

## **Chapter 8**

### **The structure of military intelligence and security organizations.**


*Kopkamtib is a concept as much as an organization. It is the cover for internal military action if needed. In a sense, it doesn't exist - it's another way of organising the same people without military legal restraints.<sup>1</sup>*

Over the life of the New Order period a number of specialized military and civilian organizations have been established and/or further developed for the purpose of surveillance and control of the Indonesian population. The next four chapters deal with the structure and organization of the Indonesian intelligence and security organizations in the 1980s. (See Figure 8.1.) Chapters Eight and Nine discuss the structure of "military" and "non-military" organizations respectively. Chapter Eight begins with a discussion of Kopkamtib and its successor Bakorstanas. The remainder of this chapter deals with the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency, Bais, and the associated service intelligence organizations, particularly the territorial Army Intelligence and Social-Political systems. Chapter Nine begins with a discussion of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board [Bakin] which, though nominally civilian, has strong military connections. Thus the division of the two chapters should be regarded as a matter of convenience rather than principle. The intelligence activities of the National Police are also dealt with under a civilian heading, even though the police have been integrated into the Armed Forces of Indonesia for some years. Opsus, the now defunct independent intelligence organization once controlled by Ali Moertopo, is also discussed in Chapter Nine, along with the two extremely important civilian bureaucracies of the Attorney-General's Department and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Chapter Nine finishes with a brief discussion of the State Cryptography Institute. Chapter Ten deals with the question of coordination between these multiple agencies of surveillance and control as an aspect of the wider question of the coherence of the state. The operations of these organizations are discussed in Chapter Eleven. Of the military organizations, some, such as Kopkamtib and

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1. PS/35.

Figure 8.1  
Indonesian Intelligence Organisations



Note: In practice there are direct connections from the strategic intelligence agency and the service intelligence branches, especially the Army's.

Note: Names in double brackets are those of organisations abolished in September 1988.

Bais, are New Order creations; others, notably the Army Intelligence and Social-Political branches, are somewhat older, although they only reached their present high stage of development after 1966.

### **KOPKAMTIB - the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order**

The centrepiece of the manifold Indonesian intelligence and security apparatus for the first twenty three years of the New Order period was Kopkamtib - the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. One might even say it was the centrepiece of the entire New Order state. Through Kopkamtib, the nominally civilian government apparatus was bypassed at any point deemed appropriate by the head of state, to allow direct military rule. Moreover, the procedures under which Kopkamtib operated allowed it to work free of the existing legal restraints on the armed forces itself. By the employment of its considerable military resources in the service of extraordinarily vague and broadly-defined political ends, Kopkamtib was the means by which Indonesia was ruled by what amounted to permanent martial law, intermittent and uneven in application, but constant in doctrine and potential.

In September 1988 President Soeharto announced the abolition of Kopkamtib, and its replacement with Bakorstanas - the Coordinating Body for Assisting in the Maintenance of National Stability [Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional]. The new body is charged with the task of "restoring, maintaining and reinforcing national stability", and will be advisory in character, headed by the Armed Forces Commander who will report directly to the President. Before assessing the significance of the new arrangements, however, it would be best to understand the full dimensions of its predecessor, which dominated the Indonesian state for almost a quarter of a century, and which in many important respects, lives on in its successor. The following sections examine the legal status, organizational structure and operating procedures of Kopkamtib. A detailed case-study of its role in labour control will be deferred until Chapter 11.

Kopkamtib was created on October 10, 1965 in the immediate aftermath of the October 1, 1965 coup to deal with the claimed threat to national security posed by the Communist Party of Indonesia [PKI] and the September 30 Movement in the armed forces. However, the organization remained in existence for almost a quarter of a century, the executive core of the militarized state. As Anderson has pointed out, what Kopkamtib had been attempting to *restore*, apparently without notable success, for twenty three years, was the Dutch *rust en orde* [peace and order] - with an extremely broad concept of unacceptable disturbances to that peace and order. In fact, Kopkamtib was a de facto long-term martial law command with a mandate to use all the resources of the Indonesian state to destroy whatever it conceived to be a threat to the state, the Pancasila state ideology and the 1945 Constitution, or to economic development. For this reason, special attention should be paid to the terms in which Kopkamtib was presented, its legal mandates, and its conception of its own role. Kopkamtib did not exist in any separate organizational form from the Armed Forces. Essentially, Kopkamtib was a concept more than an organization, an ideological formulation that allowed the re-organization of Armed Forces resources for total internal warfare and social engineering without legal restraints.

*Legal status*

Kopkamtib's legal status was vague but potent. The government's preferred legitimation for Kopkamtib was always President Sukarno's Instruction of 11 March 1966 [Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret - Supersemar] to Major-General Suharto empowering him to take all steps necessary to guarantee security, order and stability of government. In 1973 the MPR [People's Congress] resolved

[t]o give power to the President/Mandatory of the People's Congress, to take necessary steps in order to safeguard and to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation and to prevent the re-occurrence of the PKI/September 30th Movement and other threats of subversion, in safeguarding national development, the Pancasila Democracy and the 1945 Constitution.<sup>2</sup>

The next year the President designated Kopkamtib as the vehicle for this responsibility.<sup>3</sup> But when the 1982 Basic Law on Defence and Security was passed by the parliament, Kopkamtib was not mentioned.<sup>4</sup>

In organizational and legal terms, Kopkamtib was in the stream of emergency militarized internal security agencies that began with the declaration of martial law in 1957. These organizations gave regional military commanders greatly expanded powers over the civilian population. At that time, army regional commanders were designated Regional War Authorities [Peperda], responsible to the army Central War Authority [Peperpu] until 1959 and then to the Supreme War Authority [Peperti]. With the lifting of martial law in 1963 Peperti and Peperda were dissolved. In September 1964 army regional commanders acquired new security powers as Regional Authorities to implement Dwikora [Pepelrada]. The Pepelrada were responsible to the Supreme Operations Command [Koti]. The Koti and Pepelrada were abolished in July 1967.<sup>5</sup>

This was followed by the designation of army regional commanders as Special or Regional Executives [Pelaksana Khusus - Laksus] of Kopkamtib in August 1967.

#### *Aims and Functions*

The original mandate to "restore order and security" after the 30th September 1965 affair was somewhat transformed over the years. On the basis of the relevant Presidential Decisions apparently governing Kopkamtib's organization and procedures, a 1982 Army Staff and Command School manual set out the aims of Kopkamtib at that time quite clearly:

Kopkamtib forms a Government facility aiming to protect and increase order, security and stability, in the context of achieving national stability as an essential

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2. TAP MPR No.X/MPR/1973, cited in Indonesia, Kopkamtib [Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban], *The Role and Function of Kopkamtib in the National Security System*, (Jakarta: Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, January 1977), p.3.

3. Presidential decision No.9, March 2, 1974. See also Presidential Decision No. 47/1978. Both are cited in Indonesia, Seskoal [Sekolah Staf dan Komando], *Vademecum: Pengetahuan Pertahanan Keamanan*, (Bandung: Markas Besar, TNI-AD, Sekolah Staf dan Komando, Cetakan Dua, 1982).

4. Melinda Cooke, "National security", in Frederica M.Bunge (ed.), *Indonesia: A Country Study*, (Area Handbook for Indonesia, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-39), (Washington: American University, 1983), p.261.

5. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (revised edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.355.

condition for the successful implementation of the Five Year Development Plans in particular and Long-Term Development in general.<sup>6</sup>

Kopkamtib's general functions were specified as follows:

1. Coordinating the implementation of policy in the protection of security, stability and national order.
2. Preventing the activities of and crushing the remnants of the 30th September Movement/Communist Party [G30S/PKI] subversives, and other extreme groups who threaten security and social order and who endanger the wellbeing and integrity of the state and the nation based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
3. Inhibiting the moral and mental influences emerging from the G30S/PKI and other cultural streams which are opposed morally, mentally and culturally to the Pancasila.
4. Guiding the society towards more active participation and responsibility in protecting security and order.<sup>7</sup>

These guidelines, which amplified the 1973 People's Congress resolution, amounted to a comprehensive mandate for political control of the entire society - or more directly, the security of the state against the society. The breadth of the category of enemies of the state in the second paragraph was practically without limit because of the undefined (if not undefinable) character of such categories of people (as opposed to specific acts). Kopkamtib's tasks were both preventative and repressive, and remarkably ideologically defined. Not only was its work defined using the key legitimating terms of the New Order, but the work that Kopkamtib was required to carry out - in addition to clear physical repression - was by definition ideological: inhibiting the "moral and mental influences" of opponents of the state and guiding the society to a more appropriate relationship to the state.

