, CSCT #1 deployed to a field location where
team elements were integrated with their FROKA staff counterparts to foster
interoperability. Practiced maintaining communications with CFC/USFK/EUSA
from FROKA field locations during a short-notice readiness exercise and CPX
ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 83.

--Continued to expand the Combined All-Source Intelligence Center
into a fully functional facility. The CASIC, which served as an entry point
into the CFC/USFK/EUSA theater-level intelligence system, deployed to FROKA's
II Corps field headquarters during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT to support the corps
G2 staff and the US 25th Infantry Division's military intelligence battalion.

14. (1) EUSA Avn Ofc Hist Sum 1983 (U). CONFIDENTIAL (info used
UNCLAS). (2) Point Paper, EUSA Avn Ofc, 25 Jan 84, subj: UH-60 BLACK HAWK.
UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Point Paper, EUSA Avn Ofc, 25 Jan 84, subj: FY 84 Flying
Hour Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) ACoFS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1983 (U).
SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

15. CSCT #1 Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) CSCTs #2 and 3. CSCT #2, activated in January 1980, was deployed to the ROKA's Capital Corps in the extreme western sector of the forward area. The team, under ACoFS, J3 supervision, performed functions generally similar to those of CSCT #1, outlined above, with a manning level of six officers, two enlisted personnel, three ROKA liaison officers, and five KATUSA soldiers. Because of a reorganization of the ROK/US CFC's Ground Component Command, effective 1 June 1983 (see pages 49 and 51), CSCT #2 was redesignated as CSCT #3 (Provisional) on the same date and relocated to HQ Third ROK Army. Team #3's mission was expanded to include functions relative to the operation and support of the CASIC scheduled to become fully operational at HQ TROKA in early 1984. A staffing structure consisting of 18 officers and 40 enlisted personnel was authorized for CSCT #3 operations. The team participated with TROKA staffs in short-notice readiness exercises and CPX ULCHI-FOCUS LENS during the latter half of the year. The location of the team in an area distant from US facilities required construction of a support base. The first phase of construction, which commenced in October and included barracks, orderly room, dining facility, and recreation area, was projected for completion in July 1984.¹⁶

16. CSCT #2 and 3 Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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


Figure 12

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Support (I)
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for Supply Distribution Systems
A - CY 1983¹⁹
(Parentheses)

DSS-K	ALOC-K
68.6) days	22 (27.2) days
12.9) days	9 (10.4) days
15.0) days	10 (11) days
46.0 (55.7) days	13 (16.8) days
44.0 (45.0) days	17 (17) days

expended in forwarding the requisition from the EUSA SSA to NICP and, once the materiel requisitioned arrives at the POD in the time elapsed until the materiel is posted to the SSA accountable records.

^bTotal time expended from receipt of the requisition by the CONUS NICP until the materiel's arrival at the POD in Korea.

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EUSA Product Improvement/Modification Work Order Program (U)

(U) AR 750-10 established requirements governing the upgrading and modernization of Army materiel to enhance readiness, safety, effectiveness, and reliability. The application of modifications to Army equipment within EUSA was accomplished in various ways, depending upon the number of items involved and the complexity of the equipment. Relatively simple modifications were usually applied by in-country direct support units, while those of a more complicated nature were applied at general support level or by MACOM-sponsored teams from CONUS. Those involving a large number of items at different locations were sometimes applied through contracts with ROK industrial firms.

(U) Some of the more significant modifications applied to EUSA materiel during 1983 were:

--M561 Gama Goat and M792 Vehicles. Modification provided a self-primary-type oil pump to reduce early failure of the transfer gear assembly, changed the exhaust system to decrease the amount of fumes entering the driver's compartment, and replaced the steering U-joint and column to improve steering efficiency.

19. (1) ACoS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) EUSA R&A 4th Qtr, FY 83 and 1st Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

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--AN/ASC-15 Command Consoles. Modification provided a secure retransmission capability for EUSA aircraft equipped with the consoles.

--AS-1729/VRC Antenna. Modification reduced the probability of physical damage due to water intrusion into the unit base.

Maintenance Awards for EUSA Units (U)

(U) DA established the Chief of Staff, Army, Award for Maintenance Excellence in 1982 to improve unit readiness worldwide by providing a positive incentive for extraordinary organizational maintenance efforts. The annual competition was open to all active Army, Reserve, and National Guard units. MACOMS selected finalists in three equipment density categories--light, intermediate, and heavy.

(U) The winning units for the 1982 EUSA competition, chosen by an evaluation board on 12 January 1983, were: Light category - 46th Transportation Company (Medium Truck), assigned to the 19th Support Command's 69th Transportation Battalion (Motor Transport); Intermediate category - Company B, 44th Engineer Battalion (Combat), an element of the 2d Engineer Group; and Heavy category - 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 2d Infantry Division. On 30 March, DA announced that the EUSA finalists in the intermediate category (Co B, 44th Engr Bn) and heavy category (6th Bn, 37th FA) were selected as runners-up for the Chief of Staff, Army, Award for Maintenance Excellence. The awards were presented on 15 April at the American Defense Preparedness Association annual convention in Washington, DC.²⁰

Maintenance of USFK Equipment by ROK Industry (U)

(U) Background. In December 1976, at DA direction, EUSA lost its mission to perform depot-level maintenance; and Camp Carroll Army Depot at Waegwan was redesignated as the US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea. Equipment requiring depot-level maintenance was either returned to CONUS depots for overhaul, resulting in excessive turn-around times, or processed through in-country property disposal agencies. During the 13th Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in 1981, the Korean Government proposed the utilization of ROK industrial facilities to support USFK equipment maintenance requirements. At the 1982 and 1983 SQMs, the US SECDEF pledged efforts to identify means of increasing US use of the ROK industrial base. Several technical teams from DOD, DA, and DARCOM conducted surveys of Korean industrial firms and validated their existing capabilities to perform maintenance on US military equipment in various commodity categories.

(U) Equipment items for potential contracts were selected when it was determined that maintenance or repair was beyond USFK capabilities or capacities, could be adequately accomplished by ROK firms, and did not adversely affect the US logistic support base. All repair parts were obtained from CONUS sources; however, some materials, such as rubber for tire

20. ACoFS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1983. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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were des

orean sources. The attainment of sizable savings to USFK in reduced hanced maintenance turn-around time nability of USFK equipment. In development of the ROK industrial

1-26 April 1983, a maintenance natives from EUSA, DA, DARCOM, ns for maintenance contracting, rces of funding, and developed administrative and logistical 983 DA draft Program Budget personnel spaces for the jority to be assigned to the nction as quality assurance

USFK had awarded 15 contracts to as a result of the contracting effort, ss of more than \$17.5 million. Summaries of the effect during 1983 appear below.

--EUSA M113-Series Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Modernization program. In February 1980, DA approved a program to modernize EUSA's fleet of M113-series APCs by applying product-improvement kits while the vehicles were undergoing depot-level overhaul. Vehicles included in the program were the M113A1 Squad Carrier, M106A1 4.2-inch Mortar Carrier, M125A1 81-mm Mortar Carrier, M548A1 Tracked Cargo Carrier, and the M577A1 Command Post Vehicle. At the end of 1982, a total of 230 APCs in the 2d Infantry Division had been overhauled by Daewoo Heavy Industries, under annual contracts first awarded in April 1981. Modification of the M113A1 and its variants to A2 configuration included the fitting of improved suspension and cooling systems. Production quality met the standards of depot maintenance work requirements established by Red River Army Depot. The production schedule for a third-year contract, awarded in November 1982, called for the modernization of 161 additional vehicles, with a projected completion date of 31 January 1984.

--In October 1982, DA agreed to expand EUSA's M113-series upgrading program to include M730A1 CHAPARRAL Air-Defense Missile System Carriers and M741A1 VULCAN Gun Carriers. Conversion of 61 APCs to M901A1 Improved TOW Vehicle configuration was approved in November 1982, which would mark the first time such a modification has been performed outside CONUS. The total program was broadened in 1983 to include the modernization of 496 M113-series vehicles over a five-year period (394 EUSA, 24 USAFK, and 78 from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division). Total contract costs would amount to approximately \$4.84 million; savings to USFK were estimated at \$15.71 million.

21. (1) ACoFS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1983 (U) SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) FONECON, J. C. Barnhart with LTC J. G. Meikle, Dep Cdr, USAKCA, 28 Jan 85.

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--Refurbishment of EUSA Tractors. A contract was awarded in June 1982 to the Hae Nin Tractor Company to overhaul 13 EUSA D7F (Caterpillar) tractors. The contractor completed a second-year production schedule for 21 tractors in December 1983, making a total of 34 D7Fs refurbished by ROK industry. Contract costs amounted to \$524,108, while EUSA savings totaled \$549,318. At year's end, negotiations were in progress to overhaul ten D8K tractors during 1984.

--EUSA Tire Retread Program. Based upon the DA policy that MACOMs obtain 75 percent of their replacement tire requirements from retreaded products, it was determined that ROK industrial firms possessed the capability to retread EUSA's worn tires. For most tire sizes and types, the retread cost was estimated as approximately 30-40 percent of the cost for new acquisitions. The Chosun Tire Company received an initial contract in September 1982 to retread 15,459 tires at a cost of \$448,228. In December 1983, a second-year contract was awarded for 15,259 additional tires. Costs of the two contracts totaled \$949,091, while EUSA savings were estimated at approximately \$2.15 million.

--Stripping and Repainting of US Army Aircraft. US Army Troop Support & Aviation Materiel Command provided funds in 1982 for local procurement of services to strip and repaint, with chemical agent resistant coating, seven RU-21 and six RV-ID aircraft assigned to the 501st MI Group's 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation). Korean Air Lines received a contract in September 1982, valued at \$284,000, to perform the work in its overhaul facility at Kimhae, using US Government-furnished material (GFM). Cost savings were estimated at \$1.1 million. Initial production had to be delayed until 7 June 1983, however, because of the nonavailability of GFM. By 25 August, work on three aircraft had been completed. A further delay ensued since the initial contract had not called for removing epoxy primer from the aircraft. At year's end, the contract was being modified to require stripping to bare metal, a process which would require additional GFM.

--EUSA Vehicle Rustproofing Program. Following a survey by a CONUS team in April 1982 to validate ROK industrial capabilities, the Bo Sung Automobile Company received a contract in October 1982 to rustproof EUSA's tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. The first contract production schedule called for work on 198 M911 and M915-series vehicles, 51 M871 trailers, and 23 20-ton dump trucks, to be completed in January 1984. Contract costs totaled \$75,701, and cost savings were projected as \$302,000.

--US Air Force Contracts. USAF maintenance projects with ROK industries included the following contracts to be performed in FY 1984 by Korean Air Lines (costs in parentheses): corrosion control and painting of 24 F-15 aircraft (\$3.6 million); depot maintenance repair of 13 F-4 aircraft (\$3.0 million); and depot maintenance repair of nine C-130 aircraft (\$2.7 million). Cost savings computations had not been completed at the close of FY 1983.

--US Navy Contracts. During 1983, three USN Military Sealift Command ships underwent repairs by ROK industrial firms. Contract costs totaled approximately \$1.1 million; cost savings had not been determined at year's end.

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(U) Eighth Army identified the following five additional programs for contracting with ROK industry, with most planned for FY 1984 production starts (estimated contract costs/cost savings in parentheses): overhaul of approximately 96 tactical wheeled vehicles (\$640,000/\$768,000); refurbishment of track shoes/pads and roadwheels for combat vehicles (\$908,000/\$840,000); overhaul of 54 construction equipment items and 34 materials handling equipment units (\$376,000/\$748,000); overhaul of approximately 918 commercial vehicle components (\$839,000/\$900,000); and rebuilding of approximately 250 communications equipment items (\$316,000/\$632,000). At year's end, the Air Force had under study a program for contracting the repair of J-79 aircraft engine components.²²

EUSA Army Stock Fund (ASF) Operations (U)

(U) The ACofS, J4 had staff responsibility for overall EUSA ASF management and operations, while the ACofS, Comptroller provided staff accounting advice and assistance. EUSA ASF branch offices (operational elements) were located at the 19th Support Command's 6th Support Center (Materiel Management) and the 8th Medical Command's 6th Medical Supply Unit (Optical and Maintenance).

(U) EUSA ASF peacetime obligations for FY 1983 totaled \$149.7 million, representing an obligation authority utilization rate of 99.8 percent. In addition, DA provided a \$14.0 million war reserve obligation authority for investment in high-priority EUSA sustainability requirements (see page 119). FY 1983 obligations were approximately \$19 million higher than the FY 1982 level. Higher item unit prices and the inclusion of requirements for nonstandard, nonstocked items that were consumer-funded in FY 1982 accounted for most of the gain.

(U) DA approved a peacetime obligation authority amounting to \$186.0 million for FY 1984 requirements, almost 25 percent above the FY 1983 funding level. The projected increases resulted from product cost growth and support item requirements for new equipment fielded under EUSA's force modernization program. EUSA also received an additional \$14.4 million war reserve obligation authority to further improve wartime sustainability.²³

Significant Transportation Developments (U)

(U) Impact of Osan Air Base Runway Closure. The closure of the runway for repairs from 1 August to 10 December provided USFK with an excellent opportunity to exercise logistic support concepts in Korea. Air passenger

22. (1) ACofS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1984 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Point Paper, ACofS, Mat Spt Div, 20 Jan 84, subj: Contract Maintenance with ROK Industry. UNCLASSIFIED.

23. (1) ACofS, J4 Resr & Sys Mgt Div Hist Sum 1983. (2) Point Paper, ACofS, J4 Resr & Sys Mgt Div, 20 Jan 84, subj: EUSA Army Stock Fund Operations. (3) EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 83. All are UNCLASSIFIED.

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operations, primarily space-required missions, were successfully shifted to Kimpo International Airport in Seoul. Other passenger service principally related to space-available travel was moved to Kimhae International Airport near Pusan and to the ROKAF base at Suwon (midway between Seoul and Osan). Kimhae became the major aerial port for USFK cargo being moved by strategic airlift. The temporary closure of Osan AB provided a realistic test of host nation support arrangements and the Korean Contingency Resupply/Redistribution System.

(U) Containerized Cargo Handling Capability Analysis. Following the January 1983 Joint Deployment System refinement conference, USCINCPAC tasked COMUSKOREA to furnish comprehensive data on the current and programmed capabilities for cargo container discharge, distribution, and inland reception in Korea. ACoFS, J4 coordinated with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to obtain assistance in preparing a professional assessment. The MTMC's Transportation Engineering Agency published a study plan in April and completed an on-site survey of ROK ports in October. The study's primary objectives were to determine overall concepts of operation for containerized cargo handling functions, develop a viable containerized ammunition distribution system, and provide a data base for war planning in both an interim manual mode and a longer-range automated mode. Draft results of the study were expected to be available by April 1984.²⁴

New EUSA Milk Plant (U)

(U) The existing contractor-operated EUSA Milk Plant began operation in 1958 at Camp Baker in Seoul. Because of the age and nature of the facility, it had become increasingly difficult to maintain adequate operational and sanitation standards. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain funding in FYs 1979 and 1980, Congress approved an MCA project in September 1981 to construct a new milk plant at K-16 Airfield near Seoul, with the total cost estimated at \$5.6 million. In addition, \$1.2 million in OPA funds was allocated for the purchase of modern, labor-saving production equipment. A ROK construction company commenced work on the new plant in November 1981, and the basic facility was completed in October 1983. All new equipment items were received by year's end, and contract negotiations for their installation were in progress. The new EUSA Milk Plant was anticipated to be fully operational by 1 July 1984.

EUSA Energy Conservation Program (U)

(U) EUSA's FY 1983 energy conservation goals were based upon DA objectives calling for a 16 percent reduction in facility energy use (heating fuel and electricity) from a FY 1975 consumption base and a 10.6 reduction in mobility fuels (JP4 aviation fuel, automotive gasoline, and diesel fuel). The annual MACOM goals constituted increments of DA's long-range objective for achieving a 25 percent reduction in facility energy use and a 10 percent decrease in mobility fuels by FY 1985, as applied against the FY 1975 baseline.

24. ACoFS, J4 Trans Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) In FY 1983 facility energy consumption, EUSA's performance was recorded at 17.7 percent below the FY 1975 baseline level of 7,511,337 MBTUs (millions of British thermal units), exceeding the DA objective by 1.7 percent. The usage of mobility fuels was 16.4 percent below the FY 1975 level of 2,479,891 MBTUs, surpassing DA's objective by 5.8 percent. EUSA's energy costs for FY 1983 are shown on Table 16.

