

Chapter 2

Militarization: global, regional and national

In the present world order, which remains defined by Pax Americana, the militarized state is the norm in the Third World, not the exception. And these states are in fact only part-states, by and large quite unable to survive in anything like their current form if excised from their location within the wider imperial economic and political pattern. The preoccupation in this thesis with militarization and its consequences, in Indonesia and elsewhere, comes from the sheer scale of death and the institutionalized threat of violent death in the latter half of the twentieth century. Of the 10,700,000 people in the world who died as a result of fighting within or across national borders between 1960 and 1982, more than half had lived, before their premature deaths, in East and Southeast Asia.¹ (See Table 2.1.)

How have the majority of countries in East and Southeast Asia been drawn into the historical process of rapid militarization? Why is it that the governments of the region have, in the past quarter century, diverted huge amounts of scarce resources to the finally wasteful activity of paying standing armies and buying ever-increasing amounts of weaponry? Why have those armed forces come to threaten their own populations more than neighbouring states? Why is it that more than half of the countries of the Third World have some form of military government? The most important part of the answers to these questions, therefore, is militarization: of Third World states and their industrialized patrons within a system of global militarization.

While the ranks of military regimes are legion, they are mainly short-term in nature, alternating with more or less nervously civilian governments, or passing the burdens of office to others in khaki. But there are at least two exceptions. Indonesia has had a military government since 1966, continuously led by the same man - an almost unparalleled degree of militarized stability. And South Korea remains highly militarized, even though an elected (albeit military) president came to power in 1986 after twenty five years of military rule.

1. Ruth Lever Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985*, (Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Publications, 1985), pp.10-11.

Table 2.1
Deaths from war and state violence
Asia, 1960 - 1987*

Country	Period		Civilian	Military	Total
<i>South Asia</i>					
Afghanistan	1978-85	USSR invasion	150,000	150,000	300,000
Bangladesh	1971	Bengali revolt	1,000,000	500,000	1,500,000
India	1962	China-India border	1,000	1,000	2,000
	1965	Pakistan-India, Kashmir	13,000	7,000	20,000
	1971	Pakistan-India, border	...	11,000	11,000
	1983	Assam election violence	3,000	0	3,000
	1984	Ethnic, political violence	3,000	0	3,000
Pakistan	1973-77	Baluchistan	6,000	3,000	9,000
Sri Lanka	1971	Attempted Maoist coup	1,000	1,000	2,000
	1984-85	Tamils vs. government	2,000	0	2,000
<i>East Asia</i>					
China	1967-68	Cultural Revolution	50,000
	1983-84	Government executions	5,000	0	5,000
Korea, South	1980	Kwangju uprising**	2,000	0	2,000
<i>Southeast Asia</i>					
Burma	1980	BCP & others - Gov't	5,000
Cambodia	1970-75	KR-gov't, US, NV invasion	2,156,000
	1975-78	DPRK - people	1,500,000	500,000	2,000,000
	1979-85	VN invasion & resistance	14,000	10,000	24,000
Indonesia	1965-66	Massacres of communists**	500,000	500,000
	1975-87	East Timor invasion**	150,000	150,000
	1963-87	Irian Jaya annexation**
	1983-85	Petrus killings**	2,000	0	2,000
Laos	1960-62	Pathet Lao-Gov't.	5,000
	1963-73	N.Vietnam, U.S. conflict	10,000	9,000	19,000
Philippines	1972-80	Muslim revolt	10,000	10,000	20,000
	1972-85	NDF-Gov't conflict	5,000	9,000	14,000
Vietnam	1960-65	NLF-Diem gov't.	200,000	100,000	2,300,000
	1965-75	US intervention	1,000,000	1,058,000	2,058,000
	1979	China invasion	9,000	21,000	30,000
TOTAL			4,586,000	2,390,000	7,192,000

Source: Ruth Lever Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985*, (Williamsburg, VA: WMSE Press, 1985), pp. 10-11.

Notes:

* The estimates presented by Sivard were prepared by William Eckhardt of the Peace Research Laboratory. A war was defined as "any conflict including one or more governments, involving the use of arms, and causing deaths of 1,000 or more people per year".

** Denotes variation from Sivard estimate. Sivard's estimates have been accepted in a number of doubtful cases (e.g. the Philippines); only in two cases have alternative estimates been provided: South Korea and Indonesia. In the South Korean case, opposition claims of deaths from army assault in Kwangju have been accepted. In the Indonesian case, (a) deaths of PKI members and sympathisers have been set at the half a million - a possibly conservative estimate; (b) deaths in East Timor continued into the late 1980s, and numerous analysts have placed the number of deaths since 1975 at 150,000 or more; (c) the numbers of civilians and soldiers (both Indonesian government and Irianese), killed in Irian Jaya is not known, but would certainly warrant entry in this table; and (d) the "Petrus" killings of criminals by military death squads has been well documented. See Chapter 11 below.

In this chapter, then, I will discuss the concept of militarization, which, together with surveillance and terror, is one of the core concepts around which this thesis is organised as a contribution to understanding the Indonesian state. The chapter begins with a description of the classical notion of militarism and the difficulties this notion presents for the analysis of contemporary politics. I will then review the debates about alternative terms, especially "militarism" as opposed to "militarization". The main types of contemporary militarization are then outlined: national, extended or imperial, and indirect forms of militarization. These are then related to variants according to socio-economic base. The main concern of the chapter then becomes the dimensions of contemporary Third World militarization, the normal form of peripheral capitalist states. This involves a change in the social organization of state violence, and its increased salience in the life of the state and society at large. These issues are then reviewed at length in the case of regional militarization in East and Southeast Asia.

The classical notion of militarism and its difficulties

The meaning and sense attached to "militarism" was set early: its first use by Madame De Chastenay in 1816 referred pejoratively to Napoleon I's recently defeated regime.² Vagts' classic interwar study set out the history by which

militarism has connoted a domination of the military over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands and emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales of value.³

In this tradition of political thought domestic militarism was associated with an aggressive foreign policy, backed up by an unwarranted and threatening military build-up, giving the capacity to exercise a preference for the use of force in resolving conflicts between states. The same emphasis appears in Klare's more recent definition:

we can define 'militarism' as the tendency of a nation's military apparatus (which includes the armed forces and associated paramilitary, intelligence and bureaucratic agencies) to assume ever-increasing control over the lives and behaviour of its citizens; and for military goals (preparation for war, acquisition of weaponry, development of military industries) and military values (centralization of authority, hierarchization, discipline and conformity, combativeness and xenophobia) increasingly to dominate national culture, education, the media, religion, politics and the economy, at the expense of civilian institutions.⁴

Vagts and Klare accurately reflect the popular meanings of the term "militarism" in the twentieth century.

However, two difficulties have emerged with this dominant use of the term. Studies of contemporary militarization in the United States and the Soviet Union have revealed the structural character of the "non-military" institutions contributing to militarist policy

2. Volker R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.7.

3. Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, (New York, 1959 [1938]), p.12.

4. Michael Klare, "Militarism: the issues today", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 9,2 (1978), p.121.

outcomes in those countries: e.g. a military–industrial complex and the role of military research and development institutions and procedures as a somewhat autonomous factor in the contemporary arms race. To deal with this, peace researchers began to supplement the original policy/behaviour and ideology/culture dimensions of militarism with a "structural" or "systemic" dimension.⁵ The additional element recognised the degree to which contemporary superpower militarism is embedded in the domestic society, and its propensity to influence other elements in the global system in a militarist direction. As Kim put it:

Militarism...has now achieved the status of a global ideology. Contemporary militarism differs from its historical antecedents in its global reach, the immediacy of its impact, the degree of its structural penetration, and the magnitude of its lethal power.⁶

This structural and systemic emphasis was an important step towards resolving the second, larger problem. In European and North American political thought, "militarism" has been overwhelmingly associated with two specific historical episodes: Wilhelmine Germany and Japan in the 1930s. These examples generated a paradigm focussing on the overt and illegitimate role of the officer corps in government, an attempt to inculcate an overtly martial spirit into the population of industrial societies, and what was held to be the unjustifiable use of military force in foreign relations.

