

## **Session 2:4 Japan and Australia security and the unfolding of nuclear abolition**

### **JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA: SHARED SECURITY INTERESTS IN A NORTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE**

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Japan and Australia have long shared common approaches and positions on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues. Over the past four years, they have moved even closer. In 2008, then Prime Ministers Yasuo Fukuda and Kevin Rudd jointly initiated the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by Yoriko Kawaguchi and Gareth Evans. Both countries cooperated closely to work for a successful outcome to the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. Most recently they have taken the step of jointly convening and chairing a new initiative to link ten countries in a middle power grouping aimed at implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) was agreed at a meeting in Berlin on 20/4/11, with participation from Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>i</sup>

One of these common approaches of Japan and Australia has been strong support for regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) as partial measures to address proliferation risks and work towards eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are groupings of countries, or individual countries, that are party to binding internationally recognized and verified treaties or arrangements that prohibit the development, acquisition, stationing, and deployment of nuclear weapons within the zone, and seek binding negative security guarantees from nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

Australia, for its part, took the lead role in chairing the negotiations that culminated in the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, only the second such treaty in a populated region after the 1967 Latin American NWFZ Treaty.<sup>ii</sup> Both Japan and Australia have regularly supported resolutions in the UN General Assembly on nuclear weapon free zone proposals for the Middle East and Southern Hemisphere, both have attended conferences of parties of existing nuclear weapon free zone member states (the most recent being in 2010); and, in addition, Japan has played a very active and direct role in supporting negotiations for the 2006 Central Asian NWFZ, hosting two treaty-drafting conferences at Sapporo in Japan in 1999 and 2000. The 2008-9 International Commission convened by Japan and Australia specifically noted

the role of NWFZs in helping to build normative constraints against nuclear weapons and to contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament. The Commission supported “any effort to introduce them in parts of the world not presently covered”; and emphasized the urgency of the proposed Middle East NWFZ.<sup>iii</sup>

Japan’s and Australia’s joint support for nuclear-weapon-free zones was most recently affirmed at the ministerial-level April 2011 Berlin meeting that set up the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. The NPDI included as its fifth immediate priority (alongside transparency, FMCT, CTBT and IAEA Additional Protocol measures) working “to strengthen the expanding global framework of nuclear-weapon-free zones”.<sup>iv</sup>

Oddly, however, neither Japan nor Australia has so far sought at a governmental level to pursue the concept of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Japan’s own region, Northeast Asia.

This is despite the concerns both countries have raised over the proliferation threat on the Korean Peninsula posed by North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, 2006 and 2009 nuclear weapons tests, and current pursuit of enrichment capabilities that will give it the capacity to produce over 100 nuclear bombs.<sup>v</sup>

Australia’s Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, for example, recently warned:

*In the far north of our region, the secretive North Koreans are hard at work to threaten our allies, our region and us. North Korea has not only developed nuclear weapons it is also building missiles that could, in future, reach Australia: Darwin, Brisbane or even Sydney... The North Korean threat is also a reason why Australia has placed itself at the forefront of efforts for a nuclear weapons free world. At the UN last week, we pushed to bring a nuclear test ban treaty into force. We worked to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And we work to strengthen security cooperation in our region.*<sup>vi</sup>

More recently still, Australian Ambassador Peter Woolcott expressed Australian concerns at an October 2011 UN First Committee session:

*Australia remains gravely concerned about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear activities, including the revelation of a covert uranium enrichment capability. DPRK’S pursuit of nuclear weapons and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions pose a significant threat to stability of our region and to the non-proliferation efforts of the international community.*<sup>vii</sup>

Japan has similarly voiced rising concern over North Korea nuclear weapon and missile capabilities. Most recently, in the UN First Committee, Japanese Ambassador Mari Amano, cautioned that “the nuclear issues related to the DPRK...are of prime concern to the international community”, and urged the DPRK “to immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment program”.<sup>viii</sup>

Commenting on the proliferation risks affecting the Northeast Asian region, the International Commission noted that:

