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# HISTORY OF HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN

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Nuclear Policy Project

# 1972

## RCS: CINCPAC INST. 5000.5C

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**COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN**

**COMMAND HISTORY**

**1972**

**Prepared by the Office of the  
Secretary Joint Staff**

**Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan**

**APO San Francisco 96525**

**Fuchu Air Station**

**1974**

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## PREFACE

(U) CINCPAC Instructions 5000.5C (045), Ser 1239 of 9 March 1971, require the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan, to submit an annual historical report which will provide a compact historical record of the operations of its headquarters, as a CINCPAC subordinate unified command headquarters in the PACOM.

(U) This history reviews those significant actions and events which took place within Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, during calendar year 1972. It addresses the coordination, the essential task of COMUSJAPAN; administrative activities of the headquarters; and the problems and difficulties encountered. It also addresses accomplishments, objectives not obtained, and identifies key issues and problems facing the command in 1973 and beyond. The areas are reviewed by subject, not necessarily in order of importance or magnitude. The history does not duplicate the history programs of the services, however relations between Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, and other headquarters are covered when considered to be of interest.

(U) During calendar year 1972, preparation of the Command History was transferred to the Office of the Secretary Joint Staff from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J3 (Plans and Operations). It continues as an additional duty. There are no personnel spaces authorized for preparation of the Command History.

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## CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMANDSECTION I - U.S. FORCES, JAPAN

(U) STRENGTH: A major change in the strength of the Services' personnel within the command's area occurred this year as a result of the reversion of Okinawa to the Government of Japan on 15 May 1972. With the reversion approximately 40,000 service personnel were added. The decline of personnel in USFJ continued but at a reduced rate as the plans of the WestPac Base Realignment Plan were effected and perturbations in Southeast Asia operations dominated unit moves. Comparative figures for pre- and post-reversion of Okinawa dates are shown. Significant to note is that Okinawa reversion resulted in a noticeable relative distribution of forces -- 35.5% in mainland Japan and 64.5% in the new Okinawa Prefecture. It is envisioned this approximate distribution will continue for the foreseeable future.

<u>MAINLAND</u>	<u>1 Jan 72</u>	<u>14 May 72</u>	<u>Change</u>
Army	2,931	12,527	9,596
Navy	4,302	7,096	2,794
Air Force	12,435	23,939	11,504
Marines	6,234	22,459	16,225
Total	25,902	66,021	40,119
-----			
<u>MAINLAND</u>	<u>15 May 72</u>	<u>31 Dec 72</u>	<u>Change</u>
Army	2,358	3,437	1,079
Navy	4,379	4,167	- 212
Air Force	11,608	8,479	-3,129
Marines	6,195	7,013	818
Sub-Total	24,540	23,096	-1,444
<u>OKINAWA</u>			
Army	10,169	9,825	- 344
Navy	2,717	2,307	- 410
Air Force	12,331	10,292	-2,039
Marines	16,264	19,450	3,186
Sub-Total	41,481	41,874	393
Total	66,021	64,970	-1,051

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HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH

31 December 1972


		<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
ARMY	Officer	12	14
	Enlisted	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>
	Sub-Total	18	22
NAVY	Officer	8	6
	Enlisted	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
	Sub-Total	12	13
AIR FORCE	Officer	12	12
	Enlisted	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
	Sub-Total	19	19
MARINES	Officer	6	4
	Enlisted	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
	Sub-Total	7	7
CIVILIANS (US)		<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>
TOTAL		<u>81</u>	<u>84</u>

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HQ USEJ ORGANIZATION CHART

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SECTION II - THE USFJ STAFF  
KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN 1972

Commander, USFJ:

(U) Lt Gen Robert E. Pursley, USAF, succeeded Lt Gen Gordon M. Graham, USAF, as Commander, United States Forces, Japan, on 15 November 1972.

Chief of Staff, USFJ:

(U) Maj Gen Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC, replaced Maj Gen Richard M. Lee, USA, on 14 June 1972.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J3 (Plans and Operations):

(U) Colonel James P. Davis, USAF, replaced Col Philip Fetler, USAF, on 11 August 1972.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J4 (Logistics):

(U) CAPT John V. Peters, USN, replaced CAPT Richard Belt, USN, on 11 July 1972.