It is hardly accidental that these two examples represent a portrayal of the losers of two world wars by the winners in such a way as to attribute the origins of these conflicts to characteristics of the losers' domestic societies. Alternative or supplementary explanations of the outbreak of war that may deal with the international political and economic behaviour of the subsequently victorious states are thereby vitiated. Moreover, the term "militarism" is effectively reserved for one historically limited state type. While US or Soviet military spending, military industries, military capacity, and international political use of military force has been for over four decades comparable to Wilhelmine Germany, the use of the term "militarist" for the United States appears inappropriate if the basis of comparison is pre-1918 Germany and pre-1945 Japan.

The appropriate response is to recognise the historically limited connotations of the dominant interpretations of "militarism", and redefine the term more broadly, and in openly ahistorical terms, as does Michael Mann in a preparation for a more historically specific analysis:

I define militarism as a set of attitudes and social practices which regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.⁷

What is then to be understood is that even in the twentieth century there have been a number of different types of militarist states which must now be identified. The German historian Volker Berghahn distinguishes between two fundamentally different forms of

5. Kjell Skjelsbaek, "Militarism, its dimensions and corollaries: an attempt at conceptual clarification", *Journal of Peace Research*, XVI,3 (1979); and Marek Thee, "Militarism and militarization in contemporary international relations", *Bulletin of Peace Proposal*, 8,4 (1977).

6. Samuel S. Kim, "Global violence and a just world order", *Journal of Peace Research*, 21,2 (1984), p.185.

7. Michael Mann, "The roots and contradictions of modern militarism", *New Left Review*, 162 (1987), p.36. Also in his *States, War and Capitalism*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

twentieth century militarism. "Type I" is the paradigm of "classical militarism": Germany and Japan as "transitional" industrialising societies dominated by an officer corps, which is itself saturated with a martial ideology, pushing an increasingly armed and coercive state towards war with other states. The domestic political repression that accompanied the path to external aggression is a crucial element of the paradigm of classical militarism:

There can be little doubt that a connection existed between the state of open or latent civil war within these transitional societies and those aggressive designs.⁸

"Type II", high technology militarism is characteristic of the major powers of the second half of the twentieth century, where nuclear weapons have to date precluded direct major wars. This type of militarism has a very different make-up, domestically and internationally:

If Wilson was correct in assuming that the "spiritual element" is an essential ingredient of militarism, it appears to be absent from the "mass politics" of the high technology countries whose populations adhere overwhelmingly to a civilian life-style. They are consumer-orientated and openly fearful of war. There is no popular enthusiasm for paramilitarism and for programmes of territorial expansion. Attempts to organise people into militaristic associations meet, insofar as they are undertaken at all, with little success. War is not heroized into a Junger-like literature.⁹

Mann refines Berghahn's broad portrait of Type II contemporary high technology militarism by distinguishing at least three central components:

the deterrence science militarism shared by elites of East and West; the militarised socialism predominating among the Soviet people; and the spectator sport militarism prevailing among Western citizens.¹⁰

The point here is not so much the detailed portrayal of the structure of the central elements of a globalised militarism as the distinction between these forms of contemporary militarization and those of classical militarism which have so shaped the dominant public perception.

"Militarism" and "militarization"

So far, the terms "militarism" and "militarization" have been used interchangeably. Is there any reason to prefer one to the other? Militarization is an awkward and ugly term, a social science neologism, an ugly noun derived from a recently invented and barely legitimate verb, itself derived from a noun. However it does potentially differ from "militarism" in several useful senses.

Firstly, "militarization" clearly refers to a process, rather than to an end condition

8. Berghahn, op.cit., p.108.

9. Ibid, pp.108-9. Berghahn's otherwise excellent survey tends to treat contemporary western Type II militarism in terms which omit the profound cultural irrationalities underpinning its survival. For two different psychological portrayals see Joel Kovel, *Against the State of Nuclear Terror*, (Boston: South End Press, 1983); and Robert J. Lifton, *The Broken Connection*, (New York: Touchstone Books, 1979).

10. Mann, op.cit., p.36.

alone. Accordingly it allows exploration of change in state and society, change in a particular direction. It allows judgement of degree: one state may be more or less militarized than another; a given state may become more or less militarized over time. Secondly, the verb-noun form conveys a sense of interrelated socio-technical processes which, once initiated and established, carry with them a certain momentum. Such terms serve to remind us that we are talking of relations between people which unless actively resisted and restructured tend to develop a social logic of their own, and bend the unresisting will of society around them.

Sakamoto argues further that "militarization" is to be preferred to "militarism" in as much as it

refers to a dynamic process which goes beyond an aggregation of attitudinal, structural and functional facets of a system. It is a dynamic politico-military process linked with the process of economic development that runs through the history of the modern nation-state system in the last two centuries.¹¹

This takes us beyond the issue of definition, but points the way towards the location of contemporary militarization as a global, systemic and structural set of processes tied closely to the macro-history of the world system in the modern era. Kim's metaphor of militarism as cancer is apposite here:

Like cancer, militarism is an aggregate concept for a series of related diseases with different causes and consequences.¹²

Further discussion of the specific character of these processes goes beyond the question of definition. In any case, no broad, necessarily ahistorical definition can do more than roughly delineate the object of concern. The preference for "militarization" rather than "militarism" is not a strong one, but may be helpful in its connotations. What is necessary at present is to amplify the concept, and provide observable indicators of the presence or absence or variation in the phenomenon in a given historical period - in this case, the second half of the twentieth century.

Global militarization

"Militarization" here is used to refer to a particular process of change in the state and in the relationship between the state and civil society. Contemporary militarization is a global phenomenon - in three senses. Firstly, the structure of the contemporary world system implicates almost all states in a broad process of militarization - whether by autonomous choice, the pressures of external threat, the demands of alliance partners, or the follow-on consequences of technology-heavy force structures. Hence the isomorphic structures of armed forces and "defence" bureaucracies around the world, the relative standardization of equipment, personnel requirements, and even uniforms.¹³

11. Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Research on militarization", paper presented to UNESCO Regional Training Seminar for University Teachers in the Field of Disarmament, Jakarta, September 1982, p.21.

12. Kim, op.cit., p.185.

13. See Robin Luckham, "Militarism: arms and the internationalization of capital", *IDS Bulletin*, (March 1977); "Militarism: force, class and international conflict", *IDS Bulletin*, (August 1977); and "Militarism and international dependence: a framework for analysis" in Jose J. Villamil (ed.), *Transnational Capitalism and National Development*, (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979). This standardization appears all the greater the longer the time period involved. At any one time there is a spectrum of "advanced" and "old"

Secondly, contemporary militarization is global in a social structural sense, involving and having an impact upon many if not most sectors of society, especially in the advanced industrial centre countries: in terms of manufacturing, employment, science, mass culture, education and gender relations, let alone the structure of the world system. The forms and processes of militarization therefore need to be specified as global, regional and local, and their inter-relations studied.

Thirdly, there is a civilizational dimension to contemporary militarization, a quality that marks off the age as a whole, particular societies and states apart, from those which have preceded it. Mass killing is not new, but its scale is, as is the level of technological rationality applied in preparation for that end and the diminution of moral awareness of such events.

But there is also a regional dimension to contemporary militarization, determined mainly by mutual threat-perceptions amongst neighbouring states. Arms build-ups are usually regionally or bilaterally based. Consequently there is a need to tie together three levels of analysis in the understanding of any instance of contemporary militarization: global, regional and national.¹⁴

Dimensions of national militarization

Four predominantly internal dimensions are involved in national forms of militarization: expanded military force structure; military predominance in politics; a preference for coercive solutions to political problems; and cultural supports for organised state violence. A fifth dimension is the degree of offensively-oriented external military alignment, alliance, or war-fighting capacity. The core concern is with a change in the social organization of state violence, and its increased salience in the life of the state and society at large.

Broadly speaking, a state or society will be understood to be undergoing a process of militarization if it exhibits at least one of the following five characteristics:¹⁵

- (a) an increase in the size, cost and coercive capacity of a nation's armed forces, police and security agencies;
- (b) a greater political role for the military;
- (c) an increase in the state's reliance on organised force, domestically and abroad, to secure its policy goals, rather than ideological hegemony and bargaining;
- (d) a change in the culture in the direction of values and beliefs that more effectively support organised state violence; and
- (e) increasing external offensive military alignment or alliance with other states, or use of force externally.

technologies and force structures around the world.