*Powers and scope*

As coordinator of government policy in the area of security Kopkamtib was pre-eminent within the state in its role. This pre-eminence was underlined by the powers granted to the Kopkamtib commander:

to use all instruments of state and elements of the government apparatus, as well as taking all other measures in accord with and based on legal decisions which observe security rights in keeping with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.<sup>8</sup>

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6. Indonesia, Seskoad, op.cit., p.408. Chapter 3.8 of the Seskoad manual is entitled: "Kopkamtib Organization and Procedures - In Accord with Presidential Decisions Number 9, 1974 and Number 47/1978". Ibid., pp.408-412.

7. Ibid., p.408.

8. Ibid., P.411.

Table 8.1  
Kopkamtib Commanders  
1965 - 1988

1. General Suharto*	5.X.65 - 19.XI.69 (49 months)
2. General Maraden Panggabean Deputy Commander: Lt.Gen. Sumitro	19.XI.69 - 27.III.73 (40 months)
3. General Sumitro** Deputy Commander: Adm. R. Sudomo Secretary: 1. Brig.Gen Durmawel Achmad SH 2. Col. Sukarjadi	27.III.73 - 28.I.74 (10 months)
4. General Suharto Chief of Staff: Adm. R. Sudomo***	28.I.74 - 17.IV.78 (47 months)
5. Admiral R. Sudomo Chief of Staff: 1. General Darjatmo 2. General Yoga Sugama 3. General Wijoyo Suyono****	17.IV.78 - 29.III.83 (59 months)
6. General Benny Moerdani*****	29.III.83 - IX.88 (66 months)

Sources: "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite", *Indonesia*, various years; Harsja Bachtiar, *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1988).

- \* Suharto's assistants or deputies in this period are not known in full. However Sutopo Juwono was Assistant-1/Intelligence from 1967-70 at the same time as he was Assistant-1/Intelligence and Security to the Armed Forces Commander (Suharto). *Ibid.*, p.154. *Apa dan Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1985-1986*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafitipers, 1986), p.1229, describes him as "Sekretaris Kopkamtib" around this time or under Panggabean. This does not appear to be correct.
- \*\* Sumitro's tenure lasted less than a year, after which the organisation of Kopkamtib altered. During his (and apparently under Panggabean's) tenure, assistants to the Joint Staff Echelon of Hankam doubled as assistants, for the same areas, to the Commander of Kopkamtib. See "Current Data...", 1974, p.160
- \*\*\* Sudomo exercised day-to-day control during Suharto's second command. See "Current data...", 1974, p.160.
- \*\*\*\* There is a disagreement about when Wijono left the position of Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib, and whether he was replaced. According to "Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 40 (1985), p.115 Wijono retired abruptly on 4.XII.83 after 35 months as Chief of Staff. Two other sources (Bachtiar, *op.cit.*; p.349 and PS/30) maintain that Wijono finished as Chief of Staff on 4.XII.82, before Moerdani took over.
- \*\*\*\*\*The position of Chief of Staff remained unfilled under Moerdani.

Just what the final clause means is unclear - as is the term "security rights". There were, in reality, few legal limits on the powers of the Kopkamtib commander and his officers. Certainly a number of commentators maintained that, as Cooke put it [Kopkamtib's] powers of interrogation, arrest and detention were not subject to the restriction of the nation's regular legal channels.<sup>9</sup>

Certainly the nation's regular legal channels were irrelevant to Kopkamtib. But it also seems that there were no actual legal limits whatsoever on its activities. While the statements of powers quoted above refers to limits set by the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, neither documents contains any specific limitations. In any case, such constitutional restrictions would, in practice, have to be specified in legislation or regulation and enforced by an independent judiciary. There was little positive law that restricted the role of the security agencies in general or Kopkamtib in particular.<sup>10</sup>

In 1978, Yoga Sugama, then both Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib and Head of Bakin (see Table 8.1), made his powers clear with a telling comparison:

What I would like to say is this: the position given to me has never had any precedent in any country, not before. The only precedent was during Himmler's time and was given by Himmler [sic] - only with a great difference - that Himmler is doing it subjectively, because he has the power to do that and he is a powerful man who can do anything on earth, responsible to Hitler himself. While me, I am doing this and like to be responsible to the parliament and the government.<sup>11</sup>

In practice Kopkamtib had extraordinary (literally and figuratively) powers of definition of criminality and subversion; arrest without warrant and unlimited detention without trial; use of torture and brutal forms of interrogation as normal practice; manipulation of judicial procedure and trials; incarceration in inhuman prison conditions; monitoring and harassment of ex-tapols.<sup>12</sup>

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9. Cooke, op.cit., p.261. Hugeng Imam Santoso, a former Chief of the National Police dismissed by Soeharto for excessive zeal in the investigation of corruption emphasized the terror that flowed from this lack of legal restraint:

The Kopkamtib has the power to instruct the police on what they should not do. It is a kind of 'super police force'. People in Indonesia tend to be terrified when they hear the name Kopkamtib. The general feeling is that Kopkamtib can do whatever it likes. And that means in the first place they can arbitrarily arrest people.

"Former police chief speaks out on regime", *Tapol Bulletin*, 13 (December 1975), p.7. Hugeng was appointed National Police Chief in October 1968, but was moved aside in May 1971.

10. It is useful to compare the Indonesian situation with that in the Soviet Union, where, after its establishment in 1954, the KGB (as the successor to a series of political police organizations from 1917 onwards) was subjected to a series of positive legal restrictions embodied in the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, and the oversight of a Special Department of Supervision of Investigations by the State Security Organs within the USSR Procuracy in April 1956. To be sure, the officers of the Procuracy tempered their commitment to socialist legality with their greater loyalty to the party in cases of "political crimes", especially as the leadership called for greater repression of dissent, and the real restraints on the KGB came with changes in leadership enacted as a result of Communist Party controls. However, especially during the Khrushchev period, the moderation of naked terror by something more than a figleaf of law was an important innovation. See Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp.57-62.

11. "Indonesia: Power and Justice", *Tapol Bulletin*, 31 (December-January 1978-79), p.7. Yoga was speaking in English in a Dutch television interview. At the time he was simultaneously Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib and Head of Bakin.

12. This listing is based on Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, *Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror*, (London: Zed Press, 1983), ch.5. Despite the difficulties in this book deriving from the extraordinarily misleading classification of human rights activists as "collaborators" with the regime, Southwood and Flanagan provide an excellent and powerful review of the workings of the intelligence/security network - in fact, it is the only serious study of the subject.

Kopkamtib's involvement in media and information control in the early 1980s as presented by Plate and Darvi will serve to illustrate the general character of Kopkamtib's activities at the height of its powers (though some of the details of media control altered subsequently)<sup>13</sup>:

In 1974, Kopkamtib's power to review a publisher's licence, previously confined to certain geographical regions of Indonesia, was extended to include all of Indonesia. All press licenses now go through annual Kopkamtib review, and they may be summarily suspended at any time on the authority of a regional Kopkamtib commander. Secondly, a reporter may be at any time summoned to appear before Kopkamtib agents and interrogated. The nature of the interrogation is left to Kopkamtib officials to decide upon, but beatings during such sessions are not uncommon. And the secret police may threaten the reporter's employer with loss of licence as well as physical harm. Thirdly, all new publications must have the approval of the Minister for Information (since the 1974 crackdown only one new licence has been issued). Fourthly, all government advertising will be withdrawn, and pressure put on private companies to withdraw their advertising, when Kopkamtib officers believe a threat to national security - or government prestige - exists. Fifthly, and by contrast, government newspapers, which reflect the official line to the last comma, face no circulation worries: government departments are required to have their personnel subscribe to the official newspapers. Sixthly, Kopkamtib officers hold official briefings for reporters on most matters of national importance (such as the invasion of East Timor, the status of political prisoners, and elections), at which attendance for reporters is deemed advisable. While these briefings have no formal legal force, in the pervasive climate of intimidation in Indonesia, they of course have the intended effect of ensuring that the Kopkamtib line is clearly conveyed to the public.<sup>14</sup>

Since that summary of press control was written, many of the details have changed, especially following amendments in 1982 to the Press Act 1966. However, despite the changes in that Act Kopkamtib retained its legal powers to ban papers and magazines, although in practice warnings and suspensions (which turn out to be permanent) issued by the Ministry of Information under the Press Act's licensing requirements have been the preferred way of intimidating the press in the 1980s.<sup>15</sup>

#### *Structure and procedures*

The Commander of Kopkamtib from 1983 until its abolition in September 1988 was General (Ret.) Benny Moerdani, who became Kopkamtib commander at the time of his appointment as Commander of the Armed Forces.<sup>16</sup> The Commander of Kopkamtib was responsible to the President for the execution of his duties. At different

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13. For a more recent account of media controls see Asia Watch, *Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor*, (Washington: Asia Watch, 1988), p.267-316.

14. Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, *Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror*, (London: Abacus, 1982), p.251.

15. For an excellent review of the assault on freedom of the press in the 1980s see Asia Watch, op.cit., pp.267-298.

16. When Moerdani retired in early 1988 as Armed Forces Commander he did not pass on Kopkamtib to the new Armed Forces Commander, General Try Sutrisno.




times in the New Order, the Kopkamtib Commander was responsible to the Minister of Defence and/or the Commander of the Armed Forces on a day-to-day basis.<sup>17</sup>

Between 1974 and 1983 the Kopkamtib commander was assisted by a Chief of Staff [Kaskopkamtib] appointed by the President. (See Figure 8.2.) With his Personal Staff [Spri Kaskopkamtib], this officer made up the Command Assistance Echelon. It is not clear whether or not that position was in fact filled during Moerdani's tenure. The point was important to the extent that it appears that the position of Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib was the only senior position in Kopkamtib which was

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17. This section is based on the following sources: Indonesia, Kopkamtib 1977, *The Role and Function of Kopkamtib*, op.cit., an English-language public information pamphlet; Indonesia, Seskoad, op.cit., pp.408-412; and confidential interviews conducted in Jakarta in May-July 1988, especially PS/7, PS/10, PS/14, PS/15, PS/22, PS/30, PS/35, PS/38, PS/40.

Figure 8.2  
Kopkamtib Headquarters Organisation



specific to that organization, rather than a matter of an incumbent senior armed forces staff officer doubling in a Kopkamtib role.<sup>18</sup>

The remainder of the Kopkamtib staff consisted of three elements: the General Staff Echelon, the Special Staff Echelon, and a Staff Service Echelon. Firstly, the Kopkamtib General Staff Echelon [Sum Kopkamtib] was made up of five people, four of whom were two-star generals. Three were members of the staff of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff [Kasum ABRI] doubling as Kopkamtib General Staff [Sum Kopkamtib]. These were:

- Intelligence Assistant [Asintel Kasum ABRI],
- Operations Assistant [Asops Kasum ABRI],
- Territorial Affairs Assistant [Aster Kasum ABRI].

The Kopkamtib Assistant for Social and Political Affairs appears, at least in 1988, to have been drawn from slightly lower down the ABRI staff hierarchy: within the Armed Forces Staff, the Assistant for Social and Political Affairs [Assospol ABRI] was responsible to the Chief of the Staff of the Social and Political Affairs Staff [Kassospol ABRI]. Under the Assospol ABRI was the Head of the Social and Political Affairs Office [Kadin Sospol]. It was this officer who in recent years doubled as Assospol Kopkamtib.<sup>19</sup> In 1988 the Kopkamtib Assistant for Public Order and Security [Askamtibmas Kopkamtib] was not the Askamtibmas ABRI but rather the Head of the Armed Forces Legal Guidance Office Service [Ka Babinkum ABRI], reporting to both Kasum ABRI and Kassospol ABRI.<sup>20</sup>

The Kopkamtib Special Staff [Sus Kopkamtib] consisted of the Commanders and Heads of the various Kopkamtib Central Executive Echelon bodies. These were:

- Intelligence Task Force [Satgas Intel Kopkamtib],
- Information and Community Relations Office [Dispen Humas  
Kopkamtib],
- Communications Unit [Sathub Kopkamtib],
- Central Investigation Team [Teperpu],
- Central Prosecution Team [Todsapu].

These bodies varied considerably in size, lines of responsibility and the character of their work. The Armed Forces Assistant for Communications and Electronics [Askomlek ABRI] in fact oversaw the work of the Commander of Kopkamtib Communications [Dan Sathub Kopkamtib], a colonel. Information and Public Relations was a substantial normal unit operating under Kasum ABRI with about sixteen officers.<sup>21</sup>

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18. During interviews in Jakarta in mid-1988, a number of otherwise well-informed sources differed over the existence of the position of the Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib. Most maintained that Moerdani had been the last incumbent. However, according to one informant, as of 28.IV.88 the Kepala Staf Kopkamtib was Major-General Suharto, who was also Assistant-1/Security to the Army Chief of Staff [Aspam Kasad]. [PS/22] One former incumbent argued that Moerdani decided that the position was redundant and followed the double-hatting principle and assigned those tasks to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff [Kasum ABRI]. [PS/38]

19. PS/22.

20. PS/22.

21. PS/22.

The Kopkamtib Assistant for Public Order and Security [Askamtibmas Kopkamtib] in mid-1988, Major-General Djaelani, was head of both the Central Investigations Team [Teperpu] and the Central Prosecution Team [Todsapu], which were formed as and when necessary and staffed accordingly. Satgas Intel [intelligence Task Unit] was a widely used term, referring to any intelligence groups formed for a particular purpose. In the same way, Satgas Intel Kopkamtib groups appear to have been formed, both at a central and at a regional level, as and when required.<sup>22</sup>

There were, in addition to the Personal Staffs of the Kopkamtib Commander and Chief of Staff, small offices of the Secretariat [Set Kopkamtib] and the Finance Officer [Paku Kopkamtib]. These made up the Staff Service Echelon.

The double-hatting principle of Kopkamtib organization extended away from the centre to the regional level and below: the primary regional representatives of Kopkamtib were the Military Area [Kodam] Commanders doubling as Kopkamtib Area Special Executives [Laksusda]. The function of the Laksusda was to execute the policy of the Kopkamtib commander, although he may also have accepted orders from the President through the Commander of the Armed Forces. As far as is known, all Kodam commanders were also Laksusdas. The Laksusda was assisted by the Kodam staff.<sup>23</sup>

Accordingly, the Asintel Pangdam, a colonel, became the Asintel Laksusda. The Asintel Laksusda usually controlled an Intelligence Task Unit for Kopkamtib affairs (structured and staffed as necessary, sometimes more or less permanent and distinct from other Kodam intel groupings), headed by a lieutenant-colonel [designated Komsatgas Intel].<sup>24</sup> Two points are significant, here. Firstly, these powers provided the Kodam staff, and the Asintel in particular, with executive authority, including the right to arrest. This was the basis on which Kodam Satgas Intels conducted most interrogations and arrests, and political interventions. Secondly, the Asintel Laksusda normally worked directly with the Strategic Intelligence Body [Bais], (presumably apart from reporting direct Kopkamtib operations to the regional Kodam/Kopkamtib commander). Kopkamtib essentially had no separate intelligence structure.<sup>25</sup>

Several interview sources claimed that there were special financial provisions for officers doubling as Kopkamtib Area Special Executives, to be distributed all the way down the line to the Koramil. The figure mentioned for Kodam commanders amounted to a virtual doubling of nominal salary. The reasoning for this, it was claimed, was that Kopkamtib officers needed to be, at least relatively speaking, independent in income, not reliant on outside sources. Given the manifold extra-budgetary sources of unaccountable financing that have been available to Kodam commanders, this rationale might be doubted. If the suggestion was correct it would mean that there were

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22. PS/22, PS/14. In the early years of the New Order, the investigation and prosecution teams, together with "screening" teams [Tiningpu/Triningpu], were very important in the crushing of G30S/PKI and the ongoing purges of the late 60s. Prior to taking over as head of Bakin, Sutopo Yuwono was Program Director for these three teams, in addition to being Asintel Kopkamtib. [PS/40]

23. Indonesia, Seskoed, op.cit., p.412. This manual sets out the formulation of responsibilities prior to the disbanding of the Kowilhan structure in 1985. At that time, the Kowilhan Commander was designated the Regional Special Executive [Lasuswil]. (See also Figure 8.2).

