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## COMMAND HISTORY

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1976

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### VOLUME I

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME I

1976

Prepared by the Command History Branch

Office of the Joint Secretary

Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861

1977

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**ADMIRAL M. F. WEISNER**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC**



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## FOREWORD

This year--1976--was the first in many years that U.S. involvement in mainland Southeast Asia has not obscured our larger and more permanent interests in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean area. While the communist successes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should not be dismissed lightly, it is too early to assess them in historical perspective. A reaction already evident is the increasing awareness by the Japanese people and their government that they must play a greater role in their own security.

With the fall of South Vietnam, the Southeast Asian nations felt exposed and vulnerable to expected pressure from a resurgent Hanoi and possibly to a great post-war power struggle in the area. One result was impetus for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to assume a greater regional role. The first ASEAN summit conference of heads of state was held in Bali in February 1976.

By mid-1976 we had completed the withdrawal of military forces from Thailand, leaving a small Military Advisory Group as the sole U.S. military organization. Later in the year, the political environment in the Western Pacific was affected once more by a change in government in Thailand. Although the present government faces an uncertain future in striving for stability, it remains in our interest to support that effort.

In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union continued to maintain a considerable naval presence during the year. In addition, the Russians and Chinese approached some island nations of the South Pacific with blandishments of diplomatic recognition and economic assistance which could presage attempts to establish political and military enclaves in the region. This activity was balanced somewhat by renewed assurances from our Australian and New Zealand allies of their interests in the island nations.

Negotiations were resumed in 1976 with the Republic of the Philippines on a revised military bases agreement. The ensuing dialogue quickly broadened to encompass the status of our mutual defense treaty, and the dialogue was unofficially suspended after four months of technical-level talks. The position of this command continues to be that the bases in the Philippines are needed to maintain a credible deterrent posture and to protect vital sea and air lines of communication.

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The situation on the Korean peninsula continued to be a volatile and unpredictable threat to the peace of Asia. The August 1976 incident in the demilitarized zone in which two U.S. officers were killed illustrated the tension on the peninsula.

Japan's vital role in the economic stability of Asia and the world continued to be dependent upon oil from the Middle East transported by tankers using the sea lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Since Japan's military forces are dedicated to a defensive mission consistent with their constitution, the developing public acceptance in Japan of the need to cooperate in our security partnership was welcome.

An important aspect of Asian/Pacific affairs is the far-reaching impact which the action of any single nation has on other nations in the region. Any action to alter our military posture should first and foremost be weighed in the context of its impact on area stability. Political and economic initiatives are acknowledged tools of diplomacy. There can be little hope of long-term stability, however, unless diplomatic initiatives are backed up by military forces perceived by friend and foe alike to be adequate in terms of size, capability, and location.



M. F. WEISNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Commander in Chief Pacific

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## PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1969, as updated by SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 and SM-547-77 of 16 June 1977, require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on South-east Asia, to a more functionalized format.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Annex B of the 1976 history is the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI) (January - September 1976) and the continuing history of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAGTHAI) for the period October - December 1976. Histories of the U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea continue as Annexes C through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

The 1976 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as

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ALFA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters. Titles of documents cited as footnotes are unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

Chapters II, X, and Section I of Chapter IX were written by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman wrote Chapters I, III, IV, Sections I and IV of Chapter XI and supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and Sections II and III of Chapters IX and XI were written by Major Stanley E. Henning, USA. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Specialist 6 Joseph S. Simpson, USA.

The manuscript was typed by Specialist Simpson and Shirley A. Streck. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.



CARL O. CLEVER  
Command Historian

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## CHAPTER I

### THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

#### SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(C) PACOM assigned strength increased slightly in 1976, for the first time since major reductions had begun in 1969. This increase, however, reflected changes in Navy and Marine forces assigned to CINCPAC but located in the Continental United States; the forces located in the PACOM continued to decline.

(C) A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

	<u>1 January 1976</u>	<u>31 December 1976</u>	<u>Change</u>
Army	58,193	53,787	-4,406
Navy	151,164	164,613	+13,449
Marine Corps	69,033	71,982	+2,949
Air Force	51,984	43,570	-8,414
Total	330,374	333,952	+3,578

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1976 and the amounts of change from the year before are shown in the following table. Neither Taiwan nor Thailand had sufficient U.S. Forces to be included this year.


	<u>Military</u>		<u>Dependents</u>	
	<u>31 Dec 76</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>31 Dec 76</u>	<u>Change</u>
Guam	10,525	+ 645	9,683	- 1,357
Hawaii	44,274	- 203	85,524	+23,797
Japan	49,022	- 565	38,624	- 3,103
Korea	39,718	- 668	15,462	- 1,586
Philippines	14,850	+ 419	22,536	+ 2,997

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1976, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

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## THE PACIFIC COMMAND



\* Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command


Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 3.

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# COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM



—— OP COMMAND/OP CONTROL      - - - - - PLANNING AND/OR COORDINATION

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 4.

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# COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interest of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South, and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Ioring Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 25 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Malayan States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan), and the Islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomed Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisor/Representative to the following organizations.

- SEATO Council: U.S. Military Advisor
- AIZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative
- Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board
- Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the U.S. Ambassador who serves as the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

- Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
- Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate. The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual.

CINCPAC's Army Component Command, the U.S. Army Pacific, was disestablished 31 December 1974. U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Department of the Army, assumed most of the CINCPAC responsibilities. There is no Army Component Commander at this time.

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are three subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:
  - United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea)\*, Seoul, Korea
  - United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan)\*, Yokota Air Base, Japan
  - United States Taiwan Defense Command (USIDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC)\*, Taipei, Taiwan
4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:
  - Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI), Agaña, Guam.
  - Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines)\*, Subic Bay, Philippines.
  - USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia)\*, American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.
  - Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI)\*, is the CINCPAC Representative Thailand (CINCPACREP Thailand), Bangkok, Thailand.
  - Commander Naval Station Adak (COMNAVSTAADAK) is the CINCPAC Representative Aleutians (CINCPACREP ALUTIAN)\*, Adak, Alaska.
  - Commander Mid-East Forces (COMMIDASTFOR) is the CINCPAC Representative Indian Ocean (CINCPACREP INDIAN OCEAN).
  - CINCPAC Representative Joint Strategic Lancer Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command (CINCPACREP JSTPS/SAC), Offutt AFB, Nebraska.
5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (JMAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:
  - Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China - Taipei, Taiwan
  - Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
  - Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
  - Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
  - Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea - Seoul, Korea
  - Office of Defense Cooperation - New Delhi, India
  - U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan\* - Islamabad, Pakistan
  - Chief U.S. Defense Group, Indonesia\* performs the JMAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia
  - Defense Attaches Afghanistan\*, Australia, Burma\*, Malaysia\*, New Zealand\*, Singapore\*, and Sri Lanka\* are responsible for the Security Assistance function for their respective countries.
6. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to Commander, Alaska Air Command.

\*Designated as U.S. Defense Representative in September 1975. The U.S. Defense Liaison Officer serves as the USOR in Hong Kong.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 5.

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# **SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES** **FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL**

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA			CINCPACREP GUAM/ITPI		
Commander in Chief/Commander	GEN	John W. VESSEY, JR., USA	COMNAV Marianas and CINCPACREP Guam/ITPI	RADM	Kent J. CARROLL, USN
Deputy Commander	LT GEN	John J. BURNS, USAF	Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	Charles H. CROSS, USN
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	John K. SINGLAUB, USA	* * * * *	* * * * *	* * * * *
Sp Asst ROK Mil Aff and CHJUSMAG	MAJ GEN	Oliver D. STREET, III, USA	Commander, 3rd Air Div	MAJ GEN	Hilding JACOBSON, USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Franklyn S. NELSON, USA			
CDR HQ UNC (Rear)/Secy UN Jt Bd	COL	William W. WOODSIDE, USA			
and Dep UN Rep	COL	Paul E. RABE, USAF			
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Albert M. HUNT, USN			
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	CAPT	John J. KOEHLER, JR., USA	Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay/COMUSNAV Phil/	RADM	Thomas J. KILCLINE, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	MAJ GEN	Emil L. KONOPNICKI, USN	CINCPACREP Phil		
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	BGEN	Edwin L. HERRING, USN	Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	James C. HAYES, JR., USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	CAPT	James L. YOUNG, USA	* * * * *	* * * * *	* * * * *
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Terrence W. MCCLAIN, USA	Commander 13th Air Force	MAJ GEN	Freddie L. POSTON, USAF
Ch Arm Affairs Div & Secy UNCMAC	COL	Mark P. FRUDDEN, USN	Chief of Staff	COL	Donald A. KELLUM, USAF
* * * * *	* * * * *	* * * * *			
COMNAVFORKOREA	RADM				
UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN			CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA		
Commander/Commander 5 AF	LT GEN	Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF	CINCPACREP/USAF Liaison Officer/U.S. Defense Rep	COL	Jack L. DETOUR, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Otis C. LYNN, USA	Commander	JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER	
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Keith C. SPATDE, JR., USN		COL	William M. HUBBELL, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	CAPT	Richard A. HATCH, USA			
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Samuel K. DIZER, USAF			
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL	James W. ABRAHAM, USMC	OFFICE OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, PAKISTAN		
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL	Glenn M. REISLING, JR., USA			
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Paul J. JOHNSTON, USMC	USDRP	CDR	Richard F. GIBBS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Robert G. KHALEY, USMC			
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	LCOL	John R. GUTHRIE, USA	OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, INDIA		
* * * * *	* * * * *	* * * * *			
Commanding General USARJ	LT GEN	Thomas B. RUSSELL, JR., USN			
COMNAVFORJAPAN	RADM				
UNITED STATES TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND			CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, ALEUTIANS		
Commander	VADM	Edwin K. SNYDER, USN	CO, NAVSTAADAK/	CAPT	Donald J. CHILDERS, USN
Chief of Staff	BGEN	Dan A. BROOKSHER, USAF	CINCPAC REP ALEUTIANS		
Asst Chief of Staff/J1/J4	COL	Billy D. FERRIER, USAF			
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Walter A. MERRITT, USAF			
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	CAPT	Lawrence C. PHILLIPS, JR., USN			
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	John C. NORCROSS, USA			
Public Affairs Officer/002	LCDR	Neil B. THOMPSON, USN			
Legal Officer/J7	CAPT	Joseph M. BATTAGLIO, USN			
* * * * *	* * * * *	* * * * *			
Commander, Patrol and Recon Force, 7th Fleet	RADM	Mycliffe D. TOOLE, JR., USN			

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 8.

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# U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS

## FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA		JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, THAILAND	
Chief	Major General Leslie P. FURLEY, JR., USA	Chief	Colonel Aaron E. WALKER, USA
Senior Ministry of National Defense Advisor	Colonel Hugh R. BUMPAS, JR., USMC	Deputy Chief	Colonel Roy C. DALTON, USAF
Chief of Operations and Training	Colonel Richard H. FAHERLING, USA	Chief, Command Admin	Colonel Larry R. BRUMBACK, USA
Chief Resources	Colonel James H. WISTBERRY, USAF	Chief, Army Division	Colonel John G. HAYES, USA
Staff Judge Advocate	Captain Robert W. LANDHAAR, USN	CINCPACILLIBPHAL	Captain John F. DUNN, USN
Sr Advisor (Chinese Army)	Colonel Lorie F. TASCHEP, USA	Senior Marine Advisor	Colonel John B. HARRIS, USMC
Sr Advisor (Chinese Navy)	Captain George P. KELLY, USA	Chief, Air Force Division	Colonel Charles K. ROSE, III, USAF
Sr Advisor (Chinese Marine Corps)	Captain Joe F. JENSEN, USN	Chief, Support Division	Colonel John H. REDD, JR., USA
Sr Advisor (Chinese Air Force)	Colonel Glen T. BAUCHAMP, USMC	Staff Judge Advocate	Major Gary L. ANDERSON, USA
	Colonel Joseph L. PHIBREY, USAF		
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP, KOREA		UNITED STATES DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP, INDONESIA	
Chief	Major General Oliver D. STREET III, USA	Chief	Colonel William W. TOMAUGH, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/Plans and Programs	Captain Maurice W. BURRILL, USN	Deputy Chief	Colonel Mayer LITTMAN, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/Development and Acquisition	Colonel Robert S. KAH, USAF	Executive Officer	Colonel Laurence J. YOUNG, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/Logistics	Colonel Elwood J. HEIN, USA	Chief, Army Branch	Colonel Duane R. BRODER, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	Colonel Allen C. LIVINGSTON, USA	Chief, Navy/Marine Branch	Colonel Gerald M. HIGBEE, USN
Senior Army Assistance Officer	Colonel Samuel J. AZZARELLI, USA	Chief, Air Force Branch	Colonel Morgan B. LAFFITTE, USAF
Senior Naval Assistance Officer	Colonel Foy RICE, USA	Chief, Plans and Programs Branch	Colonel Richard S. VARNEY, USMC
Senior Air Assistance Officer	Captain John L. EVERNGAM, JR., USN	Chief, Communications and Electronics Branch	Colonel Robert D. DUNCAN, USA
Senior Marine Assistance Officer	Colonel Daniel G. MCINTOSH, USAF	Chief, Personnel and Admin Branch	Major Donald E. CUKJATTI, USA
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN		JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES	
Chief	Captain Charles W. COLE, USN	Chief	Major General James H. MAPS, USA
Deputy Chief	Civilian C. Lawrence O'REILL	Chief, Ground Forces Div	Colonel Herbert H. RAY, USA
		Chief, Navy Div	Colonel James P. TURQUILL, USN
		Chief, Air Force Div	Colonel Thomas H. MAUS, USAF
		Chief, Joint Plans and Programs Div	Colonel James R. GUBER, USA
		Advisor, Philippine Marine Corps	Colonel George D. HAVADEL, USMC
		Chief, Personnel and Admin Div/AG	Colonel Francis KAYE, USA

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 9.

# PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY			U.S. CIVILIANS			LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS			DEPENDENTS		
	TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USAF	TOTAL	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USAF
ALASKA	3,862	1,992	1,888	110			432					
AUSTRALIA	1,914	607	422		267		10					
DIEGO GARCIA	1,099	1,099	1,099									
GUAM	25,625	10,525	6,550	3,418	3,741		5,059					
HAWAII	153,387	44,274	17,704	10,553	9,617		23,689					
HONG KONG	68	25	13		6							
INDIA	24	6	3	1	2		1					
INDONESIA	271	78	24	10	42		5					
JAPAN Less Okinawa	59,077	16,411	1,314	4,556	4,480		2,816					
JAPAN, Okinawa Prefecture	59,954	32,611	2,544	2,798	18,661		1,561					
JOHNSTON ISLAND	134	130	83		47		1					
KOREA	81,624	39,718	31,530	59	7,906		1,703					
MACAU	16	5	3		2							
MALAYSIA	3,833	21	21				1,900					
MARSHALL IS	1,647	868	868				101					
MIDWAY ISLAND	105	113	2	102	9		6					
NEW ZEALAND	76	23	6	3	15							
PAKISTAN	58,316	11,850	24	4,951	5,888		943					
PHILIPPINES	25	1	1									
AMERICAN SAMOA	65	29	3	25	1		5					
SINGAPORE	6,217	1,953	370	390	7		1,186					
TAIWAN	540	167	60	16	4		87					
THAILAND	5	5										
WAKE ISLAND	25,537	25,537										
WESTPAC	12,376	12,376										
MIDPAC	55,690	55,690										
EASTPAC												
SUB TOTAL	550,157	259,204	53,287	128,005	33,842		38,418					
CONUS	74,248	74,248		36,608	38,140							
GRAND TOTAL	624,905	333,952	53,787	164,613	71,982		38,418					

\* REPORTED IN JAPAN

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 23.

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# CINCPAC, COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	111	64	99	137	22	13	106	78	338	292	107	0	737
USACSG	37	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	6	62	0	105
CINCPACFLT	0	0	140	162	0	0	0	0	140	162	54	0	356
CINCPACAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	421	404	421	404	248	0	1,073
COMUSJAPAN	14	4	7	4	6	1	13	8	40	17	23	8	88
COMUSKOREA	74	104	34	50	10	1	56	69	174	224	14*	0*	412
COMUSTDC	10	6	19	19	3	1	12	7	44	33	12	7	96
JCRC	3	4	0	4	0	1	3	1	6	10	2	0	18
GRAND TOTAL	249	188	299	376	41	17	611	567	1,200	1,148	522	15	2,885

\*Additional civilians listed here on previous charts transferred to other headquarters activity with reorganization; still employed in Korea.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 24.

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**MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP PERSONNEL-PACIFIC COMMAND  
ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY**

**ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976**

CATEGORY	ARMY			NAVY			USMC			USAF			TOT MIL		US CIV	TOT US PERS	LOCAL HIRE
	OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL			
MAAG CHINA	11	4		4	2		3	0		8	1		26	7	5	38	12
ODC INDIA	0	1		1	0		0	0		0	0		1	1	1	3	3
USDLG INDONESIA	11	10		4	6		2	0		8	10		25	26	5	56	19
MDAO JAPAN	2	0		3	0		0	0		2	0		7	0	5	12	5
JUSMAGKOREA	40	13		20	14		8	4		29	22		97	53	43	193	49
JUSMAGPHIL	18	2		4	3		1	0		6	4		29	9	9	47	6
JUSMAGTHAI	40	17		11	5		3	1		18	13		72	36	16	124	61
ODR PAKISTAN	2	2		1	1		0	0		2	1		5	4	0	9	7
TOTAL	124	49		48	31		17	5		73	51		262	136	84	482	162

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 25.

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# **MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM**

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1976**

	ARMY	NAVY	MC	TOTAL NAVY & MC	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
<b>TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED *</b>	3,822	148,054	69,909	217,963	24,222	246,007
<b>OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**</b>	49,965	16,559	2,073	18,632	19,348	87,945
<b>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM</b>	53,787	164,613	71,982	236,595	43,570	333,952

\* FORCES ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

\*\* FORCES PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN PACOM AREA BUT NOT ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 22.

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# AVAILABLE FORCES


ARMY		NAVY/MARINES		AIR FORCE	
ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC					
<div>1 Army Headquarters</div> <div>2 Corps Headquarters</div> <div>2 Infantry Divisions</div> <div>1 Missile Command</div> <div>1 Air Defense Brigade</div> <div>2 Separate Aviation Company</div> <div>3 Separate Engineer Battalion</div>	<div>2 Numbered Fleets</div> <div>6 Attack Carriers</div> <div>15 Cruisers</div> <div>61 Destroyers/Destroyers</div> <div>10 Submarines (SSBN)</div> <div>34 Submarines (SS/GM)</div> <div>32 Amphibious Warfare Ships</div> <div>6 Carrier Air Wings</div> <div>30 Fighter/Attack Sqdn</div> <div>9 Reconnaissance/EA Units</div> <div>6 Early Warning Units</div> <div>9 Carrier ASG Sqdn</div> <div>3 LAGPS Sqdn</div> <div>12 Patrol Sqdn</div> <div>6 Tanker detachments</div> <div>4 EC-130J 241 delay (TACAMO)</div> <div>9 SSGS Station</div>	<div>2 Marine Amphibious Force Bn</div> <div>2 Marine Divisions</div> <div>2 Marine Aircraft Wings</div> <div>14 Fighter/Attack Sqdn</div> <div>1 Photo/Reconnaissance Sqdn</div> <div>2 Tanker Sqdn</div> <div>1 Observation Sqdn</div> <div>15 Helicopter sqdn</div>	<div>2 Numbered Air Forces</div> <div>3 Air Divisions</div> <div>1 Composite Wing</div> <div>1 Tactical Air Support Wing</div> <div>3 Tactical Fighter Wings</div> <div>1 Aeromed Air Support Sqdn</div> <div>2 Tactical Air Support Sqdn</div> <div>1 Tactical Reconnaissance Sqdn</div> <div>1 Special Operations Sqdn</div> <div>9 Tactical Fighter Sqdn</div> <div>2 Tactical Air Support Sqdn</div> <div>1 Tactical Air Support Sqdn</div> <div>1 Airborne Command &amp; Control Sqdn</div>		
IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC					
<div>1 Engineer Group</div> <div>1 Signal Brigade</div> <div>1 Heavy Boat Co</div> <div>USMA Units in the Pacific</div> <div>Army National Guard Units</div> <div>1 Infantry Brigade</div> <div>1 Infantry Units</div> <div>1 Infantry Battalion</div> <div>1 Civil Affairs Group</div> <div>1 Engineer Construction Battalion</div> <div>1 Corps Headquarters (Jillg)</div>	<div>10 Destroyers (Naval Reserve Trng)</div> <div>9 Mine Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Trng)</div> <div>2 Amphibious Warfare Ships (Naval Reserve Trng)</div> <div>60 Auxiliary Ships</div> <div>3 Patrol Combatants</div> <div>2 Submarines</div> <div>1 Tactical Control Sqdn</div> <div>1 Naval Warfare Group</div> <div>1 Fleet Composite Operations Readiness Group</div>	<div>1 Air Division (SAC)</div> <div>2 Strategic Wings (SAC)</div> <div>1 Air Refueling Sqdn (SAC)</div> <div>1 Bomber Sqdn (SAC)</div> <div>2 Strategic Reconnaissance Sqdn (SAC)</div> <div>2 Weather Reconnaissance Sqdn (MAC)</div> <div>1 Test Group (AFSC)</div> <div>1 Tactical Fighter Sqdn (Air National Guard)</div> <div>1 Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS)</div> <div>1 Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS)</div> <div>1 Air-Sea Rescue/Recovery Sqdn (MAC)</div> <div>1 Air Weather Service Units (MAC)</div> <div>1 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Units (MAC)</div>			

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 10.

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# DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS




Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 13.

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# DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS




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# DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS



NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION.  
Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 77, p. 19.

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## SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

### Key Personnel Changes in 1976

#### Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, succeeded Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific on 30 August 1976. The change of command and related events are described elsewhere in this section. For the period 131700Z to 241800Z February 1976 Admiral Weisner, who at the time served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was designated Acting CINCPAC while Admiral Gayler was on leave. COL Maurice O. Edmonds, USA, served throughout the year as Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to CINCPAC.<sup>1</sup>

#### Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN Leroy J. Manor, USAF, became Chief of Staff on 13 October replacing LT GEN William G. Moore, Jr., USAF.

#### Political Adviser

(U) Mr. Leo J. Moser became the Political Adviser on 28 July replacing Mr. Roger W. Sullivan.

#### Joint Secretary

(U) COL Alan Coville, USAF, replaced COL Alan H. Birdsall, USAF, on 1 July.