14. See Chapter Six below.

15. This categorization is based on that set out in a survey of militarization of the countries of the Asian region in Richard Tanter, "Trends in Asia", *Alternatives, (special issue on militarization)*, X,1 (1984). The alliance criterion, however, was not discussed there. The first four criteria are systematically applied to the countries of the region in that paper.

This use of the term "militarization" does have a number of difficulties which, though acceptable, should be remembered. Firstly, it presumes a "normal" role for the military and a "normal" level of military activity, against which the "militarized" condition of the state can be measured. In an international system in which standing armies are the norm and where, in the last instance in a nuclear-armed crowd, there is a need for self-protection, the relatively highly militarized deviants must undertake unusual activities to be noticeable. The definition implicitly accepts a certain level of state violence as inevitable under present historical circumstances.

Secondly, the foundations of all stable states in the present world-system is a pact of compromise between dominant and minority social groups which limits the domain of issues and circumstances over which the state's violence is domestically used. Enduring societies survive their own capacity for violent self-destruction by restricting the moments when minority control over the means of violence is allowed to triumph over compromise, hegemony, ideological controls, and other forms of social control. Militarization refers to that historical moment when the balance moves rapidly towards the rule of force.

Thirdly, the approach to militarization adopted here predominantly focuses attention on the internal affairs of individual states. The fifth dimension of militarization discussed on the previous page - increasing military alignment and alliance - is one attempt to refer to the fact that contemporary militarization occurs in a highly-structured world of armed and unequal states. More precisely, the militarization of individual states occurs in a global political system which generates structural pressures on individual states to behave within a constrained set of options. The obvious inequality of nations in terms of power can be thought of as involving descending levels of sovereignty, or increasingly asymmetrical dependence, or diminished distinction between the smaller national state and other, larger national or supra-national states. Militarization is a global historical process, but one which is manifest in the activities and choices taken by individual states.

Varieties of contemporary militarization

One way of dealing with this last difficulty is to distinguish several variants of contemporary militarization of individual states: national, extended or imperial, and indirect. The *national* form of militarization is the most familiar, and it is to this form that the dimensions of militarization set out above were aimed. The *extended* or *imperial* form of militarization refers to that small number of cases usually termed super-powers. Not only are these "super-power" states themselves profoundly militarized, but they possess considerable power over other states to induce or coerce them to move in a militarized direction.¹⁶ Finally, the *indirect* mode of militarization refers to those states which, while they are not themselves seriously militarized, provide substantial support and assistance for the militarization of other states and benefit from the results. A prime example of

16. See James Petras and Morris H. Morley, "The U.S. imperial state", *Review*, IV,2 (1980). The "hegemony" debate in current international relations writing deals with some aspects of this issue. See Robert Cox, "Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 12,2 (1983); and *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Bruce Russett, "The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain really dead?", *International Organization*, 39,2 (1985).

indirect militarization is contemporary Japan, which has provided considerable political and financial support to repressive Third World states, including both Indonesia and South Korea. The question Japanese state managers now face is whether to move from the indirect to the direct, national form of militarization.

The three types of militarization (national, extended or imperial, and indirect) are found amongst both capitalist and state socialist countries. Variation derives not just from the mode of militarization, but from the characteristics of the economic system. Accordingly, the types of militarization are further distinguished into capitalist and socialist, and for the former, into mature and new industrial countries, rentier and agrarian economies. For example, national capitalist forms of militarization in South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines can be distinguished as "New Industrial", "Rentier", and "Agrarian" respectively.¹⁷ Since there are no examples of socialist rentier states, this group is distinguished as mature and new industrial economies and agrarian socialist economies. Clearly, only mature industrial states have the capacity to exercise extended or imperial forms of militarization at present, but in time, new industrial countries will probably move into forms of both indirect and extended militarization.

In the definition of militarization set out above, it was suggested that the presence of any one of five characteristics at the national level, would indicate a militarizing tendency in any given society. It is an open question as to which of these, if any, are themselves generative in that the presence of one is very likely to lead to the presence of others. The most closely connected, as means and ends, are increases in the socio-technical base (armaments, personnel and budgets) on the one hand, and the reliance on force [(a) and (c) above respectively].

Paradoxically, military rule is probably less central within contemporary patterns of militarization. The point is not so much that military governments are endemic, even the norm in the Third World. Rather, to argue otherwise misses the equally widespread militarization of nominally civilian-directed states.

The cultural dimension is specified separately as a contingency that helps to maintain a distinction between militarization in a general sense and the classic European and Japanese patterns of the first half of the twentieth century as a particular and contingent historical form.

If any one of the five dimensions may have a deeper, generative significance, it is likely to be the fifth: the increasing external military alignment. This is because alliance and alignment are not simply matters of military relations. Over time, a great many other ties between the two states and societies come to reach into the domestic structure of the subordinate partner, providing a structural impetus towards the set of options posed by the dominant partner - if not necessarily towards further militarization.

The dimensions of militarization set out above need to be understood as at best a checklist of indicators stressing common elements. Such a list says little about the depth of militarization in a society, the particular historical path by which it emerged and which has shaped its character, the tenacity of the condition, or the possibilities for self-transformation. Only national histories written within a global framework can address such issues adequately.

Simple models of "external" and "internal" influences are untenable in the contemporary world order. The militarization that characterises that world order has a

17. See Chapter 6 below for a comparison of Indonesia and South Korea in these terms.

variety of forms of intervention and influence - and equally there are as many forms of resistance and rebuff at the local level. The system of inter-state relations is itself reciprocally bound up with the global economic system driven by imperatives of capital accumulation, and limited by the global ecology.¹⁸

Regional militarization

East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia are more or less distinct political, economic and military regions, with South Asia more separate from the other two.¹⁹ All three regions are highly militarized, in large part because of their location within either the global political-military alliance system or the global economy.²⁰ For decades, the three regions have been framed by imported cold war alliance rivalries: since 1945-49 in East Asia, and from the 1950s in Southeast and South Asia. (See Table 2.2.) The end of the Pacific War left the United States with a network of bases in the Western Pacific, and the 1950s saw the extension an alliance structure based on relations with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the Philippines.²¹ The American wars in Korea and in Indochina, together with the military core logic of confrontation with the Soviet Union, hardened and extended the rationale for upgraded deployment of nuclear weapons in all three regions: from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, to Clark and Subic Bases and other bases in the Philippines, Okinawa and other bases in Japan, Onsan and other air bases in South Korea, Guam and Hawaii and other bases in the Western Pacific.

The Soviet alliance structure in Asia was always weak, and was weaker still after the end of cooperation between the Soviet Union and China at the end of the 1950s. Since the early 1960s, this consisted of dependent relations with North Korea and (North) Vietnam (weakly dependent and strongly so respectively), and later the lesser Indochina countries, in addition to the Soviet military supply relationship to India. The only Soviet military bases outside its own Pacific territories were the Vietnamese naval base at Cam Ranh Bay and the air base at Danang between the late 1970s and 1990. The period of Soviet naval expansion under President Brezhnev and Admiral Gorshkov produced a substantial counter-force to the US North-Western Pacific capacity, but little of any military consequence for the three regions in other respects.

However the alliance structure strongly influenced the militarization of all three regions in other respects. South Korea's remarkable industrialization was a result of the ability of the Korean military leadership to capitalise on the strategic privilege of the country in the US alliance system.²² Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, very large US

18. See Chapter 6 for further discussion.

19. The matters dealt with in the following section are discussed in greater detail in two earlier papers: Richard Tanter, "The militarization of ASEAN", *Alternatives*, VIII:4 (1981); and "Trends in Asia", *Alternatives*, (special issue on militarization), X,1 (1984).

20. Only in the case of Burma is it plausible to point to primarily domestic factors as the cause of militarization. Even then, petty capitalist commodity production of opium is induced by external factors. See Alfred McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper Colophon, 1970), chapter 7.