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Table 16--(U) EUSA Energy Costs - FY 1983²⁵
(Dollars in Millions)

Type	Allocation	Consumption	% Difference
Heating fuel	\$29.105	\$26.463	-9.1
Electricity	27.641	29.518	+6.8 ^a
Mobility Fuel	20.244	19.354	-4.4
Mobility Reserve	.480	--	--
Total	\$77.470	\$75.335	-2.8

^aConsumption was higher than planned primarily because of increased electrical equipment acquisitions throughout EUSA and abnormally cold winter weather. DA had not established separate objectives for heating fuel and electricity; usage levels of heating fuel and electricity were combined and reported as total facility energy consumption.

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(U) In November the new position of Energy Conservation Manager (DAC GS-12) was established in the ACoFS, J4 Services and Energy Division. Energy conservation targets established for FY 1984 were to reduce facility energy consumption to 18 percent below the FY 1975 baseline and mobility fuel use to 7.9 percent below the baseline level.²⁶

25. EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 83. UNCLASSIFIED.

26. (1) ACoFS, J4 Svc & Energy Div Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 83. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Point Paper, ACoFS, J4 Svc & Energy Div, 20 Jan 84, subj: Energy Goals and Accomplishments. UNCLASSIFIED.

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USFK/EUSA Acquisition Activities (U)

(U) Acquisition Management Concept and Procedures. Since 1967 there had been strong evidence of collusive bidding practices among Korean contractors doing business with USFK. Congressional criticism in 1976 concerning alleged improprieties in USFK acquisition methods served as a catalyst for adopting an essentially non-competitive Controlled Single-Source Selection Procedure (CSSSP) in March 1977 for a three-year test period. To achieve more responsive and cost-effective contract performance, two new overseeing elements were established: the Source Selection Board (SSB), with the primary function of choosing Korean contractors to be solicited for USFK requirements; and the Command Acquisition Policy Board for monitoring SSB operations, providing policy guidance for the improvement of procurement activities and for assuring that the contractor selection system maintained consistency with Service component policies. In October 1979 the Assistant Secretary of the Army (RD&A) authorized USFK to continue use of the CSSSP through CY 1984.

(U) During the period 7-25 February 1983, the DA Acquisition Management Review Agency (AMRA) conducted an in-country survey of contract management within USFK and implementation practices at the US Army Korea Contracting Agency (USAKCA). The primary purpose of the survey was to assess the overall effectiveness of the CSSSP. The AMRA team concluded that (1) the fundamental acquisition environment in Korea, where competition in contract services was effectively precluded, had remained largely unchanged since 1977, and (2) the method of selecting a single prospective contractor source, under CSSSP provisions, continued to be the only viable means for executing USFK contracts.²⁷

(U) Realignment of USFK Acquisition Functions. Concurrent with the issuance of AMRA's survey report in early May, the ASA (RD&A) requested COMUSKOREA to provide plans and proposed refinements for USFK/EUSA contracting management and operational practices. In his 30 June response, COMUSKOREA recommended that USFK assume the acquisition missions and functions which the Hawaii-based US Army Western Command (WESTCOM) had performed in support of USFK/EUSA since 1979. The transfer would entail the designation of CDREUSA as a Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) and COMUSKOREA as operationally responsible for the CSSSP. A central, composite office would be established in HQ USFK/EUSA by 1 December to perform HCA and CSSSP functions as well as subordinate unified command coordinative roles. The proposed Assistant Chief of Staff, Acquisition Management (ACoFS, Acq Mgt) heading the office would

27. (1) ACoFS, Acq Mgt Hist Sum 1983. (2) Ltr, ASA (RD&A), to distr, 5 May 83, subj: Acquisition Management Review Agency Survey of Management of the Controlled Source Selection Procedure (CSSP) at U.S. Army Korea Contracting Agency (KCA), Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) and Far East District (FED), Corps of Engineers (COE) Seoul, Korea. Filed in ACoFS, Acq Mgt. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

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report directly to the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff. The Chief, ACoFS J4 Staff Acquisition Office was tasked to coordinate the transfer of the functions.²⁸

(U) The ASA (RD&A), on 26 July, approved COMUSKOREA's plan for the realignment of USFK/EUSA contract management operations. The approval message specified that COMUSKOREA would function as a Head of Contracting Activity only in his role as CDREUSA. As an HCA, he would manage contracting activities through technical channels rather than command channels, with direct authorities from the Secretary of the Army. As COMUSKOREA, he would have special responsibilities for the stewardship of the CSSSP, the method authorized for use in selecting Korean contractors in lieu of the normal competition requirements prescribed in DOD acquisition regulations. All DOD contracting offices in Korea (USAKCA, Far East Engr Dist, and Korea Area Exchange) were required to establish internal CSSSP operating procedures consistent with the controlling USFK regulations. COMUSKOREA was directed to furnish ASA (RD&A) an annual assessment of the CSSSP, to include trends and recommendations for continuing or changing the basic policy.²⁹

(U) Effective 1 December 1983, CDREUSA was designated as a Head of Contracting Activity. After functioning on a provisional basis since 5 September, the Office of the ACoFS, Acquisition Management became fully operational on 1 December as a separate HQ USFK/EUSA staff element. Concurrently, the ACoFS, Acq Mgt assumed staff supervision over the USAKCA. The transfer of three DAC personnel spaces from WESTCOM, for inclusion in the new office's staffing pattern, was pending at year's end.³⁰

(U) 1983 Contract Execution and Administration. The US Army Korea Contracting Agency continued its direct support procurement mission, providing supplies, services, and construction services to USFK elements throughout the ROK. During the year, USAKCA executed over 75,000 contractual actions valued at over \$144 million. Values of contracts, by commodity types, are shown on Table 17. (See pages 133-136 for descriptions of USFK contracts with ROK industry for maintenance of US military equipment.)

(U) Initiatives to Improve Contract Administration. In response to Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) citations of increasing irregularities in contractor cost data, the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff directed several actions during 1983 to preclude incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse in contracting activities. The possible elimination of contractors under solicitation due to DCAA audits was assessed to have the potential for inhibiting in-country

28. Msg, COMUSKOREA, to ASA (RD&A), 300001Z Jun 83, subj: Contract Management Support for USFK/EUSA. UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in ACoFS, Acq Mgt.

29. (1) Msg, ASA (RD&A), to COMUSKOREA, 261630Z Jul 83, subj: Contract Management Support for USFK/EUSA. Filed in ACoFS, Acq Mgt. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, Acq Mgt, 20 Jan 84, subj: Expanded Contracted Management. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

30. ACoFS, Acq Mgt Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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contracting operations during end-of-fiscal-year close-outs and for affecting contracts which supported immediate mission needs.

(U) The thrust of the effort was centered on assuring that (1) contractual needs were fully evaluated prior to the solicitation process, (2) statements of work and specifications were clear and accurate, and (3) contracting officer's representatives (COR) in subordinate organizations responsible for monitoring contractor performance were adequately trained and given the resources to accomplish their surveillance missions. In May, commanders of requiring activities were directed to establish board procedures to verify the need for proposed supply and service contracts and to assure the adequacy of contract surveillance after awards were made. Major subordinate commanders were tasked in September to appoint a principal assistant for all matters pertaining to the COR program.³¹

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Table 17--(U) USFK Contract Values - CY 1983³²
(Dollars in Millions)

Commodity	Army	Air Force	Navy	Total
Services	\$37.2	\$7.4	\$1.8	\$46.4
Utilities	28.8	8.7	--	37.5
Supplies	18.8	6.1	0.5	25.4
Construction	9.7	1.8	--	11.5
Facility Engineers	8.3	2.0	--	10.3
Nonappropriated Fund	6.3	0.3	--	6.6
Subsistence	6.1	0.3	--	6.4
Total	\$115.2	\$26.6	\$2.3	\$144.1

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31. (1) USAKCA Hist Sum 1983. (2) Ltr, EAKC-CO, USFK, to distr, 10 May 83, subj: Establishment of Review Procedures for Contractual Requirements. (3) Ltr, EAKC-CO, USFK, to distr, 12 Sep 83, subj: USFK/EUSA Contracting Officer's Representatives. (4) Ltr, EAKC-CO, USFK, to distr, 8 Nov 83, subj: Preparation of Estimates and Statements of Work for Contracted Supplies and Services. All references UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in USAKCA.

32. USAKCA Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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end of 1985. Series production of the ROKIT was forecasted to commence in early 1988 and continue through the 1990s.

(U) In March 1983 the MND established a ROKIT field office in Warren, Mich, near Detroit, to provide more direct coordination with GDLS and the US Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), both located in the Detroit vicinity. The Washington field office was retained as an administrative element. At year's end, some 35 ROK development and manufacturing engineers were assigned to the Warren office to coordinate TDP delivery, evaluate industrial plant equipment required to undertake tank production in the ROK, and develop cost-effective manufacturing procedures.

(U) The Project Manager, M1 Tank System (PM-M1), in TACOM assumed responsibilities in April 1983 for coordinating ROKIT activities and providing assistance and consultation. The PM-M1, then-MG D. D. Ball, visited Korea on 25-29 April to conduct a risk assessment of the ROKIT program. As a result of his recommendations, additional engineering and technical personnel were added to the ROKIT Program Manager's Office staff and a ROKA BG was appointed to head the organization. In addition, the MND established an ad hoc program review committee chaired by the First Asst Minister, MND, and including representatives from the Agency for Defense Development (ADD)⁸, ROK Army Training Command, and the Ministry of Trade & Industry, as well as Hyundai Rolling Stock and ROKIT subcontractors.

(U) MG R. J. Sunell, appointed PM-M1 in June, visited the ROK on 23-29 October to evaluate ROKIT program developments. During the visit, the ROKIT Program Manager conducted the initial in-country XK-1 program review. After a tour of Korean manufacturing facilities and briefings on production capabilities, General Sunell concluded that the ROKG possessed the capacity to produce the ROKIT in accordance with the program schedule. Staffing of a ROKIT Support Office, organized as an element of the PM-M1 Office in TACOM, was under way at year's end.⁹

8. (U) The ADD, a quasi-governmental agency, was established in 1970 to provide R&D support for ROK armed forces and defense industries. Agency missions included conducting military research and engineering projects, testing and evaluating weapon systems and other materiel, and developing defense-related technology. The US had provided technical assistance to the ADD since 1972 through information exchanges, joint ROK-US research projects, and the direct involvement of JUSMAG-K project engineers. As the level of technological expertise in ADD increased rapidly over the years, JUSMAG-K engineers shifted their emphasis from "hands on" technical help to assistance in planning and conducting comprehensive R&D programs. The ADD, headquartered at Taejon, operated R&D and engineering centers at Taejon, Anheung, and Chinhae; JUSMAG-K maintained permanent offices at the Taejon and Chinhae centers.

9. (1) JUSMAG-K ACofS, Dev & Technology Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K ACofS, Dev & Technology, 21 Nov 83, subj: ROK Indigenous Tank Program (ROKIT XK-1) (U). CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Info Paper, PM-M1, 30 Nov 83, subj: ROKIT Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

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nology. The US Army maintained 18 annexes; the US Navy, 17; and the US Force, three.

(U) One new US Army annex, covering Proving Ground Technology, was signed in 1983, bringing the total number of DEA annexes in effect to 39. The US Navy had approved one new annex, on Shallow Water Surveillance Systems and Techniques, and a modification of the existing annex on Torpedoes. Both were awaiting ROKG signature at year's end. Two proposed annexes were under review by US Services: Diving, Salvage, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Navy); and Airborne Electronic Systems and Techniques (Air Force).

(U) At the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in April 1983, the ROK ADD had proposed expanded cooperation in the development of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare defense systems (see page 63). In early October the US Army upgraded the security classification level of data to be exchanged under the CBR DEA from CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET to facilitate cooperation in areas previously excluded.¹⁷

(U) ROK-US Scientist/Engineer Exchange Program (SEP). To assist in transferring needed technology to the ROK, the US and ROK Governments signed an MOU in 1975 establishing the SEP, under which selected Korean participants received, at ROKG expense, on-the-job experience in US DOD laboratories and research centers. In 1979 the program was extended for six additional years, through 1985. The ROK Agency for Defense Development submitted proposals annually to the US Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) for training positions to accommodate ROK personnel. At the end of 1982, a total of 121 ROK scientists and engineers had participated in the program, including 12 who received training in 1973 prior to the formal SEP inception.

(U) Sixteen ROK scientists and engineers were accepted for the 1983-84 SEP which commenced in July 1983 (nine at US Army, five at US Navy, and two at US Air Force installations). An additional 16 candidates were proposed for the 1984-85 program. No US personnel had been assigned to Korean facilities since reciprocity was not covered in the MOU establishing the SEP. At the October 1983 meeting of the US-ROK Technological Cooperation Committee, the members agreed that the USDRE, in coordination with the military Services, would draft an amendment to the SEP MOU to allow the participation of US scientists and engineers in the program.¹⁸

17. (1) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Dev & Technology, 18 Nov 83, subj: Data Exchange Agreement (DEA). UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Dev & Technology, 23 Nov 83, subj: Expanded CBR Cooperation. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLAS). (3) JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Dev & Technology Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

18. (1) Ibid. (2) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Dev & Technology, 18 Nov 83, subj: Scientist/Engineer Exchange Program (SEP). UNCLASSIFIED.

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Part V: ROK Air Force Programs (U)

F-5 Aircraft Coassembly in Korea (U)

(U) In late 1978 the Korean Institute for Aeronautical Technology began an assessment of means to fulfill the high-priority national goal of developing an indigenous aircraft industry. The ROK had already completed the first step when it commenced local coproduction of 500MD helicopters in 1977. The F-5 aircraft was selected over other competitors primarily because of its multi-purpose capabilities in air defense and close air support roles and its economy of operation. The ROK Air Force had been performing programmed depot maintenance on its F-4 and F-5 aircraft since 1978. An MOU between the ROK and US Governments authorizing the F-5 coassembly program, designated Peace Freedom III, became effective in October 1980.

(U) The program was a mix of direct commercial sales and FMS agreements, totaling over \$600 million in value, for the coassembly of 48 F-5E aircraft and 20 F-5F models with an advanced handling characteristics package. Korean Air Lines and a Northrop Aircraft Corporation technical assistance team (TAT) coassembled the F-5 airframes at KAL's Kimhae facility, while Samsung Precision Industries and a General Electric TAT assembled the engines at the Samsung plant. An \$81 million FMS case provided USG-furnished aeronautical equipment, spare parts, non-recurring R&D and contractor engineering services, support equipment, TAT costs, and case management services. The commercial contract portion, negotiated with Northrop at a cost of approximately \$525 million, covered aircraft assembly sets, tooling, and some production line support equipment.

(U) Production of F-5F models began in 1982. The first ten aircraft coassembled under the KAL/Northrop program were delivered to ROKAF by the end of 1983, two aircraft ahead of the original 1980 schedule. Production quantities for the coming three years were planned as follows: 1984, ten F5Fs and four F5Es; 1985, 24 F5Es; and 1986, 20 F5Es.


F-16 Aircraft Acquisitions (U)

(U) The ROKG signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in December 1981 for an FMS purchase of 36 F-16C/D aircraft (30 C and six D models), designated Project Peace Bridge, with an estimated value of \$931 million. Under the sales terms, two aircraft would be delivered every other month commencing in April 1986 and extending to January 1989. The final signing of the LOA was the result of an initial request for F-16 fighters by the ROKG in March 1977. The F-16s, with their extensive air-to-air combat and air-to-ground interdiction capabilities, would provide crucial additional depth to ROKAF engagements in an AirLand Battle scenario. After conducting a facilities site survey in May 1982 at Taegu Air Base, the proposed F-16 operating site in Korea, USAF F-16 System Program Office representatives concluded that ROKAF possessed an excellent capability to support F-16 fighters.

(U) In June 1983 the second F-16 Program Management Review was conducted in Seoul by USAF representatives. The ROKAF was informed that since F-16 C/D

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DCS-Korea Fiber Optic Cable System (U)

(U) Background. The most ambitious initiative to be undertaken within the TPICK framework was the establishment of a DCS backbone system of buried fiber optic cable to replace the existing microwave system. (Unlike microwave equipment, fiber optic cables do not radiate electrical energy and, because they are installed underground, are less vulnerable to air attack.) Approved in concept by the US JCS in 1982 as a US-ROK cost-sharing program, the five-year project would involve the installation of approximately 320 miles of underground cable along a general line from Uijongbu (HQ Combined Field Army [ROK/US]) in the north to the port of Pusan in the southeast, as depicted on Figure 14. Work on the backbone of the system would be conducted under a three-phase program projected for completion in 1986.