*... it is hardly surprising that some regional nerves have been jangled and that speculation has resurfaced that Japan and South Korea, in particular, might not be willing to resist for much longer the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. There is further speculation that South Korea... would be certain to act if Japan did, for fear of its eastern neighbour as much as its northern one.*<sup>ix</sup>

Given the high proliferation stakes in Northeast Asia, with grave risks for both the whole Asia Pacific region and the global non-proliferation regime, it is surprising that neither Japan nor Australia has pursued the same regional solution for Northeast Asia that they have so strongly supported elsewhere, namely the establishment of regional nuclear free zones. This is a little like a doctor being themselves diagnosed with cancer but then refusing to contemplate the very treatment that they dispense to others. Meanwhile, it is no accident that, in another proliferation prone region, the Middle East, the international community has turned to the concept of a NWFZ as a most promising avenue to a solution, with the US, Russia, UK and UN, jointly convening a Middle East NWFZ Conference in 2012 (to be hosted and facilitated by Finland).<sup>x</sup>

It becomes even more surprising when the failure to act on previous diplomatic efforts to achieve a Northeast Asian NWFZ, or more limited Korean Peninsula NWFZ, are considered.<sup>xi</sup> During the Cold War, the West ignored both Soviet and North Korean calls for establishing such a zone, including Mikhael Gorbachev's 1985 proposal. The US also ignored its own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency commissioned 1972 study suggesting such a zone on the 1967 Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty model. Had such a zone been established then, we would not of course be facing the North Korean proliferation threat now. Rather the choice was made to emplace nuclear weapons in South Korea and create a military cordon sanitaire around North Korea, with the predictable result of increasing the incentive for North Korea to itself acquire nuclear weapons.

In an all-too-rare 1992 moment when some sunshine suddenly broke through the perpetual fog of inter-Korean distrust and hostility, the two Koreas agreed on a *Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula*. This did include many features of a NWFZ, including bans on testing, manufacture, production, receiving, possession, storing, deployment or use of nuclear weapons, as well as including bans on uranium reprocessing. Unfortunately, the fog closed in again and the Joint Declaration was never implemented. It is notable that one of the problems of the Joint Declaration was that it failed to draw on, and learn from, the experience of other NWFZs in its provisions and processes, not least in its failure to provide binding security guarantees on non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Further attempts to denuclearize the Peninsula through the US-North Korean bilateral 1994-2001 *Agreed Framework*, and the subsequent 2003-2009 *Six Party Talks* (chaired by China and including the two Koreas, US, Japan and Russia), were also to fail.

Despite their failure, the Six Party Talks did serve to bring the key regional parties together, and, in the absence of a the kind of regional organization (like ASEAN, the OAS or the African Union) that has provided a negotiation forum for other NWFZs, the Six Party framework may yet provide a similar negotiation forum, especially since the US, China and Russia would also be required to provide the security guarantees for such a zone. It is significant, also, that, in its engagement with the Six Party Talks, the Japanese government did agree to take one small step towards a wider Northeast NWFZ. The Six Party 13/2/2007 Agreement not only included a staged plan for denuclearizing the Peninsula but also a commitment to set up a “Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”.<sup>xii</sup> Unfortunately, this further glimpse of sunshine disappeared behind the clouds of accusations and recriminations that marked the final years of the US Bush Administration.

Even in the current impasse, and despite the deterioration in inter-Korean relations associated with the North Korea’s 2010 sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, there remains every reason for reconsidering the relevance and value of establishing a wider Northeast Asian NWFZ, including not only the two Koreas but also Japan, and, further afield, even Taiwan and Mongolia.

Detailed proposals for such a Northeast Asian NWFZ have been advanced by civil society groups and academics concerned at the lack of progress in resolving regional conflicts that now threaten the security of the whole of Northeast Asia. The most recently advanced proposals include those of the Peace Depot, John Endicott’s Track 2 process, and the Nautilus Institute.