21. On the history of US Pacific basing and alliance policy see Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden Bello, *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986).

22 See Chapter 6 for a comparison of South Korea and Indonesia in this respect.

military assistance substantially paid for a series of military Force Modernization Programs which brought the South Korean military force structure to a point comparable to that of the United States forces with

Table 2.2
Alliances of Asia

Dominant partner	Subordinate partners
United States	Australia Japan Pakistan Philippines South Korea (Taiwan)
USSR	Cambodia Laos Mongolia Vietnam

Notes

1. There are two sets of equal alliances:

(a) North Korea has treaties with both the Soviet Union and China.

(b) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is made up of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

2. The relationships between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, Cambodia and Mongolia loosened after 1989.

which it was designed to conduct joint operations.²³ But in addition to the economic and military consequences of alliance were the political ones: from the coup by Park Chung-hee in May 1961 to the end of the Chun Doo-hwan dictatorship in 1986, the United States supported military government in South Korea, moderating its donation of legitimacy only in the most public of military excess (e.g. the death sentence against Kim Dae-jung) or at the point when it became clear by 1984-85 that the choice was either liberal reform or revolution. A comparable pattern, *mutatis mutandis*, characterised the US relation to the militarization of the Philippines. The differences between the two cases were firstly the front-line location of South Korea in the confrontation with the Soviet Union, compared with the Philippines rear supply-base role; secondly the very different characters of the economies and social structures of the two countries at 1945; and thirdly, the size and strategies of the opposition groups in the two countries.

Indonesia, whilst not a formal participant in the US alliance structure and a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, has in fact been strongly aligned with the United States on most policy matters of mutual interest, and a major recipient of US military aid. Since the end of the colonial period Indonesia has been considered a strategic target for the United States. In 1954 the National Security Council secretly specified that "all feasible covert means", including the "use of armed force if necessary" was to be used to thwart a projected communist takeover of the economically significant part of the country.²⁴ The United States intervened in 1958 by supporting the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, and most importantly through military aid and psychological warfare assistance in the critical 1964 - September 1965 period. Leaving aside the nature of that intervention, the vital US interests in Indonesia have been strategic and economic. The strategic interest has been a residual one, a function of Indonesia's population size and location across the sea-lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, rather than a function of any external challenge. It was a sense of domestic communist and nationalist threat to foreign-controlled enclave commodity oil and minerals production which most animated US policy-makers to commit themselves to a militarized resolution of Indonesian political difficulties in the 1960s.²⁵

The US extended pattern of militarization also affected the internal structure of the communist governments in the regions, especially North Korea and Vietnam. The character of both states was largely determined by war or the threat of war from the US or its local ally.

Table 2.3 sets out the pattern of East and Southeast Asian regional militarization. Extended militarization is primarily a matter of intervention by the United States, and to a lesser extent by the Soviet Union, in both cases in the form of military and economic assistance, commercial arms sales, direct military basing, and diplomatic support for client or allied governments with limited or no domestic legitimacy. The indirect militarizing role played by Japan, and to a much lesser extent, Australia, should not be

23. This included payment for the full costs of up to 50,000 South Korean combat soldiers in South Vietnam for more than five years.

24 National Security Council memorandum reported in United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XII*, (Washington D.C.), p.1066, cited in Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980*, (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p.174.

25 On the US and Indonesia more generally see Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno", *Pacific Affairs*, 58,2 (1985).

underestimated - through small amounts of military aid in the Australian case, increasingly large amounts of economic assistance in the Japanese case, and strong diplomatic support from both countries. South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as ASEAN in general, have been the prime targets of this approach.²⁶

In national terms, five main types of militarization have been significant since the 1960s in East and Southeast Asia. Table 2.3 classifies the militarized states of East and Southeast Asia according to the following five types:

- a. New industrial capitalist states
- b. Rentier capitalist states
- c. Agrarian capitalist states
- d. New industrial communist states
- e. Agrarian communist states

26. See Chapter 6 on Japan-Indonesia relations. In general see Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo - Jakarta Relations, 1957-1966*, (Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and the University of Hawaii, 1976);
******Economic and Political Authoritarianism*, (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1986); Kunio Yoshihara (ed.),
Japan and Thailand, (Kyoto: Kyoto University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989); and Kunio Yoshihara, *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia*, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Table 2.3
Types of contemporary militarization
in Asia

		Extended/ imperial	National	Indirect
	Mature industrial	<i>United States</i>		<i>Japan</i> <i>Australia**</i>
Capitalist	New industrial		<i>Singapore</i> <i>South Korea</i> <i>Taiwan</i>	
	Rentier		<i>Indonesia</i>	
	Agrarian*		<i>Philippines</i> <i>Malaysia</i> <i>Thailand</i>	
	Mature industrial	<i>Soviet Union</i>		
State socialist	New industrial		<i>North Korea</i>	
	Agrarian*		<i>Vietnam</i> <i>Cambodia</i>	
Other	Agrarian*		<i>Burma</i>	

Notes:

* Countries labelled *agrarian* vary considerably. Malaysia and the Philippines are similar in general, although the corporate agri-business and manufacturing sectors are larger in Malaysia. A comparable distinction can be made between Vietnam and Cambodia.

** Australia is labelled a *mature industrial* country, despite the fact that its export income comes primarily from minerals and agricultural commodities. It has a comprehensive though uneven and declining manufacturing sector. Clearly it is comparable to Japan or the United States in its economic structure in only limited ways. However it is these characteristics which have formed its political character.

Militarization has been the norm rather than the exception in East and Southeast Asia throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While there are important variations, all except Burma could be described by Feith's term "repressive developmentalist".²⁷ In general such regimes pursue rapid national economic growth through integration into the world capitalist system by greatly expanded trade and inflows of investment.²⁸ The state generally expands greatly in size, complexity and infra-structural capacity.²⁹ Resistance to the accompanying rapid social transformation and dislocation is met with pronounced political repression, although the target group and manner of repression will vary with the international political and economic situation, internal ethnic and class structure, and the actual type of resistance generated. The use of state force to resolve political crisis is distinctive, going beyond matters of temporary political intervention by the military to strengthen a faltering civilian hand. Paradoxically, while coercion is central, considerable efforts are made to secure at least a modicum of domestic legitimacy, and to replace pre-existing symbols that have lost their political efficacy. This is pursued by cultivating adherence to developmentalist and statist ideologies, with ostensibly ideologically neutral and technically expert state managers playing a key symbolic role. At the same time, the primary requirement remains external military, ideological and political support - most importantly in these regions from the United States, and to a lesser but increasing extent, Japan.³⁰

As a first estimate, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, and Bangladesh should be seen as militarized peripheral capitalist states. Malaysia, India and Singapore share some of this group's qualities, but not all, and should be regarded as being at some half-way point.

Yet even the first group is not all of a piece. The militarized capitalist cases can be distinguished on the basis of distribution of Gross Domestic Product and the make-up of exports. (See Table 2.4.) Two tiers can be readily distinguished. The first group is made up of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. These are essentially industrialised countries with a substantial manufacturing sector, a large industrial workforce, markedly higher per capita national incomes than elsewhere in the region except Japan, and structurally committed to export-oriented industrialization at the higher end of the technological range.³¹ The second tier, more heterogeneous than the first, is made up of predominantly agrarian societies integrated into global markets for agricultural commodities, minerals or fuels, with relatively small, although growing, manufacturing sectors. All of these militarizing states are attempting to diversify into export-oriented industrialization by

27. Herbert Feith, "Repressive developmentalist regimes in Asia: Old strengths and new vulnerabilities", *Alternatives*, VII,4 (1981). Feith's term could equally be applied to North Korea.

28. See Chapter Six for a discussion of variations in forms of integration, and degrees of autonomy within integrationist strategies pursued by Indonesia and South Korea: rentier-militarist and mercantilist-militarist respectively.