(U) In the fiber optic system to be installed, channels of telephone, television, and computer data communications would be combined by terminal equipment into streams of digital pulses, sent simultaneously by lasers over hair-thin strands of glass. The transmission links, consisting of 12 glass fibers bundled together in a one-half-inch cable, would be buried in underground ducts. Two of the fibers would be used to transmit about 600 channels of voice and data information; three others would be reserved for television use, such as Armed Forces Korea Network broadcasts; and the remaining seven fibers would be designated as back-up and future-growth lines. The new system would eventually extend to all major command/control centers which used official DOD voice and data communications facilities within the ROK and from Korea to out-of-country locations. The obsolescent analog microwave equipment on mountain-top sites throughout Korea would be replaced by the digital fiber optic system as the construction work progressed. The microwave transmitters, antennas, and receivers would be maintained as alternate communications equipment.

(U) 1983 Developments. On 4 May, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed between the US and ROK Governments which included the following major provisions:¹

--Costs would be shared by the US and ROK Governments on a 50/50 basis for constructing the common US-ROK backbone of the fiber optic cable duct system, which would extend from the southern edge of Seoul to Pusan and be routed along major expressways.


--All construction work on the cable duct system backbone would be accomplished under the aegis of the Korea Telecommunications Authority (KTA).

--Spurs from the backbone would be funded and solely owned by the nation which required them, but all duct construction work would be performed by KTA.

1. (1) ACoFS, J6 Plans & Prog Div Hist Sum 1983 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) US/ROK MOA for the Korea Optical Fiber Cable System, 4 May 83. UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in J6 Plans & Prog Div.

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CHAPTER XI: WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS) IN KOREA (U)

(U) General. The WWMCCS provided the US National Command Authorities (NCA) and Joint Chiefs of Staff with the capability to exercise operational direction of US military forces in peacetime and through all levels of conflict.¹ The system's secondary mission was to support unified and specified commands, Service component commands, and DOD agencies. The WWMCCS performed those missions by providing data processing and information exchange systems by which the NCA and other appropriate commanders could accomplish the following: monitor the current situation, to include the operational status of both US and relevant foreign forces; respond to warnings and threat assessments; employ forces and execute operation plans; perform attack, strike, and damage assessments; reconstitute and redirect forces; and terminate hostilities and active operations.

(U) The USFK WWMCCS was designed to achieve several vital automatic data processing capabilities for USFK and its component commands: (1) direct interaction by users at remote locations with the WWMCCS H-6060 mainframe computer to provide automated storage, update, and retrieval of data; (2) drafting, storage, and retrieval of selected command/control messages destined for transmission to both in-country and external recipients via the automatic digital network (AUTODIN) operated by the 1st Signal Brigade, accomplished by an interface linking the WWMCCS main computer and the AUTODIN Switching Center (both located at Camp Walker in Taegu); and (3) access to the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) which provided services such as teleconferencing and files transfers among WWMCCS installations worldwide. The USFK WWMCCS main computer also accommodated one of COMUSJAPAN's primary interfaces with USCINCPAC.

(U) For USFK WWMCCS users, the primary means of communicating with the main computer was through remote visual information projector (VIP) terminals located in command/control centers and selected USFK staff activities throughout the ROK. The VIP terminals permitted processing, dispatch, and receipt of messages and data from the main computer and allowed the exchange of command/control information between geographically distant command centers. On-line, near-real-time processing capabilities permitted job initiation at all terminal sites with hard copy output produced by page printers. The WWMCCS mainframe computer had the unique communications capability of allowing system users to construct pre-formatted messages in advance for later release. The TANGO Command Post near Seoul was serviced by a remote network processor which provided access to the WWMCCS mainframe computer. Additional in-country hardware assets included two van-mounted mobile VIP terminal systems to support USFK staffs at remote locations.

(U) Since the USFK WWMCCS operated in a TOP SECRET NOFORN mode, stringent security controls were established over the system's software programs. These included a security matrix which restricted the processing of designated

1. (U) The NCA consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JCS Pub 1.)

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classified data at terminal stations or remote line printers. In addition, a unique user identification code and password was assigned to each individual authorized access to the WWMCCS.

(U) Management and functional control over the USFK WWMCCS was exercised by the Director, Joint Command Information Systems (JCIS), under USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff supervision. The JCIS Director maintained liaison with WWMCCS staff elements at PACOM, USN CNO, and JCS and served as Chairman of the USFK WWMCCS ADP User Group which met quarterly. The JCIS, a separate USFK staff directorate, was manned by personnel from all three Services on an approximately equal basis but was totally funded by the US Navy. The FY 1983 budget, allocated from Operations and Maintenance, Navy funds, amounted to \$1.7 million. A total value of approximately \$7.5 million was placed on the computers and peripheral equipment controlled by the JCIS. Hawaii- and Japan-based elements of the US Naval Electronics Engineering Activity (NEEACT) provided technical support for the USFK WWMCCS, while the in-country 1st Signal Brigade (USA) and 2146th Communications Group (USAF) furnished communications assistance.

(U) 1983 Developments. Three new permanent WWMCCS remote terminal sites (RTS) were installed during the year. New RTS facilities became operational in mid-July at Suwon Air Base to serve resident USAFK elements and at TANGO CP to provide WWMCCS access for USFK-controlled special warfare units. In August, an RTS was installed in the USFK Main CP's Joint Staff Operations Center, located at Camp Walker, Taegu, to furnish a full range of WWMCCS services, including message processing to the AUTODIN system, the WIN, and the Joint Deployment System. A fourth new RTS was under construction at the Military Traffic Management Center in Pusan at year's end and was scheduled to become operational in early 1984.

(U) On 9 March, a newly refurbished 30-foot remote processing trailer was returned to JCIS by NEEACT, Japan. The trailer had been outfitted with additional ADP and communications equipment, including a remote line printer and connections for up to eight VIP terminals. After providing support for Exercise TEAM SPIRIT from the TANGO CP, the trailer was deployed to Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, to assist the USFK/EUSA ACofS, J3 in planning WWMCCS support for other major exercises, including CPX ULCHI-FOCUS LENS.

(U) The major WWMCCS hardware acquisitions in 1983 consisted of upgraded equipment for the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network. The first phase of the improvement program was completed in June with the installation, testing, and cutover of the WIN to a C30 Interface Message Processor (IMP). The processor, located with the mainframe computer at Camp Walker, permitted direct entry to the WIN from in-country terminals at greatly increased circuit speeds. Prior to the IMP's arrival, access to the WIN from Korea and Japan had to be channeled through IMPs based in Hawaii. The second phase of the upgrading involved the installation in November of a Datanet 6661 system for the WIN circuits to achieve greater reliability and processing speed.

(U) The following major new software programs were installed on the USFK WWMCCS during the year:

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--Target Construction System, a replacement program for the PACOM Nuclear Weapons Analysis System. The program performed target, arming point, and weapon selection functions associated with nuclear contingency planning.

--Allied Cooperative Support Sharing System, a program which summarized and indexed allied assistance provided to US forces worldwide.

--GARFIX, a USREDCOM-developed program which converted Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) map grid coordinates to geographic coordinates and vice versa.

--Significant Events/History System, a program released to Command Post Seoul which provided a capability to input and extract significant historical information.

(U) A marked increase was noted in the use of WWMCCS by USFK staffs during the year. The Eighth Personnel Command (Provisional), ACofS, J3, J4, and J5, and the Combined Transportation Movements Center, in particular, expanded their employment of mission-related WWMCCS services such as time sharing, message processing, teleconferencing, and files transfer. WWMCCS programs, especially Automated Master Scenario Lists, were used extensively in all major joint/combined exercises conducted in 1983.²

2. JCIS Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER XII: COMPTROLLER (U)

FY 1983 Command Operating Budget (COB) Performance (U)

(U) Eighth Army successfully executed its FY 1983 operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) budget through intensive financial management actions taken at all levels of command and systematic application of resources to prioritized requirements. Obligations totaled \$452.311 million, representing a 99.99 percent utilization of available funds. Factors contributing to the effective year-end close-out included: early identification, prioritization, and support of Facility Engineer Activity-Korea projects; development and command-wide coordination of a year-end closing management plan; and close cooperation throughout the year between major subordinate commanders, activity directors, and the EUSA Comptroller. Tables 19 and 20 show the year-end status of OMA obligations and the allocation of funds by type of expenditure.

(U) Since the DOD Appropriation Act was not implemented until 21 December 1982, EUSA operated throughout the 1st Qtr, FY 1983 (Oct-Dec 1982) under the restrictions of a congressional continuing resolution authority (CRA). The CRA, which in effect constituted an interim appropriation, authorized the continuation of normal operations but precluded the initiation or resumption of any project or activity for which funds were not available during FY 1982.

(U) The revised EUSA FY 1983 annual funding program (AFP), reflecting final congressional action and totaling \$444.502 million, was received in February 1983. The level of funding was 3 percent less than the \$457.285 million amount identified in the budget request to DA, a shortfall caused primarily by the redirection of OMA appropriations to help finance other congressional actions including pay raises for military and civilian personnel, increased variable housing allowances, and civilian health benefit programs. Subsequent adjustments to the EUSA AFP made during the 4th Qtr, FY 1983 (Jul-Sep) provided a net funding level increase of approximately \$7.9 million. Funding for Real Property Maintenance Activities increased \$8.5 million and was applied to high-priority minor construction and rehabilitation projects. Allocations for the fielding of force modernization systems were augmented by \$1 million, and a \$1.6 million excess in various minor programs was returned to DA.

(U) At the beginning of FY 1983 (Oct 1982), the official Korean won-US dollar exchange rate equated to 742:1. The rate continued to decline throughout the fiscal year, standing at 789:1 at the year's close (30 Sep). Part of the savings generated by the currency devaluations was withdrawn by DA, and the remainder was applied to EUSA's most urgent unfinanced requirements. Those savings, coupled with other excess funds and additional support from DA, enabled the command to fund the major unfinanced requirements during the year.

FY 1984 Command Operating Budget

(U) From March through June 1983, all elements of Eighth Army contributed inputs for the development of the FY 1984 COB, which identified funding requirements for the operations and maintenance, Army appropriation. In

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July, based upon program and budgeting guidance issued by DA, EUSA submitted a FY 1984 OMA budget totaling \$498.765, as shown on Table 21. A comparison of projected funding levels with existing and planned program requirements revealed FY 1984 OMA unfinanced requirements amounting to \$116.971, listed on Table 22.

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Table 19--(U) Utilization of EUSA FY 1983 Direct OMA Funds
(Dollars in Millions)

Program/Subprogram	Obligations
P2 - General Purpose Forces	\$427.997
Mission	\$135,360
Base Operations	122,946
Real Property Maintenance	169,691
P38 - Intelligence Activities	0.062
P72 - Central Supply Activities	3.034
P84 - Medical Activities	9.986
P87 - Other General Personnel Activities	5.904
P95 - Public Affairs/Community Relations	0.317
P10 - Support of Other Nations	5.011
Total	\$452.311

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Table 20--(U) Allocation of EUSA FY 1983 OMA Budget
(Dollars in Millions)

Category	Expenditures
Civilian Employee Salaries, Wages, Allowances	\$140.641 (31%)
Korean National Employees	\$85.431 (19%)
Korean Service Corps	22.109 (5%)
DA Civilian [US] Employees	33.101 (7%)
Supplies	168.941 (37%)
Contractual Services	134.053 (30%)
Travel	8.676 (2%)

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Table 21--(U) EUSA FY 1984 OMA Budget
(Dollars in Millions)

Program/Subprogram	Amount Requested	Amount Authorized
P2 - General Purpose Forces	\$470.069	\$456.924
Mission	\$168.410	\$164.054
Base Operations	143.668	136.700
Real Property Maintenance	157.991	156.170
P38 - Intelligence Activities	1.731	1.716
P72 - Central Supply Activities	3.651	3.650
P84 - Medical Activities	10.962	10.681
P87 - Other General Personnel Activities	5.969	6.332
P95 - Public Affairs/Community Relations	0.273	0.273
P10 - Support of Other Nations	6.110	6.101
Total	\$498.765	\$485.677

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Table 22--(U) EUSA FY 1984 OMA Unfinanced Requirements
(Dollars in Millions)

Priority	Requirement	Amount
1	JCS Exercises	\$ 5.250
2	Flying Hour Program	1.439
3	POL Allocation and Funding	0.756
4	Simultaneous Obligation OMA/Army Stock Fund	34.000
5	Force Modernization Projects	1.022
6	Direct Hire US Personnel Shortage	0.923
7	Word Processing Equip Leasing Program	0.995
8	Chapel/Community Ctr Sup & Equip	0.250
9	Contract Real Property Maintenance Projects	63.113
10	Morale Support Activities	0.464
11	Replace Obsolete Copiers & Typewriters	0.841
12	Travel	0.403
13	Executive Development Group Training	0.010
14	Contract Security Guards	4.200
15	Regimental Unit Insignia	0.300
16	Cable Television Service	3.000
Total	\$116.971

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(U) Congress failed to approve an appropriations bill for FY 1984 prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (1 Oct 83). A continuing resolution authority was passed, however, which authorized the continuation of normal operations but precluded the initiation or resumption of any project or activity for which funds were not available during FY 1983 (a repetition of the circumstances which prevailed in the preceding year, noted in the preceding topic).

(U) In early December, Congress enacted the DOD FY 1984 appropriations bill; EUSA received its annual funding program, totaling \$485.677 million in direct OMA allocations, on 16 December. The authorized funding levels were approximately \$13 million less than EUSA had requested in its COB submission, as indicated on Table 21. The FY 1984 AFP, however, reflected a \$33.5 million increase over the FY 1983 allocation.¹

Combined Budget for HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command

(U) Background. A principal issue requiring resolution when the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was established in November 1978 was the division of responsibility for funding the operation of the new binational headquarters. Preactivation agreements between ROK and USFK planners specified that budgeting and cost-sharing proportions for administrative support would be determined through mutual consent. The overriding concerns of USFK were that US financial support of CFC should be commensurate with the defense benefits derived, that funding actions should be accurately recorded and accountability strictly maintained, and that all US resources should be provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) Following budget development work performed in 1980 by a study group composed of CFC staff officers and augmented with USFK financial management and legal specialists, the US and ROK permanent representatives to the ROK-US Military Committee approved a combined budget model in December 1980.² Shortly thereafter, a Combined Budget Activation Committee (CBAC) was formed, cochaired by the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff and ROK Asst MND (Compt). CBAC meetings and continuous refinement of cost data by the USFK Comptroller led to an agreement in late 1981 between COMUSKOREA and the ROK MND on a 62 US:38 ROK cost-sharing ratio. On that basis, COMUSKOREA and the ROK MND approved a combined budget totaling \$680,771 on 30 December 1982 to support the day-to-day operations of HQ CFC, including Command Post TANGO, during CY 1983.

(U) The new combined budget provided for equitable overall cost sharing rather than cumbersome item-by-item apportionments, which allowed for increased budgetary flexibility as well as savings in some areas. For example, the ROK's share of CP TANGO costs was not funded directly since the CP was used primarily as a US communications facility during most of the year. The US expenditures were offset, however, by increased ROK funding for office supplies and automatic data processing services.

1. ACoFS, Compt Prog & Bud Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

2. (U) For a brief description of the ROK-US Military Committee, see note 1, page 1.

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(U) 1983 Developments. The CY 1983 combined budget for HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command was successfully executed with US contributions recorded as 61.7 percent of the total and ROK funding as 38.3 percent. The US expended 99.6 percent of its budget allocation, while ROK expenditures came to 100.6 percent of the amount planned. The US share was funded under operation and maintenance, Army Program 10 (Support of Other Nations) resources, shown on Table 19. The utilization of funds for the combined budget is summarized on Table 23.

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Table 23--(U) HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command Budget Execution³
Actual Expenditures-CY 1983

Funding Category	ROK Contribution	US Contribution
Building Utilities & Maintenance		
HQ ROK/US CFC	\$187,453	---
CP TANGO	---	\$227,374
Other Facilities	---	65,168
Office Supplies	29,713	52,847
Automatic Data Processing	43,176	74,876
Total	\$260,342	\$420,265

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EUSA Integrated Programming Plan (U)

(U) In August 1982, the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff directed the ACoFS, Comptroller to coordinate the design of a computerized "EUSA Master Plan" which would tie together functional staff outyear plans into a single, integrated document and reflect the relationships between them. For example, if the EUSA Force Development Plan required bachelor enlisted quarters to be built at Camp Long in FY 1985, the command's Military Construction, Army (MCA) Plan should show that the facility was programmed for construction by that fiscal year.

(U) In June 1983, the Yongsan Data Processing Center produced the first draft of the Integrated Programming Plan (IP²), which contained force stationing and modernization requirements, all major and minor construction needs (appropriated and nonappropriated funding), and requisites for additional real estate. EUSA installation commanders throughout the ROK reviewed the data and annotated necessary changes, adding projects that were needed but not included in the IP² and deleting projects which were no longer considered essential.