Assistant Chief of Staff, J5 (Civil Affairs):

(U) Col Pierce E. Mounts, USA, replaced Col William Panttaja, USA, on 4 December 1972.

Staff Advisor, Surgeon, J74:

(U) CAPT Robert C. Lanning, USN, replaced CAPT John J. Dempsey, on 18 August 1972.

Staff Advisor, Chaplain, J75:

(U) Col L. E. Burnette, USA, replaced LTC James Morrill, USA, on 15 April 1972.

Staff Advisor, Comptroller, J76:

(U) Major Thomas R. Bousquet, USAF, replaced Col Milton J. Scott, USAF, on 27 December 1972.

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## RETURN OF OKINAWA TO GOJ

(U) Clearly the most significant event in the year 1972, the return of Okinawa to Government of Japan control, had great impact on U.S. Forces, Japan.

a. (U) Plans concerning command relationships on Okinawa after reversion were completed in early 1972 and implemented on 15 May 1972 with the establishment of the Okinawa Area Coordinator (OAC) and Okinawa Area Field Office (OAFI). Based on six months of experience by those offices, a study was conducted during November, in accordance with the Okinawa Transfer Plan, in order to validate the requirements for and functions of both the OAC and OAFI. After a review of all factors, it was determined that both offices should be continued at present with another review scheduled for May 1973.

b. (U) Upon the reversion of Okinawa, Hq USARJ was transformed from a directorate staff headquarters with one subordinate command to a general staff headquarters with seven subordinate commands. Concurrently, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, was discontinued and the 2d Logistical Command was inactivated and replaced by United States Army Base Command, Okinawa, a subordinate command of USARJ. Simultaneously, Headquarters, IX Corps was transferred from Okinawa to Camp Zama. This major reorganization and realignment was conducted smoothly and efficiently with no interruption of essential services or mission performance.

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d. (U) Extended application of SOFA to Okinawa was accomplished and emphasis placed on liaison and agreements in the areas of entry and exit, quarantine, postal, control of traffic and vehicle operations, and Article XIV contractors.

e. (U) Conversion of the Okinawa local national (LN) workforce to the indirect hire employment system was completed to the mutual satisfaction of the USG and GOJ.

f. (U) During CY 1973 efforts will be continued to monitor and coordinate JSDF deployments and mission assumptions through the medium of the Ad Hoc Defense Working Group for JSDF Okinawa Beddown. The objective will be to completely transfer Okinawa defense responsibility to the GOJ, hopefully by 15 May 1973, but not later than 1 July 1973.

g. (U) The establishment of Tri-Service Administration of government family housing on Okinawa was initially to have been resolved at the local level following reversion. Due to major service inequities and misconceptions as to assignment control of housing, however, responsibility for solution was assumed by the Tri-Service Housing Council in mainland Japan. The delays and responsibility changes prevented successful resolution of this issue during 1972. Present milestones call for the project to be completed early in CY 1973.

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CHAPTER II

PLANNING

SECTION I - PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1-1

1-1

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1-1

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## SECTION II - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

1. (U) In support of Okinawa Reversion, the Joint Committee approved the Okinawa Air Traffic Control Agreement. An objective for CY 1973 is to insure continued implementation of this agreement so that the JCAB will assume responsibility for ATC within the Okinawa FIR by 15 May 1974. Two potential problem areas warranted close attention.

a. An agreed concept for Center/Radar Approach Control (CERAP) familiarization training was reached on 13 October 1972; this agreement is expected to be signed by 1 March 1973. The training concept involves "facility rating" five JCAB controllers as a cadre to provide follow-on training in Okinawa Center to ten additional JCAB controllers. This number of controllers is the minimum number of radar-trained controllers which JCAB requires to operate their own enroute facility 15 May 1974.

b. The JCAB has yet to "break ground" on a new ACC facility at Naha. This development will be watched closely as further delay may portend a delay in the GOJ assuming ATC responsibility on 15 May 1974.