24. PS/14.

25. PS/7. The activities of Laksus personnel are reported at length in Asia Watch, op.cit..

important formal pay differentials (as opposed to informal benefices of office) built into the structure of the Armed Forces in favour of the security and intelligence streams rather than combat and other functional streams. The same sources maintained that these funds were more strictly accountable to the Kopkamtib Financial Officer than were mainstream ABRI funds.<sup>26</sup>

*Kopkamtib at war: Irian Jaya and East Timor*

There was an important difference between the long-term active role played by Kopkamtib in counter-insurgency in Irian Jaya and its apparent absence from East Timor occupation operations. In Irian Jaya intensive security and counter-insurgency campaigns seem to have been under Kopkamtib auspices from at least the late 1960s or early 1970s, with the Kodam Commander functioning (as elsewhere) as the Area Special Executive [Laksusda] for Kopkamtib. Most Indonesian military documents that have come into the public domain from Irian Jaya show some Kopkamtib auspice. Moreover, the very large numbers of Papuan testimonies critical of the Indonesian military, have usually referred to Kopkamtib as the dominating agency of the Indonesian military presence.<sup>27</sup>

East Timor, however, was, as of 1988, treated as a full war zone and is controlled through an East Timor Operational Command, the head of which was the commander of Kostrad Division I (Airborne), and whose staff provided planning and coordination for Timor operations.<sup>28</sup> Kopkamtib was apparently considered inappropriate for dealing with the fourteen year-old war in East Timor, although with the "opening" of East Timor announced in 1988, a Bakorstanas role may emerge.<sup>29</sup>

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26. PS/22. The verification of this claim bears on the general question of Kopkamtib officials and money. Personal reports of extortion by intelligence officers against ex-tapols are commonplace in conversation. It also seems, from such reports, that it is possible for at least some groups of people, on at least some limited occasions, to buy their way out of trouble with intelligence personnel (Kodam Satgas Intel officers and NCOs are most often mentioned). Needless to say, this must impair the operating efficiency of those parts of the intelligence complex. Just who is able to do this and in what circumstances is unclear. Knight op.cit. writes that one of the means by which the KGB is kept loyal to the current party leadership is by pay rates several times higher than those of comparable services such as the police and the military.

27. See Chapter Eleven. There is now a great deal of evidence, some partisan, some impartial, of the virtually constant policy of brutality adopted by Indonesian military forces in Irian Jaya for over twenty years. For our purposes, the most important single source is Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985). Much of Osborne's material itself comes from the Papua New Guinea intelligence services - both military intelligence and the National Intelligence Organization [NIO]. See also Asia Watch, op.cit.; and the Amnesty International reports cited there.

28. PS/15, PS/22, PS/14. The commander of Kostrad Division I in 1988 was Major-General Mantiri. Korem 164/Wira Dharma is responsible for day-to-day operations.

29. See "Timor Timur Terbuka, Sekarang", *Tempo*, 2 July 1988 and "Menko Polkam Sudomo: Timor Timur Bukan Wilayah Tertutup", *Kompas*, 29 June 1988.

### *Kopkamtib and labour*

Since the late 1970s labour relations has been identified as an ongoing potential threat to "economic development and national security", to be dealt with by a coordinated mix of surveillance, prevention and repression. Kopkamtib has been deeply involved in efforts to control an expanding and increasingly assertive industrial labour force. In concert with the Department of Labour Power, headed from 1983 to 1988 by the former head of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, and government-controlled union groups and client business groups, Kopkamtib has established a comprehensive system of labour surveillance and intervention capacities, especially in the industrially vital Jakarta-Bogor-Bekasi-Tangerang region.

Under Sudomo, Kopkamtib and the Department of Labour Power became intertwined through the establishment of series of inter-agency surveillance and intervention "teams" and procedures. The first attempts at Kopkamtib coordination of an intelligence- and security-coordinated corporatist approach were apparently inadequate, and in mid-1982 Sudomo, still at Kopkamtib, announced that *all* labour disputes should be notified directly to Kopkamtib.

In early 1983 Sudomo, by now heading the Ministry of Labour Power, issued a Notice of Decision<sup>30</sup> which established Labour Crisis Control Centres [Pusat Pengelolaan Krisis Masalah Ketenaga Kerjaan] as a means "of improving the implementation of development" by preventing labour conflict in a manner suitable to Pancasila Labour Relations.

Labour Crisis Centres were intended to prevent industrial conflicts arising, and, if such a "crisis" should occur, prevent its spreading, and "facilitate a quietening down and bargaining between the parties in dispute". The new organizations in the Ministry were to operate at two levels: a Policy Centre and Field Action Groups.

Two related sets of bodies were established at the same time. The Labour Crisis Control Centre was to be chaired by the Minister, and to include representatives from various sections of his department, from the employer groups and the government-controlled trade union peak organization FBSI. The second body was the Conflict Prevention Central Executive - not mentioned in the general document. This regional

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30. Indonesia, Menteri Tenaga Kerja, *Pembentukan Pusat Pengelolaan Krisis Masalah Ketenaga Kerjaan*, (KEP-130/MEN/1983, Tanggal 21-4-1983).

Table 8.2  
Conflict Prevention Executive Centre:  
Membership/Organisation

1. Delegate from Kopkamtib	Chairperson
2. Delegate from Kopkamtib	Secretary
3. Delegate from Secretariat General of the Department of Labour Power	Member
4. Delegate from the Directorate General for Management of Labour Relations and Labour Protection [Binalindung]	Member
5. Delegate from the Directorate General for Labour Utilisation and Management	Member
6. Delegate from FBSI	Member
7. Delegate from Kadin / PUSPI	Member
8. Delegate from the Regional Government [PEMDA]	Member
9. Delegate from Technical Department	Member
10. Delegate from the Kopkamtib Area Executive [Laksusda]/local Police	Member

Source: Indonesia, Menteri Tenaga Kerja, *Pembentukan Pusat Pengelolaan Krisis Masalah Ketenaga Kerjaan*, (KEP-130/MEN/1983, Tanggal 21-4-1983).

-level body was controlled by Kopkamtib - which provided both the chairperson and the secretary. (See Table 8.2.)

A year later, Sudomo's department announced the establishment of Early Warning Posts [Pos Siaga Naker] for "24-hour non-stop [Eng.] monitoring and resolution of labour affairs" in the industrial concentration of Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi (Jabotabek). These offices of the Department of Labour Power would be able to handle reports direct from the public, or as raised in the press.<sup>31</sup>

Workers have been, in practice, regularly hauled before the local intelligence sections of the police, or before Kopkamtib officers.<sup>32</sup> Indoc reports the case of PT Textra in 1980, where not only did the Kopkamtib Area Special Executive act as the company spokesman against workers, but actually signed the employer's "Data on the Reason for the Dismissals".<sup>33</sup>

### Opstib [Operasi Tertib]

The abolition of Kopkamtib went together with the abolition of a relatively obscure organization, Opstibpus [Operasi Tertib Pusat]<sup>34</sup> - Operation Order - with that organization's functions being dispersed to all government departments and agencies. Opstib was established in September 1977 by Presidential Instruction 9/1977, following a request in June of that year by the President to Kopkamtib to assist the government in dealing with widespread corruption, especially illegal charges and tolls and bribes.<sup>35</sup> The Minister for Reform of the State Apparatus was responsible for coordination of the operation, with assistance to be provided as required by the Chief of Staff of Kopkamtib (Admiral Sudomo at the time).<sup>36</sup> The first head (1977-1986) was Major-General E.J. Kanter, a military lawyer.<sup>37</sup>

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31. "Pos Siaga Naker Siap Bantu Pengusaha dan Karyawan", *Kompas*, 8 June 1984.

32. See many examples reported from the late 1970s onwards in INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit. *Kronologi PT Central Star Knitting Corporation*, (Bogor: FBSI, Januari 1983) shows the involvement of the local Police Security Intelligence [Intelpampol] unit. In the case of striking workers at P.T. U.I.P.I. at Cimanggis, Bogor,

a territorial operation was carried out by government apparatus consisting of: Village Guidance NCOs [Babinsa], Village Social Leadership NCOs [Binmas Desa], District officials [Kecamatan], Village Heads [Kepala desa], and local Neighbourhood Association [RT/RW] officers coordinated by the Military District Chief of Staff [Kasdim] 0621 Bogor Kabupaten, Social and Political Regional Staff, as well as the Cimanggis Police Commandant. (Ibid., p.11)

33. See INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., pp.5-22. This case parallels Korean reports of the KCIA signing labour dispute settlements as a party to the dispute. See Choi Jang Jip, *Interest Groups and Political Control in South Korea: A Study of the Labor Unions in Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980*, (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, August 1983). In Indonesia, one constant means of harassment of labour organising is the accusation of involvement (even of workers unborn in 1965) in the 30th September Movement/Communist Party of Indonesia. See, for example, *Kronologi P.T. Central Star Knitting Corporation*, op.cit., pp.18 ff.

34. Opstibpus and Opstib are used interchangeably here as in most references to the organization, although Opstibpus seems to have been the official title.

35. "Mengenang PO Box 999", *Tempo*, 17 September 1988.

