

## **Chapter 9**

### **The structure of non-military intelligence and security organizations**

In addition to the military intelligence and security agencies, there are a wide range of such agencies within the civilian sector of the Indonesian state, although the term "civilian" is used rather loosely. These agencies vary considerably in size, organizational mission, and political importance. The most important is the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin), the head of which reports directly to the President. Bakin has a comprehensive intelligence brief, and in the past was extremely active in direct political intervention, at home and abroad. While Opsus [Special Operations] no longer exists, this private intelligence empire under the control of Ali Moertopo was an important factor in Indonesian political life for more than a decade. Police intelligence is included in this chapter in the "civilian" category, even though the National Police are formally a part of the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Home Affairs' Directorate of Social and Political Affairs is a large and powerful organizations which is responsible for a number of intelligence and political management tasks deemed vital for the survival of the New Order - not least maintaining surveillance and controls over more than 1.7 million former political prisoners or former Communist Party members. Within the Attorney-Generals' Department, the Intelligence Affairs section is headed by a senior military intelligence officer. And, as in South Korea, this appears to reflect the need for a strong intelligence input if dissent is to be controlled at least in part through the legal system rather than by coercion alone. The last organization that is discussed is the State Cryptography Institute. These organizations should be regarded as only "nominally" civilian. Many are headed by military officers, and their upper reaches principally staffed by military personnel.

#### **BAKIN: the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency**

Bakin [Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara] is a nominally civilian intelligence organization which reports directly to the President. According to its long-serving (1974-1989) former head, Yoga Sugama, "Bakin is formally responsible for political intelligence outside the defense and security field".<sup>1</sup> Bakin is distinct from both Kopkamtib and the military more generally. It has its own communications network, outside both regular military and civilian systems.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Ulf Sundhussen, "The military: structure, procedures and effects on Indonesian society" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucien W. Pye (eds.) *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p.65, paraphrasing Yoga in *Sinar Harapan*, December 12, 1969.

2. Melinda Cooke, "National security", in Frederica M.Bunge (ed.), *Indonesia: A Country Study*, (Area Handbook for Indonesia, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-39, Washington: American University, 1983, p.263.

Prior to the establishment of Bais in 1983, Bakin was, in Cooke's words, "the principal national body responsible for centralizing and coordinating domestic and foreign intelligence gathered by such organizations as the army, the police and Kopkamtib".<sup>3</sup> Bakin in the late 1980s is no longer paramount in the intelligence structure, but remains important.

#### *Origins*<sup>4</sup>

Bakin's origins lie in the demise of a Guided Democracy period organization, the Central Intelligence Agency [Badan Pusat Intelijens - BPI]. The BPI was founded in 1959 by Soekarno with Djuanda as Prime Minister and Nasution as Minister of Defence, in response to an armed forces desire for an integrated intelligence service. In the face of inter-service rivalry, Foreign Minister Subandrio, at that time acceptable to the military, was appointed as its head.<sup>5</sup>

In the latter part of the Guided Democracy period the BPI became something of a personal political vehicle for Dr. Subandrio who had become First Minister after the death of Djuanda in 1963, and whose swing to the left was bitterly resented by the anti-communist mainstream Army leadership. By 1965, according to Nasution, "our [Army] intelligence was penetrated by the Communist Party [PKI] and the BPI was a tool of the PKI".<sup>6</sup> The size and budget of the Central Intelligence Board is not known. But like its New Order successor, the BPI obtained considerable extra-budgetary funds from Indonesian and foreign business sources.<sup>7</sup>

Nor is there a great deal of detailed evidence about the activities of the Central Intelligence Board. This was a period of intense manoeuvring and rivalry between the various intelligence organizations - the BPI, the PKI's Special Bureau, Army intelligence, and possibly others - each of which had, to a very considerable degree, inter-penetrated the others. The BPI was certainly involved in surveillance of those whom Subandrio considered his (and/or Sukarno's) political enemies.<sup>8</sup> It was also involved in surveillance of the Indonesian business and student community in Japan<sup>9</sup>. During the Malaysian

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3. Ibid., p.263. See also John M. MacDougall, "Patterns of military control in the Indonesian higher bureaucracy", *Indonesia*, 33 (1982), p.97. Cooke's work is the most comprehensive open study to date on the Indonesian intelligence and security agencies. It was written prior to Moerdani's assumption of command of the armed forces, and prior to the establishment of Bais.

4. See Appendix 3.

5. PS/13. Despite the wealth of information in the major studies of the Indonesian military by Crouch, Anderson and McVey, Sundhaussen, Jenkins and Utrecht, there is remarkably little discussion of the crucial role of the various intelligence agencies during the Guided Democracy and Early New Order period.

6. A.H. Nasution, *Menuhi Panggilan Tugas - Jilid 6: Masa Kebangkitan Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), p.195. Nasution also reports that the BPI was the conduit for the information passed to President Sukarno by the 30th September Movement/PKI about the Council of Generals [Dewan Jenderal]. Ibid., pp.197-200. See also Sundhaussen, op.cit. p.205, who stresses the overlap between the PKI and the BPI, and the involvement of the latter in the affair of the Gilchrist letter.

7. Nishihara discusses some Japanese sources of these funds, mentioning a BPI fund of \$250,000 that Subandrio had deposited with Daiwa Securities through a counselor in the strongly BPI-influenced Indonesian embassy in Tokyo. See Nishihara Masashi, *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo - Jakarta Relations, 1957-1966*, (Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and University of Hawaii, 1976), pp.154-7.

8. PS/13.

9. Nishihara, op.cit., pp.154-157.

campaign it conducted intelligence-gathering operations<sup>10</sup>, but also, in competition with Nasution's intelligence chief, maintained contacts with dissidents in Sarawak, and went on to train the Malaysian rebels of Chinese descent and "apparently organized raids into these territories which commenced in April 1963"<sup>11</sup>. There seems little doubt that Subandrio fought effectively to retain personal control of the organization, for example against Nasution in 1962.<sup>12</sup>

After Soekarno's hand-over of power to Suharto on 11 March 1966, the BPI building was occupied by Hankam intelligence units under Asintel Magenda, and the organization effectively disbanded after Subandrio's arrest a week later. The organization was not formally abolished for some time afterwards.<sup>13</sup>

However the army was concerned to secure the entire troubled intelligence apparatus through an integrated organization. A new, military body, the State Intelligence Command [Komando Intelijens Negara - KIN] was established to take over the functions, but not the personnel, of the BPI, most or all of whom were considered by the military leaders to be implicated in the 30th September Movement/Communist Party [G30S/PKI]. Suharto was its first head, and Yoga Sugama, as chief of Army intelligence, was Chief of Staff.<sup>14</sup>

However, the new organization was soon found wanting, apparently because it was military in conception, and possibly because of the haste with which New Order institutions were being constructed at the time. In 1967 KIN was reorganized into Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, with a broader brief to coordinate the workings of all intelligence organs, military and civilian, and to provide advice, in the first instance, directly to the President.<sup>15</sup> Its head was Suharto, with day-to-day control under the Deputy Head, Brigadier-General Sudirgo. (See Table 9.1.) Sudirgo was a Military Police Corps [CPM] officer with a long involvement in intelligence stretching back to Zulkifli Lubis's Group A within the Ministry of Defence Section V in Jogjakarta in 1947. After the murder of the head of Army intelligence, General Parman, by the 30th September Movement, Sudirgo replaced him as Asintel. In 1968 he was arrested for being allegedly involved with the 30th September Movement,

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10. Sundhaussen, op.cit., p.174.

11. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (revised edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.60.

12. Sundhaussen, op.cit., p.163.

13. A.H.Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas - Jilid 7: Masa Konsolidasi Order Baru*, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1988), p.18, and PS/13.

14. PS/40. Other names associated with KIN were Soegiarto (Soegiharto, later Jaksa Agung?), Sugeng Jarok, and R. Pirmgadie, a naval deputy. Sources differ on just how much Bakin took over from BPI in terms of personnel. One source [PS/13] maintains (as was widely claimed at the time) that Bakin took over many lower level BPI operatives. There is no doubt that Moertopo in Opsus had a remarkable capacity to recruit from amongst defeated adversaries - Darul Islam, PRRI/Permesta, the PKI [Ruth McVey interview, Melbourne, March 1988; PS/12]. Opsus overlapped with Bakin (with Moertopo as the key common element), operating both within it and beyond it, making it at times almost indistinguishable in its use of use of informers and agents from all over the society, although in other respects the organizations were very different.

15. PS/30. The actual dates when BPI was formally abolished, KIN established, and then replaced by Bakin, are not clear. Bakin was certainly operating by 1968, and may have been in existence a year earlier. KIN was established in either late-1966 or early 1967. This was a period of rapid change of personnel in intelligence, both as a result of purges and rapid elevation of those who were close to Suharto.

Table 9.1  
 Heads of Bakin  
 1967 - 1988

1. Major-General Suharto*	1967 - 1970 (c.36 months)
Deputy Head: 1. Brig.-Gen. Sudirgo 2. Maj.-Gen. Yoga Sugama	
2. Major-General Sutopo Juwono**	? .I.70 - 28.I.74 (48 months)
3. Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama	28.I.74 - (182 months)***
Deputy Head: 1. Lt.-Gen. Ali Moertopo 2. Lt.-Gen. Benny Moerdani 3. Maj.-Gen. Sudibyo	
4. Major-General Sudibyo	

Sources: "Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, various issues; Harsja W. Bachtiar, *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1988).