2. (U) For the Japan mainland, the CAS will continue the attempt to obtain sufficient training airspace for U.S. Forces. Until such time as such airspace is established, however, U.S. Forces will not be restricted by GOJ limitations placed upon JSDF aircraft operations. In the meantime, there is positive evidence that the JCAB intends to initiate formal action to apply Japan Civil Aviation laws to U.S. Forces. Objectives in this area for 1973 are therefore threefold:

a. Continue training airspace negotiations.

b. Revise the 1952 ATC Agreement.

c. Firmly resist any action to have U.S. aircraft operate under the purview of the Civil Aviation Code.

3. (U) The JCAB will eventually take over all approach control responsibility within Japan but will leave

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terminal control at U.S. airfields (tower/GCA) in the hands of U.S. personnel. Accordingly, U.S. aircraft operations at Kadena, Iwakuni, Yokota, and Misawa will be affected and aircraft deployments into and/or from Japan may require prior coordination with the JCAB so as not to disrupt civil aircraft schedules. (A form of prior consultation?) As U.S. Forces tactical aircraft inventories are reduced, pressures at all levels will be made for U.S. Forces to release established special use airspace.

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## SECTION III - OPERATIONAL MATTERS

2. (U) Training Areas:

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a. In support of Okinawa reversion, the USFJ headquarters prepared and negotiated 30 memorandum actions in the Joint Committee which provided for U.S. Forces use of 55 land/water training areas on Okinawa. Meanwhile, with respect to mainland Japan, USFJ continued to coordinate use of U.S. training areas with GOJ agencies and nine (9) training areas were released as no longer required by U.S. Forces.

b. The North Fuji Maneuver Area (NFMA) continued to dominate our attention with regard to training areas and our objective of increased USMC use was attained. In 1972, 70 firing days were realized versus 38 for CY 1971. We also attained another objective whereby arrangements for use are now negotiated at the level of the Defense Facilities Administration Office. When agreement cannot be reached, COMNAVFORJAPAN-Defense Facilities Administration Branch discussions are held at the Bureau level before escalation to the USFJ-DFAA level. We did not meet our objective of converting the NFMA into a II.4.b. SOFA (combined use) facility; this will be a prime objective for CY 1973.

3. (U) Operational Coordination: This major activity has included coordination of the following operational matters with appropriate U.S./GOJ agencies: operational deployments, safe haven operations, significant exercises, ATC requirements, airfield utilization, and significant incident reporting. The major accomplishment in each of these areas involved the establishment of procedures which afford timely dissemination and coordination of U.S. Forces operational matters. An objective for 1973 will be to translate operational procedures into USFJ policy directives. To accomplish this, the following USFJ policy letters will be revised or published:

- a. Significant Incident Reporting - revised.
- b. Aircraft Hijacking - new.
- c. Airfield Landing Permits - new.
- d. Typhoon Warnings - new.
- e. Force Transfer/Operations - revised.

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- f. PRC Civil Aircraft Landing at U.S. Forces Airfields in Japan - new.
- g. Disaster Control and Military Support - revised.

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## CHAPTER III

### FACILITIES MATTERS

(U) Completion of the Okinawa Reversion negotiations resulted in 88 Joint-Committee approved memorandums covering retention of U.S. military facilities in Okinawa.

#### SECTION I - PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS

1. (U) Aviation Fuel Support to JASDF at Misawa AB: New JP-4 Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS) levels for Misawa Air Base were established and action was initiated to complete an agreement between U.S. Navy and JASDF for the U.S. Navy to provide aviation fuel support to JASDF at Misawa AB.

2. (U) JASDF Okinawa Reversion POL Beddown Actions: JASDF Okinawa Reversion POL beddown actions were completed to include actions to have USARJ enter into an agreement with JASDF to have the U.S. Army POL Depot, U.S. Army Base Command Okinawa (USARBCO), provide petroleum tanker unloading service at Naha Port and pipeline service to Naha AB from the port.