3. ACoFS, Compt Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) A second computerized draft of the IP² was processed in late October, with the following separate, parallel plans incorporated into a consolidated, single-source document: the EUSA Five-Year Force Development Stationing Plan; EUSA Program Analysis Resource Review; EUSA applications of the DA Program Objective Memorandum, The Army Authorization Document System, and Vertical Force Accounting System; EUSA MCA and Minor Construction Projects; ROK-US Combined Defense Improvement Projects; and the EUSA Engineer's Land Acquisition Plan.

(U) It had become apparent during expansions and updates of the IP² that, of all the EUSA staffs represented in the document planning group, the ACofS, G3 had the primary interest in most of the IP² components. Consequently, in December, the Chief of Staff approved designating ACofS, G3 as the EUSA executive agent for the consolidated plan vice the ACofS, Comptroller. At year's end, the transfer of IP² responsibilities to the G3 Force Development Division was in progress.

Work Methods and Standards Program (U)

(U) Background. In 1980, EUSA became actively involved in supporting DA initiatives to develop Army-wide summary-level work performance standards. The criteria prepared were for use by Army managers to measure and evaluate performance efficiency and by manpower specialists to determine staffing requirements. EUSA was tasked to assist the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in base operations functional areas (supply, maintenance, and transportation), the US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) in finance and accounting standards, and the Office of the Chief of Engineers in family housing and facilities engineering areas.

(U) 1983 Developments. Work measurement data on supply activities collected in November 1982 at Supply Point 48, US Army Garrison, Pusan, was forwarded to FORSCOM along with EUSA comments in March 1983. In April-May, a work measurement study was conducted on automotive general equipment repair activities at the US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea, Camp Carroll. The study report was submitted to FORSCOM in July. The commercial accounts and travel pay functions of the US Army Finance and Accounting Office-Korea were restudied in August-September and the results sent to USAFAC. The data collected would be used to update summary-level work performance standards established by USAFAC in 1980.⁴

Installation of Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS)-Army Automated Coding System (JACS) (U)

(U) Background. The JACS was developed as a front-end module to the central JUMPS-Army, located at the US Army Finance and Accounting Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. It comprised a mini-computer assisted source data conversion system for use in Army finance offices worldwide for the input of military pay change data to the central site at USAFAC. The system was designed to improve finance services for the individual service member by

4. ACofS, Compt Mgt Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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reducing the processing time for pay changes and increasing the accuracy of input to JUMPS-Army. Construction modifications and site preparations, to accommodate the specific environmental and power requirements peculiar to the JACS equipment, were accomplished during 1981.

(U) 1983 Developments. The JACS was implemented in the four EUSA finance offices during November. Installation and training teams from the Office of the Assistant Comptroller of the Army (ACOA) provided assistance at each site during the transition and furnished training for EUSA operating personnel. Visits by ACOA teams for the purpose of site certification were planned for February-March 1984.⁵

5. ACoFS, Compt Fin Acct Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER XIII: ENGINEER (U)

Eighth Army Construction Program (U)

(U) Background. EUSA's Military Construction, Army (MCA) programs have been directed at improving the command's readiness and quality of life posture by replacing inadequate Korean-War vintage troop barracks, dining halls, tactical maintenance facilities, utility systems, warehousing, ammunition and POL facilities, and substandard temporary buildings necessary for administrative and community support activities. Additional construction requirements had been generated by recent EUSA force modernization initiatives and related increases in the support force structure.¹ (An engineer readiness issue concerning wartime construction authority is discussed on page 78.)

(U) MCA funding for EUSA requirements had historically been low, averaging approximately \$8.9 million annually from 1957 through 1980. Following President Carter's early 1977 announcement of the phased withdrawal of US ground combat forces from the ROK, the Congress deferred EUSA's entire FY 1978 MCA budget in light of the planned troop reductions, and amounts of only \$7.6 million and \$1.5 million were approved for FY 1979 and 1980 construction, respectively. After suspension of the troop withdrawal plan in July 1979, MCA appropriations took a significant turn upward. Congress approved \$60.58 million for EUSA MCA funding in FY 1981 and \$62.32 in FY 1982. Additional amounts were approved for Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS), Korea Area Exchange, tenant MACOM MCA, and major nonappropriated fund projects. (Summaries of EUSA FY 1981-82 construction projects appear in USFK/EUSA AHR 1981, pp. 296-98; and USFK/EUSA AHR 1982, pp. 269-71.)

(U) 1983 Developments. Continuing congressional support for the command's construction programs was reflected in the EUSA FY 1983 MCA appropriation which totaled \$56.98 million. Allocations from other sources amounting to \$16.17 million brought the total funding for EUSA-programmed FY 1983 construction projects in the ROK to \$73.15 million. Table 24 contains a listing of all projects under construction and their costs. Allocations of FY 1983 MCA funds by functional categories and to EUSA subordinate commands are shown on Table 25.

(U) The EUSA FY 1984 military construction program, totaling \$73.27 million, was under congressional review at the close of 1983. The submission for FY 1985 funding, amounting to \$155.93 million, had been forwarded to DA by year's end. Sources of funding for both years are indicated on Table 26.

1. (U) The US Army Corps of Engineers, Far East District (FED), headquartered in Seoul, is the DOD agency assigned responsibility for all major US military construction activities in the ROK. Assigned to the Hawaii-based US Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean, the FED's missions are to design projects, administer contracts for construction of new major facilities, and repair and upgrade existing structures throughout Korea.

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Table 24--(U) Eighth Army FY 1983 Construction Program
(Dollars in Millions)

Installation	Project	Contract Costs
<u>Military Construction, Army (MCA) Funding</u>		
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Tactical Equipment Shops	\$16.700
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Sewage System Upgrade	9.900
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Electrical System Upgrade	4.600
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Water System Upgrade	3.900
Camps Casey/Howze	Dining Facilities	4.050
Camp Essayons	Bachelor Housing (MLRS Unit)	2.100
Camp Kittyhawk	Bachelor Housing	1.900
Camp Red Cloud	Bachelor Housing	0.610
K-16 Airfield	Direct Support Maintenance Facility	5.500
Camp Henry	Emergency Operations Center	2.150
Camp Henry	Power Distribution System Upgrade	1.550
Camp Carroll	Technical Inspection Facility	1.000
Camp Carroll	Trailer Repair Shop	0.790
Camp Carroll	High Pressure Water/Steam System	0.530
Pusan Storage Facility	Water Distribution/ Fire Protection System	1.700
Subtotal		\$56.980
<u>Exigent Minor Construction MCA (EMMCA) Funding</u>		
Far East Dist Engr Compound	General Office Building	\$ 0.979
Command Post TANGO	Intelligence Facility	
	Environmental Controls	0.930
Camp Greaves	Troop Aid Station	0.905
Camp Hovey	Troop Aid Station	0.863
USA Com Hosp-Seoul	Alternate Power System Upgrade	0.846
ROK Ministry of National	USFK Administrative	
Defense Annex	Facilities Upgrade	0.505
Hannam Village (Seoul)	Child Care Center	0.394
Subtotal		\$ 5.422
<u>Tenant MACOM (Office of The Surgeon General) MCA Funding</u>		
Camp Casey	Troop Medical Clinic	\$ 3.800
<u>Major Nonappropriated Fund Resources</u>		
Yongsan Garrison	Youth Activities Center	\$ 1.900
Camp Red Cloud	Entertainment Center	0.516
Subtotal		\$ 2.416

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Table 24--Continued

Installation	Project	Contract Costs
<u>Korea Area Exchange Funding</u>		
Yongsan Garrison	Main Store Expansion	\$ 1.900
Yongsan Garrison	Drive-In Restaurant	0.628
Yongsan Garrison	Concession Arcade Upgrade	.150
Osan Air Base	Main Cafeteria	.750
Camp Walker	Cafeteria Renovation	.146
Subtotal		\$ 3.574
<u>DOD Dependent Schools Funding</u>		
Yongsan Garrison	School Cafeteria	\$ 0.960
Total Construction Program Costs		\$73.152
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Table 25--(U) Allocations of EUSA FY 1983 MCA Funds
(Dollars in Millions)

Category/Command	Amount	Percent
<u>Functional Categories</u>		
Maintenance	\$22.99	40.4
Engineering Support	21.65	38.0
Life Support	8.66	15.2
Operations & Training	3.68	6.4
<u>Distribution to Subordinate Commands</u>		
2d Infantry Division	\$41.25	72.4
19th Support Command	13.22	23.2
UNC Support Group-		
Joint Security Area	1.90	3.3
USA Element, Combined		
Field Army (ROK/US)	0.61	1.1
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Table 26--(U) Funding Sources for EUSA FY 1984-85 Construction Programs
(Dollars in Millions)

Source	FY 1984	FY 1985
EUSA MCA	\$56.389	\$109.943
Nonappropriated Funds	16.624	23.365
Tenant MACOM MCA	0.260	10.780
Korea Area Exchange	--	9.704
DOD Dependent Schools	--	2.140
Total	<u>\$73.273</u>	<u>\$155.932</u>

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(U) EUSA MCA programs for FY 1985-89 outyears were supported by DA at the funding levels shown below:

1985 - \$110 million	1986 - \$117 million	1987 - \$182 million
1988 - \$200 million	1989 - \$220 million	

(Amounts above do not include nonappropriated fund, tenant MACOM MCA, Korea Area Exchange, or DOD Schools construction projects.)

(U) The effects of funding support of the magnitude shown above, if realized, would provide essential command/control, intelligence, and other facilities required to support EUSA force modernization initiatives; make significant contributions to the logistical base in terms of storage capacity and survivability; provide modern semipermanent working, living, and recreational facilities for US personnel; upgrade or replace all outdated, deteriorated utility systems on US installations; and reduce the backlog of essential maintenance and repair to a more manageable level in the near term and totally eliminate work order accumulations in the mid-term time frames.²

Maintenance and Repair of EUSA Real Property Facilities (U)

(U) Background. To complement ongoing, long-range MCA projects for modernized troop billets, dining halls, and other essential structures, a comprehensive five-year EUSA Facilities Upgrade Program was developed in late 1976, using operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) funds. The program encompassed essential emergency repairs and improvements required to establish a safe and healthful living environment for troops. Specific upgrading projects were designed to correct many years of neglect caused by inadequate

2. Fac Engr Actv-Korea Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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manning and funding levels of EUSA facilities engineering activities. However, the maintenance and repair objectives were set back significantly by President Carter's early 1977 decision to gradually withdraw all US ground combat forces from the ROK by 1982.

(U) Phases I and II of the OMA program, costing \$29.9 million, provided living improvements at 17 camps throughout the 2d Infantry Division and 33 other EUSA installations by mid-1979. Phase III, extending into FY 1981, rehabilitated semipermanent and permanent installations earmarked for use by the EUSA post-withdrawal residual force. Following the July 1979 suspension of the force reduction program, the expenditure levels for OMA-funded real property maintenance activities (RPMA) increased sharply, to \$51.76 million in FY 1981 and a record \$76.72 million in FY 1982.

(U) In March 1980, the Command Work Review Board (CWRB), chaired by the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff, was established to review, evaluate, and approve priorities for the design and accomplishment of EUSA's RPMA program. Unfinanced projects at installation level were thereafter prioritized by the Facilities Engineer Activity-Korea, and those approved by the CWRB were integrated into the EUSA Command Priority List which formed the basis for obligating RPMA funds.

(U) 1983 Developments. A total of \$56.72 million was expended during FY 1983 on the RPMA program. Funding totaling approximately \$50 million was expected to be available for FY 1984 RPMA projects.

(U) During preparation of the FY 1984 Command Priority List, EUSA engineers developed a more comprehensive population model of the command which, in addition to reflecting the density of US military personnel, indicated the distributions of KATUSA soldiers, DOD and Korean national civilian employees, and command-sponsored dependents. The extent to which each segment of the population would make use of the RPMA-funded working, billeting, messing, and recreational facilities were considerations included in the model.³

Troop Construction Projects (U)

(U) During 1983, EUSA's 2d Engineer Group undertook a wide variety of construction and maintenance projects. The group's two combat (heavy) battalions, the 44th and 802d, were engaged in projects totaling \$4.5 million in funded costs. Among the more significant taskings were:

--Projects at Camp Humphreys involving Army airfield repair work, construction of maintenance and storage facilities for the 43d Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, and paving the CPX access road.

--Construction of two bachelor enlisted quarters at Camp Indian in the 2d Infantry Division area.

3. Ibid.

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--Fabrication of three warehouses at Camp Garry Owen in the 2d Infantry Division area to replace a storage facility destroyed by fire in November 1982.

--Construction of an extensive leadership reaction course at the 2d Infantry Division Training Center on Cheju Island.⁴

Real Estate Actions (U)

(U) Real Estate Holdings. At the end of 1983, USFK components occupied 128 installations in the ROK with a total land area of 73,635 acres. Eighth Army controlled 104 installations (66,781 acres), 22 were US Air Forces Korea facilities (6,762 acres), and US Naval Forces Korea controlled two installations (92 acres).

(U) Acquisitions and Releases. During the year, the USFK/EUSA Engineer processed 65 actions through US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) channels (discussed on page 207) to acquire real estate in support of USFK's mission-essential requirements. The scope and types of acquisitions are shown below.

USFK exclusive use	88.9 acres
Easement use	14.2 acres
Temporary use	16.8 acres
Extension of temporary use (primarily for 2d Inf Div training areas) ...	32,259.3 acres

(U) Three US Army forward area radar sites (two acres each) were released to the ROK Ministry of National Defense as excess to EUSA mission requirements.

(U) Nonavailability of Real Estate. Land in Korea had been made available for USFK use by the ROK MND pursuant to SOFA provisions. Prior to September 1983, USFK had requested use of real estate interests valued at approximately \$113 million. Land costing an additional \$81 million would be required to support construction and training activities programmed for 1984. The MND budget for 1984, however, provided for less than 2 percent of the aforementioned USFK needs. An ACofS, J3 review of priorities reduced the total additional real estate requested by major subordinate commanders from 833.8 acres to 628.9 acres. Military construction projects for which land could not be provided by the ROKG were resited to existing USFK-controlled real estate or reprogrammed for future years. Adverse impacts on training and construction were expected to become more severe as the cost of land continued to escalate.⁵

EUSA Family Housing Administration (U)

(U) The EUSA Engineer successfully executed the FY 1983 Army Family Housing (AFH) plan through intensive financial management actions taken by

4. 2d Engr Gp Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

5. Engr Real Estate/SOFA Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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HQ EUSA and major subordinate commands. Actual obligations totaling \$19.126 million were recorded against the \$19.147 million AFH plan, resulting in a 99.9 percent utilization rate. Obligations under the FY 1983 Unaccompanied Personnel Furnishings (BOQ/BEQ) budget amounted to \$7.188 million against \$7.190 million allocated, reflecting a 99.9 percent utilization rate.

(U) EUSA's family housing occupancy rate for its 487 US Government-owned family quarters averaged 97.2 percent during CY 1983, slightly below the DA minimum objective of 99 percent. A total of 203 dwelling unit turnovers occurred in the peak period of 1 April through 30 September, resulting in 3,832 days of lost occupancy. Necessary maintenance and repair work accounted for 2,741 of the lost days and quarters assignment administration for 1,091 days. Procedures to refine maintenance and repair scheduling and housing assignment practices to improve the occupancy rate were in progress at year's end.⁶

USFK Family Housing Initiatives (U)

(U) Replacement Family Housing. At year's end, final design work was under way for the construction of 372 sets of family quarters to replace 300 USG-leased housing units at Friendship Village in Seoul and 72 in Taegu. Both complexes had been occupied by USFK personnel since late 1973. The Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) was scheduled to construct the new housing for lease to USFK at three sites on Yongsan Garrison South Post. The project included a kindergarten, child care center, administration building, and central utilities building. The ROK Government was to furnish funding for construction, estimated at \$28 million, under the ROK-US Combined Defense Improvement Projects program. Ground breaking was planned for 1 June 1984 at both the Seoul and Taegu projects, pending USFK approval of KNHC's designs; occupancy was projected for autumn 1985.

(U) New USAF Family Housing. HQ USAF approved the construction of 200 additional apartment units near Osan AB, adjacent to the existing Mustang Valley leased housing area. Congressional action was expected in spring 1984. The KNHC would construct the housing on a build-to-lease basis under an agreement similar to that used for the Mustang Valley complex. Occupancy was planned for 1987, although land acquisition for the project remained an unresolved issue at the close of 1983.