29. See Chapter 6 on varying measures of "state-strength".

30. See Chapter Six below.

31. For a discussion of the implications of the dynamics of this structure in the South Korean case see Clive Hamilton and Richard Tanter, "The antinomies of success in South Korea", *Journal of International Affairs*, 41,1 (1987); and Richard Tanter, "The political economy of arms control and demilitarization: the case of South Korea", paper presented to the Conference on the Arms Race and Arms Control in Northeast Asia, Korean Association of International Relations, Seoul, 28-29 August (1986).

offering labour more cheaply than countries in the first tier.³² The second tier should be further distinguished: while the bulk of the Indonesian labour force is engaged in agriculture, the country's economy - and government finance even more so - is centred on rent income from oil and gas exports. Accordingly, it is better classified as *rentier*.

Other sources of variation stem from the geo-political position of particular countries, and from unique aspects of recent history. South Korea's unique position is defined by its participation for more than forty years in a set of antagonisms that involved it in conflicts or alliances with the United States and the Soviet Union, China and Japan, as well as North Korea. The formative experiences of the Indonesian military in the revolutionary war against the Dutch colonial power distinguish its collective outlook from that of the Malaysian military, which grew directly out of the colonial forces.

The central element in contemporary militarization is always an increase in military spending: money for the expanding material basis of coercion. Military expenditures (in constant terms) and growth rates in

32. Malaysia is clearly a border-line case in economic terms, and Burma is an anomaly in many respects.

Table 2.4
Selected economic indicators
Militarised capitalist states of East and Southeast Asia

Country	GNP per capita		Distribution of GDP (1987)				Percentage of merchandise exports (1987)			
	US\$ 1987	Average annual growth rate (%)	Agri-culture	Industry	(Manufacturing) ^a	Services	Fuels, minerals & metals	Other primary commod.	Machinery & trans. equipment	Other manufactures
Rentier:										
Indonesia	450	4.5	26	33	14	41	54	18	3	24
Agricultural:										
Burma	214	..	28	..	10	..	4	85	8	3
Malaysia	1810	4.1	18	..	26	..	25	36	27	13
Philippines	590	1.7	24	33	25	43	14	24	6	56
Thailand	850	3.9	16	35	24	49	2	45	12	41
New industrial:										
Singapore	7940	7.2	1	38	29	62	17	11	43	29
South Korea	2890	6.4	11	43	30	46	2	5	33	59
Taiwan ^b	5520	..	5	..	38	..	1	6	30	63

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1989, (New York: Oxford University Press/World Bank, 1989), pp.164-165, 174-175, 194-195; except for bold face figures, which are from Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook, 1990, (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1990), pp.6-7.

Notes: a. Manufacturing is a sub-group of Industry. b. Burma and Taiwan GNP per capita entry is GDP per capita for 1988.

such expenditures are shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for all countries in the region. It goes without saying that in no country was military spending at the end of the decade lower than at the beginning. In East and Southeast Asia, real growth rates in the first half of the decade (1976-80) averaged 6.6% and 5.6% respectively, although both averages fell substantially in the latter period. Major countries such as North and South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand had very high growth rates in the first period. Malaysia and the Philippines actually had apparent negative growth in military spending in 1981-85.³³

Arms transfer data somewhat modifies this picture. (See Table 2.7.) Increased spending can be used for more soldiers, more and better equipment, or both. Most importantly, it becomes clear that spending on armaments, as opposed to other types of military expenditure, rose more substantially than total military expenditure. One case in point is Malaysia. While its rate of increase of military spending became negative in 1981-85, the value of its arms transfers in the same period was 260% higher than the preceding five years. Even allowing for delays in equipment arrival, this suggests, as is evident from other countries in the table, that the pace of arms acquisitions was considerably greater even than is suggested by the military expenditure growth rates.

Setting aside individual differences, these arms transfers have been characterised by:

- (a) a considerable increase in value throughout the 1970s, and a general slowing of the rate of increase in the 1980s;
- (b) an increase in the number of weapons systems transferred;
- (c) proliferation of weapons of greater technical sophistication and destructive capacity;
- (d) a spread in the range of imported weapons systems towards more complete industrial arsenals³⁴;
- (e) a broad US dominance amongst suppliers, but with a tendency to diversification of sources of supply; and

33. See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the limitations of military expenditure data in such countries.

34. The spread of more complete industrial arsenals is a major change from earlier Third World patterns of reliance on a limited range of obsolete equipment. The change is important in terms of potential capacity for violence, costs, social resources devoted to complementary industrialised activities (e.g. training and logistical support), and the follow-on character of military technologies exported to peripheral countries from industrial centre countries. See Mary Kaldor, "The significance of military technology", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 8,2 (1977).

Table 2.5
 Military expenditure, Asia, 1976 - 1985
 constant prices (1980 US\$ mn.)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
South Asia	5718	5521	5773	6269	6599	7055	7795	8137	8605	9087
Afghanistan	79	82	84	125	[174]
Bangladesh	163	179	168	177	187	(209)	234	233	(236)	(245)
India	4256	4042	4233	4585	4755	5015	5445	5677	5992	(6182)
Nepal	17	18	18	20	20	20	23	25	28	[32]
Pakistan	1161	1156	1231	1302	1404	1572	1817	1915	2032	2199
Sri Lanka	41	45	39	61	59	54	[69]	73	91	190
East Asia	13907	15008	16722	17369	18112	18845	19861	20689	21259	22050
Hong Kong	64	98	142	156	279	(271)	(234)	(222)	[221]	..
Japan	8233	8467	8987	9573	9766	10041	10429	10913	11369	11879
Korea, North	1147	1168	1307	1429	1533	1677	1807	1968	2129	(2213)
Korea, South	2433	2891	3603	3384	3707	3844	4003	4168	4131	4477
Mongolia	140	139	145	(165)	(146)	(217)	(246)	(249)	(263)	..
Taiwan	1890	2245	2538	2662	2681	2795	3142	3169	3146	3481
Southeast Asia	7363	7771	8360	8633	9248	10217	11060	11250	10891	11118
Brunei	95	96	107	189	[192]	180	[200]	(217)	(279)	..
Burma	156	181	213	227	(246)	[257]	(263)	(261)	(262)	(274)
Indonesia	(2469)	(2384)	(2576)	(2458)	(2723)	(3059)	[3391]	[3318]	[3600]	[3937]
Malaysia	923	1059	1108	1249	1557	1856	1970	2090	1840	1769
Philippines	991	980	899	825	776	836	887	757
Singapore	500	556	520	533	605	677	748	816	905	960
Thailand	913	1101	1382	1559	1476	1574	1699	1823	1968	2041
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia	1316	1414	1555	1593	1673	1778	1902	1968	2037	2137

Source: SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1986), Table 11A.3.

Conventions:

() Uncertain data or SIPRI estimates of military expenditure. [] Rough estimate.

Table 2.6
Military expenditure,
Asia 1976 – 1985:
real growth rates
(percentage)

	<i>1976-80</i>	<i>1981-85</i>
<i>South Asia</i>	4.2	6.0
Afghanistan	21.4	..
Bangladesh	2.6	3.2
India	2.2	3.2
Nepal	4.3	11.3
Pakistan	5.1	7.7
Sri Lanka	10.6	30.8
<i>East Asia</i>	6.6	3.8
Hong Kong	33.0	-6.8
Japan	4.6	4.2
Korea, North	7.8	7.1
Korea, South	9.5	3.4
Mongolia	2.6	5.8
Taiwan	8.3	4.4
<i>Southeast Asia</i>	5.6	1.5
Burma	11.1	1.3
Indonesia	2.3	5.7
Malaysia	12.4	-1.6
Philippines	-6.5	-4.8
Singapore	3.4	8.8
Thailand	12.3	6.6
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos	5.9	4.3

Source: Derived from SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1986), Table 11A.3.

(f) establishment and spread of substantial capacities for licensed and indigenous armaments production.