3. (U) Tri-Service Petroleum Contingency Support Plan: As directed by CINCPAC, the Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Japan (SAPOJ) developed a sound tri-service contingency support plan to satisfy CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 fuel requirements at Itazuke AB.

4. (U) Development of Disposal Methods to Handle Tetraethyl Lead Sludge Residues: Safe and sound disposal methods and procedures were developed for handling tetraethyl lead sludge residues from tank farms.

5. (U) Tri-Service Action to Reduce Air Pollution: Tri-service action was coordinated for conversion to the new Navy distillate boiler fuel for use in Japan in order to reduce air pollution. Action was initiated to purge and replace JP-5 stocks in Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks (PWRS) with new JP-5 with Fuel System Icing Inhibitor (FSII), required by the Navy effective 1 July 1972.

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6. (U) POL Termination Rehabilitation Program:  
The current on-going POL terminal rehabilitation programs, including Navy Project-019, should be completed in CY 1973. In the next five years, it is estimated that \$1 million will be required annually for repair and maintenance of tri-service petroleum facilities in Japan.

7. (U) Pipeline POL Replenishment for Yokota:  
USFJ must negotiate some type of agreement with the GOJ in order for the U.S. military to use the new JNR pipeline for JP-4 deliveries to Yokota AB on a thru-put charge basis only. It is not in the best interest of the U.S. to pay \$1.5 million to finance the JNR pipeline tie-ins at Tsurumi POL Terminal and at Yokota AB. If the U.S. military eventually becomes a customer of the JNR pipeline with Yokota AB being a prime U.S. installation in Japan, quite possibly in the next five years all fuels (motor gasoline, heating fuel and JP-4) now being delivered to Yokota by rail and truck could be delivered by the JNR pipeline at \$500,000 per year savings to the U.S. Government.

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SECTION II - EXCESS

(U) Project "Home Run": Excess equipment and materials accumulated in Japan and on Okinawa totalling 12,955 M/T valued at \$7.2 million were returned to COMUS during 1972 under the project title "Home Run." A DOD-approved program, the excess equipment and supplies included such items as construction materials, food handling and office equipment, vehicles, nonperishable subsistence items, and medical and general supplies, and were returned for reallocation within CONUS by the Government Services Administration.

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## CHAPTER IV

### COMMUNICATIONS

#### SECTION I - PROJECTS COMPLETED FOR 1972

1. (U) Okinawa Reversion-Related Negotiations:  
All C-E related negotiations pertaining to the reversion of Okinawa were successfully completed.

2. (U) Settlement of Major Telephone Bill Dispute:

a. The long-standing telephone bill dispute with Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Public Corporation was finally resolved. This removed a major irritant, often a matter raised in the Diet by Opposition parties, that has existed between USG and GOJ since the mid-1950's.

b. Shortly after the signing the Peace Treaty, a disagreement arose with GOJ because USFJ was using telephone cables procured with Termination of War (TOW) funds which had been provided by GOJ to facilitate operation of the occupation. Other cables had been provided in connection with the Japanese Government Relocation Construction Program (JGCP), whose purpose was to consolidate USFJ outside metropolitan areas. The position of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTTPC) was that these TOW and JGCP cables were its property and should be paid for at leased rates. USFJ's position was that while it continued to use the cables, it should pay only the maintenance costs.

c. Since the positions could not be reconciled, a temporary working agreement was reached. NTTPC would bill USFJ at leased rates: USFJ would red-line charges it considered inappropriate and pay maintenance costs.

d. In the nearly 20 years that followed, the problem repeatedly surfaced in Congress, the Japanese Diet, and the media of both countries. By some Japanese calculations, the outstanding amount was approximately \$25,000,000 or double if interest was included. Together with the status of Okinawa, it was considered a final vestige of the occupation.

e. An Ad Hoc Subcommittee under the USFJ/GOJ Joint Committee was established and USFJ began negotiations with GOJ Foreign Ministry. Agreement was reached on payment of a little over \$2,000,000 for the 1952-1971 period.

