

Chapter 12
Theory and practice in
intelligence and control operations:
(2) Surveillance

This chapter follows on from the previous one in examining the application of Indonesian military textbook models of intelligence and social-political control operations, this time concentrating on surveillance rather than terror. In the first half of the chapter, the involvement of Kopkamtib, Bais and the Department of Labour Power in the establishment of an increasingly comprehensive system of labour surveillance and repression is reviewed. The second half of the chapter is a review of detailed mass surveillance and monitoring activities undertaken by the intelligence apparatus. Three sets of cases are reviewed: questionnaires administered to striking industrial workers, interrogations of Islamic prisoners by intelligence officers and psychologists, and the application of a battery of political and psychometric questionnaires to leftist former political prisoners.

The division of Chapters 11 and 12 around the themes of "terror" and "surveillance" is a bit artificial. In the previous chapter, terror was very clearly linked to surveillance both in planning and execution of operations in Timor and Irian. In the intelligence activities reviewed in this chapter terror and surveillance are still intermingled, but the balance shifts towards systematic mass surveillance of particular target groups in Indonesian society. The forms of subsequent intervention are sometimes terrorist, but more often pre-emptive or simply coercive and exclusionary. Here social science and social engineering are the tools of intelligence agencies seeking to steer Indonesian society towards "development". Terror, in mass form in memory and in selective form in lived experience, remains as an underpinning for surveillance based methods of social control, but is momentarily moved a little into the background.

Controlling labour

Since the late 1970s labour relations has been identified by the Indonesian state as an ongoing potential threat to "economic development and national security", to be dealt with by a coordinated mix of surveillance, prevention and repression. Kopkamtib has been deeply involved in efforts to control an expanding and increasingly assertive industrial labour force. In concert with the Department of Labour Power, headed from 1983 to 1988 by the former head of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, and government-controlled union groups and client business groups, Kopkamtib has established a comprehensive system of labour surveillance and intervention capacities, especially in the industrially vital Jakarta-Bogor-Bekasi-Tangerang region.

Indonesia is, of course, a predominantly agricultural country, with a largely rural labour force.¹ But different labour groupings have been politically significant in Indonesian politics, most obviously through those affiliated with the Communist Party prior to 1965. After the militancy of labour groupings throughout the Guided Democracy period, the New Order government pursued a constant policy of "de-politicizing labour". In practice this has meant a policy of *state* political involvement to ensure that labour

1. See Table 2.4.

cannot mobilize to oppose government policies at a collective, political level, or to carry out effective militant industrial action.

In this section I will briefly outline the situation of organised labour in Indonesia under the New Order, and then discuss the development of the elaborate mix of ideological, legal and surveillance/intervention controls over an increasingly volatile labour force.

First corporatist attempts

In the early years of the New Order, serious union activities were effectively banned, although several of the surviving political parties had labour associated groups, and an Indonesian Labour Consultative Council [MPBI] was established in 1968, and was designated by Suharto as the "one and only receptacle" for workers.²

However, in the run-up to the 1971 elections there were anxieties on the part of those responsible for managing the elections that these arrangements left altogether too many hostages in the hands of fortune. It was a time when Ali Moertopo was stripping all the political parties of autonomy, and a new corporatist complex of sectoral organisations was being established. First civil servants (defined extremely widely) were pushed into Korpri (the Republic of Indonesia Civil Servants Corps), and tied to the government political party, Golkar. Then in 1973, workers in the private sector were allocated to a new peak trade union body, the All-Indonesia Labour Unions Federation [FBSI], at the head of which, both nationally and locally, were officials cleared by Kopkamtib (and/or Bakin or Opsus), and with strong Golkar connections.³

The creation of FBSI was a compromise between at least two competing views within the New Order government in the late 1960s and early 1970s concerning labour. Both positions sought to control labour, both politically and economically.

[The government's] legitimacy was premised on the narrower goals of economic development, and these required industrial peace. The economic stabilization plan launched in 1966 required wage restraint and the contraction of credit which inhibited the development of domestic business and curtailed the creation of new employment. In addition, the government policy on rationalization of the bureaucracy, which called for steady across the board salary increases for civil servants, assumed smaller increments in the private sector, which caused wage "pressures" there. Finally, the door had been opened to foreign investment further adding to the potential for labor unrest.⁴

The first solution to the problem was a straightforward response of simply banning unions, crushing nascent attempts at local organisation, and ruling the society through martial law-type instruments and directives. The second position, equally antagonistic to

2. Dwight Y. King, "Defensive modernization: the structuring of economic interests in Indonesia", in Gloria Davis (ed.), *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?*, (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1979), p.187.

3. FBSI was established with assistance and advice from the AFL-CIO and the International Council of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU], and its officers had strong Golkar connections at all levels. See United States, Embassy, Jakarta, *Labor Trends in Indonesia*, (May 1984), pp.19-24. By 1983 FBSI claimed 2.9 million members out of a workforce of 65 million, 40% of whom were less than 30 years old.