(U) Civilian Employee Family Housing. Historically, USFK has encountered serious difficulties in recruiting and retaining US civilian employees, caused in part by the limited availability of adequate, affordable family housing on the local economy near major USFK installations. To alleviate this long-standing problem, USFK planned to provide 675 housing units for DOD civilian employees--550 in Seoul, 100 in Taegu, and 25 in Pusan. DA had programmed the required leasing funds, and the necessary documentation for congressional action was under preparation at year's end. The Korea National Housing Corporation would construct the new apartments through build-to-lease arrangements, with occupancy projected for 1985.

6. EUSA R&A 2d, 3d & 4th Qtrs, FY 83 and 1st Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) New Joint Military Installation Plan. In February 1983, USFK staffs, under the aegis of ACoFS, JI, commenced planning for development of a new joint Army/Air Force installation near Osan AB which would include 3,400 family housing units. One of the primary purposes of the plan was to allow a significant increase in accompanied tours for personnel assigned to Osan and Suwon Air Bases and Camp Humphreys. Operational elements (some 1,700 personnel) of three Army organizations--2d Engineer Group, 1st Signal Brigade, and 501st Military Intelligence Group--would relocate from Seoul and Camp Humphreys to the new installation. Concurrent with unit redeployments planned for the 1986-90 time frame, the housing units would be constructed through a build-to-lease agreement with KNHC. MCA and related programming and concept design work for operations and support facilities was scheduled to commence in early 1984.⁷

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Developments (U)

(U) In early 1982, the EUSA Aviation Officer and Engineer commenced planning for publication of updated flight maps of the Demilitarized Zone area to reduce the likelihood of air space violations. A terrain mock-up prepared in-country was provided in September 1982 to the 29th Topographic Battalion in Hawaii for development and production of the map sheets. By June 1983, the battalion had completed the printing of all 28 sheets, which were issued to all US Army and ROKA aviation units. The new maps included overprints of vital flight information, accentuated flight corridors keyed to easily identifiable terrain features such as roads and major ridge lines, and portrayed for the first time the exact location of the barrier fence near the DMZ southern boundary.⁸

7. Engr Hsg & Furn Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

8. Engr Plans & Op Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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attributed primarily to a reduction in the number of command sponsored positions, and the granting of commissary/exchange privileges to non-command sponsored spouses whose sponsors extended their one-year tour of duty in the ROK to two years (authorized in May 1982).⁴

Eighth Army Safety Program (U)

(U) During 1983 EUSA achieved a 23 percent reduction in Army motor vehicle accidents (AMVA); reportable AMVAs totaled 145 compared to 188 in 1982. The 1983 AMVA rate of 3.58 accidents per million miles driven bettered the DA objective of 4.47 per million miles by 20 percent. The reduction was attributed to command emphasis on accident prevention and the 1 January implementation of the Motor Vehicle Emphasis (MOVE) Program. Under this program, training materials for drivers and supervisors and safety publications (posters, command bulletins, etc.) were distributed on a monthly basis. The MOVE Program stressed universal safety issues such as the effects of alcohol consumption on driving and importance of seat belt use as well as unique road conditions and other driving hazards encountered in Korea.

(U) Reportable injuries to EUSA military personnel declined from 199 in 1982 to 175 in 1983, of which approximately half occurred in the 2d Infantry Division. Injuries to KATUSA soldiers and Korean national civilian employees increased slightly, however, from 68 in 1982 to 76 in 1983. Accident prevention campaigns were focused on safe practices in maintenance/repair, on-duty sports, and recreation pursuits, since the bulk of injuries sustained occurred in those activities.⁵

Eighth Army Education Program (U)

(U) EUSA maintained 16 Army Education Centers, located throughout the command, which provided all educational services required or recommended by DOD and DA. US academic institutions offering programs under competitive bid contracts were: Central Texas College (replaced Los Angeles Metropolitan College Overseas in September 1983), providing basic skills and MOS training, testing services, and vocational courses; University of Maryland, offering four-year baccalaureate degree programs; and University of Southern California and University of Oklahoma, offering graduate-level programs.

(U) Enrollments in major EUSA education programs during CY 1983 are shown below:

Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP) II (On-Duty) ...	9,477
MOS Improvement (On-Duty)	13,766
College Level (Off-Duty)	11,946
Korean Language (On- and Off-Duty)	2,705
English Language Training for KATUSA	2,947

4. (1) ACoFS, JI Plans, Plcy & Svc Div Hist Sum 1983. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLAS). (2) EUSA R&A, 2d & 4th Qtrs, FY 83. UNCLASSIFIED.

5. ACoFS, JI Safety Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) Enrollment data indicated that 88 percent of EUSA enlisted members, 29 percent of warrant officers, and 36 percent of officers assigned had participated in Army continuing education courses during the year, slightly above the 1982 level. Participation in graduate-level college courses increased about 14 percent, and US Army Garrison-Yongsan continued to maintain graduate-level enrollments larger than any other US Service installation in PACOM.

(U) The number of EUSA soldiers eligible for the Basic Skills Education Program rose approximately 50 percent at the beginning of 1983 because of a DA-directed change in the BSEP referral criterion. Effective 1 January the below-90 score on the general technical aptitude area (GT) test used for BSEP eligibility was increased to a score of below 100. As a result of the new standard, some 58 percent of all EUSA personnel in grades E-1 through E-5 were identified as eligible for BSEP instruction. Of a total of 6,392 soldiers considered eligible, 2,125 (33 percent) were enrolled in the program at year's end, exceeding the 25 percent participation rate set as the EUSA objective.

(U) Army Education Program resources continued to support EUSA's training missions by expanding MOS-related instruction to include the Battalion Training Management System (discussed on page 112). A total of 298 Training Workshops and 202 Platoon Trainer Workshops were conducted throughout the year by contract educational institutions.⁶

EUSA Alcohol and Drug Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) (U)

(U) The major portion of EUSA's ADAPCP was conducted through nine out-patient Community Counseling Centers, located at densely populated installations, and one Residential Treatment Facility at US Army Community Hospital-Seoul. A total of 1,458 military personnel were admitted to the rehabilitation program for alcohol abuse in 1983, an increase of 254 cases over the previous year. The number of admissions for drug abuse totaled 571, a gain of 270 over 1982. Of the foregoing totals, 113 were patients in the 16-bed Residential Alcohol Treatment Facility at US Army Community Hospital-Seoul; 107 successfully completed the 6-8 week program. Of the total 2,029 individuals admitted to the ADAPCP in 1983, 271 were separated from service as rehabilitation failures.

(U) Alcohol abuse was the primary cause of one USFK death in CY 1983 and a contributing cause in four other deaths. A total of 97 citations were issued to USFK personnel for driving under the influence of alcohol, and analyses showed that misuse of alcohol or drugs was a contributing factor in 9.9 percent of all law enforcement incidents during the year.

(U) Command-wide preventive measures centered on: educating commanders, NCOs, and supervisors to detect and refer substance abusers for rehabilitation; deglamorization of alcohol at social events; and extensive media coverage on the harmful effects of alcohol and drug abuse. USFK also continued to

6. (1) ACoFS, J1 Educ Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

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coordinate with ROK law enforcement activities against drug manufacturers and traffickers.⁷

EUSA Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Activities (U)

(U) Fund Utilization. Appropriated fund (APF) support received by EUSA for MWR activities totaled \$11.853 million in FY 1983. Of that amount, \$11.450 million was allocated for Recreation Services Operations-Korea (RSOK) activities, while the remaining \$403,000 provided support for child development services.

(U) The EUSA Morale Support Fund (MSF) was the parent instrumentality for the control of nonappropriated funds (NAF) expended for recreational purposes. Management of unit NAF funds throughout the command was decentralized from the EUSA MSF to seven area morale support funds, each servicing units within its geographic area. Available FY 1983 MSF resources amounted to approximately \$6.0 million, of which \$3.6 million were reimbursements from the APF account. A total of \$3.4 million was allocated to RSOK and the area morale support funds, while \$ 2.6 million was expended for 22 NAF capital purchase and minor construction projects including racquetball courts, athletic field renovations, and equipment acquisitions.

(U) NAF major construction projects under way, separately funded by DA grants, included a \$1.9 million youth activities center at Yongsan Garrison and a unit entertainment center at Camp Red Cloud, costed at \$516,000. Both projects were projected for completion by the end of 1984. The unit entertainment center would serve as a prototype for six additional centers to be constructed command-wide, with resultant savings in design costs.

(U) Installation of Slot Machines. Commencing in October 1983, approximately 700 slot machines were placed in EUSA clubs and Armed Forces Recreation Centers (AFRC) by year's end, with nearly 400 additional machines scheduled for installation by February 1984. All funds collected under the program were deposited in a DA central trust fund. After program expenses were deducted, the remaining funds were distributed in three equal shares to the Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation Fund, EUSA Morale Support Fund, and the installation where the income was generated. The funds would be used for installation-wide MWR capital purchase and minor construction requirements, and not solely for club projects. Costs incurred by clubs in support of the slot machine program were reimbursable from the EUSA share of net income. At year's end, a total of \$598,578 had been collected from use of the machines. After deductions for operating expenses and DA's share, EUSA and installation shares combined amounted to \$317,800.

(U) Seoul Garden Hotel. On 1 January 1983, USFK acquired the Seoul Garden Hotel to help meet transient billeting requirements and to serve as an Armed Forces Recreation Center. The American-style hotel, built in 1979, had 397 rooms and provided a variety of services at reasonable cost. Food and

7. (1) ACoFS, JI Human Resr Div Hist Sum 1983. (2) EUSA R&A, 2d. & 4th Qtrs FY 83 and 1st Qtr, FY 84. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

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beverage facilities included a specialty dining room, family-style restaurant, coffee shop, delicatessen, bakery, two concession restaurants (Korean and Japanese), three lounge areas, and a night club. Banquet facilities comprised a large main ballroom seating 500 and three smaller private meeting rooms as well as a roof garden outdoor banquet area.

(U) USFK acquired the hotel on a five-year lease agreement, with an option to extend for five additional years. The lease was subject to cancellation on 90 days notice. Leasing costs for the first five years of operation were set at \$3.4 million per year. Eleven EUSA NAF instrumentalities provided loans totaling \$3.4 million and the Naija AFRC contributed a grant of \$700,000 to fund the initial operations of the Seoul Garden. The hotel, staffed with 512 Korean national and 18 US employees, opened for business as a transient facility on 15 January.

(U) The hotel incurred a deficit of \$730,000 during the first two months of operation, which was attributed to excessive start-up costs and a low occupancy rate. Furthermore, a full professional US management staff was not in place until May. Through intensive management efforts, the deficit was reduced to \$580,000 by the end of the fiscal year (30 September). The FY 1983 occupancy rate was recorded as 82.4 percent. In October, 89 slot machines were installed in the hotel to generate revenue for offsetting capital improvement and lease costs. The start-up loan (\$3.4 million) provided by EUSA NAF resources was converted to a grant in November 1983.⁸

USFK Ration Control System Changes (U)

(U) Effective 1 November 1983, the following changes to the USFK ration control system were implemented in Korea Area Exchange and Army/Air Force commissary outlets: monthly dollar limits of combined exchange/commissary purchases for family sizes four-five, six, and seven were increased to \$850, \$1,075, and \$1,115, respectively; letters of authorization were no longer required for personnel in grades E-5 and E-6 when making a first purchase of controlled items; color television tuners and monitors and Walkman-type cassette players were added to the list of controlled items; cosmetics and hand-held hair dryers were decontrolled; monthly limits of soda were increased from six to eight cases for single individuals; and purchases of baby-related items were authorized during the final 120 days of pregnancy.⁹

EUSA Civilian Personnel Developments (U)

(U) Manpower Management. At the end of CY 1983, EUSA's Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) strength stood at 921, a deviation of 3.7 percent above the objective ceiling of 888. Overhire of temporary lower-grade clerical employees against vacant permanent higher-grade spaces, in which hiring lags existed, permitted the command to exceed the ceiling because of the difference in salary ranges. (For example, several temporary GS-3 clerks could be hired against one

8. ACofS, J1 Prog Mgt Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

9. ACofS, J1 Data Mgt Div Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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GS-12 permanent vacancy using the same amount of funds.) There were 149 temporary DAC employees on the rolls at year's end. EUSA's Korean national (KN) employee strength totaled 9,036 at year's end, which was only 98.8 percent of the authorized level but within the 98 to 100 percent objective range.

(U) Through application of intensive position classification and manpower management efforts, the average grade level of EUSA's DAC employees was recorded as 8.8027 at the close of CY 1983, compared to the 9.4430 average registered a year earlier. The DA objective, a not-to-exceed limit, remained at a 10.1176 level. Factors contributing to the decline included the hiring of temporary lower-grade employees against vacant higher-grade spaces, noted earlier, and the employment of USFK dependents in lower-grade positions normally designated for occupancy by Korean nationals.¹⁰

(U) EUSA employed 268 USFK dependents at year's end under the DOD Family Member Hire Program, who represented 31 percent of the DAC work force. The program, applied to positions below the GS-9 level, eliminated the necessity for CONUS recruitment actions and resulted in considerable savings in housing allowance payments and travel/transportation expenses. Of the total family members employed, 96 occupied positions normally designated for Korean nationals under a policy initiated in 1982. In addition, 77 dependents were recruited for EUSA nonappropriated fund positions. From May through September, DOD activities in Korea serviced by EUSA Civilian Personnel Offices employed a total of 511 dependent youths under the DOD Summer Employment Program.

(U) EUSA Merit Pay System. Eighteen of EUSA's 79 merit pay system employees (GS-13 and above) received cash awards totalling \$44,616 in FY 1983, well below the \$103,000 budgeted for merit pay raises. Individual awards averaged approximately \$3,000 each. Raters, reviewers, and approving officials continued to submit inflated ratings; 41 of the 79 prepared were recommended for downgrading by the EUSA Merit Pay Review Board for lack of justification on how performance exceeded standards. Educative efforts continued throughout the year to apprise all raters, reviewers, and approving officials on the necessity for improvements in the merit pay appraisal process.

(U) Emergency-Essential (E-E) Civilian Employee Positions. In July 1983, DA issued instructions requiring EUSA to identify essential US direct-hire civilian employees who would be retained in Korea during emergency situations. The positions would be needed during a period of mobilization, after noncombatant evacuation had been accomplished, to prevent serious degradations of wartime missions and critical military support systems. The EUSA Chief of Staff approved 27 E-E positions command-wide that had previously been included on Mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowance.

(U) Civilian Employee Living Quarters Allowances (LQA). Effective 2 October 1983, US civilian employees in Korea received LQA increases ranging from \$1,200 to \$1,800 per annum. The adjustments, made by the Department of State, were based upon reports of actual employee expenditures for rent and

10. EUSA R&A, 3d Qtr, FY 83 & 1st Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

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utilities costs submitted during May 1983. The newly established rates for areas where the bulk of the civilian work force were employed are shown in Table 29.

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Table 29--(U) US Civilian Employee Living Quarters Allowances
Per Annum - Effective 2 October 1983

Area of Assignment	GS-14 & Above	GS-10 to 13	GS-1 to GS-9a
Seoul			
With Family ^b	\$10,400	\$9,300	\$8,300
Without Family	8,300	8,100	7,800
Taegu			
With Family ^b	7,800	7,800	7,400
Without Family	7,400	6,400	6,300
Pusan			
With Family ^b	6,600	6,300	5,400
Without Family	5,400	5,400	5,000
Pyongtaek (Osan AB/ Cp Humphreys area)			
With Family ^b	8,300	8,100	5,900
Without Family	7,300	6,300	5,500

^aGS-7 to 9 employees with more than 15 years Federal service entitled to same allowances as GS-10 to 13.

^bEmployees with more than one family member at duty post received additional amounts above basic rates as follows: 2-3 dependents - 10%; 4-5 dependents - 20%; 6 or more dependents - 30%.

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(U) Korean National Employees Pay Adjustment. Analysis of data collected from a Locality Wage Change and Benefits Survey completed in April 1983 resulted in determinations to increase the pay schedules for USFK KN employees, effective 1 June, by amounts averaging 8.7 percent for white collar employees and 9.8 percent for wage grade workers. During the survey, data gathering teams from USFK's Office of Civilian Personnel Director (OCPD) accumulated information on pay rates and employee benefit practices from 69 Korean business concerns and government agencies located in Seoul, Taegu, Pusan, Osan, and Kunsan, where large numbers of KN workers were employed.

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(U) The survey findings also supported a 0.3 percent increase in tuition assistance payments made to employees with dependents in middle school or high school. Also included was a new provision to pay employees for limited amounts of unused annual leave that otherwise would be forfeited at year's end.

(U) Housing for Korean National Employees. The Korean Employees Union, using long-term loans from the ROK Government, initiated housing construction projects to meet the needs of USFK KN workers at several locations. Construction of 136 apartment units in the Pyongtaek (Camp Humphreys) vicinity was completed by the close of 1983. Another project to build 200 dwelling units in the Camp Howze (2d Infantry Division) area was projected for completion in early 1984.¹¹

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program (U)

(U) Developed in 1981, the USFK/EUSA Affirmative Action Program Plan (AAPP) remained the principal management tool for eliminating barriers to the recruitment of women and minority group members to the command's civilian employee rolls. AAPP hiring goals established in 1982 continued in effect for professional, administrative, technical, and clerical occupational groupings.