- \* Suharto was the first head of Bakin, with Sudirgo as Chief of Staff (sometimes described as Deputy). After Sudirgo's arrest in 1968 he was succeeded by Yoga.
- \*\* Yoga carried on as Chief of Staff of Bakin briefly under Sutopo until sent to the United Nations as Deputy Chief of Mission in 1971. Under Sutopo there were initially three deputies - Administrative Intelligence, Investigation/Intelligence, and Counter-Intelligence. In 1971, Intelligence was split into Domestic and Foreign, and a fifth deputy for Education/Training was added. Ali Moertopo was a special deputy for "Psywar plus" [Panggalangan] from 1971. It is not clear when he became Deputy Head of Bakin.
- \*\*\* To January 1989.

and replaced as Deputy Head of Bakin by Yoga Sugama.<sup>16</sup>

When Sutopo Yuwono took over as head of Bakin from Suharto in January 1970, Yoga returned to Hankam as Assistant for Intelligence and Head of Pusintelstrat, and a year later in what seemed a demotion, was removed to New York as Deputy Head of Mission at the UN. He returned as head of Bakin in 1974 after Sutopo's removal following the Malari Affair.

#### *Structure and Personnel*

Bakin today has a Head [Kepala - Ka Bakin], Deputy Head [Wakil Kepala] and four Deputies, each responsible for a directorate: Administration, Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, and Analysis/ Production. Beneath each of these there are a number of bureaus and semi-autonomous offices, such as the Coordinating Agency for Chinese Affairs.<sup>17</sup> (See Figure 9.1.)


The number and arrangement of the directorates and lower bodies has changed over the years. After Yoga's departure as Deputy Head in 1970, the new head, Sutopo Yuwono, left the position vacant. At the time, there were three main deputies - for Administration, Intelligence [Penyelidikan], and Counter-Intelligence [Pengamanan]. From 1971 on, Ali Moertopo, Personal Assistant for Intelligence to the President, became a Special Deputy for Covert Actions - Psychological Warfare [Panggalangan]. In 1971, the structure was altered, splitting Intelligence into two parts, Internal [Dalam Negeri] and External [Luar

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16. PS/40. The real reasons for Sudirgo's arrest had much more to do with intra-army faction fighting. The Military Police Corps [CPM/Pom] supplied a number of BPI and Bakin personnel, some quite senior, such as Sudirgo and Nichlany Sudardjo. In 1968-72 Sudirgo was Deputy Head of Military Police at the same time he was a Bakin Deputy (for Operations and for Internal Intelligence). Nichlany and Sudirgo were both part of the "A Group" around Zulkifli Lubis in the Kementerian Pertahanan Bagian V in 1947. Many of this group had received influential intelligence training by the Japanese (e.g. in the Special Forces [Yugekitai]). Soenarso, also came from this Yugekitai stream. Most of the group went into Army intelligence; a minority went into the CPM. [PS/40] See also Harsja W. Bachtar, *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1988), pp.316-7; *Apa dan Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1985-1986*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafitipers, 1986), pp.585-6. Ben Anderson maintains that the CPM was a descendant of the Kenpeitai, thus providing an important Japanese influence on what was to become Bakin. Another direct influence would be through Yoga Sugama himself, who trained at the Japanese Imperial Military Academy. However, little is really known about Yoga's preferred organizational style and its origins.

17. PS/40, PS/39. The Coordinating Agency for Chinese Affairs was until recently headed by Major-General (Ret.) Soenarso, a former military police intelligence officer. Other reported units are Psychological Warfare, Propaganda and Information under Deputy III, and the Social and Political Affairs Support Service [Dinas Panggalangan Sospol Bakin]. These positions, along with that of Personal Staffer to the Head of Bakin and Personal Secretary to Ali Moertopo as Minister of Information, were held by Drs. Soetjipto, who became Director-General for Public Information in 1987 after a civilian career with Army intelligence, Komando Intelijens Negara and Bakin. *Indonesia Reports*, 23 (October 1987), p.29. It is not clear whether this is the same Dr. Soetjipto who headed the Republic's first intelligence organization in 1945 - see Appendices 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 9.1  
Bakin  
Headquarters Organisation - 1988



Negeri], and adding a fifth main deputy for Education and Training [Pendidikan].<sup>18</sup>

Bakin has offices in the major provincial cities although little is known of Bakin's actual organization outside the capital beyond the fact that various people are identified anecdotally in provincial centres as "the local Bakin people". In July 1987 the newspaper *Kedaulatan Rakyat* provided a rare published reference to regional Bakin personnel when it reported the comments of a person identified as "the Boyolali Area Bakin man" speaking at a meeting to resolve a local conflict with the local government.<sup>19</sup>

Until his retirement in 1989 Yoga Soegama, the head of Bakin, had an unprecedented tenure in the position - fourteen years.<sup>20</sup> His close association with Suharto goes back at least to the mid-1950s when he was Assistant-I/Intelligence to Suharto in T&T/Diponegoro. His close personal relationship with Suharto is held to be one of the reasons for his long tenure. His successor is the former Deputy Head of the agency, Major-General Sudibyo.

The position of Deputy Head of Bakin (and that of the Deputies) is the choice of the President. In Yoga's long tenure as Head of Bakin, Suharto has given him at least four Deputy Heads - Ali Moertopo, Benny Moerdani, Rujito and finally Sudibyo.

In the case of Moertopo and Moerdani, Yoga had to deal with activist Deputy Heads of quite different temperaments from his own, with autonomous power bases in the intelligence and security apparatus, and, most importantly, with close personal access to the President rivalling his own. In his choice of Deputy Head of Bakin Suharto has pursued his general policy of balancing one power-base against another, both within organizations and between them.

Major-General Sudibyo, came to the job of Deputy Head in late 1987, after his predecessor, Major-General (Ret.) Rujito retired after a stroke, and after Moerdani's retirement. took over as Head. The contrast between the two men is sometimes seen as a turning point in Bakin itself. Rujito, Deputy Head after Moerdani, was one of the last of the 1945 Generation, trained by the Japanese in Peta, serving as a Chudancho. He spent most of his subsequent army career in intelligence, except for time out in the early 1970s as Deputy Commander of Seskoad, followed by a four-year spell as Consul-General and then Ambassador to the newly independent Papua-New Guinea. From there he returned to Bakin, Deputy/1. Rujito was deeply immersed in Javanese culture, in the mystical practices of *kebathinan*, and believed deeply in their superiority to other cultural forms.<sup>21</sup>

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18. PS/40.

19. PS/14 and *Indonesia Reports*, 24 (November 1987) p.5.

20. Yoga's long tenure is much discussed, and a number of explanations are commonly offered. Two are convincing. The first is that the holder of the most sensitive intelligence position in the entire system must be someone the President trusts completely, and with whom he can comfortably discuss his difficulties and anxieties ranging from broad matters of state policy or to the consequences of his family's avarice. The second is the Lyndon Johnson explanation of his retention of the unlovely and unloved J. Edgar Hoover as Director of the FBI well past normal retiring age. Given the untold political liabilities locked away in Hoover's filing cabinets, said Johnson, it was better to have the man on the inside of the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in. These are by no means mutually exclusive.

21. As Deputy Commandant of Seskoad, Rujito ruefully told Peter Britton in 1971 that he had tried to teach *kebathinan* as part of the Seskoad curriculum, but had had to discontinue the attempt. But, he maintained, the specifically *Javanese* background of Indonesian culture was a great national strength:

Of all the kinds of knowledge, it is only technology that is lacking. Once technology is added in, once technology is mastered, Indonesia will be great because there is in our culture already an understanding of the aims and goals of life.

Peter Britton, *Military Professionalism in Indonesia: Javanese and Western Military Traditions in Army Ideology to the 1970s*, unpublished MA thesis, Department of History, Monash University, February 1983.

Sudibyo came to the post as a much younger man, a protege of Moerdani. As Deputy Head of Bakin, Sudibyo simultaneously held the vital bureaucratic position of Director G (Intelligence Production) in Bais, where he was a Moerdani protege. His military biography is extremely sketchy, listing only his Seskoad class in 1972 (probably as a major or lieut.-colonel), and his appointment in 1984 as Asintel Hankam and then Asintel Kasum ABRI.<sup>22</sup> He is a model of the intelligence stream of the intelligence - special forces stream that came to dominate the Army under Moerdani. And coming out of Bais, he undoubtedly owes his rise to Moerdani. Yet, as more than one observer pointed out, once a senior officer comes to such a position, it is no longer possible to draw neat lines of continuing political allegiance corresponding to organizational genealogy.<sup>23</sup>

While Bakin is nominally a civilian organization, it has always been under military control and staffed at the senior level by serving or retired ABRI officers. The appointment of Sudibyo marks an even closer integration into the military bureaucracy - paralleling the appointment of other Moerdani-stream intelligence professionals into the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Attorney-General's Department. Civilians are employed in Bakin, up to the middle level, such as Soetjipto mentioned above.

The place where civilians may have predominated was at the lowest levels, especially in Moertopo's areas. Even before Moertopo's time in Bakin, the organization acquired a certain number of lower-level staff and agents from defunct earlier organizations, such as the BPI.<sup>24</sup> Moertopo used large numbers of part-time civilian operatives for the psychological warfare and covert action operations in which he specialized, and which were not limited to Opsus.

