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1984 ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT

USFK/EUSA

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(U) Pictured on the front and back covers is a segment of the barrier fence near the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone. The Zone, which constitutes the de facto frontier between North and South Korea, is a 4,000-meter-wide strip of land that runs along the 27 July 1953 cease-fire line, from the east to the west coast for a distance of 241 kilometers. It serves as a tenuous buffer between the world's sixth largest and seventh largest land combat forces, each maintaining a posture of readiness for war.

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## PREFACE

The principal objective of the US Forces Korea/Eighth US Army Annual Historical Review is to present a clear, succinct account of major developments within the command and to serve as a convenient source of reasonably comprehensive and quickly retrievable information for use by commanders and staffs. The document will serve as a means of orienting new personnel and as a source for answering inquiries of a historical nature.

The staff of the Historical Branch, Secretary Joint Staff, prepared the Review for publication. It is based in part upon narrative contributions from organizational elements having primary responsibility for the subject matter covered and in part upon other materials collected by the Command Historian as well as special research efforts and interviews.

The Review is designed to satisfy historical reporting requirements from the Department of the Army and the US Pacific Command. It provides a reference and research base for those headquarters and is used by the US Army Center of Military History for the preparation of formal official histories.

This Review does not encompass the detailed activities of the United Nations Command, ROK/US Combined Forces Command, or US Air Force and Navy component commands in Korea. Historical developments within those organizations are treated in their separately published histories.

For these.

The US Forces Korea/Eighth US Army Chronology 1984, an unclassified supplement to this Review, was published and distributed separately. Comprised of entries on significant military, political, and economic developments in the Republic of Korea, the Chronology records the day-by-day sequence of events directly or indirectly affecting the US military presence in Korea.

JAMES C. BARNHART, Command Historian  
STEPHEN L. Y. GAMMONS, Asst Historian  
ERNA ROBINSON, Editorial Assistant

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GEN ROBERT W. SENNEWALD

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ROK/US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA  
COMMANDING GENERAL, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

4 JUNE 1982 - 1 JUNE 1984



GEN WILLIAM J. LIVSEY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ROK/US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA  
COMMANDING GENERAL, EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY

1 JUNE 1984 —

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA/EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301

1984

The Year in Review

Operating with a full plate of requirements, most of them unique to the Northeast Asian theater, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Eighth Army continued focusing on one overarching concern--readiness to fight. That clear-cut purpose was closely interwoven with the advancement of a major United States foreign policy objective--to deter the renewal of war on the Korean peninsula. Forward-deployed forces demonstrated American resolve to meet treaty obligations and protect US interests. The geostrategic importance of the region and our security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK), spanning more than three decades, made that alliance symbolic of America's role in the Asian-Pacific area.

Inherent in our strategy and commitments was the recognition that the Korean peninsula remained unstable and potentially one of the most volatile regions in the world. Given the peninsula's location at the confluence of three major world powers--the Soviet Union, mainland China, and Japan--any hostilities erupting in Korea would clearly hold the possibility of wider escalation. Viewed from that perspective, the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the North and South constituted the "front line" for all of East Asia and the Pacific.

There were no substantive indications that the North's regime had altered its avowed goal of communizing the entire peninsula. The threat of a surprise attack had increased substantially during the year, not waned. The North Korean Army was placing emphasis on developing mechanized, combined arms forces and redeployed a number of those units closer to the DMZ. Additional armor units were positioned in the Western Corridor--the primary high-speed attack route to Seoul, located only 26 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone. New and improved weapons systems were being produced by the North's indigenous arms industry and introduced at a rapid pace into field units. Additional new aircraft and naval vessels further enhanced their combat capabilities.

The ROK and in-country US forces represented the visible, immediate deterrent to the foregoing North Korean threat. They were backed by a US

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commitment which would deploy out-of-country augmentation elements--ground, air, and naval--to Korea in the strength needed to stop and defeat an invasion. Both the ROK and USFK maintained combat-ready, interoperable forces--well armed, trained, and motivated, and employed with a reliable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structure, and a sustainable support base.

However, as Mark Twain once noted, "Even if you're on the right track, you will get run over if you just sit there." Consequently, US Forces Korea and Eighth Army vigorously pursued programs throughout 1984 that would consolidate past accomplishments and bring about improvements in such key areas as force modernization, command and control functions, logistics sustainability, living and working conditions, and interoperability with ROK forces.

A significant factor in Eighth Army's readiness posture was its force structure, which had to contain the wherewithal for fast-paced combat operations, particularly in the critical first days of hostilities. The UH-1/UH-60A helicopter exchange was completed in the 2d Infantry Division, 17th Aviation Group (Combat), and 377th Medical Company (Air Ambulance). Employment of the Blackhawks more than doubled troop and equipment payloads for airmobile operations, an essential part of AirLand Battle doctrine. A multiple-launch rocket battery was deployed to the division's general support artillery battalion in June, representing the largest single increase in raw firepower in Eighth Army since October 1978 when an additional armor battalion was added to the division's troop list.

The division also replaced its M48A5 tanks during the summer with M60A3 models--an upgrade that further offset North Korea's numerical advantage in armored forces--and its armor and mechanized infantry battalions were converted to the Division 86 (Heavy) structure. In November-December Eighth Army fielded 1,630 new commercial utility cargo vehicles, which replaced several series of overage light tactical trucks.

The addition of F-16 and A-10 aircraft in recent years considerably strengthened the combat posture of USFK's air component, and operations and logistics staffs were pursuing a program to upgrade ROK airfields scheduled to receive US air augmentation squadrons during contingencies. The US Navy's Seventh Fleet and its Third Marine Amphibious Force frequently trained on and around the Korean peninsula during the year, reflecting our plans for ever-increasing integration of that unique naval capability into our overall defense strategy.

As noted earlier, US forces in Korea had the singular distinction of being the most forward deployed American units in the Pacific area of operations. That forward defense posture dictated urgent requirements for training programs to ensure proper integration of tactics and doctrine and emphasize our interoperability with ROK forces in the conduct of coalition warfare.

TEAM SPIRIT was the largest field training exercise (FTX) in 1984 specifically designed to practice and evaluate the wartime disciplines and procedures of USFK's ground, air, and naval components and demonstrate the projection and sustainment of their combat power. Held in early spring, the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercise, conducted by the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, integrated national and multi-Service capabilities and

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practiced the full range of combined arms operations. Involving more than 200,000 ROK and US forces, it was the most sophisticated and tactically realistic field maneuver in the annual TEAM SPIRIT series which began in 1976. Some 60,000 US personnel from all Services took part, including approximately 36,400 who deployed from continental United States (CONUS) and Pacific Command (PACOM) bases to augment in-place ROK-US forces in Korea.

American ground augmentation units included HQ I Corps from Fort Lewis, WA, which took part for the first time as an FTX player; the division headquarters and a brigade from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division, marking the seventh year of "Tropic Lightning" participation; and a brigade headquarters and battalion task force from Fort Ord, CA's 7th Infantry Division. Three Army corps participated in the FTX, two in the Blue Force and one with the Orange Force. Nine divisions operated in forward areas, plus four division headquarters deployed in the rear to provide second- and third-echelon images. Force interoperability was stressed throughout the exercise, particularly in the Blue Force. Divisions were rotated between its two corps and at various times the divisions included mixed forces of ROK and US soldiers or ROK troops and US Marines.

US Air Force augmentations included elements of three fighter wings and two tactical airlift wings from CONUS and Alaska, as well as special operations and supporting aircraft. Other USAF commands in the USPACOM area provided additional fighter aircraft, airlift assets, B-52 bomber support, airborne warning and control systems, and air rescue aircraft. In all, over 650 ROK Air Force and USAF tactical aircraft participated in TEAM SPIRIT 84, with close air support for ground forces constituting over half of the nearly 9,000 missions flown. A US Seventh Fleet task group led by the carrier Kitty Hawk supported a large-scale amphibious operation by integrated ROK-US Marine forces on the peninsula's southeast coast. During the assault landing phase, the US Third Marine Amphibious Force was supported by some 130 carrier-launched USN and USMC aircraft.

Communications-electronics improvements achieved during the year included deployment of the first tactical satellite communications company to Korea in May, and fielding of Vinson communications security devices to replace older equipment. Several C3I enhancements were also under way. The most significant were upgrading of facilities and systems at the command's warfighting command post, and an automated data processing-assisted intelligence system to satisfy USFK support requirements to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command.

Throughout the ROK, Eighth Army intensified its support for families through enhanced professional services and improved facilities for community activities and recreational opportunities, all designed to place emphasis on the Year of the Army Family. In August, ground was broken for 300 leased family housing units at Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, to replace a like number of older leased apartments located several miles south of Yongsan. Occupancy was projected for fall 1985.

Approximately \$130 million were expended in 1984 on Eighth Army's new construction projects and for renovation of existing facilities, representing a sizable increase over the previous year's \$113 million allocation. The bulk of those funds was allocated for replacement and upgrading of structures such

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as bachelor housing and maintenance facilities essential to both quality of life and readiness. Projects at 2d Infantry Division installations received the highest priority.

On a more disturbing note, a clash erupted on 23 November between United Nations Command (UNC) soldiers and North Korean Army security guards in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area inside the DMZ. The armed encounter marked the first gunfire exchange ever to occur in the truce zone during the entire history of the Armistice Agreement. North Korean guards opened fire in pursuit of a Soviet citizen who defected across the Military Demarcation Line dividing North and South Korea. The firefight that followed left one ROK soldier killed and a US soldier wounded. Three North Koreans were killed and five others seriously wounded. Many more North Koreans who had crossed into the UNC area could have been killed except for the restraint and self-discipline shown by the UNC guards, who kept the incident from escalating into a major crisis.

Having touched on some of USFK's historical accomplishments during the past year, I would like to turn to the importance of history to the US military establishment in Korea. The volume you are now reading is the only continuing, comprehensive record of significant developments within this command and adds to the institutional memory of the headquarters. The Annual Historical Review serves as a primary source for official histories published by the US Army Center of Military History and is submitted through the US Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It can be used to good advantage within our own command as a convenient reference guide for current and future planning and operations, as a briefing resource, and as a valuable medium for orienting newly assigned key personnel to USFK's missions, recent activities, accomplishments, and problems.

Finally, it is appropriate to recognize all those who, through their performance and dedication, have made possible the achievements recorded in the following chapters--the rank and file from all elements of US Forces Korea.



WILLIAM J. LIVSEY  
General, USA  
Commander

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LOCATIONS OF MAJOR HEADQUARTERS




Figure 1

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Table 1--(U) Republic of Korea Basic Information  
(As of 31 December 1984)

Land Area .....	38,175 square miles
Limits of Territorial Waters .....	12 nautical miles
Population .....	approx. 40.6 million
Annual Growth Rate .....	1.6 percent
Literacy Rate .....	90 percent
Life Expectancy .....	men, 64.2 years; women, 70.6 years
Gross National Product .....	\$81.1 billion
GNP Per Capita .....	\$1,998
Defense Budget .....	\$4.5 billion
Percent of GNP .....	5.5 percent
Percent of Government Budget .....	33.2
Currency .....	Won: 827=\$1
Type of Government .....	Republic (power centralized in a strong executive)
President .....	Chun Doo Hwan
Prime Minister .....	Chin Iee Chong
Minister of National Defense .....	Yoon Sung Min
Minister of Foreign Affairs .....	Lee Won Kyung
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .....	GEN Lee Ki Baek
Army Chief of Staff .....	GEN Chung Ho Yong
Chief of Naval Operations .....	ADM Choe Sang Hwa
Air Force Chief of Staff .....	GEN Kim In Ki

## US Country Team Principals

US Ambassador .....	HON Richard L. Walker
Commander, US Forces, Korea .....	GEN William J. Livsey, USA
Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea .....	MG Hugh J. Quinn, USA

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## CHAPTER I: COMMAND (U)

### Synopsis of the US Military Command Structure in Korea (U)

(U) When North Korea (NK) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council condemned the action and called upon member nations to halt the aggression. The US and 15 other countries sent fighting forces to help the ROK defend itself. Thus was born the United Nations Command (UNC), an international force formed to stop armed aggression. It was formally established in Tokyo on 24 July 1950 by its first Commander in Chief (CINCUNC), GEN Douglas A. MacArthur. Two weeks earlier, the UN Security Council had made President Truman its executive agent for carrying out the fight against aggression in Korea.

(U) The Eighth US Army (EUSA), which had been on occupation duty in Japan, sent combat units to Korea on 30 June 1950 and two weeks later, established a forward headquarters in the ROK. The principal ground force of the Korean War, EUSA remained in Korea after the 27 July 1953 Armistice to participate in the rebuilding and security of the Republic.

(U) HQ UNC moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 July 1957 in conjunction with an overall reorganization of US military forces in the Pacific.<sup>1</sup> Concurrent with this move was the formation of US Forces Korea (USFK) as a subordinate unified command of the Hawaii-based US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to coordinate joint Service activities in the ROK.

(U) On 1 July 1974, as part of a DOD-wide reduction in headquarters staffing levels, HQ EUSA was consolidated with HQ UNC and USFK. Following the disestablishment of HQ United States Army Pacific in Hawaii, Eighth Army was designated as a major Army command (MACOM) on 1 January 1975.

(U) The ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was formally activated on 7 November 1978 at Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Colocated with HQ UNC, CFC evolved as the primary operational command in Korea, responsible for war planning and defense of the ROK. It had operational control (OPCON) over three field armies as well as all ROK air and naval forces.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The senior US Army officer in Korea directed all four of the foregoing commands, serving concurrently as CINCUNC, CINCCFC, Commander US Forces Korea

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1. (U) The UNC comprised a separate legal and military entity in South Korea. CINCUNC was charged with responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement (see page 8) based upon strategic guidance issued by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

2. (U) CINCCFC, as the senior US military officer in Korea, received mutually developed operational guidance and strategic direction for the defense of Korea from the ROK/US Military Committee, Plenary Session. That body comprised both US and ROK JCS chairmen, USCINCPAC, CINCCFC, and an additional ROK representative. The Military Committee, Permanent Session, based in Korea, consisted of the ROK JCS chairman and CINCCFC, who represented the US JCS chairman. The Permanent Session would perform functions of the plenary group when the latter was not in session.

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(COMUSKOREA), and Commanding General, Eighth US Army (CG EUSA). During 1984, GEN Robert W. Sennewald performed those functions until 1 June, when GEN William J. Livsey assumed command.

## Missions (U)

(U) As directed by the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), COMUSKOREA integrated planning among US component commands in Korea and exercised OPCON over US forces assigned; functioned as US Defense Representative in Korea, responsible for US Governmental administrative coordination as specified in DOD and USCINCPAC directives; provided support for UNC and ROK/US CFC; and coordinated US military assistance to the ROK.

(U) CG EUSA was responsible for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces assigned to insure optimum readiness for ground combat operations; provided logistical and administrative support for forces, including HQ UNC, to fulfill operational requirements of CINCCFC and COMUSKOREA; and furnished support to other commands, agencies, services, non-assigned US Army organizations, and ROK forces as directed by higher authority.

## Command and Staff (U)

(U) HQ USFK/EUSA was staffed as follows during the period 1 January-31 December 1984:<sup>3</sup>

COMUSKOREA/CG EUSA: GEN William J. Livsey (USA) replaced GEN Robert W. Sennewald (USA) on 1 June.  
Deputy COMUSKOREA: LTG John L. Pickitt (USAF).  
Chief of Staff, USFK/EUSA: MG James N. Ellis (USA) replaced MG John W. Hudachek (USA) on 4 September.  
Deputy Chief of Staff: COL Jerome L. Haupt (USA) replaced COL John H. Blewett (USA) on 1 September; latter had replaced COL Gordon M. Hunt (USA) on 28 May.  
Secretary Joint Staff: COL Conrad Boterweg (USA) replaced COL Robert A. Neitzke (USA) on 13 August.  
Command Sergeant Major: CSM Larry J. Hampton (USA).  
ACofS, J1: COL George Souza (USAF) replaced COL Barbara D. Francis (USAF) on 29 June.  
ACofS, J2: BG Larry D. Church (USAF).  
ACofS, J3: MG Kenneth C. Leuer (USA).  
ACofS, J4: BG James Piner, Jr., (USA).  
ACofS, J5: MG Donald J. Fulham (USMC) replaced BG Charles H. Pitman (USMC) on 14 July.  
ACofS, J6: COL Richard J. Mallion (USA) replaced COL Peter A. Kind (USA) on 29 June.  
ACofS, Comptroller: COL Thomas A. Gray (USA).  
ACofS, Engineer: COL Norman C. Hintz (USA) replaced COL Melvyn D. Remus (USA) on 15 May.  
ACofS, Acquisition Management: Mr. Wilfred J. Curley.  
Inspector General: COL Gerald E. Webb (USA).  
Judge Advocate: COL John R. Thornock (USA).

3. (U) Headquarters organization is shown on Figure 2.

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Public Affairs Officer: COL Theodore R. Heil (USAF) replaced COL Rallin J. Aars (USAF) on 30 June.  
Special Asst to Dep COMUSKOREA, for SOFA/Intl Relations: Dr. Carroll B. Hodges.  
Adjutant General: COL Jack C. Wheeler (USA) replaced COL Ezra C. Cummings, Jr., (USA) on 1 August.  
Provost Marshal: COL David F. Prim (USA) replaced COL John H. Blewett (USA) on 28 May.  
Surgeon: COL Richard T. Travis (USA).  
Chaplain: COL David W. Hoh (USA) replaced COL Alfred E. Brough (USA) on 4 June.  
Asst to CofS, Automation Management: COL Perry C. Butler (USA) replaced COL Gary L. Kosmider (USA) on 16 July.  
Director, Joint Command Information Systems: COL John G. Griffith, Jr., (USAF).  
Headquarters Commandant: COL Harold V. Floody, Jr., (USA) replaced COL Jerome L. Haupt (USA) on 31 August.  
Civilian Personnel Director: Mr. Hugh L. Shirley.  
Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea: MG Hugh J. Quinn (USA).

(U) Following is a listing of USFK component and major subordinate commanders as of 31 December 1984:<sup>4</sup>

Eighth US Army: GEN William J. Livsey replaced GEN Robert W. Sennewald on 1 June.  
Combined Field Army (ROK/US): LTG Louis C. Menetrey.  
2d Infantry Division: MG Henry Doctor, Jr.  
19th Support Command: BG Charles M. Murray replaced BG Fred E. Elam on 16 May.  
US Army Garrison-Yongsan: COL Winton Spiller, Jr., replaced COL Grant B. Dalgleish on 26 April.  
18th Medical Command: COL Richard T. Travis.  
8th Personnel Command (Prov): COL Jack C. Wheeler replaced COL Ezra C. Cummings, Jr., on 1 August.  
US Air Forces Korea: MG Craven C. Rogers, Jr.  
US Naval Forces Korea: RADM Charles F. Horne III replaced RADM F. Warren Kelley on 20 April.

## Transfer of Internal Review (IR) Functions (U)

(U) Effective 1 March 1984, the USFK/EUSA Comptroller's Internal Review Division became a separate organizational entity under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff. The realignment was based upon a DA policy which specified that IR organizations should be placed where they could provide support directly to headquarters command groups. EUSA's major subordinate commands subsequently implemented similar transfers of IR functions.<sup>5</sup>

4. (U) USFK command relationships and EUSA force structure are shown on Figures 3 and 4.

5. (U) Ltr, GCJ-M, HQ USFK, 27 Jan 84, subj: Organizational Transfer of Internal Review Functions from Comptroller to Command Group. UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in Compt Mgt Div.



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## USFK/EUSA COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS





Figure 3

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## EUSA FORCE STRUCTURE



1) UNDER OPCON OF US ARMY ELM. COMBINED FIELD ARMY (ROK/US)

2) ADMIN HQ ORGANIZED TO PROVIDE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY FOR ALL EUSA UNITS DURING CONTINGENCIES

3) UNDER CINCPAC OPCON

Figure 4

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## CHAPTER II: US MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOREA (U)

(U) Pre-Korean War Period. Large-scale US military involvement in Korea stemmed from the 1943 Cairo Declaration in which the US, China, and Great Britain agreed that when the war with Japan was won, Korea, which had been under Japanese domination for 40 years, should become free and independent. The Soviet Union also agreed to the Declaration in early August 1945, near the conclusion of World War II, when she declared war on Japan and thereby secured a legitimate pretext for gaining a foothold in Korea.

(U) The war in the Pacific ended on 2 September 1945. Since the 38th Parallel roughly divided the Korean peninsula, it was determined by mutual consent that American troops would accept the surrender of the Japanese south of the Parallel and the Russians would receive the surrender of those to the north. To carry out that mission, the 7th Infantry Division was deployed to South Korea, with the first elements arriving on 8 September 1945. Soon thereafter, XXIV Corps headquarters opened in Seoul to control the US occupation force, which within several months reached a strength level of three divisions plus supporting troops. To handle civil affairs, US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was formed as a separate command. Collectively, the American military presence was known as US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK).

(U) The establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948 dictated a shift from US military to ROK Government (ROKG) control and realignment of the US command structure in Korea. USAMGIK came to an end and USAFIK units gradually began to leave the peninsula in late 1948. By the end of June 1949, the last increment had departed. The US Military Advisor Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was formed on 1 July 1949, with a strength of approximately 500, to continue assistance to the fledgling ROK Army. From then until the North Korean invasion in mid-1950, KMAG was the only US military element remaining in the ROK.

(U) Although USSR occupation troops withdrew from North Korea in 1948, Soviet influence did not. Kim Il Sung, whom the Soviets had installed as Communist Party head in October 1945, rose rapidly in power to become President of the "Democratic Peoples Republic," which Kim upheld as the sole governing body for the entire peninsula. After the Soviet refusal to permit United Nations-sponsored elections in the North, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 1948 acknowledging the ROK as the only legal government. North Korea vociferously disagreed with the UN's policy of recognition and made preparations to settle the issue by force of arms.

(U) The Korean War. At dawn on 25 June 1950, the North launched a full-scale assault across the 38th Parallel. Within a few days, President Truman committed US air, naval, and ground forces to provide assistance to South Korea. Eventually, 15 other nations also sent combat contingents to help the young Republic defend itself against the invaders. Thus was born the United Nations Command, the first UN force in history specifically formed to stop aggression. The UN Security Council appointed the US as the executive agency for the UN Command; and General Douglas MacArthur, Far East commander, was designated as the first CINUNC. The US still represents UN peacekeeping efforts in Korea.

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(U) The fighting on the Korean peninsula continued unabated for three years. US casualties numbered 142,091, of whom 33,629 were killed in action or died as a result thereof. It was, at the time, the fourth largest war in America's history. ROK Army casualties totaled over 400,000, and those suffered by the South Korean civilian population were estimated at about one million.

(U) More than 90 percent of the external forces committed under the United Nations Command banner were furnished by the US. The major US combat elements were: Eighth Army, with three corps and nine divisions (including the 1st Marine Division); three task forces of the Seventh Fleet; and the Far East Air Forces, with 20 groups and 70 squadrons. The Marines deployed both the aforementioned division and an air wing. The average US strength in Korea during the war was approximately 250,000, of which about 70 percent were Army troops. A peak strength of 302,000 was reached in July 1953.

(U) The war in Korea ground to a halt when, after two years of difficult negotiations, the Military Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. This was an agreement between the opposing military commanders to cease all hostile actions pending a political settlement. The major powers involved, after talks at Geneva in April 1954, were unable to reach an understanding and Korea remained divided by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The MDL bisected the 4,000-meter-wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) stretching across the peninsula's 150-mile width. The Military Armistice in Korea eventually became the longest armed truce in recorded history.

(U) At the time of the Korean armistice, there were about 932,000 UNC ground forces in Korea, including 591,000 ROK and 39,000 from other allied countries. All ROK forces were under the operational control of the US CINUNC in accordance with a 14 July 1950 decree by President Syngman Rhee. Other non-US allies, the largest contingent of which was the British Commonwealth Division, were attached to US commands. In addition to the United Kingdom, these were: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, and Luxembourg. Other than small liaison and honor guard contingents, all were withdrawn from Korea by mid-1955 except for a Turkish element which departed in 1966 and a company of Thai troops which was withdrawn in 1971.

(U) The Post-War Era. A Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the US became effective on 17 November 1954. Under its provisions, both parties would act to meet a common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. The ROK granted the US "the right to dispose US land, air and sea forces in and about the Republic as determined by mutual agreement." In an agreed minute to the treaty, the ROK Government announced that it would keep its armed forces under operational control of the United Nations Command as long as the UNC was responsible for the defense of Korea. The US Government agreed to carry out an extensive program of economic and military assistance.

(U) Reduction of US forces in Korea after the war was relatively rapid and within two years of the July 1953 Armistice, US ground forces strength had been reduced to two divisions plus support units. The Eighth Army forward area configuration by mid-1955 comprised I Corps (Group), the "Shield of Seoul," responsible for defending the critical western corridors

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into the ROK. One US infantry division was deployed along an 18 1/2-mile front immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone in the I Corps (Group) sector, and another division constituted the corps group reserve. The balance of the 50,000-man ground force structure in 1955 comprised a corps artillery element, air defense units, a logistical command, and area support and service units.

(U) HQ United Nations Command moved from Tokyo to Seoul on 1 July 1957 in conjunction with the overall reorganization of US military forces and command structures in the Pacific. Concurrently, US Forces Korea (USFK) was formed as a subordinate unified command of the Hawaii-based Pacific Command. USFK's major missions were to coordinate joint Service activities in the ROK and exercise operational control of its component commands--Eighth Army, US Air Forces Korea, and US Naval Forces Korea. The senior US Army officer in Korea commanded three headquarters, serving as CINCUNC, COMUSKOREA, and CG EUSA.

(U) In the ensuing years, USFK component commands continued their defense readiness missions, helped modernize the ROK armed forces, and added a significant measure of stability that enhanced the ROK's remarkable economic progress. The next major change in US force structure in Korea took place in April 1971 when the 7th Infantry Division was withdrawn. This left the US with no ground troops deployed along the DMZ except for a small element guarding the Panmunjom truce area. The 2d Infantry Division thus became the last remaining US Army division deployed in the strategic Northeast Asia region.

(U) The withdrawal in the spring of 1971, which was part of a general US troop reduction policy in Asia enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, involved a drawdown of 20,000 American troops, mostly from the departing 7th Infantry Division, and necessitated numerous base closures and unit reorganizations and consolidations. The withdrawals, however, were accompanied by increased US military aid for the modernization of ROK forces.

(U) In April 1971, KMAG was eliminated as a subordinate command of Eighth Army and redesignated as Army Section, Joint US Military Assistance Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K). Previously, the military assistance program had been administered by three separate Service advisory groups, each reporting through its own Service channels. The establishment of JUSMAG-K simplified command relationships by consolidating multi-Service organizational efforts, with the Chief, JUSMAG-K, reporting directly to COMUSKOREA. The restructuring also recognized the lessened need for direct advisory efforts as ROK forces matured.

(U) Meanwhile, the post-war US Army logistics infrastructure in the ROK had been undergoing numerous changes in concept and reorganization, aimed at providing optimum supply and maintenance to US forces. The present systems evolved in 1972 when EUSA decided to consolidate its support activities on a functionalized-area basis. As a result, the huge ASCOM logistics complex near Inchon, one of the most active installations of its kind in the US Army, was closed in June 1973. Missile and aviation maintenance support operations were re-established chiefly around Camp Humphreys; and heavier maintenance support, further south, primarily at Camp Carroll near Waegwan. The 19th Support Command, headquartered at Taegu, evolved as EUSA's principal logistics control organization.

(U) The US Air Force in Korea experienced its first buildup after the Korean War as a result of the abortive North Korean commando raid on the Blue

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House (the ROK Presidential residence in Seoul) and the capture of the USS Pueblo. Following those incidents, both of which occurred in January 1968, there was a significant increase in tactical air units in the ROK, with greater emphasis on air-ground operations training. US Air Forces Korea personnel strength doubled to around 10,000.

(U) The US Navy has had no ships or planes homeported in the ROK, and Navy/Marine strength has stood at approximately 400. US Naval Forces Korea provided liaison and support to offshore Seventh Fleet and Marine Corps units during major combined ROK-US exercises.