4. King, op.cit. In fact, there were real pressures emerging even in the early years after the holocaust against the PKI. The number of disputes brought before the Department of Labour Power's arbitration machinery, after a considerable filtering process, rose from 108 in 1966 to 550 in 1968 and 965 in 1972. The actual numbers of strikes and serious disputes would have been rather higher. See *ibid.*, pp.187,197.

the articulation of an independent trade union interest, argued that, on balance, the regime's interests lay in constructing a trade union apparatus through which inevitable labour demands could be channeled, filtered, and managed. Moreover, such an approach had the useful side-effect of keeping at bay the surprisingly vociferous labour interests in the IGGI donor countries.⁵

The view of those favouring controlled direction and manipulation within an increasingly elaborate corporatist structure won out over those relying on command and suppression alone. The resulting government position was to encourage the formation of unions at the enterprise level under the auspices of FBSI. In 1981 Kopkamtib Commander Sudomo explained that companies employing more than 25 workers should allow the formation of plant-level company unions, and deplored reports of obstructive companies.⁶ Five years later, with the framework of Pancasila Industrial Relations and the National Tripartite Cooperative Body in place and FBSI replaced by the even more malleable All Indonesian Federation of Workers [SPSI - Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia] (see below), Sudomo, now Minister for Labour Power, issued official Guidelines for the Formation, Guidance of Enterprise Unions.⁷ Under the labour law⁸ strikes are legal for most workers⁹, but require the approval of the Minister of Labour Power, which, unsurprisingly, is rarely granted. In practice, strikes are common, and an increase in their number and intensity provoked much of the new corporatist and interventionary apparatus.

Pancasila industrial relations

By the late 1970s, it was clear that the corporatist approach would need to be strengthened. Three approaches were used: ideological, organisational, and intelligence surveillance and intervention. The first step was both ideological and organisational. The state ideology of Pancasila was extended into the realm of Pancasila Industrial Relations¹⁰ built around the concepts of *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus) with, according to Admiral Sudomo, "worker and employer as an example/symbol of 'one big

5. The ICFTU and the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation both had substantial representation in Indonesia in the late 1960s (and the ICFTU much further back), and, somewhat competitively, put pressure on the government to allow the establishment of a new peak labour organisation. See Jacques Leclerc, "The origins of FBSI", in INDOC, *Indonesian Workers and Their Right to Organise*, (Leiden: Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre, 1981), pp.80-81.

6. *Kompas*, 28 August 1981.

7. Attachment to Indonesia, Keputusan Menteri Tenaga Kerja, Nomor: KEP-1109/MEN/1986.

8. There is a confusing morass of conflicting Dutch, Indonesian legislation, and Indonesian government decrees, but the fundamental New Order legislation is in Act No.14, 1969.

9. It is unclear, in fact, just who has the legal right to strike in Indonesia. Soekarno's Presidential Decrees No. 7 and 23, 1963 are still in effect, and are often cited as a justification to ban strikes. No. 7 prohibits strikes in industries, enterprises and departments deemed "vital", and imposes a penalty of a year's imprisonment on those who violate its provisions. The industries are listed in the second decree, and can only be described as wide, varied, and imprecisely defined. See INDOC, *Indonesian Workers and Their Right to Organise, March 1983 Update: Increasing Militarisation of Labour Relations*, (Leiden: Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre, 1983), p.7. Needless to say, it is the spirit of the law that is applied, quite liberally interpreted.

10. Formerly known as Pancasila Labour [Perburuhan] Relations, until the term *buruh* was anathemized in the mid-1980s as having dangerous leftist connotations. On the language of labour and the state see Hans Goderbauer, "New Order industrial relations: managing the workers", *Inside Indonesia*, 13 (1987), and especially Jacques Leclerc, "Vocabulaire social et repression politique: un exemple indonesien", *Annales*, (March-April) 1973.

family' which works together".¹¹ To complement this paternalist ideology, a corporatist labour relations structure has been erected around a tripartite relationship between government-sponsored unions, employers' federations, and the Department of Labour Power. The familistic ideology of Pancasila Industrial Relations has grown in recent years, along with the tripartite organisations.¹²

The tripartite structure allowed some blunting of the more direct and obvious aspects of the security direction of the entire apparatus. In 1978, Sudomo announced after the 1978 devaluation of the rupiah that it was illegal for firms to raise wages to help workers counteract the consequent rise in the inflation rate to about 30%.¹³

After a devaluation eight years later Sudomo, together with the heads of the SPSI and the business peak organisation Kadin/Apindo, issued a National Tripartite Labour Institute Accord [Kesepakatan Bersama Lembaga Kerjasama Tripartit Nasional] presenting the devaluation as a "strategic" move for the defence and continuity of national development in the interests of the whole society. As a consequence, he said, any rise in wages must be deliberated upon in a family-like way with workers and unions.

Bargaining must be carried out in such a way as to ensure that neither directly nor indirectly did it give rise to flare-ups which would disturb national development or the continuity of company production. Unilateral coercive actions like dismissals, strikes, go-slows, lock-outs, etc. must be prevented.