#### *Political role*

In the past, the name of Bakin was synonymous with the politicized military of Indonesia, with an aggressive intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert action posture, and, in Ali Moertopo's time, with a combination of deviousness in plotting and often brutal and malicious political intervention. Bakin had authority, de facto or otherwise, to mount active intelligence operations at home and abroad. Moreover Bakin sat between two powerful, although quite differently structured, executive bodies - Ali Moertopo's Opsus, and the Kopkamtib structure. Writing in the late 1970s, Sundhaussen suggested that Bakin's "activities hardly include the mounting of operations: it is usually confined to research and analysis only".<sup>25</sup> This is contradicted by a number of informants, including those involved in the three organizations at that period. As one put it, Bakin "under Ali" [i.e. when he was Deputy Head] was

"activist - always making things happen. It wasn't just Ali himself, or his power, but

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22. See Appendix 1 and Bachtiar, op.cit., p.324. Two far from objective remarks about Sudibyo made by people in very different positions are interesting for the future of Bakin. One victim of the intelligence system remarked that for all his dislike of what Sudibyo stood for, "he is not as fascist in his thinking as Yoga" [PS/9]. Another Indonesian intelligence professional who had disparaged the post-Ali Bakin under Yoga, saying "Now, Bakin is nothing", spoke approvingly of Sudibyo's appointment. "He's very proper", rather legalistic, a military professionalizer, unlike Rujito who, like many of his generation, "was all over the place". [PS/37]

23. One observer pointed to the way that Moerdani and his mentor Moertopo were originally "at one", but in the process of distinguishing himself, Moerdani went on to eclipse the older man. [PS/40]

24. PS/13.

25. Sundhaussen, op.cit., p.65.

Ali's capacity to act as a channel for other forces".<sup>26</sup>

Ali's early Bakin position of Special Deputy for Covert Action - Psychological Warfare [Penggulangan] was more than the name suggested: "Psywar Plus. Psywar is a bit limited. Plus was to create special conditions."<sup>27</sup>

But there was a deep division in the intelligence field in the late 60s and 70s between what Jenkins labels the "pragmatic" vs. the "principled" streams, typified by Ali Moertopo and Sutopo Yuwono, the Head of Bakin from 1970 - 1974.<sup>28</sup> Both groups were highly oriented to political intervention, but differed in organizational style, willingness to use "non-military" resources and tools (the Opsus "zoo" Moertopo maintained), and the extent to which these resources were used to play politics for personal and factional, as opposed to regime, ends.<sup>29</sup>

Moertopo's antagonists within the intelligence and security apparatus saw things differently.

"The free-wheelers didn't have to exercise responsibility. They just played dirty [main kayu]...They misused our people down below. [And] this led to a position of confusion in the institution."<sup>30</sup>

But with Kopkamtib, such personality clashes were less important. In the first decade of Bakin, its heads and senior officers were also the intelligence executives of ABRI headquarters, and therefore, of Kopkamtib - Sudirgo, Sutopo Yuwono, Yoga Soegama, Kharis Suhud. After Malari, the dismissal of Sumitro as Kopkamtib commander and Sutopo as Bakin head was followed by a still closer integration of Bakin to Kopkamtib under Suharto and Sudomo.

In the late 1980s Bakin is undergoing a period of transition born of the aging of its leadership, the pressure of professionalization and centralization of military intelligence under Moerdani, and the loss of an executive capacity. The separation of Bakin from an executive role has been quite marked. Opsus no longer exists, and Bais, in its relationship to Kopkamtib, and to the Army Asintel structure down the line, is effectively an executive body.<sup>31</sup>

Bakin's official function has changed. While it still conducts active or offensive intelligence operations abroad, it is now "prohibited to make operations inside".<sup>32</sup> Whereas in the past, Bakin was "koordinasi plus", now its role is restricted to intelligence-gathering and coordination.<sup>33</sup> The actual nature of the coordination is not

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26. PS/37.

27. PS/40.

28. David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p.30.

29. See Indro Tjahjono's trial statement in section 3 below for examples of the zoo and its methods .

30. PS/40.

31. Cooke, op.cit., p.263 maintains that Bakin previously relied on the Kopkamtib Laksusda to implement its commands locally.

32. PS/40.

33. This coordination role includes an external liaison element, although this is shared with Bais. The Australian Secret Intelligence

clear. There is a weekly meeting chaired by Bakin of representatives of all the significant intelligence organizations - Bais, Intelpampol, Home Affairs, Attorney-General (Intelligence) and Foreign Affairs.<sup>34</sup>

A number of observers noted Bakin's disproportionate involvement in Chinese affairs, both domestic and international. The Coordinating Body for Chinese Issues has already been mentioned. Bakin has an interest in a Chinese-language daily paper, *Harian Indonesia*, from which it also derives some extra-budgetary revenue.<sup>35</sup> The organization appears to have a special interest in the Indonesian embassies in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and Yoga's (and the organization's?) alleged financial connections with Taiwan.<sup>36</sup> These financial connections apart, the origins of this concentration seem to be two-fold - the perceived People's Republic of China involvement in G30S/PKI at the time of Bakin's formation, and Taiwan's "experience" in anti-communist activities, and their "more open" attitude to sharing these skills.<sup>37</sup>

Bakin's traditional structure of informers and agents still seems to be in place, and its decline in power is still a relative affair. Its bureaucratic and surveillance resources remain substantial. Security clearances for appointments to politically sensitive academic jobs (as well as foreign academics' and researchers' visas) are still the province of Bakin. Within the major ministries and departments, it is claimed that there are Bakin "advisors".<sup>38</sup>

Not surprisingly, most people who are targets of these activities are unable definitely to attribute their plain-clothes surveillance or political difficulties to one agency or another - from below, everything looks like "intel". Moreover, the changes in recent years involving Bais are not widely known.

A great deal of these agencies' work is achieved by their reputation - the fear of being watched by unknown means is almost as powerful as active terror. As in almost every other security state, a feeling of isolation and a decline in social solidarity is one of the most potent tools of dictatorship.

However, it is important to remember that there is, at least at a formal level, a system of parliamentary oversight of Bakin. The People's Representative Body [DPR] has a

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Service [ASIS], to name but one, first appointed a liaison officer with Bakin in 1977. See Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*. (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p.172. There seems to be a division of labour whereby Bakin liaises with embassy political staff (Foreign Ministry/State Department staff) and Bais with embassy military and other service attaches.

34. PS/37.

35. PS/37. Bakin's sources of revenue are both budgetary and extra-budgetary, although little is known about the particular companies involved. It would be important to know the fate of these extra-budgetary sources in recent years, when military companies generally have been both less successful financially and (partly as a result) more subject to attempts by military authorities to bring them back under full military control and make management responsible and responsive to the companies' "owners".

36. The Bakin Deputy for Intelligence in 1988, Brigadier-General (Ret.) Irawan Keceng Soekarno, is a former head of the Indonesian Government Trading Office [Kamar Dagang R.I.] in Taiwan. See Bachtiar, *op.cit.* p.353. Yoga's only published work of which I am aware is a speech given when a Taiwanese university awarded him an honorary doctorate. The reported head of the Coordinating Body for Chinese Affairs, Major-General (Ret.) Soenarso has a long-standing involvement in Chinese Affairs. One of his colleagues in that agency, Brigadier-General (Ret.) Sukisman specialized in Chinese Studies at the University of Indonesia. See Charles Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983).

37. PS/37.

38. PS/19.

number of commissions. The responsibility for oversight of Bakin lies with Commission I. The Head of Bakin makes periodic appearances before the Commission, offering prepared statements and answering questions of commission members. To date, this has been a largely token affair, in part due to restrictions on what is to be publically discussed, but rather more from the self-censorship of politicians who are not prepared, at least for the present, to antagonize the regime in general or the intelligence services in particular. However, the basis for a public platform of legitimate scrutiny is in place.<sup>39</sup>

### **OPSUS: Special Operations**

Opsus [Operasi Khusus - Special Operations] existed, in one form or another, from the early 1960s to the early 1980s. It was established by Ali Moertopo, then Assistant-1 (Intelligence) within Kostrad, as an "activist military unit" in 1963-1964. It was used by Suharto and Moertopo to establish independent covert Kostrad contacts with the Malaysian government in 1964 and 1965.<sup>40</sup> As Cooke put the matter delicately,

The legal status of Opsus in 1982 was obscure, but a network of its operatives continued to gather domestic political intelligence and to conduct political liaison in service of the president.<sup>41</sup>

In fact, by the time of Ali Moertopo's death in 1984, Opsus had outlived its era, although it still existed. In 1982 the editors of *Indonesia* still referred to "the enormous 'private' intelligence empire run by General Ali Moertopo"<sup>42</sup>, but Moertopo's position with Suharto was no longer certain. He was dismissed as Minister for Information in 1983. The former protege, Moerdani, was re-organizing the bureaucratic intelligence and security apparatus to produce a quite different set of organizations from the personalized and "private" Opsus. When Ali died, it appears that Opsus, as an organization, dissolved. What happened to its intelligence and financial assets, however, may be another matter.

#### *A private intelligence empire*

Opsus emerged gradually out of the operations of Moertopo within the West Irian campaign, in which he worked in an intelligence unit based, at least for part of its existence, in Sulawesi.<sup>43</sup> It seems to have become a recognized grouping by late 1964 when Soeharto was using Moertopo to make secret contacts with the British and Malaysian governments, in part through Captain Moerdani operating through a front office in Bangkok.<sup>44</sup> It was at this point that Ali established effective contacts with former PRRI [the CIA-backed Indonesian Revolutionary Government] rebels living in Malaysia and elsewhere, such as Des Alwi.<sup>45</sup>

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39. PS/42.