(U) In response to a feasibility study requested by the JCS, staffs serving HQ Eighth Army and HQ UNC/USFK were integrated into a single joint staff on 1 July 1974. The Department of the Army was designated as the executive agent for the consolidated HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA. Following the discontinuance of the US Army Pacific command in Hawaii, Eighth Army was designated as a major Army command effective 1 January 1975.

(U) In mid-1977, the 4th Missile Command--the last organization of its kind in the Army--was inactivated. EUSA combat support organizations were also inactivated or redeployed from Korea in 1978-79 as the ROK Army increasingly assumed additional communications and logistics support functions. Beginning in 1980, all three Hawk battalions of EUSA's 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade were inactivated and their missions, launchers, and missiles transferred to the ROK Army.

(U) The post-war era was marked by North Korean belligerence and periods of open violence as the North built up its war potential. These years of uneasy peace witnessed, in addition to the commando raid on the Presidential residence in Seoul and seizure of the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of an unarmed USN reconnaissance plane, major infiltration attempts across the DMZ and along both coasts, firefights on the high seas, an assassination attempt on former President Park's life which resulted in the death of his wife, discovery of secret underground tunnel complexes extending from the North into the UNC side of the DMZ, and the brutal axe murders of two US Army officers in the Panmunjom truce area. The most recent addition to the list of violent episodes was the October 1983 bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (see USFK/EUSA AHR 1983 (U), pp. 25-27.)

(U) To the Koreans, the reassuring presence of US troops has been a "comrade-in-arms, forward together" association, a helping hand for ROK armed forces, communities, and morale. For the US, our military involvement has been rooted in important strategic considerations. Then-Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand gave the following clear-cut appraisal in 1976:

America's military presence in Korea provides a uniquely stabilizing element on a peninsula where the interests of four major powers converge by operating as a restraint on North Korean provocations, a brake on Sino-Soviet adventurism, and a reassurance to US allies, particularly Japan, of American commitment to their security.

(U) It was against this backdrop that President Carter, in early 1977, directed the withdrawal of all US ground combat elements from South Korea over a five-year period. Planning for the drawdown included measures to strengthen

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and modernize South Korean forces as well as a marked increase in US Air Forces Korea's tactical aircraft assets. Because of congressional delays in authorizing compensatory equipment transfers from US to ROK Army units, the original drawdown schedule was modified in April 1978. By the end of that year, only 3,400 personnel, including one of the 2d Infantry Division's maneuver battalions, had been deployed from the ROK. Other EUSA units were inactivated or redeployed during the 1977-78 period and in subsequent years, as noted previously; but those actions had been planned well before President Carter's withdrawal decision.

(U) At the annual ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting in July 1977, US and South Korean defense officials had agreed that a combined command would be established before the first phase of the US withdrawal was completed. Activation of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command on 7 November 1978 at Yongsan Garrison in Seoul was hailed as a major milestone in military cooperation between the two countries and added concrete evidence of America's commitment to defend the Republic. On 8 November 1978 an additional F-4 fighter squadron arrived at Taegu AB for assignment to the 314th Air Division, thereby increasing USAF tactical air power in the ROK by 20 percent.

(U) On 20 July 1979, following his visit to the ROK and after personally reviewing the implications of revised intelligence estimates which reflected a drastically increased North Korean threat, President Carter suspended further withdrawals of 2d Infantry Division elements from Korea pending a reassessment of the military balance. This decision, while welcomed, generated extensive redirection of EUSA's fiscal and manpower programming efforts and major modifications to force structure and stationing plans, all of which had been based on anticipated implementation of the phased withdrawal program.

(U) Results of the intelligence studies which had such a strong influence on the President's decision to postpone US troop withdrawals added an urgent impetus to force readiness upgrading in the ROK. The analyses confirmed that North Korea's ground force strength, armor and artillery firepower, mobility assets, and special warfare capabilities were of a magnitude considerably greater than previously estimated.

(U) When ROK President Park Chung Hee was slain by one of his close associates in October 1979, the steadfastness of the US security commitment made an important contribution to stability in the Republic during the difficult period following the assassination. Steady improvement of combat capabilities and readiness posture continued to be the most prominent USFK/EUSA objectives in the following years.

(U) During 1981-82, US Air Forces Korea added significant combat multipliers to its tactical air inventory. Deployment of an A-10 Thunderbolt squadron markedly improved close air support for ground forces, and more advanced F-16 aircraft replaced F-4 models in the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. In the 2d Infantry Division, delivery of new-model, self-propelled 155-mm howitzers and TOW-equipped assault helicopters represented a quantum increase in fire support capabilities. At the end of 1982, US Army and US Air Force strength levels in Korea stood at approximately 27,000 and 11,000, respectively.

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(U) President Reagan visited Korea in November 1983, and became the first US Commander in Chief to go inside the Demilitarized Zone. He viewed North Korean Army positions only 1,100 yards distant from Guard Post Collier and later addressed 2d Infantry Division troops at nearby Camp Liberty Bell.

(U) During 1983 USFK/EUSA activities and programs focused primarily on consolidating past achievements, updating and coalescing AirLand Battle doctrine in the Korean environment, and planning and implementing improvements in such key areas as force modernization, logistics sustainability, living and working conditions, and interoperability with ROK forces. Actions on that full schedule of requirements were pursued within the framework of the command's "main business"--improving its readiness to fight.

(U) Summaries of major developments in which HQ US Forces Korea and Eighth Army played significant roles in 1984 comprise the remaining chapters of this volume.

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## CHAPTER III: THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (U)

### The ROK on the World Scene (U)

(U) The latter half of 1984 saw a series of encouraging developments in the ROK's external affairs. Japanese-Korean relations improved significantly as a result of President Chun Doo Hwan's state visit to Japan in early September. A highlight of that historic event was the Emperor's expressing, albeit in a circuitous way, regrets for Japan's past harsh colonial rule over Korea from 1910 until 1945. In late September, North Korea offered, and the ROK accepted, shipments of relief goods to help South Korean flood victims. Talks at Panmunjom between the two sides advanced from topics centering on humanitarian exchanges and Olympic Games participation to more substantive economic issues. A firefight at the truce site on 23 November between North Korean and US and ROK security guards following the defection of a Soviet attache beclouded the environment but would not, in all probability, reverse the general trend of North-South discussions. International developments in 1984, excluding the 23 November incident, seemed a welcome change from events such as the Rangoon bombing atrocity in October 1983 which killed 17 high-ranking ROK officials. Summarized accounts of the most significant 1984 developments appear below.<sup>1</sup>

### ROK President's Historic Visit to Japan (U)

(U) Returning an unprecedented call in Seoul by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in January 1983,<sup>2</sup> ROK President Chun Doo Hwan became the first Korean head of state to pay an official visit to Japan in more than 1,000 years.<sup>3</sup> Although the two countries had been tied by formal diplomatic relations for nearly 20 years, the former colony and its one-time conqueror still viewed each other with deep-seated suspicion and mistrust.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The state visit, to be highlighted by meetings between President Chun and Emperor Hirohito, had been announced by the ROK Government in early July, and dates for the three-day sojourn were subsequently set as 6-8 September. During the week before the trip, comprehensive discussions between both governments' senior officials centered on an agenda of continuing problems,

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1. (U) Sources used in compiling this chapter were news media reference files maintained in SJS Hist Branch.

2. (U) During that visit Japan agreed to a \$4 billion aid package to finance major ROK development projects over a five-year period. See USFK/EUSA AHR 1983 (U), pp. 28-29.

3. (U) President Syngman Rhee traveled to Tokyo on 6-14 January 1953; however, his primary purpose was not to visit the Japanese Prime Minister, but to attend a conference of US military and diplomatic leaders at HQ United Nations Command.

4. (U) A nationwide Japanese poll in May placed South Korea third on a "most hated nation" list, after the Soviet Union and North Korea. A Korean Gallup Poll of 1,000 ROK citizens in April showed Japan was the third most disliked country, following North Korea and the Soviet Union.

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including Korea's \$2.6 billion annual trade deficit with Japan, the latter's reluctance to share high technology with the ROK, and discrimination suffered by Japan's estimated 675,000 ethnic Koreans, many of whom had lived there since World War II.

(U) Demonstrators in Seoul and Tokyo alike made clear that the foregoing issues carried heavy political risks for both countries. On 29 August, Seoul riot police used tear gas to disperse more than 1,000 university students protesting President Chun's visit. The following day Korean residents of Japan staged a rally in Tokyo for the same reason. Students and police clashed again in Seoul on 4 September, when more than 200 youths rioted during a march to the Japanese Embassy.

(U) Commentators in the ROK expressed the view that the trip would be judged a success or failure on a symbolic point: whether or not Emperor Hirohito would apologize to some extent for Japan's past domination over Korea. In explaining the troubled relationship, the editor of Seoul's leading newspaper said, "The trip is more ceremony than substance. After all, we are standing at the starting line, not the finish line."

(U) The risk of the visit was indicated by the security precautions taken in Tokyo to protect President Chun during his three-day stay, the largest operation of its type ever mounted in Japan. The 23,000 policemen mustered outnumbered the force arrayed when President Reagan visited Tokyo in November 1983. Their mission was to shield President Chun from any violent protests, ranging from scheduled demonstrations by pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in Japan to assassination attempts by North Korean agents reminiscent of the October 1983 bomb attack aimed at the ROK President.

(U) During a state banquet at Tokyo's Imperial Palace on the first day of the visit, 6 September, Emperor Hirohito made his first official comment on Japan's 1910-1945 rule over Korea. The Emperor stopped short of apologizing but expressed regret "that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century." He further voiced the hope that President Chun's visit would promote the "new-born relationship between our two countries." Hirohito also paid tribute to Koreans for their contributions to Japanese learning and culture in the sixth and seventh centuries. President Chun acknowledged the Emperor's statements of regret and remarked that the "unfortunate past . . . should be made to serve for the cultivation of even closer relationships between Korea and Japan in the future."

(U) At a luncheon on 7 September, Prime Minister Nakasone remarked to President Chun that "there was a period in this century when Japan brought to bear great sufferings upon your country and its people." He added that "the government and people of Japan feel a deep regret for this error and are determined to firmly warn ourselves for the future."

(U) A formal meeting later in the day between Chun and Nakasone focused on the broader concerns of peace in Northeast Asia, particularly the ever-continuing problem of tensions between North and South Korea. Nakasone assured Chun that the Japanese Government had no intention of upgrading its still-unofficial contacts with the Pyongyang regime, but he also stressed the importance of attempting to "move North Korea from its position of isolation."

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(U) At the final dinner of the summit conference, President Chun raised the difficult issue of Korean reunification. He repeated his standing offer to meet personally with NK President Kim Il Sung and suggested that Tokyo might be a venue for such talks.

(U) On 8 September, the final day of the state visit, President Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone issued a joint communique in which the latter called for a "direct dialogue" between the two Koreas and appealed for the admittance of both North and South Korea to the United Nations. (The North had continually opposed membership for both countries on grounds that it would undermine efforts to reunify the two Koreas.) Concerning the wide trade imbalance favoring Japan, both leaders agreed to continue consultation toward balanced trade expansion "through periodic ministerial conferences, trade talks and other meetings." Prime Minister Nakasone also stated his willingness to make continued efforts to improve the legal status and treatment of Japan's Korean residents.

(U) The US Government welcomed the "second rapprochement" between the ROK and Japan since cooperation between the two would be critical to its own plans for containing the expansion of Soviet power in the Pacific. The People's Republic of China gave a qualified endorsement to President Chun's journey by arranging Vice Premier Li Peng's Tokyo visit to coincide with Chun's, thus indirectly associating China with the rapprochement of its two neighbors. The widespread political and diplomatic support for the Chun mission obscured the shrill attacks from Radio Pyongyang, which denounced the visit as "a criminal trip."

## North Korean Flood Relief Aid for the ROK (U)

(U) On 8 September, the North Korean Red Cross unexpectedly offered large quantities of rice, clothing, medicine, and cement, valued at approximately \$12.7 million, for some 200,000 South Korean flood victims. Torrential rains in early September, heaviest in the northern third of the country, had caused the worst floods in the ROK since 1972, with more than 200 people reported dead or missing and property damage estimated at \$48 million. The ROK Government had already turned down relief assistance from the International Red Cross and initially responded negatively to North Korea's aid offer, accusing Pyongyang of engaging in a propaganda ploy. Subsequently, on 14 September, the ROK decided to accept the North's offer of flood aid as a move to improve inter-Korean relations. The president of the South Korean Red Cross expressed hope that the acceptance would serve "as an occasion to foster an atmosphere of reconciliation and mutual assistance between South and North Korea."

(U) Negotiations between both countries' Red Cross officials on 18 September at Panmunjom broke down after 5 1/2 hours, when no accord could be reached on methods for delivering the flood relief items.<sup>5</sup> The two sides agreed that some of the supplies should be delivered by ship to the ROK ports

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5. (U) The meeting of Red Cross officials from the two countries was the first since December 1977, when preliminary discussions were held regarding the reunion of families divided by the Korean War. Those talks lapsed when the North boycotted a scheduled follow-up meeting in early 1978.

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of Inchon, near Seoul on the west coast, and Pukpyong on the upper east coast. The North, however, insisted it be allowed to truck some relief goods directly into Seoul, where they would be turned over in public ceremonies. The South flatly rejected the proposal, maintaining that North Korean vehicles carrying supplies would have to transfer them to the South Korean Red Cross at the Panmunjom truce site. The following day, 19 September, Pyongyang announced it would honor the ROK's conditions for delivery of the relief goods.

(U) On 29-30 September, the North Koreans delivered some 1,475 truckloads of supplies at the farming village of Taesongdong, located approximately 1/4 mile from Panmunjom in the southern (United Nations Command) portion of the Demilitarized Zone. The goods were left at Taesongdong for later pick-up by South Korean trucks. In all, the NK vehicle convoys delivered 7,200 tons of rice, some 500,000 yards of cloth, and 759 boxes of medical supplies. The ROKG subsequently distributed the rice and textiles through Red Cross channels to designated disaster areas and transferred the medical supplies to the Red Cross hospital in Seoul.

(U) When the deliveries at Taesongdong were completed, the trucks returned to the North carrying 1,600 suitcases, each containing a cassette radio, quartz wristwatch, high-quality textiles, blankets, and children's/ladies' wear worth about \$750 at current export prices; the "return gifts" from Seoul were handed out to the more than 800 NK truck drivers and others who took part in the delivery operation.

(U) Meanwhile, on 30 September, 12 North Korean freighters made cement deliveries, totaling 88,500 tons, at Inchon and Pukpyong. A 13th freighter ran aground while still in NK waters. A replacement shipment, consisting of 11,500 tons, was delivered at Inchon 2 October, fulfilling the promised 100,000-ton offer to Seoul. Each flood-hit village across the ROK received about five tons of cement for housing repairs, with the surplus used for work on damaged public facilities.

(U) In a 4 November interview with Pacific Stars and Stripes, US Ambassador to the ROK Richard L. Walker commented on the unexpected North Korean offer of flood relief goods to the south. He remarked, "the greater surprise was that the ROK accepted the offer. What that acceptance meant, . . . was that the leaders of a great number of the top echelons of government and business here in South Korea had sufficient self-confidence that they could accept it without viewing it as demeaning. Rather, they accepted in the hope it might open the way for dialogue, and this may indeed be the result."

## Semblances of North-South Economic Cooperation (U)

(U) In a 20 August news conference, President Chun urged establishment of trade ties between North and South Korea "to achieve harmony and common prosperity." He declared he was prepared to provide "free technology and materials that can make a substantial contribution for the betterment of the North Korean people's life." On 25 August, Radio Pyongyang reported that President Chun's offer of technical and economic assistance had been rejected

6. (U) President Park Chung Hee had made a similar proposal in 1977 when he offered food assistance to the North, but Pyongyang did not respond.

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as "shameless propaganda." On 12 October, following the North's deliveries of flood relief goods (summarized above), the ROK Deputy Prime Minister, in a letter to his NK counterpart, issued another call for comprehensive bilateral talks to promote trade and economic cooperation.

(U) Departing from its past practice of ignoring similar overtures, Pyongyang accepted the ROK minister's proposal on 16 October. The NK Deputy Premier suggested a meeting on 15 November at the Panmunjom truce village and proposed each side send a five-member delegation headed by a vice minister. The North also requested continuation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line which had been reopened 28 September to coordinate flood relief shipments. The ROKG concurred with all of the North's proposals.

(U) On 15 November, North and South Korea opened first-ever talks at Panmunjom regarding possibilities of trade and other economic exchanges. Kim Ki Hwan, a ranking official of the ROK Economic Planning Board, led the South's delegation and Vice Trade Minister Li Song Rok, headed the North's. The size of both delegations had been increased from five to seven members.

(U) As the meeting began, Minister Kim spoke of the ROK's desire "to restore national unity at an early date through exchanges and cooperation." NK Minister Li agreed, stating, "we must not repeat past failures and must make this meeting successful for the benefit of both sides."

(U) During 2 1/2 hours of substantive discussions, both sides agreed that a railway line linking Seoul and Pyongyang with the NK west coast port of Sinuiju should be reopened.<sup>7</sup> Each delegation also offered a list of proposed trade exchanges. The ROK indicated an interest in purchasing North Korean briquet coal, pig iron, zinc, scrap metal, fisheries products, and silk cocoons. In return, Seoul offered finished manufactures including household appliances, automobiles, color television sets, and high-grade steel. The North's trade proposals were more general in nature, calling only for two categories of barter exchanges--raw materials for raw materials and finished goods for finished goods. Both sides also agreed, in principle, to consider joint projects aimed at developing the Korean Peninsula's mineral wealth, establishing joint fishing zones and land reclamation projects, and opening key ports in both countries for bilateral trade.

(U) At the meeting's conclusion, both delegations concurred on forming a joint economic cooperation committee to further investigate the foregoing proposals. A second round of economic discussions was slated for 5 December at Panmunjom.

(U) On 27 November, four days after a fire at Panmunjom (summarized in following topic), the NK chief delegate told his ROK counterpart, through a telephone link, that the Northern side would not attend the economic talks scheduled for 5 December. The North Korean official claimed "the safety of the delegates cannot be guaranteed" and that "the climate for dialogue has

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7. (U) A 14-mile rail section passing through the Panmunjom truce zone, between Munsan (in the ROK) and Kaesong (in NK), had been disconnected in late 1946.


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seriously deteriorated." He suggested postponing the talks "until next year." On 15 December, the ROKG announced that Pyongyang had agreed to resume the conferences on 17 January 1985.

### Firefight in the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom (U)

(U) On 23 November, one ROK soldier and at least two NK security guards were killed during a gunfire exchange in the JSA at Panmunjom; one US soldier and up to five North Koreans were wounded. The firing erupted between Korean Peoples Army (KPA) and United Nations Command troops when a Soviet citizen broke away from an NK-sponsored tour group and defected across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) dividing North and South Korea. Shouting to UNC soldiers for "help and cover," the defector ran some 150 yards into the southern (UNC) half of the JSA, eluding pistol-firing KPA guards. Shortly thereafter, up to 17 KPA troops armed with automatic rifles crossed the MDL, firing at UNC guards providing cover for the defector who had hidden in a swampy area south of the Sunken Garden. A 25-minute exchange of gunfire ensued, which ended when a hastily arranged ceasefire was announced through loudspeakers.



(U) The defector, identified as Vasily Yakolevich Matuzok, a Korean-language student with the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, escaped unhurt from the firefight and was placed under US military control in Seoul. The gunfire exchange was the first ever to occur in the Panmunjom truce zone during the entire history of the 27 July 1953 Armistice Agreement.

(U) At a 26 November Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting, RADM Charles F. Horne III, Senior UNC Member, called on North Korea to account for the firefight incident three days earlier. Admiral Horne reminded the NK Senior Member, MG Kim Tae Ho, of the September 1976 agreement to separate the UNC and KPA guard forces with the MDL between them.<sup>8</sup> He charged the "deliberate and flagrant breach" of that agreement was "totally responsible for the most serious incident in the 31-year history of the JSA." He also noted that KPA guards "would have suffered more serious casualties had it not been for the discipline and restraint of the UNC guard force." In response, the NK Senior Member claimed the Soviet defector Matuzok, being unfamiliar with the JSA, had inadvertently crossed the North-South demarcation line and was then "abducted" by UNC personnel.

8. (U) On 18 August 1976, two US Army officers supervising a tree trimming detail were slain by axe-wielding North Korean guards about 400 yards distant from the site of the latest clash. In September 1976, following the previous month's incident, the JSA was partitioned along the MDL and UNC and KPA military personnel were restricted from crossing the MDL into the opposing side. See UNC/USFK/EUSA AHR 1976 (U), pp. 9-26.

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(U) The UNC side showed a videotaped interview with Matuzok, in which he said he had "decided to defect approximately two years ago" when he was a graduate student at the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He further stated, "I cross the line (MDL) of my own free will; it was a quite voluntary decision," emphasizing that he was not enticed or coerced in any way. Asked whether he wished to return to the North, he replied firmly, "I don't wish to return at all."

(U) The KPA's General Kim denounced the UNC's interview with Matuzok, claiming, "the US imperialist aggressors are systematic wreckers and violators of the armistice agreement," avoiding blaming the ROK. He demanded the immediate return of the defector, declaring "international opinion strongly condemns your action."

(U) Matuzok left Seoul on 30 November for a United Nations refugee camp in Rome, hoping to be eventually granted asylum in the US. A precedent for such action had been established in October 1981 following the defection of a Czech cook assigned to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

(U) On 25 September, GEN William J. Livsey, CINCUNC, presented the Purple Heart to PVT Michael A. Burgoyne, the UNC security guard wounded in the firefight at the JSA. Burgoyne was at the US Army Community Hospital-Seoul recuperating from a gunshot wound in the neck. CPL Jang Myung Ki, the UNC soldier killed in the gunfire exchange, was honored posthumously by both the ROK and US Governments. Jang was posthumously awarded the ROK Meritorious Service Medal and General Livsey presented the deceased soldier's parents with the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device, the highest award for valor given by the US in peacetime to foreign military personnel. Armed only with a pistol, Jang's close defensive fire against advancing North Korean guards forced the enemy to take cover and evasive action, gaining critical time for UNC reinforcement troops to become engaged.

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(U) The ROK-US Senior Level Working Group provided overall guidance and direction for selection of SCM agenda topics based on their relevance and urgency. The group also monitored follow-up actions generated from prior SCMs. Meetings were hosted alternately by the ROK Ministry of National Defense and USFK. ROK members included the Assistant Minister, Planning and Management, MND; Director, Policy and Plans Bureau, MND; and the Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The US was represented by the Chief, JUSMAG-K; USFK ACoS, J5; and the Counselor for Political Affairs, US Embassy, Seoul.

(U) On 7 May, two days before the SCM commenced, the ROK/US Military Committee convened its Sixth Plenary Session in Seoul with Generals Lee Ki Baek and John W. Vessey, Jr., chairmen of their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, presiding. Conducted to provide strategic direction and guidance to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the meeting served as a top-level forum for reviewing war deterrent and combat readiness efforts on the peninsula.<sup>8</sup>

(U) The Republic of Korea hosted the 16th Annual SCM in Seoul on 9-10 May. The ROK delegation was headed by Minister of National Defense Yoon Sung Min and included Lew Byong Hion, Ambassador to the US; GEN Lee Ki Baek, Chairman, JCS; and other key MND and MOFA officials. The US delegates, led by SECDEF Caspar W. Weinberger, included Richard L. Walker, Ambassador to the ROK; GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman, JCS; Richard L. Armitage, Asst SECDEF for International Security Affairs; Michael I. Burch, Asst SECDEF for Public Affairs; ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USCINCPAC; and GEN Robert W. Sennewald, COMUSKOREA.

(U) After opening remarks by Minister Yoon and Secretary Weinberger, a ROK JCS J5 representative presented a summary report of the Sixth Annual ROK US Military Committee Meeting held earlier (noted above). The report included an updated assessment of the North Korean threat and briefings on ROK/US Combined Forces Command operational improvements and force enhancements, results of combined ROK-US studies on critical defense issues, and ROK JCS proposals for further strengthening CFC's warfighting capabilities.

(U) Thereafter, four functionally-organized combined committees, co-chaired by ROK and US delegates, completed separate discussions on specialized topics. Each committee presented its report the following day in the second plenary session.

(U) The Security Cooperation Committee focused primarily on the following issues:

--(U) Foreign Military Sales (FMS). In committee discussions, the US delegation noted that Congress had been considering action under the 1984-85 Security Assistance Authorization Act to include Korea among those nations with improved FMS repayment terms--specifically a 20-year period for reimbursement of principal, following a 10-year grace period during which only interest payments, at US Treasury rates, would be required. The ROK delegation, while expressing its appreciation for the US side's continuing

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8. See note 2, page 1, for composition and principal function of the ROK/US Military Committee, Plenary Session.

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--C Battery, 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery - From Camp Giant to Camp Pelham.

--B Company, 2d Engineer Battalion - From Camp Edwards to Camp Giant. On 16 August, the 665th Medical Detachment (Dental Service) was relocated from Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) to Camp Walker (Taegu) to provide additional support to EUSA units located in Area V. (See map, page 208).

## EUSA Program Analysis Resource Review (PARR) (U)

(U) Background. The PARR provided a formal means for EUSA to identify and explain its resource requirements to DA. Covering the five years following the current budget period, PARR initiatives were submitted in the form of prioritized Program Development Increment Packages (PDIP), which were either originated by EUSA or directed by DA in response to recognized program needs. The EUSA Commander's Statement in the PARR discussed resource requirements and deficiencies in terms of the command's ability to accomplish its missions. Also incorporated in the PARR were Economy, Efficiency, and Management Improvement PDIPs showing budget and avoidance savings. DA guidance documents specified constraints for PDIPs in PARR submissions and provided administrative instructions. The Program Development Group, composed of representatives from principal EUSA staffs and MSCs, drafted the PARR under ACoS, G3 supervision during September-December each year for submission to DA the following January. The extent of DA support for each PDIP was revealed in the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submitted to DOD in May as the Army's proposal for resource allocation during the applicable five-year defense program cycle.

(U) FY 1986-90 PARR. Submitted to DA in January 1984, the document contained the PDIPs listed below, in order of priority. (All were EUSA-initiated except the first PDIP listed, which was DA-directed.)

--Establishment of EUSA Combat Support Coordination Team #3 and operations facilities at HQ Third ROK Army (see page 91).

--Combat Service Support-I. Improved stockage of repair parts and increased fire protection for Petroleum Distribution System-Korea (replaced by 2d Quartermaster Group on 16 September 1984), and construction of 30,000-square-foot storage warehouse in 2d Infantry Division area.

--Construction of a new 17,500-square-foot USFK/EUSA Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility, and procurement of 14 tactical facsimile sets for 19th Support Command logistics centers.

--Construction of new warehouse, ammunition bunker, and auxiliary power stations at Materiel Support Center-Korea (MSC-K) (Camp Carroll), and movement of evacuation hospital equipment to Japan.

--Construction of CH-47 aircraft maintenance hangar at Camp Humphreys.

--Combat Service Support-II. Expansion of maintenance work bays and construction of vehicle test track at MSC-K, procurement of eight mini-computers for logistics ADP network within 19th Support Command, and provision of accessories for EUSA war reserve vehicles.

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Table 7--(U) Participating Forces in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84

Element	ROK	US	Total
ROK/US CFC Ground Component Command	96,600 <sup>a</sup>	20,700	117,300
ROK/US CFC Air Component Command	25,000	15,000	40,000
ROK/US CFC Naval Component Command	19,730	450	20,180
ROK/US CFC Combined UW Task Force	6,000	200	6,200
US Navy/Marine Corps Forces	--	23,800	23,800
Units Not OPCON to ROK/US CFC <sup>b</sup>	7,217	3,028	10,245
Total	154,547	63,178	217,725

<sup>a</sup>Includes 2,630 ROK Naval Marine Force personnel.

<sup>b</sup>Includes EUSA support units/elements.

