Chapter 3
Surveillance and the model of totalitarian rule

This chapter is concerned with the second of the three core concepts with which this thesis is concerned, namely surveillance. Together with militarization and terror, surveillance is the key to understand the importance of intelligence agencies in contemporary Third World politics. In this chapter it is linked to the question of totalitarian rule, and an assertion that it is necessary to consider the question of contemporary Third World militarized states in the same light as the fascist experience which underlies models of totalitarian rule.

The chapter begins with Michel Foucault's original discussion of the idea of surveillance in the shift in characteristic types of punishments in Western Europe between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For Foucault the emerging carceral paradigm of punishment signalled the onset of a broader type of social control or policing based on surveillance and state processing of knowledge of citizens based on that surveillance - "the disciplinary society". Internal pacification of the society was a prerequisite for the use of surveillance-based forms of control. On the basis of that internal pacification, surveillance and the creation, maintenance, intellectual analysis, and peopling of categories of deviance develop together - and recur in the development of more formalised agencies of domestic political intelligence in the twentieth century.

Giddens takes Foucault's idea of surveillance as the basis for a reinterpretation of the concept of totalitarian rule, which he regards as a potential within all modern states. For Giddens, the key elements of totalitarian rule are an extreme focusing of surveillance; moral totalism; terror; and the prominence of a leader figure with mass support. This model is based on the German and Italian fascist states, and on the Stalinist Soviet state.

I will argue that while Giddens' linking of surveillance and the potential for totalitarian rule is helpful, the value of his model of totalitarian rule is somewhat vitiated by a failure to consider the parallel episode of "emperor-system fascism" in Japan. The examination of the Japanese experience is important for several reasons.

The Japanese experience modifies the claim that the European and Soviet history provides the only plausible account of pathways to totalitarian rule. It is particularly important because there are some aspects of that experience which provide an important guide to the situation in the contemporary peripheral capitalist state. This is particularly clear in Giddens' failure to consider the question of the role of world-orders in establishing conditions for potential totalitarian rule. The Japanese model of an integrated transnational system of power, with varying types and levels of surveillance and terror at the centre and periphery of the system is the best guide to the current hierarchical world-system of militarization. A central argument of this thesis is that Indonesian politics since 1965 are best understood in terms of a totalitarian ambition, albeit somewhat one which is unsystematic in conception and thwarted in practice. To this end it is helpful to re-think the questions of totalitarian rule and fascism.

Internal pacification and surveillance

The era of militarization known as the "military revolution" of seventeenth century Europe was linked to three fundamental political shifts: the use of armies primarily for external expansion or defence; internal pacification within a more clearly geographically defined nation-state; and social control beyond the bayonet and belief through methods of policing based on surveillance.

The character of the European state-system - the defining "world-order" of the day demanded that the new armies be used almost exclusively for external wars of defence and expansion. To be sure, all states rested then as now on the final resort to force in the shape of the army - whether at Peterloo or the Paris Commune. But the bread and butter work of generals came to be fighting generals and troops of other countries rather than their compatriots. The increasing powers of central national governments allowed - and then, in action-reaction fashion amongst neighbours - required, an externally-oriented military force.

> A state that wished to survive had to increase its extractive capacity over defined territories to obtain conscripted and professional armies. Those that did not were crushed on the battlefield and absorbed into others...No European state was continually at peace. A peaceful state would have ceased to exist more speedily than the militarily inefficient ones actually did.[1]

Equally these demands placed on the state by geo-politics forced the pace of what has been variously called "nation-building" (Bendix), the construction of "organic states" (Mann), or more realistically "internal pacification" (Giddens).[2] Through contest and negotiation with subordinate states and contending or supportive social classes, central national governments, whether absolutist, parliamentary or otherwise, came to prevail as the dominant political form within which social life in a given territory was organized - and which was the primary agent of geo-politics.

> Merchant and landlord capitalists entered and reinforced a world of emergent warring yet diplomatically regulating states. Their need for, and vulnerability to, state regulation both internally and geo-politically, and the state's need for finances, pushed classes and states towards a territorially centralized organization. State boundaries were heightened, and culture, religion, and classes were naturalized.[3]

On the other hand, as internal pacification meant that the resort to domestic military force became less frequent, forms of social control other than force and ideology - the bayonet or belief - were required. Religion and other forms of cultural control remained salient but were never sufficient to ensure order in societies undergoing rapid economic and social transformation. Amongst the most important changes in the form and depth of social control was regulation based on observation and the collection of information by the state and other bodies - surveillance. In the following centuries the manifold

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1. Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power: Volume I - A history of power from the beginning to A.D.1760.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.490.

2. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969); Mann, op.cit.; and Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).

3. Mann, op.cit., p.514.

development of state surveillance generated a wide variety of state and para-state forms of social intervention and control yielding unprecedented capacities for state penetration of society, and, by the fusion of terror and surveillance, the possibility of a new form of rule - the totalitarian ambition.

Foucault and Giddens on surveillance

In two famous passages in *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault provides vivid images of what he presents as the shift between the principal modes of social discipline in pre-modern and modern western history: the public infliction of physical pain to the body and the penitentiary.[4] The book begins with a florid description of the awful fate of the regicide Damiens, who was butchered by the state in public and exemplary fashion in Paris in 1757. The baroque cruelty of the execution was, Foucault suggests, necessarily public, and necessarily a matter of the public visitation of state power on the *body* of the victim: a rite of state.[5] The killing of Damiens stands, for Foucault, as a paradigm of pre-Enlightenment punishment and domestic statecraft.

By contrast, Foucault presents Jeremy Bentham's proposal less than half a century later for a model penitentiary, where a single unseen guard could observe hundreds of prisoners. Bentham's original model, realized in numerous subsequent prison designs in the United States and elsewhere in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, envisaged a circular prison like a multi-storied wheel, with a single guard at the centre able to observe any of the many prisoners in cells on the rim of the wheel. These cells were to be arranged in such a way that at any point the lone guard would be able to observe the activities of any of the prisoners, without them being sure that they were being observed. The full potential of Bentham's idea was limited by the techniques of the mechanical age. Electronic forms of one-way communication and bio-electronic forms of coding and tracking bodies do greater justice to it.

The new reformers' model involved the replacement of physical violence to the body (especially public execution) with imprisonment under what were hoped to be the reforming influences of closely supervised and depersonalised solitude, hard labour and religious indoctrination. Post-Enlightenment modes of punishment were, Foucault argues, a dramatic enhancement in state power over the bodies and minds of prisoners and of citizens generally through the combination of new modes of surveillance and sequestration.

In Foucault's words:

Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of

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4. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, (London: Allen Lane, 1977).

5. The political role of the public body was not limited to the fate of criminals. It was a necessary part of kingship as well. The public and literally visceral fate of the unfortunate regicide Damiens had its necessary echo in that of the sovereign, Louis XIV:

> The king of France was thoroughly, without residue, a "public" personage. His mother gave birth to him in public, and from that moment his existence, down to its most trivial moments, was acted out before the eyes of attendants who were holders of dignified offices. He ate in public, went to bed in public, woke up and was clothed and groomed in public, urinated and defecated in public. He did not much bathe in public; but then neither did he do so in private. I know of no evidence that he copulated in public, but he came near enough, considering the circumstances in which he was expected to deflower his august bride. When he died (in public), his body was promptly and messily chopped up in public, and its severed parts handed out to the more exalted among the personages who had been attending him throughout his mortal existence.

G. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State*, (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp.68-69, cited in Mann, op.cit., p459.

> conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in action; that the perfection of power should render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers...Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable.[6]

For Foucault the Panopticon was not just a prison, but a particular type of prison as a model technology of power based on surveillance "permanent in its effects even if discontinuous in action", since inmates/citizens would be observable at any time, but never sure of just when: a rationalization of domination through heightened surveillance.

For Foucault and others[7] the new prisons of the early nineteenth century signal the onset of a broader change in the mode of social control in the nineteenth century, towards what Foucault regarded as "the disciplinary society", where the two English-language senses of "discipline" manifest the new fusion of knowledge *as* power:

> The Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate men's behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised.[8]

It is possible, Foucault suggests, to speak of a "disciplinary society" emerging from this shift as "an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of `panopticism"'.

> Not because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but because it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring together the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements.[9]

And with the development electronic capacities for surveillance, the Panopticon image becomes hopelessly anachronistic, its functions performed on a much broader scale by computer-mediated social relations:

> The electronic grid is a transparent structure in which activities taking place at the periphery - remote working, electronic banking, the consumption of information and entertainment, tele-shopping, communication - are always visible to the electronic

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6. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p.201. Elsewhere Foucault describes a quarantine during an epidemic as another paradigm of the disciplinary method:

> This enclosed space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted at a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined, and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead - all this constituted a compact model of the disciplinary method. Ibid., p.197.

7. See Michael Ignatieff's discussion of Foucault and Rothman in "State, civil society and total institutions: a critique of recent social histories of punishment" in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

8. Foucault, op.cit., p.204.

9. Ibid., p.216.

"eye" of the central computer systems that manage the networks.[10]

However, while such dramatic amplifications of surveillance capacities are important, we should beware of to easy an acceptance of the totalising claims of omniscience which abound here. Total systems of surveillance are, fed by well-nigh universal fantasy, easy enough to imagine. But there are clear inhibiting factors relevant to all such systems, in all ages. The number of files may be limited, by technical considerations or by limits imposed by legal or practical difficulties. Files may not be available to those who need them - either held centrally but required on a de-centralised basis, or vice-versa. The flow of information between users, or between collection and use may be impeded, and there may be less than technically optimum opportunities for surveillance of subjects within a given system.[11] These are all contingent points of inefficiency, and opportunity for exploitation by resistance.

Moreover, all this is not to suggest that surveillance was a new element of state power: far from it. Rather that the combination of the absolutist state and the uneasy coexistence of capitalist and feudal social relations allowed a pattern in which savage and arbitrary order sat beside a degree of freedom from state surveillance surprising to modern citizens. "Law and order" was maintained previously by

> a combination of traditional mechanisms and those expressing the new authority of the central state. They comprised an amalgam of military violence, a spectacular and brutal penal code and a deferential social hierarchy of patronage constituted by personal relations of dependence and surveillance. Within these structures of social control, subject populations had routine freedoms from the surveillance of state administrators because the impact of market society was more than the traditional structures of community regulation and the new penal powers of the state could accommodate.[12]

The onset of the "disciplinary society" involved a double shift: a shift in the character of punishment went together with a great expansion in the number of formal rules of society:

> The creation of a perceived need for "law and order" is the reverse side of conceptions of "deviance" recognised and categorised by central authorities and professional specialists.[13]

Surveillance and the creation, maintenance, intellectual analysis, and peopling of categories of deviance develop together - and recur in the development of more formalised agencies of domestic political intelligence in the twentieth century.

The subsequent debates over Foucault's "archaeology" of forms of social control in

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10. Frank Webster and Kevin Robins, *Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis*, (Narwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1986), p. 366. See also Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), pp.102-3.

11. See Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline frm 1700 to the Present Day*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p.40.

12. Dandeker, op.cit, p. 58.

13. Giddens, op.cit., p.184.

contemporary industrial societies have substantially modified the dichotomous emphasis of his original bravura portrait. The notion of a "disciplinary society" has rightly been much criticized. Foucault does not provide anything like a comprehensive account of the state. Indeed he maintains that the concept of a disciplinary society and his emphasis on micro-technologies of power and the politics of the body renders such a theory obsolete. In fact, other societies outside Europe had developed comparatively effective surveillance systems over very wide areas based on methods such as family registration, traditional spying, and legal systems of collective familial responsibility.[14]

Some have noticed the functionalism latent in Foucault's exposition which leads him to assume the efficacy of power structures he otherwise claimed to wish to see demolished.[15] Foucault's insight, suggests Edward Said, was not so much an imagination *of* power as an imagination *with* power.[16] While acknowledging that other "modalities of power" remain, Foucault's curious faith in the efficacy of surveillance-based social policing ignores the continuous inputs of brutality required to keep central institutions of the modern disciplinary society, such as the prison system, from collapsing completely. For the present, however, the deficiencies of omission or exaggeration in Foucault's account are not particularly relevant.[17]

The establishment of surveillance-based state administration was necessarily preceded by internal pacification of the societies in question. On the one hand military power came to be associated with external conflict, and on the other hand domestic control was carried out by a variety of non-militarized police and other government agencies based on increasingly bureaucratic systems of surveillance. Internal pacification of the domestic society by the modern nation-state progressively diminished the place of internal violence, even if was not eradicated.

Giddens has taken Foucault's broad idea of surveillance[18] to refer to "the mobilizing of administrative power - through the storage and control of information" - which he sees

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14. For example the various versions of the Chinese imperial *pao-chia* system, later taken up by the Japanese in Taiwan and elsewhere. See Chen Ching-Chih, "Japanese adoption of the `Pao-Chia' system in Taiwan, 1895-1945", *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXIV,2 (1975), and "Police and community control systems in the empire", in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

15. See Michael Waltzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault", in David Couzens Hoy (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); and Michael Ignatieff, "State, civil society and total institutions: a critique of recent social histories of punishment" in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

16. Edward Said, "Foucault and the imagination of power, in David Couzens Hoy (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.152.

> With this profoundly pessimistic view went also a singular lack of interest in the force of effective resistance to it, choosing particular sites of intensity, choices which, we see from the evidence on all sides, always exist and are often successful in impeding, if not actually stopping, the progress of tyrannical power...[The paradox is] that Foucault's imagination of power was by his analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorization to leave it go more or less unchecked.

Ibid. pp.151,153.

17. For a sample of sympathetic critics of Foucault's history see Ignatieff, op.cit., Steven Spitzer, "The rationalization of crime control in capitalist society" in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.) *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), and Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), and on his philosophy more generally the selection in D.C.Hoy (ed.) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), especially pieces by Said, Walzer, and Hoy himself.