This must be understood as the primary element in militarization: the proliferation of the material basis for state coercion and warfare, foreign or domestic.³⁵

The size of the armed forces of these countries showed complex changes over the same period. Some countries showed dramatic increases in the size of their armies and militias: e.g. the Philippines armed forces grew 240% between 1970 and 1982.³⁶ While the size of the armed forces of the region as a whole grew throughout the 1970s into the middle 1980s, three heavily militarized states reduced the size of their military establishments: Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. Such reductions, since they were accompanied by increases in military spending, indicate a shift to a more technology- and capital-intensive and more highly-trained military force. The significance of this trend towards improved professional standing armies is enhanced by the proliferation of militarized police forces, border security units, industrial security units, narcotics forces and other para-military units.³⁷

The predominant form of government in peripheral capitalist states in East and Southeast Asia through the 1970s and 1980s was one in which the military either held power alone, shared power with other civilian leadership groups, or provided the crucial support for a nominally civilian leadership (as in the Philippines under Marcos). Military leaders ruled for much of the period in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea. Political competition of course remained in every case, and over time, the base of competition broadened. But in every case, until the late 1980s, the military retained the whip hand. "The antinomies of success" in South Korea led to irresistible pressures for modification in the form of military rule in that country in 1986, although the depth of democratic changes should not be overestimated.³⁸ Singapore maintained an effective one party parliamentary state. Only in India and Malaysia were there effective electoral contests between civilian elites. However, in each case the electoral process was suffused by coercion and control of state resources by incumbents, with continuity tending to become dependent on the use of at least para-military power.

In each case, it is necessary to ascertain the precise role of the military: the depth to which military control of the state actually penetrates; the ideology which legitimates the political role of the military, both within the military itself, and for public consumption; and the coherence of the military as a political entity. This last is affected by the balance of political forces that the military must accommodate; its own internal character, divisions, and traditions; and the class project of the military as it develops in response to political crisis. The extent and duration of the institutionalising of the military's role also varies for much the same reasons.

35. It should of course be clear that data on arms imports and/or manufacture does not of itself provide an indicator of military strength. That is always something to be assessed relative to a given adversary.

36. The armed forces of the Philippines jumped from 33,000 in 1970 to 113,000 in 1982, according to *The Military Balance*, (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, International Institute of Strategic Studies, various issues).

37. For the Indian example of diversifying para-military and military force structure see Government of India, *India 1981*, (New Delhi: Ministry of Information, 1981), pp.417-420.

38. See Hamilton and Tanter, *op.cit.*

Explanations

There is no doubt about the seriousness of the picture drawn so far: the pre-dominant Asian state form is militarist or militarizing. The questions that now arise deal with explanations: why have events in one country after another, often starting from quite different historical positions, ended so uniformly? Are these outcomes historically contingent and readily reversible? Or are they the result of embedded social processes which will tend to reproduce the militarized condition for some time in the future? Do the explanations offered actually explain? For instance, governments often explain their need for expanded arms budgets by referring to developing internal security problems. Counter-insurgency campaigns are a state response to rural rebellion - and often in turn generate still deeper resistance, leading to calls for more arms, and so on. Similarly, military intervention in government is often seen to occur when (and because) civilian elites are divided and unable to carry on the work of government to the satisfaction of the military, or that of the country's foreign creditors, financial and otherwise. Both explanations are often appropriate, but they also beg the question as to why such situations should arise in the first place, and just why the military should attempt to resolve the conflicts in a particular direction.

Three sets of explanation will be set out briefly for the peripheral capitalist (and equally, state socialist) forms of militarization. The first and most familiar deals with security threats to the nation-state. More precisely, militarization here is seen as a response to elite perceptions of threats to the integrity of the state from within in the form of insurgency, from without as actual or threatened invasion or attack, or again from without as a result of the "destabilising" consequences of the activities of larger and more distant foreign powers. The second set of explanations deals with the institutional interests of the military itself as a body, and related institutions such as the arms industries within core industrial countries. The final set of explanations locates militarization in the reproduction dynamics of the society as a whole.

In each case, the question, as Albrecht puts it for the state socialist form, is whether militarization is understandable as an outcome of specific circumstances, explicable in terms that are either unique or contingent, or rather as "a variant of global militaristic development with its *systemic indifference*".³⁹ If the answer is the former, then there is reason to believe that when the conditions that gave rise to the increased military spending and arms purchases, military rule, state terror, and militarist thinking pass, then so too will the results. Such a hope that the militarizing process is so readily reversed is less plausible if it is seen to arise from deeper social causes.⁴⁰

The state system and threat perceptions are the most common explanation for militarization, the one offered most often by such states themselves. Internal or external threat requires a response by the state in the form of heightened externally-oriented defence preparedness or the development of expanded counter-insurgency capacity.

39. Ulrich Albrecht, "Red militarism", *Journal of Peace Research*, XVII,2 (1980), p.143.

40. This is not say that there is no hope in such cases: on the contrary, the tendency of structural models to present closed futures immune to political intervention should also be avoided. What is needed are explanations that emphasise contradiction, the structural sources of political possibility, and the emergence of political spaces that enable the mobilization of political will to change. But equally, what is to be avoided are explanations at too shallow a level, which give rise to false hopes of easy change.

Actual or threatened invasions were claimed by Thailand, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, India and Pakistan, amongst others. Substantial insurrections existed in many if not most of the repressive developmentalist states in the 1970s and 1980s. Counter-insurgency operations usually demand new armaments, and project the military more deeply into the everyday workings of the society, particularly as the military takes over the functions of the civilian police. In the repressive developmentalist case, insurrection is used to justify the shift in the professional and political roles of the military around the twin themes of national security and national economic development.⁴¹ Even where the arms appear to have been ordered with the alleged threat of invasion in mind, their deployment contributes to the sheer salience of the military as a potential instrument of intimidation of the domestic population.⁴²

However, counter-insurgency requirements in themselves do not always constitute an adequate explanation. Firstly, there are examples where the militarization substantially predates the insurrection. This requires a careful scrutiny of such claims in terms of sequence, and also a separation of the elements of militarization and their phasing.⁴³ Secondly, and more generally, the fact of counter-insurgency operations leading to militarization does not of itself explain why the insurgency developed when and where it did. For this it is necessary to examine the forces that lead to tribal or sectional revolt at a given point. Peasant rebellion, tribal resistance, and labour struggles all arise from inchoate decisions to armed resistance in the face of state indifference to or active supports for assaults on ways of life, standards of subsistence, or sheer survival. Throughout peripheral capitalist Asia, the causes of rebellion lie in movement in the nexus between the shifting relationships of the state and the local and world economy on the one hand, and the inter-ethnic and inter-regional social structure on the other.⁴⁴

Militarization as a response to external threat is plausible in one case in East and Southeast Asia: the case of Vietnam. The country's birth in the war of independence, the twenty year war against the United States, the country's invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent invasion of Vietnam by China is undoubtedly the primary cause of the militarization of the country. It is possible, though implausible, to regard each of these events as an expression of an inherent drive to power by a militarist communist party bent on regional hegemony. A more plausible explanation, especially if the origins of the Cambodian episode are examined in the light of long-standing culturally and geographically rooted tensions between China and Vietnam, is that Vietnamese militarization is due to the persistence of a correctly perceived set of external threats. If this is true, then there is good reason to expect that if and when Vietnam can be extricated from

41. See Alfred Stepan, "The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion", in Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.), *The Political Influence of the Military*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

42. E.g. Thailand's imports of advanced fighter aircraft, tanks and anti-tank missiles after the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in 1979.

43. Indonesia is a useful example here. The fundamental militarization of the country occurred well before the counter-insurgency campaigns in Irian Jaya, East Timor and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, as Chapter Seven will show, the failure of the initial invasion of East Timor led to a considerable expansion of arms purchases.

44. This is particularly the case for rebellions of ethnic minorities. See Cynthia Enloe, "State-building and ethnic structures: Dependence on international capitalist penetration", in T.K.Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *Processes of the World System*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980).

this very powerful set of coordinated international pressures then the state should shift back to a less militarized condition.

Institutional pressures in two forms contributed to the militarization of East and Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s: the global armaments complex and the military as a national corporate body.⁴⁵

Corporate interests of the military

The corporate interests of the military derive primarily from what Kaldor has described as the "relations of force" in any given society.