#### Director for Plans

(U) RADM William R. McClendon, USN, continued to serve as Director for Plans. As his deputy, COL E. Gene Sprague, USA, served until he was replaced by BGEN Jack R. Sadler, USA, on 17 July.

#### Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Gardiner M. Haight, JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT Harland B. Cope, JAGC, USN, on 21 June.

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1. CINCPAC 022072Z Feb 76.

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**HUGH A. BENTON**  
**RADM USN**  
 Director for Logistics  
 and Security Assistance



**WILLIAM R. MC CLENDON**  
**RADM USN**  
 Director for Plans



**JACK R. SADLER**  
**BGEN USA**  
 Deputy Director for Plans




**CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, JR.**  
**BGEN USAF**  
 Director for Communications-  
 Data Processing



**BOBBY L. HATCH**  
**CAPT SC USN**  
 Comptroller



**GARDINER M. HAIGHT**  
**CAPT JAGC USN**  
 Staff Judge Advocate



**ROBERT G. W. WILLIAMS, JR.**  
**RADM MC USN**  
 Surgeon



**ROY F. LINSEMEYER**  
**GS-16 CIV**  
 Chief, Research and Analysis Office



**RICHARD U. SCOTT**  
**PL 313, GS-17E CIV**  
 Director AROI

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## KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL



**LEROY J. MANOR**  
LT GEN USAF  
Chief of Staff



**WILLIAM E. MC LEOD**  
MAJ GEN USA  
Deputy Chief of Staff



**LEO J. MOSER**  
FSO-1 CIV  
Political Adviser



**ALFRED J. LYNN**  
GS-15 CIV  
Chief Office for Public  
and Governmental Affairs



**ALAN COVILLE**  
COL USAF  
Joint Secretary



**JAMES H. JOHNSON**  
BGEN USA  
Director for Personnel  
and Inspector General



**DOYLE E. LARSON**  
BGEN USAF  
Director for Intelligence



**FRANK C. LANG**  
MAJ GEN USMC  
Director for Operations

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### Change of Command

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner became Commander in Chief Pacific on 30 August 1976, relieving Admiral Noel Gayler, who had been CINCPAC since 1972. Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., headed the list of distinguished guests and visitors and addressed the assembly. General Fred C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff, presented the Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Gayler, who retired from active duty the following day.

(U) The ceremony was a great deal like the one held four years earlier for change of command. On the mall near Hickam Tower at Hickam Air Force Base, troops of all Services massed in formation on a sunny, hot Hawaiian afternoon. One departure from the 1972 ceremony was that the men and women in the military formations did not pass in review. The Navy, it was learned, no longer taught marching in boot camp. But the ceremony was concluded by a fly-by of aircraft from all of the Services, with the faster jets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps followed by Army helicopters.

(U) The CINCPAC Protocol Office was responsible for development of guest lists (1,800 names), design and ordering of invitations, seating and parking identification systems, and ceremony brochures. The ceremony itself was believed to cost about \$32,000, with the principal portion of that amount (over \$23,000) the cost for movement and repair of bleachers. The reception that followed, attended by about 800, cost approximately \$3,600. The ceremony coordinator, a Plans Directorate officer, recommended that consideration be given to using the new (1976) public Aloha Stadium for the next such ceremony as it was an attractive site, had seating in place, had a field already lined and marked, had close and abundant parking, and was centrally located. Also, it would be considerably less expensive.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Admiral Maurice Franklin Weisner was born on 20 November 1917 in Knoxville, Tennessee, the son of Clint Hall and Adra Inex (Ogg) Weisner. After graduation from Knoxville High School, he attended the University of Tennessee before entering the U.S. Naval Academy in 1937. He graduated and was commissioned on 7 February 1941, and then served on the aircraft carrier WASP. On 20 May 1943 he was designated a naval aviator and joined Patrol Bombing Squadron TWENTY for service in the Southwest Pacific war area until 1945.

(U) This service was followed by duty with Patrol Bombing Squadron NINETY-EIGHT; the staff of Commander Fleet Air, West Coast; tours of duty as navigator on board the USS BADOENG STRAIT and USS RENDOVA; and service on the

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1. J003/75 After Action Report, 9 Sep 76, and enclosures.

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staff of Commander Fleet Air Wing FOURTEEN. During 1949 and 1950 he became executive officer and then commanding officer of Patrol Squadron FORTY-SIX in combat in Korea. In May 1951 he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In April 1953 he became executive officer of All-Weather Fighter Squadron THREE. Then, after command of Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE in 1954 and 1955, he returned to the Office of the CNO where he headed the Air Striking Forces Unit until July 1958.

(U) After completing the National War College, he took command of Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED ONE in June 1959. In January the following year he became operations officer of Commander Carrier Division ONE, and in November assumed command of USS GUADALUPE. A year later he became commanding officer of USS CORAL SEA.

(U) He served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel from July 1962 to March 1964, when he was assigned as Director, Air Weapons System Analysis Staff in the Office of the CNO. In September 1965 he became Commander Carrier Division ONE, and from March 1967 to June 1969 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Personnel Control and then Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. In July 1969 he was named Commander, Attack Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet/Commander Attack Carrier Division FIVE, operating all the carrier forces of the Seventh Fleet. In March 1970 he took command of the Seventh Fleet. He became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) in September 1971 and in September 1973 became Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(U) The Admiral's decorations include three Distinguished Service Medals, two Legions of Merit, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, six Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V", and more than 20 unit, campaign, and foreign decorations.

(U) The Admiral married the former Norma H. Smith of Knoxville. Their three sons are Maurice Hall, Franklin Lee, and Stewart Holland.

### Staff Organizational Changes

(U) The year 1976 saw fewer major organizational changes than had taken place in many years. The few minor adjustments that were made are outlined briefly below.

#### Research and Analysis Office

(U) In November 1974 a Review and Analysis Office had been established to provide advice and counsel on scientific and technical matters relating to CINCPAC's missions and functional responsibilities, and to conduct a review

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and analysis program for CINCPAC and his staff, and, when required, for subordinate unified commanders and Military Assistance Program activities. This office had been created to consolidate functions previously performed by the Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC and certain functions of the Scientific Analysis Group of the Operations Directorate. The office was subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff and was called Code J021.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 22 November 1976 this office was redesignated the Research and Analysis Office, maintaining essentially the same charter as noted above, with the tasking to provide objective bases for command decision-making wherever possible. It was also created as an independent office, Code J77, with administrative support to continue to be provided by J301 in the Operations Directorate. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer continued to serve as Chief of this office.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Because of limited fiscal and manpower analytical resources within the headquarters, the office acted as a focal point for studies that required the use of those resources. In November 1976 a Studies and Analyses Steering Committee and Senior Review Group were established for the management of studies, analyses, war games, computer simulations, and similar activities undertaken by CINCPAC and CINCPAC staff agencies with a scientific basis for decision-making, but which were not normally performed by a division action officer. The Research and Analysis Office served as the executive agent for such studies and analyses, which had been approved by a Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Director for Plans and consisting of the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Communications-Data Processing, with the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Pacific invited to participate. The committee was to review requirements, work in progress, completed studies, and requirements for assistance from component commands or contractors. The Senior Review Group, which consisted of the Chief of Staff and his Deputy and selected Directors appropriate to the business at hand, would review the committee's work and take appropriate action on recommendations.<sup>3</sup>

### Office for Public and Governmental Affairs

(U) In 1974 a new position had been created within the executive offices, a Special Assistant to CINCPAC to be coordinator for Congressional matters.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
  2. CINCPAC Notice 5401, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Research and Analysis Office, J77, establishment of; J77 Admin HistSum Dec 76.
  3. CINCPACINST 5250.1, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Conduct and Management of Studies and Analyses.

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On 25 April 1975 the special assistant also assumed duties for direction and administration of Public Affairs and Protocol; thus staff codes were revised to J003/74 and J003/75, respectively. The mission and functions of the office remained the same in 1976, but on 29 November the position of the office in the organization was realigned and redesignated Code J03. The office was charged to recommend public affairs policy for the PACOM and supervise implementation of the DOD public affairs program to include administration of Pacific Stars and Stripes. The office monitored the status of legislation that affected the command and prepared CINCPAC for Congressional discussions and briefings. The office also directed the supervised protocol activities for the command and served as focal point for General Accounting Office audits of command interest.<sup>1</sup>

### Operations Directorate

(U) During October two modifications were made in the Operations Directorate. On 1 October the Command and Control Systems Architect, Plans, and Requirements Branch (J335) of the Command and Control Division (J33) was transferred to the Requirements, Evaluation and Special Projects Division (J34). This was done to centralize the technical management and planning of future Operations Directorate command and control development programs into a single division. After the transfer J335 was redesignated J341, with the name Command and Control Architecture Branch, and J34 was renamed the Technology, Requirements, and Evaluation Division. J341 continued to support the Command and Control Division in all of its previous functions and also retained its support functions of automated data processing services and Worldwide Military Command and Control System overview for the Operations Directorate. Action officers and operations analysts previously assigned to J34 were placed in a new technology and evaluation oriented branch, J342, with the same title as the division.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 1 August the Oceanography and Meteorology Office had absorbed the personnel and functions of the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Office (J222M) of the Intelligence Directorate, creating the Staff Oceanography, Meteorology, Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Office (J30B). In October that office was redesignated the Geophysics Division (J37). Mission, function, and personnel were unchanged.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 21-22; CINCPAC Notice 5400, 29 Nov 76, Subj: Office for Public and Governmental Affairs; realignment and redesignation of.
  2. J340 HistSum Oct 76.
  3. J37A HistSum Oct 76.

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#### Management Control Detachment-Pacific Disestablished

(X) As discussed in the CINCPAC Command History for 1974, the CINCPAC Management Control Detachment-Pacific had been relocated from Yokota Air Base, Japan to Hawaii. This agency was disestablished effective 1 April 1976 and its residual functions were performed in CINCPAC's Directorate for Operations by the Permissive Action Link (PAL) Management Control Team (PMCT). Effective 31 March all Army personnel were reassigned from the unit. Four officers and three enlisted personnel were assigned to the Operations Directorate; the remaining four officers were reassigned to other commands.<sup>1</sup>

#### Consolidation of Special Operations and PSYOP/Unconventional Warfare Agencies

(U) The consolidation of the Operations Directorate's Special Operations Branch (J316) and the Plans Directorate's Psychological Operations/Unconventional Warfare Division (J55) had been under study for some time, as discussed in the 1975 History, with all agreeing on the idea of consolidation, but not in agreement on where the consolidated organization belonged on the staff. As directed by the Chief of Staff, the two offices were merged on 15 May 1976 in a new Special Operations Division in the Directorate for Operations. The new organization had the code J36. Besides providing for an integrated operation, a manpower saving of two spaces resulted. In addition to the duties of the former two agencies, the new division was responsible for certain collateral functions that had been managed by J316; these were foreign and domestic disaster relief, lava control, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and the Central Identification Laboratory. The new division was directed to be responsive to the Plans Directorate in preparation of the Joint Strategic Operations Plan and other contingency plans.<sup>2</sup>

#### Reconnaissance Activities Consolidated

(U) By 1 July the colocation of several branches of the Intelligence and Operations Directorates was completed. From the Current Operations Division of the Operations Directorate, the Reconnaissance Branch and the Electronic Warfare Branch were colocated with the Intelligence Directorate Collection Management Division's Signal Intelligence and Photo Intelligence Branches. The relocation was directed by the Chief of Staff to improve CINCPAC

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 31; J131 HistSum Feb 76; J142 HistSum Mar 76.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 23-24; CINCPAC Ltr Ser 1254, 23 Jun 76, Subj: Change 2 to HQ CINCPAC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), 1 Nov 75; J3/Memo/329-76, 5 May 76, Subj: HQ CINCPAC Staff Reorganization; J01/Memo/18-76, 19 Apr 76, Subj: HQ CINCPAC Staff Reorganization.

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reconnaissance command, control, and management. Associated with this colocation was the establishment of the position of Joint Reconnaissance Center Watch Officer (for which five new officer spaces were established) located in the PACOM Intelligence Watch Center.<sup>1</sup>

### Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate Reorganized

(U) Effective 1 July the Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate reverted to a single deputy concept. (Two deputies had been assigned since the consolidation of two separate directorates, one for Logistics and the other for Security Assistance, which had taken place effective 1 July 1975.) The reorganization also reduced the divisions responsible for security assistance materiel and services program management and training from three to two. In a 1 December 1975 reorganization the number of Security Assistance plans and program divisions had been reduced from four to three, which were North Asia (J46), East Asia (J47), and South Asia (J48). With the 1 July 1976 reorganization the two newly formed divisions were the East Asia Plans/Programs Division (J46) with responsibility for Australia, Fiji, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and a South Asia Plans/Programs Division (J47) responsible for Afghanistan, Brunei, Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The Evaluation and Management Division staff code was changed from J49 to J48.<sup>2</sup>

### Redesignation of Organization Administering Air Force Personnel Matters

(U) Air Force personnel on the CINCPAC staff were serviced by an Air Force Branch of the Headquarters Personnel Division (J14). In addition, they were considered to be assigned to an Air Force organization, the name of which had been Detachment 1, 1131st USAF Special Activities Squadron. Effective 1 April the title for that organization was changed to Air Force Element Pacific Command.<sup>3</sup>

(U) This change was instituted to more clearly identify the various Headquarters Command operating locations throughout the Air Force and better determine supply and budgetary priorities. Effective 1 July 1976 the Headquarters Command in the Pentagon assumed the function of a major command. The position that had been designated "Detachment Commander" in Hawaii was changed to "Program Manager." His responsibilities were similar to those of the Detachment Commander, except that he had no statutory authority to levy

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1. J3141 HistSum Jul 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 24-25; J452 HistSum Jul 76.

3. J143 HistSum Apr 76.

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## AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 January 1976				30 June 1976 <sup>1</sup>				31 December 1976			
	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOT
CINCPAC	7	15	3	25	5	16	0	21	5	17	0	22
Inspector General	5	3	1	9	5	3	1	9	5	3	1	9
Office for Public/Governmental Affairs	0	0	0	0	13	10	11	34	13	10	11	34
Chief of Staff					3	2	4	9	3	2	4	9
Deputy Chief of Staff	5	1	5	11	2	0	1	3	2	0	1	3
Review and Analysis Office	2	0	6	8	2	0	7	9	2	0	9	11
Joint Secretariat	7	40	11	58	7	40	12	59	7	39	12	58
Personnel Directorate	18	18	11	47	19	18	11	48	18	17	13	48
Intelligence Directorate	37	67	8	112	38	67	8	113	37	66	7	110
Operations Directorate	76	53	10	139	94	58	10	162	99	60	11	170
Logistics Directorate	45	23	19	87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Logistics-Security Assistance Directorate	0	0	0	0	67	26	26	119	61	21	18	100
Plans Directorate	54	27	10	91	55	27	10	92	52	26	9	87
Communications-Electronics Directorate	32	15	10	57	30	14	10	54	30	14	10	54
Comptroller	4	0	7	11	4	0	9	13	4	0	9	13
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8
Public Affairs	10	7	4	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protocol Office	3	3	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surgeon	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7
Security Assistance Directorate	40	23	23	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liaison Officer to CINCAL	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	353	301	131	785	351	287	122	760	345	281	117	743
Airborne Command Post	33	8	1	42	33	8	1	42	33	8	1	42
PACOM ADP Systems Support Group	22	41	25	88	26	46	34	106	26	46	34	106
Intelligence Center Pacific	108	139	58	305	108	139	58	305	108	139	58	305
Management Control Detachment Pacific	16	9	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous Units <sup>2</sup>	2	6	0	8	2	6	0	8	5	9	26	40
Sub-Total	181	203	84	468	169	199	93	461	172	202	119	493
GRAND TOTAL	534	504	215	1,253	520	486	215	1,221	517	483	236	1,236

- Headquarters CINCPAC FY 76 Joint Manpower Program (revised 1 November 1975) was approved by JCS 9242/271742Z Feb 76.
- PACOM Miscellaneous Units FY 77 Joint Manpower Program (revised) and three out-of-cycle changes were approved by JCS 1753/132213Z Sep 76, JCS 7027/011903Z Oct 76, and JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76. The total of 26 civilians includes 23 Local Wage Rate spaces. The miscellaneous units as of 31 December were Australia Foreign Military Sales, Administrative Specialist to the Defense Attache Office in Singapore, Administrative Assistant to the Defense Attache Office in Malaysia, the U.S. Military Advisor's Representative to SEATO and SEATO support, USMACTHAI Residual Accounting, Management of Ammunition in Thailand, and the Office of Defense Cooperation, India.

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non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The host commander of the 15th Air Base Wing, at Hickam Air Force Base, was charged with that responsibility, which was stipulated in the local host-tenant agreement under AFR 11-4.<sup>1</sup>

### Joint Manpower Programs

(U) The authorized strengths of CINCPAC staff directorates and the various other Joint Manpower Programs administered by CINCPAC are as shown on the accompanying chart. In December 1975 the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to submit plans for reduction by 20 percent for the following PACOM support activities: the Airborne Command Post, the ADP Systems Support Group, the Management Control Detachment-Pacific, the Intelligence Center Pacific, and the USMACTHAI Support Group. On 30 December 1975 CINCPAC had reported reaching those reduction goals for all except the Airborne Command Post and the Intelligence Center Pacific. On 30 January 1976 the JCS, responding to the Secretary of Defense, supported the CINCPAC position to exempt those two agencies from further reductions at that time.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 29 October the JCS approved an out-of-cycle change 2 to the Joint Table of Distribution for FY 76 and extended it for FY 77. The FY 76 year-end authorization of 743 (626 military and 117 civilian) represented a decrease of 58 spaces from the year-end FY 75 strength of 801, and a net reduction of approximately 5 percent (42 spaces), using a JCS-directed baseline of 808 spaces.<sup>3</sup>

### Flag and General Officers on CINCPAC Staff

(U) The number of general and flag officer billets on the staff, the grade levels assigned, and the Service of those officers was a matter of continuing study over the years. On 23 March 1976 CINCPAC submitted to the JCS his recommendations in this regard for the revised FY 76 Joint Table of Distribution. He had concluded that certain changes were needed. He recommended that the position of Director for Logistics and Security Assistance be changed from Navy to Army, to provide the Army with a major billet consistent with one of its major interests (as well as to improve the numerical balance among the Services, a continuing goal on joint staffs). He recommended reestablishment of the Deputy Director for Plans billet as an Army brigadier general. This had been the circumstance until 1 August 1975, when the departing deputy

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1. J143 Memo to J01, 22 Mar 76, Subj: Redesignation of Special Activity Units.
  2. J131 HistSum Jan 76, which cited MJCS 413-75 of 1 Dec 75, CINCPAC Ltr Ser C468 of 30 Dec 75, and JCSM-33-76 of 30 Jan 76.
  3. J134 HistSum Nov 76.

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had been replaced by an Army colonel from the Plans Directorate. He noted that reestablishment at the general officer level was completely justified on the basis of workload and representational requirements. Also, it could be accomplished within the total number of flag and general officers authorized. He recommended that the Director for Personnel be changed from an Army brigadier general to rotate, at the same rank, between the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain a Service balance. He planned to rotate the billet of the Director for Operations between the Marine Corps and Air Force.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The JCS reply of 3 May, however, was not in agreement with CINCPAC's proposal. A comparison of the two follows:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Position</u>	<u>CINCPAC's Proposal</u>	<u>JCS Answer</u>
Commander in Chief	010 Navy	010 Navy
Chief of Staff	09 Air Force/Army	09 Air Force/Army
Deputy Chief of Staff	08 Army/Air Force	08 Army/Air Force
Director for Personnel and Inspector General	07 Navy/Marine Corps	07 Army
Director for Intelligence	07 Air Force	07 Air Force/Navy
Director for Operations	08 Marine Corps/ Air Force	08 Marine Corps
Director for Logistics and Security Assistance	08 Army	08 Navy
Director for Plans	08 Navy	08 Navy/Air Force
Deputy Director for Plans	07 Army	07 Army/Navy
Deputy for Communications and Data Processing	07 Air Force	07 Air Force/Army

(U) On 5 May CINCPAC advised the JCS that he would like to reclaim the JCS answer. He recognized that some rotational billets were necessary, but he preferred a minimum of them at the director level. "Extension or curtailment of normal tours due to promotion, retirement or Service requirements can disrupt mix or necessitate short tours," CINCPAC said. He continued that rotation could cause the director and deputy to be of the same Service or cause lack of continuity because of simultaneous reassignment. He urged two specific requirements. The first was for an Army officer as the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance. These two areas were best served by Army expertise, he said. The other was that the Air Force should share influence in the Operations Directorate. Rotation was the "only way to do this." The proposed rotation of Service for the Director for Personnel was to keep a Service balance when the Director for Operations changed Service. He continued

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, p. 33; CINCPAC 230306Z Mar 76.
  2. JCS 2536/031348Z May 76; CINCPAC 040317Z May 76.

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that a rotational Deputy Director for Plans would be particularly difficult to manage with the Director's billet also being rotational. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he realized there were infinite combinations, but he didn't understand the rationale for the distribution provided by the JCS.<sup>1</sup>

(U) CINCPAC subsequently advised the JCS that he recognized Service interests and the possible problem of worldwide balance on joint staffs. As a general policy, however, he noted, "I would think that primary consideration would be given to a CINC's views on tailoring his own staff--provided, of course, that he maintained a reasonable balance." He noted that he had not been told of any specific objection to his original March proposal. Instead, he had simply been given a different line-up that appeared to be based solely on inter-Service compromise. "I do not think this is the way to go about tailoring a staff."<sup>2</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, CINCPAC sought and received approval for filling the position of Deputy Director for Plans with an Army brigadier general, pending resolution of the whole matter.<sup>3</sup>

(U) In September CINCPAC provided the JCS, in response to their request, with his recommended normal tour lengths for flag and general officers in the PACOM. All were for three years, except two-year tours were recommended for the Chiefs of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups in Korea and the Philippines and the Chief MAAG China. He recommended "strongly" that "we avoid rigid adherence to set tour lengths, and that the Services be given flexibility to reassign general and flag officers for purposes of career enhancement, promotion, etc." Regarding the two-year MAP tours, this allowed flexibility and tours could be extended on a case-by-case basis.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 050430Z May 76.
  2. CINCPAC 131905Z Jun 76.
  3. CINCPAC 201941Z May 76 and JCS 241354Z May 76 (both BOM).
  4. CINCPAC 090326Z Sep 76; J131 HistSum Sep 76.