18. Giddens notes that the original title of *Discipline and Punish* is *Surveillir et Punir*.

as constitutive of the nation-state.[19] Disciplinary power, for Giddens, has two senses. The first is the establishment of locales of regularized observation of the population - most importantly the work-place, but also prisons, asylums, schools and so on - as a means of control of recalcitrant groups.

The second is

> a growth in disciplinary power linked to, and expressive of, the sanctions that those in the state apparatus are able to wield in respect of "deviance". It is this second aspect that is most closely meshed with the development of surveillance as the policing of the routine activities of the mass of the population by specialized agencies separate from the main body of the armed forces.[20]

In all of these cases disciplinary power operates by the creation of a norm, and then the establishment of procedures to detect and then rectify deviations from the norm. Hence the centrality of surveillance - of law-breakers, norm-violaters, and in time, not only those who may potentially take such paths, but those who are in a position to allow such things to occur. Thus the circle of those potentially subject to surveillance tends to become ever larger.

This surveillance capacity has developed, in different nation-states, intertwined with the trajectory of class domination, but not reducible to it, as "an independent source of institutional clustering". Furthermore, Giddens argues that the modern state's surveillance capacity has benign as well as negative consequences: the welfare state is founded on detailed knowledge of the citizen population. Surveillance in the documentary sense creates not only the possibility of control from above but also the opportunity for new forms of democratic resistance.

Surveillance and the model of totalitarian rule

What is important for the present purposes is Giddens' extension of this modified application of Foucault to the question of contemporary forms of rule, most importantly the troubled but historically central category of totalitarianism. Or more precisely, totalitarian *rule* as a tendential property latent in all modern states. Moving from the classic debates over the Nazi and Stalinist state, Giddens treats totalitarianism as a form of rule characterised by

(a) an extreme focusing of surveillance;
(b) moral totalism;
(c) terror; and
(d) the prominence of a leader figure with mass support.[21]

In Giddens' model of totalitarianism, surveillance is central:

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19. Giddens, o*p.cit.*, p.181. Giddens argues (p.178) that

> There is a fundamental sense in which *all* states have been "information societies", since the generation of state power presumes reflexively monitored system reproduction, involving the regularized gathering, storage and control of information applied to administrative ends.

20. Ibid., p.187.

21. Ibid., p.303. Here Giddens is modifying Carl Friedrich's famous list of six properties of totalitarianism: (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party based on this party usually led by a dictator; (3) a highly developed secret police; (4) a monopoly over mass communications; (5) a monopoly over weapons; and (6) monopoly control over all organizations. See Carl Friedrich, *Totalitarianism*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954).

> The possibilities of totalitarian rule depend upon the existence of societies in which the state can successfully penetrate the day-to-day activities of most of its subject population. This in turn presumes a high level of surveillance...- the coding of information about and supervision of the conduct of significant segments of the population. Totalitarianism is, first of all, an extreme focusing of surveillance, devoted to the securing of political ends deemed by state authorities to demand urgent political mobilization.[22]

Terror, in Giddens' model of totalitarian rule, flows from the combination of surveillance generating "deviant" groups and industrialized weaponry for policing - plus extremities of sequestration in the concentration camp.

Giddens' own account of totalitarian rule proceeds to a discussion of modernity and the modern state around four "institutional clusters" associated with modernity. (See Figure 3.1.)

In keeping with Giddens' general position of post-marxian methodological pluralism[23] the four clusters are seen as interdependent in their development in specific cases, but finally autonomous. Class and private property (legal or effective) generates one institutional dynamic in an essentially Marxist model of political economy. One dimension of

22. Giddens, op.cit., p.303.

23. See Erik Olin Wright, "Giddens' critique of marxism", *New Left Review*, 138 (1983) for an excellent discussion of the method in Giddens' *Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (London: Macmillan, 1981) from the position of analytical marxism.

Figure 3.1
The institutional clusters of modernity



Source: Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985) p.311.

the "relative autonomy" of the state is the second source of social structuring - militarized violence in the hands of the states formed both in reference to a domestic populace *and* other states in particular types of world orders - the bureaucracies and force structures of the warfare state. The other aspect of state autonomy which generates yet another cluster of institutions are those of surveillance more properly associated with domestic social and control - the bureaucracies of the welfare and corporatist state, Keynesian or otherwise. And finally there is the project of transforming nature, the institutions (usually previously unseen) that are built upon variable assumptions about the character of the human relationship to nature.

Each institutional pole of the modern universe in turn becomes the ground of political contestation. (See Figure 3.2.) For the present purposes, three points should be made. Firstly, Giddens provides an entirely appropriate emphasis on the ecological foundations of modernity: the human relationship with nature embodied in global, uneven industrial "development".[24] Secondly, the place of military power is also appropriately emphasized, although there is no real attempt to examine the issue of the relationship between military and other forms of state power at the level of the world order. Thirdly, each of the four dimensions is seen as a realm of contestation, where otherwise extremely strong tendencies within the state are subject to contingent outcomes resulting from the clash of state institutions with socially-based political activity.

Limitations of Giddens' model

The great virtue of Giddens' approach is that he brings the central issues of middle and late twentieth century history onto the agenda of social theory otherwise concerned with "domestic" issues. Forms of rule of "extreme" or "exceptional" states are brought together with domestic "master-trends" in all modern states. The morass of studies of totalitarian and fascist rule and theory are surveyed and the despair generated by their incoherence swept away with the assertion of a clear and relatively simple model of totalitarian rule.

24. It is no accident that ecological/"development" issues have become a major concern for intelligence organizations in both advanced industrial and nuclear states, and in the newly industrializing countries.

Figure 3.2
Anti-systemic movements



Source: Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985) p.314.

Yet there are several difficulties with Giddens' reformulation of totalitarian rule which vitiate its usefulness both for the purposes he has in mind (which are, to be sure, limited and schematic in intention) and for the purposes here: viz. on the one hand, the explanation of the dominant form of Third World state; and on the other, the relationship between the contemporary expression of surveillance and terror which are central to his model.

Four problems seem important here:

(a)the distortions in the model of totalitarian rule introduced from its privileging of the European and Soviet experience;

(b)the resulting lack of consideration of the Japanese model;

(c)the lack of specification of conditions for a move towards totalitarian rule; and

(d)the lack of consideration of the influence of world-orders on the form of rule.

While Giddens' model is clearly not intended to be comprehensive, attention to these issues could extend its usefulness in understanding contemporary issues.