36. For the Presidential Instruction, and Opstibpus's own explanation of its original task see Indonesia, Kopkamtib/Opstibpus, (n.d.) *Operasi Tertib*, (Jakarta: Kopkamtib, Operasi Tertib Pusat). On its abolition see "Opstib dibubarkan sebagai tinjau lanjut pembentukan Bakorstanas" *Jayakarta*, 8 September 1988.

37. Harsja W. Bachtiar, *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1988), p.161.



At the time of its abolition, the Centre for Operation Order was headed by a Coordinator, Air Force Major-General Kahardiman SH, who earlier had been Acting Secretary of Kopkamtib. Opstibpus had a reputation for being tough and clean - helped by high wages, good facilities, and perks such as private cars.<sup>38</sup> According to government sources, the first five years of Operation Order yielded Rp.700 milyar to the government.<sup>39</sup> Later, Opstib's operations broadened somewhat. One exercise commonly referred to was Opstib's assistance in overcoming difficulties encountered in the compulsory acquisition of land for construction of a ring-road around Jakarta - Operasi Pembebasan Tanah. Opstibpus brought in its own surveyors and accountants to ensure that proper compensation was paid to those actually entitled.<sup>40</sup>

Although Opstibpus was publically associated with attempts to regularize the government apparatus, it was in fact involved in a somewhat broader range of activities. When Admiral Sudomo announced the establishment of Labour Assistance Teams in 1981, Opstibpus officers were named as regular members of the teams.<sup>41</sup> It is not clear whether they had any role in the successor organizations to these teams. As part of these wider operations Opstibpus was also reported to undertake substantial surveillance activities.<sup>42</sup>

### **After Kopkamtib: Bakorstanas**

The demise of the twenty-two year-old Kopkamtib had been expected from early 1988. When Benny Moerdani stepped down as Armed Forces Commander in favour of General Try Sutrisno, both Moerdani and the then State Secretary Sudharmono spoke in the press about the need to reconsider the suitability of Kopkamtib for the tasks of the present period.<sup>43</sup>

The reasons for the removal of Kopkamtib and its replacement with Bakorstanas are not yet completely clear. Some were external - such as the need to assuage foreign criticism of government repression that even surfaced in the backrooms of the 1988 IGGI meeting, and Suharto's to date fruitless pursuit of the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. Others were internal - including the desire of Moerdani and other military leaders for the army to retain control of Indonesian society from a less prominent and visible position.

According to Try Soetrisno, it was simply a matter of Kopkamtib having done its job well, and circumstances having changed: Kopkamtib had served a "preventive-educational" role, and a limited repressive one in the past, and had "restored security and order". Now what was needed stability - something "which must always be good -

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38. PS/14.

39. Indonesia, Kopkamtib/Opstibpus, op.cit.

40. PS/14. See "Opstib jamin ganti rugi utuh pada yang berhak", *Kompas*, 7 July 1988.

41. *Kompas*, 28 August 1981.

42. PS/22.

43. See, for example, Sudharmono's comments at Moerdani's retirement as Armed Forces Commander, *Kompas*, February 28, 1988.

stability that is dynamic". Soetrisno went on to specify the kind of stability that Bakorstanas is intended to achieve:

Stability broadly speaking, covering political stability, economic, social, cultural, and defence and security stability. Broad, wide-ranging. That stability becomes the responsibility of the government - that is departments and agencies - and the whole society.<sup>44</sup>

While the details of the elite military debate are not known, it is certain that at least one grouping of serving and retired generals had advocated the abolition of Kopkamtib for some time, arguing that it had done its work, and now brought Indonesia only international disrepute and domestic resentment.<sup>45</sup>

The half-year wait between the first public intimations that change was on the way and the announcement of the new body may well have reflected wider intra-state conflict over the future direction of the regime symbolized in the military's campaign against Vice-President Sudharmono. Certainly the changeover was announced in the midst of the most strenuous anti-communist campaign in over a decade - which was certainly in part a military factional tactic aimed at Sudharmono.

Kopkamtib was abolished on 5 September 1988, and replaced by Bakorstanas the same day, with General Try Sutrisno as its chairperson.<sup>46</sup> Bakorstanas is ostensibly to be advisory in character, and responsible directly to the President. The body is described as "non-structural" - like Kopkamtib. Kodam Commanders switched from being the Area Special Executives [Laksusda] for the Kopkamtib Commander to being the Area Bakorstanas executives [Bakorstanasda].

State Secretary Moerdiono explained that Bakorstanas would coordinate efforts by government departments and agencies towards the restoration, maintenance and reinforcement of national stability in the face of various obstructions, challenges and threats...

Soetrisno stressed the limitations on the new body:

From this Presidential Decision Bakorstanas has the function of monitoring data and information. I have the authority to document existing or now issues.<sup>47</sup>

The basic work towards these objectives, Moerdiono said, would be done by the various departments and agencies of the government. But if "fast and effective measures" needed to be taken, especially in the face of physical threats to national stability, then the President could authorize the Armed Forces Commander to use the powers at his disposal. Any department or agency facing difficulties or obstructions, he

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44. "Bangsa ini memerlukan pertahanan total" *Tempo*, 17 September, 1988, p.29.

45. PS/37, PS/38, PS/40, PS/14. Gen. (Ret.) Sumitro claimed he advocated its abolition during his tenure as Kopkamtib Commander. (Interview, Jakarta, 9 June 1988) See also Sumitro's comments on the change in *Kompas*, 13 September 1988.

46. Presidential Decisions No.29/1988 and No.252/M/1988. The following paragraphs are based on the account in *Kompas*, 7 September 1988 unless otherwise noted.

47. "Bangsa ini..." op.cit., p.30.

said, may request the assistance of the Armed Forces.

The board of the agency is chaired by General Sutrisno. Permanent members include the Secretaries of the Coordinating Ministers for Political and Security Affairs, Economy and Finance, and People's Welfare, delegates from the Armed Forces Headquarters, the various services (including the National Police), the Attorney-General's Department, and from Bakin. Other members will be co-opted as necessary. A Secretariat is located at Armed Forces Headquarters, and headed by a senior officer responsible to the Armed Forces Commander. The cost of central Bakorstanas activities will be paid out of the Armed Forces budget; that of its technical and regional operations will come from the budgets of the departments concerned, including that of the Armed Forces. Most importantly, until there is specific legislation to the contrary, the web of regulations proclaimed under Kopkamtib auspices over the past two decades remain in force, and Kodam commanders retain their effective authority as Laksusda.

Yet after its first year of operation the hope evoked by the passing of Kopkamtib has been dampened, if not stamped out. Bakorstanas in practice has turned out to have many of the characteristics of its unlamented predecessor. During student protests at the Bandung Institute of Technology [ITB] soldiers acting under Bakorstanas authority, working with police, raided student buildings and homes, arrested students without warrants, and held them in detention without either warrants or charges. According to a student document students held by Bakorstanas for interrogation have been beaten and bashed, kicked, burned with cigarettes, and several afterwards admitted to hospital in intensive care after suffering bayonet gashings and stamping by jackboots which caused them to vomit blood from internal injuries.<sup>48</sup> Another ITB document refers to "Bakorstanas torturers". These cases suggest that the announced promises about Bakorstanas' "coordinating" role have yet to be honoured.

Yet the fact that certain promises were made, and that Kopkamtib was abolished does to some extent render the security apparatus more vulnerable. Demands can be made that the new agency act within the procedures set down in the criminal code - and from the response to the ITB incident, it appears that students and lawyers have been asserting those rights in direct criticism of Bakorstanas violations of the law. Human rights activists have been provided with a little more leverage in their battle with Leviathan.

### **BAIS ABRI: Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency**

By the late 1980s Bais ABRI [Badan Intelijen Stratejis ABRI] had become the most important element of the Indonesian intelligence structure proper.<sup>49</sup> It is the military body formally responsible for the collection of intelligence, both external and domestic, military, political and social, with the term "strategic" understood to refer to the broad interests of the state, rather than a narrow definition referring to military affairs or international geo-politics. Bais is a centralized operational intelligence-gathering body closely articulated with the resources of the Armed Forces Commander

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48. From a Pernyataan Sikap issued from a Kerja Nasional Forum Komunikasi, Senat-Senat Mahasiswa Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan (IKIP) Se-Indonesia at Cibubur 8-11 September 1989.

49. Note that in the case of Bakin and Bais, the term "badan" which is usually translated as "body" has been rendered as "agency".

(who was, until early 1988, the Commander of Kopkamtib). It is the peak of the separate service intelligence structures. In particular, it is at the apex of the line of army intelligence assistants from the office of the Army Chief of Staff down through the Kodams and Korems and Kodims (where the Asintel structure stops) to the local Koramil captain or warrant officer and finally to the Babinsa [Village Guidance NCO] in the villages and kampungs.