Hiromichi Umbeyashi has developed, in association with Peace Depot, a draft “3+3” Model Northeast Asian NWFZ that would cover the two Koreas and Japan, with a supportive role for China, the United States and Russia. The Model Treaty incorporates standard core denuclearization provisions and negative security assurances that are part of other zones but also goes further than other established NWFZs by explicitly asking that zone members discard their dependence on extended deterrence (the nuclear umbrella). As Umbeyashi notes, there was agreement at the NPT 2000 Review Conference that NPT parties would seek “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies”.<sup>xiii</sup> This objective has been reaffirmed by the US Obama Administration as a key principle in its current security and nonproliferation policies and strategies.

John Endicott’s proposal, initially stimulated by the 1991 US decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Korea, has been under discussion in regular Track 2 discussions between academics and officials from both the region and other relevant countries.<sup>xiv</sup> It focuses on the possibility of establishing a circular or elliptical limited nuclear weapon free zone taking in the two Koreas, Japan, and surrounding land territories of China and Russia, and sea areas within the zone. This would be an important reassurance and confidence building measure for all the countries within the zone, and demonstrate the commitment and good faith of the relevant nuclear weapon

states whose support is needed for Korean denuclearization. As one aspect of a newly negotiated Korean NWFZ, an additional protocol could embody the main benefits of the LNWFZ by requiring the nuclear weapon states not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on either sea or land within a specified circular or elliptical zone, even within their own land territories falling within the zone.

While previous Northeast Asian denuclearisation proposals have focused either on the Korean Peninsula itself, on the creation of a NWFZ covering the whole Northeast Asian region, or a “limited” nuclear weapon free zone, an alternative way forward would be the initial establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone between Japan and South Korea, with North Korea encouraged to join at a later date. This is the proposal advanced by the Nautilus Institute in its recent concept paper, *Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (KJNWFZ) Concept Paper*.<sup>xv</sup>

The Nautilus proposal argues for building on the significant expansion and experience of other regions in the establishment of NWFZs, with zones now in force in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Antarctica, and a total of 112 states now party to such zones. In Northeast Asia, the Nautilus paper notes that a KJNWFZ, in addition to meeting such core aspects of NWFZ arrangements as prohibiting possession, stationing or transporting of nuclear weapons, effective verification and compliance, clear boundaries, negative security guarantees, or use of the zone for firing against third parties, would need to address a number of issues specific to the Northeast Asia region. These specific regional issues would include: dismantlement of existing nuclear weapon facilities and research programs; current arrangements and understandings on nuclear transit and nuclear extended deterrence; special entry into force mechanisms and treaty geographic boundaries that would facilitate inclusion of a denuclearised North Korea at a later date (and potentially also Mongolia and Taiwan); and alliance relationships in the region, particular China's relationships to regional states, and the US bilateral relationships with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan; missile delivery systems and associated difficulties in distinguishing military from space-launch missiles; and issues associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly enrichment and reprocessing.

While the Nautilus proposal might not appear to deal overnight with the clear and present threat posed by increasing North Korean nuclear weapon capabilities, the initiative would have several benefits. It would build on the experience of previous NWFZs in other regions in achieving longer term denuclearisation outcomes; offer immediate confidence-building benefits in achieving ways through the present impasse with North Korea; and provide longer term security benefits in reducing or even preventing potential nuclear rivalry between Japan and the two Koreas. It should also be noted that existing coercive approaches to North Korean proliferation are not necessarily proving effective overnight, and may even be proving counterproductive.

A key aspect of the Nautilus proposal, discussed more fully in a separate paper<sup>xvi</sup>, is that, on the Latin American Tlatelolco NWFZ Treaty precedent, it can include North Korea within the zone boundaries but allow for entry into

force mechanisms that do not necessarily require North Korea to bring the treaty into force immediately. Just as two highly nuclear capable Latin American states, Brazil and Argentina, did not immediately bring the Tlatelolco Treaty into force for their territories until much later after it applied to the rest of Latin America, so North Korea could simultaneously be included in, and consulted on, negotiations for a NEANWFZ, and thereby provided with every inducement to bring the treaty into force at a later date, particularly in the context of securing binding negative security treaty guarantees on non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons from all the nuclear-weapon-states, including the United States. The lack of such guarantees, of course, was one of the fatal weaknesses in the 1992 *Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula*; and such guarantees have been a leitmotif in North Korean responses to demands for it to denuclearize unilaterally in the absence of such guarantees.