Privileging the European model

Firstly, what is immediately clear against the background of the voluminous studies of both totalitarianism and fascism is that Giddens has decided that the conceptual advantages of collapsing the separate historical sequences of Italian fascism, German Nazism, and Soviet Stalinism into a single category of rule outweigh the costs.[25] Obviously this is done with an awareness of the long debate for and against this approach. In recent years, the approach Giddens takes has by and large been rejected as either too limited by its Cold War ideological baggage, where the advantages of conceptually tying the Soviet Union to fascism are obvious; and/or as eroding awareness of the historical specificity of each, particularly in misinterpreting the character of Stalinism as opposed to the Italian and German experiences. For Giddens, the value of emphasising the common elements (extreme surveillance, terror, moral totalism, and the prominence of a leader figure) outweigh the disadvantages. However it is finally only the elements of surveillance and terror that are tied back to the broad concerns of his general theory of modernity. The role of the leader figure, introduced as part of an explanation of the relative popularity of totalitarian regimes with significant parts of the domestic population, is accounted for in a disappointingly thin rehearsal of the Freud/Le Bon theory of regressive identification of a mobilized population with the single leader.[26] This is not to suggest either that the historically specific individual is irrelevant to a general model of totalitarian rule, or that particular psycho-social patterns of leader-follower relations should be ignored. However, the European model, and especially the case of Hitler, may be misleading in this regard, elevating a particular psycho-social leader-follower pattern and its innovative organizational exploitation into a general

25. See Les K. Alder and T.G. Paterson, "Red fascism: the merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American image of totalitarianism (1930s-1950s)", *American Historical Review*, (1970) for a discussion of the development of the Nazi-Soviet model.

26. Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, op.cit., p.305.

requirement[27]. Surveillance and terror are much more central requirements than a particular leader-follower relation. While moral totalism would seem an ideal support for totalitarian rule, it is possible to imagine less hysterical, more technocratic alternatives.

Such criticism leads towards a re-formulation of Giddens' criteria of totalitarian rule (in particular the ideological and leadership elements) rather than an immediate retreat to the comforts of historical specificity.

Dismissing the Japanese model

Giddens' limitation of the bases of his model to Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1930s is a choice that echoes an equally long debate: the marginalising of the Japanese example, or, to put it another way, the privileging of the European experience. Giddens' approach reflects what is probably the dominant interpretation: that fascism is a specifically European phenomenon of the first four decades of this century. Its European-ness lies mainly in two elements: the saturation of fascist ideology with promises of renewal and rebirth in the face of the trauma and degradation of war, defeat and economic depression; and mass movements that brought fascist leaders to power in German and Italy (and close to it elsewhere), which gave material form to the vitalist promise of fascist ideology in organizations that had revolutionary - or at least radically anti-capitalist and anti-aristocratic/plutocratic -overtones[28].

What is at issue is not fascism but totalitarianism - or rather its theoretical revival without its Cold War baggage. And there, the exclusion of Japan from consideration is more serious. If Stalinism is to be included in the resources from which the model is constructed, then the Japanese "emperor-system fascism" is also worthy of consideration. The Japanese example in fact provides a clearer link than the European fascisms to the contemporary Third World militarized state - where the label of "fascism" is seen as radically inappropriate because of the lack of an ideologically aroused mass base.[29] The Japanese model is in fact compatible with Giddens' broader concerns, and may lead to a more satisfactory general model of totalitarian rule.

Modelling the path to totalitarian rule

A third weakness of Giddens' general model of totalitarian rule is in his conception of that outcome as "a tendential property" of all modern states - because of their capacities for extreme surveillance and militarized assaults on their populations. This has the virtue of removing the presumption that totalitarian rule is something radically deviant from the general experience of modernity, something that occurs to The Other. What is omitted, however, is consideration of the circumstances under which that tendency is

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27. On Hitler's construction of the Nazi appeal on a quasi-religious basis in the particular context of post-Versailles Germany see Arno Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The "Final Solution" in History*, (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 90-110.

28. The literature of obviously vast. For a sampling see Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979). Note especially Renzo De Felice, *Interpretations of Fascism*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), and *Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976). Gavan McCormack, "Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism?", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14,2 (1982) provides a useful review prior to his principal discussion of the Japanese experience. On Stalinism see the useful volume edited by Robert C. Tucker, *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, (New York: Norton, 1977), especially the contributions by Tucker, Stephen Cohen and Moshe Lewin.

29. See, for example, Patrick Flanagan's "U.S. imperialism and the `third world'", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 12,1 (1980), an attack on Chomsky and Herman's use of the category of "sub-fascist" in their *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume I: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, (Boston: South End Press, 1979). Note Herman's reply.

actualized. When, how and why do modern states move towards this type of rule - highly unstable though Giddens takes it to be?[30] In Europe, fascist movements were, above all else, counter-revolutionary, responses to a prior mobilization of democratic and socialist forces (albeit in the particular European post-war context). Japanese emperor-system fascism, disparate though its origins were, arose in part within the bureaucracy and the military in response to the popular mobilization of the Taisho period amidst profound social change generated by capitalist transformation.[31]

Giddens, following Arendt, gives some clue by emphasising the relationship between terror and legitimacy (and its first cousin, apathy), at least of a limited and transient kind, and consequently terror and deviance. Mass terror in the Nazi and Soviet cases followed, rather than preceded, the establishment of the power of the rulers. Wildt, distinguishing between totalitarian *systems* (e.g. under Stalin) and totalitarian *regimes*, links mass terror to legitimation derived from overcoming deep-seated problems of accumulation:

> The fact that it [fascism] temporarily succeeds in solving these problems provides the *totalitarian system* enough legitimation to develop the terror sufficiently to prevent all effective opposition. Stalinist mass terror has fulfilled its historical function of depoliticising the population and rendering it apathetic long enough to stabilise the specific class structure of Soviet state capitalism under conditions of extreme accumulation problems.[32]

In *totalitarian regimes* of Eastern Europe, even with Stalinist terror in their establishment phases, sufficient apathy was not generated for such system stabilization to occur. Occupation by the Red Army was a prerequisite for the survival of Eastern European state capitalism.[33] This in turn brings us to the question of world-orders as a problem in the analysis of fascism - and contemporary Third World militarization.

The place of world-orders

Finally, Giddens' discussion of totalitarianism is restricted to the internal analysis of the nation-state. While his approach has the great virtue of linking previously disagreeably separate "political science" and "sociological" discourses[34], he does not explicitly link the tendential capacity for totalitarian rule to his earlier discussion of the nation-state system or to the industrialization of war, although the stage is certainly set.

The most important lacunae is precisely a discussion of world-orders, and in particular, the present global world-order in which the globalization of social relations

30. Again, there is a vast literature, both liberal and left, on the question of the causes of fascism, and it is surprising that Giddens has not addressed the more abstract and schematic question of the circumstances under which a tendency to totalitarian rule is invoked (although such conditions would probably be at one level of abstraction lower than the general theory).

31. And of course, resistance to Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria provoked the most extreme response. As will be argued below, the Japanese model (then and now) is a necessarily transnational one: moderate repression at home, and extreme and violent counter-insurgency programmes abroad.

32. Andreas Wildt, "Totalitarian state capitalism: on the structure and historical function of Soviet-type societies", *Telos*, 41, (1979), p.54. My emphasis.

33. Ibid., p.56. "It [Eastern European state capitalism] cannot therefore be called *totalitarian* with regard to the genetically and structurally conditioned constitution of social consciousness, but only with regard to its political constitutions."