40. Jenkins, op.cit., p.12. Peter Polomka, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, (Ringwood: Penguin, 1971), p.133, places the beginning of Opsus in 1963 when Suharto became commander of Kostrad. Bouchier nicely describes Opsus (possibly citing someone else) as "a 'positive clandestine intelligence' body". See David Bouchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup*, (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984), p.125. Moerdani was a key protege of Moertopo's, and one of the commanders of the two paratroop battalions so disastrously dropped into West Irian in 1962 (the other commander was Untung). He was also one of the key Malaysian contacts.

41. Cooke, op.cit., p.263.

42. "Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 33 (1982), p.131.

43. See Appendix 3. Bachtiar, op.cit., p.210 uses the phrase "Leader, Special Operations Command (Opsus), Irian Barat" to describe

A few years later Polomka described Moertopo as "the Man from Raden Saleh street", where his office was located, convenient both for its proximity to Suharto's home and its relatively inconspicuous ease of entry for Ali's many full- and part-time operatives and informers. In Polomka's words:

In the post-coup period, Ali Moertopo emerges as one of the military's liveliest intellects and a leading "trouble shooter" for the President. In the wide range of difficult assignments he has handled, he has frequently shown an ability to break through "bottlenecks" and get results where others have failed.

Amongst many such assignments, Polomka cited Moertopo and Opsus' role in the 1969 "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian:

Shop shelves, long since bare of all but a few unsaleable items, were suddenly crammed with tinned foodstuffs, toilet articles, household goods, and, especially, the Irianese people's favourite brand of Dutch beer...Opsus had every available plane on charter, some of which were flying gifts, including pigs, for influential tribal chiefs in the remote highland regions.<sup>46</sup>

Another report, from an OPM source, tells of Moertopo addressing the 1,024 members of a specially appointed referendum council who gathered at some point before the Act of Free Choice itself:

If you want independence you had better ask God if he would be kind enough to raise an island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean so you can migrate there. You can also write to the Americans. They have set foot on the Moon, perhaps they will be willing to fix up a place for you there. Those of you who think about voting against Indonesia must think again, for if you do, the wrath of the Indonesian people will be on you. Your accursed tongues will be cut out and your evil mouths ripped open. Then I, General Ali Moertopo, will step in and shoot you on the spot.<sup>47</sup>

Unfortunately we know little more than that, except for a hint of "dirty tricks" activities during the vote itself<sup>48</sup>.

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Moertopo's position in 1961. This period is very unclear.

44. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, (Melbourne: Fontana/Collins, 1980), p.38. McDonald describes Opsus at this point as "Kostrad's Special Operations Group". Just where Opsus fitted in organizationally at the different points of its existence is not clear. The one loose and changing organization seems to have operated under Soeharto's auspices, but in different army units. Perhaps by the end, there was no auspicing unit, even as cover.

45. Jenkins, *op.cit.*, p.58.

46. Polomka, *op.cit.*, p.133. Polomka, after reporting this Soviet-type manipulation, shows an entirely appropriate understanding of the difficulties of totalitarian politics:

To do this, while lacking effective institutions of government, he [Moertopo] is forced to devise and exploit novel and irregular ways of securing and maintaining effective power, of formulating national policies, and of convincing a sufficient majority of people of the appropriateness of those policies and of the government's ability to carry them out...Indeed, Indonesian politics is generally such a political jungle that it is hard to see how Suharto could survive without assigning important roles to bodies like Bakin, Opsus and Aspri. *Ibid.*, pp.133,139.

47. The statement was reported to OPM's Henk Joku by Rev. Origines Hokojo. Cited in Malcolm Gault-Williams, "Organisasi Papua Merdeka: the Free Papua Movement lives", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 19,4 (1987), p.34. There is no confirmation that Moertopo actually said these things. But then, the metaphors of the reported speech are reasonable descriptions of much of what followed in the years to come.

48. There is a need for a more careful account of the annexation of Irian Barat. Unfortunately, the only substantial account of the Act

Moertopo and Opsus played an important but obscure role in 1966-67 orchestrating support for Soeharto's position within the Interim People's Consultative Assembly [MPRS].<sup>49</sup> Moertopo here seems to have played the role of political fixer for his master inside the parliament when it was too slow in turning on Soekarno, showing the talents and resources Moertopo later displayed on a larger scale. By this time Ali had made connections with the Chinese Catholic activists who were to become his "political technocrats" in due course, and was expanding the size of the "zoo".

From this point on it is difficult to distinguish between the work of Opsus and the work of Moertopo's Psychological Operations section of Bakin.<sup>50</sup> The operation most closely associated with Opsus was the preparation for the 1971 election, including the transformation of Golkar into a political party and the forcible re-construction of the leadership of the Indonesian Nationalist Party [PNI] and the Moslem parties, where the organization appears to have been quite open - possibly before the opprobrium it subsequently acquired had built up.<sup>51</sup>

Apart from involvement in later elections, Moertopo's most important operations were directed against Islamic groups and the first stages of the East Timor war. By the mid-1970s, Islamic groups and political parties (even after Moertopo's "reconstruction") were alarming the government with their independence from control. All other social groups had been effectively incorporated or liquidated in the first decade of the New Order. But devout Islam, the "outsider" stream of Java's culture, and the mainstream in the less populous parts of the country outside Java, held a community social and cultural structure which retained, as it still does, sufficient resources to constitute an alternative to the Pancasila state. The (Islamic) Unity Development Party [PPP] was standing up to government pressure to abandon its use of the Ka'abah (the shrine at Mecca) as its campaign symbol.

Just weeks before the 1977 election, the then Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, announced details of the arrests of members of an Islamic group, Komando Jihad [Holy War Command], holding them responsible for a series of recent bombings. The arrested leaders of the group were all formerly prominent leaders of the Darul Islam, the West Java-based movement for an Islamic state in Indonesia, which had held off government forces from 1950 until the early 1960s.

There was no doubt that these men were involved with Ali Moertopo and Opsus. The only question to be answered was who was using whom? The Komando Jihad group existed in some form, but Islamic leaders, such as former Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir, claimed that Moertopo's agent provocateur's had infiltrated the group, and incited them to acts of violence. In particular, Pitut Suharto was named as an Opsus member in

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of Free Choice, by May, does not provide much information on Moertopo's role, although there is interesting material on the overall Indonesian operation, and the activities of Sarwo Edhie and Sudjowo Tjondronegoro. See Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985) has more material on the OPM and on the diplomatic aspects of the affair, but very little on the Indonesian side of things.

49. Ken Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study*, (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974), p.9; May, op.cit., p.145ff.

50. Moerdani was Deputy Head of Bakin until 1978, and Deputy for Psychological Operations/Covert Action from 1971.

51. See Ward, op.cit. for a detailed account of the process of electoral manipulation in East Java, and May, op.cit. more generally.

this role. Opsus itself, through Jusuf Wanandi and Harry Tjan, maintained that indeed Suharto did have contacts with the former Darul Islam leaders on behalf of Moertopo, but that Moertopo's good intentions were misused by the militant Moslems.

It is clear that senior military officers considered it probable that the whole affair was a typical Moertopo special operation. As Moertopo's former Bakin Head, Sutopo Yuwono put it:

I don't know if the government was behind the Komando Jihad. I wasn't there. But if you talk about the possibility, thinking like that, it is possible. So create a problem, a special issue, something like that...Somebody is always thinking about such things like that.<sup>52</sup>

The whole affair deserves closer study, because it was the first of a series of such affairs involving Islamic groups over the next decade. In each case, allegedly militant Islamic groups bent on political change by violence were uncovered by the security agencies. Time and again, the charge of provocation was brought up in circumstances where the key people were either killed by the security forces before they could be brought to court, or the legal procedures in the courts were so structured as make it impossible to properly assess the truth of the matter.

In the years after the Komando Jihad, Moertopo's influence waned, and that of his one-time protegee, Moerdani rose. And at the same time, the place of Opsus cowboy-style operations was displaced by equally ruthless but more bureaucratically organized Bais-type operations.<sup>53</sup> (See Chapter Eleven.) Up until the time of Moertopo's death in 1984 and the subsequent dissolution of Opsus, there may well have been more than one set of intelligence initiators of such provocations working, in addition to Opsus, through Kopkamtib, Bakin and Pusintelstrat. In any case, as the wave of Muslim trials through the 1980s after Ali's death showed, plausible suggestions of the planting of agent provocateur's did not diminish with Ali's death: on the contrary.<sup>54</sup>

Moertopo's and Opsus' involvement with East Timor between 1974 and December 1975 has been well told by Hamish McDonald, and will not be repeated here in detail.<sup>55</sup> Suffice to say that as East Timorese voices for independence began to be heard after the Portuguese army revolution in 1974, the question of East Timor began to be seriously considered in Jakarta. In the face of equivocation from Soeharto about a military solution, Moertopo attempted to ensure a victory for pro-Indonesian forces in East Timor by his

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52. Jenkins, op.cit., p.56.

53. Bais was established in 1983. However Moerdani was a key figure in all arenas of Indonesian intelligence (Armed Forces headquarters, Strategic Intelligence Centre, and Bakin) from at least 1977 onwards.

54. See *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial*, (London: Tapol, 1987); Amnesty International, *Indonesia: Muslim Prisoners of Conscience*, (London: Amnesty International, 1986).