### *Origins*

Bais epitomises the effects of Moerdani's efforts to transform the Indonesian military, particularly the intelligence and security streams. It was formed in the reorganization of 1983 out of the smaller Strategic Intelligence Centre [Pusintelstrat], which had existed in some form under the same name since at least 1970.<sup>50</sup> Apart from being larger and more comprehensive in role than its predecessor, Bais is a manifestation of two significant long-term trends in the structure of the intelligence and security system under Moerdani: centralization and professionalization. With the change of name came a shift from the Ministry to the Armed Forces Commander's headquarters staff. The new name - "body" [badan] rather than the old "centre" [pusat]<sup>51</sup> - signified a major upgrading:

As *Sinar Harapan* describes it, the term Badan in ABRI parlance refers to an institution that imposes centralized control in its "field" throughout the Armed Services. Pusat, on the other hand, refers to an institution which replicates at the central level partly autonomous organizations within each of the service. Thus "Bais-ABRI probably will perform those intelligence functions within ABRI's domain which up to now were probably carried out by each of the services' intelligence chiefs". In effect, the creation of Bais, its titling and status, represent a concentration of "intelligence capabilities" in institutional terms which until now has only existed in personal terms --i.e., Benny Moerdani's simultaneous holding of three key intelligence positions.

Bais's concerns parallel those of the previously pre-eminent intelligence organization, Bakin [Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara - the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency] - that is, military and political intelligence, foreign and domestic. Unlike Bakin, however, Bais is solely military in personnel, and has, assuming the Kopkamtib arrangements are unchanged in practice, an operational arm through the Laksusda structure that Bakin lacks.

The new organization manifests Moerdani's drive to professionalize the intelligence system under military control. Its hierarchical and formal structure is the antithesis of the amorphous personally-controlled Opsus empire employed on an almost private basis by Ali Moertopo from the mid-sixties to the late seventies. Unlike Moertopo's practice of drawing the best operatives from the existing political

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50. "Current data on the Indonesian military elite after the reorganization of 1969 - 1970", *Indonesia*, 10, (1970), p.194.

51. "Current data on the Indonesian military elite..." *Indonesia*, 37, (1984), pp.149-150 (hereafter "Current data..."). At the time Moerdani simultaneously held the positions of Assistant for Intelligence [Asintel] to the Chief of the ABRI General Staff (and before that, to the Minister of Defence and Security), Deputy Head [Wakil Kedua] of Bakin, and Head of Pusintelstrat [Kapusintelstrat], as well as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Pangab) and Commander of Kopkamtib from 1983. Between 1978-1983 he had also been Assistant for Intelligence at Kopkamtib (Asintel Kopkamtib): see David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p.27.

environment (or from amongst his former enemies), the development of Bais has been prepared for with the establishment of an Armed Forces intelligence school. The ABRI Intelligence Development Centre [Pusat Pengembangan Intelijens ABRI] at Ciomas near Bogor was intended to supplement the existing, less sophisticated service schools, especially the Army's Intelligence School nearby at Ci Kemeuh in western Bogor.<sup>52</sup>

#### *Structure*

From 1983 - 1988 Bais was under the command of its Head, who was also the Commander of the Armed Forces, Benny Moerdani. (See Table 8.3.) As of mid-1988 his successor, Try Sutrisno had not taken on the position of Head [Kepala] of Bais. Instead, Moerdani's Deputy Head, Major-General Sutarjo, remained in that position as the effective, if not the formal, head of the organization. What is striking, however, is that (at least during the transition period) Sutarjo reported to both the Minister for Defence and Security and the Armed Forces Commander.<sup>53</sup>

At the centre, Bais consists of three echelons - ten sections, a number of administration detachments, and five operational units. The sections, their heads as of mid-1988, and the number of subordinate units in each, are set out in Table 8.4 and Figure 8.3.

The work of Section I is not known, but it has been suggested that it may refer to East Timor operations. The work of the Vietnamese Management section was under the supervision of the organization's deputy head (and effective head), and reportedly under Moerdani's direct control.

As in much of the rest of the intelligence system, most of these senior officers hold powerful positions elsewhere, often several. Major-General Nugroho, for example, was appointed Director A (Internal Affairs) Bais in 1983. Between 1984 and 1988 he was Deputy Attorney-General (Intelligence) [Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Intelijen] until early in 1988 when he moved to become the Secretary-General of the Department of the Interior [Dalam Negeri]. Between 1986 and 1988 he was on the Expert Staff of the Kopkamtib Commander.<sup>54</sup> Throughout this period Nugroho remained as head of the key Internal Affairs [A] section of Bais.

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52. The new ABRI Intelligence School (sometimes referred to as Pusedik (Intel?) ABRI) runs a six-month course for all services, with army entry at captain level.

53. PS/22, PS/14.

54. Most of the central Jakarta offices of Bais are located in Tebet, except for the Bais A [Dalam Negeri] offices, which are on Merdeka Barat, close by the Departemen Dalam Negeri headquarters.

Table 8.3  
Heads of Pusintelstrat and Bais  
1970 - 1989

**Pusintelstrat**

- |  |                     |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. Major-General Yoga Sugama<br>Deputy Head: Major-General Djajusman | 28.V.70 - 18.VII.71 |
| 2. Major-General Djajusman   | 18.VII.71 - 11.X.73 |
| 3. Rear-Admiral Koesnadi Bagda                                       | ? - 11.VIII.77      |
| 4. Major-General Benny Moerdani                                      | 11.VIII.77 - 1983   |

**Bais**

- |   |                |
|---|----------------|
| 1. Lieutenant-General Benny Moerdani<br>Deputy Head: Major-General M.I. Sutarjo | 1983 - ?.II.88 |
| 2. Major-General M.I. Sutarjo   | ??.1988 -      |


Sources: "Current Data...", various years; *Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara R.I.*, (annual), (Jakarta: B.P.Alda - Penerbit Almanak R.I.) various years; Harsja W. Bachtjar, (1988), *Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1988).

Table 8.4  
Strategic Intelligence Body  
[Bais]  
Major Divisions\*

A.	Internal Affairs (Nugroho)		[7]
B.	External Affairs (Pandji Susilo)	<i>Ranks.</i>	[5]
C.	Military Affairs (I Gusti Ngurah Gde)		[4]
D.	Security/Counter-Intelligence [Pengamanan] (Panjaitan)		[5]
E.	Planning, Research and Development (Tedy Roesdi)	<i>Spelt 4.250</i>	[4]
F.	Management (Not known)		[2]
G.	Intelligence Production (Sudibyo)		[4]
H.	Supervision (not known)		[2]
I.	[Not known]		[Not known]
	Special Section: Vietnamese Management (Sutarjo)		[Not known]

Note: \* Bracketed figures indicate sub-divisions under this section.

Figure 8.3  
BIS  
Headquarters Organisation





Similarly, the Director G (Intelligence Production) Bais, Major-General Sudibyo, was simultaneously the Assistant for Intelligence to the Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff [Asintel Kasum ABRI] and automatically, Asintel Kopkamtib.<sup>55</sup> In late 1987, Sudibyo became the Deputy Head of Bakin, while retaining his position as Director G (Intelligence Production) in Bais.<sup>56</sup> Air Force Major-General Teddy Rusdi, was simultaneously Director E (Planning and R & D) Bais and Assistant for General Planning (and Budgets) to the Armed Forces Commander, an extremely important bureaucratic position literally controlling the purse-strings of the Armed Forces.<sup>57</sup>

In other words, the senior Bais officers sit at the very centre of the intelligence and security system and are intertwined with Kopkamtib, the ABRI Staff, Bakin, and the most politically significant "civilian" departments, Interior and Attorney-General's.

The administration detachments at Bais headquarters are straightforward - Headquarters Detachment, Communications Detachment, Secretariat, Finance, Laboratory Services, Cypher/Coding Services and Photo Laboratory Services. More important are the five operational units or teams, distinct from the staff level sections. These are Strategic Intelligence, Basic Intelligence (Records, Archives, etc.), Domestic Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence, and Technical Intelligence (Electronic Intelligence, etc.).

This Bais central staff and unit structure is then positioned atop the line of service intelligence branches, especially the Army's Asintel line, reporting upwards from the Kodim to Korem to Kodam and then Bais.

#### *Foreign Activities*

There are five possible significant areas of foreign activity for Bais: running military attaches in Indonesian embassies; strategic military and political assessments of the external environment; foreign intelligence operations; cooperation with friendly foreign intelligence agencies; and counter-intelligence at home against foreign services. Directorate B (External Affairs) is in charge of running of military attaches abroad.