The neighbouring region of Southeast Asia has already provided an important precedent in the form of the 1995 Bangkok Treaty, a NWFZ treaty negotiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This treaty built on the earlier 1971 Declaration of a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and was motivated by the region's dual concerns to prevent further nuclear power rivalry in the region (as occurred during the second Vietnam War when both the Soviet Union and the United States had bases in the region) and to constrain nuclear proliferation within the region. Northeast Asia currently lacks a negotiation forum comparable to ASEAN, but, as former US diplomats, James Goodby and Donald Gross, note, the United States could and should be pursuing a "two-track approach" that simultaneously addresses regional security as well as North Korean issues.<sup>xvii</sup> More specifically, Goodby and Gross argue that a "multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia" could be a "much needed agent for change" and "could help lead the region to a stable peace".

ASEAN's successful implementation of a nuclear free weapon free zone, despite the former presence of nuclear weapon state (NWS) military bases and close relationships between some regional states and NWS, demonstrates what is feasible in a previously conflict-prone region; and may yet prove to be a vital restraining factor in preventing some regional states from following North Korea's example (such as Burma, which already has close relations with North Korea).

Similarly, the South Pacific NWFZ, which an earlier Australian Labour Government was responsible for initiating during the final decade of the Cold War, is another important precedent for Northeast Asia, particularly given the fact that Australia, like Japan and South Korea, has such a close security relationship with the United States. As in the case of the Southeast Asian NWFZ, the South Pacific zone includes all the core prohibitions on nuclear weapons common to other zones while containing some specific provisions that relate to particular aspects of nuclear weapon threats in this region, such as the nuclear weapon testing programs that France, the UK, and the US chose to conduct for varying periods from 1946 to 1996 in the Pacific environment, with both short and longer term health impacts on Pacific peoples.<sup>xviii</sup>

Both the SEANWFZ and SPNFZ treaties provide valuable precedents and lessons for a comparable zone in Northeast Asia that might be pursued jointly by Japan and Australia, while at the same time containing some weaknesses that would need to be avoided in a Northeast Asian context.

Both treaties contain the core NWFZ provisions against the manufacture, acquisition, and control of nuclear weapons, as well as stationing of nuclear weapons by external states on member states' territories (the latter being an important difference from the NPT). The SPNFZ goes a little further than other treaties in extending bans on nuclear testing to international waters through its Protocol 3 which bans nuclear weapons testing anywhere in the zone, including high seas areas falling within the designated boundaries, which go as far as the Equator and link up with the Tlateloco and Antarctic Treaty boundaries. The SEANWFZ treaty goes further than any other NWFZ in extending its provisions to continental shelves and 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), including the prohibition of using nuclear weapons anywhere in zone, including from the EEZs, a requirement that has delayed NWS ratification of the relevant protocols. Nuclear weapon state reluctance to ratify the protocols is related to their insistence on their right to deploy and use such weapons in the SEANWFZ EEZ waters (despite the fact that they have stated that they have removed tactical nuclear weapons from their vessels).

Both treaties involve verification and control systems that require sign-up to IAEA safeguards. In the case of Northeast Asia, where proliferation problems and issues have already occurred, not only in North Korea but also in South Korea and Taiwan, it would seem prudent for any NEANWFZ arrangements to require IAEA Additional Protocol safeguards, as well as the standard safeguards.

More generally, both groups of countries have sought through the treaty protocol mechanisms to extend constraints over certain nuclear weapon activities over wider surrounding areas (EEZs in the case of SEANWFZ, both continental shelves and high seas in the case of SPNFZ). The Pacific Forum has already been successful in this in the case of SPNFZ (France having ratified all the Protocols, and the US about to complete ratification).