55. McDonald, op.cit., pp.189-215. On the East Timor invasion more generally see Jill Jolliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, (Brisbane: University Of Queensland Press, 1978); James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed* (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1983); Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, (London: Zed Press, 1984); and Amnesty International, *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights - Extrajudicial Executions, 'Disappearances', and Political Imprisonment*, (London: Amnesty International, 1985); "'Disappearances' in East Timor since August 1983: An Update", (London: Amnesty International, ASA 21/13/87, March, 1987), and "Statement on East Timor by Amnesty International to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization", August 12 1988.

well-trying methods of manipulation, bribery and where necessary violence.<sup>56</sup> After the failure of the Opsus-inspired UDT coup in August 1975 it was becoming clear that Moertopo's approach was in trouble. In September, Opsus "Chief of Staff" Colonel Aloysius Sugianto cajoled the defeated UDT [Timorese Democratic Union] and Apodeti forces on the Indonesian side of the border to request Indonesian assistance to achieve integration, and stepped up the border war with Paratroop Regiment [RPKAD] troops. Two months later, Indonesian troops invaded East Timor in force in Operation Seroja (Lotus). The political operation that began with Ali Moertopo's manipulation approach then turned into a full-scale counter-insurgency war that is without end fifteen years later.<sup>57</sup>

*Opsus personnel: thugs, spooks and political technocrats*<sup>58</sup>

While it is clear that Opsus for over a decade was a substantial (if not large) organization, both in terms of personnel and influence, the make-up of the organization is unclear. What sorts of people worked for Opsus? How were they organized? How defined was Opsus as an organization - or was it, as Ruth McVey said of the sometime Trotskyist political party *Murba* in its last years, as much a mood as an organization? Was it in fact a collection of people working for and through other organizations, such as Bakin, Golkar etc., as much as *in* Opsus?

From what has been written so far, the people who worked for and with Opsus divide into two not very distinct groups - the intellectuals and political activists (or as Moertopo called them at one point, his "political technocrats"<sup>59</sup>), and the spooks and goons - including amongst the latter numerous informers, strongarm men, underworld figures, surveillance people and manipulators. Together they made up what was referred to as Moertopo's zoo.

The intellectuals were mainly associated with the Catholic and the Chinese communities, and many of them became involved in the work of Centre for Strategic

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56. In the *London Times* (2 September 1975), the experienced journalist Gerald Stone reported his experience with the results of Opsus' typical style of operations in the politically critical weeks in East Timor after the UDT coup in August 1975:

Time after time, when I tried to trace a story to its source, I found only someone who heard it from someone else. Strangely, it is in the interests of all three governments - Portuguese, Indonesian and Australian - to make the situation appear as chaotic and hopeless as possible. In that light I am convinced that many of the stories fed to the public in the last two weeks were not simply exaggerations; they were the product of a purposeful campaign to plant lies.

Cited in Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume I: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p.136.

57. McDonald's account provides an important basis for understanding why the war in East Timor is so often regarded as "an intelligence war" in Indonesian military circles. It is not, however, completely clear. At some point Moertopo's role diminished and that of Moerdani became much more important. Even so, Timor is still regarded as "an intelligence war" by some Indonesian military figures, despite the fact that under Armed Forces Commander Muhammed Jusuf between 1979 and 1983 the mainstream army came to have a greater role [PS/13]. Just what Moertopo's role was after December 1975 is unknown. While Moertopo remained at Bakin there was much Bakin activity overseas, including at the United Nations where Fretilin diplomatic representatives were highly successful. In the early 1980s Jenkins, as already mentioned, reported the complaints of senior non-intelligence generals of being excluded from planning. By the late 1980s similar complaints could be heard in Jakarta, labelling East Timor as "Benny's war" and "intel-controlled". Yet over time this charge became less clear. What seems more correct is to point to the fusion that occurred under Moerdani between two streams of intelligence - Army intelligence proper and Opsus-type activities - with an upgraded special forces role - Kopassus and Kostrad. Together, senior officers from both streams came to dominate the Armed Forces leadership and East Timor commands. See Appendix 3. Little is known about just how these changes occurred.

58. See Appendices 1, 2, and 3.

59. Ward, *op.cit.*, p.47.

Studies (CSIS) in the 1970s.<sup>60</sup>

The Catholics, including Liem Bian Kie [Jusuf Wanandi], Liem Bian Koen [Sofjan Wanandi], Harry Tjan and Moerdopo, have enjoyed the closest relationship with Moertopo, Liem Bian Kie having been his assistant since 1967. They have been primarily aroused since Gestapu by the fear of triumphant Islam, by anxiety lest the release of Muslim energies and the rehabilitation of Muslim organizations overthrow the balance between the secular forces and the Muslims...Ali's bent for temporizing with political parties so that they might be steered and manipulated in the name of Pantja Sila democracy struck a responsive chord with the Catholics, for they were determined to secure the perpetuity of Pantja Sila before making any radical changes in the political structure.<sup>61</sup>

Tjan and the Liem brothers had been strongly influenced by a Dutch-Indonesian Jesuit, Father J. Beek in the stream of Catholic Action.

Before the coup Beek had been urging Catholics to prepare for the eventuality of a communist takeover by developing a standby underground movement. This led to the institution after the coup of 'One Month Caderization' courses for young Catholics at Asrama Realino, a student residence on the outskirts of Jogjakarta. The cadres received intensive training in leadership skills such as public speaking, writing and 'group dynamics'.

Roman Catholic youths in Central Java played some part in the massacre of PKI suspects in 1965-6. But another target of Beek was Islam. While other Catholics argued that the church should build contacts with the Muslims, Beek took a militant antagonistic approach. For him the church had a stark choice: embrace the new regime, or go under to the Muslims.

With the need to secure a pro-Indonesian vote in the West Irian 'Act of Free Choice' of 1969, and because Christianity was the prevalent religion in that territory, Beek became even more useful to Ali. Beek's cadres were sent to work to help win over the Irianese. However valuable for Ali Murtopo, the connection (which Beek has denied) aroused misgivings in both the army and the church. It came under strong attack at an Indonesian bishops' conference in 1971. "In theory Beek's ideas are fine", one of his colleagues comments, "but in practice they are dirty".<sup>62</sup>

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60. See "Father J.van Beek" in Appendix 1. Beek was a mentor for the Liem brothers, Harry Tjan and others. The presence of numbers of Catholics in intelligence work today may reflect his influence.

61. Ward, op.cit., pp.35-36. Ward also notes the baroque and obscure 60s American social science jargon that was used by these people during the 1971 election campaign as they laboured to make Golkar the vehicle of "akselerasi modernisasi":

'Political technocrats' of Bapilu stressed that 're-education' of the people was necessary so that they could be trained in 'non-ideological' and 'pragmatic thought processes', so that they could give effective 'social participation' and, if necessary, supply 'social control', as long as it was of a 'programme-oriented' nature. Golkar victory, furthermore, would give a 'multiplier effect' on the development of 'rational thinking'. Ibid., p.47.

62. McDonald, op.cit., pp.101-2. Beek's hostility to Islam led him to suggest that Moslems were using communist-type strategies to bring about an Islamic state. See May, op.cit., p.238. Australian readers will recognize the parallel with B.A.Santamaria. Beek and Santamaria's National Civic Council were in contact, and, according to McDonald, the NCC may have provided financial support.

While other groupings of politically-oriented intellectuals were important in Ali's entourage, these Chinese and Catholic intellectuals were the long-haul centre of Opsus thinking. Just who made up the other group, and what sorts of tasks they actually performed, is not at all clear. Opsus picked up many of the intelligence people involved with the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and the Japanese-trained intelligence boss (and former Deputy Army Chief of Staff) Zulkifli Lubis.<sup>63</sup> Opsus seems also to have picked up a number of operatives and informers from the world of student activism in the 1960s and 1970s.

#### *Opsus' financial base*

Like other military units in Indonesia, Opsus required considerable extra-budgetary funds for its workings. Yet, by its nature, it required more funds than most, and funds that were largely unaccountable. It needed funds for its own network of informers and operatives, but also to buy off the recalcitrant and the willing-to-be-bought -- a vital ingredient in election campaigns (a task it undoubtedly shared with other government agencies, especially the Department of Home Affairs). It also needed money to support "other organizations under its patronage such as KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia - the National Committee of Indonesian Youth) and for the publication of its newspapers (*Suara Karya* and *Berita Buana*)".<sup>64</sup> If the organization was to be under Ali's control, he had to have his own sources of finance, separate from those of the military, separate from those of rival agencies, and certainly unaccountable.

In his 1977 dissertation, Robison outlined Opsus financial involvements in some detail, as a backdrop to his accounts of the economic nationalist policy position pushed by CSIS/Opsus-related forces against the World Bank/IMF free trade line from the National Development Planning Agency [Bappenas]. Since the material on Opsus's financial activities was omitted from his 1986 book, Robison's material is quoted here in some detail.

The earliest ventures of Opsus into economic activities were typical of the informal activities engaged in by most military units in the period before the joint venture institutionalized their operations. During the period of confrontation Opsus made money out of rubber smuggling and in 1969 was able to collect 'commissions' for granting import monopolies for the Irian trade to five companies, the largest of which was C.V.Berkat, operated by the Chinese businessman Yap Swie Kie. Opsus was also involved in the de-blocking of funds frozen by the Malaysian government through the person of Bambang Trisulo, a lawyer who had been given charge of the de-blocking and who is now a prominent figure in both the Opsus and Hasan business groups. The manner in which the process of deblocking was controlled and operated led to allegations that only a proportion of funds were actually transferred back into consolidated revenue and that the bulk was used to finance Opsus

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63. Ruth McVey, interview, Melbourne, March 1988. Another informant recalls meeting Lubis in the early 1970s in an Opsus-connected office in Kebayoran Baru, ostensibly devoted to an import-export business. (Confidential interview, Melbourne, March 1988)

64. Richard Robison, *Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia: 1965-1975*, (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Department of Government, University of Sydney, 1977), p.277. See also James Schiller's account of the election process in Jepara: *State Formation in New Order Indonesia: The Powerhouse State in Jepara* (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Politics Department, Monash University, 1986).

activities.