34. "The nation-state, let me repeat, is the sociologist's `society'".

renders the nation-state a subordinate element in a wider "society". We have already seen the importance of world-orders in the shaping of the "military revolution" and the subsequent rise of internally-pacified central states in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is impossible to analyze what Giddens would have to regard as contemporary trends towards totalitarian rule (however incomplete they may be) without distinguishing at least three components of global social relations:

> (1) the organization of production, more particularly the *social forces* engendered by the production process; (2) *forms of state* as derived from a study of state/society complexes; and (c) *world orders*, i.e. the particular configurations of forces which successively define the problematic of war and peace or the ensemble of states. Each of these can be studied as a succession of dominant and emergent rival structures.[35]

The great majority of Third World militarized and authoritarian states came into existence within the framework of U.S. support; most remain in existence only because of external support. Many of the rest came into existence as part of a somewhat parallel structure of Soviet support. More to the point, the global presence or absence of terror and/or heightened domestic political surveillance as an element of rule is generally not explicable by primarily domestic factors. This is as true for relatively peaceful (but in most cases, substantially militarized) First World states in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific as of the endemic low-level terror in the Third World militarized state. As the earlier example of Japanese imperialism pre-saged, relative calm under surveillance at home can be coupled with extreme repression in the closely-related periphery. Lack of world-order analysis leaves Giddens wrong-footed on the contemporary echoes of totalitarian rule in the Third World.

The Japanese model of emperor-system fascism

These difficulties become clearer in the light of the pre-1945 Japanese experience. It will be seen that in many respects the Japanese model, while possessing several important unique features, provides a rather better guide to contemporary Third World state formation than does the European experience. This will also be helpful in separating the contingent from the necessary or general parts of a model of totalitarian rule.[36]

The term "emperor-system fascism" refers to a system of power that emerged gradually from a process of renovation of the ongoing structure and cultural traditions of the Meiji state[37], without the radical disjuncture of the pre-existing "normal" bourgeois state that characterized the European experience of fascism. It was a matter of

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35. Robert W. Cox, "Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 10,2 (1981), pp.137-8.

36. The following summary draws heavily on the extended reviews of recent Japanese scholarship by Herbert Bix, "Rethinking `emperor-system fascism': ruptures and continuities in modern Japanese history", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14,2 (1982), and McCormack, op.cit. On the issue of thought control see also Okudaira Yasuhiro, "Some preparatory notes for the study of the Peace Preservation Law in pre-war Japan", *Annals of the Institute of Social Science* (University of Tokyo), 14 (1973); and Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). Peter De Mendelssohn, *Japan's Political Warfare*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1944) gives a lively account of the bureaucratic organization of the system of mass mobilization.

37. Indeed, those Meiji cultural "traditions" were themselves the epitome of the "invention of tradition", however embedded in pre-existing cultural forms. See Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

> fascism by instalments, by and through the process of strengthening absolutism...i-ncomplete [and] tension-ridden, a transient, incomplete, composite and `recomposed' dictatorial form.[38]

The most distinct disjuncture, the final assumption of executive leadership by the military in 1936, often leads to the characterization of the epoch as militarist rather than fascist. Yet, as will be seen, both the periodization and the characterization are misleading.

Four elements define the essential quality of the system of emperor-system fascism, growing from the late twenties (some would put it earlier) with continual modification and intensification throughout its life until 1945:

(1) a sustained coalition of autonomous elements which made up the system: bureaucracy, military, *zaibatsu* capitalists, and the emperor and the imperial household subordinating all others;

(2) bureaucratically-controlled passive mass mobilization through intermediate bodies combined with cultivation of domestic and foreign political crisis manipulation;

(3) a bureaucratic legally-based system of repression based primarily on pre-emptive surveillance and intimidation aimed at progressively broader categories of "holders of dangerous thoughts"; and

(4) a coupling of this domestic mode of surveillance and low-level terror at home with a ferocious amplification of the same model against the contiguous colonial populations.

Ruling bloc

For the present purposes, the composition of the ruling bloc is not a major concern, except in two respects. The first is to note Bix's conclusion that despite the very considerable autonomy of the military over its own affairs and over the administration of the colonies and the conduct of the Pacific war, the absolutism of the imperial system was real. The emperor (in practice representative of the upper segments of the capitalist class, at some points in alliance with large landlords) held substantial actual power:

> Never was the military able to successfully defy the emperor's will; nor were military commanders ever able to strengthen their authority beyond the will of the emperor. Neither, until the very end of the war, could they bring the *zaibatsu* to heel by defying the *zaibatsu* in their own sphere of influence. Thus in peacetime as well as in wartime Japan, the ultimate nerve-center of decision-making never ceased to be `civilian' in coloration.[39]

This is important in so far as it diminishes the temptation to reduce Japan after 1936 (if not before) to a matter of "militarism", while leaving open the question of fascism.[40] It also reiterates the point that militarization may go hand in hand with "civilian" leadership

38. Bix, op.cit., pp.8-9, 5, 19.

39. Ibid., p.10.

40. It was neither "civilian" nor "military", but an integrated mix in which the meaning of the term "civilian" had connotations quite different from other post-absolutist states in capitalist societies.

(in this case emperor/bureaucracy/*zaibatsu*) in which the crucial element was the "totalitarian" combination of more or less constant extreme surveillance and a repressive terror at a varying, but rarely extreme level (in Japan itself) - under civilian auspices. Secondly, the position of the emperor and the suffusing of the political culture with values of emperor-worship based on the Meiji constitution, coupled with a driving pressure for renovation of that emperor system from within the state bureaucracy itself, provided much of the dynamic energy for change in a fascist direction otherwise provided in Italy and Germany by a mass movement with (counter-) revolutionary overtones.

Passive mass-mobilization

The second distinctive feature - bureaucratically controlled passive mass mobilization - is important in the same context. While there were various movements by young military officers that had important political effects at various points (especially in the assassinations of the 1930s), there was no parallel to the Italian and German mass mobilization from below in counter-revolutionary parties, and there was no comparable rupture with existing state forms. Particular elements at the core of the state themselves initiated the establishment of intermediate groups to which in time the whole population was required to belong, beginning with the formation of civilian air-raid defence groups in Japanese cities in 1932 against the background of the sense of crisis engendered by the Army-initiated "Manchurian incident".[41] However mobilization proper in the form of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement initiated by Prime Minister Konoe did not get under way until after the invasion of China met heavy resistance. In this sense much of the mobilization from above was a state-reaction to war,

> intended to slow social trends that had been developing for decades. Labor conscription, media controls, altered school curricula, commodity rations, and campaigns to lift the birth-rate were based on a conservative social vision predating the mass consumer economy.[42]

Mobilization was intended to be total, and "mass" in that sense, but was always mediated through intermediate groups of a top-down character and designed to orchestrate loyalty to the emperor-system. Mass spectacle meetings were designed to combine arousal of feelings of loyalty with structural passivity. A leading Home Ministry "reformist" reflected in 1933 that in "thought policy"

> the mass psychology in meetings and demonstrations, the feelings of celebration, the feelings of tension in ceremonies and the like, play an important role in mobilizing propaganda which arouses the people's spirits.[43]

A series of state-initiated and state-orchestrated movements throughout the 1930s led up to the adoption of the "General Mobilization of the Nation" in 1938:

> ...the role of civilian rightists was to envelop the whole people in a harmonious

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41. See De Mendelssohn, op.cit. Of course in Germany in the months after the Nazi accession to power most if not all civilian groups were "coordinated" into a Nazi Party organizational framework. See William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power*, Revised edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), pp.218-232.