In the case of the SEANWFZ, the treaty was largely initiated through the efforts of diplomats and government leaders concerned to prevent a re-emergence of nuclear weapon state military involvement in the region, and to reduce the likelihood of future horizontal proliferation in member states. In the case of SPNFZ, there was a much greater grassroots impetus for establishing the zone as a result of regional concerns over nuclear testing in the region from the late 1950s onwards: the zone that was finally negotiated during 1983-85 reflected both pressures from civil society and the resolve of regional leaders to restrain and prevent further use of the region by external powers for nuclear testing and radioactive waste dumping.

While these two neighbouring Asia Pacific regional NWFZs offer useful precedents for creating a similar zone in Northeast Asia, they also have weaknesses that would need to be avoided in new zone arrangement,

particularly when the specific Northeast Asian history and proliferation context is considered.

At the time that each of the zones was negotiated, neither had experienced nuclear weapon stationing, nor were there any countries in either zone with nuclear power industries using or producing significant amounts of weapons grade fissile materials. As a consequence, the verification and compliance mechanisms are not as developed and rigorous as the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty, which created a permanent agency, OPANAL, to monitor and oversee treaty implementation. In the case of Northeast Asia, given the overt and covert proliferation that has already occurred in the region, and the advanced nuclear industries in all zonal states, it would obviously be more important to follow the Tlatelolco path of creating a specialised monitoring and verification agency that would work closely with the IAEA and any bilateral monitoring agencies (such as the Brazil-Argentina agency, ABACC).

Another weakness is the lack of specific constraints on nuclear weapon research in either the SPNFZ or SEANWFZ treaties, although in the case of the SPNFZ Treaty, Australia has passed national legislation interpreting the treaty as preventing such research. Since North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan have all at some stages conducted such research, openly or covertly, then it would seem vital that a NEANWFZ explicitly prohibit such research. In this respect, it would be preferable for a Northeast Asia zone to follow the more recent African and Central Asian NWFZ treaties. The African Pelindaba Treaty's Article 3 specifically requires parties "not to conduct research on" and "not to receive any assistance in the research on" nuclear weapons<sup>xx</sup>; while the Central Asia Semipalatinsk Treaty contains almost identical bans on such research.<sup>xx</sup>

A third weakness in the SPNFZ Treaty is the failure to specifically relinquish extended nuclear deterrence arrangements where a zone member is party to a military alliance with a nuclear weapon state, as is the case of Australia's ANZUS Alliance with the United States. This omission could call into question the negative security degrees from other nuclear weapon states, and is inconsistent with the more general aims of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security arrangements. It also highlights the inconsistency of the Western nuclear weapon states in continuing to withhold ratification of the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty on precisely the same grounds that some of the Central Asian states have military alliances with Russia that might conceivably result in nuclear weapons being used on their behalf (despite the fact that the Treaty does in fact, on a close legal analysis, prohibit such use). Given the formal and informal bilateral alliances that Northeast Asia states have with nuclear weapon states (the US in the case of Japan and South Korea, China in the case of North Korea), it would seem necessary that a NEANWFZ also explicitly forego reliance on extended nuclear deterrence, and create an overriding obligation not to invoke nuclear retaliation or use under any previously negotiated military alliance treaties or arrangements. As already discussed, the Peace Depot Model NEANWFZ Treaty has incorporated a specific provision that zone member states: "eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its security policy".<sup>xxi</sup> In the historical context of the encirclement

of North Korea with regionally-based tactical nuclear weapons up to 1991, such undertakings are particularly crucial for securing region-wide commitment to the zone.

As North Korea moves closer to re-engaging with its regional neighbours following its recent separate talks with the United States, China and Russia, there are opportunities for Australia and Japan to begin pursuing a more comprehensive and effective solution to the regional proliferation in the form of negotiating a Northeast Asian NWFZ treaty. Such moves might begin with Track 2 and Track 1.5 discussions between government experts, UN experts, and academic and non-government specialists on identifying the issues and options; and progress to more formal discussions, either under Six Party Talks frameworks, or through separately convened working groups, such as Japan assisted with in the case of the Central Asian NWFZ negotiations.