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Since USFJ had paid maintenance costs, actual cash payment was less than \$800,000.

f. The agreement was signed on 3 June 1971 by the NTTPC contracting supervisor and the contracting officer of the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Japan. In effect, neither party abandoned its position. Therefore, to minimize future problems, another agreement was signed simultaneously by which USFJ stated its policy would be to use the minimum number of cables and phase out those not needed or not repairable. NTTPC would continue to provide repairs. Both sides would consult about repair versus replacement, and where agreed NTTPC would replace at its expense and lease to USFJ.

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SECTION II - COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS FOR 1973

1. (U) Telecommunications Center Consolidation: CINCPAC planning for the consolidation of telecommunication centers has commenced at JCS direction. The effort is independent of base consolidation and is part of a world-wide effort. The planning will be separated into two sections.

a. Mainland Japan: This study will first determine if a consolidation plan is actually required under guidelines established by the JCS. Initial data base survey was submitted to CINCPAC by COMUSJAPAN on 7 November 1972.

b. Okinawa: JCS has directed CINCPAC to develop a plan for consolidation of telecommunication centers. Initial data base survey was submitted to CINCPAC by COMUSJAPAN on 10 November 1972.

2. (U) DSSCS Integratiion Into AUTODIN: The Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) is in the process of being integrated into the AUTODIN system. This action will allow the complete phase-out of the Spintcomm Automatic Relay Center (SARC), a complex computer-controlled switch at Fuchu. All necessary modifications to the AUTODIN Switch at Camp Drake have been completed. Rehoming of all subscribers for the Fuchu SARC to the AUTODIN Switch at Drake will be completed in March 1973.

3. (U) Consolidation of Okinawa TEA Annexes into Japan TEA Annexes: With the reversion of Okinawa, a separate frequency annex to the Telecommunications Electronics Agreement (TEA) was created. This approach was necessary to keep the frequency negotiations from being confused with day-to-day actions on frequencies for mainland Japan. The 1973 review of the TEA annexes will result in a single consolidated set of frequency assignments for all of Japan.

4. (U) Telephone Tie In by American Embassy in Japan with U.S. Forces Telephone System: The American Embassy operates a separate telephone system to support their own activities. A much more effective approach

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is to tie into U.S. Forces telephone system. This will be investigated in detail.

5. (U) EMI Easements: Joint Committee actions on Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) easements need updating. Base consolidations will result in changes and updating requirements through Joint Committee.

6. (U) Far East Network: Since the reversion of Okinawa, USFJ promised to review the continued need for a second FEN AM station on Okinawa. PACAF has been tasked to conduct a listener survey in early 1973 to determine audience participation. An answer will be expected 15 May or after.

7. (U) Criticality of Communications Coordination During Next Five Years Due to Base Consolidations and Phasedowns of U.S. Presence in Japan: Coordination of communications planning will be critical during the next five years in view of the base consolidations and phasedowns of the U.S. presence in Japan. Major modal points and primary communications paths must be maintained so long as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan is in effect if a rapid force build-up is suddenly required. Any such emergency will require the best communications available if an effective, rapid, and orderly build-up is to progress. Particular attention will be required to insure that the pull-down does not reduce residual capability to a point where contingency missions could not be adequately performed. The following are major issues which will be critical for as long as five years.

8. (U) Communications Modifications Resulting From Base/Installation Consolidation: Many modifications to the communications system will be required as projected base/installation consolidations are effected over the next few years. Planning and scheduling must be accomplished throughout the next year to insure uninterrupted communications. These efforts will be divided into three major categories:

a. Phase I - The Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan (KPCP), primarily a SAF program.

b. Phase II - The major communications effort involved will be the Japan-Korea communications link

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up-grade. Negotiating quid-pro-quo for the link is a major concern. Determination of the level of redundancy required is a second needed decision.

c. The projected Okinawa Prefecture base consolidation plan is expected to have major impact on communications. This will be primarily a USARJ program.