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### SECTION III--OTHER PACOM HEADQUARTERS STAFFING

#### Reductions in MAAGs and U.S. Personnel so Assigned

(G) On 28 February the JCS advised CINCPAC of a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs that legislation passed by the U.S. Senate (S.2662), if enacted into law, would require the disestablishment of 10 Military Assistance Advisory Groups worldwide. In addition, it would be necessary to withdraw 222 of the authorized 1,622 spaces in such MAAGs by 30 June 1976. The JCS asked for prompt action to identify the MAAGs that were logical candidates for disestablishment and the personnel spaces that should be earmarked for deletion from authorization documents. Actions regarding personnel in the process of being assigned should be held in abeyance to avoid personnel hardships resulting from reassignment while in transit or shortly after arriving at a new assignment. Possible personnel shortfalls, it was acknowledged, could occur if the legislation did not become law.<sup>1</sup>

(U) CINCPAC provided a list in order of priority and identified personnel spaces for reduction. The JCS further requested rationale for such prioritization of MAAGs in terms of U.S. interests and justification for their retention. This CINCPAC report was provided on 16 May, and is discussed in greater detail in the Security Assistance chapter of this history.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Throughout this middle part of 1976 major changes were occurring in the national-level management of the Security Assistance Program; these are also addressed in the Security Assistance chapter.

(S) When the final decision was made in the Defense Department and passed on to the State Department for review and approval, there were 11 MAAGs slated for disestablishment. Only one was in the PACOM; that was India. The others were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay. All personnel actions and movement of personnel made excess by reductions was to be completed as soon as feasible, but not later than 15 February 1977. "Consider in such planning retention of a 3 man liaison group allowed by Sec 104 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."<sup>3</sup>

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1. JCS 9748/280630Z Feb 75.
  2. CINCPAC 160410Z May 76.
  3. JCS 1285/091723Z Aug 76.

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(C) The military assistance organization in India, the Office of the Defense Representative India, was the only CINCPAC agency designated for disestablishment. The office there, however, which had been physically located within the Embassy, enjoyed a somewhat unique situation in that the number of currently assigned American personnel (one officer, one enlisted, one civilian secretary) was within the manning allowed by the 1976 law. Therefore, the termination action, according to the ODRI, "should not affect the continuity of our day-to-day operations" with the Government of India in any way. Assignment of three U.S. personnel to the Embassy staff, which was authorized, would not reduce the services being provided nor would it affect liaison actions with the Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador noted that the fact that the Military Assistance agency in Pakistan had not been terminated could lend emphasis to the thinking in some corners of the Indian Government that the United States was "tipping the scales in favor of Islamabad." As the termination was to be merely an internal change, the Ambassador saw no need to inform the Indian Government, either formally or informally, that there had been any change. If questioned, it would be stated that there had been some internal changes, but that it was "business as usual."<sup>1</sup>

(C) CINCPAC officially disestablished the Office of the Defense Representative India effective 30 September. He directed that the residual liaison group be responsible for Security Assistance programs for India and for U.S. property when assigned to the former ODRI. In September CINCPAC requested JCS approval to transfer the billets in the residual element to the FY 77 PACOM "Miscellaneous Units" Joint Manpower Program. The JCS approved CINCPAC's request on 30 December.<sup>2</sup>

(U) In the PACOM, the following Service assignments and grade levels were authorized for the heads of Security Assistance agencies:<sup>3</sup>

China	07	Rotational Air Force/Army
India	06	Army
Indonesia	06	Rotational Army/Navy/Air Force
Japan	06	Rotational Navy/Air Force/Army
Korea	08	Army
Pakistan	06	Air Force
Philippines	07	Army
Thailand	07	Rotational Army/Air Force

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1. AMEMB New Delhi 11945/150940Z Aug 76.
  2. CINCPAC 240410Z Aug 76 and 282352Z Sep; JCS 7316/302322Z Dec 76.
  3. JCS 9054/051934Z May 76.

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(S) This last authorization, however, came under further study. On 19 June CINCPAC advised that he believed that a continuing requirement existed for an 07 Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand "for at least next year," but by October an Army 06 had been assigned to that billet.<sup>1</sup>

(U) The India billet was filled by a Navy 05 beginning in July 1976, but the position had been changed to Air Force 05 and would be so filled in 1977.

Defense Attaché Office Laos Disestablished

(U) In September 1973 the position of Defense Attaché in Laos was established. (Formerly there had been a Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Attaché.) Revised Terms of Reference were approved by the JCS on 12 March 1976. On 25 May, however, the JCS closed the Joint Manpower Program. Of the total authorization of 154 spaces (29 military, 15 U.S. civilian, and 110 local Wage Rate), the following actions took place. Returned to the Defense Intelligence Agency were 3 military, 6 U.S. civilians, and 6 Local Wage Rate. Eight were used for compensation with other PACOM Joint Manpower Programs (5 military and 3 U.S. civilian). The remaining 131 were returned to the Services (21 military, 6 U.S. civilians, and 104 Local Wage Rate). By June the DAO was manned by two officers, one non-commissioned officer, and two Local Wage Rate employees.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 190254Z Jun 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 57-58; JCS 8919/121633Z Mar 76 and 5698/252030Z May 76; J1313 HistSum May 76.

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#### SECTION IV--COMMAND AND CONTROL

##### Unified Command Plan Changes Expand the PACOM

(U) The Unified Command Plan, published by the JCS, was the basic charter of the unified and specified commands. It was based on decisions made by the President and the Secretary of Defense. It outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various commands. Revisions to this plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, by which geographic boundaries were set, and by which basic missions were assigned.

(U) The last major change that had affected the PACOM had been effective on 1 January 1972, when the command, which was already the largest of the unified commands, was increased in area from about 85 million square miles to about 94 million. Additions at that time included the countries of Southern Asia extending westward to the eastern border of Iran, and much of the Indian Ocean as well as the Aleutian Islands and parts of the Arctic Ocean.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On 2 April 1976 the JCS advised that a change to the plan had been recommended to move the boundary between the Atlantic Command and the PACOM farther westward, from 62°E to 17°E, giving CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean, effective 1 May 1976. The change had been approved by the President on 3 March and the Secretary of Defense had directed implementation on 23 March. The JCS encouraged the continuation of inter-command arrangements relative to the Pacific/Atlantic/European Commands similar to those already in effect.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The enlarged command included the entire Indian Ocean, including the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden, but excluding the Malagasy Republic. The expanded area included the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives. All land areas of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, remained in the European Command area. Africa south of the Sahara and the Malagasy Republic remained unassigned. Accompanying these changes were plans for manpower reductions in all of the commands, all the result of a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense that tasked the JCS to review potential realignments, tasking of the unified and specified commands, and reducing or

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, p. 41.

2. JCS 2290/022322Z Apr 76.

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eliminating outdated tasks with the objective of streamlining military headquarters. (Staff reductions throughout the command are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.)<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 8 April, in anticipation of the boundary change, CINCPAC advised his component commanders and the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group of the expansion and asked them to assess additional area responsibilities against available assets to accomplish required tasks and respond to potential contingencies. The functions that he asked them to report on included (but were not limited to) the collection and reporting of intelligence; control and protection of shipping; search and rescue missions; port visit arrangements; disaster relief; noncombatant emergency evacuation; exercises with friendly forces; and antisubmarine warfare operations.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 19 August the Honolulu Star-Bulletin published a report that the PACOM "again stretches out," noting that another eight million square miles of water off East Africa had been acquired in May, expanding the command to an area of 102 million square miles.<sup>3</sup>

#### Review of PACOM Tasking

(U) As noted above, in October the Secretary of Defense directed that the JCS review the taskings of the unified and specified commands and Defense agencies that reported through the JCS with a view toward eliminating or reducing tasks that were outdated. The JCS forwarded a list of tasks to be reviewed in JCS J5M 293-76 of 27 February. It contained approximately 1,150 individual tasking statements taken from the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, JCS publications, JCS and Defense Department directives, and public affairs and protocol requirements. CINCPAC was directed to review each tasking and provide recommendations, by exception, for elimination or reduction of specific tasks. The JCS also requested a compilation of tasks from other sources, not included in their list, with command and recommendation as appropriate.

(U) CINCPAC initiated such a review, establishing an ad hoc working group comprised of directorate, staff agency, and Service representatives. The detailed review of each task was conducted by the directorate or agency in

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1. J563 HistSum Jan 76; SECDEF Memo to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman, JCS, and the Directors of Defense Agencies, 22 Oct 75, Subj: Unified and Specified Commands (PACOM, USEUCOM, USREDCOM, LANTCOM, SAC) and Supporting Structure.
  2. CINCPAC 080231Z Apr 76. See the Plans chapter for CINCPAC's Indian Ocean Assessment.
  3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 19 Aug 76, p. D-8.

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whose area of cognizance the task fell. CINCPAC's Navy and Air Force component commands and the Army's CINCPAC Support Group reviewed the entire list and commented, where appropriate, on tasks with Service implications.

(U) The results of CINCPAC's review were forwarded to meet the 1 April suspense. The forwarding letter also commented on the numerous Service Department directives the PACOM headquarters was required to respond to because of the joint make-up of its personnel, and the significant impact of one-time requirements and taskings from higher authority.<sup>1</sup>

CINCPAC-CINCEUR Command Arrangements Agreement

(S) On 16 April 1974 the Commander in Chief of the European Command had forwarded a proposed draft of a USCINCEUR-CINCPAC Command Arrangements Agreement. He noted the contiguous areas of responsibility of the two commanders, and recognized the possible situations in which the employment in proximity of forces of both unified commands might be required or beneficial to U.S. objectives. The purpose of establishing command arrangements, he said, was to promote effective mutual support between the forces of the two commands. He then listed possible arrangements in regard to the authorization of direct liaison for planning, cooperative measures for intelligence matters, and particularly with regard to exchange of operational command for the Mid-East Force and Indian Ocean task forces.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Work continued throughout 1975 and half of 1976 before the agreement was finally completed. Admiral Gayler signed as CINCPAC on 19 May and General A.M. Haig, Jr., Commander in Chief of the European Command, signed on 1 July 1976.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Part of the delay concerned the planned movement of the PACOM boundary which is discussed in changes to the Unified Command Plan elsewhere in this history. The principal other delay concerned whether or not the forces operating in the geographic area of a unified commander should be "chopped" to him during normal peacetime operations. This term meant that operational command/operational control (which the JCS had defined as synonymous) of forces was to pass from CINCEUR to CINCPAC when forces were operating in the PACOM area. CINCPAC wanted the forces to be chopped to him; CINCEUR did not agree. There seemed to be no clear-cut guidance in JCS publications, although both Unified Action Armed Forces and the Unified Command Plan pertained.

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1. J563 HistSum Mar 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1974, Vol. I, pp. 88-89.

3. Memorandum of Agreement between Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR).

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(C) CINCPAC provided his thoughts on this matter to the CINCEUR on 20 March 1976. He noted that there was one area of concern to him, "effective and unambiguous chain of command." He believed the following principles should apply:<sup>1</sup>

...Tactical control of forces in a given area should be unified.

...A commander should be able to exercise effective control over all politico-military matters in his area, including port visits.

...He should have a clear-cut military chain of command vice quote cooperative unquote and quote coordinating unquote arrangements.

...Arrangements should be joint and therefore agreed between unified commanders. [The Commanders in Chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets had been working on their own arrangements.]

He noted that the Indian Ocean boundary had been changed to reduce forever the ambiguity from multiple command arrangements. Unity of command and unity of effort demanded that it be kept unambiguous, he said. "Operational command" avoided unnecessary administrative complications, "and I think it essential for both of us." He forwarded a command arrangements agreement that reflected these thoughts.

(C) When the JCS advised of the boundary change in the revised Unified Command Plan, however, they encouraged the continuation of inter-command arrangements relative to PACOM/LANTCOM/USEUCOM boundaries similar to those already in effect.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 8 April the CINCEUR provided his rationale as to why forces should not be chopped as they crossed boundary lines. He believed that the parent unified commander should retain operational command of forces unless it was mutually agreed in a given instance by the two commanders, or directed by the JCS. The existing CINCEUR-CINCLANT agreement, which did not chop forces, had "provided the essential flexibility to permit MIDEASTFOR to frequently cross UCP 'boundaries' and still operate on USCINCEUR's behalf effectively, as well as in the best interests of national objectives." He continued that he

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1. CINCPAC 200249Z Mar 76.

2. Op. Cit., JCS 2290/022322Z Apr 76.

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believed there would be "no perceivable gain in requiring ships and aircraft during routine operations to chop upon crossing UCP boundaries; in fact, such a rigid procedure could contribute to confusion and uncertainty."<sup>1</sup>

(C) CINCPAC provided still further rationale for the principles he had outlined on 20 March. Included were thoughts that any occurrence involving a MIDEASTFOR ship operating in the PACOM likely to cause an issue or create a diplomatic incident was to be resolved by CINCPAC; that operations involving MIDEASTFOR ships and Seventh Fleet ships in company or on a common task should be under the direction of only one unified commander; that CINCPAC needed to be able to direct MIDEASTFOR ships on short notice on urgent but unexpected requirements, such as search and rescue or disaster assistance; the need for CINCPAC to approve all port visits to PACOM countries (procedures in this regard were already in effect and working); and the need to be able to employ MIDEASTFOR ships from time to time to carry out tasks for which authoritative direction should be provided by CINCPAC.<sup>2</sup>

(C) With these recommendations, CINCPAC forwarded another draft agreement that he believed would maintain unity of command in the best way short of a change in operational command.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The final agreement then was concurred in by both commands, and signed as noted above. COMIDEASTFOR was to be assigned additional duty as the CINCPAC Representative, Indian Ocean, on a not-to-interfere basis with COMIDEASTFOR responsibilities to USCINCEUR. During his normal operations he would be assigned additional duty to CINCPACFLT to accomplish CINCPAC tasks in CINCPAC's area of responsibility on a not-to-interfere basis with his responsibilities to USCINCEUR. In that regard, one specific task concerned Operational Control Authority in the Naval Control of Shipping Organization, in coordination with the Commander Third Fleet, within the single integrated area encompassing the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean west of 78°E longitude.

(C) During normal peacetime operations, operational control of forces was to remain with the parent unified commander regardless of geographic location of forces, unless otherwise agreed mutually by USCINCEUR and CINCPAC, or as directed by the JCS. The commands were to inform one another in a timely manner of operations planned or conducted in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Gulfs of Aden and Oman in order to permit close coordination and preclude mutual interference between U.S. Forces.

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1. USCINCEUR 081627Z Apr 76.
  2. CINCPAC 272321Z Apr 76 (EX).
  3. J5/Memo/055-76, 26 Apr 76, Subj: CINCPAC-USCINCEUR CAA (U).

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COMIDEASTFOR was to operate in support of CINCPACFLT for those operations in the Indian Ocean that supported CINCPAC's mission, with certain exceptions. These were that when it was mutually agreed by the two unified commanders, for the accomplishment of specific missions, OPCOM of COMIDEASTFOR and forces assigned, as required, would be passed to CINCPAC for operations in the PACOM area of responsibility as directed by CINCPACFLT, with OPCOM to be returned to USCINCEUR upon completion of assigned missions; that for short-term urgent requirements, such as search and rescue or disaster assistance, MIDEASTFOR ships operating in the PACOM area would operate as directed by CINCPACFLT, who was to keep all concerned informed; and that whenever MIDEASTFOR ships operated in company or on a common task with Seventh Fleet forces, tactical command and conduct of operations would be as directed by CINCPACFLT for the duration of the operation.

(C) By agreement with CINCLANT, operational command of MIDEASTFOR relieving ships transiting via the Cape of Good Hope passed to CINCPAC at 17°E. Operational command of these ships would be passed to USCINCEUR upon crossing EUCOM boundaries, at a port designated as point of relief, or as mutually agreed by USCINCEUR and CINCPAC.

(C) The agreement discussed war or contingency operations resulting from attack or threat of attack on U.S. Forces of the forces or territory of a country considered vital to U.S. interests. Arrangements were outlined for four situations: CINCPAC forces operating in support of USCINCEUR, CINCPAC forces augmenting USCINCEUR, USCINCEUR forces operating in support of CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR forces augmenting CINCPAC.

(C) Also outlined were arrangements regarding the exchange of operational command of CINCPAC forces augmenting USCINCEUR for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, regarding the release and employment of nuclear weapons, and regarding Public Affairs responsibilities.

#### Commanders' Conference

(C) On 18 and 19 May CINCPAC attended a conference convened by the Chairman of the JCS at the Readiness Command Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. It was attended by the Service Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands. In preparation for the conference, CINCPAC submitted seven proposed discussion topics, and subsequently expanded on the seven in response to a request from the European Command. Only two of the seven topics were selected for presentation, however,


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
during what was actually one day of meetings. Admiral Gayler led a discussion on the two topics: foreign military training--value versus costs, and realistic contingency planning and crisis management.<sup>1</sup>

Kunia Facility Closed

(b)(1)



(U) In 1962 CINCPAC had initiated a project to build a ground headquarters on top of the Kunia facility to replace his Camp Smith Headquarters (which was also of World War II vintage) and the Secretary of Defense had included the cost in the FY 66 Military Construction Program, but Congressional committees did not authorize such construction.<sup>2</sup>



(U) Modernization of the facility continued over the years. In 1972 a Honeywell H6050 computer was installed as part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS); it was the first such computer in the PACOM. In 1974 an Emergency Action Booth was enlarged and equipped with Western Electric Model 304 consoles similar to those at Camp Smith.<sup>4</sup>

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1. JCS 1811/242244Z Mar 76 (EX); CINCPAC 070749Z Apr 76; SSO Seoul (Golf 3) 060533Z May 76 (BOM); JCS 5737/112217Z May 76 (EX).
  2. CINCPAC Command Histories 1963, Vol. I, p. 18; and 1964, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
  3. CINCPAC Command Histories 1963, Vol. I, p. 18; and 1967, Vol. I, p. 48.
  4. CINCPAC Command Histories 1972, Vol. I, p. 40; and 1973, Vol. I, p. 67.

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(U) During 1975 still further ADP improvements were made at both Camp Smith and Kunia, but by the end of that year many proposals regarding Kunia were being held in abeyance as continued use of the facility came under study. One reason was that improvements were also occurring elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 9 January 1976 CINCPACFLT advised that the computer system that provided all ocean surveillance and status of forces data on the Fleet, and the system that generated the FORSTAT (Force Status and Identity Report) data cards for CINCPAC and the JCS was no longer in use. An evolutionary process had allowed transfer of Navy functions from Kunia to CINCPACFLT's Headquarters at Makalapa (near Pearl Harbor). The only data base information maintained by computer at Kunia was the Single Integrated Operation Plan data from CINCPAC's Honeywell 6060 system. There were no Fleet plans to implement a remote terminal capability at Kunia from Makalapa. "In view of the foregoing, the continuation of the ERS [Emergency Relocation Site for CINCPACFLT] and the ACFK [Alternate Command Facility] at Kunia is of doubtful usefulness since the facility no longer has the requisite communications support capability." He estimated that closing the facility entirely would result in an annual saving of \$5.6 million, conversion to caretaker status a saving of \$4 million, and securing of all CINCPACFLT Emergency Relocation Site spaces as \$100,000. He rescinded the requirement to maintain Kunia as a Navy ERS, and asked that CINCPAC look closely at his requirement to maintain an Alternate Command Facility there.<sup>2</sup>

(C) CINCPAC had already had the matter under study throughout 1975. The ever-decreasing use of the facility made it less cost effective to keep open. An Operations Directorate preliminary analysis of costs, floor-space use, and tenant functions was presented to CINCPAC in July 1975. He requested further information, and recommended closure actions were presented to CINCPAC in January 1976, coinciding with CINCPACFLT's proposal. CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that the requirement for both the ERS and the ACFK was rescinded. To fulfill his obligation for continuity of operations, he explained, he was examining other locations that could serve as an Alternate Command Post. (Establishment of this new Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) is discussed in more detail below.) CINCPAC said that he understood that the Kunia facility could be closed entirely with the relocation of the remaining tenants and that this should be accomplished without delay. CINCPAC also advised all tenant agencies of this decision and encouraged them to assist CINCPACFLT as the responsible executive in taking appropriate action as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 56.
  2. CINCPACFLT Ltr Ser 34/A-18, 9 Jan 76, Subj: Kunia Facility; use of (U).
  3. CINCPAC Ltr Ser C21, 21 Jan 76, Subj: Kunia Facility (U); CINCPAC 232007Z Jan 76; J341 HistSum Jan 76.

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(C) CINCPACFLT notified the Chief of Naval Operations that Kunia was excess to Navy needs and requested authority to dispose of the facility. The CNO, however, subsequently alerted CINCPACFLT regarding a joint study that the Navy was to lead on military real property requirements in Hawaii. The study had been directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The CNO wanted certification that the Kunia closure was in support of study objectives, which were to obtain maximum possible combined Service utilization of real property over the long term; to identify current, long-range, and mobilization real property requirements; and to determine dominant users for each significant installation, activity, and property associated with requirements. The CNO asked CINCPACFLT to advise if the Kunia property was significantly peculiar that disposal decision would not be of significance in meeting new study objectives. He also asked that CINCPACFLT identify tenant commands involved in the action and the impact associated for each by the closure.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Subsequently, permission from the Secretary of the Navy and the Congress would be required before decommissioning of the facility, but this would not be forthcoming until the spring of 1977.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Certain CINCPAC actions regarding relocation were begun early in 1976. The Communications-Data Processing Directorate, in coordination with CINCPACFLT, began removal of the 800-line Government-owned telephone exchange to be replaced with a few commercial lines until the facility was closed; estimated cost savings were \$600,000 a year. That directorate also began coordinating with the Army to relocate the WWMCCS computer from Kunia to Fort Shafter, where it would be used temporarily until it was to be moved once again to the proposed Regional ADP Center to be in the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific building in 1978. The move to Fort Shafter was accomplished and the Honeywell 6060 computer was operational there by June 1976. The Kunia Nuclear Operations Branch (J32K) completed its relocation to Fort Shafter on 21 May and was redesignated the Fort Shafter Nuclear Operations Branch (J32S). That organization attained full operational status on 1 June. June 1976 had been set by CINCPACFLT as the target date for relocation of all activities, but that date was not attained by all agencies. Total moving expenses were estimated at approximately \$3 million.<sup>3</sup>

(C) In April the Fleet Operations Control Center Pacific (FOCCPAC) had notified all Kunia tenants that existing Inter-Service Support Agreements would be cancelled on 1 October. This was the target date for final relocation of the CINCPAC Alternate Command Post to Hickam Air Force Base. Effective 1 June

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1. CNO 312159Z Mar 76.