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Table 8--(U) Location of US Personnel Participating in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84

Service	In-Country	USPACOM	CONUS	Total
Army	14,200	4,850 <sup>a</sup>	1,650 <sup>b</sup>	20,700
Air Force	9,000	4,000	2,000	15,000
Navy	400	15,100	100	15,600
Marine Corps	50	8,600	--	8,650
Total	23,650	32,550	3,818	59,950 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>From 25th Inf Div, Hawaii.

<sup>b</sup>From 7th Inf Div, Fort Ord, CA and HQ I Corps, Ft. Lewis, WA.

<sup>c</sup>Does not include CUWTF and Units not OPCON to ROK/US CFC.

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(U) Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 activities were divided into three major phases: Deployment, 1 February-19 March; Employment, 16-30 March; and Redeployment, 28 March-30 April. Summaries of exercise highlights follow.<sup>2</sup>

2. (1) UNC/CFC/USFK/EUSA TEAM SPIRIT 84 After Action Report, 3 Aug 84.
- (2) Recapitulation of TS 84, prep by ACoS, J3 Exer & Doctrine Div. Both SECRET.

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its three-year life cycle. The first COHORT units deployed to Korea were two infantry companies and one field artillery battery from the Fort Ord-based 7th Infantry Division which arrived in 1983. All were assigned to 2d Infantry Division battalions affiliated with the same regiment to which the COHORT units belonged under the Combat Arms Regimental System.

(U) During 1984 six COHORT units were deployed to the 2d Infantry Division in conformity with the following schedule:<sup>7</sup>

January .... C Co, 2d Bn, 23d Inf from 9th Inf Div, Fort Lewis, WA.  
March ..... B Co, 2d Bn, 9th Inf from 7th Inf Div, Fort Ord, CA  
              ..... A Btry, 2d Bn, 8th FA from 7th Inf Div.  
May ..... B Co, 2d Bn, 23d Inf from 9th Inf Div.  
August ..... B Co, 4th Bn, 9th Inf from 7th Inf Div.  
September .. A Co, 2d Bn, 23d Inf from 9th Inf Div.

All were assigned to 2d Infantry Division battalions linked to the same regiment. Three infantry companies from 9th Infantry Division battalions were scheduled for COHORT deployments in 1985.

## Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training (RCODT) (U)

(U) Under DA's RCODT Program, US Army Reserve and Army National Guard units projected for dispatch to the ROK in support of contingency OPLANs were authorized to conduct their annual two-week active duty for training (ADT) periods in Korea. Managed by FORSCOM, the program provided the RC participants unique mission-oriented training with the EUSA organizations they would support in wartime. Program participation grew from 10 reserve component (RC) units taking part in FY 1981 to 175 organizational cells, representing 106 units, deployed in FY 1984, as indicated below:

Army Reserve - 1,765 personnel/112 cells representing 57 units.

National Guard - 623 personnel/63 cells representing 49 units.

Because of limited support capabilities, EUSA's RCODT program emphasized unit cell participation rather than entire unit deployments. The 19th Support Command, however, sponsored ADT periods for numerous complete combat service support units. A large number of the participating cells/units were employed during major exercises such as TEAM SPIRIT and ULCHI-FOCUS LENS.<sup>8</sup>

## ROK-US Junior Officer Exchange Program (U)

(U) Established on 17 September 1984, this program was designed to enhance interoperability between ROK Army and EUSA forces through direct observation

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7. EACJ-FD-M Memo to CofS, 28 Feb 85, subj: Review of the New Manning System (NMS) Concept. UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in G3 Force Dev Div.

8. Point Paper, EUSA Sr USAR Advr, 15 Jan 85, subj: Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training (RCODT) Status. UNCLASSIFIED.

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


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(U) In 1984, the TKP transported a total of 12.8 million barrels of petroleum products, of which 77 percent were for ROK commercial firms. Revenue generated for USFK from the commercial throughput amounted to \$6.06 million.<sup>9</sup>

## Fielding of New Equipment in EUSA (U)

(U) Major weapons and equipment items fielded to EUSA units during 1984 included the following:

--(U) UH-60A Blackhawk Transport Helicopters. Deliveries of 100 UH-60As to EUSA aviation units were completed in October 1984, under a schedule of deployments commencing in October 1983. The Blackhawks replaced UH-1 "Huey" series helicopters in the air assault, air cavalry and aeromedical evacuation roles. By June 1984, a total of 40 UH-60As had been deployed to the 2d Infantry Division--25 to 4th Sqdn, 7th Cav and 15 to A Co, 2d Avn Bn--and 30 to the 17th Aviation Group (Combat)--15 each to 128th and 201st Avn Co's. During June-October, 25 Blackhawks were distributed to the 8th Medical Command's 377th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), 1 was delivered to the 19th Support Command's 45th Transportation Company (AVIM), and 4 were received for operational readiness float.

--(U) The deployment plan provided for simultaneous issue of UH-60As to two different units, one divisional and one nondivisional, to allow adequate time for training air crews and maintenance personnel. All in-country UH-60A and UH-1 aircraft remained above DA materiel condition standards throughout the entire fielding period.

--(U) Unit and intermediate maintenance support packages received during the aircraft deployments met the full criteria for spare parts, special tools and test equipment requirements. A 13-member materiel fielding team from the US Army Aviation Systems Command provided assistance during the fieldings and a 4-man team from the Aviation Logistics School conducted new equipment training for EUSA pilots and maintenance specialists. Through an agreement with USAF, Kunsan Air Base provided support for receiving and processing the UH-60As, which were delivered by C-5A aircraft, and for retrograding UH-1Hs on C-5A return flights to CONUS.

--(U) Since the UH-60As were true infantry squad carriers--the first in the Army's aviation history--they replaced the less capable UH-1Hs in a ratio of 15:23 in EUSA's combat support aviation companies. The Blackhawk could carry an external sling load of 8,000 pounds, enabling it to transport light artillery weapons and other equipment beyond the capacity of the UH-1H. All critical components on the UH-60A were armored or duplicated to provide greater protection against cannon and small-arms fire.

(U) In January 1984, the ROKG requested authorization to purchase 20 of the 97 UH-1H helicopters displaced by the UH-60A conversion. The sale was approved by DA in April and a Letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed by the ROKG in September. The 20 UH-1Hs were sold for \$450,000 each on an "as is" basis and the transfer was completed in November.

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9. ACoFS, J4 SAPOK Hist Sum 1984 (U). SECRET.

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fire-control functions: fire-support coordination; keeping track of ammunition stocks and status of weapons; storage and application of meteorological data; fire-mission processing; fire planning; target-intelligence processing; and the computation and use of survey data.

--(U) In October DA suspended TACFIRE fielding worldwide, primarily because of spare parts shortages. At year's end, ACoS, J4 was coordinating with US Army Communications-Electronics Command to determine future fielding actions.

--(U) Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCV). During November-December EUSA fielded 1,630 new CUCVs to combat and support units command-wide, to replace M151 and M880 series tactical vehicles (3/4-ton to 1 1/4-ton capacities). All CUCV models were equipped with diesel engines, automatic transmissions, and power steering. Issue was originally scheduled to start on 1 August but had to be postponed primarily because of production problems at CONUS manufacturing plants and shortfalls in vehicle support packages.

--(U) Centralized deprocessing and distribution of the new vehicles was performed by the 19th Support Command's 194th Maintenance Battalion at Camp Humphreys. Turn-in of displaced vehicles was accomplished concurrently with the issue of the CUCVs. The distribution schedule had called for unit-set fielding; however, because some CUCV models were not received in the quantities and time frames required, all units except 2d Infantry Division elements were issued their vehicles on an incremental basis. TACOM representatives provided new equipment training in September and logistical assistance throughout the fielding period. The final increment of 200 CUCVs would be distributed in early 1985, bringing the total number fielded to 1,830.

--(U) M929 5-Ton Dump Trucks. In April EUSA distributed 29 new M929 vehicles to fill existing shortages. The M929s, equipped with diesel engines and automatic transmissions, represented a significant product improvement over the M817 models previously fielded. Eighteen of the M929s were issued to the 2d Infantry Division's combat engineer battalion and 11 to EUSA's 2d Engineer Group (Combat/Heavy).

--(U) AN/MSM-105(V)1 Electronic Quality Assurance Test Equipment (EQUATE). In February the Materiel Support Center-Korea received a transportable AN/MSM-105(V)1 EQUATE system designed for intermediate-level field maintenance operations. The new system provided a diagnostic, performance, and fault isolation capability for digital, analog, and hybrid electronic line replaceable units and printed circuit boards. A second set was scheduled for delivery to the 45th Transportation Company (AVIM) in late 1985.

--(U) Radio Test Sets. Fielding of 63 AN/GRM-114A general purpose radio test sets, which began 15 February, to EUSA units was completed in April 1984. The test sets were for use in repairing and aligning all FM radios--such as the VRC-12 series--and most AM radios.

See page 33 for summaries of new tactical intelligence system fieldings and page 140 for summary of mobile satellite communications system deployment.

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support directly from CONUS depots for all classes of supplies and equipment except subsistence items, bulk petroleum products, and ammunition.

(U) The average OST for DSS-K at year's end was 55.8 days. For ALOC-K, the total average was 23.8 days. See Table 13 for OST data on normal priority, non-backordered, DSS-K and ALOC-K requisitions (from authorized stockage lists).<sup>12</sup>

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Table 13--(U) Order-Ship Times for Supply Distribution Systems  
Supporting EUSA - CY 1984  
(1983 Data in Parentheses)

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	DSS-K	ALOC-K
Total Order-Ship Time	55.8 (55.3) days	23.8 (22.0) days
In-Country Pipeline Segment <sup>a</sup>	8.8 ( 9.3) days	9.7 ( 9.0) days
DA Objective	15.0 (15.0) days	10.0 (10.0) days
CONUS Pipeline Segment <sup>b</sup>	47.0 (46.0) days	14.1 (13.0) days
DA Objective	44.0 (44.0) days	17.0 (17.0) days

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<sup>a</sup>Total time expended in forwarding the requisition from the EUSA SSA to the CONUS NICP and, once the materiel requisitioned arrived at the POD in Korea, the time elapsed until the materiel was posted to the SSA accountable records.

<sup>b</sup>Total time expended from receipt of the requisition by the CONUS NICP until the materiel's arrival at the POD in Korea.

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### EUSA Excess Materiel Management Program (EMMP) (U)

(U) In January ACoFS, J4 established the EMMP as a management initiative to identify and redistribute usable excess materiel within the command or, if excess to command requirements, return the materiel to CONUS supply depots for Army-wide redistribution. To identify and correct problem areas, and monitor completion of directed corrective actions, a EUSA EMMP team was formed to survey selected units/support activities on a recurring, biyearly basis.

(U) In 1984 EMMP surveys resulted in recovery of over \$223.2 million in excess materiel and the return of \$151.9 million in excess materiel to CONUS supply depots. Redistribution actions within the command resulted in improved readiness postures in 18 EUSA units. This initiative not only provided significant cost savings to EUSA, but also lent improvements to the Army-wide supply system. Resultant cost savings through expeditious recovery and return

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12. (1) ACoFS, J4 Supply Br Hist Sum 1984. (2) EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 1984 and 1st Qtr, FY 1985. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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of usable excess materiel to the supply system provided additional procurement funds for mission-essential supplies, repair parts, and equipment for force sustainment. The EMP also provided for maximum reuse of resources, improved customer support, and precluded unnecessary procurements.

## EUSA Product Improvement/Modification Work Order Program (U)

(U) Requirements established by AR 750-10 governed the upgrade and modernization of Army materiel to enhance readiness, safety, effectiveness, and reliability. Modifications applied to Army equipment within EUSA were accomplished in various ways, depending upon the number of items involved and the complexity of the equipment. Relatively simple modifications were usually applied by in-country direct support units, while those of a more complicated nature were applied at general support level or by MACOM-sponsored teams from CONUS. Those involving a large number of items at different locations were sometimes applied through contracts with ROK industrial firms.

(U) Some of the more significant modifications applied to EUSA materiel during 1984 were:

--PU-625 3KW Generator. Modification provided an electronic ignition system and a larger cranking pulley for easier starting and improved engine performance.

--M110A2 Howitzer. Increased system reliability and operation were derived from such enhancements as improved and added parking brakes, driver's warning light, hatch cover torsion bar, and a gunner's seat support.

--AN/GRC-122/142 Communications Shelter. Installation of AN/UGC-74 teletypewriters provided the capability to interface with modern high-speed equipment, resulting in improved reliability and quieter operation.

(U) Under provisions of a May 1982 Modification Work Order (MWO) Fielding Plan between EUSA and US Army Troop Support and Readiness Command (USATSARCOM), Dynaletron, Inc., representatives applied, in-theater, major MWOs to EUSA's rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. Designated Project OLR, the contractor team, located at Camp Humphreys, installed MWOs on site or at unit locations. Aircraft mission capable time and flying hour program costs were not affected by MWO downtime or MWO kit costs. Scheduling aircraft for MWO was accomplished on a calendar year basis by ACoFS, J4. Modifications completed during 1984 included: six on CH-47Cs, four on UH-1Hs, one on OH-58As, three on AH-1Ss, two on UH-60As; three on RU-21Hs; and three on RV/OV-1s.

## Maintenance of USFK Equipment by ROK Industry (U)

(U) Background. In December 1976, at DA direction, EUSA lost its mission to perform depot-level maintenance; and Camp Carroll Army Depot at Waegwan was redesignated as the US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea. Equipment requiring depot-level maintenance was either returned to CONUS depots for overhaul, resulting in excessive turn-around times, or processed through in-country property disposal agencies. During the 13th Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in 1981, the ROKG proposed that Korean industrial facilities be utilized to support USFK's equipment maintenance requirements. At subsequent SQMs, the US SECDEF pledged efforts to identify means to increase

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US use of the ROK industrial base. Several technical teams from DOD and DA commodity commands surveyed Korean industrial firms and validated their existing capabilities to perform maintenance on US military equipment in various commodity categories.

(U) Equipment items for potential contracts were selected upon determination that: maintenance or repair was beyond USFK capabilities or capacities; could be adequately accomplished by ROK firms; and did not adversely affect the US logistic support base. All repair parts were obtained from CONUS sources; however, some materials, such as rubber for tire retreading, were procured locally. Attainment of contract maintenance objectives afforded sizable savings to USFK in reduced labor and transportation costs, and the enhanced maintenance turn-around time improved USFK's equipment combat readiness and sustainability. Additionally, the ROK's developing industrial base benefited from the program (see pages 123-24). Quality assurance inspectors from EUSA's US Army Korea Contracting Agency monitored the maintenance operations to ensure adherence to contract standards.

(U) Contract Performance. Since 1981, USFK had awarded 14 contracts to ROK industry totaling \$28 million. As a result, the command realized more than \$24.4 million in savings from the contracting effort by year-end FY 1984, with anticipated savings in excess of \$30.1 million by the end of FY 1985. Negotiated contracts in effect during 1984 are summarized below.

--M113-Series Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Modernization Program. In February 1980 DA approved a program to modernize the 2d Infantry Division's M113-series APC fleet by applying product improvement kits while the vehicles were undergoing depot-level overhaul by Daewoo Heavy Industries, a Korean firm under contract to USFK. Vehicles initially included in the program were M113A1 squad carriers, M106A1 4.2-inch mortar carriers, M125A1 81-mm mortar carriers, M548A1 tracked cargo carriers, and M577A1 command post vehicles. In following years the upgrading program was expanded to include M730A1 Chaparral air defense missile system carriers, M741A1 Vulcan gun carriers, reconfiguration of APCs to M901A1 Improved TOW Vehicles, and conversion of M125A2 81-mm mortar carriers to M106A2 4.2-inch mortar carriers.

--The modernization program was broadened in 1983 to include 24 APCs from in-country USAF units and 78 from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division's inventory. Among the more extensive modifications applied to the early-model APCs was fitting of improved heating, cooling, and suspension systems. By January 1984, a total of 391 APCs had been overhauled and upgraded by Daewoo under annual contracts first awarded in 1981.

--A fourth-year contract for upgrading 133 APCs was awarded to Daewoo in January 1984. Conversion of 61 APCs to M901A1 Improved TOW Vehicle configuration was included in the 1984 contract (see page 103). The entire five-year program, involving modernization of 604 M113-series vehicles, was scheduled for completion by 30 September 1985.

--The upgrade program for the 2d Infantry Division's M741 Vulcan Gun Carriers, requiring approximately 45 days per vehicle, necessitated the vehicles, with their mounted weapons station, be turned in to the contractor. In October 1984, DA approved a EUSA request to allow the unit to remove and retain the weapons station for in-house maintenance while the vehicle was being

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upgraded. On 12 December, a representative from US Army Armament, Munitions & Chemical Command provided training to 2d Infantry Division general support personnel on proper removal and reinstallation of the weapons station, a task normally performed at depot level. Subsequently, M741 vehicles were turned in for upgrade minus the weapons station.

--Refurbishment of EUSA Tractors. A contract was awarded in June 1984 to the Hae Nin Tractor Company to overhaul 12 EUSA D8K (Caterpillar) tractors. The company received a second contract on 5 December 1984 to overhaul 10 DJ-410 (Caterpillar) tractors. By year-end 1984, the contractor had overhauled, since its first contract in June 1982, 34 D7Fs and 12 D8Ks. Total contract costs amounted to \$962,954 from which EUSA realized \$1,207,581 in total savings.

--EUSA Tire Retread Program. Based upon the DA policy that MACOMs obtain 75 percent of their replacement tires from retreaded products, it was determined that ROK industrial firms possessed the capability to retread EUSA's worn tires. For most tire sizes and types, retread cost was estimated as approximately 30-40 percent of the cost for new acquisitions. The Chosun Tire Company received an initial contract in September 1982 to retread 15,459 tires. In January 1984, a second-year contract was awarded the company for an additional 15,259 tires. In March the Chosun Tire Company went bankrupt, which terminated the contract. Prior to its bankruptcy, the company had completed 11,300 tires. The Heung-Ah Tire Company was awarded a contract in December to retread 9,487 tires. At year-end 1984, total contract costs amounted to \$1,434,318 with cost savings estimated at \$2,190,469.

--Stripping and Repainting of US Army Aircraft. US Army Troop Support & Aviation Materiel Command provided funds in 1982 for local procurement of services to strip and repaint, with chemical agent resistant coating, seven RU-21 and six RV-ID aircraft assigned to the 501st MI Group's 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation). Korean Air Lines received a contract in September 1982, valued at \$284,000, to perform the work in its overhaul facility at Kimhae, using US Government-furnished material (GFM). Cost savings were estimated at \$1.1 million. Initial production had to be delayed until 7 June 1983, however, because of the nonavailability of GFM. By 25 August, work on three aircraft had been completed. A further delay ensued since the initial contract had not called for removing epoxy primer from the aircraft. In early 1984, the contract was modified to require stripping to bare metal, a process which required additional GFM. The added requirement increased the contract cost to \$294,496. The cost savings realized by USFK amounted to \$1,175,498. By year's end, 13 aircraft had been repainted, with the last aircraft scheduled for completion by 30 June 1985.

--EUSA Vehicle Rustproofing Program. Following a survey by a CONUS team in April 1982 to validate ROK industrial capabilities, the Bo Sung Automobile Company received a contract in October 1982 to rustproof EUSA's tactical wheeled vehicle fleet, including 198 M911/915-series vehicles, 51 M871 trailers, and 23 20-ton dump trucks. The \$71,964 contract, completed in January 1984, resulted in a \$236,400 cost savings. Another contract was awarded in January 1984 for 226 vehicles, later modified to include an additional 412 vehicles. The contract was completed in October. Contract costs and cost savings were \$132,833 and \$272,796, respectively. A third contract for 564 vehicles was awarded to the Bo Sung Automobile Company in November. Savings on the \$95,962 contract were estimated at \$210,520.

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--US Air Force Contracts. During FY 1984, USAF contract maintenance projects performed by Korean Air Lines included (costs in parentheses): corrosion control and painting of 23 F-15 aircraft (\$2.4 million)--contract issued in March 1984; depot maintenance repair on 41 F-4 aircraft (\$6.4 million)--contract issued in December 1983; depot maintenance repair on 8 C-130 aircraft (\$2.9 million)--contract issued April 1984. All contracts were scheduled to be completed by May 1985. Cost savings computations had not been completed at close of FY 1984.

--US Navy Contracts. During 1984, one USN Military Sealift Command ship was repaired under contract by a ROK industrial firm. Contract cost totaled approximately \$200,000; cost savings had not been determined at year's end.

(U) Eighth Army identified four additional programs for contracting with ROK industry, with most planned for FY 1985 production starts (estimated contract costs/cost savings in parentheses): overhaul of approximately 519 tactical wheeled vehicles (\$2.8 million/\$8.4 million); refurbishment of track shoes/pads and roadwheels for combat vehicles (\$908,000/\$840,000); overhaul of 13 construction equipment items and 15 materials handling equipment units (\$678,786/\$1 million); and rebuilding approximately 156 communications equipment items (\$587,812/\$1.8 million). DA and Army Materiel Command were requested to provide technical personnel and funding support for the maintenance programs. At year's end, the Air Force had a program under study for contracting the repair of J-79 jet engine components and for electrical system improvements on F-16 aircraft.<sup>13</sup>

## EUSA Army Stock Fund (ASF) Operations (U)

(U) The ACofS, J4 had staff responsibility for overall EUSA ASF management and operations, while the ACofS, Comptroller provided staff accounting advice and assistance. EUSA ASF branch offices (operational elements) were located at the 18th Medical Command's 6th MEDSOM and the 19th Support Command's 6th Support Center (Materiel Management).

(U) In FY 1984, EUSA's ASF peacetime obligations totaled \$193.9 million, representing an obligation authority utilization rate of 99.7 percent. In addition, DA provided a \$14.3 million war reserve obligation authority for investment in high-priority EUSA sustainability requirements (see pages 93-95). FY 1984 obligations were \$44.2 million higher than the FY 1983 level. The increase resulted from requirements for secondary items supporting equipment fielded under force modernization programs, and inclusion of 12-month requirements for nonstocked items having long procurement leadtimes.

(U) The command received a peacetime obligation authority amounting to \$199.5 million for its FY 1985 requirements. The increase resulted primarily from product cost growth (inflation) and initial support item costs for new

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13. (1) ACofS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1984 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Point Paper, ACofS J4 Mat Spt Div, 14 Jan 85, subj: Contract Maintenance with ROK Industry. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) FONECON, S. Gammons with Mr. K. H. Choe, Maint Br, ACofS, J4 Mat Spt Div, 21 Nov 85. (4) FONECON, S. Gammons with Mr. G. Davenport, Maint Br, ACofS, J4 Mat Spt Div, 22 Nov 85.

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equipment fieldings under force modernization programs. EUSA also received an additional \$48.8 million (a 70.7 percent increase) war reserve obligation authority to further improve wartime sustainability.<sup>14</sup>

## EUSA Energy Conservation Program (U)

(U) The command's energy conservation goals for FY 1984 were based upon DA objectives calling for an 18 percent reduction in facility energy use (heating fuel and electricity) from a FY 1975 consumption base and a decrease in mobility fuels (JP-4 aviation fuel, automotive gasoline, and diesel fuel) by 7.9 percent. The annual MACOM goals constituted increments of DA's long-range objective to achieve a 25 percent reduction in facility energy use and a 10 percent decrease in mobility fuels by FY 1985, as applied against the FY 1975 baseline.

(U) In FY 1984 EUSA facilities' energy consumption was recorded at 12.2 percent below the FY 1975 baseline level of 7,511,337 MBTUs (millions of British thermal units), missing the DA objective by 5.8 percent. The usage of mobility fuels was 9.4 percent below the FY 1975 level of 2,479,891 MBTUs, bettering DA's objective by 1.5 percent. EUSA's energy costs for FY 1984 are shown on Table 14.<sup>15</sup>

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Table 14--(U) EUSA Energy Costs - FY 1984  
(Dollars in Millions)

Type	Allocation	Consumption	% Difference
Heating fuel	\$24.178	\$23.660	-2.1
Electricity	26.974	30.230	+12.1 <sup>a</sup>
Mobility Fuel	17.951	17.797	-0.9
Mobility Reserve	.425	.200	-52.9
Total	\$69.529	\$71.888	+3.4

<sup>a</sup>Consumption was greater than planned primarily due to increased electrical equipment acquisitions throughout EUSA and higher air conditioning usage during the peak summer months. DA had not established separate objectives for heating fuel and electricity; heating fuel and electricity usage levels were combined and reported as total facility energy consumption.

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14. (1) ACoFS, J4 Resr & Sys Mgt Div Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, J4 Resr & Sys Mgt Div, 8 Jan 85, subj: EUSA Army Stock Fund Operations. (3) EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 84. All UNCLASSIFIED.

15. EUSA R&A, 4th Qtr, FY 84; 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) Energy conservation targets established for FY 1985 were to reduce facility energy consumption to 20 percent below the FY 1975 baseline and mobility fuel usage to 4.6 percent below the baseline level.

## Maintenance Awards for EUSA Units (U)

(U) DA established the Chief of Staff, Army, Award for Maintenance Excellence in 1982 to improve unit readiness worldwide by providing a positive incentive for extraordinary organizational maintenance efforts. The annual competition was open to all active Army, Reserve, and National Guard units. Finalists were selected by MACOMs in three equipment density categories--light, intermediate, and heavy.

(U) Winning units for the 1983 competition were selected in March 1984. The 46th Transportation Company (Medium Truck), assigned to the 19th Support Command's 69th Transportation Battalion (Motor Transport), received runner-up honors in the light density category, and the 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 2d Infantry Division, was runner-up in the heavy density category. The presentations were made at the annual American Defense Preparedness Association convention held 19-28 March in Washington, DC.<sup>16</sup>

## Army Food Service Awards (U)

(U) The 1984 Philip A. Connelly Award was presented to the 8th Personnel Command's (Provisional) Dining Facility at Camp Coiner (adjacent to Yongsan Garrison) on 15 June, recognizing the facility as the best large dining hall in the Army. The Pusan Storage Facility's dining hall received runner-up honors in the small facility category. The Philip A. Connelly Award was presented annually by DA and the International Food Service Executives Association in recognition of excellence in preparation and serving of food.<sup>17</sup>

## Project Freedom (U)

(U) Background. Project Freedom was formed in CONUS as a nonprofit organization to represent the interests of former US prisoners of war and relatives of those still listed as missing in action (MIA). Headed by COL Lewis L. Millett, USA Ret and a Korean War Medal of Honor recipient, a Project Freedom group made a preliminary visit to Korea in September 1983 to search for unmarked graves that possibly contained remains of US personnel. The group selected a mass grave site on a hill near Umi-ri village<sup>18</sup> for exhumation. On 22 December 1983 the SECDEF directed EUSA to formulate an MIA recovery plan, based upon information provided DOD by Project Freedom.

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16. ACofS, J4 Mat Spt Div Hist Sum 1984 (U). SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

17. ACofS, J4 Svc & Energy Div Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

18. (U) Umi-ri, located approximately 12 miles southwest of Taegu, was a site of intensive battle action in August 1950 during the Pusan perimeter defense.

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(U) The ACoFS, J5 International Affairs Officer was tasked to coordinate Project Freedom's activity with ROKG agencies to ensure all requirements according to Korean laws and customs were met, and to assure adherence to the strict protocols involved. Logistical support was coordinated by ACoFS, J4, including arrangements with the Hawaii-based Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) to examine, on-site, any skeletal remains found to determine their nationality. Remains tentatively identified as American were to be shipped to the CIL for positive identification.