42. T.R.H.Havens, "Japanese society during World War II", *Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan*, Volume 8, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), p. 278.

43. Cited in McCormack, op.cit., p.31.

atmosphere, suppressing or reducing to submission resistance to the national defense state. The people were organized in small groups capable of mutual control and mutual surveillance.[44]

This applied equally in the colonies. In Korea for example, after the Manchurian Incident local police organized residents into "current [political and military] situation discussion groups" for indoctrination purposes.[45]

Just how effective this repressive system of mobilization and control was in practice can easily be over-estimated: bureaucratic ambition should never be accepted as reality. But there can be little doubt that the system was totalitarian in intent.

Domestic surveillance and limited terror

The third element of the system was domestic surveillance and repression. The centre piece of the repressive apparatus was the Peace Preservation Law, enacted in 1925, and serving as the organising legislation for a variety of existing and subsequent legislative and administrative thought control measures.[46] The initial concern of the Peace Preservation Law was intellectual and working class-based communist and anarchist currents, and the peasant movements channeling rural unrest. In time, however, a great range of other groupings and bodies of opinion beyond the left were considered to be harbouring "dangerous thoughts" - from Shinto reform groups ("heresy annihilation" began in 1936) through to proposers of Esperanto. Labour movements and their attached cultural organizations were considered extremely important for surveillance and control, as were the subjects of students' researches. Public opinion was closely monitored by the Ministry of Home Affairs to ascertain potential impediments to the conduct of state policy, especially foreign war.[47] Mass arrests followed the enactment of the law - 18,397 in 1933.[48]

The number of dissidents placed on trial was relatively small in comparison to the numbers arrested, though large in absolute numbers. Despite the fearsome reputation of the repressive apparatus, there were no executions under the Peace Preservation Law in Japan itself, although it was a distinctively different matter in the colonies.[49] Prosecution

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44. Furuya Tetsuo cited in McCormack op.cit., p.31.

45. Chen Ching-chih, "Police and community control systems in the empire", in Ramon H, Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.233.

46. This law was aimed at "anyone who has organized an association with the objective of altering the *kokutai* or the form of national government or of denying the system of private property", or anyone aiding, instigating, encouraging or discussing such matters. The Peace Preservation Law was amended several times and re-written in the last years of the war, and supplemented by the Thought Criminal Probation Law of 1936.

47. Okudaira, op.cit., pp.49-50.

48. Bix, op.cit., p.6.

49. Okudaira, *op,cit.,* p.50. Mitchell, op.cit., p.191, makes the same point in a more apologetic fashion:

"No mass application of terror, no Japanese executed in Japan under the provisions of the Peace Preservation Law (prior to the single exception in 1944), no deportations or use of forced labour and no category of non-persons. If executions and prison terms are chosen as the yardsticks by which to measure repressiveness, then Japanese thought-control policies appear mild. The reasons for this softer Japanese approach ... may be summarized as a feeling that all Japanese were brothers under the Emperor, and that no offender was beyond salvation."

This deceptive phrasing elides the question of terror in the colonies and the widespread use of torture in Japan itself as means of inducing renunciation of beliefs.

and trial were not the usual end the state had in mind:

> The main objective of Peace Preservation Law became to "brainwash" the possessors of "dangerous thoughts" and let them "tenkô" [recant sincerely] through various means such as incessant inspection and observation of possessors of "dangerous thoughts" or their organized groups, sweeping round-ups which did not necessarily pre-suppose indictment, and severe examinations and torture toward those who were under restraint so that they would hold the "right" Japanese spirit...Although the Peace Preservation Law was in its form a criminal law, it was utilized more in the actual exercise of authoritative power (surveillance, observation and arrest) through administrative measures than in the application of punishment after trial.[50]

A unit within the Central Police Bureau, the Special Higher Police *[Tokubetsu Kôtô Keisatsu, or Tokkô]* (often referred to as the Thought Police *[Shisô Keisatsu]*), was responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs to carry out constant, secret surveillance over groups and individuals on the blacklist.[51]

In addition to the Peace Preservation Law system there was the separate military police or Kempeitai formed in 1882 as a combination of political police and general internal intelligence. The Kempeitai and the Justice Ministry's Thought Section operated in parallel. As the Pacific War widened, torture in prison, and especially by the Kempeitai, became more extensive. Within the military itself, the Kempeitai acquired greater independence, and were responsible directly to the minister.[52] By war's end the Kempeitai had 75,000 members, one-third of whom were officers. According to Deacon

> The Kempei Tai were responsible for checking on any Army personnel who might be suspected of harbouring "dangerous thoughts", and they could not only arrest soldiers three ranks higher than themselves, but carry out instant punishments on their own initiative.[53]

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50. Okudaira, op.cit., pp.51,54. Mitchell provides an extensive account of efforts to achieve renunciation of beliefs. Richard Deacon's account in his *A History of the Japanese Secret Service*, (London: Frederick Muller) p.160, based on Mitchell goes rather further to speak of a "positive, tolerant and detached quality" of the Thought Police, as with "a somewhat sorrowing priest or doctor".

51. There was in fact competition between the Special Higher police responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs for preventing thought disruptions to public order and the Judicial Police responsible to the Ministry of Justice who dealt with actual violations of social and public order. See Okudaira, op.cit., p.55. Bix op.cit., p.7 points out that in the late twenties the intensification of this system got underway in a crisis atmosphere "with the appointment in all prefectures of `thought procurators' (shisô gakari), `special higher police' (tokkô keisatsu), `military thought police' (shisô gakari kempei), Home Ministry police officials (keimukan), and specially-deputized `police assistants' (keimukanho)." The Military Thought Police was established to counter the effects of leftwing activities within the army itself which materialized in the mid-20s.

52. In 1931 the head of the Kempei Tai in Manchukuo was Lt.Gen. Tojo Hideki. See Robert J.C. Butow (1961), *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp.72-73.

53. Deacon, op.cit., p.163. For the wartime role of the Kempei Tai in Indonesia and Malaysia, see the memoirs of its members in National Federation of Kenpeitai Veterans' Associations (1986), *The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia project, Cornell University, Translation Series No.65); and also Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds.), *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942 - 1945*, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1986). In addition to these military and civilian police agencies there was a separate system of Special Service Organs specializing in political intrigue.

> They were attached to all Japanese garrisons overseas and were usually housed blatantly in substantial concrete buildings of their own. [T]hey worked closely with all agencies of Japanese subversion including the Opium Board, the Secret Police *[Kempeitai]*, Military Intelligence, and Japan's shadowy supra-governmental Civilian Spy Service.

The Special Service Organs were responsible to the Second Department (Intelligence) of the Army General Staff. David Bergamini, *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy*, (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp.362,374.