2. J340 HistSum Feb 77.

3. CINCPAC 121904Z Mar 76; J341 HistSums Jan, Jun 76; J322 HistSum May 76.

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the CINCPACAF Alternate Command Facility at Kunia was closed; PACAF retained alternate headquarters at 5th Air Force Headquarters at Yokota Air Base, Japan, and at 13th Air Force Headquarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

(C) In April CINCPAC had requested JCS approval to install the Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System at the new ALCOP at Hickam, but it was subsequently decided (and approved by the JCS) to install it at Camp Smith with an Automatic Digital Network terminal at the ALCOP. This equipment was expected to be ready in the spring of 1977.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The Defense Communications Agency, Pacific completed removal of all equipment and relocated to nearby Wheeler Air Force Base on 10 September. Also moving to Wheeler was the 326th Air Division; this move was completed by 15 October.<sup>3</sup>

(C) The 326th Air Division had been one of the last two tenants. The last was the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility, which terminated operations at Kunia on 19 October. The Fleet Operations Control Center continued to provide support until the departure of all tenants. They terminated their communications center operations on 19 October. Their in-house generators were secured on 18 October, with pumps and fans being run from Hawaiian Electric Company sources and billed to Barbers Point Naval Air Station.<sup>4</sup>

(C) FOCCPAC made plans to secure the interior entrance of the exhaust tunnel containing the Hawaiian Telephone Company systems, which needed outside access. They planned to build a more useful outside entrance for this tunnel, provide it with security systems remoted to a nearby facility and supply it with Hawaiian Electric Company power. The tunnel could then be entered from the outside of the facility by telephone company employees for maintenance on their systems, and also be used for remote control operations of the Navy microwave relay system within the tunnel. The facility would be placed under administrative control of the Naval Air Station at Barbers Point after deactivation of the FOCCPAC.<sup>5</sup>

(U) By early 1977 all major internal systems had been turned off except for a pumping system that fed water through the facility to irrigate the pineapple fields above. Upon receipt of expected closure approval from the

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1. J34 HistSums Apr, Jun 76.
  2. Ibid.
  3. J34 HistSums Sep-Oct 76.
  4. Ibid.
  5. J34 HistSums Aug-Sep 76.

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Secretary of the Navy, FOCCPAC was to be decommissioned and the Navy's Facilities Engineering Command Pacific Division was expected to handle negotiations for disposition of the facility. It was first to be offered to the other Services and then the State of Hawaii. If not taken over by a government agency or the State of Hawaii, its ownership would revert to the Campbell Estate.<sup>1</sup>

New Alternate Command Post Established

(S) In connection with the closing of CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia, discussed above, on 27 March CINCPAC announced a new concept for continuity of operations. The CINCPAC Command Center at Camp H.M. Smith would function as the primary command post until it was disabled or until primary command post duties were assumed by the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post, airborne. In time of war, the CINCPAC ABNCP would function as the primary command post during a trans/post nuclear attack. In peacetime, a fixed ALCOP would function as the primary command post when the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith was disabled. The CINCPAC ABNCP ground facility at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii was designated the CINCPAC ALCOP. At this time CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that CINCPAC staff people would coordinate space and other requirements to support establishment of the ALCOP.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In May CINCPACAF approved use of the ABNCP Ground Operations site to locate the new CINCPAC ALCOP. CINCPACAF had assumed the lead for site preparation and the installation of communications equipment. On 14 July the final design of space reconstruction was finished by the 15th Air Base Wing and forwarded to the Navy's Public Works Center on 16 July. The PWC funded the first \$20,000 of an expected \$90,000 cost on 14 July. Completion was expected by 15 September.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The new facility was activated on 15 October and Kunia's post was closed on 19 October. Only partial service was available until 15 December when installation of a switching console was completed.<sup>4</sup>

(S) Teletype support to insure continuity of operations was outlined in a CINCPAC message of 1 May. "The ALCOP must provide a capability to relay JCS Emergency Action Messages to SIOP [Single Integrated Operation Plan] forces, to fulfill responsibilities assigned in the EAP-JCS Vol IV [Emergency Action Procedures], and to provide space for a very austere Command Center Watch Team (CCWT) and a minimum staff." The austere CCWT would consist of five

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1. J340 HistSum Feb 77.
  2. CINCPAC 270126Z Mar 76; J332 HistSum Apr 76.
  3. J34 HistSums May, Jul 76.
  4. J340 HistSum Oct 76.

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people. The only time more than five would be required to deploy to the ALCOP would be in the unlikely situation in which both a disabled Camp Smith and an emergency situation existed at the same time. Under those circumstances, approximately 15 more people would deploy. The message then listed the minimum required communications capability: JCS Alert Network termination and conferencing; Missile Warning Display System (receive only); CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network (teletype connectivity to PACOM commands); teletype uplink position to CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (airborne); Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (this requirement was subsequently deleted--IEMATS was installed at Camp Smith); World-wide Automatic Secure Voice Conferencing Network; Automatic Secure Voice Communications; dual access Automatic Digital Network; Automatic Voice Network access; and World-wide Military Command and Control System ADP Visual Information Processor and line printer (medium speed). Certain of these facilities were already in place in the ABNCP Ground Operations area.<sup>1</sup>

#### Airborne Command Post Activities

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post, nicknamed BLUE EAGLE, maintained the ground alert status that had begun in January 1970, conducting deployments, exercises, and training throughout the year. In 1976 the EC-135 aircraft that comprised the Airborne Command Post were all converted from the "P" model to the "J" model. The first of the "J" models had arrived in 1975, the second arrived on 23 January 1976 and the third and last in August. They were assigned to the 15th Air Base Wing to support the CINCPAC ABNCP mission. The new aircraft carried numbers 055, 056, and 057. The aircraft had the same basic communications capability as the earlier "P" model, but the addition of fan jet engines and improved navigational equipment enhanced the system. The addition of the fan jet engines increased endurance or range by approximately 12 percent.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 22 February the first mission using the ABNCP in a secondary tactical role was flown. Two Battle Staffs participated in a Marine Corps exercise called BEARING THUNDER on the Island of Hawaii. Special arrangements were made to unsecure the communications nets for the period as the BLUE EAGLE aircraft were not equipped with secure voice radios. In March, however, a very high frequency secure voice system was installed in Aircraft 056 to enhance the operation of the aircraft in a tactical role. During November the aircraft were modified with installation of satellite communications equipment. In December, utilizing this equipment and the Navy's GAPFILLER satellite, communications training exercises were accomplished during a routine deployment.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 010211Z May 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 53-55; J3310 HistSums Jan, Aug 76.

3. J3310 HistSums Feb-Mar, Nov-Dec 76.

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(C) The first deployment of the ABNCP to the Indian Ocean area occurred in January. A two-day stop at Diego Garcia was made and a local mission of six hour's duration was flown from that island northwest into the Arabian Sea. Communications with the Commander Middle East Force and elements of command were exercised during the flight. CINCPAC's Director for Communications-Data Processing was aboard during the entire deployment.<sup>1</sup>

(C) As was the usual procedure, there were two kinds of training exercises conducted regularly throughout the year. BLUE EAGLE TWO was an alert training exercise in which the aircraft taxied to a runway hold area; BLUE EAGLE FOUR was an exercise that launched the aircraft on a local flight. For each, the standard for completion was to be less than 15 minutes. Most were well within that time frame, and only one exceeded it. On 30 January a false start and puddling of fuel in the tail pipe caused an engine fire. After "correcting the problem" the flight proceeded normally, but 19 minutes and 58 seconds elapsed before takeoff. BLUE EAGLE TWO exercises averaged about three a month, with eight during the year from deployed locations, usually Kadena on Okinawa or Yokota in Japan. BLUE EAGLE FOUR exercises averaged two a month.<sup>2</sup>

(C) Regular tests of low frequency/very low frequency operations were also conducted by the ABNCP. Between January and the final test in September, an average of about five tests a month were conducted with designated Naval Communications Stations. After this coverage testing was completed, results were to be published by the Defense Communications Agency. In two-thirds of the months in which such tests were conducted, one or two scheduled tests were cancelled because of weather or equipment problems. Also, throughout the year tests were conducted in support of the Defense Communications Agency's Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) Technical Evaluation Plan for contingency communications link to fleet ballistic missile submarines. These tests ran from one to three a month.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Various officers visited and were briefed on the ABNCP during 1976. Shortly after he was assigned as CINCPAC, Admiral Weisner visited, was briefed on operations, and toured a BLUE EAGLE aircraft. Others who visited or toured the aircraft included some visitors from Richmond Royal Australian Air Force Base, where the aircraft had deployed; Mr. Richard Shriver, Director of Telecommunications and Command Control Systems from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; LT GEN C.J. LeVan, Director of Operations in the Office of the JCS;

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1. J3310 HistSum Jan 76.
  2. J3310 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.
  3. J33145 HistSums Jan-Dec 76.

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RADM W.R. McClendon, CINCPAC's Director for Plans; and members of a House of Representatives Appropriations Staff subcommittee.<sup>1</sup>

(U) On 29 and 30 November instructors from the Joint Air Ground Operations School presented a course of instruction to all battle staff members. The course had been designed to fill a requirement to develop battle staffs capable of coordinating small-scale tactical operations.<sup>2</sup>

(U) Four times during the year parts of antennas were lost, but no damage to the aircraft or other property was incurred in any case.<sup>3</sup>

(C) BLUE EAGLE participated in JCS POLO HAT Exercises on 27 May and 26 August, and on 29 October supported GIANT MOON 8, a test of the Emergency Rocket Communications System.<sup>4</sup>

Review of PACOM Command and Control Facilities

(U) In late August and early September members of CINCPAC's Command and Control Division in the Operations Directorate visited a number of facilities in the PACOM to examine command and control facilities, to include emergency action training and procedures, crisis action management, and command and control communications. Specific areas examined included emergency action training and certification procedures; physical layout of command centers; commanders' availability test call procedures; manning of command centers to include the number and qualification of personnel and watch team schedules; command and control communications, to include use of the JCS Alert Network, CINCPAC's Voice and Teletype Alert Networks, and All-Source Information Center nets; crisis action notification procedures; organization for crisis actions; and problem areas requiring CINCPAC's support. Without exception, the team found that all areas visited appeared to be well organized and personnel were highly motivated and appeared well qualified. Specific units visited were as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Guam: Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 3 and the Naval Communications Station.

Philippines: The 13th Air Force Command Center, the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing Command Center, and the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Van Facility.

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1. J3310 HistSums Feb, Aug-Nov 76.
  2. J3310 HistSum Nov 76.
  3. J3310 HistSums Feb, Jun, Aug 76.
  4. J3310 HistSums May, Aug, Oct 76.
  5. J3321 HistSum Sep 76

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Taiwan: The Taiwan Defense Command's Command Center and All-Source Information Center, Detachment 1 of the 13th Air Force, and the Republic of China's Tactical Air Control Center.

Korea: Both the Main Command Post and the Forward Command Post of the UNC/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army, the 51st Composite Wing and 314th Air Division Command Center, and the Osan Air Base Tactical Air Control Center.

Japan: The 5th Air Force's Command Center and its Command Advisory Function/Reconnaissance Operations Center/All-Source Information Center; the Yokota Air Base Consolidated Command Post, and the CINCPAC ABNCP Alert Facility and Van.

### Command Center Modernization Project

(U) In late August, just as he was about to relinquish command, Admiral Gayler advised the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that he had learned of a decision by the Navy Comptroller to defer the Command Center Modernization Project, P-002, from the FY 78 Military Construction Program to the FY 79 program. He sought the CNO's assistance in overturning this decision, noting that Admiral Weisner supported his position. On 13 September Admiral Weisner was advised that the project remained in the FY 78 program, as requested. This project designed to rebuild the CINCPAC Command Center facility was funded in the Department of the Navy Military Construction Program at \$4.2 million.<sup>1</sup>

### Intelligent Terminal Project

(U) An "intelligent" terminal for use at CINCPAC headquarters had been demonstrated in 1975 and endorsed by Admiral Gayler. This was an experimental Touch Terminal device, a piece of equipment like a portable television set that was activated by physically touching the screen to select and print the range of things within its capability. In April 1976 a team from the University of Illinois (which had introduced the concept to CINCPAC) demonstrated it for CINCPAC staff members. "Everyone liked the feature of touch entry vice keyboard." The team was able to link the Digital Equipment Corporation computer with the Honeywell 6060 computer for the first time in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System community. FORSTAT (Force Status and Identity Report) data retrieval became available on the device in June.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 280200Z Aug 76; CNO 131954Z Sep 76; J3/Memo/T543-77, 19 Sep 77, Subj: Review of Draft CINCPAC Command History, Chapters I and III.
  2. J335 HistSum Apr 76.

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Command and Control Communications

(8) In response to a request from the JCS, CINCPAC provided his satellite communications requirements, as follows:

...The early achievement of a high quality military communications satellite capability that provided channels in quantity and continuous operation is considered an urgent requirement. Such a capability would have been of inestimable value in support of operations in Southeast Asia...even if sophisticated secure control circuits, anti-jam protection, and nuclear survivability features were not provided. Recognizing that a worldwide...[satellite communications system] might some day be called on to resist enemy spoofing, jamming, or direct attack...[CINCPAC] urged that the program be vigorously pursued with the most simple and uncomplicated design schemes that could be devised. CINCPAC preferred a soon-in-operation, high quality system with reasonable protection to a spoof-proof, jam-proof, highly protected facility in the 1980's.

This statement was submitted regarding the Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project and was dated 19 November 1966.<sup>1</sup>

(8) The requirement for satellite communications continued to be expressed 10 years later in 1976, although the additional requirement for "secure" communications had been added. In comments on broad architectural alternatives for the WWMCCS, on 10 February CINCPAC's message to the JCS stated that it was "imperative" that we "move out now (not wait for 1985) to satisfy critical requirement for satellite based, secure, conferenceable, high capacity, rapid, reliable, interoperable communications." This, it was believed, would result in cost savings. Even though satellites were initially expensive, they were not so in the long run "considering manpower and all other aspects." "We must immediately improve wide band secure communications in this theater. High quality voice interoperability of communications with the diplomatic/State [Department] community in PACOM is an absolute must." In selecting what he considered the most viable of the WWMCCS alternatives presented, he again stated the need for sufficient secure wide band communications "now," provision of portable stations in the right places, insurance that there was adequate interoperability between

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1. J335 HistSum Apr 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. I, pp. 119-120, which cited CINCPAC Ltr Ser 001901 of 19 Nov 66.

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the right people and systems, improvement of automated data processing (and the data input), and improvement of the operations and communications security of "all our forces."<sup>1</sup>

(S) The same subject was addressed by CINCPAC to the JCS in connection with on-going study of the PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (of 12 December 1975). CINCPAC noted that the primary PACOM objective continued to be achievement of a "capacious satellite communications system at earliest practical date." The operation connected with the seizure of the SS MAYAGUEZ, he noted, was "executed under marginally adequate communications...." He outlined some of the problems still being encountered and then addressed future contingencies.

(C) CINCPAC said that these future contingencies, which had become the major concern, were infinite in variety, unpredictable, and fast-breaking. Effective command, control, and communications "will be crucial to success of our operations." Experience had shown that the prime command circuit would be one that could conference the JCS, the theater commander, the executing commander, and a limited number of supporting commanders by secure voice. "Voice commands must then be followed by secure record data, on dedicated channels that can provide simultaneous upward and downward data flow." Additionally, tactical communications "must be" compatible across land, sea, and air. Long-haul communications should be satellite where possible, for security, capacity, reliability, and flexibility; air-transportable satellite terminals had to be available. High frequency communications should be relied on as little as possible. "Where they must be used, alternate circuits and proper frequency choice are essential, preempting frequency allocations as may be necessary."

(C) "Immediate priority must be given," the message continued, "to achieving viable alternatives against failure of operational satellites; obtaining higher communications capacity for the Indian Ocean; expanded capability for wide band secure voice and secure voice/data conferencing; and additional terminals to include shipboard, airborne, and mobile ground additions." A second major objective was to provide CINCPAC and his staff with a facility that would make relevant and unambiguous the mass of information converging on the headquarters during a crisis. "Lack of visual real-time display of crisis events and locations was felt strongly at PACOM Headquarters, where conflicting reports causing dissimilar perceptions of crisis situations had to be repeatedly clarified." Identification of these shortcomings had mostly resulted from problems encountered in live situations. Methods must be developed, it was believed, to allow adequate identification and quantification of real world deficiencies

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1. CINCPAC 100113Z Feb 76.

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at other than crisis times. "Substantial effort must be devoted to identification and promulgation of critical WWMCCS evaluation criteria," and adequate funding provided to allow the testing of critical assets during exercise environments. (As an example, participation of an Airborne Command and Control Center in Exercise TEAM SPIRIT was considered highly desirable, but funding was not available.) "Such actions would assist the formulation of meaningful exercises and result in improved training outcomes and realistic rather than artificial determinations of C<sup>3</sup> capabilities."<sup>1</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 202010Z Mar 76.

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SECTION V--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Posture of U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific

~~(S)~~ In 1973 the U.S. Army had begun major studies for its own reorganization. One immediate effect on CINCPAC had been the proposed disestablishment of his Army component command in Hawaii. That U.S. Army Pacific headquarters had, in fact, been disestablished on 31 December 1974, and in its place was created a unique organization, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group that was a field operating agency of the Department of the Army, not a CINCPAC component command. The details of this action were addressed in the CINCPAC Command History for 1974, as were the beginnings of other Army studies throughout the PACOM. These studies continued in 1975 under sanction of the Secretary of Defense with the goal of reducing the Army support structure in the Western Pacific, particularly Japan. These actions were known as WESTPAC II, and at the Defense level as Program Budget Decision 253.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ By 1976 the program was known as the WESTPAC III Study - Posture of U.S. Army Forces in Western Pacific, FY 78-FY 82 (U), and the matter was still under review. In this WESTPAC III the Army provided a review of Pacific logistic forces and supporting bases and forces, particularly Northeast Asia, and examined the Army's ability to support the evolving Forward Defense Strategy in Korea. On 23 September the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the Army study, although not a detailed review on a line-by-line basis. Rather, the JCS asked for comments on the proposed realignment actions as to their political, military, or contingency implications. The JCS then asked CINCPAC to comment on a number of specific questions raised in a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. CINCPAC's specific replies will be addressed later in this discussion. In the meantime, CINCPAC asked for the comments of his subordinate unified and component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the CINCPAC Representatives in the Philippines and Guam/TTPI. Abstracts of selected replies follow:<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ COMUS Korea provided his thoughts on 2 September. He provided a number of general comments relative to continuing the Army force presence in Northeast Asia through FY 82. He noted that the defense of Korea was the forward defense of Japan, and that regional perceptions of the U.S. commitment to WESTPAC were as important as the actual commitment. Japan was important as a reservoir for shipment of materials from the Continental United States, as an

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1. Detailed accounts are provided in CINCPAC Command Histories 1974, Vol. I, pp. 63-80; and 1975, Vol. I, pp. 89-96.
  2. JCS 4167/152225Z Sep 76 and 5657/231932Z Sep 76; CINCPAC 240224Z Sep 76.

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intermediate staging area for airlift, and as an area for the performance of heavy maintenance. Japan also provided an alternative to basing in Korea and Taiwan. If the United States closed out or reduced facilities in Japan, "we seriously hamper our flexibility in future years for projecting U.S. interests in the Western Pacific." He concluded that a strategic lift shortfall would seriously hamper the U.S. Army's ability to logistically support its own ground forces and those of its allies.<sup>1</sup>

(S) COMUS Japan noted that the Japanese Government had repeatedly expressed concern over the residual U.S. Force structure in Japan, during both formal and informal discussions. He outlined the concern that had been expressed over the years by COMUS Japan and CINCPAC to the JCS over the lack of communication with the Japanese concerning proposed reorganizations. Both the State Department and the JCS had acknowledged the validity of such concerns and recognized the adverse impact on U.S.-Japan relations that might result. However, it had been directed that no discussions be held, or notification of intentions given, until Service-proposed reductions and realignments were integrated into a single coordinated position. He continued, "Presently one and one half years after receiving JCS directives not to discuss plans for reorganization/reduction of U.S. Forces in Japan with the GOJ [Government of Japan] until a coordinated U.S. position was determined, there still appears to be no coordinated U.S. military approach to the future stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan." He continued that movement of war reserve assets was considered to be the most sensitive issue in WESTPAC III and discussion prior to implementation would perhaps moderate its potentially adverse impact on U.S.-Japan relations. Finally, there remained an even greater concern regarding U.S.-Japan relationships. WESTPAC III represented a unilateral U.S. Army view and did not include similar uni-Service plans for force changes in Japan. COMUS Japan was aware such plans were or had been under consideration. "There appears to be a need to examine the question of total Army presence in Japan and the viability of the types of functions residual Army forces would be assigned...in the light of other Service plans--in other words a unified approach rather than single-Service approaches."<sup>2</sup>

(S) The U.S. Ambassador commented on WESTPAC III in response to a request from COMUS Japan. He noted that the Army's plan involved withdrawal of most Army activities from Okinawa and transfer of about half of the Army ammunition stored in Japan to Korea. The Embassy was concerned about implications Japan might draw from the plan concerning long-term U.S. intentions and about labor and facilities problems associated with its implementation. The Ambassador elaborated on these views. The Japanese reaction, he noted, would depend not

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1. COMUS Korea 020735Z Sep 76.
  2. COMUS Japan 060440Z Oct 76.

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so much on the content of the Army plan as on the U.S. ability to provide its rationale within the broader context of long-range U.S. planning for the Western Pacific. [REDACTED] 1.5

[REDACTED] Implementation of the plan would apparently involve additional Army reduction-in-force actions on Okinawa at a time when past reductions were already responsible for a significant portion of Okinawa's serious unemployment problem. Regarding facilities, while the Embassy was not aware of the extent to which other Services would acquire Okinawa facilities released by the Army, "there obviously will be major impact on previously agreed consolidation plans such as Okinawan Base Consolidation Package (OBCP), and the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP)." The proposed Army drawdown would stimulate pressures for further base releases. The Ambassador recommended that U.S. Forces review overall facilities requirements on Okinawa in the light of WESTPAC III and existing consolidation and reductions plans.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC's Navy and Air Force component commanders commented. CINCPACFLT saw no impact on his plans provided POL service on Okinawa continued as it had in the past. (Transfer of POL functions on Okinawa was one of the matters under consideration in the plan.) CINCPACAF provided his specific comments on the questions posed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, but also provided some general observations. The Army's proposal to move a heavy boat company to Hawaii to support inter-island training movements of the 25th Infantry Division would result in significant savings on contract barge expenses, etc., but it would not obviate the requirement for airlift to training sites on Hawaiian islands other than Oahu. CINCPACAF believed this airlift was necessary to provide joint training in planning, load preparation, loading and off-loading, documentation, and safety requirements. Movement for training solely by boat could erode proficiency and adversely affect the 25th Division's capability to deploy rapidly and effectively by air in a contingency. Also, the study did not address aerial resupply support (materiel, personnel) required to augment the 19th Support Brigade in Korea in the event of a contingency in Korea or elsewhere in the PACOM requiring aerial resupply. Prior to the withdrawal from Southeast Asia the Army had maintained a delivery rigging support complex in Okinawa and Thailand that supported Cambodian resupply efforts. Army adjustments since then had reduced their in-theater capability to support a major aerial resupply effort. Such a requirement could realistically occur as a result of initial North Korean attacks or might be required to support

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 14863/050225Z Oct 76.