(U) On 27 September 1984, following the Korean Chusok holiday, final coordination with ROK officials was completed. (During Chusok, Korean families traditionally decorated family graves to honor deceased family members. Postponing final coordination until after the holiday allowed for positive identification of all graves belonging to Korean families.) Subsequently, the plan was revised to open all graves unclaimed by Korean families, rather than a representative sampling. Exhumation of 55 unclaimed graves was conducted during 4-12 October; none contained skeletal remains of US personnel. In supporting Project Freedom, EUSA's manpower and logistical costs totaled \$88,546.<sup>19</sup>

## USFK/EUSA Acquisition Activities (U)

(U) Since March 1977 USFK had used a noncompetitive method of contracting in the ROK. The procedure, known as Controlled Single-Source Selection Procedure (CSSSP), was implemented to counter pre-1977 collusive bidding practices among Korean contractors doing business with USFK. Given the growing sophistication of Korean contractors and passage of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369), to be effective 1 April 1985, USFK began the transition to competitive procedures in late 1984. The ultimate goal was to move away from CSSSP toward full and free competitive bidding by year-end 1985. On 1 December 1984, ACoFS, Acquisition Management exempted all contracting requirements procured under small purchase and other simplified purchase procedures from the CSSSP. Other contracting activities to be exempted from CSSSP included concessionaire requirements--effective 1 February 1985; and contracting requirements under \$100,000--effective 1 March 1985. Subsequent to the dates mentioned, the foregoing contracting requirements were to be procured on a competitive basis.

(U) The US Army Korea Contracting Agency (USAKCA) continued its direct support procurement mission, providing supplies, services, and construction services to USFK elements throughout the ROK. During FY 1984, USAKCA executed over 80,000 contractual actions valued at over \$396 million. Contract values, by commodity types, for FY 1983 and 1984 are compared in Table 15. (See pages 107-10 for descriptions of USFK contracts with ROK industry for maintenance of US military equipment.)<sup>20</sup>

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19. (1) ACoFS, J4 Spt Svc Br Hist Sum 1984. (2) ACoFS, J5 Int's Affairs Off Hist Sum 1984. (3) Point Paper, ACoFS, J4 Spt Svc Br, 17 Jan 85, subj: Project Freedom. All UNCLASSIFIED.

20. (1) ACoFS, Acquisition Management Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, Acquisition Management, 5 Oct 84, subj: Contract Expenditures at USFK/EUSA. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 15--(U) USFK Contract Values - FY 1984  
(Dollars in Millions)

Commodity	FY 1983	FY 1984 <sup>a</sup>
<u>USAKCA</u>		
Services	\$ 39.8	\$ 44.1
Supplies	6.1	7.1
Subsistence	3.5	3.5
Facility Engineers	55.2	52.0
Construction (Minor)	10.7	21.0
Nonappropriated Funds	6.3	7.2
Government Bills of Lading	3.4	4.7
Small Purchases	31.1	31.5
Subtotal	<u>\$156.1</u>	<u>\$171.1</u>
<u>FED</u>		
Construction	\$158.2	\$168.9
Architect & Engineer	10.4	14.6
Off-Shore Materials	24.0	47.9
Subtotal	<u>\$168.6</u>	<u>\$183.5</u>
<u>KOAX</u>		
Personal Services	\$ 24.1	\$ 18.3
Commodity Concessions	2.1	5.2
Pacific Field Office Merchandise	8.8	10.2
Construction/Architect and Engineer	1.8	1.5
Support Service	.1	.6
POL	7.0	5.9
Subtotal	<u>\$ 43.9</u>	<u>41.7</u>
Grand Total	\$368.6	\$396.3 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Figures include contracts awarded to both Korean and US contractors.

<sup>b</sup>FY 1984 total includes \$330 million awarded solely to Korean contractors.

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Service budgets, and Compensatory Equipment Transfer actions under which US weapons and equipment were transferred to the ROK Army on a non-reimbursable basis when EUSA units were inactivated (\$5.5 billion).

--Excess Defense Articles provided under special legislation (\$700 million).

--IMET programs which furnished training in CONUS for approximately 35,500 ROK forces personnel (\$200 million).

(U) Foreign Military Sales. Credit funding through FMS procedures, initially established in 1971, reached a peak in 1977-78 when \$275 million were authorized in each of those years, but had decreased thereafter. Through FY 1984 the US Congress had provided approximately \$2.0 billion in FMS credit financing for the ROK. Congress authorized credit funds totaling \$230 million for FY 1984 FMS financing.

(U) At several annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meetings, the ROK Government had requested more favorable terms for FMS credits. The FY 1985 Continuing Resolution Authority passed by Congress in October 1984 authorized a 20-year period for reimbursement of principal, following a 10-year grace period during which only interest payments were required, at US Treasury rates. Previously, principal had to be repaid over a seven-year span, following a five-year grace period.<sup>3</sup>

## Collective Security in the Northeast Asia Region (U)

(U) Reproduced below is a summary on collective security prospects prepared by JUSMAG-K in April 1984. Since it provides a succinct description of the ROK's unique geopolitical situation and its capabilities for exerting national power, the summary should serve as useful background for the topics on ROK-US security assistance relationships which follow.<sup>4</sup>

(U) The Republic of Korea depends on continued US support to guarantee its independence. In return the ROK has consistently supported US policy. Since South Korea withdrew military forces from South Vietnam in the 1970's, Korean forces have not been deployed outside the Republic, and there are no plans to do so. The Korean Government declined invitations in 1983 to join peace keeping operations in the Middle East. Collective security in the Northeast Asia region implies US-ROK-Japan cooperation. While many Koreans appreciate the practical aspects of trilateral security cooperation, distrust of long-term Japanese intentions persists and could effectively constrain any plans to share or reapportion the collective security/defense burden. Nevertheless, recent events like the KAL shootdown and growth in the Soviet Union's Asian forces have

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3. (1) JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Plans & Plcy Hist Sum 1984 (U) SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K ACoFS, Plans & Plcy, 8 Jan 85, subj: FMS Credit Financing for ROK. UNCLASSIFIED.

4. Msg, COMUSKOREA J5 to USCINCPAC J-5, 110830Z Apr 84, subj: JSPDSA FY 87-94 Input (U). SECRET. Declass on OADR. Filed in J5 Strat & Plcy Div. 107

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(U) In 1984 ROKA returned 870 line items of MAP materiel, valued at \$1.34 million, to US control. A total of 28 high-value, redistributable line items worth \$799,825 were reported to USCINCPAC for utilization screening. By year's end ALC maintenance facilities shipped 6,009 tons of scrap grant aid equipment residue to the US Defense Property Disposal Office at Pusan. Throughout the year JUSMAG-K FLC-P personnel monitored ALC stock control activities and assisted their ALC counterparts in identifying excess grant aid materiel, confirming item quantities and condition, and administering the required reporting procedures.<sup>15</sup>

## Part V: ROK Air Force Programs (U)

### F-5 Aircraft Coassembly in Korea (U)

(U) In late 1978 the Korean Institute for Aeronautical Technology began assessing ways to fulfill the high-priority national goal of developing an indigenous aircraft industry. The ROK had already completed the first step when it commenced local coproduction of 500MD helicopters in 1977. The F-5 Freedom Fighter jet aircraft was selected over other competitors primarily because of its multi-purpose air defense and close air support capabilities and its economy of operation. Additionally, the ROK Air Force had been performing programmed depot maintenance on its F-5 and F-4 Phantom II jet aircraft since 1978. An MOU between the ROK and US Governments authorizing the F-5 coassembly program, designated Peace Freedom III, became effective in October 1980.

(U) The program was a mix of direct commercial sales and FMS agreements, totaling over \$600 million in value, for the coassembly of 48 F-5E aircraft and 20 F-5F models with an advanced handling characteristics package. Korean Air Lines and a Northrop Aircraft Corporation technical assistance team (TAT) coassembled the F-5 airframes at KAL's Kimhae facility, while Samsung Precision Industries and a General Electric TAT assembled the engines at the Samsung plant. An \$81 million FMS case provided USG-furnished aeronautical equipment, spare parts, non-recurring R&D and contractor engineering services, support equipment, TAT costs, and case management services. The commercial contract portion, negotiated with Northrop at a cost of approximately \$525 million, covered aircraft assembly sets, tooling, and some production line support equipment.

(U) Production of F-5F models began in 1982 and E model production began in 1984. Through year-end 1984 a total of 20 F model and 5 E model F-5 airframes had been delivered to the ROKAF. Overall, the KAL/Northrop coassembly program was ahead of schedule and under projected cost.

### F-16 Aircraft Acquisitions (U)

(U) The ROKG signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in December 1981 for an FMS purchase of 36 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon jet fighter aircraft

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15. (1) JUSMAG-K Army Sec Hist Sum 1984 (U). SECRET. (2) Point Paper, ACofS, J3 Ops Div, 29 Oct 84, subj: Force Modernization--ROK Forces (U). SECRET. (3) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K Army Sec, 9 Jan 85, subj: ROK Army Air Defense Modernization. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Point Paper, JUSMAG-K Army Sec, 9 Jan 85, subj: ROKA Aviation Force Improvements (U). CONFIDENTIAL.

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DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM-KOREA  
MICROWAVE SYSTEM




Figure 12

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would be accomplished under the TPICK FYP. New initiatives would not be considered until USFK developed a Command and Control Master Plan (CZMP), which would then be used as the basis to develop required operational capabilities documentation and funding consideration. ACoS, J3 began formulating a draft CZMP in January 1984. Published on 10 May, the USFK CZMP replaced the TPICK FYP as the command's primary command and control communications planning document.<sup>1</sup> (See page 92 for summary of CZMP content.)

## DCS-Korea Fiber Optic Cable System (U)

(U) Background. The most ambitious initiative undertaken within the TPICK framework was the establishment of a DCS backbone consisting of buried fiber optic cable to replace the existing microwave system. (Unlike microwave equipment, fiber optic cables did not radiate electrical energy and, because they were installed underground, were less vulnerable to air attack.) Approved in concept by the US JCS in 1982 as a US-ROK cost-sharing program, the three-phase, five-year project involved the installation of approximately 320 miles of underground cable along a general line from Uijongbu (HQ Combined Field Army [ROK/US]) in the north to the port of Pusan in the southeast, as depicted on Figure 13.

(U) In the fiber optic system to be installed, channels of telephone, television, and computer data communications would be combined by terminal equipment into streams of digital pulses, sent simultaneously by lasers over hair-thin strands of glass. Transmission links, consisting of 12 glass fibers bundled together in a one-half-inch cable, would be buried in underground ducts. Two of the fibers would be used to transmit about 600 channels of voice and data information; three others would be reserved for television use, such as American Forces Korea Network broadcasts; the remaining seven fibers would be designated as back-up and future-growth lines. The new system would eventually extend to all major command/control centers which used official DOD voice and data communications facilities within the ROK and to out-of-country locations. The obsolescent analog microwave equipment on mountain-top sites throughout Korea would be replaced by the digital fiber optic system as the construction work progressed. The microwave transmitters, antennas, and receivers were programmed to be retained as alternate communications equipment.

(U) 1984 Developments. Begun in September 1983, construction of the Seoul-Pyongtaek leg of the fiber optic duct system was completed in July 1984. An existing duct system between Seoul and Uijongbu was to be used on a leased basis. On 20 July, contracts were awarded for duct construction between Pyongtaek (Camp Humphreys) and Taejon (Camp Ames). The American Telephone & Telegraph Co., was awarded a contract on 26 July for electronics and cable

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1. (1) Msg, USCINCPAC/CS3 to COMUSKOREA/J6, 170137Z Nov 83, subj: Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK). (2) Msg, JCS/C3SC to COMUSKOREA/SJ-P, 291631Z Dec 83, subj: Telecommunications Plan for the Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK). (3) Sum Sheet, ACoS J6 to Cdr, USFK/EUSA, 30 Dec 83, subj: Future Status of the TPICK Document. All UNCLASSIFIED. Filed in C4S Rqmt Div. (4) Intvw, S. Gammons with Capt A. Friedrich, ACoS, C4S Res Mgt Br, 22 & 24 Oct 85. (5) Intvw, S. Gammons with 1LT G. Langston, 1st Sig Bde Proj Impl Br, 28 Oct 85.

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**ROK-U.S. FIBER OPTIC CABLE SYSTEM**




Figure 13

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## CHAPTER XI: WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS) IN KOREA (U)

(U) General. The WWMCCS provided the US National Command Authorities (NCA) and Joint Chiefs of Staff with the capability to exercise operational direction of US military forces in peacetime and through all levels of conflict.<sup>1</sup> The system's secondary mission was to support unified and specified commands, Service component commands, and DOD agencies. The WWMCCS performed those missions by providing data processing and information exchange systems by which the NCA and other appropriate commanders could accomplish the following: monitor the current situation, to include the operational status of both US and relevant foreign forces; respond to warnings and threat assessments; employ forces and execute operation plans; perform attack, strike, and damage assessments; reconstitute and redirect forces; and terminate hostilities and active operations.

(U) The WWMCCS provided USFK and its component commands with several vital automatic data processing capabilities: (1) direct interaction by users at remote locations with the WWMCCS H-6060 mainframe computer to provide automated data storage, update, and retrieval; (2) drafting, storage, and retrieval of selected command/control messages destined for transmission to in-country and external recipients via the automatic digital network (AUTODIN) operated by the 1st Signal Brigade, accomplished by an interface linking the WWMCCS main computer and the AUTODIN Switching Center (both located at Camp Walker, Taegu); and (3) access to the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) which provided services such as teleconferencing and files transfers among WWMCCS installations worldwide. The USFK WWMCCS main computer also accommodated one of COMUSJAPAN's primary interfaces with USCINCPAC.

(U) For USFK WWMCCS users, the primary means of communicating with the main computer was through remote visual information projector (VIP) terminals located in command/control centers and selected USFK staff activities throughout the ROK. The VIP terminals permitted processing, dispatch, and receipt of messages and data from the main computer and allowed the exchange of command/control information between geographically distant command centers. On-line, near-real-time processing capabilities permitted job initiation at all terminal sites with hard copy output produced by page printers. The WWMCCS mainframe computer had the unique communications capability of allowing system users to construct pre-formatted messages in advance for later release. The TANGO Command Post near Seoul was serviced by a remote network processor providing access to the WWMCCS mainframe computer. Additional in-country hardware assets included two van-mounted mobile VIP terminal systems to support USFK staffs at remote locations.

(U) Since the USFK WWMCCS operated in a TOP SECRET NOFORN mode, stringent security controls were established over the system's software programs. These included a security matrix which restricted the processing of designated classified data at terminal stations or remote line printers. In addition, a unique user identification code and password were assigned to each individual authorized access to the WWMCCS.

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1. (U) The NCA consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JCS Pub 1.)

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(U) Management and functional control over the USFK WWMCCS was exercised by the Director, Joint Command Information Systems (JCIS), under USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff supervision. The JCIS Director maintained liaison with WWMCCS staff elements at USPACOM, USN CNO, and JCS and served as Chairman of the USFK WWMCCS ADP (automatic data processing) User Group which met quarterly. The JCIS, a separate USFK staff directorate, was manned on an approximately equal basis by personnel from all three Services, but was totally funded by the US Navy. The FY 1984 budget, allocated from operation and maintenance, Navy funds, amounted to \$2.0 million. Computer and peripheral equipment valued at \$789,000 were installed during FY 1984, bringing the total value of installed equipment controlled by JCIS to \$5.5 million. Hawaii- and Japan-based elements of the US Naval Electronics Engineering Activity (NEEACT) provided technical support for the USFK WWMCCS, while the in-country 1st Signal Brigade (USA) and 2146th Information Systems Group (USAF) furnished communications assistance.

(U) 1984 Developments. In March a new WWMCCS remote terminal site was installed in the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) facility at Pusan, colocated with the Military Sealift Command Office. Consisting of two VIP terminals, a remote line printer, two each page (or screen) printers, and associated communications equipment, the remote terminals provided the MTMC with secure, direct access to USFK/EUSA command and control activities, as well as JCS, DA, and the Joint Deployment Agency. This allowed MTMC to fulfill its command and control deployment reporting/monitoring responsibilities to higher headquarters.

(U) Hardware improvements upgrade to the WWMCCS mainframe computer were accomplished in June. The upgrade consisted of an additional processor (giving the system a dual processor capability), three MSU0451 disk drives, and a memory increase of 512K, 32-bit words. The additional disk drives provided the necessary increase in the amount of permanent file storage space, preparatory to loading the Joint Deployment System and its integrated data base of contingency and exercise operations plans.

(U) The following major new software programs were installed into the USFK WWMCCS during the year:<sup>2</sup>

- Situation Report System (SITREP), allowed responsible staff agencies to enter their portion of SITREP information from any remote WWMCCS VIP terminal.

- Program Review System (PROGRESS), an internal management tool used by JCIS to monitor the status of various WWMCCS systems.

- Joint Deployment System (JDS), gave users the capability to send/receive deployment related transactions, and provided a deployment data base in a deliberate and time-sensitive planning, deployment, execution, and sustainment environment.

- Contingency Construction Report (CONREP), provided the USFK Engineer the ability to better control the physical development and funding status of current and proposed critical construction projects in support of contingency operations, and the ability to transmit that information to USPACOM, JCS, and the 416th Engineer Command (USAR).

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--Facility Control Office Report (FACON), provided users with an automated capability to input station, link, trunk, and circuit outages into an Index Sequential Processor data base to produce a daily report for transmission into the AUTODIN system.

(U) Planning begun by JCIS in 1983 continued throughout 1984 for the future implementation of the WWMCCS Information System (WIS); a modernization program to replace the ADP component of the WWMCCS system. This was an evolutionary program to upgrade ADP hardware, software, procedures, data formats, communications, and reporting systems required for effective command and control of USFK forces. The WWMCCS ADP was a consolidation of diverse organizational systems serving varied specific missions. When completed, WIS would provide improved processing support for such WWMCCS functional tasks as current situation monitoring, formulating responses to warnings, selecting options, employing forces, damage assessments, reconstituting forces, and terminating operations.

(U) In the early stages of the WIS modernization program, primary concentration would be on installation of local area networks, automated message handling processors, and Ada computer language software development. Automated message handling software was under development at year's end and hardware for the common users subsystem was also available for procurement. Later milestones included installation of processors dispersed to different USFK installations and use of the Defense Data Network to interconnect USFK command and control centers with the NCA, JCS, and other DOD activities.

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2. (1) JCIS Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Intvw, S. Gammons with MAJ I. Burnett, JCIS Resr Mgt Div, 21 & 23 Oct 85. (3) FONECON, S. Gammons with LCDR K. Whitten, JCIS Sys Dev Div, 21 Oct 85.

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## CHAPTER XII: COMPTROLLER (U)

### FY 1984 Command Operating Budget (COB) Performance (U)

(U) Eighth Army successfully executed its FY 1984 operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) budget through intensive financial management actions taken at all levels of command and systematic application of resources to priority requirements. Obligations totaled \$489.009 million, representing a 99.99 percent utilization of available funds. Factors contributing to the effective year-end close-out included: early identification, prioritization, and support of Facility Engineer Activity-Korea projects; development and command-wide coordination of a year-end closing management plan; and close cooperation throughout the year between major subordinate commanders, activity directors, and the EUSA Comptroller. Additionally, year-end spending was closely monitored to prevent excessive buys, avoiding wasteful spending by ensuring that funds were obligated only for valid requirements. Tables 18 and 19 show the year-end status of OMA obligations and the allocation of funds by type of expenditure.

(U) Congress failed to approve an appropriations bill for FY 1984 prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (1 October 1983). A continuing resolution authority (CRA) was passed, authorizing continuation of normal operations but precluding initiation or resumption of any project or activity for which funds were not available during FY 1983 (a repetition of the circumstances which prevailed during October-December 1982).

(U) On 8 December 1983, Congress enacted the DOD FY 1984 appropriations bill; soon thereafter, EUSA received its annual funding program (AFP), totaling \$463.8 million in direct OMA allocations. The authorized funding levels were \$33.2 million (6.7 percent) less than the \$497.0 million amount identified in the budget request to DA. This shortfall was caused primarily by a redirection of OMA appropriations to help finance other congressional actions including: Pay raises for military and civilian personnel, increased variable housing allowances, and civilian health benefit programs. However, DA provided EUSA an additional \$25.307 million in year-end funding, including \$7.6 million for Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) projects. This provided net FY 1984 funds totaling \$489.107 million. In addition, EUSA reprogrammed \$3.4 million from other accounts to achieve a \$33.731 million reduction in the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) and Command Priority List (CPL) projects.

### FY 1985 Command Operating Budget

(U) From March through June 1984, all elements of Eighth Army contributed inputs for the development of the FY 1985 COB, which identified funding requirements for the operation and maintenance, Army appropriation. On 1 July, based upon program and budgeting guidance issued by DA, EUSA submitted a FY 1985 OMA budget totaling \$553.620 million, as shown on Table 20. A comparison of projected funding levels with existing and planned program requirements revealed FY 1985 OMA unfinanced requirements amounting to \$17.814 million, listed on Table 21.

(U) As in previous years, Congress failed to approve an appropriations bill before the beginning of the fiscal year. Consequently, the Government began its FY 1985 fiscal operations under a continuing resolution authority,

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which was effective through 12 October 1984. On that date, Congress passed a final CRA effective through 30 September 1985. This document, however, was in fact the appropriations bill as it contained the DOD and military construction appropriations in their entirety. The CRA had the same impact as if the DOD and military construction appropriations had been enacted separately, marking the first time Congress had taken such an action. Subsequently, EUSA received

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Table 18--(U) Utilization of EUSA FY 1984 Direct OMA Funds  
(Dollars in Millions)

Program/Subprogram	Obligations
P2 - General Purpose Forces .....	\$462.971
Mission .....	\$157.077
Base Operations .....	137.810
Real Property Maintenance .....	168.084
P38 - Intelligence Activities .....	0.145
P72 - Central Supply Activities .....	2.997
P84 - Medical Activities .....	10.854
P87 - Other General Personnel Activities .....	5.641
P95 - Public Affairs/Community Relations .....	0.370
P10 - Support of Other Nations .....	6.031
Total .....	\$489.009

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Table 19--(U) Allocation of EUSA FY 1984 OMA Budget  
(Dollars in Millions)

Category	Expenditures
Civilian Employee Salaries, Wages, Allowances .....	\$149.324 (30%)
Korean National Employees .....	\$90.101 (18%)
Korean Service Corps .....	22.109 ( 5%)
DA Civilian [US] Employees .....	36.189 ( 7%)
Supplies .....	198.270 (41%)
Contractual Services .....	131.695 (27%)
Travel .....	9.720 ( 2%)

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Table 20--(U) EUSA FY 1985 OMA Budget  
(Dollars in Millions)

Program/Subprogram	Amount Requested	Amount Authorized
P2 - General Purpose Forces .....	\$518.627 .....	\$499.447
Mission .....	\$186.897 .....	\$170.236
Base Operations .....	147.881 .....	144.605
Real Property Maintenance ....	183.849 .....	184.606
P38 - Intelligence Activities .....	5.055 .....	0.124
P72 - Central Supply Activities .....	5.825 .....	5.825
P84 - Medical Activities .....	11.709 .....	11.716
P87 - Other General Personnel Activities .....	5.507 .....	6.960
P95 - Public Affairs/Community Relations .....	0.286 .....	0.386
P10 - Support of Other Nations .....	6.611 .....	6.729
Total .....	\$553.620 .....	\$531.187

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Table 21--(U) EUSA FY 1985 OMA Unfinanced Requirements  
(Dollars in Millions)

Priority	Requirement	Amount
1 .....	Flying Hour Program .....	\$ 1.445
2 .....	Ammunition Storage-SALS-K .....	4.750
3 .....	Security Guard Services .....	4.562
4 .....	Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) .....	7.057
Total .....		\$17.814

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a 1st Quarter, FY 1985 allocation of \$171.6 million and an annual funding program of \$531.187 million, shown in Table 20. This funding level depicted a \$52.1 million increase over FY 1984 allocations.<sup>1</sup>

1. (1) ACoFS, Compt Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, Compt Resr Con Dist Br, 4 Oct 84, subj: FY 1984 Year-End Closing. (3) Point Paper, ACoFS, Compt Resr Con Dist Br, 1 Dec 84, subj: FY 85 Command Operating Budget (COB). (4) Intvw, S. Gammons with Mr. B. Cartmell, C, Resr Con Dist Br, ACoFS, Compt, 7 Oct 85. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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## Combined Budget for HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command

(U) Background. When the ROK/US Combined Forces Command was established in November 1978, a principal issue was division of responsibility for funding the new binational headquarters operation. Prior agreements between ROK and USFK planners specified that proportional budgeting and cost-sharing for administrative support be determined through mutual consent. What concerned USFK was that US financial support of CFC should be commensurate with the defense benefits derived, that funding actions should be accurately recorded and accountability strictly maintained, and that all US resources should be provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) The ROK-US Military Committee<sup>2</sup> approved a combined budget model in December 1980. Later, a Combined Budget Activation Committee (CBAC) was formed, cochaired by USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff and ROK Asst MND (Compt). CBAC meetings and cost data refinements by the USFK Comptroller led to a 1981 accord between COMUSKOREA and ROK MND on a 62 US:38 ROK cost-sharing ratio. On that basis, the HQ ROK/US CFC's combined budget was approved each year. This provided for equitable overall cost sharing rather than cumbersome item-by-item divisions, allowing for increased budgetary flexibility as well as savings in some areas.

(U) 1984 Developments. The CY 1984 combined budget for HQ ROK/US CFC was successfully executed with US contributions recorded as 62.1 percent of the total and ROK funding as 37.9 percent. The US expended 99.9 percent of its budget allocation, while ROK expenditures came to 99.6 percent of the amount planned. The US share was funded under OMA Program 10 (Support of Other Nations) resources, shown on Table 18. The utilization of funds for the combined budget is summarized on Table 22.<sup>3</sup>

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Table 22--(U) HQ ROK/US Combined Forces Command Budget Execution  
Actual Expenditures-CY 1984

Funding Category	ROK Contribution	US Contribution
Building Utilities & Maintenance		
HQ ROK/US CFC .....	\$191,131 .....	---
CP TANGO .....	---	\$206,048
Other Facilities .....	---	78,828
Office Supplies .....	56,321 .....	63,014
Office Machines .....	---	9,142
Automatic Data Processing .....	75,227 .....	171,790
Total .....	\$322,679 .....	\$528,822

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2. (U) For a brief description of the ROK-US Military Committee, see note 2, page 1.

3. ACoFS, Compt Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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## Tactical/Nontactical Installation Service Support (ISS) Operations Study (U)

(U) Unlike other area commands, the 2d Infantry Division had no garrison type organization established to provide ISS to units in the division's area of responsibility. ISS in the division was self-contained and furnished partly by MTOE resources, with TDA augmentation provided in cases where MTOE assets could not support the requirements. ISS functions were distributed amongst division staffs, Deputy Commander for Installations (DCI), Division Support Command (DISCOM), and the division's major subordinate commands (MSC).

(U) In January 1984, the 2d Infantry Division requested USFK/EUSA ACofS, Comptroller to conduct a feasibility study on separating nontactical ISS functions from division tactical ISS functions and placing them under the control of either the DCI or other appropriate organization. Examples of tactical support functions (inherent to tactical missions) included such activities as chaplain, inspector general, public affairs, comptroller/finance, safety, and education. Nontactical support activities included Army Community Service, Army Emergency Relief, energy conservation, ration control, facilities management, civil affairs, and minor facility repair.

(U) For purposes of the study, conducted during July and August, four alternatives were developed for evaluation: Alternative I addressed existing procedures; Alternative II suggested all tactical and nontactical support functions be realigned under DCI; Alternative III proposed realignment of all nontactical support functions under DCI; and Alternative IV recommended realigning all nontactical support functions under DISCOM.

(U) Upon analysis of those options, Alternative I was found unacceptable because nontactical support functions were split between some division staffs (ACofS, G1, G3, G4), DCI, and MSCs, resulting in a mixture of nontactical and tactical missions. Acceptance of Alternative II would have resulted in higher operating costs and increased manpower requirements (860 additional personnel). The division's wartime requirements also made it impractical to adopt this alternative. Alternative IV was inadvisable because it would not have realigned installation functions as required, but would have combined tactical missions with nontactical missions.