...the techniques of force are the weapons and the way that they are used. The relations of force are the organization of men, the nature of the military hierarchy, the methods of recruitment. Together, they comprise the form of force.⁴⁶

All existing armies have a hierarchical structure, and by the late 1980s, almost all are to a greater or lesser degree, industrialised. The commitments and opportunities that derive from commanding positions in the relations of force give rise to the corporate interests of the military. Just what these interests are in any given case cannot be predicted in advance in any simple way, except to say that there are no known examples of officer corps of industrial armies⁴⁷ turning away from a hierarchical and industrially-based form of force. While usually the officer corps in Third World countries have intervened in favour of the maintenance or establishment of economic integration with the world economy, there are contrary examples. And even those that have intervened in such a direction have not always done so on the basis of "national surrender" to the global free market: the pre-war Japanese militarist ideology that Park Chung-hee brought with him to power led to the establishment of a mercantilist economic strategy, rather than a liberal strategy. Moreover, while the relations of force model points to useful institutional clusters of interest (amongst officers, officers of a given rank or service), it needs to be supplemented by other considerations, such as ethnicity, ideological predilection⁴⁸, and prior experience of the military in political power and competing pressures.⁴⁹

However, the corporate interests of the military, though they may rarely be entirely unitary in a given case, have had a powerful influence on the surge to power. Three considerations come to mind. The first is the claim in some cases (e.g. the pre-war Japanese military and the Indonesian military under Soekarno) that budgetary matters (within certain limits) and command appointments are a military prerogative, over which no civilian interference is tolerable. On such occasions, civilian meddling is said to "provoke" military intervention.⁵⁰ A second substantial set of military corporate interests

45. A third institutional pressure that is active in certain cases arises from the proliferation of nuclear energy in many repressive developmentalist countries.

46. Mary Kaldor, "The military in development", *World Development*, 4,6 (1976), p.467. The relations of force could also include the political activities of the military officer corps, the relation between the military and the remainder of the state.

47. Kaldor distinguishes between "pre-industrial" and "industrial" armies in the Third World. *Ibid.*, pp.468-469, and Kaldor, "Military technology and social structure", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 42,7 (June, 1977).

48. Miles Wolpin, "Socio-political radicalism and military professionalism in the Third World", *Comparative Politics*, XV,3 (1983).

49. Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military withdrawal from government responsibility", *Armed Forces and Society*, 10,4 (1984).

50. Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).

is more profane: the simple matter of wealth and other rewards available from the state when other interests are unable to prevent military plunder, constitutionally organised or not. To be sure, the commercial instincts of the higher and better established portion of an officer corps may be at war with the unrewarded concerns for military professionalism in other parts of the military or the state as a whole, but there is no inherent reason to suppose that one will always prevail over the other. The third example of military corporate interest which may contribute to militarization may be in fact a confused blend of interest and ideology, but is the most important of all: the desire to establish or retain access to core nations' military and military-industrial systems. The establishment and maintenance of strong links between core-nation and peripheral-nation military and political elites is clearly a major aim of military assistance and training programmes. Despite the occasional left-wing coup by a US-trained officer, the general pattern seems to be that foreign training, familiarity and concern for advanced weaponry, the psychological and political rewards of at least partial inclusion in the intra-alliance clubs of intelligence-sharing and strategic discussion or planning, and the uneven but persistent consequences of the usual (but not uniform) higher-class origins of senior officers all lead towards a preference for political conservatism and integration into the world economy.⁵¹

Global armaments pressures

The institutional pressures in the global armaments flow involve both "push" and "pull" factors. On the demand side there are local military elites who see arms imports (or domestic licenced assembly or production) as a solution to their political problems, or who have become dependent, economically or technologically, on a continued supply of military high technology. On the supply side pressures include industry promoters (military hardware shows; Lockheed-type bribery⁵²; Military Assistance Advisory Groups), and supplying governments anxious to maintain their balance of payments or military industries' viability⁵³, support friendly governments⁵⁴, or maintain access to the military or those less friendly. As the data presented in Table 2.7 show, arms exports to East and Southeast Asia expanded rapidly in the 1970s, but then generally began to slow in the early- to mid-1980s. In the latter half of the 1980s exports slowed still further. US arms export and military aid policies and the global economy provide the main explanations of these secular changes.

In the early 1970s, US arms exports to Third World countries expanded rapidly under the Guam Doctrine announced by President Nixon, according to which US allies in the Third World would undertake responsibility for their own defence, with US weaponry acquired through military grants, or later, as the US economy deteriorated, through concessional credits or commercial sales. Booming oil and commodity markets, in addition to US aid and credit, provided the opportunity for weapons sales. The Guam Doctrine was an attempt to solve two problems at once: increasingly hostile public

51. The Russians have had rather less luck with their trainees: perhaps for exactly these reasons.

52. The Lockheed scandal is often overlooked as a relatively well-documented example of effective weapons-pushing. Indonesia was one of the countries involved. See David Boulton, *The Lockheed Papers*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978).

53. Ron Smith, Anthony Humm and Jacques Fontanel, "The economics of exporting arms", *Journal of Peace Research*, 22,3 (1985), and Chris Paine, "Arms exports and the economy", *Pacific Research*, Jan.-Feb. 1977.

54. Michael T. Klare, *The American Arms Supermarket*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), and Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Aranson, *Supplying Repression: US Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad*, (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981).

opinion ruled out the use of American ground troops for Third World intervention, and the purchase of US equipment promised to help rectify the balance of payments crisis caused by the Vietnam War.

The politically mediated character of the US economy is important here. Government arms export decisions are affected by pressures from corporate lobbies, competing claims from the separate armed services in procurement and replacement costs for weapons systems also used by US forces, overall national economic considerations (such as balance of payments problems), in addition to the more obvious strategic concerns. The brief interregnum of the Carter Administration's restrictions on weapons exports was always selectively applied (as the Indonesian example will show), and in the last years of that administration, hardly at all in these regions.

The slow-down in weapons sales of the middle and late 1980s which followed the boom period is sometimes attributed to a rising tide of Third World democratization. Luckham points to

a more complex situation, in which commercial considerations and the politics of empire sometimes led in different directions. The decline of American sales during the mid-1980s was part of a general contraction in the international arms market brought about by low oil and commodity prices; the depressed economies of many developing countries; a lull in the weapons replacement cycles of major Third World purchasers; and the growing debt burdens of the latter (a not negligible share of which derive from military-related debt). It also resulted from the sales drives of European and Third World arms producers, who were entering the market place with weapons that were often cheaper, more aggressively marketed, more suited to local conditions, and less encumbered by political restrictions, than American weapons...The fall in weapons sales was also influenced by the United States' own military procurement cycle. By the mid-1980s the massive new acquisition programmes of the US armed forces had put severe pressure on existing production capacity. In consequence the major arms firms had less incentive to seek markets overseas. But when budget constraints brought the procurement boom to a halt, arms manufacturers once again went in hot pursuit of external markets; and this was soon reflected in increased arms export orders toward the close of the 1980s.⁵⁵

55. Robin Luckham, *American Militarism and the Third World: The End of the Cold War?*, (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Working Paper No. 94, October 1990). US arms exports (Foreign Military Sales plus commercial deliveries) declined constantly from \$25 billion in 1982 until when they reached \$10 billion in 1987. The following year they jumped to \$18 billion. United States, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, p.67, cited in *ibid.*, p.37

Table 2.7
Value of arms transfers,
cumulative 1976-80 and 1981-85,
by major supplier and recipient country
(current US\$ mn.)