Only a small section of the total Opsus business interests are identifiable through direct shareholding. This section includes the Pan group of companies, and the PT Anem Kosong Anem group, the major shareholders of which are Bambang Trisulo and General Hamonganan Pasaribu, a military associate of General Moertopo. Companies in these groups are small apart from the two latest ventures in poultry and assembly of electronic equipment, both of which are minority shareholdings in joint ventures.

The Opsus group has not established private ownership of large business groups as other centres of power have done. Instead, it has assumed a less institutionalized role: that of protector to Chinese business groups.

For the greater part, Opsus plays the role of 'protector' to four major Chinese business groups, those of Panglaykim and Mochtar Riady, Yap Swie Kie (Soetopo Jananto), Liem Bien Hwa (Budianto Halim), and those of Liem Bian Khoen (Sofjan Wanandi) and Liem Bien Kie (Jusuf Wanandi). Unlike the majority of military or Palace business groups, the companies owned by these Chinese businessmen are not formally linked to Opsus because neither Ali Moertopo nor Soejono Humardani occupy official positions as directors or shareholders.<sup>65</sup>

It is not clear how these companies have fared in recent years, but at least one source maintains that they are no longer yielding incomes at the same levels - for CSIS at least.<sup>66</sup>

### **National Police Intelligence**

Police intelligence in Indonesia has always been politically-oriented from the time of the Dutch Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst [PID] and the Japanese Kotto Keisatsu (Special Police) and Kenpeitai (Military Police). The first police intelligence organization of the independent state was the Pengawasan Aliran Masyarakat [PAM], formed in 1945. It was succeeded by three organizations: the Dinas Pengawasan Keamanan Negara [DPKN], the Pengawasan Keamanan Masyarakat [PKN], and finally in 1972, Intelpampol.<sup>67</sup> (See Table 9.2.) It appears that there was little difference in function between these Indonesian police intelligence organizations, at least until the middle of the 1970s.

The degree of carry-over to the Republican police from the Dutch and Japanese organizations is unclear. Certainly there were substantial numbers of nationalist former Dutch police, jaksas and pamong praja involved in the revolutionary intelligence organizations, including some ex-PID.<sup>68</sup> One graduate of the Dutch and Japanese civil

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65. Robison, op.cit. p.281. Details of companies linked to Opsus are set out in his Appendix B, pp.xvi-xvii.

66. PS/37.

67. PS/36.

68. PS/40.

police training in Indonesia maintained that the Japanese curriculum largely took over the Dutch one, with the exception of training in Himitsu Sen [Secret War] - espionage, double agents, etc.<sup>69</sup>

Since 1961, the National Police have been integrated into the armed forces, with the Chief of the National Police [Kapolri] having formal

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69. PS/36.

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Table 9.2  
Police intelligence organisations  
Dutch colonial, Japanese occupation, and Indonesian

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Late Dutch colonial period

Political Intelligence Service  
*Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst*  
[PID]

Japanese occupation period

Special Higher Police  
*[Tokubetsu Kôtô Keisatsu]*  
and  
Military Police  
*[Kenpeitai]*

Indonesian Republican period (successive)

Community Supervision  
*Pengawasan Aliran Masyarakat*  
[PAM]

State Security Service  
*Dinas Pengawasan Keamanan Negara*  
[DPKN]

Community Security Supervision  
*Pengawasan Keamanan Masyarakat*  
[PKM]

Police Security Intelligence  
*Intelijen Pengamanan Polisi*  
[Intelpampol]

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standing comparable to the other heads of services.<sup>70</sup> Together with the ABRI Chief of Staff's Assistant for Security and Social Order [Askamtibmas] (always a police 2-star general), he coordinates a force of more than 150,000 personnel, with plans announced for substantial expansion.<sup>71</sup> Under the Kapolri, in addition to staff and related bodies, and the seventeen Police Area Commands, there are Deputies for Administration [Demin Kapolri] and for Operations [Deops Kapolri]. (See Figure 9.2.)

The Directorate of Intelligence and Security Affairs [Dit Intelpam Pol]<sup>72</sup>, an organization which has existed under a number of names since the earliest days of the revolution, is placed under the Deputy for Operations. Intelpampol's duties cover, inter alia,

"Early Detecting" and "Early Warning" in the context of Police Operations and activities, and Public Order and Security [Kamtibmas] Operations. The techniques of carrying out Intelpampol's functions cover all efforts, activities and work, including Investigation, Counter-Intelligence and Support/Covert Operations in the context of carrying out preventive and repressive Police operational duties including Defence and Security operational duties allocated to the Police.<sup>73</sup>

While some maintain that Intelpampol is only concerned with criminal activities, the definition of that term is in the hands of the military authorities. In fact, police intelligence officers, presumably from Intelpampol, have been involved in highly political cases.<sup>74</sup>

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70. The actual process of integration took some time, but formally began in June 1961 with Law No.13/1961. The process, along with a great deal of other interesting historical material on the police, is sketched in *Almanak Kepolisian Republik Indonesia 1982-1983*, (Jakarta: Kadispem Polri No. Pol.:SPEN/35/V/82/PEN, 1982).


71. In the then Police Chief's report to the 1982 annual meeting of senior police officials, details are given of both expansion and internal re-organization. See *Almanak Kepolisian 1982-1983*, op.cit., pp.39-47. Testifying before Commission III of the DPR (Parliament) in early October 1984, National Police Chief Anton Sudjarwo said that the size of the police (150,000 men) would be increased to 180,000 by 1989, and that a high school diploma, rather than merely an elementary school certificate, would henceforth be required for candidacy for a police officer. See "Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 40 (1985), p.136. After Sudjarwo's sudden death in 1987 he was succeeded as Kapolri by General (Pol.) Drs. Moch. Sanoesi.

72. The Director of Police Intelligence and Security Affairs [Dir Intelpam Pol] in 1988 was Colonel (Pol.) Drs. Soetjipto Broto. See *Kompas*, 10 June 1988.

73. *Indonesia, Kepolisian Republik Indonesia: sekilas lintas*, (Jakarta, 1976), p.72.

74. For an example see the account by A.M.Fatwa, Secretary of the Petition of 50 Group, of his arrest, interrogation and detention for almost a year before trial: *Dakwaan Subversi - Dulu Untuk Darurat Revolusi, Kini Untuk Darurat Pembangunan - Eksepsi Drs. H.A.M.Fatwa*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, 1985), and *Beberapa Pandangan dan Sikap Politik*, (disampaikan sebagai Lampiran Eksepsi atas Dakwaan Pidana Subversi, pada Pengadilan Negeri, Jakarta Pusat, LP Cipinang-Jakarta Timur, 21 August 1985). This episode is discussed in Chapters Eleven and Twelve.

Figure 9.2  
 Indonesian Police Force  
 Headquarters Organisation



The proposed expansion of the police role in association with internal security (and especially in relation to "development problems") will presumably lead to a greater intelligence and repression role for the police. Soedjarwo explained the rationale for expansion by saying that "social conflicts are bound to occur everywhere".<sup>75</sup> The political role of the police, and police intelligence in particular, is not clear, and the police have always played second fiddle to the military under the New Order.<sup>76</sup>

One particular area of police involvement in severe repression was during the *petrus* [mysterious killings/killers] campaign of 1983-84, although the nature of that involvement is far from clear. Writing several years earlier in reply to a State Department claim that "there is no evidence of systematic torture or police brutality", Ben Anderson wrote:

This is a typical example of State Department prevarication. The Department knows perfectly well that the *police* have nothing to do with political detentions, which are handled by Kopkamtib and military intelligence.<sup>77</sup>

Yet within three years, police played an important part in the *petrus* killings, by providing lists of ex-convicts and suspected criminals (with photographs and other identifying information) to the death squad organizers, and by providing death squad members. According to van der Kroef, the killings, beginning in early 1983, were first carried out by

fairly hastily assembled military police and national police personnel. Later, some of these, after a special training course in "criminal detection", were reconstituted as permanent "special taskforces". They formally were part of the national police, but in actuality were temporarily seconded to the army. Preference appears to have been given to members of the paracommando units, usually called Kopassandha.<sup>78</sup>

Both Bais and the National Police seem to have been involved in the planning of the campaign, which was treated as a matter of "ABRI against the outlaws". Several otherwise highly reliable informants maintained that its implementation was systematic and normally involved the local Chief of Police providing lists of potential victims to Bais.

"Only the area head of police could authorise 'termination'. Almost always this procedure was followed. There was one case in Bali where a person without any criminal involvement was killed."<sup>79</sup>

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75. "The reorganization of the Indonesian armed forces, Parts II", *Tapol Bulletin*, 70 (1985), p.20.

76. Fatwa quotes a conversation with a troubled police colonel confronted with the illegality of the actions of his military colleagues, and his demeaning subordination to the Laksusda: "Polisi tidak bisa apa-apa, ibarat rumah polisi itu letaknya cuma diemper dan laksus itu diatas sebagai atap yang menaunginya". Fatwa, op.cit., p.30.