(U) The study concluded that Alternative III be adopted as it best satisfied the study's purpose with the least amount of additional resources. With an increase of five personnel, all nontactical support functions could be realigned under DCI. Under the proposal, functions relating to Army Community Service, Army Emergency Relief, civilian personnel, noncombatant evacuation, and ration control performed by ACofS, G1, as well as G3's range control function, could be transferred to DCI, along with existing manpower resources. Personnel spaces within DCI would be increased by one officer and two enlisted personnel, plus personnel transferred from ACofS, G1 and G3. With that manpower, it was envisioned DCI would be able to perform the personnel, community services, and range control functions. The study also recommended transferring the bachelor quarters furnishings management function, plus the facilities management and energy conservation functions from ACofS, G4 to the Division Materiel Management Center (DMMC) and Area Facilities Engineer, respectively. These functional transfers, in concert with other suggestions, would relieve the Commander, 2d Infantry Division, and MTOE units from concern

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over nontactical ISS functions. The study results were under review by division staffs at year's end.<sup>4</sup>

## Study of Establishing a Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC) (U)

(U) On 1 February 1984, EUSA ACoFS, J4, requested ACoFS, Comptroller to perform a study to identify TAMMC missions and functions and to determine which EUSA organizational elements were presently performing those activities. The study's objectives were to formulate recommendations to improve operations management and to increase combat service support mission effectiveness; and to determine optimum organizational structure and alignment for peacetime TAMMC organizations to effectively convert to wartime missions.

(U) Above corps level under the existing system, EUSA materiel management functional responsibilities were haphazardly aligned and not clearly defined. Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), and TAMMC functions identified by the study were each performed, to some extent, by HQ EUSA, HQ 19th Support Command, and 6th Support Center (Materiel Management) (the latter two organizations located at Camp Henry, Taegu). However, EUSA ACoFS, J4 was not performing all theater Army level functions and ACoFS, Materiel, 19th SUPCOM, and 6th Spt Cen were not fully responsible for COSCOM or TAACOM level activities. While the 6th Spt Cen accomplished mostly COSCOM/TAACOM/TAMMC inventory management functions, its organizational structure and functional responsibilities were not aligned to allow functioning as a complete materiel management center at any level, in peace or war. Besides functional alignment problems, several other shortfalls contributed to the system's ineffectiveness: Duplication of effort; unnecessary coordination and delay in communication; unclear lines of responsibilities; and fragmented MMC functions.

(U) In devising workable alternatives, several assumptions were made: (1) A complete COSCOM MMC would be available via deploying CONUS reinforcements during wartime augmentation. It was envisioned the 6th Spt Cen could still be required to perform some COSCOM MMC functions after the arrival/activation of the incoming COSCOM MMC. (2) In-country units would be brought to wartime strength by incoming individual fillers; therefore, in-country personnel and equipment assets would have to be available to accomplish TAMMC missions during both peacetime and wartime periods. (3) Functional responsibilities relating to the MMC could be realigned, providing a basis for improving operations management, thereby increasing mission effectiveness.

(U) Based on the above, three alternatives were formulated. Alternative C, relating to the system then in operation, was rejected in that it worked only under a peacetime scenario where supporting forces and workloads were relatively stable factors. Alternative N suggested assigning all routine operating MMC functional responsibilities (except those which were a theater Army's responsibility) to a TAACOM. Accordingly, EUSA ACoFS, J4 would act as the TAMMC principal staff materiel manager with the 19th SUPCOM designated as the TAACOM, and 6th Spt Cen would act as the operating COSCOM/TAACOM/theater Army materiel manager. This proposal was also rejected. While combining MMC

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4. 2ID Tactical/Nontactical Installation Service Support Operations Study, 9 Oct 84, prep by ACoFS, Compt Mgt Div. UNCLASSIFIED.

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functions would improve mission effectiveness in peacetime, those actions alone would not satisfy wartime requirements.

(U) To achieve the study's objective, the best prospect was Alternative E. In recommending this alternative, the study noted that, to be effective and efficient, Korean theater MMC missions could best be accomplished by: Removing MMC functions from EUSA ACoFS, J4 and 19th SUPCOM ACoFS, Materiel to 6th Spt Cen; transforming 6th Spt Cen into a TAMMC, configured with some modification to current doctrine; and resultant consolidation of MMC functions be regrouped to achieve greater efficiency. Under that model, the command TAMMC (6th Spt Cen) would perform all levels of MMC functions--less divisional--based on the centralized, integrated theater-wide COSCOM/TAACOM/theater Army materiel management concept. The combined TAMMC would provide the supply and maintenance portion of combat service support to all nondivisional units. The study recommendations were under EUSA ACoFS, J4 review at year's end.<sup>5</sup>

## USFK Storage Capabilities and Requirements Study (U)

(U) Past reviews of USFK's storage facilities, consisting mostly of Korean War vintage structures, had been conducted primarily by individual organizational elements. A joint, coordinated USFK-wide, review of storage facilities and current and long-term storage requirements had never been accomplished. In early FY 1984, ACoFS, J4 requested ACoFS, Comptroller to prepare a study from this aspect of the overall logistics program, specifying all US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine organizations in the ROK be covered.

(U) Conducted during March-October 1984, the study covered all USFK elements plus the DOD Military Traffic Management Center (MIMC) at Pusan Port and US Army Japan's remote storage site at Sagami, Japan. The study's broad objectives were to ascertain capability shortfalls and under-utilization, interservice economies, procedural and operational improvements and potential savings, and status with respect to current and long-range storage requirements.

(U) The study revealed no one individual or entity was responsible for USFK-wide management and coordination of storage requirements; facilities utilization, or adherence to efficient and effective storage practices and procedures. Nor was there an overall system to estimate current or projected storage requirements. Storage capabilities were not well known even at the installation level throughout USFK because facility documentation was either noncurrent or inaccurate, nor were any regular utilization analyses conducted. The study concluded that current and long-term storage and warehousing capacities were less than satisfactory, as evidenced by stockage objectives and stock on-hand. Requirements and large war reserve procurements were found to exceed storage/warehousing capabilities; however, that problem was in the process of being corrected through military construction projects.

(U) The study recommended that appointment of an overall USFK storage management officer would facilitate USFK's storage processes, ensuring effective and efficient facilities usage. Opportunities were noted for

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5. Study of Establishing a Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC), 30 Nov 84, prep by ACoFS, Compt Mgt Div. UNCLASSIFIED.

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interagency cross-servicing that would result in better facilities utilization and enhancement of USFK's readiness posture. The study also suggested that a more integrated approach to utilization of the Sagami storage site could be of value to USFK. To achieve the study's objectives, 10 principal recommendations were offered:<sup>6</sup>

--Appoint storage management officers at USFK and major subordinate command levels.

--Require all USFK elements to develop annual storage requirements and capabilities estimates.

--Develop an automated command storage management system.

--Require updated documentation throughout the command on facilities actually being used for storage.

--Consider relocating barrier materials stored at the US Army Materiel Support Center-Korea facility to ROK control, thus freeing 100,000 square feet of storage space.

--Request Operations Analysis Group, ROK/US CFC simulate the AirLand Battle logistics operations to determine impacts of: Current storage and supply status; projected storage and supply status; major supply item positioning; and current storage facilities by types, locations, and contents.

--Initiate a command-wide cost and feasibility study on the use of mezzanine space, nesting equipment, or other types of storage racks to better utilize current warehouse space.

--Institute a system to monitor high-value item shipments to ensure delivery dates do not significantly precede installment or usage dates.

--Expedite construction and use of K-span buildings initially offered by US Army Materiel Command in 1982.

--Review previous EUSA decision against using portable/modular structures to meet Army storage requirements in Korea. In-country US Air Force elements used these structures extensively with success.

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6. USFK Storage Requirements and Capabilities Study, prep by ACofS, Compt Mgt Div. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 23--(U) Eighth Army FY 1984 Construction Program  
(Dollars in Millions)

Installation	Project	Contract Costs
<u>Military Construction, Army (MCA) Funding</u>		
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Bachelor Housing	19.500
Various Locations, 2d Inf Div	Tactical Maintenance Facilities	4.750
Camps Ames/Carroll	Communications Site Revetments	1.266
Camp Carroll	COSIS Maintenance Facility	1.300
Camps Colbern/Red Cloud	Bachelor Housing	3.700
Camp Colbern	Communications-Electronics Facility	0.200
Camp Colbern	Company Administration Facility	0.470
Camp Edwards	General Purpose Auditorium	0.500
Camp Essayons	Tactical Maint Facility (MLRS)	1.000
Camp Essayons	Battery HQ Admin Facility (MLRS)	0.450
Camp Henry	Materiel Management Center	3.600
Camp Howze	Gymnasium	1.950
Camp Humphreys	Aircraft Shelter and Revetment	5.000
Camp Humphreys	Technical Supply Facility	1.650
Camp Humphreys	Chapel/Community Center	1.200
K-16 Airfield	Bachelor Housing	3.650
K-16 Airfield	Covered Storage Facility	0.630
K-16 Airfield	Gymnasium with Swimming Pool	1.550
Camp Kittyhawk	Tactical Maintenance Facility	0.610
Camp Red Cloud	Warehouse	0.750
Camp Red Cloud	Enlarge Gymnasium	0.360
Camp Red Cloud	Post Security Lighting	0.400
Camp Red Cloud	Theater with Stage	0.690
Supply Point 51	Tactical Maintenance Facility	0.890
USA Garrison, Yongsan	Coml Vehicle Parts Supply Point	1.100
USA Garrison, Yongsan	Air-Condition Library	0.620
Subtotal		\$57.786
<u>Unspecified Minor Military Construction Army (UMMCA) Funding</u>		
Camp Carroll	Preinsp Fac & Power Train Annex	\$ 0.523
Camp Casey	AFKN Transmission Tower	0.452
Camps Casey/Coiner/Sears	TMDE Facility	1.202
Camp Garry Owen	Warehouse	0.564
Camps Greaves/Hovey	Troop Aid Station	1.768
Command Post TANGO	Intelligence Facility	
	Environmental Controls	0.930
USA Community Hosp-Seoul	Alternate Power System Upgrade	0.846
Subtotal		\$ 6.285

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Table 23--Continued

Installation	Project	Contract Costs
<u>Tenant MACOM (USA Intelligence &amp; Security Command) MCA Funding</u>		
Location 177	Perimeter Fence & Security Lights	\$ 0.260
<u>Major Nonappropriated Fund Resources</u>		
Camps Carroll/Humphreys	Consolidated Club	\$ 5.450
Camps Casey/Edwards	Multipurpose Field	1.200
Camp Casey	NCO/Enlisted Member Club	1.132
Camp Henry	Expand NCO Club	0.659
USA Garrison, Yongsan	Bowling Center	<u>4.400</u>
Total Construction Program Costs		\$78.772
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Table 24--(U) Allocations of EUSA FY 1984 MCA Funds  
(Dollars in Millions)

Category/Command	Amount	Percent
<u>Functional Categories</u>		
Life Support	\$26.850	46.5
Operations & Training	10.786	18.7
Maintenance	\$ 8.750	15.1
Morale, Welfare & Recreation	6.870	11.9
Supply & Storage	4.130	7.1
Engineering Support	0.400	0.7
<u>Distribution to Subordinate Commands</u>		
2d Infantry Division	\$28.150	48.7
19th Support Command	14.016	24.2
USA Garrison, Yongsan	11.610	20.1
USA Element, CFA (ROK/US)	3.400	5.9
UNC Support Group-JSA	0.610	1.1
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Table 25--(U) Funding Sources for EUSA FY 1985-86 Construction Programs  
(Dollars in Millions).

Source	FY 1984	FY 1985
EUSA MCA	\$107.690	\$148.150
Korea Area Exchange	14.350	--
Tenant MACOM MCA	10.550	7.196
Nonappropriated Funds	7.235	11.115
DOD Dependent Schools	2.140	2.200
Total	\$141.965	\$168.661

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(U) EUSA MCA programs for FY 1987-90 outyears were supported by DA at the funding levels shown below:

1987 - \$170 million	1988 - \$182 million
1989 - \$195 million	1990 - \$255 million

(Amounts above do not include nonappropriated fund, tenant MACOM MCA, Korea Area Exchange, or DOD Schools construction projects.)

(U) Analysis of EUSA's construction program for FY 1984 and beyond provided the greatest insight thus far into master planning conflicts, constructional issues, and problems in efficient coordination between major and minor construction programs. Although continuing problems with munitions storage area locations, real estate acquisitions, and aviation relocation decisions made MCA programming a challenge, EUSA's funding program for FY 1986-87, if approved, would be double the allocations provided in FY 1981-84. Full coordination of the command's MCA program with USA Intelligence and Security Command, Office of the Surgeon General, and major NAF programs remained to be realized. Although the USA Information Systems Command (USAISC) did not have an MCA program in Korea, coordination of EUSA MCA projects continued in support of USAISC's 1st Signal Brigade activities. (Also see CG EUSA's comments on providing facilities, page 204.)<sup>2</sup>

## Maintenance and Repair of EUSA Real Property Facilities (U)

(U) Background. A comprehensive EUSA Facilities Upgrade Program was developed in late 1976, using operation and maintenance, Army (OMA) funds, to complement ongoing, long-range MCA projects for modernized troop billets, dining halls, and other essential structures. The OMA-funded program

2. (1) FEA-K Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, FEA-K, 26 Jun 84, subj: EUSA MCA Program. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Intvw, S. Gammons with Mr. S. Fujitani, P3M Directorate, FEA-K, 23 Sep 85.

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encompassed essential emergency repairs and improvements required to establish a safe and healthful living environment for troops. Specific upgrading projects were designed to correct many years of neglect caused by inadequate manning and funding levels of EUSA facilities engineering activities. Following the mid-1979 suspension of President Carter's force reduction program, OMA funding increased sharply, to a record \$76.7 million in FY 1982.

(U) In March 1980, the Command Work Review Board (CWRB), chaired by the USFK/EUSA Chief of Staff, was established to review, evaluate, and approve priorities for the design and accomplishment of EUSA's real property maintenance activities (RPMA) program. The Facility Engineer Activity-Korea (FEA-K) thereafter prioritized unfinanced projects, and those approved by the CWRB were integrated into the EUSA Command Priority List (CPL), forming the basis for obligating RPMA funds.

(U) 1984 Developments. In FY 1984, EUSA expended \$52 million in OMA monies to fund priority minor construction projects under the RPMA program. These projects included upgrading and repairing temporary facilities to extend their life until replaced by MCA construction. EUSA was therefore able to continue supporting force increases and modernization programs designed to improve combat readiness and soldier quality of life.

(U) In mid-October, the EUSA CWRB approved a command-wide CPL for FY 1985 totaling \$125 million. Of that amount, EUSA received \$62 million for FY 1985 RPMA projects, leaving \$63 million in unfunded requirements. Included in the FY 1985 RPMA plan was a comprehensive troop construction program jointly developed by EUSA's 2d Engineer Group, FEA-K, and ACofS, Engineer, specifically designed to meet the group's training requirements.<sup>3</sup>

## Troop Construction Projects (U)

(U) During 1984, EUSA's 2d Engineer Group undertook a wide variety of construction and maintenance projects. The group's two combat (heavy) battalions, the 44th and 802d, were engaged in projects estimated at \$3.6 million in funded costs. Among the more significant tasks completed during the year were:<sup>4</sup>

--Fabrication of temporary facilities and firing points at the 2d Infantry Division's Fire Base 4P3.

--Construction of an ammunition holding area for the 2d Infantry Division's MLRS battery at Camp Essayons.

--Paving the CPX access road and upgrading the Army airfield at Camp Humphreys.

--Construction of a battalion headquarters building at Camp Mercer.

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3. FEA-K Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

4. ACofS, Engr, Plans & Ops Div Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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## Facilities Master Planning (U)

(U) Background. Master planning in EUSA prior to 1980 was fragmented and inadequate because of uncertain US national policies regarding the extent of US presence in Korea (primarily President Carter's troop withdrawal plan, noted earlier). In 1982, the Facilities Engineer Activity-Korea developed a comprehensive master planning concept. The concept's central feature was a system of overlays for each major Army installation which integrated existing site maps with land use zoning, major construction sitings, safe distance requirements, and proposed and completed OMA projects. The graphic display system proved an essential aid to FEA-K planners in identifying real estate requirements, siting discrepancies, and OMA/MCA funding overlaps.

(U) 1984 Developments. During the year, the Seoul-based Far East District, US Army Corps of Engineers, prepared site maps and proposed facility sites for 25 major camps in the 2d Infantry Division area. Site planning products for 13 Army installations in the Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan areas were projected for completion by spring 1985. With the establishment of a master planning division in January 1984, FEA-K became more actively involved in force development and equipment modernization actions, providing EUSA staffs with the ability to identify and resolve potential conflicts early in the planning process.<sup>5</sup>

## Real Estate Actions (U)

(U) Real Estate Holdings. At the end of 1984, USFK components occupied 128 installations in the ROK with a total land area of 73,657 acres. Eighth Army controlled 104 installations (66,777 acres), 21 were US Air Forces Korea facilities (6,788 acres), and US Naval Forces Korea controlled two installations (92 acres).

(U) Acquisitions and Releases. During the year, the USFK/EUSA ACoFS, Engineer processed 35 actions through US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) channels (discussed on pages 181-82) to acquire real estate in support of USFK's mission-essential requirements. There were no significant land releases during 1984. The scope and types of acquisitions are shown below.

USFK exclusive use .....	9.4 acres
Easement use .....	38.9 acres
Temporary use .....	6.8 acres
Extension of temporary use (primarily for 2d Inf Div training areas) ...	26,188.8 acres

(U) Nonavailability of Real Estate. Land in Korea was made available for USFK use by the ROK Ministry of National Defense pursuant to SOFA provisions. Over the past several years, USFK had requested use of land interests valued at over \$200 million. With a budget of only \$1 million annually for USFK real estate needs, however, the ROK MND was unable to acquire land urgently needed to support US military construction and training activities. Construction projects for which land could not be provided were

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5. (1) FEA-K Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) FONECON, S. Gammons with CPT T. Mitchell, P3M Directorate, FEA-K, 1 Oct 85.

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resited to existing USFK-controlled real estate or reprogrammed for future years. Adverse impacts on training and construction were expected to become more severe as the cost of land continued to escalate. USFK planners presented the issue to their ROK counterparts for consideration during the annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in May (see page 55). At year's end, USFK master planners were intensifying the use of existing real estate assets, with primary emphasis on vertical construction to conserve space.<sup>6</sup>

## EUSA Family Housing Administration (U)

(U) The ACoFS, Engineer successfully executed the FY 1984 Army Family Housing (AFH) plan through intensive financial management actions taken by HQ EUSA and major subordinate commands. Actual obligations totaling \$20.517 million were recorded against the \$20.532 million AFH plan, resulting in a 99.9 percent utilization rate. The FY 1984 budget for Unaccompanied Personnel Furnishings (BOQ/BEQ) amounted to \$4.933 million. That entire amount was successfully utilized by the close of the fiscal year.

(U) EUSA's family housing occupancy rate for its 487 US Government-owned family quarters averaged 97.4 percent during CY 1984, slightly below the DA minimum objective of 99 percent. A total of 267 dwelling unit turnovers occurred during the year, resulting in 4,642 days of lost occupancy. Necessary maintenance and repair work accounted for 2,677 of the lost days, and quarters assignment administration for 1,965 days. Emphasis on refining maintenance and repair scheduling and housing assignment practices to improve the occupancy rate continued throughout the year.<sup>7</sup>

## USFK Family Housing Initiatives (U)

(U) Replacement Family Housing. By year's end, planning and final design work was completed on 372 sets of family quarters destined to replace 300 USG-leased housing units at Friendship Village in Seoul and 72 units in Taegu. Both complexes had been occupied by USFK personnel since late 1973. The new Seoul housing was to be constructed by the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) for lease to USFK at three sites on Yongsan Garrison South Post: the H-201 heliport, golf driving range, and skeet range. The project included a kindergarten, child care center, administration building, and central utilities building. The ROKG funded the construction, estimated at \$28 million, under the ROK-US Combined Defense Improvement Projects program. Agreements signed with the ROKG in May specified that USFK would maintain fire and police protection for the new housing areas in both Seoul and Taegu. Because of design changes, unforeseen site preparation problems, and time required to finalize the foregoing agreements, groundbreaking at Yongsan Garrison was postponed from 1 June to 9 August. Occupancy of the new housing units was forecasted for September 1985.

6. (1) ACoFS, Engr Real Estate/SOFA Div Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.  
(2) Msg, COMUSKOREA to USCINCPAC, 102305Z Dec 84, subj: Quarterly Report to SECDEF (U). CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLAS). Declass on OADR. Filed ACoFS, J5 Strat & Plcy Div.

7. EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d, & 4th Qtrs, FY 84 and 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) Construction of the 72 housing units at Camp Carroll, near Taegu, was delayed due to land acquisition problems, which were resolved in December 1984. The project's final design was also completed that month and was under review. Construction was to commence in late spring 1985, with occupancy programmed for early 1986.

(U) New USAF Family Housing. HQ USAF approved the construction of 200 additional apartment units near Osan AB, adjacent to the existing Mustang Valley leased housing area. Support facilities provided by the USAF were programmed as an FY 1985 military construction project. The KNHC would construct the housing on a build-to-lease basis under an agreement similar to that used for the Mustang Valley complex. Occupancy was planned for 1987, although land acquisition for the project remained an unresolved issue at the close of 1984.

(U) Civilian Employee Family Housing. For many years USFK had encountered serious difficulties in recruiting and retaining US civilian employees, caused in part by severe shortages of adequate and affordable western style housing near major USFK bases. USFK planned to acquire 675 family housing units primarily for civilian employees, through a build-to-lease arrangement with KNHC, to alleviate this long-standing problem. The units would be constructed in Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan, with occupancy projected in 1985. USFK forwarded the necessary statutory documentation for submission to Congress on 25 May 1984, and leasing funds were subsequently programmed by DA. A congressional hearing was expected in February 1985.

(U) New Joint Military Installation Developments. In February 1983, USFK staffs, under the aegis of ACoS, J1, commenced planning for development of a new joint Army/Air Force installation, to include 3,400 family housing units. One of the primary purposes of the plan was to allow a significant increase in accompanied tours for personnel assigned to Osan and Suwon Air Bases and Camp Humphreys. The plan also envisioned relocating 1,600 personnel from the 501st Military Intelligence Group, 2d Engineer Group, and 1st Signal Brigade, plus support personnel, to the new installation during the 1986-90 time frame.

(U) The new complex, if approved, would occupy approximately 1,000 acres of land near Osan AB. Cost to the ROK Government was estimated at \$580 million (\$150 million for land acquisition and \$430 million for KNHC build-to-lease family housing). Initial construction cost to the US for mission and support facilities was estimated at \$220 million. Facility requirements included a hardened facility for the 501st MI Group, other related mission support facilities, family housing, unaccompanied personnel housing, and community support facilities. M&A and related programming and concept design work for operation and support facilities were initiated during the year. This project would significantly reduce personnel turbulence, improve operational efficiency and continuity, and enhance the quality of life for USFK personnel. This would be achieved, in part, through:

--Consolidation of dispersed 501st MI Group assets at its approved wartime contingency location to improve tasking, collection, and reporting efficiency and minimize dependency on electrical communications.

--Hardening of command, control, and communications intelligence elements to allow continuous support to the (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command.

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(U) In late 1982, USFK substantially reduced the number of authorized command sponsored positions, from 3,948 to 2,951, primarily because of an acute shortage of suitable housing. By the close of 1984, the number of sponsored assignments had been increased to 3,079, allocated as follows: Army--2,091; Air Force--682; Navy--201; Marine Corps--30; and key/essential US civilian employees--75.<sup>3</sup> As of 31 December 1984, a total of 6,208 command sponsored dependents of military personnel and 3,163 sponsored dependents of civilian employees resided in the ROK.<sup>4</sup>

(U) Non-Command Sponsored Dependents. After several years of unexpected continued growth, the non-command sponsored dependent population in Korea reached a total of over 9,000 in 1975, generating congressional concern. A November 1975 EUSA study submitted to DA pointed out that the arrival of individually sponsored family members was beyond EUSA's control, unlike the command sponsored dependent level which could be effectively constrained. Major considerations centered on the impact nonsponsored dependents had on the support capabilities of medical, commissary, exchange, and DOD school facilities, as well as the difficulties involved in evacuating large numbers of dependents in the event of hostilities in the ROK. The study concluded that individually sponsored family members should be reduced to the lowest possible level by providing EUSA with DA authority to prohibit them from using commissaries, exchanges, and DOD schools. Military medical services would continue to be provided as specified by law.

(U) Meanwhile, under a May 1975 revision in the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement, dependents acquired in the ROK, with some exceptions, had been denied access to commissaries, exchanges and class VI (alcoholic beverage) outlets, as a measure to curb blackmarketing. Approximately 4,200 nonsponsored dependents were affected by that policy change.

(U) In late 1975, congressional conferees agreed that "... in no case should non-command sponsored dependents be authorized support services in the ROK when the sponsor's tour remains the short 'all others' tour." In February 1976, DOD issued a memorandum to the Service components directing implementation of the congressional policy, which subsequently went into effect on 1 July 1976 through a change in the USFK ration control regulation. By the end of that year, the number of individually sponsored family members in Korea had declined to 6,663, from a high of 10,342 recorded in January 1976.

(U) From 1977 through year-end 1984, the nonsponsored dependent population level fluctuated considerably. At the end of 1978, 9,197 resided in the ROK, a 72 percent increase from July 1977. (The number of command sponsored family members rose only 28 percent during the same period.) A downward trend in the individually sponsored dependent level began in 1979 and continued through the

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3. (U) Key/essential employees were those authorized USG-furnished family housing. Other civilian employees, although command sponsored, were not included in the above allocations.

4. (1) USFK/EUSA AHR 1982 (U), pp. 286-87. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr FY 85. (3) Point Paper, ACoS, J1, Pers Svc, 10 Sep 84, subj: Command Sponsored Position List. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (4) FONECON, S. Gammons with SGM E. Bass, ACoS, J1, Pers Svc, 1 Jul 85.

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end of 1981, when the population fell to 6,709. The following year saw a reverse trend and the number climbed to 8,938. The upward trend continued through the end of 1984, when the number of non-command sponsored dependents totaled 10,694, the highest level ever recorded. Of that total, 9,574 were military family members, and 1,120 were civilian employees' dependents.

(U) ACoS, J1 attributed the increase primarily to the continuing effect of the 1982 reduction in command sponsored positions (noted earlier), granting of commissary/exchange privileges to nonsponsored spouses whose sponsors extended their one-year tour of duty in the ROK to two years (authorized in May 1982), and generally improved living conditions for nonsponsored dependents. Other contributing factors, revealed in surveys, included the desire to maintain family integrity, spouse having relatives in the ROK, and in-country marriages between USFK personnel and Korean nationals.<sup>5</sup>

(U) As discussed previously, non-command sponsored dependents were not allowed access to commissary, exchange, or Class VI outlets. However, as an exception to policy, USFK received congressional approval to conduct a one-year test program that would lift that restriction. Beginning 1 December 1984, nonsponsored spouses were allowed to shop alone in those facilities providing they had the following documents: Sponsor's ration control plate, a DOD dependent identification card, and a medical service authorization plate issued to all nonsponsored dependents. The primary intent of the policy change was to reduce the amount of lost duty time by the military sponsor, as well as to improve the quality of life for the non-command sponsored family. Allowing spouses shopping privileges eased sponsors' concerns for their family's welfare, particularly when the soldier was deployed in the field. Approximately 1,500 nonsponsored families were affected by the new policy; more than half were spouses of 2d Infantry Division personnel.

(U) The change in policy was initially proposed by USFK on 9 October 1982; however, prior to gaining approval to conduct the test program, the proposal had to clear both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Congressional approval was received on 26 September 1984 with the following stipulations: No change in the monthly dollar limits;<sup>6</sup> would not cause congestion in the facilities; nor would the stocking of goods be affected in any way. Because of the added congestion that would occur, dependent spouses were not allowed to accompany their sponsors into commissary, exchange, or Class VI facilities at Kunsan Air Base, or at three 2d Infantry Division locations: Camps Casey, Edwards, and Stanley. Concurrent shopping

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5. (1) UNC/USFK/EUSA AHR 1975 (U), pp. 194-95, 210. (2) UNC/USFK/EUSA AHR 1976 (U), pp. 243-44. (3) UNC/USFK/EUSA AHR 1978 (U), pp. 292-93. (4) USFK/EUSA AHR 1980 (U), pp. 326-27. (5) USFK/EUSA AHR 1981 (U), pp. 334-35. (6) USFK/EUSA AHR 1982 (U), p. 286. All SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (7) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED.