Both Bais and Bakin produce annual assessments of the strategic situation facing the Indonesian state, both in domestic and external terms, with at least part of the Bakin assessment circulating in non-military circles. In recent years there has been considerable rivalry between the two organizations, partly expressed through these annual assessments. The Armed Forces Commander's annual Leaders' Meeting [Rapat Pimpinan - Rapim Pangab], at which the Kodam commanders, the ABRI staff hierarchy and the commanders of the elite units, together with the Armed Forces Commander [Pangab], debate the coming year's outlook, base their discussions on the Bais assessment.<sup>58</sup>

Cooperation with the intelligence agencies of friendly foreign countries is shared

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55. In April 1988 Sudibyo was reportedly replaced as Asintel Kasum ABRI by Rear-Admiral Sumitro. [PS/22]

56. On Sutarjo and Sudibyo see Bachtiar, *op.cit.*, p.408 and p.324 respectively, though there are errors in both entries. As is often the case with younger senior intelligence officers, both biographies show long gaps - up to twenty years in Sutarjo's case. See Appendix 2 for the careers of these and other intelligence and security officers.

57. One source claimed that as of April 1988 Rusdi had been replaced in both jobs by Major-General Sugeng Subroto, Commander of Kodam V/Brawijaya. By mid-June, however, both were still at their old posts and no new posting for Rusdi had been announced.

58. PS/14; PS/15.

by Bais and Bakin - probably along a notional "military"/"civilian" distinction. Since Indonesia receives military assistance from a wide range of western countries there is probably a comparable range of base level contact - with military attaches at least - through Bais. More intimate contact seems limited to the United States and several of the ASEAN states. With the latter, there are annual meetings and exchanges of discussion papers.<sup>59</sup>

There is no evidence of active external intelligence operations by Bais to date, though it is reasonable to assume that they are conducted. In the past Bakin has regularly operated abroad, often on offensive covert operations.<sup>60</sup> Not only does Indonesia face a hostile external environment from foreign governments and citizens' groups critical of its domestic political repression and its occupation of East Timor, but Indonesian military doctrine positively recommends such operations. According to the Army Staff and Command College manual:

1) Strategic intelligence activities and operations include investigation, counter-intelligence and psychological warfare/supportive action efforts, covert and open.

2) Foreign targets are dealt with covertly. Domestic targets are dealt with covertly or openly.<sup>61</sup>

One area where Bais foreign operations could be expected would be in Papua-New Guinea, against both the OPM [Organisasi Papua Merdeka - Free Papua Movement] and their supporters in that country. It is likely that there is now either a Bais dominance on Papua-New Guinea, or at least some degree of competition with Bakin. The confirmed bribery of the important Papua-New Guinea political figure, Ted Diro (then Defence Minister), by Moerdani indicates the ability of Indonesian intelligence to intervene in its neighbour's political life beyond the question of the OPM. Another area of Bais concern would be Lisbon, a large centre of East Timorese refugees. Finally, Australia would be an important intelligence target for Bais, both because of the Timorese connection, and because of the general strategic situation of the two countries.

#### *Political activities*

Although it is a military organization Bais is highly oriented towards political analysis - in line with the general ABRI concern for social engineering and social control. Its Internal Affairs (A) and Internal Security (D) Directorates operate on an archipelago-wide day-to-day monitoring of all social conditions deemed politically significant - what Indonesian military terminology dubs *Ipoleksosbudmil* matters (Ideological - political - economic - social - cultural - military). Here there is a close integration with the Army's Social and Political Affairs and Territorial Staff structure, and with the Social and Political and Special Directorates of the Department of the

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59. PS/15. One area yet to be explored is possible electronic intelligence cooperation between Indonesia and other countries. See footnote 83 below.

60. PS/13.

61. Indonesia, Seskoad, *op.cit.*, p.311 and chapter 2.18 - "Intelligence Operations".

Interior and the office of the Deputy Attorney-General (Intelligence).

But there are still some important matters which are unclear. On the one hand, a number of informants, targets of intelligence agency activities, claimed that there were many military intelligence agents and informers in political organizations, religious groups, universities, non-government organizations, and so on. Yet for understandable reasons, most victims were unable to distinguish between Bakin and military watchers, or different parts of the military out of uniform.

Other informants believed that Bais now does have a widespread informer and agent network, but believed that Bais does not have the kind of covert action and "dirty tricks" capacities for which Bakin (and especially Opsus) were notorious in the 1970s. More specifically, these observers believed that Bais does not have an effective apparatus for political intervention equal to that of Ali Moertopo's Opsus. Some observers suggested that the lack of such a capacity (and raw political skill compared with Moertopo) was a factor in Moerdani's recent political difficulties.

The generalized use of terror by military intelligence will be dealt with in Chapter Eleven. For the moment, it is enough to say that Bais is the peak of the Army Asintel structures, which employ torture and abuse of legal rights on an administrative basis. But the question of Bais's political operations is still open. The comparison between Moertopo and Moerdani does raise a further question. What is the net political effect of the kind of bureaucratic centralization and professionalization Moerdani has put in place? Are there in fact certain types of covert political operations and certain types of political judgement that have to be exercised somewhere within the state apparatus of permanently militarized states? In South Korea, the KCIA was purged and its influence shredded by Chun Doo Hwan in 1979-80 after the director of the KCIA assassinated President Park Chung-Hee. Yet within four or five years, the agency had returned to something like its former position, reportedly because of the inability of its main rivals, Army Counter Intelligence (latterly the Defense Security Command) and the National Police, to come up with the political, as opposed to the sheer repressive, goods.

### **Army Intelligence: from Aspam Kasad to Babinsa**

The effectiveness of Bais as a body engaged in comprehensive surveillance and preventive and repressive intervention rests on its articulation with the Kopkamtib legal structure on the one hand, and the personnel and organization of the Armed Forces Intelligence, Social and Political Affairs and Territorial lines on the other.

#### *Headquarters intelligence and security staff*

Since the re-organization of 1983, the command and staff picture has been as follows. At the headquarters staff level, there are two structures: the staffs of the Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Social and Political Staff, and the staff of the Army Chief of Staff.

Directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces [Pangab] are the Chief of the ABRI General Staff [Kasum ABRI], the Chief of the Social and Political Affairs Staff [Kassospol ABRI] and the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces [Irjen ABRI].<sup>62</sup> (See Figure 8.4.) Amongst the Assistants responsible to these

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62. The Chief of ABRI General Staff is responsible for most of the staff activities found in "normal" armies - operations, intelligence, personnel, logistics, communications, plus territorial affairs and public order and security in the Indonesian internal security emphasis. The Chief of the Social and Political Staff manages the social and political affairs structure and the whole Armed Forces supply of

positions are those for

Intelligence [Asintel ABRI]

Operations [Asops ABRI]

Territorial Affairs [Aster ABRI]

Communications and Electronics [Askomlek ABRI]<sup>63</sup>

Security and Social Order [Askamtibmas ABRI]

Social and Political Affairs [Assospol ABRI]

Each of these coordinates some area of the intelligence/ security system for ABRI. Bais is responsible directly to the Commander in Chief as was Pusintelstrat before 1983.


For our purposes the most important of these ABRI intelligence-related positions is the Assistant for Intelligence [Asintel ABRI]. This position has been maintained, *mutatis mutandis*, through all the re-organizations of the Department of Defence and Security [Hankam] and Armed Forces Head Quarters since the mid-1960s. The position now labelled as Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff is apparently

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officers and NCOs to civilian agencies where they work as *karyawan*. This officer also manages their political direction.

63. The role of the Assistant for Communications and Electronics (to the ABRI Chief of the General Staff) [Askomlek] is rarely commented upon in relation to intelligence. Since Indonesia is not known to be party to any international military or intelligence sharing agreements (of the UKUSA Agreement-type) this may be understandable. But conventional military electronic surveillance is probably considerable vis-a-vis Malaysia and Singapore and East Timor. Certainly Indonesia, with considerable overseas aid, has invested a great deal in upgrading both civilian and military electronic communications in recent years. There may be a measure of cooperation with Malaysia for electronic surveillance of the Straits of Malacca. The role of computer data-bases in internal surveillance is considered later in this thesis, and this office may be involved.