(U) The percentage of females in the USFK/EUSA work force rose from 31.3 percent in 1982 to 34.1 percent in 1983. Increases in the employment of minority group members in 1983 were: Blacks - 1 percent; Hispanics - 3 percent; American Indians/Alaskan Natives - 0.1 percent; and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders - 2.2 percent. Approximately 20 percent of the GS-13 vacancies created during the year were filled by minority group candidates. Asian Americans continued to represent a significant majority of USFK/EUSA's minority group employees.¹²

11. OCPD Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

12. (1) EEO Ofc Hist Sum 1983. (2) OCPD Hist Sum 1983. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER XV: SELECTED STAFF ACTIVITIES (U)

US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (U)

(U) Background. Article IV of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed in October 1953 granted the US the right to dispose its military forces "...in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement." Following negotiations which began in 1962, the US-ROK SOFA was concluded on 9 July 1966 and entered into force on 9 February 1967. The SOFA's 31 articles and appended minutes and understandings covered virtually all facets of relationships between USFK and the South Korean government and people. The basic principles embodied in the US-ROK SOFA combined respect for Korean laws with detailed provisions which gave the US armed forces, US civilian employees, invited contractors, and dependents a special, carefully defined status in view of the importance of the US presence to the defense of the ROK.

(U) Implementing Agency. The US-ROK Joint Committee was established as the primary means of consultation between the US and the ROK on all matters concerning SOFA implementation. The Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs served as the ROK Joint Committee representative, assisted by senior officials from other ROK ministries and agencies. The Deputy COMUSKOREA functioned as the US Joint Committee representative, aided by designated officers from USFK staffs and component commands, a political advisor from the US Embassy, Seoul, and a Secretary to provide administrative support.¹ In accordance with SOFA policy, matters which the Joint Committee were unable to resolve would be referred through appropriate channels to the respective governments for further consideration.

(U) Twelve subcommittees advised the US-ROK Joint Committee on technical matters in the following functional fields: Facilities and Areas, Criminal Jurisdiction, Civil Jurisdiction (Claims), Finance, Labor, Transportation, Commerce, Security and Law Enforcement, Utilities, Entry and Exit (Ad Hoc), Civil-Military Relations (Ad Hoc), and Illegal Transactions in Duty-Free Goods (Ad Hoc).

(U) 1983 Developments. The US-ROK Joint Committee held four formal meetings during the year--on 25 March, 17 June, 9 September, and 29 November.² Principal Joint Committee actions included:³

1. (U) The US Joint Committee Secretary was assigned to the Office of the Special Assistant for SOFA/International Relations, a staff element of the Office of the Deputy COMUSKOREA.

2. (U) Detailed accounts of the meetings are contained in 1983 US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee Minutes. Filed in Ofc of Sp Asst for SOFA/Intl Rel & US SOFA Secretariat.

3. Sp Asst for SOFA/Intl Rel & US SOFA Secretariat Hist Sum 1983. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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--(FOUO) Approval of two recommendations from the Transportation Subcommittee occasioned by the temporary suspension in August 1983 of flight operations at Osan Air Base to permit runway resurfacing and other improvements. The approvals afforded USFK the temporary use, from 1 August through 30 November, of specified Kimpo International Airport facilities by DOD-chartered aircraft engaged in transporting USFK personnel. Because of unanticipated delays in completion of the Osan AB renovation work, the Joint Committee exigently approved on 27 December a time extension for USFK use of Kimpo facilities until 20 January 1984. (See pages 136-37.)

--(FOUO) Approval of a recommendation from the Ad Hoc Entry and Exit Subcommittee to add Kimhae International Airport and Cheju International Airport to the list of seven existing ports authorized by the ROKG for entry and exit of USFK personnel.

--(FOUO) Approval of 102 recommendations from the Facilities and Areas Subcommittee related to various USFK real estate interests which involved granting new additional facilities to USFK or return to the ROKG of USFK-acquired real estate no longer required.

--(FOUO) Approval of two recommendations from the Utilities Subcommittee concerning changes in rates applicable to USFK for electric power and water services.

--(FOUO) Assignment of 140 tasks to the Facilities and Areas Subcommittee, related primarily to USFK acquisition or release of real estate (land and/or facilities)(see page 194). A significant number of the tasks involved extensions of time periods for real estate parcels acquired by USFK for temporary use, and measures required for the protection or relocation of portions of the Trans-Korea Pipeline (see pages 125-27).

--(FOUO) Tasking of the Transportation Subcommittee to review and recommend changes in existing Joint Committee procedures for licensing and registration of vehicles privately owned by USFK personnel. Objective was to reduce the time required in the vehicle registration process and otherwise improve its administrative effectiveness. Completion of the task was expected in 1984.

--(FOUO) Tasking of the Labor Subcommittee to act upon a ROK Government request to reinstate 12 former Korean national, Korea Area Exchange employees who were removed from their positions in 1980-81 on suspicion of illegal diversion of exchange merchandise.

Judge Advocate (U)

(U) SOFA Criminal Jurisdiction. Article XXII of the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement provided for ROK authorities to have primary jurisdiction over USFK military and civilian members in cases involving criminal offenses against ROK law, persons, or property. The US military authorities had the primary right in practically all other cases involving US personnel; however, USFK-affiliated civilians not subject to trial by military court-martial in peacetime were normally tried by ROK tribunals.

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(U) During the period 1 December 1982-30 November 1983, ROK authorities exercised jurisdiction in cases involving 6 US Army military personnel, 148 Army/Air Force civilian employees, and 182 Army/Air Force dependents. An additional 45 cases pending at the end of 1982 were also concluded, raising the total number of cases handled in 1983 by ROK authorities to 381. A total of 28 cases were concluded by trials and 64 by fines imposed by summary procedure; 255 were dismissed and approximately 40 cases remained pending at year's end. The most serious cases resulted in the conviction of three Army members charged with customs violations or robberies who were sentenced to 2 1/2 to 5 years imprisonment, and the conviction of a dependent for attempted murder who received a 3-year prison term. On 12 November, just prior to President Reagan's visit to Korea, President Chun pardoned unconditionally all seven Army and Air Force military members confined in ROK prisons, who were released and returned to the US for separation from military service.

(U) EUSA Military Jurisdiction. The number of EUSA personnel tried under courts-martial proceedings during 1983 is shown below (1982 figures in parentheses).

General Courts-Martial	71 (48)
Bad-Conduct-Discharge Special Courts-Martial ...	123 (111)
Normal Special Courts-Martial	85 (107)
Summary Courts-Martial	89 (122)

The rate of courts-martial (all categories) conducted within EUSA in CY 1983 was calculated as 2.95 per 1,000 members, compared to the Army-wide rate of 2.10 per 1,000 members. Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, was administered at a rate of 50.09 per 1,000 members, contrasted with the Army-wide rate of 40.52. (Data on founded offenses within EUSA appears on Table 30, page 210.)

(U) American Preference Program. A joint Senate/House conference committee resolving differences on the FY 1984 DOD military construction bill concluded that DOD should examine construction projects in Pacific areas, including Korea, to determine where an American Preference Program (APP) could be initiated within existing agreements. If legally permissible, procedures were to be instituted to restrict awards to US firms in projects where costs exceeded \$5 million, including subcontracted work. Although the legislative committee report did not constitute an enacted law of Congress, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) indicated on 23 November 1983 that the APP would be implemented in Korea unless it could be shown that it was not in accord with existing agreements.

(U) A study of the problem by USFK/EUSA Engineer, Korea Contracting Agency, and Far East District Engineer staffs and the US Embassy, Seoul concluded that the APP, if carried out, would endanger the ROK-US security relationship, result in substantial construction delays, significantly increase US costs, and bring USFK construction programs to a halt. The Judge Advocate further concluded that the APP was not in accordance with the negotiating history of the US-ROK SOFA and therefore could not be implemented

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appropriately in Korea. At year's end, DOD indicated that the proposed APP would not be carried out in the ROK.⁴

(U) Claims. During 1983, the US Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea (USAFCS-K) obligated \$1,282,079 in final settlement of 614 claims by Korean nationals filed under Article XXIII of the SOFA. The majority, totaling 513, arose in connection with official duties of USFK personnel. The US assumed 75 percent of their settlement costs, amounting to \$996,868. (Pursuant to the SOFA, the ROK paid 25 percent of such claim costs.) The remaining 101 claims, generated by USFK personnel in off-duty status, were settled for \$285,210, with the US paying 100 percent of the costs.

(U) USAFCS-K and subordinate Army claims offices in Korea paid \$791,899 on 2,879 claims filed by USFK military personnel and civilian employees for personal property lost or damaged incident to their service, and by non-DOD US citizens for personal injury and property losses caused by USFK personnel. Although the number of claims paid in 1983 rose by 10 percent, the costs of settlement decreased by 3.6 percent.

(U) Centralization at USAFCS-K of recovery of contractual liability from commercial carriers, for lost or damaged property of USFK members, resulted in a Korea-wide collection for the US Government of \$127,305, a 38.6 percent increase over 1982. A total of \$65,558 was regained under the US Medical Recovery Act, an eight-fold increase from the previous year, and \$26,511 was recovered for damages to USG property.⁵

Provost Marshal (U)

(U) Indiscipline Within Eighth Army. Data on founded offenses committed by EUSA personnel in CY 1983 appears on Table 30.

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Table 30--(U) Founded Offenses Within EUSA, CY 1983

Offense	Percent of Total Offenses in EUSA	EUSA Rate Per 1,000 Members	Army-Wide Rate Per 1,000 Members
Crimes of Violence ^a	6.3	1.49	1.10
Crimes Against Property ^b	68.2	16.18	15.26

4. (1) JA Hist Sum 1983. (2) EUSA RGA, 2d & 3d Qtr, FY 84. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

5. USAFCS-K Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 30--CONTINUED

Offense	Percent of Total Offenses in EUSA	EUSA Rate Per 1,000 Members	Army-Wide Rate Per 1,000 Members
Dangerous Drugs ^C	8.3	1.95	1.21
Marijuana ^C	17.2	4.31	3.74

^aConsisted of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Aggravated assaults represented 78 percent of offenses.

^bIncluded burglary/housebreaking, larceny, auto theft, and arson. Larcenies over \$50 represented 65 percent of offenses.

^cUse, sale and possession.

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The rate of absent-without-leave offenses committed by EUSA personnel in CY 1983 was calculated as 2.04 per 1,000 members, compared to the Army-wide rate of 4.50 per 1,000 members.⁶

(U) EUSA Confinement Facility. During 1983 a total of 597 personnel were incarcerated in the EUSA Confinement Facility at Camp Humphreys. The average daily prisoner population was 38; detention time for those in pretrial confinement averaged 40 days. Twenty-nine prisoners were transferred during the year to the US Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; 149 to the US Army Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, Kans.; and 7 to the Transient Personnel Control Facility, Fort Ord, Calif. Two dependent wives of USFK personnel were confined in a ROK prison facility.⁷

(U) Counterterrorism Initiatives. In April 1983 the ROK JCS requested that joint ROK-US manning of checkpoints be implemented along four main routes leading into Seoul. The request was based upon intelligence reports that North Korean infiltrators might use US uniforms and vehicles to reach the Seoul area for terrorist operations. Four joint checkpoints were established at critical locations on 4 May, using 56 military policemen detailed from EUSA.

6. EUSA R&A, 2d & 3d Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

7. PM Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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MP companies. Commitment to the joint mission impacted adversely on EUSA MP mission requirements such as supporting annual TEAM SPIRIT exercises.⁸ (Other issues reflecting on EUSA military police readiness posture are summarized on page 75.)

(U) The Countering Terrorism Mobile Training Team, US Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Ala., conducted an intensive seminar course on 7-10 June, the first of its type conducted in Korea. The course included topics on training and planning in defending against terrorism operations, security self-protection, crisis management, and hostage negotiations. Some 48 USFK participants representing 16 organizations and agencies attended the sessions, along with 49 ROK officials from 5 Korean law enforcement agencies.

(U) On 7-10 September the USAF Office of Special Investigations sponsored an Anti-Terrorist Evasive Driving Course to qualify VIP drivers who had arrived in Korea without such training. A total of 17 USFK drivers completed the course, which included instruction in basic safe driving procedures, offensive tactics, and vehicle preparation, followed by two days of hands-on training at Osan AB in high-speed evasive-action driving techniques.

(U) EUSA Military Police Investigator Academy. Established in 1973 by the command's Provost Marshal, the EUSA Military Police Investigator Academy continued to offer a training curriculum for enlisted investigators in the WESTPAC area. A total of 594 students, representing all US Services from organizations throughout PACOM had graduated from the three-week course since its inception. The 18th session, conducted from 27 February to 18 March 1983, graduated 46 students, the largest class in the academy's history.

(U) Major course subjects included: countering blackmarket activities and ration control violations, processing and handling of evidence, crime scene processing, reports and forms, use of a polygraph, counterterrorism, legal aspects of investigations, and a drug enforcement mini-course. Upon completing the instruction, graduates underwent a 90-day, on-the-job training program in their parent units before being awarded the appropriate skills qualification rating. The academy staff from the USFK/EUSA Provost Marshal Office was supplemented by instructors provided by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command, US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, USFK Judge Advocate, Army and Air Force MP units, Korea Area Exchange Security Office, and the US Drug Enforcement Agency.

(U) Customs Law Enforcement. Several incidents involving the importation of large amounts of like items in household goods and unaccompanied baggage shipments (HHG/UB) by USFK personnel into the ROK convinced Korean authorities that the "reasonable limits" of incoming duty-free goods were being exceeded. (Most of the articles in question had a high potential for diversion to the Korean blackmarket.) No system for scrutinizing HHG/UB shipments had ever been established to ascertain whether US personnel had violated ROK customs laws on

8. Point Paper, PM, 19 Jan 84, subj: Joint ROK-US Manning of Checkpoints. UNCLASSIFIED.

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imported duty-free articles. To meet appropriate US responsibilities under the SOFA, the USFK/EUSA Provost Marshal coordinated a training program to certify military policemen as customs inspectors. In April 1983 they began "integrity inspections" of incoming HHG/UB throughout USFK, except at USAF bases where Air Force personnel performed the surveys. When shipments appeared to contain excessive duty-free goods, a report was forwarded to the individual's unit commander for final determination.

(U) Certified MP inspectors had commenced examining accompanied baggage of incoming PCS and TDY personnel at Kimpo International Airport in February 1983. By year's end, five confiscations of duty-free goods had been made, including one from a USFK member attempting to evade customs duties on items valued at \$40,000.⁹

Inspector General (U)

(U) Inspector General Action Requests. Inspectors General at HQ EUSA and major subordinate commands processed 909 action requests submitted during CY 1983, of which 33 percent were determined to be justified complaints. In 1982 the volume of requests totaled 970, with 39 percent considered substantiated. Data on the most active categories of requests in 1983, in descending order, and the principal bases for their initiation are summarized below:¹⁰

--Conditions in Unit - 209 complaints; 32 percent justified. Primarily directed at commanders' actions and policies, inattention to soldiers' problems, harassment, maltreatment, and leave & pass denial. High personnel turnover rates, both in the enlisted ranks and the officer chain of command, contributed to misperceptions of actual conditions in EUSA units.

--Personal Financial Matters - 72 complaints; 57 percent justified. Claims of nonsupport by civilian dependents (married/separated/divorced) constituted the bulk of action requests in this category. A smaller number were based on indebtedness, which affected both military and civilian personnel; a majority of the complaints resulted from sponsors not providing adequate financial support for spouses following the sponsors' PCS move to Korea.

--Assignment/Reassignment - 65 complaints; 26 percent justified. Numerous allegations based upon delayed receipt of orders to execute PCS moves. Allegations of unjust denials of requests for joint domicile were the basis for the second largest number of complaints in this category.

--Transportation & Travel - 51 complaints; 49 percent justified. Primarily directed at delayed port calls for PCS travel, restrictions on

9. PM Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

10. (1) IG Hist Sum 1983. (2) EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d & 4th Qtr, FY 83 and 1st Qtr, FY 84. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

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concurrent travel of dependents, lost/damaged/destroyed household goods, and TDY travel policies. Frequent misunderstanding of leave policies and travel entitlements resulted in personal hardships not easily resolved within the chain of command without external assistance.

--Medical/Dental/Veterinary/Pharmacy - 42 complaints; 26 percent justified. Complaints of improper posting of medical/dental records and withdrawing or not granting physical profile limits generated the bulk of allegations.