6. (U) Under ration control procedures, unaccompanied soldiers and those with nonsponsored families were placed in the Family Size 1 category. Soldiers who were not authorized separate rations had a monthly dollar limit of \$275; those authorized separate rations were limited to \$375.

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was allowed at all other USFK installations. A final report on this test program was due to USCINCPAC in March 1986.<sup>7</sup>

## EUSA Family Action Plan Initiatives (U)

(U) In January 1984, DA distributed the Army Family Action Plan (FAP) containing 65 issues developed from recommendations made at family symposiums and surveys and reports. Following the issuance of the FAP, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army jointly decreed 1984 as the Year of the Army Family.

(U) The EUSA FAP, which was in draft form at year's end, developed the philosophy contained in an Army Family White Paper issued by the Chief of Staff of the Army in August 1983. The critical components of that philosophy were: Building a strong partnership between the Army and its families; promotion of wellness through adequate support to families; development of a sense of community; and strengthening mutually reinforcing bonds between the Army and its families.

(U) To manage the FAP within EUSA, the position of Community and Family Services Officer was established under ACoFS, JI Plans, Policy and Services Division in March 1984. Responsibilities of this new position included:

- Development of EUSA's FAP; coordination of FAP initiatives with other EUSA activities and subordinate commands; and point of contact for EUSA FAP.

- Oversight and policy guidance for Army Community Service and Child Development Services.

- Focal point for Quality of Life initiatives.

- Liaison to United Services Organization and American Red Cross.

(U) The following are some of the initiatives that had been undertaken by EUSA by the end of the year:

- Construction of a new 300-unit post family housing area on Yongsan South Post (Seoul) to replace a 300-unit government leased facility located four miles distant (see page 161).

- Involvement of family members in designing and selecting materials for new family housing.

- Construction and upgrading of Child Development Centers and DOD Dependent Schools throughout Korea; completion of two new Child Development Centers in Hannam Village, near Yongsan.

- Upgrading or replacement of EUSA medical/dental facilities.

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7. (1) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI Data Mgt Div, 10 Jul 84, subj: Ration Control. (2) ACoFS, JI Data Mgt Div Hist Sum 1984. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (3) FONECON, J. C. Barnhart with MSG R. Garcia, ACoFS, JI Data Mgt Div, 7 Aug 85.

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The Yongsan Data Processing Center developed the sales update system and ACofS, JI developed the remaining three programs.

(U) Optical Character Reader (OCR). A microcomputer-based OCR, acquired to support the ration control system, became operational in October 1984. This new system was designed to improve accuracy and efficiency in the processing of approximately 550,000 ration control sales cards produced monthly. The sales cards were redesigned to allow quantities of purchases to be annotated in a "mark sense" (OCR readable) format. This allowed data to be entered into the computer directly from the sales cards, eliminating the need for keypunching. The introduction of OCR was also designed to: Improve and simplify controls over purchases of duty-free goods in exchanges and commissaries; improve violation reporting procedures while providing patrons protection against system-generated errors; implement a system for checking inventory management; and counter the perception that ration control was ineffective. Cost of the new equipment was placed at \$318,311 and installation cost was estimated at \$132,000.

(U) TEAM SPIRIT 84 (TS 84) Ration Control Cards. ACofS, JI designed and printed special temporary ration control cards for out-of-country TS 84 participants. Accountable offices throughout the command issued a total of 35,620 cards during the course of the exercise.<sup>12</sup>

## Eighth Army Safety Program (U)

(U) During 1984 EUSA achieved significant reductions in the number of Army motor vehicle accidents (AMVA) and the number of AMVAs per million miles driven. There were 113 AMVAs reported in 1984, compared to 145 in 1983, representing a reduction of 22 percent. The 1984 AMVA rate of 2.71 accidents per million miles driven bettered the DA objective of 3.54 per million miles by 23 percent. The reductions were attributed to increased command emphasis on accident prevention and safety awareness generated by the Motor Vehicle Emphasis (MOVE) Program initiated in January 1983. Under this program, training materials for drivers and supervisors and safety publications (posters, command bulletins, etc.) were distributed on a monthly basis. The MOVE Program stressed universal safety issues such as the effects of alcohol consumption on driving and importance of seat belt use as well as unique road conditions and other driving hazards encountered in Korea.

(U) EUSA's vehicle safety record was noteworthy considering that accident rates in the ROK were among the highest in the world. In 1984, the number of accidents involving Korean vehicles increased by 11.5 percent, injuries by 7.5 percent, and deaths by 4.3 percent. A comparison of 1983 statistics showed 1,523 accidents and 101.5 deaths per 10,000 vehicles occurred in the ROK, while figures for the United States stood at 131.7 accidents and 3.3 deaths per 10,000 vehicles. The chances of a EUSA driver being involved in a vehicle accident in Korea were approximately 12 times greater than in the US, and the risk factor for being involved in a fatal accident was about 31 times greater.

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12. ACofS, JI Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) Reportable injuries to EUSA military personnel, KATUSA soldiers, and Korean national civilian employees also declined significantly in 1984. Injuries to military personnel were reduced 23 percent, from 175 in 1983 to 134 in 1984. In 1983 there were 76 injuries to KATUSA soldiers and Korean civilian employees compared to 59 injuries in 1984, which represented a 22 percent reduction. Accident prevention programs focused on safe practices in maintenance/repair, on/off duty sports, and other recreational pursuits, since most injuries occurred in those activities.

(U) Safety Crisis Action Center (SCAC). For the first time in the history of Team Spirit (TS) exercises, the JI Safety Division operated a 24-hour SCAC during the field maneuver phase of TS 84, conducted 20-27 March 1984 (see pages 80-84). Augmented by four US Army Reservists the mission of the SCAC was to: Provide immediate countermeasure action to serious/catastrophic accident potentials; receive, tabulate, and analyze accident information; and provide daily accident prevention performance data to the USFK staff and Command Post TANGO.

(U) Explosive Safety Course. The US Army Safety Center presented a newly developed Explosive Safety Course on 4-8 June 1984 at the Seoul Garden Hotel. Topics covered included: Identification and basic characteristics of explosives; classification and storage of explosives; application of quantity distance standards; and control of specific hazards. Attendees at the ACofS, JI-sponsored course were US military/civilian and invited Korean safety professionals.<sup>13</sup>

## Eighth Army Education Program (U)

(U) Army Education Centers maintained by EUSA at 16 locations throughout the command provided all educational services required or recommended by DOD and DA. US academic institutions offering programs under competitive bid contracts were: Central Texas College, providing basic skills and MOS training, testing services, and vocational courses; University of Maryland, offering four-year baccalaureate degree programs; and University of Southern California and University of Oklahoma, offering graduate-level programs.

(U) Course enrollments in major EUSA education programs during CY 1984 are shown below:

Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP) II (On-Duty) ..	10,909
MOS Improvement (On-Duty) .....	13,054
College Level (Off-Duty) .....	9,392
Korean Language (On and Off Duty) .....	3,414
English Language Training for KATUSA .....	3,095

(U) Enrollment data indicated 88 percent of EUSA enlisted personnel, 28.4 percent of warrant officers, and 35.2 percent of officers assigned had participated in Army continuing education courses during the year, with the

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13. (1) ACofS, JI Safety Div Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACofS, JI Safety Div, 14 Jan 85, subj: Motor Vehicle Accidents. (3) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 85. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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latter two percentages slightly below the 1983 level. Participation in graduate-level college courses increased about 15 percent, and US Army Garrison-Yongsan continued to maintain graduate-level enrollments larger than any other US Service installation in PACOM.<sup>14</sup>

## EUSA Alcohol and Drug Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) (U)

(U) The major portion of EUSA's ADAPCP was conducted through nine out-patient Community Counseling Centers, located at densely populated installations, and one Residential Treatment Facility at US Army Community Hospital-Seoul. A total of 1,172 military personnel were admitted to the rehabilitation program for alcohol abuse in 1984, a decrease of 286 cases (20 percent) from the previous year. The number of admissions for drug abuse totaled 234, a decrease of 337 (59 percent) over 1983. Of the foregoing totals, 129 were patients in the 16-bed Residential Treatment Facility; 121 successfully completed the 6-8 week program.

(U) The decline in ADAPCP enrollments was attributable primarily to firm stances taken by commanders on substance abuse. Alcohol was the most abused substance (82 percent), followed by marijuana (14 percent), with other drugs making up the remainder. There were two alcohol-related deaths reported in 1984.

(U) Command-wide preventive measures centered on: Educating commanders, noncommissioned officers, and supervisors to detect and refer substance abusers for rehabilitation; deglamorization of alcohol at social events; and extensive media coverage on the harmful effects of alcohol and drug abuse.<sup>15</sup>

## EUSA Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Activities (U)

(U) Fund Utilization. Appropriated fund (APF) support received by EUSA for MWR activities totaled \$14.9 million in FY 1984. Of that amount, \$12.6 million were allocated for Recreation Services Operations-Korea (RSOK) activities, while the remaining \$2.3 million provided support for other EUSA MWR activities.

(U) The EUSA Morale Support Fund (MSF) was the parent instrumentality for the control of nonappropriated funds (NAF) expended for recreational purposes. Management of unit NAF funds throughout the command was decentralized from the EUSA MSF to seven area morale support funds, each servicing units within its geographic area. Available FY 1984 MSF resources amounted to approximately \$7.3 million, of which \$4.1 million were reimbursements from the APF account. (FY 1984 MWR construction projects are included on Table 23, page 157.)

(U) Army Recreation (Slot) Machines (ARM). The reintroduction of slot machines, which began in October 1983, in EUSA club and Armed Forces Recreation Center (AFRC) facilities was completed by April 1984. A total of 1,096 slot

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14. (1) ACoFS, JI Educ Div Hist Sum 1984. (2) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 85. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

15. (1) ACoFS, JI Human Resr Div Hist Sum 1984. (2) EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d, 4th Qtrs FY 84 and 1st Qtr, FY 85. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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machines were installed EUSA-wide. By the end of the year these machines had generated more than \$10.9 million in revenues. After expenses, approximately \$5.9 million were credited to EUSA's ARM account.

(U) Revenue derived from the slot machines was placed in a DA ARM Trust Fund until required for disbursement. Within the Trust Fund, separate accounts were established for the MACOM and installation where the machines were installed. After program costs--including contributions toward equipment replacement--were subtracted, the remaining income was divided into three equal shares and credited to the Army MWR Fund, the MACOM and the installation where the funds were generated. Within EUSA, as an exception to policy, the Seoul Garden Hotel received both its one-third share and EUSA's one-third share. Income from the slot machines was intended primarily for NAF Capital Purchases Minor Construction requirements.

(U) Seoul Garden Hotel. On 1 January 1983, USFK acquired the Seoul Garden Hotel to help meet transient billeting requirements and to serve as one of the two Armed Forces Recreation Centers (the other being the Naija Hotel). The American-style hotel, built in 1979, had 397 rooms and provided a variety of services at reasonable cost. Food and beverage facilities included a specialty dining room, family-style restaurant, coffee shop, delicatessen, bakery, two concession restaurants (Korean and Japanese), three lounge areas, and a night club. Banquet facilities comprised a large main ballroom seating 500 and three smaller private meeting rooms as well as a roof garden outdoor banquet area.

(U) The hotel was acquired under a five-year lease agreement, with an option to extend for five additional years. The lease was subject to cancellation on 90 days notice. Leasing costs for the first five years of operation were set at \$3.4 million annually. The Naija AFRC contributed a \$700,000 grant and 11 EUSA NAF instrumentalities provided loans totaling \$3.4 million (converted to grants in November 1983) to fund the Seoul Garden's initial operations. The hotel, staffed with 512 Korean national and 18 US employees, opened for business as a transient facility on 15 January 1983.

(U) The hotel incurred a \$730,000 deficit during the first two months of operation, which was attributed to excessive start-up costs and a low occupancy rate. Furthermore, no full professional US management staff was in place until May 1983. The deficit was reduced to \$580,000 by the end of FY 1983, and in October 1983, the hotel installed 89 slot machines to generate revenue for offsetting capital improvement and lease costs. However, Seoul Garden Hotel continued to operate at a loss throughout CY 1984, with total deficits amounting to \$398,663. The facility's occupancy rate for FY 1984 was 87.7 percent.

(U) Naija Hotel. The Naija Hotel, built by the Japanese in 1935, occupied 1.05 acres of prime real estate in downtown Seoul. From the end of World War II the Naija was used as an apartment complex by US personnel until 1970, when it was converted to an Armed Forces Recreation Center. In 1948 the ROK Government provided free release of the property to the US Government, with the stipulation that when the property was no longer required by the US it would revert back to the ROK. The 78-room facility employed over 100 people and its operation included concessionaire shops, a first class restaurant, snack bar, game room, and 48 slot machines that were installed in October 1983.

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(U) The success of the Naija was evidenced by the maintenance of an average occupancy rate of 95 percent during the previous 10 years. The occupancy rate for FY 1984 was 93 percent. Furthermore, the facility had not suffered a net loss in any year of operation. The Naija's income for CY 1984 totaled \$351,948.<sup>16</sup>

## EUSA Civilian Personnel Developments (U)

(U) Manpower Management. At the end of CY 1984, EUSA's Department of Civilian (DAC) strength totaled 1,032, a deviation of 11.4 percent above the 926 authorized. The assigned strength increase was caused by the hiring of temporary lower-grade employees against validated manpower needs in excess of authorizations. At year's end, EUSA had recognized requirements for 187 additional personnel spaces. The Korean national civilian strength within EUSA stood at 9,414, only 0.7 percent above the authorized strength of 9,349.

(U) The FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act eliminated DOD civilian personnel end strengths on a one-year test basis. This action was designed to allow managers additional flexibility to meet changing mission needs based on budgeted, documented, and validated workload requirements. In effect, this permitted EUSA to hire full-time employees on a temporary basis for a specified period of time to meet valid manning requirements.<sup>17</sup>

(U) Historically, recruitment of US civilian employees for duty in Korea had always been difficult. This was attributed to: Lack of adequate, reasonably priced, western-style housing; limited medical, dental, and other logistical support; and for some positions, isolated duty locations where dependents were not authorized. During 1984, some critical positions at the GS-9 level and above, such as engineers, auditors, and communications-electronics technicians, continued to require an excessive amount of time to fill. It was difficult to compete with private industry in recruiting for those types of positions because of significantly higher salaries paid by the private sector. Security clearance requirements were another factor that added considerably to recruitment time.

(U) To reduce hiring lags for communications-electronics technicians the EUSA Civilian Recruiting Office, Seattle, WA, in coordination with USA

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16. (1) ACoFS, JI Prog Mgt Div Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI Prog Mgt Div, 9 Jan 85, subj: Recreation (Slot) Machine Operations in Korea. (3) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI Prog Mgt Div, 10 Jan 85, subj: Army Recreation Machine (ARM) Financial Management Policy and Procedures. (4) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI Prog Mgt Div, 10 Jan 85, subj: Army Recreation (Slot) Machine Program. (5) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI SGH, 1 Nov 84, subj: Seoul Garden Hotel. (6) Point Paper, ACoFS, JI Prog Mgt Div, 10 Jan 85, subj: Naija Hotel. (7) EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d, & 4th Qtrs, FY 84 and 1st Qtr, FY 85. All UNCLASSIFIED. (8) USFK/EUSA AHR 1983 (U), pp. 202-03. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

17. (1) EUSA R&A, 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) FONECON, Mr. S. Gammons with Mr. T. Herndon, OCPD Staffing & Employee Svcs Div, 30 Jul 85. (3) FONECON, Mr. S. Gammons with Mr. G. Blaskowsky, ACoFS, RM Rqmt & Utilization Div, 31 Jul 85.

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Information Systems Command, began contacting military separation and transfer agencies to identify potential candidates leaving military service who already had the required security clearances. Initial feedback from this effort indicated a possible need for some job restructuring to higher grade levels, or special salary rates in order to compete with the private sector for the skills of potential candidates. The feasibility of those options was under consideration by management and civilian personnel office representatives at year's end.

(U) Through application of intensive position classification and manpower management efforts, the average grade level of EUSA's DAC employees was 8.7348 at the close of CY 1984, compared to the previous year's average of 8.8027. The DA objective, a not-to-exceed limit, remained at 10.1176.

(U) Prior to May 1984, EUSA had operated under a DA-imposed ceiling of 79 filled GS/GM 13-15 positions. This ceiling was suspended by DA in May in view of a Presidential directive to reduce occupied GS/GM 11-15 positions by 8 percent over the next four fiscal years, beginning FY 1985. Within EUSA, incumbents (approximately 480 employees) of those positions, who constituted 60 percent of the US work force, were responsible for managing a Korean work force of 10,000 employees. The command advised DA that the mandated reduction could adversely affect EUSA's ability to accomplish its mission, as well as severely hinder its civilian recruiting efforts. Although targets had not been established for GS/GM 11-15 positions by year's end, DA was advocating reduction achievements through attrition, sound position management, and cost savings programs.

(U) In support of DA efforts to avoid unwarranted high grade growth, EUSA established an objective to maintain filled GS/GM 13-15 positions at 79. To ensure grade escalation was controlled, the following measures were taken:

--Proposed new GS/GM 13-15 positions were reviewed by a High Grade Review Committee and approved/disapproved by the Chief of Staff.

--Proposed new GS 11-12 positions were reviewed by supervisors and Civilian Personnel Office classification specialists. Controversial cases were resolved by Command Position Management Officers.

--All occupied positions were systematically reviewed for proper grade level whenever they became vacant.

(U) Labor-Management Agreement. On 14 May 1984, after 14 months of negotiation, a landmark labor-management agreement between US civilian employees and USFK was signed by a National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1363 representative and GEN Robert W. Sennewald, COMUSKOREA. The new agreement went into effect 13 June 1984. This was the first contract concluded in the union's 15-year history of operating in Korea and set in writing grievance and arbitration procedures for its approximately 450 members. Representatives from servicing civilian personnel offices, subordinate commands, and attached units received training on the contract's terms and, in turn, conducted training for all supervisors/managers in their respective geographic areas.

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(U) Family Member Hire Program. The DOD Family Member Hire Program allowed dependents of military personnel and US civilian employees to receive preference in filling position vacancies below the GS-9 level. One benefit derived by USFK from this program was a readily available pool of applicants, thereby eliminating the need for CONUS recruitment. Considerable savings were also achieved through reduced costs for allowances and logistical support, i.e., travel, housing, and transportation of household goods.

(U) At the close of CY 1984, a total of 832 family members were employed at USFK installations. Additionally, within EUSA, 112 positions designated for Korean nationals were filled by qualified family members. Of those, 108 were US citizens, 1 Korean, and 3 were third-country nationals.

(U) Summer Employment Program. From the end of May through September 1984, USFK employed 608 dependent youths under its Summer Employment Program, compared to 511 the previous year. For 1984, the DOD-set pay rate amounted to \$2.70 per hour, an increase of 15 cents over the 1983 rate. All youths who applied for employment during 1984 were hired.

(U) Emergency-Essential (E-E) Civilian Employee Positions. In July 1983, DA issued instructions requiring EUSA to identify essential US direct-hire civilian employees who would be retained in Korea during emergency situations. These individuals would be needed during a period of mobilization, after noncombatant evacuation had been accomplished, to prevent serious degradations of wartime missions and critical military support systems. In 1984, the EUSA Chief of Staff approved 1 additional E-E position, bringing the total to 28 command-wide; all were included on Mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowance. As of 31 December 1984, four of the E-E positions were vacant, with recruitment in progress.

(U) Civilian Employee Living Quarters Allowances (LQA). Effective 15 April 1984, the US State Department approved a special LQA rate increase for US civilian employees in the Seoul area, which averaged 15.4 percent for employees both with and without families. Higher LQA rates for areas outside Seoul went into effect on 11 November 1984. The increases were intended to help offset escalating costs for living accommodations in Korea. The newly established rates for areas where the bulk of the civilian work force were employed are shown in Table 28.

(U) Korean National Employees Pay Adjustment. Analysis of data collected from a Locality Wage Change and Benefits Survey, conducted during March-April 1984, resulted in determinations to increase the pay schedules for USFK KN employees, effective 1 June. The increment averaged 5.9 percent for white collar employees and 9.6 percent for wage grade workers. The benefits allowance was increased from 7.0 percent to 7.7 percent of base pay. For the second consecutive year, the USFK Korean Employees Union accepted the annual wage and benefits adjustment package without filing a formal dispute or threatening serious labor unrest.<sup>18</sup>

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18. (1) OCPD Hist Sum 1984. (2) Point Paper, OCPD, 11 Jan 85, subj: Civilian High Grade Control Program. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 28--(U) US Civilian Employee Living Quarters Allowances  
Per Annum - As of 31 Dec 84

Area of Assignment	GS-14 & Above	GS-10 to 13	GS-1 to 9a
Seoul			
With Family <sup>b</sup>	\$12,300	\$11,000	\$9,800
Without Family	9,800	9,600	9,200
Taegu			
With Family <sup>b</sup>	7,800	7,800	7,400
Without Family	7,400	6,400	6,300
Pusan			
With Family <sup>b</sup>	7,000	7,000	5,600
Without Family	5,600	5,600	5,000
Pyongtaek (Osan AB/ Cp Humphreys area)			
With Family <sup>b</sup>	8,400	8,400	6,400
Without Family	7,300	6,600	6,100

<sup>a</sup>GS-7 to 9 employees with more than 15 years Federal service entitled to same allowances as GS-10 to 13.

<sup>b</sup>Employees with more than one family member at duty post received additional amounts above basic rates as follows: 2-3 dependents - 10%; 4-5 dependents - 20%; 6 or more dependents - 30%.

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## Fund Drive Campaigns (U)

(U) Overseas Combined Federal Campaign (OCFC). The 1984 OCFC was conducted throughout Korea from 22 October through 30 November. Contributions collected totaled \$832,859, a new high for this particular campaign in Korea. The actual solicitation rate was 99.8 percent.

(U) Army Emergency Relief (AER) Campaign. The 1984 AER Campaign was conducted throughout EUSA from 27 April through 15 June 1984. A 100 percent solicitation rate netted contributions totaling \$210,325, exceeding the 1983 aggregate by \$25,288.<sup>19</sup>

19. ACoFS, JI Plans, Plcy & Svc Div Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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## CHAPTER XV: SELECTED STAFF ACTIVITIES (U)

### US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (U)

(U) Background. Article IV of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed in October 1953 granted the US the right to dispose its military forces "... in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement." Following negotiations which began in 1962, the US-ROK SOFA was concluded on 9 July 1966 and entered into force 9 February 1967. The SOFA's 31 articles and appended minutes and understandings covered virtually all facets of relationships between USFK and the South Korean Government and people. The basic principles embodied in the US-ROK SOFA combined respect for Korean laws with detailed provisions giving the US armed forces, US civilian employees, invited contractors, and dependents a special, carefully defined status in view of the importance of the US presence to the defense of the ROK.

(U) Implementing Agency. The US-ROK Joint Committee was established as the primary means of consultation between the US and ROK concerning SOFA implementation. The Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as the ROK Joint Committee representative, assisted by senior officials from other ROK ministries and agencies. The Deputy COMUSKOREA functioned as the US Joint Committee representative, aided by designated officers from USFK staffs and component commands, a political advisor from the US Embassy, Seoul, and a Secretary providing administrative support.<sup>1</sup> Any matter which the Joint Committee was unable to resolve would be referred through appropriate channels to the respective Governments for further consideration.

(U) Twelve subcommittees advised the US-ROK Joint Committee on technical matters in the following functional fields: Facilities and Areas, Criminal Jurisdiction, Civil Jurisdiction (Claims), Finance, Labor, Transportation, Commerce, Security and Law Enforcement, Utilities, Entry and Exit (Ad Hoc), Civil-Military Relations (Ad Hoc), and Illegal Transactions in Duty-Free Goods (Ad Hoc).

(U) 1984 Developments. The US-ROK Joint Committee held three formal meetings during the year--on 10 February, 29 June, and 12 October. Principal Joint Committee actions included:<sup>2</sup>

--(FOUO) Conclusion of a US-ROK Memorandum of Agreement on safeguarding and control of areas on Yongsan South Post (Seoul) and Camp Carroll (near Taegu) planned for release to the ROKG for construction of USFK family housing units by the Korea National Housing Corp (see pages 161-62). Under the MOA, USFK would retain security/police functions and criminal

1. (U) The US Joint Committee Secretary was assigned to the Office of the Special Assistant for SOFA/International Relations, a staff element of the Office of the Deputy COMUSKOREA.

2. Sp Asst for SOFA/Intl Rel & US SOFA Secretariat Hist Sum 1984. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Detailed accounts contained in Minutes of US-ROK SOFA Joint Committee Meetings 1984. Filed in Ofc of Sp Asst.

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jurisdiction in the housing areas after transfer to the ROKG, for as long as the family quarters were occupied exclusively by USFK personnel. (29 June meeting.)

--(FOUO) Approval of an agreed understanding between the USFK Engineer and the Director, Installation Bureau, ROK MND, on the means of cost sharing for the operation and maintenance of the Command, Control, Communications Bunker at Camp Red Cloud used by Combined Field Army (ROK/US). The US would be reimbursed for the ROK share of costs corresponding to that portion of the facility's floor space used solely by ROK personnel, plus an equitable portion of the space jointly used by ROK and US personnel. The cost-sharing formula would apply to expenditures for electricity, heating oil, air conditioning, water and sewage disposal, building maintenance and repair, fire prevention and protection, pest control, and janitorial services. (29 June meeting.)

--(FOUO) Approval of a recommendation by the Commerce Subcommittee which would permit a US-invited contractor firm, Trans-Asia Engineering Associates, Inc., to perform contract services for the Korea Maritime Port Authority, a ROKG agency, without impairment of Trans-Asia's SOFA status and privileges. (12 October meeting.) (Under the SOFA, US-invited contractors could not engage in business activities in the ROK other than those pertaining to USFK contracts, except through mutual US-ROK accord.)

--(FOUO) Approval of 61 recommendations submitted throughout the year by the Facilities and Area Subcommittee, related mainly to various USFK real estate interests which involved granting new additional facilities or areas to USFK or returning to the ROKG USFK-acquired real estate no longer needed. (see pages 160-61).

--(FOUO) Assignment of 64 new tasks throughout the year to the Facilities and Areas Subcommittee, related primarily to USFK acquisition or release of real estate (land and/or facilities). A significant number of the tasks involved extensions of time periods for real estate parcels acquired by USFK for temporary use and measures required for protection or relocation of portions of the Trans-Korea Pipeline (see pages 99-101).

### Judge Advocate (U)

(U) SOFA Criminal Jurisdiction. Article XXII of the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement provided ROK authorities primary jurisdiction over USFK military and civilian members in cases involving criminal offenses against ROK law, persons, or property. US military authorities had the primary right in practically all other cases involving US personnel; however, USFK-affiliated civilians not subject to trial by military court-martial in peacetime were normally tried by ROK tribunals.

(U) During the period 1 December 1983-30 November 1984, Korean authorities exercised jurisdiction in cases involving 7 military personnel (6 Army and 1 Marine Corps), 172 Army/Air Force civilian employees, and 182 Army/Air Force dependents. An additional 42 cases pending at the end of November 1983 were also concluded, raising the total number of cases handled by Korean authorities in 1984 to 403. Of those cases, 296 were dismissed, 7 were concluded by trial

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(all resulting in suspended sentences), and 48 by fines imposed by summary procedures. A total of 52 cases remained pending at the end of November 1984.

(U) One murder case in 1984 had unique SOFA implications. On 26 November 1984, an Air Force General Court-Martial at Osan Air Base tried Staff Sergeant Clyde E. D. Mansfield on a charge of premeditated murder. He was found guilty and, on 27 November, sentenced to life imprisonment. In early February 1984, the sergeant, who was stationed at an Air Force site in California, traveled to Korea on leave and located and killed a Korean national. The victim was the ex-husband of the sergeants girlfriend, who also lived in CONUS. Sergeant Mansfield then returned to his duty station in California before he became a suspect in the case. The case presented a complicated legal issue concerning jurisdiction and venue because Sergeant Mansfield had never been stationed in Korea and the US had no extradition treaty with the ROK. After a series of negotiations, the ROKG consented to have Sergeant Mansfield brought to Korea to be tried by US military court-martial. In essence, the ROKG granted an "advanced waiver of jurisdiction," without which Sergeant Mansfield may have escaped trial completely.