Recipient	Period	Total	Supplier						Others
			USSR	US	France	UK	West Germany	China	
East Asia	1976-80	10,600	2,800	5,300	240	550	150	-	1,650
	1981-85	18,975	4,950	9,840	375	375	505	220	2,710
China	1976-80	700	220	0	50	400	0	-	20
	1981-85	385	80	30	80	0	5	0	190
Japan	1976-80	1,000	0	1,000	0	20	0	-	0
	1981-85	3,750	0	3,700	0	0	40	0	10
Korea, North	1976-80	525	240	0	0	0	10	-	270
	1981-85	990	390	0	20	0	0	210	370
Korea, South	1976-80	2,200	0	2,000	10	10	80	-	120
	1981-85	1,960	0	1,900	10	10	0	0	40
Mongolia	1976-80	210	200	0	0	0	0	-	0
	1981-85	470	470	0	0	0	0	0	0
Taiwan	1976-80	1,200	0	1,100	0	0	0	0	155
	1981-85	2,750	0	2,300	10	0	0	0	440
Southeast Asia	1976-80	4,775	2,090	1,305	170	130	60	0	1,020
	1981-85	8,670	4,010	1,910	255	365	460	10	1,660
Burma	1976-80	70	0	10	5	0	30	-	70
	1981-85	140	0	10	0	10	30	0	90
Cambodia	1976-80	70	10	0	0	0	0	-	60
	1981-85	360	350	0	0	0	0	0	10
Indonesia	1976-80	825	0	220	40	40	20	-	510
	1981-85	1,025	0	220	190	150	160	0	305
Laos	1976-80	180	180	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1981-85	170	160	0	0	0	0	0	10
Malaysia	1976-80	500	0	170	110	50	0	-	185
	1981-85	1,310	0	330	30	50	200	0	700
Philippines	1976-80	280	0	220	5	20	10	-	30
	1981-85	225	0	150	0	5	10	0	60
Singapore	1976-80	250	0	160	10	10	0	-	75
	1981-85	570	0	350	30	90	50	0	50
Thailand	1976-80	700	0	525	5	10	0	-	90
	1981-85	1,225	0	850	5	60	10	10	290
Vietnam	1976-80	1,900	1,900	0	0	0	0	-	0
	1981-85	3,645	3,500	0	0	0	0	0	145

(continued)

Table 2.7
Value of arms transfers, cumulative 1976-80 and 1981-85
By major supplier and recipient country
(Millions current dollars)

(continued)

Recipient	Period	Total	Supplier						
			USSR	US	France	UK	West Germany	China	Others
South Asia	1976-80	4,400	2,800	270	450	200	50	-	570
	1981-85	10,050	5,730	1,365	895	840	160	420	640
Afghanistan	1976-80	460	450	0	0	0	0	-	10
	1981-85	1,590	1,500	0	0	0	0	0	90
Bangladesh	1976-80	70	20	0	0	10	0	-	30
	1981-85	150	30	5	0	5	0	70	40
India	1976-80	2,800	2,300	50	50	160	0	-	190
	1981-85	6,070	4,200	60	550	800	120	0	340
Nepal	1976-80	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0
	1981-85	10	0	0	5	5	0	0	0
Pakistan	1976-80	1,100	20	220	390	20	50	-	360
	1981-85	2,190	0	1,300	340	20	40	350	140
Sri Lanka	1976-80	20	10	0	5	10	-	-	5
	1981-85	40	0	0	0	10	0	0	30

Sources: United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1983*, (Washington: ACDA, 1983), Table III, and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986*, (Washington: ACDA, 1986), Table III.

Notes:

- (a) "To avoid the appearance of excessive accuracy, all numbers in this table are independently rounded, with greater severity for larger numbers. Therefore, components may not add to totals." Ibid.
- (b) "Estimates of the Soviet Union's arms exports in value terms are currently under review and may be revised in future editions." Ibid.

The consequences of arms inflows resulting from all of these pressures on Third World countries is considerable, although there are now markedly greater differences amongst "Third World" recipients than even a decade ago.⁵⁶ But whatever the economic level of the country, the level of destructiveness in any conflict is increased, as is the human cost of resistance. The possession of such weaponry elevates the self-confidence and prestige of ruling elites, adding to their intimidatory capacities, and providing visible evidence of external legitimation. perhaps the most important consequence is the creation of technological, economic and military dependence on industrial suppliers, and in turn, creating an imperative to mould the domestic economy in a such a way as to produce the required foreign exchange and to provide the appropriate socio-technical industrial supports.⁵⁷

Militarization and the reproduction of social formations.

The threats governments feel from the manoeuvrings of foreign powers, from external aggression and internal insurrection go some way to explain the flood of arms and soldiers in Asia. Similarly, arms industries pressure, the consequences of large-scale arms transfers, and the corporate interests of the military take the explanation further. But neither set of explanations is sufficient to explain so broad and recurring a pattern, and neither address the question of the potentially embedded and systemic nature of militarization. In the case of repressive developmentalist states, why does militarization coincide with widespread changes of a regular kind in the economic and social structures of these countries?

In Dieter Senghaas' phrase, militarization needs to be understood in the context of the reproduction dynamics of total social formations which are structured antagonistically rather than consensually.⁵⁸ What part does militarization play in the survival of the dominant groups in the society, and in the maintenance of the structure of domination and control as the society as a whole is transformed?

Militarization of peripheral capitalist societies is most cogently understood as a response by a part of the state to crises of capital accumulation mediated by political crisis, and subsequent steps to secure the conditions of social reproduction under existing relations of domination. The military have a crucial role to play at moments of potential structural transformation, and when the political crises generated by such shifts threaten to imperil the survival of that system. The precise role of organised force - the class project of the military - will vary according to the character of the economy concerned, its past and shifting location in the international economy, and the character of the political and economic crises generated within a given historical setting.⁵⁹ This may involve

56. Helen O'Neill, "HICs, MICs, NICs and LICs: some elements in the political economy of graduation and differentiation", *World Development*, 12,7 (1984); and Ulrich Menzel, "The differentiation process in the Third World and its consequences for the North-South conflict and development theory", *Law and State*, 30 (1984).

57. Mary Kaldor and J. Ansari, "Military technology and conflict dynamics: the Bangladesh crisis of 1971", in M. Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide (eds.), *The World Military Order*, (London: Macmillan, 1979).

58. Dieter Senghaas, "Militarism dynamics in the context of peripheral capitalism", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 8,2 (1977), pp.103-109.

59. For a model of the *national* class projects in the military, see Robin Luckham, "Militarism: force, class and international conflict", op.cit. But see also his later paper, "Anarchy or transformation? Scenarios for change", *IDS Bulletin*, 16,4 (1985), which outlines various *global* economic-military state projects - mostly models for what I have termed *extended and indirect forms of militarization*.

providing physical security and maintaining the physical-political integrity of nation-state, intervention to resolve conflicts (manifest at the social, political or economic level) generated by the process of capital accumulation, shifts in regime, and temporary or prolonged military rule and/or administration. Furthermore, these considerations apply also to the global capitalist system and its structurally generated crises - for the resolution of which extended and indirect forms of militarization are extremely important.⁶⁰ The structural economic problems of the advanced capitalist world find expression in both global militarization and the economic restratification of the world.

It may be argued that this is a reductionist approach making the military simple "instruments of capital", or one which denies the obviously contingent elements of political, not to mention military, life. There is obviously no *a priori* necessity for the success of conservative military class projects: alternative class projects emerge; domestic alliances waver; the nature of "the capitalist interest" becomes unclear; sectional loyalties interfere; the costs of military rule become too great. Shahs fall without a fight; Marcoses cannibalize too much of their own class; the Chuns of the world face the fact that their US partners will only accept so much bloodshed on television when the risk is revolution; Allendes do get elected. There is no *a priori* guide as to precisely which set of capitalist interests will receive the corporate support of the military. In all these senses, the class project of the military at any given time is emergent and contingent. There are no universal "functional requirements of the system" which override all other considerations.

The military are not the simple instruments of capital - or complicated ones for that matter - waiting for the expression of the wishes of international capital. There have been radical military elites which have taken power with a different class project from the norm, and attempted to lay the foundations of national state capitalism, most notably the Peruvian interventions of the 1960s. As with any group, military corporate consciousness emerges slowly, sometimes behind the actions in which the group has become embroiled. It is conceivable for sections of an otherwise pro-western, pro-capitalist officer corps to come to think along radical nationalist or even socialist lines. Ideology is rarely a simple reflection of interests. The point is that such developments are uncommon for reasons that are not hard to understand.

The difficulties of state capitalism are considerable, as the Peruvian generals discovered: there are yet more forms and media of foreign domination than direct foreign investment. The constraints of participation in the world market ultimately led to the abandonment of the Peruvian experiment, and no subsequent radical officer regime has done any better. The selection mechanisms culling out or deflecting such radical military thinking are considerable, both within most armed forces, and internationally, particularly with the development of ideologically sophisticated officer training establishments by both regional powers and the United States.

60. See Luckham, "Anarchy or transformation...", *ibid.*