9. (U) Communications Support for Okinawa Air Defense and Air Traffic Control: The communications supporting both the air defense (AD) and air traffic control (ATC) on Okinawa were, prior to reversion, an integral part of other military communications systems. The functions of AD and ATC are being turned over to the Japan Defense Agency and Japan Civil Aeronautics Bureau, respectively. Separating and coordinating the release of parts of these support communications will continue until the transfer of functions has been completed.

10. (U) AUTOSEVOCOM System Upgrade: The initial objective of the planned upgrade of the existing Japan system is to replace the obsolete and hard-to-maintain AN/TRC-24 radios. The necessary broadband links will be provided by minor modifications to the existing 484-M Kanto Plain Micro-Wave System. Main efforts will be to upgrade links from Camp Zama to Atsugi and Kamiseya, and to provide broadband links (better quality of service) between the SECORD switches at Fuchu, Camp Zama, and Yokosuka (CY 1973-1974).

11. (U) Telephone Standards Compliance: U.S. Forces telephone systems in Japan do not now comply with the DOD standard (40/60 ratio to Class A to Class B telephone on military bases/installations). Should this goal be reached or waived, up to 10% of the Class A phones can be given direct access to the AUTOVON system. In Japan, U.S. Forces switchboards have technical and equipment problems which may prevent reaching such a ratio, especially at Zama and Fuchu. The requirement may have to be waived if any Class A phones are to have direct access to AUTOVON.

12. (U) Single Service Communication Support in all of Japan: Consideration must be given to the eventual rationalization of communication support in all of

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Japan under a single service. Presently, Air Force has responsibility for all Japan, except Okinawa. Army has responsibility on Okinawa.

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CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL - US - DJ RELATIONSHIPS

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SECTION II - LABOR (JAPANESE NATIONALS)

1. (U) Change from MLC to MLA: Pursuant to instructions from CINCPAC, USFJ is seeking to change the form of the Master Labor Contract (under which U.S. Forces utilize appropriated fund Japanese nationals) from a procurement contract to a country-to-country agreement to be called the Master Labor Agreement. This would streamline administration on the U.S. side through eliminating the procurement contract aspects and channels and creating a single point of contact between the GOJ and USFJ. DFAA has informally advised it would have no objections in principle but would have to coordinate such a proposal with other GOJ agencies. A formal proposal to the GOJ is now being prepared.

2. (U) Study and Comparison of the MLC/NPS Base Pay: During the 1971 wage increase negotiations, CNFJ raised the question of cutting down on the MLC base pay alleging that the USFJ was paying for a 40-hour work week the same amount that the GOJ was paying to its civil service (NPS) employees for a 44-hour work week. CNFJ also proposed that we should cut down the USFJ differential over a period of years by 2% a year or so. After considerable negotiation with the DFAA on this subject - with DFAA nonconcurring with the USFJ proposal - it was agreed that DFAA and USFJ would conduct a study and comparison of the MLC/NPS base pay. A USFJ ad hoc group of technicians (from the service commands and Hq USFJ) is currently making a study on this subject and the USFJ and DFAA have exchanged comments thereon. The joint study is scheduled to be completed by the end of March 1973.

3. (U) General Wage Increase: In accordance with DOD and CINCPAC Instruction, U.S. Forces are committed to pay wages generally equivalent to those prevailing in the host country for similar skills. U.S. Forces, Japan implements this policy by moving wages of local national personnel at the same time and in the same proportion as wage level adjustments provided for Japanese National Public Service (NPS) employees. Annually, usually in late November or December, the Government of Japan adjusts the pay and allowances of its NPS employees based on a survey of the pay and allowances prevailing in private industry. Thereupon, USFJ and DFAA enter negotiations

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on providing similar adjustments to USFJ employees.

4. (U) Reduction in Force: A continued drop in employee strength is projected as base consolidations and mission changes occur and support requirements are reduced. As in the past, such reductions and the accompanying feeling of uncertainty and insecurity will result in strikes, some of which may be marked by disorders. There will probably be continued pressure from GOJ to give 90 days advance notice of RIF's even though the labor contracts and agreements do not require that much advance notice. The Chief of Staff, Hq USFJ, agreed in January 1970 to provide 90 days advance notice whenever possible.