77. Benedict R.O.G. Anderson, "Prepared Testimony on Human Rights in Indonesia and in East Timor" for the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, February 6, 1980, p.7. Anderson went on to point out that there was, well prior to the Petrus killings and despite press censorship, evidence of police cruelty towards prisoners, including the use of the hold-all "shot while trying to escape".

78. Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Petrus': Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia", *Asian Survey*, XXV,7 (1985), pp.748, 752. E.g. *Tempo* reported that the Medan police provided a list of 900 such people in early April 1983.

79. PS/30. Explicitly confirmed by PS/36. Just why the whole edifice of the Indonesian criminal justice system was unable to deal

## Department of Home Affairs: Directorate-General of Social and Political Affairs

A vital, but largely unexamined part of the intelligence and security apparatus is the "sospol" stream within the Department of Home Affairs [Dalam Negeri]. Home Affairs is the premier department of the state, with an extremely extensive set of concerns, ranging from supervision of political affairs of all kinds through to agricultural and village development. Its importance to the state in New Order times is reflected in the seniority and numbers of the military officers appointed to its upper echelons. In 1988, the Minister of Home Affairs was General (Ret.) Rudini, former intelligence and special forces officer who rose to become Army Chief of Staff after commanding Kostrad. At the same time the Secretary-General of the department was Major-General Nugroho, who also retained his crucial position as Director A (Internal Affairs) Bais.<sup>80</sup>

The most important part of the Department of Home Affairs for intelligence purposes is the Directorate-General for Social and Political Affairs, which according to the *State Almanac* has the responsibility for carrying out duties regarding political management/guidance in the country, development of national unity in the context of activities for national political management/guidance and Pancasila ideological development, for the implementation of the Perspectives of the Course of the Nation [Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara - GBHN] in accord with the 1945 Constitution and based on policy set down by the Minister of Home Affairs.<sup>81</sup>

The Director-General (Social and Political Affairs) in 1988 was Brigadier-General TNI Hari Sugiman, who was earlier Personal Assistant [Spri] to former Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo.<sup>82</sup> In addition to a Secretariat, the Directorate-General is made up of five listed directorates.<sup>83</sup> (See Table 9.3.)

Each of these Directorates is reproduced within the Ministry of Home Affairs organizations at the Provincial level in Directorates of Social and Political Affairs advising the Governor, and at the *kabupaten - kotamadya* level in Social and Political Affairs Office advising the *Bupati - Walikota*.

The precise separate functions of these units is not yet clear. In addition there is reportedly another Directorate (or section) for "Special [Khusus] Social and Political Affairs", which deals with non-routine problems.<sup>84</sup>

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with a "crime wave" raises wide-ranging questions about the police and their relation to the "criminals". The accounts of quasi-official high-level police involvement with the executions and the selection of targets do not square with suggestions that there was an anti-police element in the campaign - which by its nature, involved the military "doing what the police could not do".

80. As mentioned already, prior to becoming Secretary General of the Department of Home Affairs, Nugroho was simultaneously Director A Bais, Junior Attorney-General (Intelligence) and on the Expert Staff of the Kopkamtib Commander. See Appendix 1. For earlier patterns of interlocking appointments see John H. MacDougall, *op.cit.*, p.102, and "Military penetration of the Indonesian government: the higher central bureaucracy", *Indonesia Reports*, 14 (1986).

81. *Almanak Negara Republik Indonesia 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Alda, 1987), p.337.

82. Typically for up and coming intelligence and security officers, Hari Sugiman's listed biographical details are extremely thin - see Appendix 1, and Bachtiar, *op.cit.*, p.123.

83. *Almanak Negara 1987*, *op.cit.*, pp.53-4.

84. PS/30.

The actual work of the Social and Political Affairs stream is frequently alluded to, but rarely documented. Together with the Sospol line in the territorial commands, Social and Political Affairs officers constitute the regime's "political commissars".<sup>85</sup> One of the few examples deals with preparations for the 1987 general election, and shows what is believed to be the more general pattern of concerns and integration of this section with the wider intelligence and security apparatus:

Ever since the first post-1965 general elections in 1971, the military regime has given itself special powers to screen party lists of candidates. This time around, a new element has been introduced, the Certificate of Personal [Political] Cleanliness [SKBD]. The

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85. PS/13.

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**Table 9.3**  
**Department of Home Affairs**  
**Directorate-General of Social and Political Affairs: #**  
**Directorates.**

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General Development	(Drs.P.Goenardo)
Ethnic Unity Development	(Drs. Soewarno)
Community Development	(Moch. Barir, SH)
Security Affairs	(H.R.Soedirman)
Civilian Defence and Public Order Development	(Drs.Dja.jusman)

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Source: *Almanak Negara Republik Indonesia 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Alda, 1987).

Note: Bracketed figures indicate heads of sections as of 1987.

Screening Committee charged with checking election lists and ordering the exclusion of candidates deemed unsuitable, is a high-power intelligence group, chaired by Major-General Hari Sugiman, Head of Social and Political Affairs at the Interior Ministry. This Central Investigation Committee, along with its regional network of committees, includes the state intelligence agencies - Bais and Bakin - the security agency, Kopkamtib, the Armed Forces headquarters and the Veterans Association.<sup>86</sup>

A major intelligence and security activity of this section is surveillance and control of the more than 1.7 million Category B and Category C ex-political prisoners. In the early 1980s, administrative responsibility for ex-tapols was shifted from Kopkamtib to the Department of Home Affairs and the Attorney-General's Department, nominally civilianizing a central security activity. In practice, ongoing surveillance is carried out by a number of agencies in coordination, and infringements of restrictions on ex-tapols are immediately reported to the local koramil post for action.<sup>87</sup>

The Directorate-General for Social and Political Affairs is the regime's key organ for surveillance of ex-tapols:

A year earlier Soegiman, previously a senior Kopkamtib official, convened a meeting of all the Department's provincial directorates of social and political affairs, to call for the 'meticulous and selective examination of the right to vote of each and every' former member of the PKI.<sup>88</sup>

The Sospol stream in the Home Affairs department is closely articulated with the Rukun Tetangga/Rukun Warga system of neighbourhood organization, (as already suggested, "the base level of control") in this case for electoral surveillance:

'Guidance and supervision' would be carried out by lurahs, and by heads of Rukun Tetangga [RT - Neighbourhood Associations] and Rukun Kampung [RK - Kampung Associations].<sup>89</sup>

But the most important connection is with the military Social and Political Affairs stream, flowing from the Assistant for Social and Political Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces Social and Political Affairs Staff (Assospol Kassospol ABRI) down to the Assistants for Social and Political Affairs at the Kodam and Korem levels, where, as one informant put it, they sit as "political commissars" beside the civilian Governors and Bupatis.<sup>90</sup> The Assospol would also advise the Kodam commander in the Regional Consultative Council [Muspida], where the head of the civil administration chairs a

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86. "Election Special II", *Tapol Bulletin*, 78 (December 1986), p.25. On the SKBD see *ibid.*, p.4.

87. "1.7 million ex-tapols are being re-registered", *Tapol Bulletin*, 70 (July 1985); PS/5. Many of those classified as ex-tapols were never actually arrested, and of course, most of those arrested were never tried. Before many significant political events, local checks on ex-tapols are carried out by Dalam Negeri officials, usually accompanied by police and local military officials.

88. "Anti-communist witch-hunt, 1985", *Tapol Bulletin*, 72, (November 1985), p.15.

89. *Ibid.*, p.15.

90. PS/13.

council made up of himself, the Military Area Commander [Pangdam], the Head of the Police Area [Kadapol], and the Senior Attorney or prosecutor [Jaksa Tinggi] for the province. But beyond this formal organization, little is known of the organization of ABRI Sospol activities.<sup>91</sup>

### **Attorney-General's Department: Intelligence Affairs**

Within the Attorney-General's Department is a Deputy Attorney-General for Intelligence Affairs [Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Intelijen]. While little information is available about this organization, its significance to the regime is indicated by its recent heads. In 1988, a new appointment was made - Brigadier-General Soekarno, a long-time intelligence officer, who came to the post after five years as Head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Development Centre at Bogor from 1980-85. Like his predecessor, Major-General Nugroho (now Secretary-General of the Department of Home Affairs, and Director A (Internal Affairs) Bais, Soekarno was also a former Personal Assistant to the Commander of Kopkamtib.<sup>92</sup>

The Deputy Attorney-General heads a staff made up of at least four Directorates, each of which has a number of Sub-Directorates.<sup>93</sup> (See Table 9.4.) An Intelligence Operations Centre is located under the Deputy Attorney-General for Special Criminal Affairs.<sup>94</sup>

Little detail is available on the precise role of the directorate-general. Its involvement in elections became clear in the run-up to the 1987 general election:

State control of the election campaign is in the hands of a Panitia Pengawas Pelaksanaan Pemilu Pusat (Central Committee to Supervise the Conduct of the Election). It has laid down rules that which effectively exclude any political campaigning by the contesting 'parties'. The Attorney-General chairs the Committee, but the key figure is the vice-chairman, Major-General Nugroho...<sup>95</sup>

When Soekarno was appointed in 1988, Attorney-General Sukarton described the responsibilities of the position, and justified an expansion of the role:

The Jamintel guides "legal intelligence" on a continuing basis and brings it to as complete as possible a level so that the intelligence function will really be able to smooth the turning of the wheels of the prosecutorial machinery. Legal intelligence has increased its scope both domestically, regionally and internationally. "Intell-

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91. The Muspida structure is repeated, mutatis mutandis, at the kabupaten/Tingkat-II level. For the wider organization of ABRI Territorial Management doctrines and the place of Social and Political Operations within this, see Chapter Eleven.