Australia, while located outside the Northeast Asian subregion, has strong links to the region through its substantial and growing economic involvement with both Japan and South Korea, shared commitment to democracy, and its people to people contacts and networks with the region. As Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, noted in a recent address to an Australia-Korea Year of Friendship Dinner, Australia is engaged deeply in East Asia “as we evolve for the first time a region-wide political and security agenda which will hopefully over time cultivate the culture and the norms of security cooperation rather than the expectation of some future conflict”.<sup>xxii</sup>

Australia’s partnership with Japan in a range of new non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, including the commitment to pursue an expansion of nuclear free zones through the efforts of the new NPDI network, and its own experience in establishing NWFZs, suggest that it is well-placed to join with Japan in working jointly on new denuclearization arrangements for the whole of the Northeast Asia region.

For both Australia and Japan there are a range of shared security benefits in establishing a regional NEANWFZ that warrant urgent exploration and pursuit over the coming critical period – before North Korea acquires major enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

The principal and most obvious long-term security benefit is to avert a dangerous, almost unthinkable, nuclear arms race between densely-populated regional neighbours still afflicted by unresolved conflicts and issues dating from the Second World War and the Korean War; and constantly engaged in border disputes along the Korean DMZ. Once nuclear weapons were to be acquired by all parties, there would not only be the possibility of intentional, if suicidal, nuclear war, but also the possibility of pre-emptive, miscalculated, or accidental nuclear attacks.

Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities, nuclear proliferation across the whole region would have devastating effects on the global non-proliferation regime, potentially leading to a collapse of the NPT, and uncontrolled export of nuclear weapon materials and technologies from North Korea to both state and non-state actors in other parts of the world. For both Australia and Japan, as for many other middle powers, this could pose

multiple and unpredictable types of damage to their security, economies, and peoples. As nuclear weapon capabilities and even “off-the-shelf” nuclear weapons spread across the globe, they could be faced with not just one Fukushima-scale radioactive contamination event but multiple nuclear catastrophes.

As in the case of successful NWFZ negotiations in other regions, the actual process of involving parties in seeking to negotiate a Northeast Asia NWFZ can itself be a crucial confidence-building process that enables regional actors to better understand each others’ security needs and fears. It is not always necessary that all states bring the treaty into force at the same time. Rather the treaty can establish a normative framework that allows for confidence-building processes to encourage states to bring the treaty into force at a later date.

Australia and Japan, and their allies, must decide between pursuing a war path or a peace path in Northeast Asia. Continued confrontation and military containment strategies have been conspicuously unsuccessful and unproductive in “deterring” North Korea. Rather such strategies appear to have merely served to provoke and confirm North Korea in its own nuclear and military belligerence.

The peace path would be to pursue diplomatic initiatives based on comprehensive and multilateral strategies that can provide cooperative solutions to the nuclear, military, economic, energy, environmental, and human security, dilemmas confronting the region.

Creating a Northeast Asian NWFZ warrants urgent consideration as one such initiative. There is still time and opportunity for Japanese and Australia leaders, and their counterparts in Washington, Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang, to pursue more cooperative approaches rather than unleash an escalating cycle of military action and reaction that can only end in catastrophe.

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<sup>i</sup> Quinlan, Gary, Australian Ambassador to the UN, *Statement on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDII) at the Follow-up to the high-level meeting held on 24 September 2010: revitalizing the work of the Conference on*

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*Disarmament and taking forward multilateral negotiations*, Australian Mission to the United Nations, 27/7/11.

<sup>ii</sup> Baaro, Makurita, “The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Rarotonga)”, in Alves, Pericles Gasparini & Cipollone Daiana Belinda (eds.), *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1997, pp.49-54; Hamel-Green, Michael, “The South Pacific – The Treaty of Rarotonga”, in Thakur, Ramesh (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones*, Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 1998, London, pp.59-80.