5. (U) Health Insurance for Employees on Okinawa: Health insurance protection for employees of large companies (500 or more employees) in Japan is provided by employees and management forming a society to which both contribute and which manages the insurance premium and payments. U.S. Forces employees in mainland Japan are covered by such a society. For employees of smaller firms, government employees and self-employed persons, the Government of Japan operates a health insurance society. Because forming and operating such a society is difficult and complex, it was agreed between the U.S. and GOJ during the reversion negotiations that employees of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa would be covered by the GOJ society for an interim period. During 1973, it is anticipated that either the present USFJ Health Insurance Society for employees in the mainland will be extended to include employees in Okinawa or a separate society will be formed.

6. (U) Labor Cost-Sharing: During the course of US-GOJ negotiations on the 1972 general wage increase GOJ officials raised the possibility of GOJ paying all or part of the pay, allowances, social insurance, and administrative costs now borne by the U.S. Forces for utilizing Japanese employees. USFJ is exploring the possibilities of developing a proposal for such cost-sharing but the idea is still in the formative stage. Any such proposal would require high level clearance and probably be presented at the diplomatic level.

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CHAPTER VII

MISCELLANEOUS ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ONGOING PROJECTS

1. (U) Movement of Combat Vehicles: In coordination with USARJ and the American Embassy, USFJ Headquarters played a major role in developing procedures, now applicable to all services, which allow the movement of combat vehicles and other oversized and overweight military cargoes to continue in Japan. The threat to halt continued movement of U.S. Forces combat vehicles has largely abated with certain exemptions to domestic laws being obtained and by recent changes in the Japanese Road Laws.

2. (U) Yen Revaluation: During the last half of calendar year 1972, there was considerable speculation about a further revaluation of the yen, generally predicted to be in the neighborhood of 10 percent. As a means of preventing further aggravation of the already deteriorated financial positions of the non-appropriated funds, this command took action based on a previously obtained authorization to convert maximum reserves and day-to-day cash accumulations to yen.

3. (U) Classified Files: The latter part of 1972 was devoted to a complete review of headquarters classified files. The review was completed on 8 December 1972. By this review and inventory, 85 percent of Top Secret files were determined to be no longer necessary and were prepared for destruction. A full review of all files and destruction of those documents no longer required will be accomplished in early 1973.

4. (U) Drug Abuse Prevention: Command emphasis continued to aim toward the suppression of illicit drug use and trafficking by military personnel, U.S. civilian employees and U.S. dependents in Japan. This was a key issue this year and will continue to be in 1973. While many of the lesser included objectives of program were successfully accomplished last year, a number of sub-issues remain to be solved. The respective services have established drug abuse counselling and rehabilitation centers and the Japanese Government has assisted with an active campaign to locate and apprehend drug offenders

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under Japanese laws. The resolution of some drug issues during 1973, particularly in the area of control of drugs sold openly on the Japanese market and a form of jurisdiction over U.S. civilian personnel, will contribute greatly to the achievement of the main objective: the suppression of illicit drug use.

5. (U) Temporary Living Allowance: Establishment of standardized temporary living allowance regulations for all services in Japan is still in progress. This is a direct goal which is to be completed in the first quarter of CY 1973. Preliminary work now completed insures accomplishment of the projects within the prescribed time frame.

6. (U) Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EO&T) Program: All service commanders in Japan have excellent EO&T programs in progress. However, 1972 was the first year in which effective joint coordination in this field was established. The visit of Mr. Curtis Smothers, Office of DASD/EO (M&RA)\*, in June of 1972 provided commanders with an excellent evaluation of existing problem areas and made helpful suggestions for improvement. The Joint Services Human Relations Advisory Council, composed of Equal Opportunity and Human Relations staff officers from the service commands on Okinawa, have been working on a joint program of information exchange and on submission of coordinated recommendations to the senior service commanders. Progress is being made in obtaining improved Japanese police protection in problem off-base areas on Okinawa as well as on mainland Japan. An Interservice Human Relations Panel, organized partly in response to CINCPACINST 5350.2, is now being established to coordinate EO&T affairs at the service senior headquarters level in Japan.