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the COMUS Korea counteroffensive. Finally, it appeared that the dollar value of War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) proposals would be substantial and should be addressed in relation to available WRSA funds and related needs of the other Services.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPAC considered all of the inputs when he provided his response to the JCS on 15 October. First he noted that he understood the Army's rationale for charting a new course for Army forces and facility realignments in the five year period under study. CINCPAC's major concern was Japanese reaction, the possible reduction in logistic support flexibility, and the potential permanent loss of access to Japanese facilities. He assumed coordination with the allies and other Services would be accomplished prior to incremental implementation. He then addressed specific answers to the questions that had been asked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Certain of these questions and CINCPAC's comments in reply follow.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Will the further commitment of our munitions base to Korea and reduction of our support structure in Japan compromise broader theater support capabilities and flexibilities? "Since the security of Japan and the ROK are closely linked, the movement of some Class V stocks [munitions] presently stored in Japan to Korea will enhance security of Northeast Asia (NEA) by placing stocks in location where need is most likely. However, reduction of Army support base in Japan could limit Army's ability to support contingencies outside Korea."

(S) What is the impact of moving the material resources to Korea, should it become national policy to substantially reduce the U.S. presence in Korea? "Impact should be minimal. U.S. national policy is to assist allies in their own defense. U.S. plans for forward defense require prepositioning of stocks in-country regardless of U.S. Force levels maintained in a particular country. If national policy calls for a further reduction of U.S. presence in Korea, it does not necessarily follow that simultaneous retrograde of stocks in Korea would be required. However, if it is determined that simultaneous retrograde was necessary, redeployment of forces and retrograde of stocks could be time phased as necessary. Alternatively, ammunition could be sold to the ROK."

(S) How does WESTPAC III impact on U.S.-Japanese defense relations? "Key to the issue is Japan's perception of the change. Worst case would be if GOJ interprets WESTPAC III as shift in policy away from Japan and perceives a reduction in U.S. resolve. Japan's perception ultimately depends on effectiveness of U.S. efforts to explain move. In theory, repositioning additional war

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1. CINCPACFLT 070127Z Oct 76; CINCPACAF 072030Z Oct 76.
  2. CINCPAC 150213Z Oct 76.

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reserves to Korea suggests a better capability to defend ROK--mutually understood to be in Japan's interest. However, reductions...could be viewed as a lack of U.S. commitment to the direct defense of Japan, even though lessening of U.S. military presence on Honshu and Okinawa could be of political benefit to GOJ."

(S) After some questions and answers about specific logistic matters associated with munitions storage, it was asked, "If, in fact, capability for direct defense of Japan is degraded, is degradation a prudent risk under threat projections for Northeast Asia through FY 82?" "In view of current GOJ and U.S. threat perceptions...degradation considered a prudent risk. However, additional factors need consideration. First, U.S. withdrawal from Japanese facilities is normally irreversible. Second, potential change in U.S.-Korea relations should Congress direct substantial U.S. force withdrawals from Korea prior to FY 82. Third, PRC [People's Republic of China] policy changes as they might affect the current balance of power and international relations in Northeast Asia prior to FY 82. Therefore, prudent risk as we see it now is subject to continuing assessment."

(S) With regard to Army facilities on Okinawa that would be vacated under WESTPAC III implementation, were there any other Service requirements which would justify transfer and retention by U.S. Forces and preclude reversion of facilities to the GOJ and minimize RIF of local national work force? "Since May 1972 reversion, U.S. Forces and facilities on Okinawa have been reduced/consolidated. PBD [Program Budget Decision] 280 and 253 further reduce U.S. Army force level and facilities in Okinawa. Since there is a continuing requirement to provide support to USMC and USAF combat forces in Okinawa, facilities identified as excess by a Service would automatically result in other Service review for retention. Therefore a proposal to return a costly facility such as the Makiminato Service Area to the GOJ is subject to these reviews. Recognize that past RIFs have been dictated more by changes in mission requirements than by return of facilities to the GOJ. To minimize the impact of RIFs caused by any future changes in mission, U.S. should continue past practice of closely coordinating our force adjustments among the Services and with the GOJ."

(S) Several other specific questions were addressed before the matter of POL functions on Okinawa, which the Army study had suggested be transferred to another Service. CINCPAC commented that such a transfer would not result in savings to the Defense Department as the function would have to be performed by another Service or agency.

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(S) Commenting on the Makiminato Service Area, which was under discussion, CINCPAC noted that he considered early return to the Japanese Government in total or in part a sensitive issue to be reviewed by all Services prior to decision. The area housed a mortuary, milk plant, laundry and dry cleaning facility, cold storage and subsistence warehousing, property disposal, and other support activities that were required by U.S. Forces on Okinawa. Experience had indicated that real estate returned to the Japanese Government was no longer available for military use. Once released, no provisions existed for reentry. Japan could interpret a U.S. proposal for joint use as an indication that real estate was no longer needed.

(S) In the matter of the implication that the 15-day safety factor for ammunition WRSA would be eliminated, CINCPAC commented that the WESTPAC III proposal to maintain only a 60-day level of ammunition WRSA for Korea was an area of concern. The proposal eliminated the 15-day safety factor. CINCPAC Operation Plan 5027 called for the 15-day level for U.S. and ROK forces. He believed that the goal for ammunition planning for WRSA should remain at 75 days. He also addressed the proposed elimination of Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS) for PACOM reserve and reinforcing divisions. CINCPAC recognized that Planning and Programming Guidance governed and limited prepositioning, but the WESTPAC III plan to eliminate all PWRMS for Army reserve and reinforcing divisions "raises serious doubts of whether adequate materiel, especially ammunition, will be available to support Army contingency operations within the Pacific." From a logistics point of view, CINCPAC continued, such "action limits flexibility within PACOM." He outlined what the Army logistics posture would be in the defense of Korea and other PACOM contingencies, noting that he believed that a flexible logistic posture was important as a hedge against possible contingencies.<sup>1</sup>

#### Forces and Basing in Korea

(C) Early in December officials in both Korea and Japan began expressing apprehension regarding the direction of U.S. Korean policy under the newly elected American Government. Japanese officials had repeatedly stressed the importance of consultations before any troop withdrawals and had been "unprecedentedly explicit in describing U.S. force presence in ROK as 'essential prerequisite' for stability in NE Asia." One Japanese observer detected similar uneasiness at the Soviet and Chinese embassies in Tokyo over the possibility of rapid troop withdrawal. At the same time, however, accounts in the Korean press, attributed to a high official in the U.S. State Department, had assured the Japanese that Japan and Korea need not worry about the reduction of American troops in the Carter Administration. If true, this

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1. Ibid.

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was overtaken by events. The President-elect's news conference of 21 December announced the planned withdrawal of some ground forces, and by early 1977 the United States had advised both Korea and Japan that it intended to withdraw 6,000 of 30,000 ground forces by the end of 1978.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The matter of the 4th Missile Command's disestablishment was included in a report entitled the Defense Department Pacific Basing Study, prepared at the request of the Senate Armed Services Committee and provided to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. On 16 December a member of that House Committee was briefed by representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the JCS and was told:<sup>2</sup>

The transfer of the HONEST JOHN battalion to the ROK, the deactivation of the SERGEANT battalion, and deactivation of the 4th Missile Command is expected to be completed in FY 77-FY 78.

#### Military Use of Cheju-Do

(S) As noted in the 1975 Command History, Cheju-Do was an island off the southern coast of Korea. At that time President Park had again raised the issue of possible use of Cheju-Do for basing USAF units, but had been advised that the United States saw no use for the island, that mainland sites should have first priority in planning for additional airfields.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In 1976 the subject was raised again, this time by the ROK Defense Attache, who implied that the ROK Government might be willing to assume partial or complete costs of land acquisition and construction of facilities for U.S. use on the island. In early April the JCS tasked CINCPAC to provide comments and recommendations on possible military use of the island. CINCPAC sought the comments of COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, the Strategic Air Command, the CINCPAC component commanders, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group.<sup>4</sup>

(S) CINCPAC considered these comments when he provided his reply to the JCS on 20 April. He advised that he saw no attractive requirement for permanent peacetime basing of U.S. Forces on the island. PACAF had two bases

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1. AMEMB Seoul 9560/030815Z Dec 76; AMEMB Tokyo 17851/030900Z Dec 76; AMEMB Seoul 10180/270812Z Dec 76; Deadline Data on World Affairs.
  2. CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA Seoul 160102Z Dec 76, readdressed to CINCPAC as JCS 221330Z Dec 76; JCS 2864/230001Z Dec 76.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 110.
  4. JCS 5081/061809Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 070143Z Apr 76.

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in Korea in caretaker status available for upgrading. The Army was eliminating some bases in Japan and consolidating facilities in Korea. Navy and Marine requirements in the Western Pacific could be better served by the existing base structure. The U.S. base and support structure in Japan and Korea represented substantial investment in terms of cost and commitment, CINCPAC said, and well served U.S. peacetime presence. He believed the United States should turn down the ROK offer and attempt to convince the ROK Government that its resources could be better used to improve and expand the mainland base structure, particularly at Pohang and Yechon.<sup>1</sup>

#### Forces and Bases on Taiwan

(U) President Nixon's 1972 visit to China was followed by plans for draw-downs of U.S. Forces and the closing of U.S. bases on Taiwan. The United States had, in the Shanghai Communiqué, agreed to progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as tension in the area diminished. Such reductions had begun and as of 31 July 1975 there were 2,977 Americans assigned in Defense Department agencies, and as Embassy guards.<sup>2</sup>

(U) On 11 March 1976 a story in the Boston Globe reported that President Ford had given a secret pledge to China to reduce the American military presence on Taiwan by about 50 percent over the next year, according to "well-placed administration officials." The pledge reportedly was made by the President during his December 1975 visit, and was meant to reassure China's leaders that the United States was determined to further the normalization of relations even if it wasn't quite ready to break formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish them with China. American troop strength, according to the newspaper report, had already been reduced from a force of 8,600 at the time of Nixon's first visit to approximately 2,200.<sup>3</sup>

~~(TS)~~ On 19 February the JCS had advised CINCPAC and COMUSTDC of a meeting of the Senior Review Group of the National Security Council to be held on 23 February to consider a 50 percent withdrawal of U.S. military personnel on Taiwan by the end of 1976. The meeting was also to consider possible alternative locations for the U.S. Army Communications Command, War Reserve Material (WRM) storage, and the Shu Lin Kou Station. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views and recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINCPAC 200106Z Apr 76.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, pp. 113-115.

3. The newspaper text was quoted in SECSTATE 059426/1/111818Z Mar 76.

4. JCS 1617/191339Z Feb 76.

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(TS) CINCPAC's response of 21 February reviewed the importance of COMUSTDC for support of the Mutual Defense Treaty; WRM in support of CINCPAC Operation Plan 5025, Defense of Taiwan/Penghus (C); the requirement for a communications link from the Philippines through Taiwan to Northeast Asia; and the high value placed on retention of the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center to handle aircraft maintenance. CINCPAC identified 289 spaces for possible deletion, with 15 from the TDC and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) staffs, 40 from the USN Support Activity at Taichung/Tsoying, 59 in the conversion of the Navy hospital at Taipei into a dispensary, and 175 for base support personnel required to maintain WRM storage at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base. CINCPAC deferred to the National Security Agency on reductions of intelligence activities.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) On 23 March the JCS further tasked CINCPAC to provide data on the U.S. dependent population on Taiwan and requested comments regarding the possible imposition of a remote-tour policy for the island. CINCPAC's reply of 3 April further defined his original input on the reduction of U.S. military presence, plus a full report on dependent population and assessment of an isolated-tour policy on mission, morale, personnel actions, and funding. CINCPAC identified 862 military spaces for potential reductions. A detailed review of all units and activities with authorized manning was submitted with proposed reductions by unit.<sup>2</sup>

(TS) On 20 April the JCS expressed appreciation for the refined and expanded information. They advised that the civilianization of selected military functions, a key element of the CINCPAC plan, was being pursued with "appropriate authorities." The JCS noted CINCPAC nonconcurrence with JCS priorities for deletion of non-intelligence functions and requested CINCPAC's comments. CINCPAC sought the comments of his component commanders, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and COMUSTDC.<sup>3</sup>

(TS) CINCPAC considered the responses from those commanders in preparation of his reply of 6 May. The specific questions raised by the JCS were answered as follows:<sup>4</sup>

- Would deletion of WRM include return of caretaker facilities at CCK [Ching Chuan Kang] and Tainan Air Bases to ROC [Republic of China] armed forces? CINCPAC said that while withdrawal of WRM would not require return of caretaker

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1. CINCPAC 210130Z Feb 76.
  2. JCS 9680/231997Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 030349Z Apr 76.
  3. JCS 9362/202317Z Apr 76; CINCPAC 220052Z Apr 76.
  4. CINCPAC 062321Z May 76.

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facilities, the need to retain them under this situation was questionable. The loss of Taiwan WRM "would have more serious impact on capability to establish viable combat force than loss of caretaker facilities." The establishment of combat operations capability at bare bases could be accomplished faster than reintroduction of war-sustaining WRM. Reintroduction of the necessary level of munitions was time consuming and posed serious logistic problems.

- Would deletion or reduction of USTDC have greater adverse impact on U.S. capability to fulfill treaty obligations than deletion of WRM? CINCPAC advised that both USTDC and the WRM were considered essential to support treaty obligations. It was the ROC Government's perception of U.S. intent or capability to fulfill treaty obligations that was crucial in determining which activity was the most important. Prepositioned WRM were essential to meet initial requirements for the defense of Taiwan, and the concept in OPLAN 2025 relied heavily on these munitions. Removal of WRM could be viewed by the ROC as a unilateral action by the United States to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty. Deletion of the TDC could also result in a similar perception by the ROC, and reduction of that agency would inhibit effective bilateral planning. Substantial reduction or elimination of the TDC would create problems in reconstituting the headquarters for emergencies or contingencies because of the austere manning levels at other PACOM headquarters. In summary, CINCPAC said, it was difficult to compare the impact of deleting TDC versus WRM because of different missions and links to the security treaty. He considered the retention of the TDC most important, especially during the drawdown period. Upon tacit or open demise of the treaty and withdrawal of the WRM, TDC could be eliminated. The headquarters should be retained, however, as long as the mission remained unchanged.

- Are communication requirements of DAO, MAAG, USTDC, AFCMC [the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center, a Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) operation that was engaged in aircraft repairing], and NAMRU-2 [Navy Medical Research Unit 2] supportable by other means if USACC-T [U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan] is deleted? CINCPAC provided the means by which those agencies could be supported if the USACC-T was deleted, but recommended retention of a USACC-T detachment.

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- Other than economic advantages and shortened transit times, how does PDM on Taiwan as opposed to relocation of PDM to CONUS contribute to PACOM readiness? CINCPAC replied that economic advantages and shortened transit times were important considerations for retention of the PDM facility. PACOM readiness was the "primary consideration." CINCPAC provided expanded data on the need for retention of the PDM facility on Taiwan, a facility that accommodated Navy, Marine, and Air Forces aircraft and helicopters. Relocation to the CONUS would be "extremely costly" in terms of funding and loss of aircraft in the theater.

(TS) In a concluding remark, CINCPAC noted that removal of WRM and personnel from Taiwan would also impact on other PACOM plans or contingencies. Under the existing theater-wide WRM concept, WRM positioned on Taiwan could be used to support other PACOM contingencies. Movement off the island would require redistribution in the theater to the maximum extent possible. The loss of POL storage would increase the PACOM-wide shortfall as additional storage facilities were not available.

(TS) The JCS, in response to CINCPAC's earlier initiative on civilianization of U.S. military spaces as a means to accomplish the 50 percent reduction, prepared a memorandum on the subject in May for the Secretary of Defense, recommending that the Secretary forward it to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) Late in June the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments regarding the minimum U.S. capability required to support the ROC under the Mutual Defense Treaty. CINCPAC's response was based on the forces earmarked for contingency deployment and civilianization of certain military spaces. It was as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- Major U.S. Forces earmarked for commitment included, from the Army, 2 HAWK battalions, 1 HERCULES battalion, 1 Special Forces battalion, and communications-electronics and logistics units; from the Air Force, 12 tactical fighter squadrons, 2 tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and support units; and from the Navy, 3 carriers, 43 destroyers, 2 nuclear-powered submarines, and support units.

- Implementation of OPLAN 5025 would require an on-island U.S. command to interface with the ROC military and

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1. J5313 HistSum May 76, which cited JCSM-198-76 of 24 May 76.
  2. JCS 9101/292152Z Jun 76; CINCPAC 191330Z Jul 76.

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Ministry of National Defense. U.S. naval forces afloat supporting 5025 would continue to operate under CINCPAC operational control through CINCPACFLT in coordination with the U.S. on-island commander.

- The TDC, CINCPAC said, fulfilled the on-island requirement, but its presence was not essential for purely military reasons; the requirement was based on political, not military, need. A U.S. command could be provided by other means.
- The MAAG was considered essential to ROC force modernization and could accept TDC peacetime functions should the TDC be withdrawn. This latter option would require some augmentation. In addition, some military spaces could be converted to U.S. civilian billets.
- Caretaker airfields, WRM, and communications support functions would require 139 military personnel, providing qualified civilian personnel and contractors were available for augmentation to maintain the existing level of readiness.
- The U.S. Army Communications Command-Taiwan would require 35 U.S. military personnel to maintain communications links, provided qualified civilians and contractors were available to maintain the communications system for residual U.S. Forces.

(TS) The JCS noted that CINCPAC's reply appeared to be dependent on the availability of qualified civilians and contractors. As no determination had yet been made regarding the civilianization matter, the JCS asked CINCPAC to provide the minimum number of military spaces required to provide initial support at the air bases if civilianization was not approved. CINCPAC then stated a requirement for 178 military spaces for contingency support at Taipei, Ching Chuan Kang, and Tainan, and 43 for communications support.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) In still another exchange, on 31 August the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide a statement of the minimum military personnel required to support a residual force of 417 communications and air base support (including WRM) personnel. CINCPAC estimated a minimum of 85 U.S. military and 27 Defense Department civilians.<sup>2</sup>

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1. JCS 4875/042152Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 120242Z Aug 76.
  2. JCS 4961/312217Z Aug 76; CINCPAC 042215Z Sep 76.

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(TS) Project GINSENG was under development during 1976 and will be the subject of further discussion below. This was a project to automate and collect remotely certain intelligence gathered by the Shu Lin Kou facility. Because of the availability of the equipment, manpower and dollar savings, and upgrading of facilities, it was expected to provide automation without product degradation. The equipment had been originally intended for installation at Ramasun, Thailand, but that facility was no longer available to the United States. The use of remote relay technology instead of the existing operation was considered to be a matter of replacing personnel with machines that represented the latest "state of the art."<sup>1</sup>

(TS) "Highest authority" directed a number of actions regarding these planned force deployments, the JCS advised CINCPAC on 22 September. The instructions were as follows. A manpower reduction in Taiwan to a ceiling of not more than 1,400 by 31 December 1976 of Defense Department personnel, military and civilian. The ceiling did not apply to those assigned to the American Embassy or contractual personnel including those associated with the remoting facility to be installed at Shu Lin Kou. The Embassy in Taipei was to be notified in advance of specific drawdowns. There was an injunction against the total withdrawal during 1976 of any single unit or activity without prior approval by the National Security Council. In connection with the installation of the remoting facility at Shu Lin Kou, there was to be inclusion within the overall manpower reduction during 1976 of as many Defense Department personnel as possible then assigned to that facility. Implementing actions should be based on the assumption that the remoting facility would be approved and installed by mid-December 1976 and fully operational by March 1977, at which time it would be operated by contractual personnel with only four Defense Department supervisory personnel. Another assumption was that the manpower ceiling would be implemented by 31 December 1976, but that personnel reassignments would be programmed to reach the manpower ceiling as operational requirements permitted. The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide recommendations on space reductions to reach the indicated ceiling.<sup>2</sup>

(TS) The JCS provided additional guidance on 25 September, noting that accomplishment of this reduction "may be feasible only by accepting certain impacts," such as possible loss of operational capability to Shu Lin Kou, personnel turbulence, and degradation of other capabilities. Accordingly, the JCS requested that CINCPAC's reply to the 22 September message include alternative plans that would reach the goal, but with accompanying impacts.<sup>3</sup>

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1. SECSTATE 238153/250211Z Sep 76.
  2. JCS 4526/221933Z Sep 76.
  3. JCS 7776/251659Z Sep 76.

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(TS) On 1 October CINCPAC advised that while he recognized the Taiwan drawdown as "inevitable," he saw major difficulties in completing the reduction by the end of December. He said that the United States would run the risk of very serious diplomatic, logistics, and personnel problems. Such a rapid reduction was likely to be viewed diplomatically as a "mass exodus," contrary to the desired American image. The logistics problems associated with moving personnel, dependents, and household goods would severely tax existing transportation facilities even if the execute order were received immediately. Morale would be adversely affected by a disruptive short-notice move during the holiday season and by potential monetary loss to individuals. He hoped for a more realistic drawdown schedule.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) CINCPAC provided still further rationale for delaying the drawdown in his message of 7 October in which he provided the requested plan to reduce to 1,400 to the JCS. He said:<sup>2</sup>

...Believe it important to emphasize that mass reduction by 31 December 1976 is not prudent course of action. Effect of highly visible airlift, movement of personnel and logistics activities increases potential for creating unfavorable national and international publicity adversely affecting U.S. image and desired low-profile approach. Specific operational impacts include: degraded intelligence; degraded command and control capability; reduced contract maintenance capability; reduced communications responsiveness; reduced investigative service (OSI and NIS); reduced medical service; elimination of civil engineer function; degraded finance capability; reduced commissary and support activities; and reduced postal service. Reduction under guidelines outlined in...[the JCS message of 25 September] could be accomplished, but significant problems would result....