--Enlisted Personnel Management System - 40 complaints; 60 percent justified. Complaints focused on enlisted evaluation reports and promotion policies.

--Administration - 36 complaints; 56 percent justified. Centered on untimely issue of identification cards to dependents and their registration in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, postal service policies, and Personnel Administration Center actions.

--Records Management - 34 complaints; 50 percent justified. Allegations of inaccuracies in personnel records and lack of records control were main causes of complaints.

(U) Inspections of Eighth Army Units. Major findings of EUSA IG teams during their command-wide inspection activities are indicated below:¹¹

--Maintenance Management. The trend of findings throughout EUSA indicated a need for increased command emphasis on: preventive maintenance checks and services; driver qualification; testing and licensing of generator operators; and establishment of effective, functional maintenance standing operating procedures. Additional problems were noted in respect to planning for construction and modification of unit maintenance facilities, an area of particular concern for units scheduled to receive UH-60 BLACKHAWK helicopters in 1984 (see pages 114-15). Existing aviation maintenance facilities were not capable of properly supporting projected aircraft densities.

--Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense. Major areas needing increased emphasis were training standards and requisitioning/stockage of proper NBC equipment and protective clothing. Inspections revealed the presence of obsolete equipment and lack of required items for actual contingency missions and training.

--Property Accountability and Supply Discipline. Property book pages were not prepared correctly in many instances and some equipment, including durable items, were not properly controlled by hand receipts. Supporting document files were not correctly posted and hand receipt holders were not appointed in writing. Lack of follow-up measures to correct previously recognized discrepancies was evident in many units. Failure to

11. IG Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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properly identify and account for decrement stocks adversely affected the management of war reserves.

--Dining Facility Operations. Inspections revealed a lack of administrative accountability for subsistence items. Quantities of food prepared did not always balance with subsistence issued from the supply point, and meals prepared in many instances did not equate with the number of meals served to personnel.

--Weight Control Program. Implementation was generally inconsistent throughout EUSA. Commanders were not referring correspondence to overweight soldiers for acknowledgment and subsequent placement in the program. Personnel records were not properly "flagged" when soldiers entered the program and, in some cases, "flags" were not removed when soldiers achieved weight reduction goals. Correspondence removing soldiers from the program was not forwarded to military personnel offices for inclusion in personnel files.

--Publications Management. In many cases, publications requirements did not accurately reflect unit needs; actions were not taken on requisitioning errors; and distribution schemes were either lacking or inappropriate.

--Self-Help Preventive Maintenance Programs. Installation commanders had not developed or implemented active self-help programs for troop repair of minor defects in barracks and other buildings. Area facility engineers were handling repairs which should have been accomplished through self-help.

--Contingency Planning and Related Training. Many units had not updated their contingency plans to support revised OPLANs. In some instances, command training and programs had not incorporated revised missions necessary to implement the modified plans.

Surgeon (U)

(U) Command Health and Medical Services.¹² The US Army Community Hospital-Seoul (USACH-S), the only full-service US military medical facility in Korea, had a 250-bed capacity capable of conversion to a 400-bed medical evacuation unit (designated the 121st Evacuation Hospital). In CY 1983 the average number of beds occupied daily at USACH-S totaled 110.5; live births averaged 1.7 daily. The number of visits to EUSA's outpatient clinics, located command-wide, averaged 1,019 per day. Daily averages of other major medical services were: dental treatments, 1,351.5; food inspections, 115,500 pounds; and spectacle fabrication, 39.8.¹³ (Data on USACH-S Alcohol Treatment Facility patient load appears on page 201.)

12. (U) Detailed information on USFK/EUSA Surgeon and 8th MEDCOM (Prov) activities is contained in Annual Historical Report-AMEDD Activities (RCS MED 41 [R4]), submitted to the Surgeon General in accordance with AR 40-226.

13. EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d & 4th Qtr, FY 83 and 1st Qtr, FY 84. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) Construction and Renovation Projects. In April 1983, construction was completed on a new 18-chair dental clinic at Yongsan Garrison South Post, with total contract costs approximating \$1.37 million. Construction work commenced in October on a new troop medical clinic at Camp Casey to be operated by the 2d Infantry Division's medical battalion. The MCA project, costed at \$3.8 million, was projected for completion in October 1985. Work on a TOE equipment storage area for the 43d Surgical Hospital (MASH) at Camp Humphreys was approximately 70 percent complete at the close of 1983. Troop aid stations at Camps Greaves and Hovey (2d Inf Div), both exigent minor MCA projects, were programmed for construction in mid-1984.

(U) A new 18-bed obstetric/gynecology ward was opened at USACH-S in July, which doubled the former patient capacity. The new ward permitted more patients to use USACH-S facilities instead of being treated at local Korean hospitals through CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of Uniformed Services).

(U) Medical Care Support Equipment (MEDCASE) Program. The MEDCASE Program was established to enable medical activities to acquire capital investment type Table of Distribution and Allowance items (with a unit price exceeding \$3,000) using Other Procurement, Army funds allocated by the Surgeon General. In January the 8th MEDCOM (Prov) requisitioned 56 items under the 1983 MEDCASE Program, totaling \$700,000 in cost, to satisfy requirements at all medical and dental clinics within the command. At year's end, 27 items had been received; order ship times averaged eight months. Ten requisitions were cancelled by initiating activities because of changed requirements and 19 items remained due-in.¹⁴

Chaplain (U)

(U) During 1983, Eighth Army chaplains conducted 8,757 religious worship services with a total attendance of 337,009. Other principal ministries included individual counseling, religious education, minority activities such as Black gospel services, and cross-cultural communication skills development programs related to Asian-American marriages.

(U) On 6 May a new Jewish chapel, the first one established in EUSA, was opened for use. Located in the Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) Community Life Center, the facility comprised a worship area, library, and kosher kitchen. A consecration service for the new chapel was planned for March 1984, following the completion of redesign and renovation work. On 15 September the 8th Medical Command (Prov) dedicated a new chapel facility in the US Army Community Hospital-Seoul. Ground-breaking commenced on 19 September for a new chapel construction project at the Hannam Village family housing area, near Yongsan Garrison.

(U) During 1983 more than 20,000 USFK military and civilian personnel and family members used the facilities of the EUSA Religious Retreat Center, a 270

14. (1) 8th MEDCOM (Prov) Hist Sum 1983. (2) Point Paper, Surg, 13 Jan 84, subj: EUSA Medical/Dental MCA Projects. Both references UNCLASSIFIED.

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percent increase over 1982 participation. The expanded usage was attributed to the introduction of one-day unit retreats, commander-chaplain "open hours" and the development of an extensive publicity program. In addition to regularly scheduled retreats for Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Buddhist military personnel and their family members, the Center offered two special retreat programs: Homeward Bound I, conducted for unaccompanied married service members to prepare them for return to family life in CONUS; and Homeward Bound II, to assist Korean wives and their US military spouses in adjusting to American society.

(U) The Eighth Army Family Life Center, established in December 1982 by the USFK/EUSA Command Chaplain, was officially dedicated on 23 February 1983. Located in Hannam Village, near Yongsan Garrison, the Center's primary functions entailed marriage and family counseling for USFK personnel, as well as associated education and training services for chaplains and other helping professionals. The Center's staffing included one Chaplain Director, one bilingual (English/Korean) civilian co-therapist, and one part-time civilian receptionist. The counseling case load averaged approximately 23 cases per week at year's end.¹⁵

Public Affairs (U)

(U) During 1983 a substantial number of international news media representatives visited the ROK for on-the-scene reporting of significant military-related events. Primary among those events were President Reagan's state visit in December (see pages 7-14), Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 83 in March (pages 100-106), 15th Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in April (pages 59-65), and Military Armistice Commission meetings held at Panmunjom (summarized in United Nations Command Historical Summary 1983). The USFK/EUSA Public Affairs Office (PAO) provided media advisories and briefings, as well as logistical assistance, to visiting news representatives throughout the year. The PAO's Combined/Joint Media Center established at Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) during TEAM SPIRIT 83, accredited 348 military and civilian journalists, photographers, and broadcasters from the US and eight foreign countries.

(U) The PAO's Community Relations Division maintained contact with a variety of ROK civic and cultural organizations to promote mutual understanding and maintain harmonious relations between USFK personnel and the Korean community. Activities included the coordination of ROK-sponsored tours, visits to Korean homes, intercultural language development sessions, and the ROK-subsidized Reunion in Korea Program by which family members and close relatives of USFK personnel visited Korea for five days at nominal cost.

(U) On 4 October 1983 the American Forces Korea Network, which operated under PAO staff supervision, became the first major military television system to join the DOD Satellite Network. The satellite terminal, located near AFKN headquarters at Yongsan Garrison (Seoul), was operated by the Korea

15. Ch Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Telecommunications Authority under an agreement with Armed Forces Information Service. The advent of satellite service expanded AFKN's broadcast day by approximately four hours, significantly increased live coverage of US network sports events, and made US public affairs programs available on a more timely basis. Actions were in progress at year's end to procure equipment for a new AFKN in-country microwave system to be installed by late 1984.¹⁶

Adjutant General Memorialization Actions (U)

(U) In 1983 Eighth Army approved the following memorializations:¹⁷

--2d Infantry Division Fire Base 4P3, to honor Major Arthur G. Bonifas, a member of United Nations Command Support Group, Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, who was killed by North Korean soldiers on 18 August 1976.

--Parade field at Camp Carroll, to honor Private First Class Luther H. Story, a member of Company A, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for actions on 1 September 1950 in the vicinity of Agok, Korea.

--Camp Walker gymnasium, to honor Colonel Thomas A. Kelly, a former Chief of Staff, 19th Support Command, who held a position of high responsibility in the Taegu military community.

16. PAO Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

17. AG Hist Sum 1983. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) RANKING DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO USFK/EUSA, 1983

ADM Thomas B. Hayward (Ret), former Chief of Naval Operations, 4-11 Jan.
Mr. Raymond J. Sumser, Dir of Civilian Personnel, ODCSPER, DA, 7-16 Jan.
MG Patrick J. Halloran (USAF), Dep Dir for Strategic C3S, JCS, 13-15 Jan.
Dr. Beth Stephens, Dir, DoD Dependent Schools 14-18 Jan.
Mr. Michael A. Janoski, Dep Auditor General, DA, 15-20 Jan.
Representative Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.), 17-18 Jan.
LTG William J. Hilsman (USA), Dir, Defense Communications Agency, 18-21 Jan.
GEN Edward C. Meyer (USA), Army Chief of Staff, 20-23 Jan.
SMA William A. Connelly, Sergeant Major of the Army, 20-23 Jan.
MG Ames S. Albro (USA), Ofc, Chief of Engineers, DA, 21-26 Jan.
RADM Thomas F. Brown III, Cdr, Task Force Seven, Seventh Fleet, 25-26 Jan.
GEN James P. Mullins (USAF), Cdr, AF Logistics Comd, 26-28 Jan.
MG William J. Mall, Jr., (USAF), Cdr, ARRS, 27-29 Jan.
ADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr, CINC, US Pacific Fleet, 27-30 Jan.
MG Carl H. McNair, Jr., (USA), CG, USA Aviation Center, 28 Jan-3 Feb.
LTG Bernard T. Mitemeyer (USA), Surgeon General, USA, 1-3 Feb.
LTG R. Dean Tice (USA), Dep Asst SECDEF (Mil Pers Policy), 1-4 Feb.
LTG Max B. Brallier (USAF), Surgeon General, USAF, 4-6 Feb.
Hon. George P. Schultz, SECSTATE, 6-8 Feb.
MG Harold I. Small (USA), Cdr, USA Transportation Center & School, 8-12 Feb.
Mr. Valcris O. Ewell, Jr., Dir, DA Acquisition Mgt Review Agency, 10-23 Feb.
MG Herman O. Thomson (USAF), Vice CINCPACAF, 14-18 Feb.
MG Robert E. Haebel (USMC), CG, 3d Marine Amphibious Force, 15-16 Feb.

Appendix A

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VADM Eugene A. Grinstead, Jr., Dir, Defense Logistics Agency, 16-18 Feb.
MG Thomas A. Diab (USAF), Mobilization Asst to CINCPAC, 16-23 Feb.
MG Garrison Rapmund (USA), Cdr, USA Medical R&D Comd, 22-26 Feb.
MG William H. Schneider (USA), CG, 25th Inf Div, 26 Feb-25 Mar.
Mr. Walter W. Hollis, Dep USofA (Opns Research) 27 Feb- 9 Mar.
MG James I. Baginski (USA), Dir of Deployment, JDA, 6-8 Mar.
RADM James W. Austin, Cdr, Fleet Air, WESTPAC, 9 Mar.
LTG Alexander M. Weyand (USA), CG, US Army Japan, 10-13 Mar.
MG Robert E. Haebel (USMC), CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, 10-21 Mar.
MG H. Thomas Chandler (USA), Chief, Army Dental Corps, 11-17 Mar.
LTG Arnold W. Braswell (USAF), CINCPACAF, 11-17 Mar.
LTG John N. Brandenburg (USA), CG, I Corps, 11-22 Mar.
LTG John K. Davis (USMC), CG, Fleet Marine Force, 12-15 Mar.
MG John V. Cox (USMC), Dir of Operations, PACOM, 12-24 Mar.
LTG Robert F. Coverdale (USAF), Vice CINCPAC, 13-17 Mar.
LTG Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., (USAF), Cdr, 5th AF, 13-21 Mar.
MG Kenneth D. Burns (USAF), Cdr, 13th AF, 14-19 Mar.
MG James N. Ellis (USA), CG, USA Engineer Center & School, 14-19 Mar.
RADM John R. Batzler, Dep Dir, Ops (Recon, Space, EW & C3QM), OJCS, 15-18 Mar.
MG Donald R. Lasher (USA), CG, USA Computer Systems Comd, 15-21 Mar.
MG James E. Moore, Jr., (USA), CG, 7th Inf Div, 15-21 Mar.
MG Donald W. Bennett (USAF), Cdr, 22d AF, 16-19 Mar.
MG Edward J. Hrycke (USA), CG, Tripler Army Medical Center, 16-20 Mar.
LTG Eugene P. Forrester (USA), CG, WESTCOM, 16-26 Mar.
LTG James R. Brickel (USAF), Dep CINC, USREDCOM & Vice Dir, JDA, 19-23 Mar.

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MG Joseph J. Went (USMC), CG, 1st Marine Air Wing, 19-24 Mar.

RADM Thomas F. Brown III, Cdr, Carrier Group 5, Seventh Fleet, 20-23 Mar.

VADM Staser M. Holcomb, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 22-27 Mar.

RADM Donald P. Roane, Cdr, Task Force 73, Seventh Fleet, 23-25 Mar.

VADM H. C. Schrader, Cdr, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet, 24-27 Mar.

MG John D. Bruen (USA), Cdr, Military Traffic Management Comd, 25-28 Mar.

VADM Kent J. Carrol, Cdr, Military Sealift Comd, 26-29 Mar.

RADM Bernard E. Thompson, Cdr, 14th Dist, US Coast Guard, 28-30 Mar.

VADM Thomas R. Kinnebrew, Dep CofS, CINCPACFLT, 29-31 Mar.

Representative Daniel A. Mica (D-Fla.), 30 Mar-2 Apr.

Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oreg.), 30 Mar-5 Apr.

MG Hugh Overholt (USA), Asst Judge Advocate General, DA, 2-8 Apr.

RADM Paul W. Dillingham, Jr., Cdr, Naval Security Group Comd, 4-5 Apr.

GEN Robert H. Barrow (USMC), Comdt, USMC, 5-7 Apr.

LTG Richard G. Trefry (USA), Inspector General, DA, 10-17 Apr.

RADM Charles F. Horne III, Cdr, Mine Warfare Comd, 11-13 Apr.

MG Edward C. O'Conner (USA), Dir, Ops Read & Mob, ODCSOPS, DA, 11-16 Apr.

MG Gerald D. Larson (USAF), Cdr, AF Intelligence Service, 14-15 Apr.

RADM Ronald E. Narmi, Comdt, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 16-20 Apr.

Hon. Paul Thayer, Deputy SECDEF, 19-21 Apr.

LTG Maxwell R. Thurman (USA), Dep CofS for Personnel, DA, 19-23 Apr.

RADM C. H. Lowery, PACOM Surgeon, 22-26 Apr.

RADM Bernard M. Kauderer, Cdr, Submarine Forces, Pacific Fleet, 24-27 Apr.

MG Duard D. Ball (USA), Proj Manager, M1 Tank System, DARCOM, 24-29 Apr.

RADM John L. Butts, Dir of Naval Intelligence, 26-30 Apr.