92. *Kompas*, 26 April 1988.

93. *Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara Republik Indonesia*, (Jakarta: B.P.Alda - Penerbit Almanak R.I., 1987), pp.396-406 (translations provided differ). Note that the *Almanak Negara* gives two of the Directorates as "Sosial Budaya" and "Politik dan Keamanan". Op.cit., p.648 It appears that most or all of the staff of this section are civilians. However *Kompas* reports its new head has a long involvement in the training of its personnel - though whether those civilians have passed through the military intelligence schools at Bogor or have been trained elsewhere or *in house* is not known.

94. *Buku Alamat...1987*, op.cit., p.405. Its head was Soengeng Soemartopo Marsigit SH.

95. "Election Special II", *Tapol Bulletin*, 78 (1986), p.25.

igence must dare to take the initiative so there be no doubt of its identity." For the process of upholding the law, the field of prosecutorial intelligence greatly supported a case for screening, investigation, sentencing demand, through implementation of the judges' decision. The Jamintel also worked to increase the role of legal intelligence in the national intelligence community along with the Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin) and ABRI's Strategic Intelligence Board (Bais, under the ABRI Commander). In addition, the Jamintel strengthened the intelligence network to stem the entry of foreign intelligence contrary to Pancasila and the Indonesian nation. Finally, the Jamintel had the task of increasing legal awareness of an increasingly critical public through "a legal information program".<sup>96</sup>

Sukarton also linked the increased salience and sophistication of the intelligence apparatus to the growth of social and legal consciousness:

The role of intelligence, according to Sukarton, raises legal awareness in the community, that is through the legal intelligence undertaken by the prosecutor and through legal intelligence carried out on a joint basis. Sukarton said that an increase in legal awareness was accompanied by critical social attitudes. For that reason it is necessary for the law enforcers to prepare themselves by improving their own quality.<sup>97</sup>

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96. *Jawa Pos* and *Kompas*, 25.IV.88, as cited in *Indonesia Reports*, No.33, June 1988. The editor of *Indonesia Reports* remarked: "This last sounds suspiciously like a combined counter-intelligence and disinformation responsibility."

97. *Kompas*, 26 April 1988.

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Table 9.4  
Attorney-General's Department  
Deputy Attorney-General for Intelligence Affairs:  
Directorates.

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Social and Political Affairs	(R.H.Irawan Bratakusumah SH)
Economic and Development Affairs	(R. Poediono SH)
Special Affairs	(Mas/dulhak Simatupang SH)
Intelligence Administration	(Gunawan Pramujono SH)

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Source: *Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara R.I. 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Aida, 1987), pp.396-406.

Note: Names in parenthesis are officer-holders as of 1987.

## State Cryptography Institute

The State Cryptography Institute [Lembaga Sandi Negara - LSN] is the body responsible for establishing, controlling and implementing encoding and cryptography policy for all state activities, but chiefly in security and secret communications. In theory, the heads of Bakin and the State Cryptography Institute coordinate on implementation. The Chairperson of the Institute, (Rear Admiral Soebardo in 1988), is directly responsible to the President.<sup>98</sup>

The Institute is made up of at least four bureaus (see Table 9.5.), in addition to the Chairperson's Expert Staff and a Secretariat. From this listing (drawn from open sources), the organization appears primarily concerned with developing and protecting government secret communications capacities, presumably in both the "civilian" and military sectors. Yet it is also known that the Institute has an external electronic intelligence gathering role which is not evident from this list - suggesting that there are other, secret bureaus or that the publically listed bureau functions are incomplete.<sup>99</sup>

Moreover, Bakin and Bais both have an external strategic brief and are involved in electronic intelligence gathering. The ABRI Assistant for Electronics and Communication [Askomlek Kasum ABRI] (currently an Army major-general) and his staff would also be involved. Just what the division of labour is between these bodies is unknown.

Little or nothing has been published about Indonesian electronic intelligence, and at first sight it seems unimportant. Yet the Straits of Malacca are one of the world's most strategically vital chokepoints, for both war-fighting purposes and for trade between Europe, the Middle East and Japan. Does the known intelligence and general defence cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia extend to cooperation over electronic surveillance of the straits?<sup>100</sup> Does inter-ASEAN intelligence cooperation extend to mutual assistance of monitoring activities of, say,

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98. See *Buku Alamat...1987*, op.cit., pp.421-22, and *Almanak Negara...1986-1987*, op.cit., pp.629-632. Rather nicely *Buku Alamat* gives the English-language title of Lembaga Sandi Negara as the "State Secrets Institute".

99. PS/30.

100. It has been suggested that intelligence ties are also quite strong with Singapore.

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Table 9.5  
State Cryptography Institute:  
Bureaus.

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1. Education	(St. Yusar Abidin)
2. Research and Development	(Mahidin Malik)
3. Equipment	(Sudarto)
4. Security	(Goenartomo)

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Sources: *Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara R.I. 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Alda, 1987), pp.421-22, and *Almanak Negara Republik Indonesia 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Alda, 1987) pp.629-632.

Note: Names in parenthesis are officer-holders as of 1988.

the Philippines New Peoples Army in the islands between Kalimantan and Mindanao?

Certainly Australian electronic intelligence aimed at Indonesia is known to be highly developed and, according to a number of Australian government sources, provides the Australian government with high-level access to Indonesian military communications in Irian Jaya and East Timor. Under the UKUSA agreement, all material collected by this Australian signals intelligence operation is provided to United States and British intelligence agencies.<sup>101</sup>

A final if unlikely question needs to be put. Is it possible that there is covert Indonesian cooperation with the United States electronic intelligence system of monitoring of ships' high-frequency radios for direction-finding at sea? In the event of any serious naval confrontation between naval units of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is imperative for the United States to know the position of all Soviet surface ships and submarines at sea. But for effective target selection, searching US submarines must be able to eliminate interference caused by vessels (of any nation) other than their targets. Accordingly, it is essential that the position of all vessels at sea in regions of strategic interest be charted and continually updated.

At first sight the question is absurd, both technically and politically. Surely the well-known United States HF/DF (high frequency/direction finding) facilities at San Miguel (the Philippines), Rama Sun (Thailand), Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Pearce (Western Australia) and Shoal Bay (Northern Territory, Australia) would be adequate for the task? But the New Zealand electronics intelligence specialist, Owen Wilkes, has pointed out that for United States purposes it would be technically desirable to locate a monitoring station in the region of the southern tip of Sumatra or west of Jakarta on Java.<sup>102</sup>

Whatever the technical desirability of such a station, there is no known US station in the area, and no evidence of Indonesian cooperation with the US for such purposes. It would also be difficult for Indonesia to publicly take part in such an arrangement and still maintain its formally non-aligned foreign policy. Yet, the history of electronic intelligence arrangements in the past two decades is littered with revelations of secret agreements.<sup>103</sup> The only impediments to such secret agreements are the political dangers of revelation - but in Indonesia today there is very little in the way of public pressure to scrutinise such activities. There is as yet no evidence of such an unlikely development, but in such cases, the files should be left open.

## Conclusion

The "non-military" character of the organizations considered here is nominal, as is to be expected in a militarized state. Bakin is the oldest of the extant New Order intelligence organizations, and has had the broadest mission of all such bodies, although in recent

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101. On the UKUSA system, and on the Australian Defence Signals Division Project Larswood, Shoalwater Bay, see Richelson and Ball, *op.cit.*

102. Personal communication, July 1988. Direction-finding is largely a matter of radio-detection combined with elementary trigonometry. Triangulation works best if the base-line provides as close to a right-angle as possible. The desirable distance between base-lines is about 2,000 - 3,000 km. On the existing arrangements Indonesia is enclosed in a rectangle, but the base lines are too long for exact positioning.

103. Richelson and Ball, *op.cit.*; James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace*, (New York: Penguin, 1983); and Duncan Campbell, "Spooks down under", *New Statesman*, (4 March 1983), and "Spy in the sky", *New Statesman*, (9 September 1983).

years it has been eclipsed by the rise of Bais. Opsus was very much a creation of the early years of the New Order, when patronage relations were more endemic than in later years. Its non-bureaucratic structure was linked with its founder, Ali Moertopo, and did not survive him. Police intelligence has become somewhat more important than the past, and with the expanded security concerns about "development" may well become more so still. There seems little doubt that police intelligence was linked with Bais in the campaign of mas murders of alleged criminals in 1983-84.

The Social and Political Directorate-General of the Department of Home Affairs is an organization which requires closer examination. It parallels the Army Social and Political staff and line stream. As the name suggests, it is a political management organization, responsible for surveillance and registration of more than a million alleged former left activists, and an increasing number of Islamic dissidents.

As in other countries with sophisticated political surveillance apparatuses, such as South Korea, there has been considerable and increasing inter-penetration of intelligence and prosecutorial activities in Indonesia. The position of Deputy Attorney-General (Intelligence) has been occupied in recent years by senior experienced military intelligence officers. Legal intelligence is seen by the government as increasingly important - partly for purposes of legitimation of the legal process, and more importantly to ensure that the legal system is used effectively for purposes of political control.

The State Cryptography Institute is a service body, whose head reports directly to the President. Little information about the precise activities of the Institute are available, and more research into the whole area of electronic intelligence, foreign and domestic, is needed.