(TS) CINCPAC forwarded a basic plan to accommodate a personnel reduction from the existing strength of 2,250 to 1,400 by the end of the year. The reduction included approximately 170 personnel from Shu Lin Kou. The preferred alternative that CINCPAC forwarded was to phase out approximately 770 Shu Lin Kou personnel by March or April 1977, when Project GINSENG was fully operational, and make minor adjustments in other organizations to reach the directed ceiling. A second alternative was to reduce the force level in a two-step approach to 1,749 by 31 December and to 1,400 by 28 February 1977. The third alternative

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1. CINCPAC 012009Z Oct 76.
  2. CINCPAC 072355Z Oct 76.

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was to reduce the force level to 1,400 by 31 December by withdrawing all 770 Shu Lin Kou personnel and making minor adjustments in assigned strength of other units on Taiwan.<sup>1</sup>

(TS) On 30 October the JCS advised that the National Security Council had agreed to CINCPAC's preferred alternative. Troop reductions were to follow a timetable that would reduce to an authorized strength of 1,400 by 31 December; reduce to an assigned strength of 1,950 by 31 December and to an assigned strength of 1,400 by 31 March 1977.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 30 November the JCS requested that CINCPAC, through COMUSTDC and the Headquarters Support Activity on Taiwan, provide support to the National Security Agency and its contractors for the installation and support of Project GINSENG. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC accept the tasking for GINSENG support and reiterated that TDC coordinate all activities regarding the Taiwan drawdown.<sup>3</sup>

(TS) At the end of 1976 the drawdown was progressing as planned, and residual Defense Department military and civilian personnel strength was down to 1,950 by 31 December. The installation of Project GINSENG was progressing as planned with an initial operational capability of 5 January 1977. Details concerning support arrangements for GINSENG were being developed, with Memoranda of Understanding and Inter-Service Support Agreements between the National Security Agency and the Headquarters Support Activity either signed or being negotiated at the end of the year.<sup>4</sup>

#### Drawdown in Thailand

(S) At the beginning of 1976, U.S. force reductions in Thailand were progressing according to a plan developed in 1975, which envisioned a force of 2,951 remaining in country after 20 March 1976. By 10 March 1976, however, CINCPAC became convinced that the United States was not likely to get Thai acceptance of anything approaching the 3,000-man limit previously negotiated. Based on this appraisal, CINCPAC advised the JCS that, to protect its vital interests, the United States should be prepared to go well below the 3,000-man limit. He viewed the following as essential:<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid.
  2. JCS 2479/301521Z Oct 76.
  3. JCS 8465/302200Z Nov 76; CINCPAC 020043Z Dec 76.
  4. J5323 HistSum Dec 76.
  5. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 131; COMUSMACTHAI-CHJUSMAGTHAI Command History 1975, pp. 73-74; CINCPAC 100251Z Mar 76 (EX).

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- Intelligence facility at Ramasun.
- Basing or staging capability for Southeast Asia surveillance and heavy lift air supply at U-Tapao (ultimately Takhli replaced U-Tapao for transit aircraft).
- MAAG to administer remaining Security Assistance programs.

(S) CINCPAC further noted that U-Tapao air base operations could be turned over to the Thai and that the United States could give up the following operations without great loss, as their product did not justify their continuance:<sup>1</sup>

- Ko Kha
- Chiang Mai
- U-2 operations

(S) On 20 March 1976 the American Embassy, Bangkok reported that the Royal Thai Government had decided that U.S. military operations, except for JUSMAG, DAO, and Embassy security guard activities, must cease effective 21 March 1976. The Departments of State and Defense advised that, since the RTG had not raised questions relating to flight operations in support of retrograde, withdrawal, and other essential humanitarian and safety operations, continued suspension of flight operations to and from and within Thailand (suspension had been ordered for four days effective 19 March 1976) did not appear necessary. The subject of continued use of U-Tapao for aircraft transiting en route to and from Diego Garcia was to be addressed separately.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The JCS execute message for the standdown of U.S. military operations in Thailand was issued on 21 March 1976. CINCPAC, in turn, issued guidance for the withdrawal of forces to be completed by 20 July 1976, based on Option II (accelerated drawdown) of CINCPAC's 15 July 1975 withdrawal plan and the COMUSMACTHAI support plan of 29 September 1975. Option II retained the Defense Attaché Office and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), and required only 450 military spaces.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Op. Cit., CINCPAC 100251Z Mar 76 (EX).
  2. AMEMB Bangkok 6534/201327Z Mar 76; Joint State/Defense 068636/202242Z Mar 76.
  3. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 122; JCS 8189/210026Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 220006Z Mar 76.

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(S) During the brief 120-day period between 20 March and 20 July 1976, approximately 80,000 short tons of equipment were retrograded by surface and air transport, and MACTHAI inventoried and transferred 22 installations and communications sites to the RTG, while planning and executing its own disestablishment and withdrawal. COMUSMACTHAI folded his flag and departed 21 July 1976 as the last general officer to leave Southeast Asia. The following were among the key U.S. operations terminated by 20 July 1976:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Date Terminated</u>
Ko Kha	19 May 1976
Ramasun	20 June 1976
U-Tapao (635 AEROSG)	20 June 1976
Chiang Mai (Det 415)	30 June 1976

(S) An in-country roll-up force was formed to handle administrative wrap-up of logistics, comptroller, and civilian personnel activities, and on 8 November 1976 the JCS retroactively disestablished the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (1 October 1976), and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand Support Group (20 July 1976). Effective 20 July 1976 authorized DOD residual organizations came under the umbrella of the JUSMAG and U.S. military presence was, and would remain, below 270.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The following major issues remained unsettled beyond the drawdown completion date of 20 July 1976:<sup>3</sup>

- Disposition of the 17-site Integrated Communications System (ICS) (see Security Assistance Chapter for detailed discussion of turnover to Thai).

- Disposition of 14,476 short tons of U.S. ammunition stocks left in Thailand (AIT) at Korat (see Logistics Chapter for details on turnover to Thai).

- Continued operation of the Chiang Mai seismic research station. The Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding were signed 29 December 1976. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. Government would pay all costs associated with maintenance and operation of the

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1. CINCPAC 152251Z Jun 76 and 030257Z Apr 76; 13AF 110830Z Jun 76.
  2. MACTHAI 200330Z Jul 76 and 161350Z Jun 76; J134 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC Daily Summary No. 3/220046Z Jul 76.
  3. AMEMB Bangkok 18805/290219Z Jun 76 and 34791/300535Z Dec 76; CINCPAC 230732Z Aug 76.

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facility, train Thai technicians, and provide the technical expertise required to conduct periodic quality control checks. In exchange, the RTG would share all data produced, as received, on a 24-hour daily basis.

- P-3 surveillance aircraft transit flights via Takhli en route to and from Diego Garcia. By 21 August 1976 support arrangements for P-3 transit flights had been completed for an initial period of 30 days and the American Embassy was authorized to provide routine automatic clearance for P-3 aircraft on request (see also Logistics Chapter concerning requirements at Takhli).

#### Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a territory assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946, had been of interest to CINCPAC. Support facilities in this area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM.

(U) As noted in the 1975 Command History, a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands had been approved by the District Legislature, approved by a plebiscite (by 80 percent), and submitted to the U.S. Congress. On 21 April 1976 in Saipan and the following day on Rota and Tinian there were ceremonies celebrating the Presidential signing of the covenant. The Presidential delegation was headed by Ambassador F. Haydn Williams; the military delegation was headed by CINCPAC's Representative to Guam and the TTPI. Formal military ceremonies were conducted on all three islands; participants included the CINCPACFLT band detachment on Guam and a Marine Corps color guard and for the ceremonies on Saipan a fly-over of B-52 and KC-135 aircraft. The CINCPACREP described as very apparent the pride of the people of the islands in their new association with the United States.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ In the rest of Micronesia, the relationship with the United States was not so clear. After returning from a visit to the TTPI, the Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission said that "unity of Micronesia is hopeless." Relations with certain districts are addressed briefly below.<sup>2</sup>

~~(S)~~ A review of U.S. policy toward the future status of Micronesia (less the Northern Marianas) was being taken by the National Security Council

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 81; CINCPACREP Guam 240146Z Apr 76.
  2. CINCPACREP Guam 150022Z Apr 76.

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Under-Secretaries Committee. That committee asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs certain questions regarding security interests in the area. The JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments. It was noted that previous instructions had authorized the President's Personal Representative to make an independence offer to the Micronesians any time he considered it advisable. The draft constitution that had been produced during 1975 had strongly emphasized Micronesian sovereignty and the apparent desire to establish a treaty relationship with the United States. One question the committee asked was, "Can any treaty relationship, in lieu of the compact of free association, be accepted by the U.S. Government without undue risk to our national security interests in Micronesia?" CINCPAC's reply concluded that the treaty relationship could neither politically nor legally assure U.S. security interests. CINCPAC explained that the key provisions of the draft compact of free association were a denial of foreign military powers and U.S. responsibility and authority over foreign affairs and defense matters. Any arrangement that would weaken those key points would be undesirable. As Micronesia had never been a sovereign state, it would be necessary for the United States to terminate the trusteeship, grant independence, and recognize the sovereign state of Micronesia in order to execute a valid treaty under international law. The treaty could gain exclusive U.S. basing, but the legal viability and durability of such a treaty was historically questionable. The treaty would be vulnerable to abrogation, with the resultant risk of loss of access to desired basing options and attendant probability of increased influence by nations whose interests were counter to those of the United States.

~~(S)~~ The JCS also asked, "Assuming that it is desirable, from a Defense perspective, to maintain full U.S. authority over all matters related to the foreign affairs and defense of Micronesia, the patrol of territorial waters and fishing zones in Micronesia is likely to be a U.S. responsibility. Given an expanded 200-mile fishing zone, can the Military Services perform this patrol mission satisfactorily with assets currently available to PACOM?" CINCPAC noted that maintaining military security included measures to protect U.S. military installations from espionage, sabotage, hostile acts, and foreign encroachment. Limited Seventh Fleet and PACAF assets made continuous patrolling of the TTPI infeasible. It was not possible to accomplish the patrolling tasks without unacceptable degradation of assigned missions.

~~(S)~~ The final question concerned the search and rescue responsibility in the TTPI area, which, beginning in June 1974, was being transferred from CINCPACFLT to the Commander of the 14th Coast Guard District. The question was when would Defense be replaced by the Coast Guard in these civil SAR responsibilities? CINCPAC advised that agreement had been concluded to transfer the function on 1 January 1977. CINCPAC, however, was concerned with the continuing lack of dedicated assets to cover the Guam area; they were

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not expected to be available for five years. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS take advantage of the National Security Council review to urge the Coast Guard to expedite acquisition of assets for the SAR mission in the area.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The National Security Council study contained the unanimous view of all of the participating departments and agencies that a united Micronesia (the Carolines and Marshalls) continued to be in the best interest of the United States and called for vigorous U.S. policy actions in pursuit of that objective.<sup>2</sup>

(U) CINCPAC continued throughout the year to monitor the progress of any status talks, although these were State and Interior Department matters.

(U) Late in the year the CINCPACREP Guam sent CINCPAC a copy of an editorial that appeared in the Pacific Daily News on 15 December, commenting on a story written by a reporter on the Washington Post regarding the CIA's electronic surveillance of Micronesian representatives participating in the negotiations. The editorial said that the State Department apparently had filed an objection with the White House, arguing that the surveillance was improper, in part because the United States was in effect negotiating with the Micronesians to become U.S. citizens. The editorial disputed that because, "We don't think most Micronesians ever wanted to become U.S. citizens." A more valid point, the author continued, was not that these were potential citizens, but rather that they were wards of the United States. "It's like bugging your adopted son after you welcomed him into your house with open arms." The editorial continued:<sup>3</sup>

...We said that we weren't surprised about the reported surveillance because there have been plenty of hints over the past 10 years that the CIA (and its military cohorts) were out in the islands in force.

Nobody is soon going to forget that earlier this year a former Daily News correspondent, Ruth Gilliam, claimed that she was offered a spying job in Palau by a military planner who operated out of Guam.

[The editorial next addressed at length the former representative of the President, F. Haydn Williams, and his role or knowledge in the surveillance activity.]

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1. JCS 4055/162343Z Mar 76; CINCPAC 260117Z Mar 76.
  2. CINCPACREP Guam 050600Z May 76.
  3. CINCPACREP Guam 201138Z Dec 76.

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The Micronesian status talks are currently stalemated, and probably won't be held for several months after the next Congress of Micronesia session in Saipan, which won't end until March. After these disclosures, how could the Micronesians ever trust the U.S. negotiators again? We wonder if there is even any point in holding future talks under such a cloud....We can't help but wonder if this is part of some overall strategy to keep the Micronesians in the U.S. camp on a permanent basis.

Some high-level strategic planners believe Micronesia has significant potential military value in the post-Vietnam period. Thus justifying CIA surveillance if it helps maintain U.S. control of the islands. The reasoning goes that if the U.S. Armed Forces were compelled to withdraw from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the Micronesian Islands could become the westernmost defense position for U.S. bases. This, coupled with the recently advanced view that oceans are suddenly worth hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars under the new economic-zone device, in both fish and mineral resources, is bound to lead many U.S. planners to the view that Micronesia can't be released....

We think that three or four years ago, with unity, the Micronesians had a chance for independence. Now we don't believe that they do any more. We see a situation in which the U.S. Congress will reject any Micronesian attempt for self-government, and may in fact annex the islands. This electronic surveillance is just about in the same league as bombing Bikini. It gives us a bad taste.

(U) The Acting Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Philip W. Manhard, replied to a joint statement issued by Micronesian political leaders, stressing the great importance the United States attached to the continuation of friendship and trust between Micronesia and the United States, not only throughout the duration of the trusteeship, but also thereafter. "Such a relationship will best serve, we believe, the interests of both our peoples." He noted that the negotiations had never been conducted in an adversary manner; the United States had always sought to be faithful to our responsibilities as trustee and to find the most constructive solutions for the best possible future for Micronesia and its relations with us. It was the policy of the United States to pursue negotiations on the basis of complete respect for the Micronesian negotiators themselves and their duly authorized responsibility to represent the best interests of all the people of Micronesia.

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"The President has taken steps to ensure that this policy is observed without exception." It was concluded that the United States welcomed and fully supported the Micronesian statement that both should take a positive approach and look to the future.<sup>1</sup>

#### Civic Action Program

(U) In 1969 the Secretaries of Defense and Interior agreed to share the cost of Civic Action Teams (CAT) on selected islands of the TTPI. By 1970 there were six teams in place. The cost of maintaining the teams was split among the Defense Department (salaries, equipment, support), Interior (per diem), and TTPI districts (construction material and training). The teams provided needed facilities and improvements, and also created much goodwill toward the United States.<sup>2</sup>

(U) When the budget was being prepared for FY 76, the cost to the Department of the Interior had nearly doubled and the High Commissioner of the TTPI had stated he could support only 2 1/2 teams in FY 76. Additional funding was not forthcoming, and the JCS approved a two-team deployment for FY 76. There were two teams budgeted for FY 77 also. Early in 1976 there were teams on Palau (a Navy team) and Truk (an Air Force team). The Palau team was disestablished and a new team established at Kusaie on 1 June 1976; the Truk team was rotated.<sup>3</sup>

(C) On 21 June the JCS requested the proposal for CAT deployment for FY 78. The High Commissioner advised that funding was available for three teams that year. CINCPAC recommended approval for three teams as requested and provided justification for continued Service funding.<sup>4</sup>

(U) Thus, the program for FY 78 provided for continuation of operations on Kusaie by the Navy and on Truk by the Air Force. The JCS advised that a third team to Yap would be Navy sponsored, but that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not yet given final approval for the three-team program. There were also plans to introduce a fourth team in Palau if funding from the Department of the Interior and the District became available later in the budget year. Action regarding Palau, however, would not be undertaken until a formal request from the High Commissioner was received.<sup>5</sup>

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1. SECSTATE 306155/172111Z Dec 76.
  2. CINCPAC Command History 1975, Vol. I, p. 84; J5124 HistSum Jul 76.
  3. J5123 HistSum Feb 76; J5124 HistSum Jul 76.
  4. JCS 7961/211610Z Jun 76; CINCPACREP Guam 300237Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 312307Z Jul 76.
  5. J5124 HistSum Dec 76; CINCPAC 150131Z Dec 76.

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Kwajalein/Ebeye

(C) Ebeye was a tiny island (.12 square miles) located four miles north-east of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. When Kwajalein had been taken over as a missile range headquarters (Kwajalein Missile Range--KMR) in 1950, all Marshallese had been moved from Kwajalein to Ebeye, approximately 450 people. About 250 of them continued to be employed at KMR at the U.S. minimum wage, which was well above what other Marshallese could have been expected to make. The result was an influx from other islands to Ebeye in search of jobs. Also, Micronesian custom required a man making money to share it with his "extended family," even the most distant relatives. Many such relatives joined supporting families in the ensuing years. By 1976 the population had burgeoned to over 7,000, and housing, water, sewerage, etc., were woefully inadequate by U.S. standards. In 1975 Admiral Gayler had visited Ebeye and expressed his dismay to the Chairman of the JCS concerning "overcrowded and deplorable conditions among Marshallese on island." He asked if the Secretary of Defense could put pressure on the Department of the Interior to improve conditions there. In July 1976, concurrent with hearings on Ebeye by a Congressional delegation, CINCPAC again voiced his concern to both the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense concerning the persistent problem of Ebeye.<sup>1</sup>

(C) The Department of the Army was subsequently tasked by the Secretary of Defense to form a study group to investigate conditions on Kwajalein. On 15 October the Secretary asked CINCPAC to provide views on how the Ebeye situation developed, what Defense agencies had done to keep conditions from worsening, and how the U.S. Government should proceed.<sup>2</sup>

(C) CINCPAC's reply of 27 November provided the requested information. The United States, through the Department of the Interior and the Trust Territory Government, administered Ebeye Island under a United Nations mandate. Ebeye was not leased by the United States as part of the KMR. In addition to Trust Territory authority, CINCPAC noted, traditional Marshallese leaders were afforded considerable power in controlling local politics. The U.S. Coast Guard maintained a small station on the southern tip of the island. The Defense Department had no program or activities on the island and did not control who lived there.<sup>3</sup>

(C) CINCPAC continued that inhabitants of Kwajalein and other islets had moved to Ebeye after accepting payment for use of their home islands for the

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1. J5124 HistSum Jul 76; CINCPAC 160350Z Jul 76 (EX).
2. SECDEF 5682/152343Z Oct 76.
3. CINCPAC 270036Z Nov 76.

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KMR. These displaced persons totaled fewer than 500. The "luxuries" afforded by the U.S. minimum wage had resulted in the subsequent migration of others, and the island that was about a mile long and 250 yards wide had a population of over 7,000. Living conditions were considerably lower than U.S. standards, but, nevertheless, no worse than many villages and communities throughout the TTPI. Although densely populated, Ebeye had public utilities not available in most of Micronesia. The fact that over one-third of the Marshallese people had elected to live there, and refused to leave, was considered evidence that they saw it as a relatively desirable place to live.

(C) CINCPAC advised that competing political and economic forces were at work; in some cases conditions were being exploited to achieve other political and economic objectives, and efforts to improve the situation were often impeded by the most vocal critics of the existing situation. Economic factors were the driving force behind the Marshallese separatist movement. The Marshallese believed that the KMR was irreplaceable and absolutely essential to the United States. Thus, they believed they could hold out for exorbitant lease terms (at that time they were talking about \$60 million a year); such an amount would support an independent political entity with no other supporting economic base. They had used Congressional and United Nations hearings to highlight their stand on separate status and the "crucial" need for increased revenues to improve conditions, but it was significant that the local government had not budgeted its own funds to improve conditions.

(C) CINCPAC next addressed the U.S. efforts to keep conditions from worsening, and potential future U.S. courses of action, including negotiations regarding future status, KMR lease terms, and other alternatives. CINCPAC noted that the U.S. Army had not been responsible for conditions on Ebeye and had made a more than reasonable effort to assist. He believed that creation of the Army study group was ill advised as it was tantamount to an admission of Army culpability. In concert with the TTPI High Commissioner, CINCPAC recommended formation of a multi-agency study group, to include Interior, Defense, Army, KMR, TTPI and Marshallese officials, and traditional leaders. The data obtained by the Army fact-finding group could be used by the interdepartmental study group, the first meeting of which was expected early in 1977.<sup>1</sup>

#### U.S.-U.K. Disputed Pacific Islands

(U) On 12 February the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the need to maintain a U.S. claim over disputed Pacific Islands and to seek military rights in view of a move by the U.K. to grant independence in 1978-79.

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1. Ibid.

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Fourteen of 18 Pacific islands jointly claimed by the two governments were included in the proposed new entity, which was to consist of the Ocean, Gilbert, Phoenix, Line, and Christmas Islands. The Ellice Islands were to remain a Crown Colony.<sup>1</sup>

(C) CINCPAC replied that, taking into consideration the evolving political status of Micronesia, the key military factor was the continued adherence to the policy of denial of the Pacific Island area to third country military activity. The United States had no requirement at the time for the islands, but should seek an arrangement that denied the area to any other military presence. Future U.S. defense needs were not clear, but CINCPAC could visualize a potential requirement to reactivate missile tracking facilities or to control sea and air lines of communication throughout the area. If the United States relinquished its claims, it should seek a quid pro quo from the United Kingdom to reserve military reentry rights. If the U.K. lacked the authority to grant such rights, arrangements should be made with the new island entities for such rights in exchange for relinquishment of claims.<sup>2</sup>

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1. JCS 1747/282236Z Jan 76.
  2. CINCPAC 120450Z Feb 76.

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## CHAPTER II

### THE THREAT

#### SECTION I--THE SOVIET UNION

##### The Overall Threat<sup>1</sup>

(S) The Soviet Union was the only world power with the potential to challenge the United States militarily. Detente with the United States, the Sino-Soviet rift, economic progress, and strategic parity with the United States lessened the probability of conflict. However, the Russians could be expected to pursue all opportunities to enhance their position.

(S) The Soviet Union continued to emphasize the development of superior forces. Russia placed high priority on advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), sea control technology, anti-satellite and advanced air defense systems, air and satellite surveillance systems, and command and control systems.

(S) A highly effective naval force designed to deny U.S. control of the seas was capable in some areas of attaining that goal. DELTA-class ballistic missile submarines with a 4,200 nautical mile missile range were operational in the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and more were expected to be deployed.

(S) Continued design, development, and operational deployment of new combat aircraft gave the Soviets the capability to maintain local air superiority in many areas. A program to replace older aircraft facing Pacific Command forces was expected to continue.

(S) The large Russian ground force was expected to continue its modernization with new tanks, heavy mobile artillery, helicopters, missiles, armored vehicles, and small arms. Because of the Sino-Soviet rift, Russia was expected to continue to improve its defenses along the Chinese border, primarily by qualitative improvements in weapon systems.