(U) EUSA Military Jurisdiction. The number of EUSA personnel tried under courts-martial proceedings during 1984 is shown below (1983 figures in parentheses).

General Courts-Martial .....	110	(71)
Special Courts-Martial (Bad-Conduct-Discharge) ....	93	(123)
Normal Special Courts-Martial .....	40	(85)
Summary Courts-Martial .....	66	(89)

The EUSA courts-martial rate (all categories) for CY 1984 was computed as 2.85 per 1,000 members, compared to the CY 1983 Army-wide rate of 2.10 per 1,000 members (1984 Army-wide data not available). Historically, EUSA rates had been higher than worldwide Army rates, partially because of the uniqueness of blackmarketing prosecutions. Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, was administered at a rate of 51.82 per 1,000 members during CY 1984, as opposed to the CY 1983 Army-wide rate of 40.52 per 1,000 members (1984 Army-wide data not available).<sup>3</sup> (Data on founded offenses within EUSA appears on Table 28.)

(U) Claims. During FY 1984, the US Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea (USAFCS-K) obligated \$1,062,460 in final settlement of 1,030 damage claims filed by Korean nationals under Article XXIII of the SOFA. These claims were generated as a result of official duties of USFK personnel. The amount obligated was an increase of \$62,069 (6.2 percent) over FY 1983, largely due to an increase in claims costs of US participation in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84. The Foreign Claims Commission, supported by USAFCS-K, settled 83 claims totaling \$440,856 (a 58 percent increase over FY 1983) for damages/injuries caused by off duty USFK personnel. The increase was attributed to the settlement of several large personal injury claims arising from privately owned vehicle accidents in FY 1984.

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3. (1) JA Hist Sum 1984. (2) EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d & 4th Qtr FY 84, 1st Qtr FY 85. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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(U) The Yongsan Garrison Claims Office paid \$386,419 on 1,235 claims submitted by Army military personnel and US civilian employees for property lost or damaged during movement to Korea. The settlement represented a 4.1 percent decrease over FY 1983. Under the Military Claims Act, \$22,826 were paid to settle 84 claims initiated by military personnel, civilian employees, and non-DOD US citizens for property losses and/or personnel injury caused by USFK personnel, reflecting a 22 percent decrease over FY 1983. Other EUSA claims offices obligated \$545,840 in FY 1984 to settle 1,556 property loss claims, most of which stemmed from losses suffered by 2d Infantry Division personnel during the September 1984 flood.

(U) USAFCS-K collected a total of \$219,424 in its affirmative claims program in FY 1984: \$146,128 from commercial household goods carriers for lost/damaged property; \$40,617 in other property damage recovery; and \$32,679 in medical care recovery. The total amount recovered was virtually identical to that recovered in FY 1983, although carrier recovery and property damage recovery were up 14.8 percent and 53.2 percent, respectively. Medical recovery was decreased almost by half due to a decrease in the number of large injury cases.

(U) Maneuver Damage Reporting Center. For the first time, USAFCS-K established a Maneuver Damage Reporting Center during TEAM SPIRIT 84. The Center served as focal point for receipt of damage reports from military units, Korean citizens, and local government officials. Working in close coordination with municipal authorities, both before and after the exercise, this concept substantially reduced the time necessary to process and settle claims filed by inhabitants of the maneuver area.<sup>4</sup>

## Provost Marshal (U)

(U) Nondivisional MP Unit Consolidation. The 8th Military Police Brigade (Provisional), with headquarters at Yongsan Garrison, (Seoul), was organized on 26 September 1984. With the exception of the 19th Support Command's Camp Ames MP Detachment, all EUSA nondivisional MP units, including the 728th MP Battalion, two separate MP companies, and two MP detachments were consolidated under the 8th MP Brigade's command and control. The realignment action gave the brigade the capability to expeditiously assume wartime MP missions without the time lag previously required to reorganize into a wartime configuration. The command/control consolidation would facilitate reception and deployment of Time-Phased Force Deployment (out-of-country augmentation) units, provide a force structure better capable of performing MP support missions during field training exercises, and afford more effective military police support to installation commanders. The 2d Infantry Division's MP Company remained under the division's control.<sup>5</sup>

(U) Indiscipline Within Eighth Army. Data on founded offenses committed by EUSA personnel in CY 1984 appears on Table 28.

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4. USAFCS-K Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

5. PM Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 28--(U) Founded Offenses Within EUSA, CY 1984

Offense	Percent of Total Offenses in EUSA	EUSA Rate Per 1,000 Members	Army-Wide Rate Per 1,000 Members <sup>d</sup>
Crimes of Violence <sup>a</sup>	5.25	1.49	1.10
Crimes Against Property <sup>b</sup>	76.75	16.70	15.26
Marijuana <sup>c</sup>	13.25	3.03	3.74
Other Dangerous Drugs <sup>c</sup>	4.75	1.18	1.21

<sup>a</sup>Consisted of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Aggravated assaults represented 75 percent of offenses.

<sup>b</sup>Included burglary/housebreaking, larceny, auto theft, and arson. Larcenies over \$50 represented 67 percent of offenses.

<sup>c</sup>Use, sale, and possession.

<sup>d</sup>Figures are for CY 1983. Complete Army-wide statistics for CY 1984 not available.

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The rate of absent-without-leave (AWOL) offenses committed by EUSA personnel in CY 1984 was registered as 1.23 per 1,000 members, compared to the CY 1983 Army-wide rate of 4.50 per 1,000 members (complete Army-wide data for CY 1984 was not available). EUSA's 1984 AWOL rate also represented a substantial decrease from its 2.04 rate recorded in 1983.<sup>6</sup>

(U) EUSA Confinement Facility. A total of 330 USFK personnel were incarcerated in the EUSA Confinement Facility at Camp Humphreys during 1984. The average daily prisoner population was 35; detention time for those in pretrial confinement averaged 45 days. The following prisoner transfers to US facilities took place during the year: 15 prisoners to the US Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, KS; 104 to the US Army Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, KS; and 32 to the Transient Personnel Control Facility, Fort Ord, CA. Two dependent wives of USFK personnel continued to serve sentences in a ROK prison facility.

(U) Counterterrorism Training. The Terrorism Counteraction Mobile Training Team, US Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL, conducted an

6. EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d, 4th Qtr FY 1984 and 1st Qtr FY 1985. UNCLASSIFIED.

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intensive seminar 15-19 October. This was the second time the course was held in Korea. It included topics on planning defenses against terrorism operations, security self-protection, crisis management, and hostage negotiations. Some 53 USFK participants representing 16 different organizations and agencies attended the sessions, along with 50 ROK officials from 5 Korean law enforcement agencies.<sup>7</sup>

## Inspector General (U)

(U) Command Climate. In February 1984, the Inspector General provided CG EUSA and staff principals the following assessment of the command climate:<sup>8</sup>

(U) The sense of purpose seen throughout the command is impressive. The soldier, the civilian employee, and the leadership are mission oriented. Soldiers want job training, and are concerned for future advancement. Frequent readiness exercises, detailed plan refinements down to company level, and system discipline manifestly demonstrate leader attention to warplans. Commanders at all levels are examining peacetime operations so we can meet any contingency quickly and efficiently. Continued emphasis upon missions will further enhance our sense of purpose.

(U) The command is physically fit. Our efforts to enforce weight and appearance standards, to identify drug and alcohol abusers, and to provide physically challenging training are paying off. The number of soldiers exceeding the Army's physical fitness standards supports a sense of pride and enthusiasm essential to the command's esprit de corps.

(U) Readiness has been clearly enhanced by our civilian workforce. Of note is the maintenance efficiency attained by Transportation Motor Pools. Korean National employees supported by knowledgeable leaders and an effective inspection program have successfully maintained an aging commercial fleet. We must continue to recognize the professional contributions made by our civilians, both U.S. and Korean National to include the Korea Service Corps.

(U) We can demonstrate more concern for soldiers. Working conditions, in the main, are austere. Recent attention to installation master planning will produce measured progress, emphasis must continue. However, safety, fire prevention, and physical security measures are found wanting. Because a building may be scheduled for renovation, we put off quick fixes to the detriment of our soldiers. Providing safety shoes for mechanics and ensuring a high state of police in fire sensitive work areas are neglected. Mechanics and drivers need hand cleaner in work areas. The dayroom is not always a pleasant place. Company Athletic and Recreation Kits have not added to recreational alternatives. Personal belongings are not always secure. There is a need for upward communications. Unit mess councils, safety councils, and command information sessions also have merit. Soldiers know when the leadership is genuinely concerned!

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7. PM Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

8. IG Hist Sum 1984. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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(U) Given our mission oriented high quality soldier, both U.S. and KATUSA, our training programs require some renewed emphasis. On the Job Training (OJT) needs to be well thought out. The best professional development we can provide junior leaders is to ensure they are technically competent to accomplish their daily functions. Officer and senior noncommissioned officer participation in MOS training, well established SOP's, better use of training facilities, to include unit learning centers, are among development opportunities. Senior leadership must set standards with associated conditions and tasks. Why can't equipment operators conduct Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services? Frequent Command inspections at company, battalion, and higher levels can achieve excellence. The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) should serve to fully rationalize effective and efficient training.

(U) Finally, our logistics processes need attention. Contractual services need review. Contracts are often poorly written and their supervision haphazard. Contracting Officer Representatives (COR's) need user feedback. We need quality controls to ensure contractor performance. The Commander's recent concerns about contract guards are illustrative of the problem. Supply discipline is continuously hampered by command failure to conduct inventories at required intervals. Damaged equipment is not repaired quickly because survey officers don't move with a sense of urgency. There is excess throughout the command. Installation self-help programs need refinements so facility engineers can be targeted on high pay-off projects. Property book reconciliations with Continuing Balance System-Expanded (CBS-X) reports need continued emphasis if CBS-X is to serve the Army's needs. Prime-time training for the various logistics career fields warrant review if our logistics processes are to be significantly improved.

(FOUO) Inspector General Action Requests. Inspectors General at HQ EUSA and major subordinate commands processed 769 action requests submitted in CY 1984, of which 32 percent were determined to be justified complaints. In CY 1983 the number of requests totaled 909 with 33 percent substantiated. Data on the most active request categories in 1984, in descending order, and the principal bases for their initiation are summarized below:<sup>9</sup>

--Conditions in Unit - 183 complaints; 24 percent justified. Primarily directed at commanders' actions and policies, inattention to soldiers' problems, storage and shipment of personal property by unit, and leave and pass denials.

--Personal Financial Matters - 84 complaints; 45 percent substantiated. Allegations of nonsupport of civilian dependents (married/separated/divorced) constituted most of complaints in this category; a majority resulted from sponsors not providing adequate financial support for spouses following the sponsors' PCS move to Korea. A smaller number were based on indebtedness, which affected both military and civilian personnel.

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9. (1) Ibid. (2) EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d, & 4th Qtr FY 84 and 1st Qtr FY 85.  
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--Transportation and Travel ~ 52 complaints; 32 percent justified. Primarily directed at delayed port calls for PCS travel, restrictions on concurrent travel of dependents, and lost/damaged/destroyed household goods. Frequent misunderstandings concerning travel entitlements resulted in personal hardships not easily resolved within the chain of command without external assistance.

--Pay and Allowances ~ 48 complaints; 54 percent justified. Mostly concerned delays in processing pay actions and errors in amount paid.

--Assignment/Reassignment ~ 48 complaints; 33 percent substantiated. Allegations of delayed assignment notification and/or nonreceipt of PCS orders, as well as requests for assignment being delayed or not processed.

--Military Justice ~ 29 complaints; 34 percent justified. Concerned mostly punishment and appeals procedures.

--Records Management ~ 29 complaints; 31 percent justified. Primary complaint was lack of records control.

--Military Personnel Actions ~ 27 complaints; 29 percent substantiated. Allegations of nonselection for individual awards/decorations and of improper flagging actions.

--Medical/Dental/Veterinary/Pharmacy ~ 27 complaints; 22 percent justified. Complaints of inadequate/improper medical care/treatment and improper posting of medical/dental records generated most allegations.

--Enlisted Personnel Management System ~ 26 complaints; 13 percent substantiated. Complaints focused on promotion policies and improper MOS utilization/classification.

(U) Inspections of Eighth Army Units. Major findings of EUSA IG teams during their command-wide inspection activities are discussed below:<sup>10</sup>

--(FOUO) Maintenance Management. Maintenance inspections of EUSA units revealed trends similar to those of 1983. Shortcomings appeared to result from a lack of chain of command involvement with maintenance training and procedures. The trend of findings throughout EUSA indicated a need for increased command emphasis on: Preventive maintenance checks and services; driver qualification; testing and licensing of generator operators; and establishment of effective, functional maintenance standing operating procedures. Of particular concern were aviation maintenance personnel shortages and inadequate facilities in some units which had received UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters (see page 101).

--(FOUO) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense. Since the last inspection, improvements in the NBC readiness posture were noted throughout the command. However, continued emphasis was required in the areas of training

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10. IG Hist Sum 1984. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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standards and requisitioning/stockage of proper NBC equipment and protective clothing. Inspections revealed the presence of obsolete equipment and lack of required items for actual contingency missions and training.

--(FOUO) Property Accountability. Property and equipment, including durable items, were not always controlled and accounted for on hand receipts, shortage annexes, and/or component listings. Additionally, appropriate actions were not always taken to safeguard and account for property when responsible or accountable individuals departed their units. Of specific concern were change of command inventories and resulting relief documentation such as reports of survey, statement of charges, and cash collections. Some units had not established adequate procedures for inventorying and disposing of personal property (absentee baggage).

--(FOUO) Physical Security. Continued emphasis was needed in areas of crime prevention, key control, lock rotation, monthly inventories, and weapons security. Many deficiencies resulted because unit personnel lacked knowledge of pertinent security directives. Physical security programs were not supported and guided by the chain of command, nor were physical security considerations included in many modernization and improvement projects.

--(FOUO) Dining Facility Operations. Inspections revealed a lack of administrative accountability for subsistence items. Quantities of food prepared did not always balance with subsistence issued from the supply point, and in many cases meals prepared did not equate with the number of meals served. Substandard sanitary conditions were noted in some units; in some instances, health, safety, and equipment work orders were deferred because a dining facility was scheduled for renovation.

--(FOUO) Fire Prevention and Safety. Lack of attention to detail by the inspected units resulted in a prevalence of improperly grounded electrical receptacles, misuse of extension cords, discharged fire extinguishers, locked fire exit doors, and improperly stored flammable materials. The fire prevention program, in many instances, was neglected through a lack of command direction in the form of written guidance and an effective inspection process.

--(FOUO) Publications Management. In many cases, publications requirements did not accurately reflect unit needs; no actions were taken on requisitioning errors; and distribution schemes were either lacking or inappropriate.

--(FOUO) Personnel Management and Administration. Recurring problems were found in the areas of leave control, meal card accountability, enlisted evaluation report control, and personnel asset inventory controls. These problems evolved, in most cases, from the lack of an established command inspection program.

### Surgeon (U)

(U) Command Health and Medical Services.<sup>11</sup> As the largest component of the 18th Medical Command (MEDCOM), the US Army Community Hospital-Seoul (USACH-S) was the only full-service US military medical facility in Korea. With a 250-bed capacity, the hospital was capable of converting to a 400-bed medical evacuation unit (designated the 121st Evacuation Hospital) during

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contingencies. In CY 1984 the average number of beds occupied daily at USACH-S totaled 118.4; live births averaged 2.4. The number of visits to 18th MEDCOM outpatient clinics, located command-wide, averaged 947.4 per day. Daily averages of other major medical services were: Dental treatments, 1,259.1; food inspections, 131,000 pounds; and spectacle fabrication, 37.5.<sup>12</sup> (Data on USACH-S Alcohol Treatment Facility patient load appears on page 175.)

(U) Construction and Renovation Projects. At the end of CY 1984, the 18th MEDCOM was managing Medical MCA and exigent minor MCA construction projects valued in excess of \$134 million. Funds for these projects were furnished by the Office of the Surgeon General to assure that adequate medical and dental facilities were available in Korea to meet growing demands for health care services. Although no new construction was completed during 1984, several projects were nearing completion and construction would begin on others in FY 1985 or later. Most of the new medical/dental facilities were slated for camps within 2d Infantry Division.<sup>13</sup>

--Health Clinic at Camp Casey, scheduled for completion in April 1985. Estimated cost, \$3.56 million.

--Troop Aid Station at Camp Hovey, scheduled for completion in April 1985. Estimated cost, \$823,000.

--Troop Aid/Dental Station at Camp Greaves, scheduled for completion in April 1985. Estimated cost, \$863,000.

--Health/Dental Clinic at Camp Red Cloud, construction to start in FY 1985. Estimated cost, \$2.7 million.

--Health/Dental Clinic renovation/addition at Camp Humphreys, construction to start in FY 1985. Estimated cost, \$5.6 million.

--New US Army Community Hospital-Seoul, construction programmed for FY 1987. Estimated cost, approximately \$60 million.

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11. (U) Detailed information on USFK/EUSA Surgeon and 18th MEDCOM activities is contained in Annual Historical Report-AMEDD Activities (RCS MED 41 [R4]), submitted to the Surgeon General in accordance with AR 40-226.

12. EUSA R&A, 2d, 3d & 4th Qtr, FY 84 and 1st Qtr, FY 85. UNCLASSIFIED.

13. (1) Point Paper, Surg, 17 Jan 85, subj: AMEDD Funded Medical/Dental Renovation/Construction Projects. (2) 18th MEDCOM Hist Sum 1984. Both UNCLASSIFIED

## Public Affairs (U)

(U) During 1984 a substantial number of international news media representatives visited the ROK to report on-the-scene significant military-related events. Primary among those events were Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 84 in March (see pages 80-84), 16th Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in May (pages 51-57), the Russian defection incident at Panmunjom in November (see pages 18-19), and Military Armistice Commission meetings held at Panmunjom

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(summarized in United Nations Command Historical Summary 1984). The USFK/EUSA Public Affairs Office (PAO) provided media advisories and briefings, as well as logistical assistance, to visiting news representatives throughout the year. The PAO's Combined/Joint Media Center established at Yongsan Garrison (Seoul) during TEAM SPIRIT 84 accredited 371 military and civilian journalists, photographers, and broadcasters from the US, ROK, and five foreign countries.

(U) The PAO's Community Relations Division maintained contact with a variety of ROK civic and cultural organizations to promote mutual understanding and maintain harmonious relations between USFK personnel and the Korean community. Activities included the coordination of ROK-sponsored tours, visits to Korean homes, intercultural language development sessions, and the ROK-subsidized Reunion in Korea Program through which family members and close relatives of USFK personnel visited Korea for five days at nominal cost.<sup>14</sup>

## Chaplain (U)

(U) During 1984 Eighth Army chaplains conducted 6,054 worship services command-wide with a total attendance of 288,964. At the EUSA Religious Retreat Center in Seoul, over 15,000 USFK members, dependents, KATUSAs, and invited guests of all major faiths participated in 660 spiritual retreats and 150 family life sessions held throughout the year. The Center continued sponsoring two unique programs--Homeward Bound I, conducted for rotating unaccompanied married service members to assist them in readjusting to family life in CONUS; and Homeward Bound II, to help departing Korean wives and fiancées of US personnel in adapting to American society. Counselors at the EUSA Family Life Center at Hannam Village, near Yongsan Garrison (Seoul), dealt with 988 cases involving troubled relationships and conducted 226 family life enrichment workshops attended by 3,442 persons.

(U) A newly constructed chapel opened in mid-July at Hannam Village provided more convenient services for the nearly 700 USFK families residing there. Extensive chapel renovation was completed during 1984 at 2d Infantry Division Support Command (Camp Casey) and at 19th Support Command's Camp Walker (Taegu).<sup>15</sup>

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14. PAO Hist Sum 1984, UNCLASSIFIED.

15. Chaplain Hist Sum 1984. UNCLASSIFIED.

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## (U) RANKING DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO USFK/EUSA, 1984

RADM Paul D. Tomb, OJCS/C3SC, 4-8 Jan.  
Mr. Noel C. Koch, Prin Dep Asst SECDEF (Intl Scty Affairs), 4-10 Jan.  
MG Merrill A. McPeak (USAF), DCS, Plans, TAC, 7-11 Jan.  
MG William H. Schneider (USA), Cdr, 25th Inf Div, 15-18 Jan.  
MG Aaron L. Lilley, Jr. (USA), Cdr, USA Trans Cen & Sch, 15-21 Jan.  
Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-NY), 19-22 Jan.  
Rep. William L. Dickinson (R-AL) 19-22 Jan.  
LTG Winston D. Powers (USAF), Dir, Def Comm Agcy, 24-26 Jan.  
GEN Robert T. Marsh (USAF), Cdr, AF Syst Comd, 24-26 Jan.  
Hon. William Mayer, Asst SECDEF (Health Affairs), 25-28 Jan.  
Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Asst SECDEF (Intl Scty Affairs), 27-29 Jan.  
Dr. O. Charles Williams, Jr., Dep Asst SAF for Adv Tech, 27 Jan-1 Feb.  
Hon. James R. Ambrose, Undersecretary of the Army, 2-5 Feb.  
Mr. J. Craig Cumbey, Dep Asst SAF for Civ Pers and EEO, 3-5 Feb.  
MG Richard M. Wells (USA), Dep Chief of Engr, DA, 3-6 Feb.  
LTG Charles W. Bagnal (USA), DCG for Tng, USA TRADOC, 5-8 Feb.  
MG Hubert T. Chandler (USA), Chief, USA Dental Corps, 10-16 Feb.  
GEN Lawrence A. Skantze (USAF), Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, 11-15 Feb.  
RADM Andrew A. Giordano, Cdr, Naval Sup Sys Comd, 13-16 Feb.  
MG Albert N. Stubblebine (USA), Cdr, USA INSCOM, 17-25 Feb.  
Mr. C. Richard Whiston, Prin Dep Gen Counsel, DA, 19-22 Feb.  
MG Thurman D. Rodgers (USA), Cdr, USA Sig Cen & Sch, 22-26 Feb.  
Mr. Roy Linsenmeyer, Chief, R&A Div, J5, USPACOM, 22-26 Feb.  
VADM Donald S. Jones, Cdr, Third Fleet, 25-27 Feb.  
MG William H. Schneider (USA), Cdr, 25th Inf Div, 26 Feb-1 Mar.  
MG William Mall, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, 23d AF, 28 Feb-1 Mar.  
MG James I. Baginski (USAF), Dir of Deployment, JDA, 28 Feb-3 Mar.  
MG Robert D. Springer (USAF), Cdr, AF Mil Pers Cen, 29 Feb-1 Mar.  
VADM Harry C. Schrader, Cdr, Naval Sur Force, USPACFLT, 3-5 Mar.  
LTG Richard K. Saxer (USAF), Dir, Def Nuc Agcy, 3-5 Mar.  
RADM Howard H. Haynes, Cdr, Pac Div, Naval Fac Engr Comd, 9-12 Mar.

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MG Rocco Negriz (USA), Dep Cdr, I Corps, 11-30 Mar.  
Mr. William F. Coakley, Dep Dir for Compn & Os Empl Plcy, DOD, 13-18 Mar.  
MG C. Reuben Autrey (USAF), Cdr, 3d Air Div, 15-27 Mar.  
MG Robert E. HaebeI (USMC), Cdr, III Marine Amphib Force, 15-31 Mar.  
LTG John N. Brandenburg (USA), Cdr, I Corps, 15-31 Mar.  
MG Tracy E. Strevey, Jr. (USA), Comd Surg, WESTCOM, 16-22 Mar.  
LTG Charles G. Cooper (USMC), Cdr, Fleet Marine Force Pac, 17-26 Mar.  
MG Duane H. Cassidy (USAF), Cdr, 21st AF, 18-20 Mar.  
MG John V. Cox (USMC), J3, USPACOM, 18-22 Mar.  
MG Thomas G. McInerney (USAF), DCS Ops & Intel, PACAF, 18-22 Mar.  
MG James L. Day (USMC), DCS for Tng, USMC, 18-22 Mar.  
MG Jerry W. Cochran (USAF), ANG Asst to CINCMAC, 18-23 Mar.  
MG John A. Hemphill (USA), Dir of Ops, J3, USREDCOM, 18-23 Mar.  
MG Robert M. Joyce (USA), TAG, DA, 19-23 Mar.  
LTG Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, USFJ/5th AF, 19-28 Mar.  
MG James E. Moore (USA), Cdr, 7th Inf Div, 19-29 Mar.  
GEN Glen K. Otis (USA), CINCUSAREUR, 20-22 Mar.  
MG Frank E. Petersen (USMC), CG, 1st Marine Air Wing, 21-23 Mar.  
GEN Jerome F. O'Malley (USAF), CINCPACAF, 21-24 Mar.  
LTG James M. Lee (USA), Cdr, WESTCOM, 21-25 Mar.  
VADM J. R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 22-24 Mar.  
Mr. Alan Campen, Dir for C2 Ops, DOD, 22-28 Mar.  
MG Albert L. Pruden, Jr. (USAF), Dir of Insp, AF Insp & Safety Cen, 24-27 Mar.  
MG Kenneth D. Burns (USAF), Cdr, 13th AF, 24-28 Mar.  
MG Walter C. Schrupp (USAF), IG, PACOM, 24 Mar-1 Apr.  
Hon. Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, 25 Mar.  
MG Donald D. Brown (USAF), DCS, Ops, MAC, 25-28 Mar.  
GEN John A. Wickham, Jr. (USA), Chief of Staff, US Army, 25-29 Mar.  
RADM Gerald W. MacKay, Cdr, US Naval Forces Japan, 25-31 Mar.  
LTG James E. Light, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, 15th AF, 26-27 Mar.  
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USCINCPAC, 26-28 Mar.  
VADM Thomas R. Kinnebrew, Dep CINC/CoFS, USPACFLT, 27-31 Mar.  
VADM C. E. Larkin, Cdr, Pac Area, USCG, 29-31 Mar.  
LTG Nathaniel R. Thompson, Jr. (USA), TIG, DA, 31 Mar-5 Apr.

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MG Kenneth E. Lewi (USA), Cdr, USA Trp Spt Comd, 7-13 Apr.  
MG George C. Lynch (USAF), Cdr, AF Comsy Svc, 11-13 Apr.  
LTG D'Wayne Gray (USMC), CofS, USMC, 13-17 Apr.  
MG Hugh J. Clausen (USA), TJAG, DA, 15-18 Apr.  
LTG Alexander M. Weyand (USA), Cdr, US Army Japan/IX Corps, 16-18 Apr.  
Ch (MG) Patrick J. Hessian (USA), Chief of Chaplains DA, 16-25 Apr.  
RADM Gerald W. MacKay, Cdr, US Naval Forces Japan, 17-18 Apr.  
Sen. Barry J. Goldwater, (R-AZ), 18-20 Apr.  
Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr., (R-TN), 19-20 Apr.  
LTG Lincoln D. Faurer (USAF), Dir, Natl Scty Agcy, 21-24 Apr.  
MG Donald W. Bennett (USAF), Cdr, 22d AF, 24-26 Apr.  
MG William C. Moore (USA), Dir, Ops, Read & Mob, ODCSOPS, DA, 26-27 Apr.  
Hon. Pringle P. Hillier, ASA (Fin Mgmt)/Act ASA (Instl & Log), 29 Apr-2 May.  
Dr. Roger K. Engel, Dir, Tac Intel Sys, OUSD (Rsch&Engr) (Intel), 30 Apr-4 May.  
MG John F. Wall (USA), Dir of Civil Works, OCE, DA, 2-4 May.  
MG Charles McCausland (USAF), Ogden AF Log Cen, 4-6 May.  
GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6-10 May.  
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USCINCPAC, 6-10 May.  
Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, 8-10 May.  
MG Clifton Wright (USAF), Dir of Engr & Svc, USAF, 8-10 May.  
RADM James G. Storms III, Cdr, Naval Log Cmd, USPACFLT, 12-17 May.  
MG Earl G. Peck (USAF), Dir, Intel/Space Plcy, Ofc, Dep USD (Plcy), 13-16 May.  
GEN James P. Mullins (USAF), Cdr, AF Log Comd, 15-18 May.  
MG Charles R. Hamm (USAF), Dep Dir of Plans, USAF, 16-22 May.  
LTG Robert F. Coverdale (USAF), Vice CINCPAC, 17-20 May.  
GEN James V. Hartinger (USAF), Cdr, Space Comd, 17-20 May.  
LTG Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, USFJ/5th AF, 17-20 May.  
LTG James A. Abrahamson (USAF), Assoc Admin, Space Trans Sys, 17-20 May.  
Hon. Marion Barry, Mayor, Wash, DC, 22-25 May.  
Ms. Susan J. Crawford, General Counsel, DA, 22-28 May.  
ADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., CINC, USPACFLT, 23-26 May.  
Hon. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 24-27 May.  
MG Truman Spangrud (USAF), Dir of Budget, USAF, 24-27 May.  
MG Alfred G. Hansen (USAF), Dir of Log, Plans & Prog, USAF, 24-27 May.