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RADM Joseph H. Miller, Staff Medical Off, Naval Forces Japan, 30 Apr-5 May.
RADM Morton E. Toole, Dep CofS for Mgt/Fleet IG, CINCPACFLT, 9-17 May.
MG John V. Cox (USMC), Dir for Opns, PACOM, 13-18 May.
Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, 17-20 May.
MG Vaughn O. Lang (USA), Dir, C3 Systems, PACOM, 19-21 May.
ADM Robert L. J. Long, USCINCPAC, 21-23.
LTG Jack N. Merritt (USA), Dir, Joint Staff, OJCS, 25-28 May.
MG Robert E. Haebel (USMC), CG, 3d Marine Amphibious Force, 1-3 Jun.
VADM James R. Hogg, Crd, Seventh Fleet, 12-15 Jun.
LTG Joseph K. Bratton, Chief of Engineers, USA, 12-16 Jun.
GEN Bennie E. Davis (USAF), CINC Strategic Air Command, 18-20 Jun.
LTG John H. Gushman (USA Ret), former CG, CFA (ROK/US), 19-28 Jun.
RADM William C. Wyatt, Fleet Maintenance Off, Pacific Fleet, 30 Jun-2 Jul.
MG Thomas B. Bruton (USAF), Judge Advocate General, USAF, 3-6 Jul.
MG Cornelius Nugteren (USAF), Cdr, Warner Robins Air Logistics Cen, 10-11 Jul.
LTG Arnold W. Braswell (USAF), CINCPACAF, 10-13 Jul.
MG Clarence E. McKnight, Jr., (USA), CG, USA Communications Comd, 11-16 Jul.
Dr. Allen R. Stubberud, Chief Scientist of the AF, 13-15 Jul.
LTG James B. Vaught (USA Ret), former CG, CFA (ROK/US), 18 Jul-2 Aug.
GEN Alexander Haig, Jr., (USA Ret), former SECSTATE, 19-22 Jul.
LTG Charles G. Cooper (USMC), CG, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 21-24 Jul.
Hon. Michael K. Deaver, Dep CofS, White House Office, 28-30 Jul.
LTG Fred K. Mahaffey (USA), Dep CofS for Operations, DA, 30 Jul-2 Aug.
ADM William J. Crowe, USCINCPAC, 6-10 Aug.
Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), 6-10 Aug.

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LTG Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., (USAF), Cdr, 5th Air Force, 10-11 Aug.
RADM Robert E. Kirksey, Dir, Plans and Policy, PACOM, 10-13 Aug.
Senator Edwin Jacob Garn (R-Utah), 11-14 Aug.
Representative Melvin Price (D-Ill.), Chmn, House Armed Svcs Com, 15-18 Aug.
MG Ruben C. Autery (USAF), Cdr, 3d Air Div, 17-26 Aug.
Hon. Lawrence J. Korb, Asst SECDEF (MRA&L), 24-26 Aug.
LTG James R. Brickel (USA), Dep CINC, USREDCOM & Vice Dir, JDA, 24-28 Aug.
MG George A. Edwards, Jr., (USA), Dir, J5, USREDCOM, 24-28 Aug.
MG Vincent E. Falter (USA), Cdr, USA Military Personnel Center, 25-30 Aug.
MG Donald W. Bennett (USAF), Cdr, 22d AF, 26-27 Aug.
GEN William R. Richardson (USA), Cdr, USA Tng and Doctrine Comd, 29 Aug-1 Sep.
LTG James M. Lee (USA), Cdr, USA WESTCOM, 31 Aug-3 Sep.
Senator Orrin G Hatch (R-Utah), 2-5 Sep.
Hon. Michael A. McManus, Jr., Dep Asst to the President, 5-7 Sep.
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, US Seventh Fleet, 9-12 Sep.
GEN Donald R. Keith (USA), Cdr, DARCOM, 14-20 Sep.
MG William E. Odom (USA), ACoFS, Intel, DA, 18-22 Sep.
Dr. Edward C. Killin, Director, DoD Dependent Schools-Pac Region, 19-24 Sep.
Mr. Jerome H. Stolarow, Auditor General, AF Audit Agency, 22-27 Sep.
Mr. Harold L. Stugart, Auditor General, DA, 23-29 Sep.
RADM Thomas F. Brown III, Cdr, Carrier Group 5, Seventh Fleet, 26-27 Sep.
ADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., CINC, US Pacific Fleet, 27-30 Sep.
Mr. James A Kelly, Dep Asst SECDEF (East Asia & Pac Affairs), 30 Sep-4 Oct.
VADM Harry C. Schrader, Jr., Cdr, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet, 2-4 Oct.
LTG Ernest D. Peixotto (USA), Comptroller of the Army, 3-8 Oct.

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LG James A. Williams (USA), Dir, Defense Intelligence Agency, 10-13 Oct.
MG Richard D. Murray (USFA), Cdr, Army-Air Force Exchange Service, 14-18 Oct.
Mr. Edward T. Watling, Chief, Facility Engineering Div, OACE, 14-21 Oct.
MG Robert E. HaebeI (USMC), CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, 15-17 Oct.
VADM Crawford A. Easterling, Cdr, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, 18-20 Oct.
MG Gerhaldt W. Hyatt (USA Ret), former Chief of Chaplains, (USA), 21-26 Oct.
MG Robert J. Sunell (USA), Proj Mgr, M1 Tank System, 23-29 Oct.
RADM William J. Ryan, Cdr, Defense Fuel Supply Center, 24-26 Oct.
LTG William R. Maloney (USMC), Dep CofS for Manpower, USMC, 1-4 Nov.
MG Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., (USA), Asst Chief of Engineers, OACE, 1-6 Nov.
GEN Andrew P. Iosue (USAF), Cdr, Air Training Comd, 3-5 Nov.
VADM Eugene A. Grinstead, Dir, Defense Logistics Agency, 9-12 Nov.
President Ronald W. Reagan, Commander in Chief, 12-14 Nov. (see pages 7-14)
RADM Huntington Hardasty, Asst Dep CNO (Plans & Policy), 13-16 Nov.
LTG Richard H. Thompson (USA), Dep CofS for Logistics, DA, 14-17 Nov.
MG Rocco Negris (USA), Dep Cdr, I Corps, 15-18 Nov.
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USCINCPAC, 16-17 Nov.
Mr. Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel, Army Corps of Engineers, 16-23 Nov.
GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20-25 Nov.
MG Edmund R. Thompson (USA), Defense Intelligence Agency, 27 Nov-1 Dec.
MG Marc C. Reynolds (USAF), Cdr, Ogden Air Logistics Center, 3-6 Dec.
ADM James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, 5-7 Dec.
GEN Thomas M. Ryan, Jr., (USAF), CINCMAC, 7-8 Dec.
MG Harold I. Small (USA), Cdr, Military Traffic Management Comd, 15-18 Dec.

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(U) PROJECTED EUSA PEACETIME SAVINGS/COST AVOIDANCES FROM
ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS, 1983
(dollars in millions)

Force Structure Offsets ^a		
Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea (5 Companies)	\$21.1	
Port Terminal Service Support (1 Company)	9.7	
Highway Transportation Support (2 Companies)	<u>8.5</u>	\$ 39.3
Personnel Augmentation		
Korean Augmentation to the US Army Program (7,240 personnel)	90.3	
Korean Service Corps Agreement (3,200 personnel)	<u>72.0</u>	162.3
Peacetime Enhancement		
Exemption from Value Added Tax and Special Excise Tax	35.6	
Preferred Electricity Rates	22.9	
Use of ROK Industrial Base	3.0	
Contributed Currency to JUSMAG-K Operations	3.4	
Assistance-in-Kind to JUSMAG-K	<u>0.4</u>	65.1
Lease-Free Real Estate		531.1
Construction		
War Reserve Stocks for Allies Munitions Storage	20.3	
ROK MND Force Improvement Plan	4.0	
Other ROK Government Projects and Subsidies	<u>2.6</u>	26.9
Total		\$824.9
Benefits to USFK Personnel		
Korea Area Exchange Gasoline Savings	16.8	
Privately Owned Vehicle Road Tax Exemption	9.5	
Travel Services in Korea	1.3	
Discount Electricity Rates for Personnel Residing Off Post ..	<u>0.3</u>	\$27.9

^aTotal force structure offsets equate to 1,729 EUSA personnel.

Source: Point Paper, CDIP Br, ACoS, G3 Force Dev Div, 19 Jan 84, subj:
Peacetime Cost Savings or Avoidances Resulting from the CDIP Program.
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(U) GLOSSARY

3CS third country sales
AAEN active Army enlisted
AAOF active Army officer
AAPP Affirmative Action Program Plan
AB air base
ACC Air Component Command
ACOA Assistant Comptroller of the Army
ACoFS Assistant Chief of Staff
ACRV armored combat recovery vehicle
ADA air defense artillery
ADAPCP Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program
ADD Agency for Defense Development (ROK)
ADP automatic data processing
AFHO Army family housing operations
AFKN American Forces Korea Network
AFP annual funding program
AFRC Armed Forces Recreation Center
AFSC Armed Forces Staff College
AGM above-ground magazines
AHR Annual Historical Review
AIASA Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
ALC Army Logistics Command
ALO authorized level of organization
ALOC-K Air Lines of Communication-Korea
AMC Army Materiel Command
AMCCOM Armaments, Munitions and Chemical Command
AMRA Acquisition Management Review Agency
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency
AMVA Army motor vehicle accidents
APC armored personnel carrier
APF appropriated fund
APFSDS armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot (tank gun projectile)
APG Aberdeen Proving Ground
APP American Preference Program
AR Army regulation
ARADCOM Armament R&D Command
ARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
ASA Assistant Secretary of the Army (p. 139)
ASCOM Army Service Command
ASD (ISA) Asst SECDEF for International Security Affairs
ASD (MR&L) Asst SECDEF for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
ASF Army Stock Fund
ASIC all-source intelligence center
ASRP Ammunition Stockpile Reliability Program
AUTODIN automatic digital network
AWACS airborne warning and control system

Appendix F

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BEQ bachelor enlisted quarters
BMY Bowen-McLaughlin-York (US contractor)
BOQ bachelor officer quarters
BSEP Basic Skills Education Program
BTMS Battalion Training Managment System
C³I command, control, communications, and intelligence
CAA Concepts Analysis Agency
CASIC combined all-source intelligence center
CBAC Combined Budget Activation Committee
CBR chemical, biological, and radiological
CCSF CPICK Combined COMSEC Support Facility
C-day Unnamed day on which a deployment commences or is to commence.
CDIP Combined Defense Improvement Projects
CDR consolidated data report
Cdr commander
CDREUSA Commander, Eighth United States Army
C-E communications-electronics
CFA (ROK/US) . Combined Field Army (ROK/US)
CFC (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command
CFDH civilian foreign national direct hire
CIE combined intelligence estimate
CINCCFC Commander in Chief, (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command
CINCMAC Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CLGP cannon-launched guided projectile
COB command operating budget
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COHORT Cohesive Operational Readiness Training
Comdt commandant
COMSEC communications security
COMUSJAPAN ... Commander, United States Forces, Japan
COMUSKOREA ... Commander, United States Forces, Korea
CONPLAN contingency plan
CONUS Continental United States
COR contracting officer's representative
CP command post
Cp Camp
CPICK COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea
CPSM Combined ROK-US Preliminary SCM Meeting
CPX command post exercise
CRA continuing resolution authority
CS combat support
CSCT Combat Support Coordination Team
CSS combat service support
CSSSP controlled single-source selection procedure
CUWTF Combined UW (Unconventional Warfare) Task Force
CW chemical warfare
CWRB Command Work Review Board
CY calendar year
DA Department of the Army

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DAC Department of the Army Civilian
DARCOM US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCS Defense Communications System
DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
D-day Unnamed day when a particular operation commences or is to commence.
DEA data exchange agreement
DEFCON defense readiness condition
Dep deputy
DESCOM US Army Depot System Command
DIB Defense Industry Bureau (ROK)
Dir director
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DOD Department of Defense
DODDS Department of Defense Dependent Schools
DOS days of supply
DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DS3 decentralized automated service support system
DS4 direct support unit supply system
DSAA Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSL D digital seismic listening device
DSS-K Direct Support System-Korea
DU depleted uranium
EASTPAC Eastern Pacific
ECQM electronic counter-countermeasures
E-E emergency-essential
EEO equal employment opportunity
EMMCA Exigent Minor Construction, Military Construction Army
ERC equipment readiness code
EUSA Eighth United States Army
EW electronic warfare
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FED Far East District (US Army Corps of Engineers)
FIP Force Improvement Plan
FLC-P Field Logistics Center-Pusan
FMS foreign military sales
FORSCOM US Army Forces Command
FROKA First Republic of Korea Army
FTX field training exercise
FY fiscal year
GAO General Accounting Office
GDLS General Dynamics Land Systems
GFM government-furnished material
GNP gross national product
GP guard post
GSA General Services Administration
GT general technical aptitude area
HARTS hardened artillery sites

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PAGE Program Analysis and Evaluation
PACOM Pacific Command
PAO Public Affairs Office
PARPRO Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PARR Program Analysis Resource Review
PCC patrol coastal combatant
PCS permanent change of station
PDIP Program Development Increment Package
PDSK Petroleum Distribution System-Korea
PEDCO Petroleum Development Corporation
PERSCOM Personnel Command
PIC-K Photographic Interpretation Center-Korea
PM-M1 Project Manager, M1 Tank System
PMTU paramilitary training unit
POD port of debarkation
POL petroleum, oils and lubricants
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PRC Peoples Republic of China
PSP prestock point
PW prisoner of war
PWRMS Pre-positioned War Reserve Material Stocks
PX post exchange
R&A review and analysis
R&D research and development
RAD rear area defense
RAS rear area security
RC reserve component
RCODT Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training
RCS requirement control symbol
RCT regimental combat team
RD&A research, development and acquisition
REDCON readiness condition
REMAN resources management
RGH rental guarantee housing
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKA ROK Army
ROKAF ROK Air Force
ROKG ROK Government
ROKIT ROK Indigenous Tank
ROKMC ROK Marine Corps
ROKN ROK Navy
RPMA real property maintenance activities
RS&D receiving, staging, and deploying
RSOK Recreation Services Operations-Korea
RTS remote terminal site
SALS-K Single Ammunition Logistics System-Korea
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR security assistance review
SATCOM satellite communications
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

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SQM (ROK/US) Security Consultative Meeting
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SEP Scientist/Engineer Exchange Program
SF Special Forces
SIGINT signals intelligence
SJS Secretary Joint Staff
SLD seismic listening device
SLOC sea lines of communication
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SROKA Second ROK Army
SSA supply support activity
SSB Source Selection Board
SSBO system support buyout
STEP-K Satellite Terminal Employment Plan for Korea
STF Special Task Force
STON short ton
TACAIR tactical air
TACOM US Army Tank-Automotive Command
TACSATCOM tactical satellite communications
TAMIS Training Ammunition Management Information System
TAT technical assistance team
TAW tactical airlift wing
TCC Technological Cooperation Committee (ROK/US)
TDA table of distribution and allowances
TDP technical data package
TDY temporary duty
TECOM US Army Test and Evaluation Command
TFS tactical fighter squadron
TKP Trans-Korea Pipeline
TMACS Training Management Control System
TMDE test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment
TNT Tunnel Neutralization Team
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile
TPFDD Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPICK Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea
TR Theater Reserves
TROKA Third ROK Army
TSCMA Tri-Service Construction Management Authority
UB unaccompanied baggage
UBL unit basic load
UCMJ Uniformed Code of Military Justice
UCP Unified Command Plan
U-FL (Exercise) ULCHI-FOCUS LENS
UNC United Nations Command
US United States
USA United States Army
USACC United States Army Communications Command
USACH-S United States Army Community Hospital-Seoul
USAF United States Air Force

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USAFAC United States Army Finance and Accounting Center
USAFCS-K United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea
USAFIK United States Army Forces in Korea
USAFK United States Air Forces Korea
USAG-Yongsan . United States Army Garrison-Yongsan
USAKCA United States Army Korea Contracting Agency
USAMGIK United States Army Military Government in Korea
USAR United States Army Reserve
USASAC United States Army Security Assistance Center
USCINCPAC United States Commander in Chief, Pacific
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(R&E) Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USFK United States Forces Korea
USG United States Government
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNFK United States Naval Forces Korea
USofA Under Secretary of the Army
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USR unit status report
USREDCOM United States Readiness Command
USSR United Soviet Socialists Republic
UTM universal transverse mercator (map grid system)
UW/SO unconventional warfare/special operations
VIP visual information projector; very important person
WESTCOM US Army Western Command
WESTPAC Western Pacific
WHCA White House Communications Agency
WIN WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WRS war reserve stocks
WRSA War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System
XK-1 ROK Indigenous Tank

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