(S) CINCPAC expected a continued presence of the Soviet Navy and long-range air for the support of Soviet political and economic objectives in the PACOM area. Russia was expected to increase its capability to interfere with PACOM lines of communication (LOC) by improving and establishing new port and base facilities.

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1. CINCPAC 291934Z Oct 76.

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(S) The Russian implementation of "peaceful coexistence" would include the support of local armed conflicts, intimidation by display of military might, propaganda, economic measures, and the use of surrogate forces when possible in "wars of liberation."

(S) Because of inadequate airlift and sealift forces, Russian ability for a conventional ground attack against Japan was extremely limited. No increase was expected in this capability in the near future.

#### Threat to LOC

(S) In a wartime situation, the main Soviet threat to allied LOC was from Soviet submarine and anti-ship missile-capable bombers. The degree of the threat was proportional to the distance of a LOC from Soviet naval and air bases. The threat to the U.S.-to-Japan LOC, therefore, was greater than to a U.S.-Australia LOC. In a wartime situation, the interdiction of U.S./allied LOC would be secondary to the protection of the Soviet Union, and the use of vulnerable surface combatants beyond local waters was unlikely. The degree of the Soviet threat against sea LOC in the Indian Ocean would be dependent upon the accessibility of the Suez Canal, and the survivability of Soviet surface units in the Indian Ocean was doubtful if struck by allied navies. Only the nuclear submarines were capable of sustained anti-sea LOC operations in the Indian Ocean without shore/auxiliary support.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In a peacetime situation, the Soviet threat would be proportional to the strength of forces in proximity to LOC during crisis periods when diplomatic, political, and economic decisions were made. The standing Soviet naval force in the Northwest Indian Ocean was a threat to, and could temporarily cut off, the oil supply to Western Europe and Japan. The Soviet Navy was able to deploy a peacetime show of force to implicitly threaten any U.S./allied sea LOC in the PACOM area. The timeliness and credibility of such implicit threats was in direct proportion to the distance from Soviet bases.<sup>2</sup>

#### Indian Ocean Presence

(S) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased steadily since 1968 when three surface combatants and two tankers were deployed. In 1976 the average force in the Indian Ocean was 19 ships, including 8 combatants. Despite the reopening of the Suez Canal, which offered the potential for rapid reinforcement of the Indian Ocean force, nearly all of the Soviet Indian Ocean

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1. IPAC Point Paper, 16 Jun 76, Subj: Soviet Threat to Allied LOC in PACOM.
  2. Ibid.

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contingent continued to deploy from the Pacific Fleet via the Malacca Strait. The annual turnover operation between the Soviet Pacific Fleet units and the Indian Ocean contingent was effected on 4 September 1976.<sup>1</sup>

(S) Soviet facilities in the Indian Ocean area were primarily located in Berbera, Somalia and included a deep-water port, petroleum storage facilities, a probable naval cruise missile handling facility, a communications facility, and five airfields with permanent surface runways longer than 7,500 feet. Soviet ships also used facilities and anchorages in other littoral countries in the Indian Ocean area. Port and bunkering facilities were available to the Soviets in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (formerly South Yemen) port of Aden, the Iraqi ports of Umm Qasar and Al Basrah, and Port Louis, Mauritius. Singapore shipyards were routinely used for the repair of Soviet auxiliary vessels. Anchorages used by Soviet naval units included Socotra, Chagos Archipelago, Coetivy, the Arab Shoals, and south of Aden.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean had been documented in the CINCPAC History for a number of years and had received increasing attention in the U.S. media as a result of the concern expressed by the U.S. Government. However, it was not until after elections held in late 1975 that the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean was specifically acknowledged by the new governments of Australia and New Zealand. In January 1976 Prime Minister Fraser of Australia acknowledged that one purpose of the new \$50 million Cockburn Sound Naval Base was to play a key role in supporting the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean and to maintain a balance of the major powers in the area. Fraser was also quoted as supporting the buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the construction of the Diego Garcia facility. He also noted that the Soviet buildup would have to be reduced substantially before it reached the same level as the United States, and that the prospects of the Soviet Union reducing its level of activity were very remote.<sup>3</sup>

(S) In a June 1976 speech to the Australian Parliament, Fraser strongly endorsed Australia's alliance with the United States and called upon the Soviet Union to show that it was serious about reaching global accommodation with the West. He expressed confidence that China supported Australia's views on the need for an effective American presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On relations with the United States and Soviet intentions, Fraser said:<sup>4</sup>

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1. DIA 4820/090118Z Sep 76; IPAC Point Paper, 22 Nov 76, Subj: Soviet Activities and Facilities in the Indian Ocean.
  2. Ibid.
  3. AMEMB Canberra 294/140551Z Jan 76.
  4. AMEMB Canberra 3958/020621Z Jun 76.

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...America is the only power that can balance the might of the Soviet Union. If America does not undertake that task it will not be done. If it is not done the whole basis of peace and stability is unsupported....

...As understood by people throughout the world, detente meant not merely the search for security from nuclear war, but a genuine overall relaxation of political and military tensions. Unfortunately the reality has not matched the aspirations--the Soviet Union is unquestionably committed to the avoidance of nuclear warfare. Reasonable people can however reasonably conclude that the Soviet Union still seeks to expand its influence throughout the world to achieve Soviet primacy. Its actions all too often appear inconsistent with the aim of reducing world tension....

In the last decade, the Soviet Union has expanded its armed forces by one million. The Soviet Navy has grown substantially while the size of the United States naval forces has declined.

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The Soviet leaders now have a strategic and political reach--a capacity to influence and even intervene--well beyond the periphery of the established zones of Soviet security interest.

The USSR has demonstrated the will to exploit that capacity where the opportunity offers.

The fabric of negotiations with the Soviet Union--which we strongly support--has unfortunately had limited success in winning restraint in this campaign.

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Stability is disturbed and tension increased if the Soviet Union makes geo-political gains through its support of wars of national liberation, by the use of surrogates.

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The time has come to expect a sign from the USSR that it understands this and that it is serious about reaching global accommodation with the West. A tangible signal is required from the USSR in the form of a restraint in its military expansion. The pace is being set by the USSR, not by the U.S.

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In recent years, China's relations with the U.S. have improved due to certain mutual interests.

China is clearly concerned at the Soviet role on her northern and southern frontiers.

Australia and China have a like interest in seeing that Soviet power in the Pacific and Southeast Asia is balanced by the power of other major states or by appropriate regional arrangements.

We can therefore expect Chinese support for our own views on the need for an effective American presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Such support has, in fact, been given.

While I was in New Zealand, the Pacific Forum countries agreed to accept the movement of U.S. nuclear ships in the Pacific Ocean area. Such a decision, of course, reflected each country's independent assessment of its own interests. China has acknowledged that such an arrangement is in her interests also.

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The Indian Ocean is of considerable political and strategic importance to Australia. Much of the vital flow of oil to our neighbors, friends, and trading partners passes through it. The entrance to the Persian Gulf has become a major focus of international attention.

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The objective of a neutral zone in the Indian Ocean, while admirable, has little chance of success with the USSR significantly increasing its permanent presence in the vital northwest sector of the ocean. It is clearly contrary to Australia's interests for the balance in this area to move against our major ally, the U.S.

It is also against our interests for both superpowers to embark on an unrestricted competition in the Indian Ocean. We seek balance and restraint. We have supported the U.S. development of logistic facilities at Diego Garcia so that the balance necessary to stability in the area can be maintained. We also strongly support the recent appeal by the U.S. Administration for restraint so that the balance can now be maintained at a relatively low level.

(U) This strong indictment of Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific areas was matched by Prime Minister Muldoon of New Zealand in May 1976. At a special news conference, he exhibited photographs of Soviet naval ships entering and leaving the Indian Ocean, provided statistics on Soviet and U.S. ship days in that region, quoted Soviet Admiral Gorshkov's 1972 statements on Russia's worldwide naval might, reiterated support for U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia, and quoted CINCPAC's view on the pace of Soviet Russia's buildup and the CINCPAC statement that the Indian Ocean was "no one's lake." Muldoon also made reference to the recent accreditation of the Soviet Ambassador to New Zealand as the Ambassador to the Kingdom of Tonga. The Soviet Ambassador had stated that press speculation as to the motives of the Soviet Union in accrediting an Ambassador to Tonga distorted the peaceful course of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Prime Minister Muldoon, on the other hand, announced that the Government of New Zealand would wait and see what the Tongan Government would do in response to a Soviet offer to build a larger airport. This proposal, he said, was part of a growing Soviet interest in the South Pacific which made the Government of New Zealand uneasy.<sup>1</sup>

#### Soviet Penetration of Southwest Pacific Islands

~~(S)~~ In April 1976 the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand, who was also U.S. Ambassador to the Government of Western Samoa, reported on a four-day visit to Tonga which had followed by only a few hours the departure of the newly accredited Soviet Ambassador. The U.S. Ambassador advised the State Department that he had learned of the Russian Ambassador's offers of technical assistance in agriculture and industrial development, the offer of scholarships for young

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1. AMEMB Wellington 1885/202243Z May 76.

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Tongans to study in Russia and the sale on the local market of fish from the Russian fishing fleet at cheaper prices than Tonga paid elsewhere. The Russian Ambassador had also suggested that the Russian fleet might purchase vegetables and other local products during their stopovers in Tonga. The U.S. Ambassador noted that the recognition of the Soviet Union by Tonga, the recognition of both the Soviet Union and the PRC by Fiji, and the recognition of the PRC by Western Samoa indicated a growing interest in the area by both Russia and China. The Ambassador believed that this was a matter of real concern to the United States. Thus began a series of messages citing attempts to verify rumors in Tonga that the Soviet Union had sought permission to establish a naval base at Vava'u. It was also rumored that the Soviet Ambassador, during his accreditation call in Tonga, had offered to develop an international-class airport in Tonga. Early in May a delegation from Tonga called on Foreign Minister Peacock of New Zealand to confirm the offer by the Soviet Ambassador of a fish canning plant, the extension of the airport runway, and other benefits in exchange for facilities in Tonga for Soviet aircraft and ships. These Tongan representatives stated that the King of Tonga felt that he had received inadequate help from the United States and the Western countries and would have to accept the Soviet offer if no additional Western aid were offered. In a parallel development, the Prime Minister of Western Samoa had stated that the Western Samoan Government was considering a request to the PRC for technical development advisers. Since, in early April, the King of Tonga had paid a State visit to Western Samoa, the U.S. diplomatic mission in New Zealand conceded the possibility of collusion between the two governments to put pressure on the Western countries for additional assistance.<sup>1</sup>

(S) From sources within the international diplomatic community, the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand became aware of approaches by Tongan officials to other Western nations and the interest of these nations in a possible joint effort to assist Tonga. The U.S. Embassy in New Zealand suggested that the State Department consider the encouragement of such joint efforts in view of the strengthening of diplomatic relations by the PRC and Russia with the island nations of Tonga, Fiji, and Western Samoa.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 9 May the State Department informed the diplomatic community that the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington had been requested to obtain further information from their governments on Soviet and Chinese activity in the Pacific. State cited the need, "...to improve our data base on this subject..." in order to confirm that the Soviets actually had made specific aid offers to Tonga. When, "...better information" had been obtained,

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1. AMEMB Suva 438/210300Z Apr 76 and 489/040140Z May 76; AMEMB Wellington 1568/270321Z Apr 76; SECSTATE 107090/031737Z May 76.
  2. AMEMB Wellington 1667/050416Z May 76.

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State intended to convene an informal meeting in Washington with the Australian and New Zealand Embassies to discuss the facts and implications of Soviet and Chinese activity. This would be followed by consideration within the U.S. Government of an appropriate U.S. response, if any. This State Department acknowledgement of a possible cause for concern in the South Pacific area was followed on the next day by a report in an Australian newspaper that Russia had offered to build an international airport in Tonga and to develop industries such as fishing and canning. The newspaper report stated that the Soviets were eager to use Tonga as a South Seas base for shipping vessels, and described the Soviet move as one of vital interest because of the power struggle between Russia and the United States in the Indian Ocean. This article discussed a visit by the Crown Prince of Tonga to Australia in which he had characterized the Tongan-Russian discussions as, "...a very delicate matter." He reportedly had stated that it was the general feeling of Tongan officials that, "...Tonga has many friends, and all we ask of them is that they don't choose our enemies for us." This Australian news report was also carried in a Fiji newspaper along with a denial by the Russian mission in New Zealand that the Soviets planned to establish a base in Tonga.<sup>1</sup>

(C) On the day before the newspaper article was published in Australia, the Crown Prince of Tonga, Prince Tupoutoa, had called on Admiral Gayler in Hawaii. Following CINCPAC's overview of Soviet interest in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, the Crown Prince had emphasized that while Tonga desired friendly relations with all countries, his government was aware of the risks in getting too close to Russia. At the same time, he expressed confidence that the Soviet Union would be unable to develop or exploit a split between the people and the monarchy because the people were strongly anti-communist. The Prince specifically denied that Tongan students would attend the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. The Crown Prince acknowledged the offer by the Soviet Ambassador to build a "Honolulu Airport" for Tonga but maintained that the King had simply thanked the Ambassador but had made no commitment. The Crown Prince commented to CINCPAC that he believed the "understandable" concern of the United States regarding the reports stemmed from the absence of U.S. representation on Tonga. This forced the United States, in his view, to rely on press rumors and reports of government statements which he said were no more reliable when emanating from Tonga than from any other country.<sup>2</sup>

(C) In a 13 May message from the U.S. Embassy in Wellington to the Department of State the Embassy confirmed that the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received positive confirmation of the offers to the King of Tonga by the Soviet Ambassador. This was followed shortly thereafter

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
1. SECSTATE 113191/090131Z May 76; AMEMB Suva 505/100205Z May 76.
2. CINCPAC 111903Z May 76.

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by a report from the U.S. Embassy in Wellington that Russia had offered a fishing fleet to the Government of Western Samoa. The source of this report noted that the Soviet offer could be highly tempting to the Government of Western Samoa, which badly needed fish for local consumption and the foreign exchange which fish exports could bring.<sup>1</sup>

(S) This growing evidence from diplomatic and intelligence sources of Soviet and PRC initiatives to establish close diplomatic and economic ties with the developing states of the Southwest Pacific caused CINCPAC to request a staff analysis of the situation. The CINCPAC Director for Plans produced several studies and analyses regarding the vulnerability of the Southwest Pacific islands to Soviet and PRC penetration.




Although the indications of Soviet interest in Tonga and Western Samoa should not be overestimated, CINCPAC recommended that the State and Defense Departments review the U.S. Government presence in each island country, ways in which the United States might provide low cost economic assistance, and the enlistment of regional joint efforts to resist Soviet penetration. CINCPAC acknowledged that the United States could not be a patron to every island in the Pacific but stressed the need to enhance closer ties between the Pacific islands and the United States whenever possible. Late in July the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Suva reported that, as a result of a visit to Tonga and Western Samoa by a Soviet fishing delegation, Russia and Western Samoa were close to agreement to develop a Samoan fishing industry. Thereupon, CINCPAC reiterated his concern to the JCS and suggested discreet economic assistance and an official U.S. delegation to Tonga and Western Samoa to examine such possibilities.<sup>2</sup>



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1. AMEMB Wellington 1812/132236Z May 76, 1851/182002Z May 76, and 1854/190339Z May 76.
  2. J51 HistSum Jul 76; AMEMB Suva 826/272200Z Jul 76; CINCPAC 100214Z Jun 76 and 312107Z Jul 76.

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1. AMEMB Suva 839/030100Z Aug 76, 874/100010Z Aug 76, and 922/232230Z Aug 76.
  2. AMEMB Suva 1142/160930Z Oct 76.

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(C) In November the JCS solicited specific recommendations from CINCPAC for consideration by various Washington area interagency working groups to deal with the problem of Soviet and PRC efforts to establish footholds in the South Pacific island nations. CINCPAC requested component commands to recommend specific actions with particular emphasis on relatively simple, inexpensive efforts which the military or other government agencies could undertake. By December the U.S. Charge in Suva noted that recent Australian initiatives, German gestures, apprehensions of island leaders, and apparent Soviet and PRC

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1. AMEMB Canberra 7707/220837Z Oct 76.
  2. SECSTATE 212014/260450Z Aug 76, which transmitted AMEMB Port Moresby 865/23 Aug 76.

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inertia had together impeded the momentum of the latter's penetration of the South Pacific and that the islanders had gained confidence that traditional friends would help with their developmental aspirations. An Australian official, recently returned from lengthy visits to Tonga and Western Samoa, had been struck by the complete absence of allusions by the Samoan Prime Minister or the King of Tonga to Soviet or PRC offers of assistance as a means of gaining leverage for Australian help. Both leaders appeared to be cooling--toward Russian overtures in particular. The Government of Australia had programmed the expenditure of at least \$11 million on Samoan development in the agriculture and maritime fields, and West Germany had also offered a modest contribution. In addition, a treaty of friendship and technical cooperation had been concluded between West Germany and the Kingdom of Tonga, and Australia had offered to do a complete study of airport facilities, improve port facilities, and consider improvements to telecommunications. These Australian initiatives and the new German interest, stated the U.S. Charge, were in highly favorable contrast to the apparent footdragging on the communist side which, aside from political considerations, had contributed to a cooling of attitudes toward their assistance.<sup>1</sup>

Other Threat Perceptions

(C) The growing Soviet military strength, and especially the increased naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, was addressed in an editorial transmitted to the State Department by the U.S. Embassy in Singapore in June of 1976. This Singapore editorial surveyed the emerging geo-political scene in the Southeast Asian region, using as a starting point the request by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) that all U.S. bases in Thailand be closed. The editorial noted that, henceforth, the only American bases in the region would be those in the Philippines which, unlike Thailand, felt no urgent pressure to eliminate the U.S. military presence. The opinion was expressed that the continuing decline of the United States military presence in the region and the concomitant growth of the Russian presence was not in the interest of ASEAN. The editorial referred to statements by Australian and New Zealand officials concerning Soviet intentions and the use by the New Zealand Prime Minister of photographs of Soviet warships off Singapore on their way to or from the Indian Ocean to support the statement that the Soviet presence was not only increasing, but ominous.<sup>2</sup>

(C) The reference in the Singapore editorial to the apparent absence of pressure regarding U.S. bases in the Philippines had an interesting sequel

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1. J51 HistSum Nov 76; CINCPAC 261907Z Nov 76 and 270051Z Nov 76; AMEMB Suva 1342/010455Z Dec 76.
  2. AMEMB Singapore 2777/041237Z Jun 76.

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or retaliatory chemical operations until 1993. The CINC was concerned that the contradictory guidance would cause confusion to commanders in the field and our Allies by continuing to include chemical munitions deployment and employment in OPLANs, exercises, and training.<sup>23</sup>

~~(S/NF)~~ It took exactly one month to receive an answer from CJCS. The United States had called for completion of the CWC by May 1992. Entry into force required ratification of the treaty by 60 countries and could take place as late as 1995. Planning guidance for CY 93-95, however, expected entry into force in 1993. Until the CWC was ratified, CJCS guidance was to maintain current retaliatory chemical planning and deployment postures, levels of training, and spending levels for planning and munitions maintenance. Unnecessary new expenditures or other costly initiatives in this area were to be avoided.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>USCINCPAC 080105Z Oct 91 ~~(S/NF)~~.

<sup>24</sup>CJCS 082305Z Nov 91 ~~(S/NF)~~.

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


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SECTION IV--USPACOM FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS

Japan


Strategic Framework for Asia



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
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<sup>26</sup>ibid.


<sup>27</sup>IPAC Point Paper (S), 11 Mar 91, Subj: Japan: Follow-On Mid-Term Defense Plan Approved (U

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
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


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
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(U) The OPCON issue had been raised on occasion by members of the National Assembly, but did not seem to be a major political issue. There appeared to be some confusion with the Korean public between OPCON and command, and public opinion frequently assumed the U.S. commander of CFC (CINCCFC) actually commanded the assigned ROK forces rather than only controlling their wartime operations. This assumption led to the belief that the United States had more control over ROK military units than was true. The OPCON issue would assume greater importance as implementation time approached.

Marine Corps Liaison Officer

(U) On 29 October 1991, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) approved the request of the ROK Marine Corps (ROKMC) commandant to establish a liaison officer at the USMC Combat Development Center (MCCDC) located at Quantico, Virginia. At the same time, CMC disapproved a request by Commander Naval Forces Korea (COMNAVFOR KOREA) to establish a USMC liaison officer billet

<sup>35</sup>USDAO Seoul 11295/230456Z Oct 91 (S/NF); J53 Point Paper (S). Subj: Command Relationships in Korea (U), 24 May 91.

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


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at ROKMC Headquarters. The stated reason was that a compensatory billet reduction could not be identified, but the CMC agreed to reconsider if a Marine officer billet within CNFK could be identified as a compensatory reduction.<sup>36</sup>

Senior Member, Military Armistice Commission

(S) Discussions on appointing a ROK general officer as senior member of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) began in 1990, as part of a transition plan to progressively place ROK officers in leadership positions. Plans to appoint MG Hwang Won-Tak, ROKA, as the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) senior member on 4 January 1991 to relieve RADM Larry G. Vogt, USN, were delayed several times. The first delay was occasioned by the possible repatriation of UNC war dead to Senator John McCain on 7 January, and subsequent delays by changes in high-level ROK officials involved in the North/South negotiations. Because North Korea had threatened to reject the credentials for a new UNC senior member and suspend all MAC contacts, CINCUNC considered it important for the new ROK leaders had an opportunity to engage in the negotiating process, establish rapport with their opposite numbers, and set future arrangement for further North/South talks before the bilateral relations were affected by the transition issue.<sup>37</sup>



<sup>36</sup>CMC 291951Z Oct 91 (U).

<sup>37</sup>CINCUNC 040255Z Jan 91 (S) and 110030Z Jan 91 (S); USFK 070730Z Feb 91 (S)(BOM).