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Mr. Charles Z. Wick, Dir, US Information Agcy, 26 May.  
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 27 May-2 Jun.  
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USCINCPAC, 31 May-1 Jun.  
LTG Charles L. Donnelly, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, USFJ/5th AF, 31 May-1 Jun.  
LTG Charles G. Cooper (USMC), Cdr, Fleet Marine Force Pac, 1-4 Jun.  
MG Thomas G. McInerney (USAF), DCS, Ops & Intel, PACAF, 2-8 Jun.  
Mr. Robert A. Stone, Dep Asst SECDEF (Instl), 4-7 Jun.  
LTG Larry D. Welch (USAF), DCS, Prog & Resr, USAF, 14-16 Jun.  
MG Walter C. Schrupp (USAF), Dep CofS/IG, USPACOM, 18-22 Jun.  
MG Frank E. Petersen (USMC), Asst Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wing, 20-23 Jun.  
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 21-23 Jun.  
MG Dan C. Mills (USAF), ANG Asst to HQ USAF, 27 Jun-1 Jul.  
Rep. Jack Edwards (R-AL), 8-12 Jul.  
Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson (R-VA), 8-12 Jul  
Rep. John T. Myers (R-IN), 8-12 Jul  
Rep. Dan Daniel (D-VA), 8-12 Jul.  
MG Harold G. Glasgow (USMC), Cdr, III Marine Amphib Force, 12-13 Jul.  
GEN Bennie L. Davis (USAF), CINCSAC, 12-14 Jul.  
Rep. Robert E. Badham (R-CA), 14-16 Jul.  
Rep. Stanford E. Parris (R-VA), 14-16 Jul.  
GEN Jerome F. O'Malley (USAF), CINCPACAF, 16-18 Jul.  
MG Thomas J. Flynn (USA), Asst Dep Dir for Ops, Natl Scty Agcy, 21-27 Jul.  
Amb. Jose Sorzano, Deputy to US Mission at UN, 25-27 Jul.  
LTG Edward L. Tixier (USAF), Cdr, USFJ/5th AF, 30 Jul-2 Aug  
LTG Joseph K. Bratton (USA), Chief of Engr, DA, 4-7 Aug.  
MG Peter G. Burbules (USA), Cdr, USA AMCCOM, 4-8 Aug.  
Mr. Noel C. Koch, Princ Dep Asst SECDEF (Intl Scty Affairs), 6-10 Aug.  
MG David B. Barker (USMC), CofS, USFJ, 7-8 Aug.  
Mr. Michael R. DiFulgo, Dir, Log & Fin Audits, USAAA, 10-15 Aug.  
Mr. Lewis D. Walker, Dep ASA for Environ Safety & Occ Health, 12-15 Aug.  
LTG Bernhard T. Mitemeyer (USA), Surg Gen, DA, 14-18 Aug.  
MG Gerald L. Prather (USAF), Cdr, AF Comm Cmd, 15-19 Aug.  
MG Frank E. Petersen (USMC), Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wing, 17-21 Aug.  
MG William E. Potts (USA), Cdr, USA Ord Cen & Sch, 17-24 Aug.

# UNCLASSIFIED

LTG William H. Schneider (USA), Dep CINC/CofS, USPACOM, 18-22 Aug.  
MG Joseph L. Fant III (USA), Dep Cdr, 2d US Army, 18-24 Aug.  
MG Daniel C. Helix (USA), Cdr, 63d USAR Cnd, 21-25 Aug.  
MG John A. Hemphill (USA), Dir of Ops, J3, USREDCOM, 23-26 Aug  
MG Harold G. Glasgow (USMC), Cdr, III Marine Amphib Force, 23-28 Aug.  
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 26-27 Aug.  
Mr. Milton H. Hamilton, Admin Asst to Secy of Army, 3-9 Sep.  
Dr. Robert G. Priddy, Special Asst to ACSI, DA, 5-10 Sep.  
MG Donald W. Bennett (USAF), Cdr, 22d AF, 8-9 Sep.  
LTG Carl E. Vuono (USA), Dep Cdr, TRADOC/Cdr, USA Comb Arms Cen, 8-12 Sep.  
GEN Thomas M. Ryan, Jr. (USAF), CINCMAC, 12-13 Sep.  
RADM Edward K. Walker, Jr., Cdr, Nav Sup Syst Comd, 13-16 Sep.  
MG Harry E. Soyster (USA), Cdr, USA INSCOM, 14-18 Sep.  
MG William P. Winkler, Jr. (USA), Comdt, USA Acad of Health Sci, 16-18 Sep.  
MG Max Baratz, Cdr, 416th Engr Comd (USAR), 22-29 Sep.  
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 25-26 Sep.  
MG James L. Day (USMC), Dep Cdr, USMC Bases, Pac, 27 Sep-2 Oct.  
Ms. Judy Ann Miller, Dep Asst SA (Mil Pers EO & Human Resr), 27 Sep-6 Oct.  
ADM William J. Crowe, USCINCPAC, 29 Sep-2 Oct.  
VADM James R. Hogg, Cdr, Seventh Fleet, 29 Sep-2 Oct.  
LTG Edward L. Tixier (USAF), Cdr, USFJ/5th AF, 29 Sep-2 Oct.  
ADM Sylvester R. Foley, Jr., CINC USPACFLT, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
GEN Richard G. Stilwell (USA Ret), Dep Under SECDEF for Plcy, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
LTG Robert D. Russ (USAF), DCoFS, RD&A, USAF, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Mr. Wallace O. Knowles, Asst for Korea, OASD (ISA), 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Mr. James A. Kelly, Dep Asst SECDEF East Asia & Pac Affairs, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Mr. George E. Dausman, Dep Asst SA for Mat Acq Mgt, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Mr. James M. Compton, Dir, Intl Log, OASD (MI&L), 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Dr. Jeanne S. Mintz, Dir, Far East/S Hemis Aff, OUSD (Rsch/Engr), 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
MG Ellie G. Shuler (USAF), Cdr, 3d Air Div, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Hon. Jay R. Sculley, Asst SA (RD&A), 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
Mr. David S. Lewis, Pres, General Dynamics, 29 Sep-3 Oct.  
MG Robert J. Sunnell (USA), Prog Mgr, Abrams Tank Sys, USA TACOM, 30 Sep-5 Oct.  
Dr. John N. Ellison, Dir, Mob Concepts Dev Cen, NDU, 30 Sep-6 Oct.

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Mr. Herbert B. Goertzel, Dep Dir Joint Data Sys Spt Cen, DOD, 4-10 Oct.  
MG Henry G. Skeen (USA), Dir of Sup & Maint, ODCSLOG, DA, 6-13 Oct.  
MG Rocco Negris (USA), Dep Cdr, I Corps, 7-12 Oct.  
MG John Phillips (USMC), CofS, USFJ, 9-10 Oct.  
MG John I. Hudson (USMC), USMC Dev & Educ Comd, 9-16 Oct.  
VADM Harry C. Schrader, Jr., Cdr, Naval Sur Force Pac, 13-15 Oct.  
LTG Clarence E. McKnight Jr. (USA), Dir, C3 Sys OJCS, 13-17 Oct.  
MG Robert W. Norris (USAF), Dep JAG, USAF, 18-23 Oct.  
LTG Max W. Noah (USA), Compt of the Army, 18-25 Oct.  
GEN George S. Blanchard (USA Ret), Pres, USO Worldwide, 20-24 Oct.  
MG Edward Honor (USA), Dir, Trans, Energy & Trp Spt, ODSLOG, DA, 20-26 Oct.  
MG Carl H. McNair, Jr., (USA), DCS for Cbt Dev, USA TRADOC, 20-28 Oct.  
VADM C. A. Easterling, Cdr, Naval Air Forces, USPACFLT, 21-23 Oct.  
GEN William R. Richardson (USA), Cdr, TRADOC, 21-24 Oct.  
LTG James E. Light, Jr. (USAF), Cdr, 15th AF, 23 Oct.  
Mr. Harold L. Stugart, Auditor Gen, DA, 23-27 Oct.  
MG Edward C. O'Connor (USA), Cdr, USA Scty Asst Comd, 27 Oct-2 Nov.  
LTG Emmett Paige, Jr. (USA), Cdr, USAISC, 29 Oct-10 Nov.  
LTG David K. Doyle (USA), ACoFS, Info Mgt, DA, 30 Oct-2 Nov.  
MG Vaughn O. Lang (USA), Dir, C3, USPACOM, 30 Oct-4 Nov.  
MG Harold I. Small (USA), Cdr, MTMC, 31 Oct-4 Nov.  
GEN Charles A. Gabriel (USAF), Chief of Staff, USAF, 1-4 Nov.  
LTG Max B. Bralliar (USAF), Surg Gen, USAF, 1-4 Nov.  
LTG David L. Nichols (USAF), DCS, Plans & Ops, USAF, 1-4 Nov.  
LTG Duane H. Cassidy (USAF), DCS, Mpr & Pers, USAF, 1-4 Nov.  
RADM William J. Ryan, Cdr, Def Fuel Sup Cen, 2-4 Nov.  
MG Eugene R. Cromartie (USA), Cdr, USACIDC, 3-12 Nov.  
GEN Robert W. Bazley (USAF), CINCPACAF, 4-8 Nov.  
MG Frank E. Petersen (USMC), Cdr, 1st Marine Air Wing, 7-8 Nov.  
MG Maurice O. Edmonds (USA), DCS for Tng, USA TRADOC, 11-15 Nov.  
GEN Andrew P. Iosue (USAF), Cdr, ATC, 12-16 Nov.  
Rep. Melvin Price (D-IL), Chmn, House Armed Services Com, 13-16 Nov.  
Rep. Mario Biaggi (D-NY), 13-16 Nov.  
Rep. Norman D. Shumway (R-CA), 13-16 Nov.

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Mr. Noel C. Koch, Princ Dep Asst SECDEF (Intl Scty Affairs), 14-17 Nov.  
Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Mayor of San Francisco, 20-24 Nov.  
Mr. Bernard Topf, Reg Dir, Def Contract Audit Agcy, DOD, 25-28 Nov.  
Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer, Chief, R&A Div, J5, USPACOM, 28 Nov-1 Dec.  
Mr. Talbot S. Lindstrom, Dep Under SECDEF (Intl Prog & Tech), 3-7 Dec.  
Hon. Richard L. Wagner, Jr., Asst to SECDEF (Atomic Energy), 6-8 Dec.  
LTG Richard K. Saxer (USAF), Dir, Def Nuc Agcy, 6-8 Dec.  
Mr. Werner E. Michel, Asst to SECDEF (Intel Oversight), 8-14 Dec.  
GEN John A. Wickham, Jr. (USA), Chief of Staff, US Army, 9-13 Dec.  
GEN Earl T. O'Loughlin (USAF), Cdr, AF Log Comd, 10-12 Dec.  
MG Walter C. Schrupp (USAF), Dep CofS/IG CINCPAC, 16-18 Dec.

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
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Appendix C (cont)

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## (U) GLOSSARY

3CS ..... third country sales  
AAEN ..... active Army enlisted  
AAOF ..... active Army officer  
AAWO ..... active Army warrant officer  
AB ..... air base  
ACC ..... Air Component Command (ROK/US CFC)  
ACMI ..... air combat maneuvering instrumentation  
ACofS ..... Assistant Chief of Staff  
ACRV ..... armored combat recovery vehicle  
AD ..... ammunition depot  
ADA ..... air defense artillery  
ADAPCP ..... Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program  
ADD ..... Agency for Defense Development (ROK)  
ADP ..... automatic data processing  
ADT ..... active duty for training  
AER ..... Army Emergency Relief  
AFH ..... Army family housing  
AFHO ..... Army family housing operations  
AFKN ..... American Forces Korea Network  
AFP ..... annual funding program  
AFRC ..... Armed Forces Recreation Center  
AHR ..... Annual Historical Review  
ALO ..... authorized level of organization  
ALOC-K ..... Air Lines of Communication-Korea  
AMC ..... Army Materiel Command  
AMVA ..... Army motor vehicle accidents  
APC ..... armored personnel carrier  
APF ..... appropriated fund  
AR ..... Army regulation  
ARM ..... Army Recreation (Slot) Machines  
ASCOM ..... Army Service Command  
ASD (ISA) .... Asst SECDEF for International Security Affairs  
ASF ..... Army Stock Fund  
ASIC ..... all-source intelligence center  
ASP ..... ammunition supply point  
AUTODIN ..... automatic digital network  
AWACS ..... airborne warning and control system  
AWOL ..... absent without leave  
BEQ ..... bachelor enlisted quarters  
BG ..... Brigadier General  
BMY ..... Bowen-McLaughlin-York (US contractor)  
BOQ ..... bachelor officer quarters  
BSEP ..... Basic Skills Education Program  
BTMS ..... Battalion Training Management System  
C-1 ..... fully combat ready  
C-2 ..... combat ready with minor deficiencies  
C2MP ..... Command and Control Master Plan

Appendix E

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# UNCLASSIFIED

C3 ..... command, control and communications  
C3I ..... command, control, communications, and intelligence  
C-4 ..... not combat ready  
CAF ..... Combined Aviation Force (ROK-US)  
CASIC ..... combined all-source intelligence center  
CBAC ..... Combined Budget Activation Committee  
CBR ..... chemical, biological, and radiological  
CBS-X ..... continuing balance system-expanded  
CCSF ..... CPICK Combined COMSEC Support Facility  
CDIP ..... Combined Defense Improvement Projects  
C-E ..... communications-electronics  
CED ..... collection, exploitation and dissemination  
CEM ..... communications-electronics maintenance  
CETS ..... contractor engineering and technical services  
CEWI ..... combat electronic warfare and intelligence  
CFA (ROK/US) . Combined Field Army (ROK/US)  
CFC ..... (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command  
CFDH ..... civilian foreign national direct hire  
CG EUSA ..... Commanding General, Eighth United States Army  
CIL ..... Central Identification Laboratory  
CINCCFC ..... Commander in Chief, (ROK/US) Combined Forces Command  
CINCUNC ..... Commander in Chief, United Nations Command  
CNO ..... Chief of Naval Operations  
COB ..... command operating budget  
COHORT ..... cohesive operational readiness training  
COL ..... Colonel  
COM ..... community  
COMINT ..... communications intelligence  
COML ..... commercial  
COMM ..... communications  
COMSEC ..... communications security  
COMUSJAPAN ... Commander, United States Forces, Japan  
COMUSKOREA ... Commander, United States Forces, Korea  
CONPLAN ..... contingency plan  
CONREP ..... Contingency Construction Report  
CONUS ..... Continental United States  
COR ..... contracting officer's representative  
COSCOM ..... Corps Support Command  
COSIS ..... care of supplies in storage  
CP ..... command post  
Cp ..... Camp  
CPICK ..... COMSEC Plan for Interoperable Communications in Korea  
CPL ..... Command Priority List; Corporal  
CPX ..... command post exercise  
CRA ..... continuing resolution authority  
CS ..... combat support  
CSCT ..... Combat Support Coordination Team  
CSS ..... combat service support  
CSSSP ..... Controlled Single-Source Selection Procedure  
CUCV ..... Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle

Appendix E (cont)

# UNCLASSIFIED

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CUDH ..... civilian US direct hire  
CUPIDS ..... Command Unique Personnel Information Data System  
CUWTF ..... Combined UW (Unconventional Warfare) Task Force  
CWRB ..... Command Work Review Board  
CY ..... calendar year  
DA ..... Department of the Army  
DAC ..... Department of the Army Civilian  
DAS3 ..... decentralized automated service support system  
DCI ..... Deputy Commander for Installations  
DCS ..... Defense Communications System  
DCSLOG ..... Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics  
DCSOPS ..... Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations  
DCSPER ..... Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  
D-day ..... Unnamed day when a particular operation commences or is to commence  
DEA ..... data exchange agreement  
DEFCON ..... defense readiness condition  
DISCOM ..... Division Support Command  
Div ..... Division  
DNMC ..... Division Materiel Management Center  
DMZ ..... Demilitarized Zone  
DOD ..... Department of Defense  
DOS ..... day of supply  
DS4 ..... direct support unit standard supply system  
DSS-K ..... Direct Support System-Korea  
EACIC ..... Echelons-above-Corps Intelligence Center  
EASTPAC ..... Eastern Pacific  
E-E ..... emergency-essential  
ELINT ..... electronic intelligence  
ENCOM ..... Engineer Command  
EQUATE ..... electronic quality assurance test equipment  
ERADCOM ..... Electronics R&D Command  
EUSA ..... Eighth United States Army  
EUSAMSP ..... EUSA Modernization & Stationing Plan  
EW ..... electronic warfare  
FACON ..... Facility Control Office Report  
FADAC ..... field artillery digital automatic computer  
FAN-P ..... Flaming Arrow Net-Pacific  
FAP ..... Family Action Plan  
FEA-K ..... Facility Engineer Activity-Korea  
FED ..... Far East District (US Army Corps of Engineers)  
FIP ..... Force Improvement Plan  
FLIR ..... forward-looking infrared  
FLOT ..... forward line of own troops  
FMS ..... foreign military sales  
FOC ..... full operational capability  
FOUO ..... for official use only  
FROKA ..... First Republic of Korea Army  
FTX ..... field training exercise  
FY ..... fiscal year  
FYP ..... Five-Year Plan

Appendix E (cont)

# UNCLASSIFIED

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GDLS ..... General Dynamics Land Systems  
GEN ..... General  
GFM ..... government-furnished material  
GM ..... general management-civilian employees  
GS ..... general schedule-civilian employees  
GST ..... ground station terminal  
HE ..... high-explosive  
HEAT ..... high-explosive anti-tank  
HEI ..... high-explosive incendiary  
HJ ..... Honest John  
HOSP ..... hospital  
HQ ..... headquarters  
HUMINT ..... human intelligence  
I&W ..... indications and warning  
IG ..... inspector general  
IMET ..... International Military Education & Assistance  
INSCOM ..... US Army Intelligence & Security Command  
IP2 ..... Integrated Programming Plan  
IPSS ..... Initial Pre-planned Supply  
IR ..... internal review  
ISS ..... installation service support  
ITV ..... Improved TOW vehicle  
JCIS ..... Joint Command Information Systems  
JCS ..... Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JDS ..... Joint Deployment System  
JP-4 ..... aviation fuel  
JSA ..... Joint Security Area  
JSCP ..... Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  
JTPF ..... Joint Tactical Fusion Program  
JUSMAG-K ..... Joint US Military Assistance Group - Korea  
KAAP ..... Korean Ammunition Allocation Plan  
KAL ..... Korean Airlines  
KATUSA ..... Korean Augmentation to the US Army  
KDIA ..... Korea Defense Intelligence Agency  
KHIC ..... Korean Heavy Industry & Construction Company  
KISS ..... Korean Intelligence Support System  
KMAG ..... Korea Military Advisory Group  
KNHC ..... Korea National Housing Corporation  
KOAX ..... Korea Area Exchange  
KPA ..... Korean Peoples Army  
KRG ..... Korea Review Group  
KTACS ..... Korean Tactical Air Control System  
LOA ..... letter of offer and acceptance  
LQA ..... living quarters allowance  
LTG ..... Lieutenant General  
MAC ..... Military Armistice Commission; Military Airlift Command  
MACOM ..... major Army command  
MAMS ..... Maintenance Activity Management System  
MAP ..... Military Assistance Program  
mbbl ..... thousand-barrel

Appendix E (cont)

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MBTU ..... millions of British thermal units  
MC ..... mission capable  
MCA ..... military construction Army  
MDL ..... Military Demarcation Line  
MDMC ..... Mobilization Concepts Development Center  
MEDCOM ..... Medical Command  
MEDSOM ..... medical supply, optical & maintenance  
MERADCOM ..... Mobility Equipment Research & Development Command  
MG ..... Major General  
MI ..... military intelligence  
MIA ..... missing in action  
MICOM ..... US Army Missile Command  
MILCON ..... military construction  
MILPERCEN ..... US Army Military Personnel Center  
MLRS ..... multiple-launch rocket system  
MMC ..... Materiel Management Center  
MND ..... Ministry of National Defense (ROK)  
MOA ..... memorandum of agreement  
MOGAS ..... automotive gasoline  
MOS ..... military occupational speciality  
MOU ..... memorandum of understanding  
MOVE ..... Motor Vehicle Emphasis Program  
MP ..... military police  
MRD ..... mobilization reserve division  
MRL ..... multiple rocket launcher  
MRMS ..... Maintenance Reporting & Management System  
MSC ..... major subordinate command  
MSC-K ..... Materiel Support Center-Korea  
MSF ..... Morale Support Fund  
MT ..... multiple-time  
MTMC ..... Military Traffic Management Command  
MTOE ..... Modification Table of Organization and Equipment  
MWO ..... modification work order  
MWR ..... morale, welfare and recreation  
NAF ..... nonappropriated fund  
NATO ..... North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NBC ..... nuclear, biological, chemical  
NCA ..... National Command Authorities  
NCIP ..... national inventory control point  
NCO ..... noncommissioned officer  
NCSC ..... National Communications Security Committee  
NEA ..... Northeast Asia  
NEEACT ..... US Naval Electronics Engineering Activity  
NEO ..... noncombatant evacuation operation  
NET ..... new equipment training  
NK ..... North Korea  
NKA ..... North Korean Army  
NKAf ..... North Korean Air Force  
NKN ..... North Korean Navy  
NVEOL ..... Night Vision Electro-Optics Laboratory

Appendix E (cont)

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OASD ..... Office of Asst Secretary of Defense  
OCFC ..... Overseas Combined Federal Campaign  
OCR ..... optical character reader  
ODP ..... Officer Distribution Plan  
OJT ..... on-the-job training  
OMA ..... operation and maintenance, Army  
OPCON ..... operational control  
OPLAN ..... operation plan  
OSD ..... Office of the Secretary of Defense  
OSHA ..... Occupational Safety and Health Act  
OST ..... order-ship time  
PACOM ..... Pacific Command  
PACTIDS ..... USMACV Theater Intelligence Data System  
PAO ..... Public Affairs Office  
PARPRO ..... Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program  
PARR ..... Program Analysis Resource Review  
PCS ..... permanent change of station  
PD ..... point detonating  
PDIP ..... Program Development Increment Package  
PDSK ..... Petroleum Distribution System-Korea  
PIBD ..... point initiating, base detonating  
PIC-K ..... Photographic Interpretation Center-Korea  
PIP ..... Product Improvement Program  
PM ..... Project Manager  
PME ..... professional military education  
POD ..... port of debarkation  
POL ..... petroleum, oils and lubricants  
POM ..... Program Objective Memorandum  
PRC ..... Peoples Republic of China  
PROGRESS ..... Program Review System  
PSP ..... prestock point  
PSYOP ..... psychological operations  
PVT ..... Private  
R&D ..... research and development  
RADM ..... Rear Admiral  
RAS ..... rear area security  
RCODT ..... Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training  
RCS ..... requirement control symbol  
RDTE ..... research, development, test, and evaluation  
REDCON ..... readiness condition  
REMAN ..... resource management  
RMTU ..... Reserve Military Training Unit  
ROC ..... required operational capabilities  
ROK ..... Republic of Korea  
ROKA ..... ROK Army  
ROKAF ..... ROK Air Force  
ROKG ..... ROK Government  
ROKIT ..... ROK Indigenous Tank  
ROKMC ..... ROK Marine Corps  
ROKN ..... ROK Navy

Appendix E (cont)

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RPMA ..... real property maintenance activities  
RS&D ..... receiving, staging & deploying  
RSOK ..... Recreation Services Operations-Korea  
SAACT ..... Surveillance & Accountability Control Team  
SAILS ..... Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply Subsystem  
SAM ..... surface-to-air missile  
SATCOM ..... satellite communications  
SCAC ..... Safety Crisis Action Center  
SCIF ..... Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility  
SCM ..... (ROK/US) Security Consultative Meeting  
SECDEF ..... Secretary of Defense  
SEP ..... Scientist/Engineer Exchange Program  
SF ..... Special Forces  
SGH ..... Seoul Garden Hotel  
SITREP ..... Situation Report System  
SJS ..... Secretary Joint Staff  
SLAR ..... side-looking airborne radar  
SLD ..... seismic listening device  
SLOC ..... sea lines of communication  
SOFA ..... Status of Forces Agreement  
SOP ..... standard operating procedure  
SPBS ..... Standard Property Book System  
SPT CEN ..... Support Center  
SROKA ..... Second ROK Army  
SSA ..... supply support activity  
STEP-K ..... Satellite Terminal Employment Plan for Korea  
STON ..... short ton  
SUPCOM ..... Support Command  
TAACOM ..... Theater Army Area Command  
TACFIRE ..... Tactical Fire Direction System  
TACOM ..... US Army Tank-Automotive Command  
TACSAT ..... tactical satellite  
TACSATCOM ..... tactical satellite communications  
TAMMC ..... Theater Army Materiel Management Center  
TAT ..... technical assistance team  
TDA ..... table of distribution and allowances  
TDY ..... temporary duty  
TFW ..... Tactical Fighter Wing  
TKP ..... Trans-Korea Pipeline  
TMDE ..... test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment  
TNT ..... Tunnel Neutralization Team  
TOE ..... table of organization and equipment  
TOW ..... tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile  
TPFDD ..... Time-Phased Force Deployment Data  
TPICK ..... Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea  
TR ..... Theater Reserves  
TRADOC ..... US Army Training & Doctrine Command  
TROKA ..... Third ROK Army  
TS ..... TEAM SPIRIT  
TTS ..... tank thermal sight

Appendix E (cont)

# UNCLASSIFIED

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U-FL ..... ULCHI-FOCUS LENS  
UMCA ..... unspecified minor military construction, Army  
UN ..... United Nations  
UNC ..... United Nations Command  
US ..... United States  
USA ..... United States Army  
USACH-S ..... United States Army Community Hospital-Seoul  
USAF ..... United States Air Force  
USAFCS-K ..... United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea  
USAFIK ..... United States Army Forces in Korea  
USAFK ..... United States Air Forces Korea  
USAISC ..... United States Army Information System Command  
USAKCA ..... United States Army Korea Contracting Agency  
USAMGIK ..... United States Army Military Government in Korea  
USAR ..... United States Army Reserve  
USATSARCOM ... United States Army Troop Support & Readiness Command  
USCINCPAC .... United States Commander in Chief, Pacific  
USD(P) ..... Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
USFJ ..... United States Forces Japan  
USFK ..... United States Forces Korea  
USG ..... United States Government  
USMC ..... United States Marine Corps  
USN ..... United States Navy  
USNFK ..... United States Naval Forces Korea  
USPACOM ..... United States Pacific Command  
USSR ..... Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
VIP ..... visual information projector  
WESTCOM ..... United States Army Western Command  
WESTPAC ..... Western Pacific  
WIN ..... WWMCCS Intercomputer Network  
WIS ..... WWMCCS Information System  
WP ..... white phosphorous  
WRS ..... war reserve stocks  
WRSA ..... War Reserve Stocks for Allies  
WWMCCS ..... Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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