Figure 8.4  
 Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters  
 Security and Intelligence Organisation



equivalent to the Assistant for Intelligence to the Central Army Command from the early 60s (the incumbent from 1962 - 1965 was Major-General S. Parman, a key target on October 1, 1965) to 1970 (when Sutopo Juwono was in charge); and to the Assistant for Intelligence to the Joint Command in Hankam from 1970 (Yoga Sugama) to sometime around 1985. As already noted, the Asintel ABRI from 1985-88 was also the Deputy Head of Bais, Sutarjo.

Below the level of the Armed Forces headquarters level, there are the service headquarters and their staffs and operational units, the most important of which are those of the Army. The separate social and political staff found at the ABRI level disappears here<sup>64</sup>, although the function is carried out at every level down to the village koramil post. For present purposes, the important positions are those of Assistant for Security to the Army Chief of Staff [Aspam Kasad] and Assistant for Territorial Affairs [Aster Kasad], especially the former, where *pengamanan* is understood to include intelligence.

*The Asintel structure - Kodam to Koramil*


Beyond the small Jakarta headquarters intelligence staff is the intelligence (and social and political affairs) organization which actually does the work of surveillance and preventive and repressive intervention, and which is linked to the control and direction of Bais above, and which was given executive authority in Kopkamtib mode. The bureaucratic arrangements, as laid down in formal *Decisions* of the Army Chief of Staff, display the manner in which intelligence and social and political control concerns increasingly dominate the army structure the closer it gets to the village and kampung level. These are as follows:

At the Military Area Command [Kodam] level, the Commander is assisted by an Intelligence Staff, usually headed by a Colonel, responsible for carrying out supporting staff activities in investigation, counter-intelligence and covert action/psychological

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64. It is not clear just how the work of the ABRI Social and Political Affairs Staff is articulated with the intense social and political concerns of army commands from kodam to koramil level, and to the Social and Political Affairs Directorate in the Department of the Interior. Harold Crouch recalls that Social and Political Affairs staff were present in the old structure, which ran (from his memory) A-1 (Intelligence), A-2 (operations), A-3 (Personnel), A-4 (Logistics), A-5 (Social and Political - i.e. Territorial), A-6 (Kekaryaan), A-7 (Finance). (Personal communication.) There is also the problem of the nominally civilian bureaucracy in the Department of Home Affairs. This is briefly discussed in the next chapter.

Figure 8.5  
Military Area Command  
[Kodam]



warfare. (See Figure 8.5) Accordingly they are to plan and coordinate the Kodam's intelligence policies, operations, units, and resources for each of these areas. This staff coordinates with the Kodam Intelligence Detachment [Den Inteldam], a unit which carries out intelligence operations, and which also continuously updates information on security-related social conditions [Ipoleksosbud] for such operations and for the Kodam commander.<sup>65</sup>

Similarly at Military Sub-Area Command [Korem] level (see Figure 8.6) there is a Korem Intelligence Staff [Sintelrem], with a Major as Head of Intelligence Section [Kasi Intelrem], and an Intelligence Platoon headed by a company grade officer.<sup>66</sup>

At the Military District [Kodim] level, the Kodim Intelligence Section Staff [Siinteldim] is led by a junior officer, usually a captain [Pasi Inteldim], with a couple of warrant officers for assistants. But at this level, the military district command, the intelligence, territorial and social and political affairs functions are fused. In addition to the local version of the intelligence duties set out above, this unit is responsible for:

- a) Development of geographic, demographic and social conditions to produce reliable locations, instruments and conditions of struggle.
  
- b) Development of the Armed Forces as a Social Force, including the organization of the Armed Forces Sacred Duty [penyelenggaraan Bhakti ABRI] in that area.
  
- c) Development of the Armed Forces functionaries [karyawan] and the Greater Family of the Armed Forces in the area.
  
- d) Assisting the arrangement of the management of social and political conditions in the area.
  
- e) carrying out communications with the community and organising the authority in the event of a state of emergency being enacted according to law.<sup>67</sup>

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65. See Indonesia, ABRI, Markas Besar, TNI-AD, *Pokok Pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam)*, Keputusan Kepala Staf TNI-AD, (Markas Besar, TNI-AD, No. KEP/4/I/1985, Tanggal 12 Januari, 1985), Pasal 10 and 49.


66. The total Korem Intelligence Section personnel is about ten - a major, a captain, a brace of NCOs and one or two privates. See Indonesia, ABRI, Markas Besar TNI-AD, *Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Resort Militer (Korem)*", op.cit., Pasal 9 and 28 and appendix.

67. Indonesia, ABRI, Markas Besar TNI-AD, *Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim): Keputusan Kepala Staf TNI-AD*, (Markas Besar, TNI-AD, No.Kep/2/I/1985, Tanggal 10 Januari 1985), Pasal 9 and appendix.



Figure 8.6  
Army Intelligence and Security  
Staff and Line Organisation

Note that only Intellegence, Sospol and  
Tritorial positions are entered here.



Finally, at the base of the entire edifice of territorial management and control is the Military Sub-District Command [Koramil], headed by a Captain or by a Warrant Officer, who in turn commands a small headquarters staff made up of three NCOs - one for administration [Ba Tuud], one for Peoples Resistance Force activities [Baurwanra], and one for management of social conditions [Baurkonsos], including intelligence affairs. In the village itself is the Village Guidance NCO [Babinsa]. (See Figure 8.7.)

The specification of duties of the Baurkonsos and Babinsa are revealing:<sup>68</sup>

*Social Conditions NCO [Baurkonsos]*

- 1) Preparing reports on social forces/potentials in rural areas [perdesaan] connected to Defence and Security affairs.
- 2) Collecting information/maintaining records in the intelligence area.
- 3) Assisting the Koramil commander in protecting the development of social conditions in the area.

*Village Guidance NCO [Babinsa]*

- 1) Training Peoples Resistance [Wanra] units.
- 2) Leading Peoples Resistance in the villages.
- 3) Giving instruction in awareness of defence of the state.
- 4) Giving instruction in village community development in the area of State Security and Defence.
- 5) Protecting Hankam facilities and resources in rural areas.
- 6) Giving reports to the Koramil commander on a regular basis and in connection with unusual village social conditions.


This is literally the bottom line of the Army Intelligence structure: the NCOs in the villages, routinely giving "guidance"; reporting on whatever happens, especially anything "unusual"; reporting on "social forces" (meaning any formal or informal social or political or cultural or economic organization or grouping); and of course carrying out active intelligence work as directed.

When this structure is further linked to the local Civil Defence [Hansip] personnel on the streets, and the village-based organization and the nation-wide system of *rukun warga*, *rukun tetangga* and *rukun kampung* (neighbourhood associations in towns and villages), an extraordinarily close mesh of control is in place - at least in theory

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68. Indonesia, ABRI, Markas Besar TNI-AD, *Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Rayon Militer (Koramil): Keputusan Kepala Staf TNI-AD*, (Markas Besar, TNI-AD, No.Kep/3/I/1985, Tanggal 10 Januari 1985), Pasal 9 and 10.

Figure 8.7  
Military Sub-District Command  
Organization



if not in practice.<sup>69</sup> The Civil Defence [Hansip], administered by the Department of the Interior but in practice integrated into the Armed Forces provides a second street-level watch on comings and goings, providing "base-level intelligence".

The Neighbourhood Association organization is partly an expression of community from below, partly a lowest level of government administration. It is certainly "the base level of control", with close association between village heads [*lurah*], the Neighbourhood Association heads, the Babinsa and his retired colleagues living nearby in the Greater Family of the Armed Forces [Keluarga Besar ABRI].

This section of the thesis has reported the designs set out in military legislation and manuals, and the views of informed observers who are mostly Jakarta-based. It is doubtful whether the grand planning is completely realised in practice. Unfortunately, no village study that I am aware of has addressed the issue of state control and the implementation of territorial management doctrines and structures. The nearest is the work of John Sullivan in his study of a Jogjakarta kampung and its relations with the state.

## Conclusion

In summary, then, the New Order has seen an expansion and rationalization of military intelligence and security organizations. Kopkamtib was for more than twenty years the operational core of security management, though it was in fact not a distinct organization but another way of arranging the Armed Forces Headquarters and Kodam staffs. During the period of Moerdani's tenure as Armed Forces Commander, the most important development was the replacement of the small Strategic Intelligence Centre [Pusintelstrat] by the Strategic Intelligence Agency [Bais] and the placement of that body at the centre of all territorial intelligence activities. At the same time, the Army's regional monitoring structure of intelligence, social-political and territorial posts was elaborated and extended to the lowest administrative levels of Indonesian society, and coordinated with nominally non-military neighbourhood surveillance bodies.

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69. See John Sullivan, "Kampung and state: the role of government in the development of urban community in Yogyakarta", *Indonesia*, 41 (1986).