<sup>iii</sup> International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra/Tokyo, 2009, p.158.

<sup>iv</sup> Beven, Terry, Director, Arms Control Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, *Urgent and United Action towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World*, presentation to the 23<sup>rd</sup> UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Matsumoto, Japan, 27-29 July 2011, p.2.

<sup>v</sup> Kile, Shannon N., Fedchenko, Vitaly, Gopalaswamy, Bharath & Kristensen, Hans M., “World Nuclear Forces”, *SIPRI Yearbook 2011*, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.351-2.

<sup>vi</sup> Rudd, Kevin, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, “North Korean Nuclear Threat Affects Us All”, *The Daily Telegraph*, 27/9/11.

<sup>vii</sup> Woolcott, Peter, *Thematic Statement on Nuclear Weapons*, Statement to the UN First Committee, Australian Mission to the United Nations, 14/10/11, p.3

<sup>viii</sup> Amano, Mari, *Thematic Debate: Nuclear Weapons*, Statement to the UN First Committee, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, 14.10/11, p.4.

<sup>ix</sup> International Commission, *op.cit.*, p.36.

<sup>x</sup> Fahmy, Nabil & Lewis, Patricia, “Possible Elements of an NWFZ in the Middle East”, *Disarmament Forum*, UNIDIR, no.2, 2011, pp.39-50 (also in French, pp.43-57 in the same issue).

<sup>xi</sup> For a fuller discussion of these diplomatic efforts (on which this section draws), see Hayes, Peter & Hamel-Green, Michael, “Paths to Peace on the Peninsula: The Case for a Japan-Korea Nuclear Weapon Free Zone”, *Security Challenges*, v.7 no.2, Winter 2011, pp.105-121.

<sup>xii</sup> Kile, Shannon, “Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation”, *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp.350-356,

<sup>xiii</sup> Umebayashi, Hiromichi, “Proposal of a Model Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”, paper presented at Workshop on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and Missile Control in Northeast Asia, Fudan University, Shanghai, China, July 16-18, 2004; Peace Depot, *A Model Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*, Working Paper no. 1 E, Peace Depot, Yokohama, November 2005.

<sup>xiv</sup> John Endicott, ‘Limited Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: the time has come’, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 13-26; John Endicott and Alan Gorowitz, ‘Track-II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia’, *Pacifica Review*, vol. 11, no. 3 (October 1999), pp. 293-323.

<sup>xv</sup> Nautilus Institute, *Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (KJNWFZ) Concept Paper*, 15 February 2010.

<sup>xvi</sup> Hamel-Green, Michael, “Implementing a Korea–Japan Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Precedents, Legal Forms, Governance, Scope, Domain, Verification, Compliance and Regional Benefits”, *Pacific Focus*, vol.26, no.1, April 2011, pp.90–112.

<sup>xvii</sup> James E. Goodby and Donald Gross, *Strategic Patience Has Become Strategic Passivity*, Nautilus Institute, 22 December 2010,

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<<http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/strategic-patience-has-become-strategic-passivity>> [Accessed 20 February 2010].

<sup>xviii</sup> Hamel-Green, Michael, "Nuclear Tests in the Pacific" in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Peace* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, March 2010), Volume 3 pp.264-269.

<sup>xix</sup> Viotti, Paul A. (ed.), *Arms Control and Global Security: A Document Guide*, Praeger, Santa Barbara, CA., 2010, pp.347-8.

<sup>xx</sup> *Ibid.*, p.357.

<sup>xxi</sup> Peace Depot, *A Model Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*, Working Paper no. 1 E, Peace Depot, Yokohama, November 2005, p.4.

<sup>xxii</sup> Rudd, Kevin, Australian Foreign Minister, *Australia and the Republic of Korea: Natural Partners and True Friends*, speech to the Australia-Korea Year of Friendship Dinner, 12/10/11, p.5.

(Vs3, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2011)