The surveillance capacities of the various police organs were greatly enhanced by the establishment of the system of *tonarigumi* or Neighbourhood Associations with the coming of World War II. The *tonarigumi* system was linked to the Air Raid Warden system that had been established in the late 1920s, and to the wartime rationing arrangements. Branches in each block or building were made up of 10 families, and the head of each reported to a higher grouping. Each head was responsible for reporting on "dangerous thoughts" within the group and preferably eradicating them by persuasion. This system of domestic surveillance and control was a modification of the centuries-old Chinese *pao-chia* system of collective responsibility the Japanese revived and perfected for modern urban and rural conditions in Manchuria and Taiwan with devastating effect.[54]

Extreme terror in the periphery

The final distinctive element of Japanese emperor-system fascism was the coupling of this low-level mode of domestic surveillance-based terror with a more extreme form in the contiguous colonies. Japanese fascism was transnational from the beginning, developing in an unbroken line from the first expeditions to Korea in the middle Meiji years, and operating in an empire which included, even before the invasion of China proper in 1937, Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, the Marshall islands and southern Sakhalin.

Japanese colonial rule was unusual in a number of respects: it was historically anachronistic, a late arrival on a stage dominated by established rival western colonial powers. More importantly, the territories Japan colonized were immediately contiguous to the centre country, and mostly societies with which Japan had historically had complex relations of cultural and military competition. Most important of all, Japan was the only colonising power to locate heavy industry in its colonies: by 1945 about a quarter of Japan's industrial base was located abroad.[55]

In colonial Korea the spurt of industrialization in the 1930s led to a forerunner of subsequently typical cases of enclave over-development. This was a period of considerable labour mobility, both from rural to urban sectors, but equally to forced labour and otherwise outside the country.[56] An urban working class formed, in addition to a Japanese-sponsored landlord class. Japanese policy towards Korea fluctuated, but from the mid-20s onwards moved in an increasingly repressive direction, until the brutal and thoroughgoing Japanization policies of Governor-General Minami after 1936.[57]

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54. See Chen, "The Japanese adoption of the `Pao-Chia' system in Taiwan, 1895-1945", op.cit. and "Police and community control systems in the empire" op.cit. The Indonesian *rukun tetangga/rukun kampung* system is a direct continuation of the *tonarigumi* system established by the Japanese occupation forces. See John Sullivan, "Kampung and state: the role of government in the development of urban community in Yogyakarta", *Indonesia*, 41 (1986).

55. Bruce Cumings, "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles and political consequences", *International Organization*, 38,1 (1984), pp.482, 487. In the Korean case, the spurt of industrialization in the 1930s led to a forerunner of subsequently typical cases of enclave over-development.

56. By 1945 11.6% of the Korean population was living outside Korea, and 20% residing outside their native province. Ibid., p.490. 422,000 Koreans were sent to Japan in enforced labour-service regulations between 1939-1944. Chen, "Police and community control systems in the empire", op.cit., p.232.

57. Kang stresses the depth of Japanese attempts at cultural controls in addition to sheer repression and the establishment of pro-colonial counter-revolutionary movements. This included, as Kang shows, an attempt at a comprehensive re-orientation of Korean Confucianism. Minami's Japanization policy contained three principles:

> [T]he clarification of the essence of the Imperial System; the oneness of the Japanese and Korean peoples; and Training for Endurance. Upon his appointment he ordered all Koreans to worship at Korean shrines. In 1937, he forced the `Oath of the

Simple terror was a frequent tactic in the colonies, often on a massive scale.[58] The most famous such case was the month-long terrorist campaign known as the "Rape of Nanking", in December 1937 in the capital of Republican China. This was not, as is sometimes suggested, a matter of ill-disciplined victorious troops taking advantage of a defeated people. Rather, in the month after the city fell on December 12th, Japanese occupying forces followed a policy of organized mass murder and rapine. The rape of Nanking was a deliberate policy designed by officers closest to the Emperor, with the intention of creating an atmosphere of extreme terror in China, which would hopefully lead to the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership over Nationalist Chinese forces. The political strategy failed, but not before the city was systematically looted of any thing of value, and the proceeds mainly directed Imperial Japanese Army revenues. More to the point, a policy of killing all Chinese prisoners and executing tens of thousands of civilians led to the murder by Japanese forces of between 150,000 and 200,000 Chinese citizens, at least 50,000 of them civilians.[59] Never again was terror employed on such a scale, but the precedent and model were established.

The system of thought crimes and thought reform established at home under the Peace Preservation Law was implemented far more harshly in the colonies (especially Korea) than in the home country. Large numbers of colonial resisters were executed, and following the invasion of Manchuria, counter-insurgency campaigns in Manchuria were intense, often against Koreans as well as Manchurians and Chinese. Thousands of Korean and Chinese communists were imprisoned and executed.[60] In these Manchurian anti-communist counter-insurgency campaigns the tactics used included

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> Imperial Subjects' upon the Koreans to test the Korean reaction to his policy ... Then he recruited Korean army service volunteers to test loyalty to the Japanese emperor...The abolition of Korean language courses followed. His last test was carried out in 1940 when he changed the Korean kin-names. Except for a small number of people, the majority of Koreans adopted Japanese-style family names. It was an unbearable insult for Koreans.

Thomas Hosuck Kang, "The changing nature of Korean Confucian personality under Japanese rule", in C.I.Eugene Kim amd Doretha E. Mortimore (eds.), *Korea's Responses to Japan: The Colonial Period 1910-1945*, (Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1975), p.309. More than 800,000 Koreans "volunteered" for the Japanese Army's Special Volunteer Service between 1938-43, under a recruiting system administered by the colonial police. See Chen, "Police and community control systems in the empire", op.cit., p.232. Note that only 17,664 were taken into the Army proper.

58. Even prior to the Peace Preservation Law arrangements Koreans had been special targets of Japanese terror tactics. Japan sent 70,000 troops to occupy the Soviet Far East between 1918 and 1922. In Vladivostok, Korean nationalists joined the revolutionary forces against the Japanese and the counter-revolutionary Russian White Army. On April 4, 1920, Japanese troops began an offensive against the Koreans in Vladivostok:

> "Sinhanch'on [the Korean section of Vladivostok] was hit mercilessly. The Japanese committed all manner of atrocities. They beat and slaughtered the people and set fire to the school. About three hundred Koreans were killed and another one hundred arrested and taken away. Both Russian and Korean captives fell prey to bloody reprisals. While....leaders of the Revolutionary Army were handed over to the White Guards and burned alive in a locomotive firebox, the Koreans were punished by the Japanese at their own discretion. ... They bundled together the Korean victims and sank them with old rails in the Bay of Ullis, near Vladivostok."

Hara Teruyuki, "The Korean movement in the Russian Maritime Province, 1905-1922", in Dae-sook Suh (ed.), *Koreans in the Soviet Union*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Center for Korean Studies, 1987), pp.17-18.

59. The International Military Tribunal in Tokyo accepted Chinese claims of 200,000 murdered and 20,000 women raped. David Bergamini states that

> after reviewing the original data and weeding out Chinese statistics, believes it fair to say that not less than 100,000 war prisoners and 50,000 civilians were executed within 37 miles of Nanking and that at least 5,000 women were raped, many of them repeatedly and on several occasions.

Op.cit., p.44.