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(C) Official notification of the change in senior members from Maj Gen James F. Record to MG Hwang Won-Tak was made on 25 March 1991. As expected, the North Korean Joint Duty Officer (JDO) rejected MG Hwang's credentials, claiming that the appointment was defective because the ROK was not a member of the United Nations and was not a signatory to the Korean Armistice. He also initially rejected the credentials appointing RADM William Mathis, USN, as a member of the MAC replacing MG Hwang, but later relented and accepted them. The response of the UNCMAC JDO was that the North had now been properly notified and that there was no valid reason to support the North's attempt to reject the notification. The following day, North Korea cancelled that day's MAC meeting because of administrative reasons, although they used MAC channels to cancel the meeting instead of now showing up without notice, and only canceled the 26 March meeting.<sup>38</sup>

(S/NOFORN) Subsequent North Korean actions included continued refusal to accept the ROK senior member appointment, unilateral suspension of reporting of replacement of combat material and personnel rotation, and the deliberate deprivation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) of their last remaining official function. (The NNSC was charged with conducting a weekly review of each side's personnel reports and Korean People's Army (KPA) material replacement reports--suspension of the reports left the NNSC with no reason for being.) This action fabricated conditions and rationale for exit of the NNSC delegations from Korea, and along with increased pressure and harrassment and reduction in support, made it clear that North Korea wanted them out.<sup>39</sup>

#### Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

(S) North Korean intent to terminate the NNSC became clear in June, when representatives of all four member countries--Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, and Sweden--were informed in May that North Korea would not object to the departure of the Polish and Czech delegations, which were stationed in North Korea. All four member countries, the United States, and Thailand, and Australia protested this action as a violation of the Armistice accords, and the NNSC continued to exist for the rest of the year.<sup>40</sup>

#### Impact of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

<sup>38</sup> AMEMB Seoul 02992/260657Z Mar 91 (S); CINCUNC 270930Z Mar 91 (S).

<sup>39</sup> CINCUNC 252350Z May 91 (S) and 210130Z Jun 91 (S/AF).

<sup>40</sup> AMEMB Seoul 05704/310934Z May 91 (C); AMEMB Prague 07823/191721Z Jul 91 (S); AMEMB Bangkok 37016/010909Z Aug 91 (C).

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DESERT STORM, OPLAN 5027-88 was not supportable. The ability of CFC to execute successfully Phase I of the plan, the defense of Seoul, was severely reduced, and the ability to execute a counteroffensive under Phase II was virtually denied. The Naval, Marine, and Air Force units scheduled to deploy rapidly and blunt the initial enemy assault were no longer available to influence the action. The almost total commitment of airlift assets to support DESERT STORM meant that the ability to move follow-on forces and evacuate significant numbers of personnel in a timely manner were marginal. Compounding the force and lift shortfalls, medical facilities and units and all classes of supply were deployed from the USPACOM at alarming levels.<sup>41</sup>

~~(S)~~ The diversions of assets, forces, and capabilities to DESERT STORM meant that the first stage of a conflict, denying the enemy a breakthrough, would last far longer than envisioned in the existing plan. Therefore, the counteroffensive phase would not begin as soon as planned, and the conflict would last longer and be more costly than the anticipated 60-90 days.

#### Security Consultative Meeting

~~(S)~~ The 23d Annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul, Korea, 20 to 22 November 1991. The security consultative process was begun in 1968 to provide a forum for consultations between ROK and U.S. defense officials. Topics included the ROK-U.S. security relationship and security related issues that impacted on the defense of South Korea. SECDEF Richard B. Cheney lead the U.S. delegation, and the meeting was hosted by ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Jong Koo. The 13th Military Committee Meeting (MCM) was held on 20 November, hosted by GEN Chung Ho Keun, Chairman of the ROK JCS. GEN Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, lead the U.S. delegation.<sup>42</sup>

#### Goals and Objectives

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ U.S. goals and objectives for the ROK were set forth in the Pacific Command Strategy. They included: to foster economic and political development; to transition the U.S. from a leading to a supporting role whereby the ROK assumed primary responsibility for its own defense with the U.S. in support; to prevent the spread of anti-United States attitudes; to improve defense capabilities while maintaining interoperability with U.S. forces; and to increase the ROK's share of the costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces on the peninsula. Specific goals related to North

<sup>41</sup>USFK 270100Z Jan 91 ~~(S)~~(BOM; J5413 Point Paper ~~(S)~~ 5 Feb 91, Subj: Operation Desert Storm Impact on 5027 (U).

<sup>42</sup>AMEMB Seoul 240854Z Oct 91 ~~(S)~~

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Korea included continued deterrence, and failing that, defeat of a North Korean attack with the minimum penetration of ROK territory.<sup>43</sup>

### Philippines

(U) In January 1991, the U.S. and Philippine governments were negotiating a new bases agreement on the premise that a U.S. presence in the Islands was necessary and desirable for the foreseeable future. In June, nature introduced new terms into the negotiations with the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. At the end of December 1991, a U.S. presence in the Philippines was no longer necessary nor, in the opinion of some parties, desirable, and we were served with an eviction notice. The two major issues in the Philippines were, first, negotiating to stay and, second, planning to leave. These are discussed below, while the evacuation and closing of Clark AB is covered in Chapter IV, Operations, of this History.

### Philippine-American Cooperation Talks

(U) During 1990, three rounds of Philippine-American Cooperation Talks (PACT) between Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus and Special Negotiator Richard Armitage were held in Manila. During the exploratory talks in May which preceded PACT I, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) presented official notification of termination of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA), effective 16 September 1991. This established a deadline: either we had a new bases agreement to allow us to remain, or we withdrew. In December 1990, Secretary Manglapus proposed the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces within five-years of September 1991.


(S/NOFORN) PACT IV opened in Manila on 9 January 1991, and concluded on the 12th. Although both sides reported satisfactory progress had been made across a wide range of issues, both also agreed that a fifth round was necessary. The negotiators were able to agree to the status of four small facilities, specifically: the San Miguel communications station and the relay station at Capas were to revert to Philippine control on 31 January 1991; Camp John Hay to revert by September 1991; and Wallace Air Station to be returned to AFP control in September with a residual U.S. presence to use and maintain the radar set. The Philippine side also agreed to keep Thirteenth Air Force (13 AF) and the 353rd Special Operations Wing (353 SOW) at Clark AB. No details of specific areas of agreement or disagreement were publicly announced, based on the understanding that no agreements reached during the course of negotiations would be considered final until the entire arrangement had been agreed upon. The situation in the Persian Gulf somewhat overshadowed

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<sup>43</sup>USCINCPACINST S3050.6, (S/NOFORN), 9 Aug 89, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy--A Multinational Approach (U).

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
<sup>44</sup>AMEMB Manila 00635/090731Z Jan 91 (U), and 01008/140222Z Jan 91 (U); J5122 Background Paper (~~SECRET~~), 16 May 91, Subj: Philippine Base Negotiations (U).

<sup>45</sup>AMEMB Manila 04575/201317Z Feb 91 (~~SECRET~~).

<sup>46</sup>USCINCPAC/Foxtrot 003 261630W Apr 91 (~~SECRET~~).

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47 AMEMB Manila 10942/031129Z May 91 (U).

48 AMEMB Manila 11053/061109Z May 91 (C) and 11320/081041Z May 91 (U).

49 J5122 Point Paper (S/NF), 9 Jul 91, Subj: Post-Pinatubo Negotiation Atmosphere (U).

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50 AMEMB Manila 17981/180355Z Jul 91 (U).


51 AMEMB Manila 22126/271036Z Aug 91 (C).

52 AMEMB Manila 22644/031124Z Sep 91 (S) and 23158/070819Z Sep 91 (C).

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53 AMEMB Manila 23319/091310Z Sep 91 (U).

54 AMEMB Manila 23320/091318Z Sep 91 (U).

55 AMEMB Manila 23444/101605Z Sep 91 (S), 23738/121317Z Sep 91 (S), and 23916/160828Z Sep 91 (S).

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
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life, but failed to resolve the issue. Deep social, economic, and political division in the country remained to be addressed.<sup>56</sup>

(S) Shortly before midnight on 16 September, the Philippine government presented a diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy. The note informed the Embassy that the Philippine Senate had by Resolution No. 1259, adopted on 16 September 1991, expressed its non-concurrence to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. It went on to announce the government's intention to bring the Senate's action on the treaty in a referendum later in the year, and withdrew the 15 May 1990 notification of termination of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. As the Senate's vote was not yet final, the government had reinterpreted its understanding of the termination date of the 1947 MBA as set forth in the Ramos-Rusk exchange of notes of 16 September 1966 to agree with the U.S. position expressed by Senior Negotiator Richard Armitage at the conclusion of the exploratory talks on 18 May 1990. Basically, that position was that the MBA was subject to termination upon one year's notice by either government after 16 September 1991, and that the legal regime that governed the status of U.S. forces in the Philippines and their use of Philippine installations should continue as defined in the MBA, as amended. This turn of events eliminated any requirement for U.S. forces to alter operations in any way as they continued to have the same operating latitude as before 17 September 1991, and with the same SOFA in effect.<sup>57</sup>

#### Withdrawal Negotiations

(S/NOFORN) Prior to the rejection of the treaty by the Philippine Senate, Ambassador Frank G. Wisner suggested planning the posture, policies, and actions to pursue in the event the treaty was not ratified.



At that time, the CINC was optimistic that some form of future access arrangement to accommodate USPACOM's operational needs could be worked out, but noted that we were prepared to relocate if required.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup>AMEMB Manila 23995/161346Z Sep 91 (S).

<sup>57</sup>AMEMB Manila 24132/170914Z Sep 91 (U) and 24249/181028Z Sep 91 (S).


<sup>58</sup>USCINCPAC 162000Z Sep 91 (S/NE).

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(C) The end of the treaty negotiations on 16 September 1991 marked the beginning of withdrawal negotiations, which proved to be another exercise in futility and frustration. President Aquino announced on 2 October that the GOP would negotiate and execute, with the support of at least 15 senators, an executive agreement with the U.S. government for the withdrawal of U.S. forces within a period not to exceed three years. She also dropped plans for a referendum as unnecessary.<sup>59</sup>



- Start withdrawal as early as January 1992 with download of the Naval Magazine, transfer of Naval Supply Depot's assets, and disestablishment or move of selected stovepipe organizations.

- As dependents had been evacuated and returned, they should not be moved again until the school year was completed.

- By June 1992, have core capabilities protected. If a new government wanted to ratify the negotiated agreement, it could be considered. Strongly recommended against new negotiations being opened as the process had been bitter and divisive.

- Goal was to reach three-year point with forces withdrawn at a pace that gave the AFP best chance to convert core facilities to AFP or commercial use.

- Conduct process in a way to keep good relations with the Philippine government and AFP to encourage future access and regional stability.

(C) The negotiating process became difficult almost immediately, with the President Aquino and her advisors seeking a negotiated, three-year executive agreement with wide political support. To the contrary, the preferred U.S. solution was a simple, rapidly negotiated agreement that covered a SOFA and operations and provided for a withdrawal committee to iron out details. This end could best be met by an executive agreement that would, by mutual agreement, establish a fall 1994 termination date for the 1947 MBA,

<sup>59</sup> AMEMB Manila 25506/021126Z Oct 91 (C).

<sup>60</sup> USCINCPAC 080200Z Oct 91 (S/NE).

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a procedure that was envisaged in the agreement. This would also deal with both the operational and SOFA issues without reopening potentially contentious issues. However, this did not meet Philippine needs for theater that the impression of negotiating hard with the United States would create, nor did it conform to the administration's perception of a three-year agreement as a way station to a longer stay for U.S. forces at Subic Bay. President Aquino lacked enough influence with the Senate to get an agreement of real substance and duration, but she hoped that her successor and a new senate would act more responsibly. A three-year withdrawal agreement would give both countries time to review the bidding and put in place a longer-term arrangement.<sup>61</sup>

(S) Opening of the formal negotiating process was marked by receipt on 18 October of a diplomatic note stating that the GOP wished to conclude an arrangement with the United States for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces by 16 September 1994. The Philippine panel for the talks would be chaired by Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.<sup>62</sup>

(S) After several rounds of meetings at which proposals and counter-proposals were offered and rejected, a final meeting was held on 26 December. The final United States position on a three-year accord was presented on 19 December, and countered by another Philippine proposal on 23 December. At the 26 December meeting, Ambassador Wisner informed the Philippine side that their latest proposals were unworkable, and that the U.S. could not meet their objectives without altering important legal and operational principles that governed U.S. defense arrangements and military forces worldwide. The U.S. position remained as provided to them on the 19th. Unless the Philippine side agreed with those terms, agreement on a mutually acceptable withdrawal arrangement was not possible.<sup>63</sup>

(S) Secretary Drilon reluctantly agreed that in the absence of substantial modification in the U.S. position and given the constitutional constraints he faced, it was fruitless to pursue further a three-year withdrawal agreement. He stated it was impossible for the panel to agree to an extension of the 1947 MBA without some changes to reflect GOP constitutional and political realities. The single most important issue to the Philippine side was the need for a detailed withdrawal plan, the document the administration could cite to legal and political critics to "prove" it had gotten a U.S. commitment to withdraw.

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<sup>61</sup>SECSTATE 331145/050536Z Oct 91 (S); AMEMB Manila 26415/090847Z Oct 91 (C) and 111153Z Oct 91 (S).

<sup>62</sup>AMEMB Manila 27330/181137Z Oct 91.

<sup>63</sup>AMEMB Manila 33513/261558Z Dec 91.

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(U) On 31 December 1991, the GOP officially conveyed its one year termination notice of the 1947 MBA. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Subic Bay had to be completed by 31 December 1992.<sup>64</sup>

Withdrawal Plan In Effect

(S) All U.S. military and civilian personnel occupying quarters in the civilian community would transfer PCS or move on base before a major reduction-in-force (RIF) of foreign national workers took place.

At the end of the school year, most dependents would leave, with the departure rate determined by the availability of moving contractors. Subic Bay Naval Station would be turned over to the GOP in September or October 1992, and NAS Cubi Point would become the hub or remaining U.S. operations. Some withdrawal actions were already underway by the end of the year, including drawdown of munitions from the Naval Magazine, removal of some elements of the Ship Repair Facility (SRF), and halting stores requisitions.

<sup>64</sup>AMEMB Manila 33627/310520Z Dec 91 (Ø).

<sup>65</sup>CINCPACFLT 292239Z Dec 91 (8).

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### Mutual Defense Board Meetings

(S) Following normal practice, USCINCPAC co-chaired the 33rd Anniversary meeting of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB) held at Ft. Bonafacio, Manila, on 16 May. The Philippine co-chair was LTG Lisandro C. Abadia, AFP Chief of Staff. The anniversary meeting was hosted by the Council of Ministers, this year by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. Topics discussed during the session included the national security situation in the Philippines; Exercise BALIKATAN; security assistance programs; the overlap in AFP/Philippine National Police (PNP) counterinsurgency operations; and the turnover of U.S. facilities at San Miguel and Camp John Hay.<sup>66</sup>

(S) The November MDB meeting was hosted by Admiral Larson, and was held at Headquarters USCINCPAC, Camp Smith, Hawaii, rather than Ft. Bonifacio. GEN Abadia and 13 other members of the AFP and PNP traveled to Hawaii to co-chair the meeting. The major point discussed during the session was that USCINCPAC was planning a withdrawal from the Philippines--the CINC saw no interest in the U.S. government in a renegotiation--and the only unknown was the time-frame. Other subjects discussed included the national security situation; Exercise BALIKATAN; security assistance matters; and turnover of Clark AB.<sup>67</sup>

### Philippines Facilities Closures

(S) On 31 January 1991, an antenna field at the San Miguel Naval Communications Station and the U.S. Navy transmitter site at Capas, Tarlac Province, were formally turned over to the Philippines. All removable property was removed, and only the buildings and structures remained. At Capas, which was adjacent to Camp O'Donnell eight miles north of Clark AB, security had been provided by a contingent of 60 U.S. Marines assigned to the facility. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) security and maintenance unit at Capas was reinforced by only 14 raw recruits. After the turnover, more than 1,000 scavengers, led by former employees, descended upon the site. They tore down the 10-mile perimeter fence, dug up copper wires, electric and communications lines, and stripped the site of fuel and water pumps, water pipes, manhole covers, and even wooden planks from a bridge. Attempts by the guard force to protect the site failed to impress the looters. In the words

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<sup>66</sup>USCINCPAC 271915Z May 91 (S).

<sup>67</sup>USCINCPAC 191702Z Nov 91 (S).

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of one Embassy staff member who visited Capas after the looters finished with it, the landscape looked like the Western Front in 1917. What happened at Capas attracted attention at the highest levels of the GOP and forced officials to the conclusion that the same thing could happen at other facilities scheduled to be returned, in particular Camp John Hay in Baguio.<sup>68</sup>

(C) On 1 July 1991, at ceremonies in Baguio and Manila, the U.S. formally turned over possession of John Hay Air Station to the GOP. The transfer was agreed to during the January 1991 round of base talks. Camp John Hay was built by the U.S. in 1903, and was the core around which the city of Baguio was built. When turned over, it was in pristine condition. The GOP had learned from the Capas experience, and the Philippine Department of Tourism developed plans and garnered the funds necessary to take over and operate the facility. Camp John Hay began business under its new management immediately after the flag lowering ceremony.<sup>69</sup>

(U) Three small facilities and portions of a larger one were returned to the GOP on 16 September 1991. Wallace Air Station was returned in a simple ceremony. Undamaged by Mt. Pinatubo's eruption, the base was in excellent condition at the time of turnover. When U.S. personnel departed, the station's radar was working and Philippine AF personnel were trained to run it. Camp O'Donnell, the control point for Crow Valley Range, was also a well-kept facility when turned over to the PAF in a ceremony conducted by the same dignitaries that participated in the closure of Wallace AS. In yet another ceremony on the 16th, San Miguel Naval Air Station was returned to Philippine control held in the base gym because of inclement weather. San Miguel NAS had suffered extreme damage from the volcano. At Clark AB, the first segment of U.S. facilities were also returned to the PAF on the afternoon of 16 September. The remaining portions of Clark were scheduled to be turned over incrementally in the coming months.<sup>70</sup>

(U) The final turnover of U.S. facilities in the Philippines to take place in 1991 was conducted on 26 November 1991 when the American flag was lowered for the last time at Clark AB. With the exception of a brief interlude during World War II, American forces had occupied Clark since 1902, when Ft. Stotsenburg was established. The first airplane arrived in 1912, and in 1919 Clark became the first U.S. air base west of Hawaii. The first flying unit stationed there was the 3rd Aerial Squadron, which became the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, the last tactical unit stationed at Clark. The 3 TFW was moved without personnel or equipment (WOPE) to Alaska and redesignated the

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<sup>68</sup>AMEMB Manila 01968/241009Z Jan 91 (C) and 05099/261039Z Feb 91 (C).

<sup>69</sup>AMEMB Manila 16334/011048Z Jul 91 (C).


<sup>70</sup>AMEMB Manila 23992/161258Z Sep 91 (C).

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3rd Wing effective 19 December 1991, replacing the 21 TFW. Thirteenth Air Force moved its headquarters to Clark in 1947, and there it remained until 26 November 1991 when it was moved WOPE to Andersen AFB, Guam. 13 AF stood up on Guam on 2 December 1991.<sup>71</sup>

### Goals and Objectives



### Singapore

#### Facilities Agreement

(U) On 13 November 1990, the Government of Singapore (GOS) and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) covering the expanded use of Singapore military facilities by U.S. forces. Our acceptance of Singapore's offer for enhanced security cooperation was consistent with the forward deployment policy and was intended to ensure greater peace and security in the region. The response was tailored to meet U.S. needs while taking regional sensitivities into consideration, and planned operations were modest and structured so as to ensure they could not be construed as U.S. bases or basing.<sup>73</sup>

(U) Under the terms of the MOU, a permanent USAF presence was established at Paya Labar Airport, and the number of permanent party USN personnel was increased. The 33-man Air Force contingent was designated as Detachment 1, Thirteenth Air Force Combat Operations Staff (Det 1 13 AFCOS), commanded by Col John R. Casper, USAF. Permanent party personnel of Det 1 began arriving in Singapore on 10 January, and full strength of 3 officers and 30 enlisted personnel was reached in May. Colonel Casper was also designed as USCINCPACREP Singapore, effective 15 January 1991, and was also assigned duties as the Designated Commanding Officer (DCO) for SOFA issues, and U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) for DOD activities. The Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) opened in Singapore in January 1991, and was under

<sup>71</sup>AMEMB Manila 30900/261492Z Nov 91 (U); CINCPACAF 270300Z Nov 91 (U).

<sup>72</sup>USCINCPACINST S3050.6 (S/NF), 9 Aug 89, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

<sup>73</sup>J5121 Background Paper (U), Subj: Enhanced Security Cooperation with Singapore, 10 Jul 91.


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the command of Commander TASK GROUP 73.8 (CTG-73.8), CAPT Daniel Allen. CTG-73.8 functioned as the USN Area Commander for other USN activities.<sup>74</sup>

Invitation to Host Other Units



<sup>74</sup>Ibid.; J5121 HistSum May 91 (U).

<sup>75</sup>AMEMB Singapore 09200/031034Z Oct 91 (S); USCINCPAC 14845Z Oct 91 (S); AMEMB Singapore 09613/171000Z Oct 91 (S).

<sup>76</sup>USDAO Singapore 10668/220544Z Nov 91 (S).

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- 77CINCPACFLT 222059Z Dec 91 (S);
- 78Det 1 13 AFCOS Point Paper (U), 10 Jul 91, Subj: POVs for U.S. Military Personnel in Singapore.
- 79SECSTATE 278992/230813Z Aug 91 (S).
- 80AMEMB Singapore 07795/240501Z Aug 91 (S).

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- 81 AMEMB Singapore 06244/110938Z Jul 91 (C); SECSTATE 225146/110035Z Jul 91 (U).
- 82 JCS 161613Z Sep 91 (C); SECSTATE 329243/040515Z Oct 91 (U); USCINCPAC 141747Z Oct 91 (U).
- 83 USCINCPACINST S3050.6 (S/NE), 9 Aug 89, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

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<sup>84</sup>AMEMB Jakarta 14677/121050Z Nov 91 (S) and 200925Z Nov 91 (C), SECSTATE  
373697/140321Z Nov 91 (S).

<sup>85</sup>USCINCPACINST S3050.6 (S/NF), 9 Aug 89, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U).

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- 86 AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 00910/040955Z Feb 91 (S). USCINCPAC 212300Z Feb 91 (C).
- 87 USDAO Kuala Lumpur 08278/100522Z Oct 91 (U) and 230708Z Oct 91 (U).
- 88 AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 07424/120942Z Sep 91 (C).
- 89 AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 07159/040935Z Sep 91 (S).

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- <sup>90</sup>ibid.; USCINCPAC 221308Z Oct 91 (S); AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 09854/120912Z Dec 91 (S).  
<sup>91</sup>USDAO Kuala Lumpur 06133/040559Z Oct 91 (S); USCINCPAC 301900Z Oct 91 (U).  
<sup>92</sup>USCINCPACINST S3050.6 (S/NF), 9 Aug 89, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy.

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