7. (U) Joint Service Coordination: The regular scheduling of monthly Country Team meetings with American Embassy personnel and the increase of informal commanders working luncheons and office conferences have greatly enhanced USFJ's capability to deal successfully with the multitude of problems and issues facing U.S. Forces in Japan. These free-talking sessions also allow the service commanders to surface issues which can be coordinated at the commander level before being passed to the Embassy or to higher headquarters.

\*DASD/EO (M&RA) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Equal Opportunity, Manpower and Reserve Affairs

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## G L O S S A R Y

Air Defense	AD
Air Self Defense Forces	ASDF
Air Staff Office	ASO
Air Traffic Control	ATC
Aircraft Control and Warning	AC&W
Amplitude Modulation	AM
Area Control Center	ACC
Army-Navy/Transportable Radio Communications	AN/TRC
Automatic Digital Network	AUTODIN
Automatic Secure Voice Communications	AUTOSEVOCOM
Automatic Voice Network	AUTOVON
Center/Radar Approach Control	CERAP
Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee	CAS
Civilian Personnel Office	CPO
Command Post Exercise	CPX
Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus	CINCPACREP
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan	CNFJ
Common User Land Transportation	CULT
Communications-Electronics	C-E
Counterintelligence	CI

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Defense Communications Agency	DCA
Defense Facilities Administration Agency	DFAA
Defense Fuels Supply Center	DFSC
Defense Liaison Branch	DOA
Defense Special Security Communications Systems	DSSCS
Direct Hire	DH
Electromagnetic Interference	EMI
Electronic Countermeasures	ECM
Electronic Intelligence	ELINT
Equal Opportunity and Treatment	EO&T
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	EOD
Facility	FAC
Far East Network	FEN
Fixed Countermeasures Radio Receiving	FLR
Flight Information Region	FIR
Fuel System Icing Inhibitor	FSII
Government of Japan	GOJ
Government of Ryukyu Islands	GRI
Government of the Republic of China	GRC
Ground Controlled Approach	GCA
Ground Self Defense Forces	GSDF
Ground Staff Office	GSO
Health Insurance Society	HIS
Human Intelligence	HUMINT

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Interservice Support Agreement	ISSA
Japan Air Defense Command	JADC
Japan Area Counterintelligence Advisory Committee	JACCAC
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau	JCAB
Japan Defense Agency	JDA
Japan National Railway	JNR
Japan Self Defense Forces	JSDF
Japanese Government Relocation Construction Program	JGCP
Joint Chiefs of Staff	JCS
Joint Staff Office	JSO
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan	JSOP
Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan	KPCP
Local National	LN
Maritime Self Defense Forces	MSDF
Maritime Staff Office	MSO
Master Labor Agreement	MLA
Master Labor Contract	MLC
Military Assistance Advisory Group	MAAG
Mutual Defense Assistance Office	MDAO
National Public Service	NPS
Naval Forces Japan	NAVFORJ
Naval Supply Depot	NSD

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Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation	NTTPC
North Fuji Maneuver Area	NFMA
Okinawa Area Coordinator	OAC
Okinawa Area Field Office	OAFO
Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program	ORRCP
Operations and Maintenance	O&M
Overseas Coordination Group	OCG
Peoples' Republic of China	PRC
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants	POL
Prepositioned War Reserve Stock	PWRS
Reduction in Force	RIF
Republic of Korea	ROK
Search and Rescue	SAR
Secure Voice Cord Board	SECORD
Self Defense Force	SDF
Ship Repair Facility	SRF
Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Japan	SAPOJ
Surface-to-Air Missile	SAM
Spintcomm Automatic Relay Center	SARC
Status of Forces Agreement	SOFA
Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement	TEA
Termination of War	TOW
United States Army Base Command Okinawa	USARBCO

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United States Army, Japan	USARJ
United States Defense Attache Office	USDAO
United States Forces	USF
United States Forces, Japan	USFJ
United States Government	USG
United States Intelligence Board	USIB

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