60. Okudaira, op.cit., p.50; Cumings, op.cit., pp.493-4.

(1)para-military "special operations";
(2)direct efforts to separate the insurgents from the masses;
(3) "purification" and administered reform of towns and villages;
(4) reconstruction and rejuvenation of towns and villages; and
(5)propaganda and pacification.[61]

By 1937, five and a half million people had been relocated in "defence hamlets" in Manchuria. Local civilians and surrendered insurgents were used for special operations - "gathering intelligence, eliminating guerillas, and performing counter-intelligence functions".[62] "Purification" of the towns and villages involved an extreme intensification of surveillance to yield "control of the local population", using measures such as:

> registration of the residents, issuance of residence certificates, regular and unscheduled checks and searches of residents and travellers, organization of the *pao-chia* and the self-defense corps systems, and confiscation of unauthorized weapons.[63]

These four elements hardly exhaust the specificity of the Japanese emperor-system fascism, but for the present purposes they establish the importance of consideration of the Japanese model for a re-evaluation of Giddens' model of totalitarianism. Firstly, surveillance is central, as Giddens proposed. However, Giddens' emphasis on a mass movement is contradicted by the Japanese experience. Mass mobilization was achieved, but in a structurally passive form controlled from above from the very beginning. It would seem that the only reasons for the inclusion of this criterion in a general model would be to explain the degree of popularity achieved by the European fascisms with a certain, substantial section of the population, at least for a period of time. The Japanese experience suggests that a mass movement was not the only way this could be achieved.

Finally, Japanese emperor-system fascism operated on a transnational basis: repression in the colonies was different in tone and severity from that at home, but part of an integrated political (and economic) system. This was a function of the characteristics of the East Asian segment of the prevailing late colonial world order. The different forms of repression in Japan and in the colonies pre-supposed each other: neither would have been either possible or necessary without the other. A colonialist form of imperialism required massive direct repression by Japanese state forces; but equally the ability to sustain that colonialist drive required control of dissident elements at home. This was achieved by a combination of low-level but widespread terror and high levels of surveillance, criminalization of dissenting thought, and bureaucratically-controlled passive mass mobilization.[64]

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61. Chong-sik Lee, *Counter-insurgency in Manchuria: the Japanese Experience, 1931-1940,* (Rand Corporation, prepared for Advanced Research Projects Agency. Memorandum RM-5012-ARPA, 1967), p.v.

62. Ibid., p.v. More precisely, the role of these groups was to exterminate communists by assassination and disruption of their groups by covert means. See Lee, ibid., pp.13-21 on the Hsueh-chu-hui operating in the Chintao region after 1934.

63. Ibid., pp.vi-vii. See also Chen, "The Japanese adoption of the `Pao-Chia' system in Taiwan, 1895-1945", op.cit., and "Police and community control systems in the empire", op.cit., for a detailed discussion of the Japanese revival and restructuring of the Chinese *pao-chia* system, and an evaluation of its success.

64. A second consequence of the prevailing world-order for the emergence of Japanese emperor-system fascism (and for the Italian

Conclusion: the relevance of the Japanese model

Why has it been necessary to present this sketch of totalitarian rule and the Japanese variant of fascism at such length in a discussion of contemporary Third World militarization and intelligence organizations? The primary reason, which will be discussed at length in Parts 2 and 3 below is that some aspects of Indonesian politics since 1965 are best understood in terms of a totalitarian ambition, albeit somewhat one which is unsystematic in conception and thwarted in practice. Reviewing the Japanese experience provides the basis for a refinement of the essential elements of such an ambition in government.

But there are three other reasons for this preoccupation with the totalitarian model, and with the Japanese variant in particular. The first objective was to provide a means for linking two widely separated bodies of thinking: the huge corpus of writing about the experience of European fascism and the origins of the Second World War on the one hand; and the smaller but still large body of writing about Third World militarization over the past quarter of a century. These two historical phenomena may appear incommensurable: the decade to 1945 saw tens of millions of dead in war, concentration camps and forced collectivization. Third World militarization has not as yet had this result - although the wars of Indochina and the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq may give some pause.[65]

But there is something a little wrong here. The defeat of fascism certainly cost twenty million or more souls, and million of Jews and others died in the Nazi Final Solution, and more millions in Stalin's crimes - but are these unprecedented events to be the only standards of historical judgement? It has been suggested that one reason why the Nazi and Stalinist crimes figure so large in the collective imagination is that they provide so unreal and demonic a model of historical evil that almost anything subsequent appears to be of such lesser importance that we need not feel the sting of judgement. Beside such crimes, the invasions of Vietnam and Afghanistan, or the establishing mass murders of Democratic Kampuchea and New Order Indonesia seem so much the less. There has as yet been no war to eradicate any Third World militarized state, so we cannot know what the cost would be in human life, but it should be understood that on a world scale the normal pattern of government that we are calling Third World militarization is of no less significance than the fascism of Central and Southern Europe in the 1930s.

The second reason for exploring the Japanese variant on the totalitarian model is that it provides the best historical guide to certain aspects of contemporary Third World militarization. As will be argued below in Chapter Six, the Indonesian pattern of militarization over the past quarter century is quite impossible to understand removed from the global context - economically, politically and militarily. However wedded we may be to the analysis of the domestic political, economic, social and ideological determinants of contemporary Third World affairs, the Indonesian example shows the clear primacy of explanations from a global and transnational perspective. (As does the

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and German fascisms for that matter) was the structural blockage experienced by late-comer imperialist nations.

65. It is worth recalling that some eight and a half million people are estimated to have died in the Indochina Wars between 1960 and 1980, and almost one million in the Iran-Iraq War. See Ruth Lever Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985*, (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publications, 1985), pp.10-11; Samir al Khalil, *The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.259.

South Korean example in a different manner.) The Japanese model of an integrated transnational system of power, with varying types and levels of surveillance and terror at the centre and periphery of the system, is the best guide to the current hierarchical world-system of militarization.

And finally, there are direct historical links between the Japanese experience up to 1945 and the Indonesian (and South Korean) intelligence state of the 1980s. As is well known, the main body of the Indonesian Army officer corps from the Revolution through until the 1970s received their basic training either directly from the occupying Imperial Japanese Army or during the Revolution from those of their comrades who had done so less than two years earlier.[66] The military men of Soeharto's generation were trained by the Japanese, and their influence prevailed in important respects over the earlier influence of the small Dutch colonial army - the KNIL. Moreover, in the field of intelligence and covert action/special forces warfare, the overwhelming influence was Japanese.[67] It is not the purpose of this dissertation to trace such influences on the development of the Indonesian intelligence state, and while claims of such a Japanese influence, or indeed, provenance, are often plausibly forwarded, I do not wish to make such a case. I only wish to maintain that if any foreign historical influences are to be found, then they will be Japanese, and for that reason alone, if for no other, it is to the Japanese experience - and model - of fascism that we should look.

66. See Joyce C. Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Benedict R. O.G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945*, (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1961); "Japan: `The Light of Asia'" in Josef Silverstein (ed.), *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays*, (New Haven: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1966); *Java in a Time of Revolution*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

67. See Appendices 2 and 3.