In the full corporatist style, the announcement continued,

Each party (SPSI, APINDO and Government) is responsible for ensuring that the spirit and the letter of this Accord is carried out by its members.¹⁴

The actual operation of these tripartite bodies has generally worked to the disadvantage of labour, and with considerable brutality employed towards particular groups of workers. More commonly, the slow pace with which the consensus and consultation principles of Pancasila Industrial Relations are applied, at both the company level and before the Regional or Central Councils, works against workers' interests.¹⁵

Organisational tightening

The second step was organisational - plugging the organisational loopholes in FBSI. In 1986 FBSI was replaced by a new peak union organisation, the All Indonesian

11. "Union leaders in companies must be good people", *Kompas*, 28 August 1981. See also Indonesia, Seskoad, op.cit., Chapter 3.2 and INDOC, *Indonesian Workers... March 1983 Update*, op.cit., p.3 on the Doctrine of Armed Forces Leadership and Social Communication [KKS-ABRI].

12. Even so, Pancasila Industrial Relations structures are only in place in 10% of companies. See *Inside Indonesia*, 12, p.20.

13. INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., p.70.

14. Indonesia, *Kesepakatan Bersama, Lembaga Kerjasama Tripartit Nasional, Nomor: 16 Tahun 1986 Tentang Penyesuaian Upah Akibat Devaluasi*, Tanggal 22 September 1986.

15. See, for example, INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., and *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit.; Goderbauer, op.cit.; "Kronologi PT U.I.P.I. Bogor" (n.d., unpublished mss). And it should not be forgotten that substantial numbers of FBSI regional and local officials were themselves serving military officers. See INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit., p.9.

Federation of Workers [SPSI]. SPSI is more tightly controlled from above than the old structure, and has ten "departments" in place of the previous 21 craft unions.¹⁶ This has further increased central control over plant unions now organised on a regional and enterprise level only.¹⁷

Intelligence and crisis intervention

The third and most important element in the control of labour, however, has been the involvement of the intelligence and security agencies, especially Kopkamtib¹⁸, both directly and indirectly. The present systematic structure of surveillance and intervention dates from the middle or late 1970s, and is closely associated with Admiral Sudomo's command of Kopkamtib and, after his transfer in 1983, of the Department of Labour Power (formerly Labour Power and Transmigration).

Under Sudomo, Kopkamtib and the Department of Labour Power became intertwined through the establishment of series of inter-agency surveillance and intervention "teams" and procedures. In August 1981 Sudomo announced the establishment of Labour Assistance Teams [Tim Bantuan Masalah Perburuhan] to detect and prevent industrial disputes. These teams were made up of officials from the (then) Department of Labour Power and Transmigration, the employers' organisations Kadin and Puspi, the Central Executive Council of FBSI, and, from within Kopkamtib, officers from Opstib Pusat [the Centre for Operation Order], and to be chaired by the Director-General for the Development and Protection of Labour [Dirjen Binalindung].

These Labour Assistance Teams, Sudomo stressed, were to complement the Central and Regional Councils for the Resolution of Labour Disputes [P4P/P4D]. The new teams, it was claimed, were mainly preventive in nature, designed to pre-empt the development of strikes and lockouts and similar disturbances that threaten the national security. But the teams would also intervene if the Councils were "unable to handle matters".¹⁹

There was little doubt in practice that it was Kopkamtib that was the coordinator of these efforts.

It seems that the team has a special concern to prevent labour conflict in regions which have been designated "strategic areas", i.e. Jakarta (where over half the strikes have occurred in the Pulogadung free trade zone), West Java, Riau, East Kalimantan, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Central Java, East Java and South Sulawesi.

16. "In the shadow of poverty and control", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 April 1986, p.59.

17. The most important difference between FBSI and SPSI is that the old organisation was a federation of separate industry-based unions, which had a vertical industry line from the work-places and regions, to the top, where they were federated. In the SPSI, the separate unions are treated as departments of a unified organisation, giving greater control to those at the top - and their government and managerial allies. There have also been restrictions on industry representatives at the daerah level taking part in the new organisation's Regional Councils [Dewan Daerah]. (PS/16, and Goderbauer, op.cit., p.15). Along with the organisational changes has been the administrative rinsing of the language. The banning of the term *buruh* in favour of *karyawan* was an attempt to dilute proletarian and oppositional connotations of labour relations. For the long history of *buruh/karyawan* polemics see Jacques Leclerc, "Vocabulaire social et repression politique...", op.cit. Goderbauer also points out the "grassroots overtones" of the term *basis* has led to its replacement by *unit kerja* [work unit] (op.cit., p.15).

18. Some thought should be given to the question of just what "Kopkamtib" means under these circumstances. In effect, especially in the industrially crucial Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi complex, it means the Kodam Intelligence Task Units and Intelligence Assistants operating under the authority of the Laksusda.

19. *Kompas*, 28 August 1981.

The Team at the national level appears to operate local-level "Detection teams" in the "strategic areas" and in particular locations, which monitor the situation and are ready to act at the first sign of trouble...They are not always called "Detection Teams": sometimes "Early Detection System" (EDS), sometimes "special team" [tim khusus], or "tripartite council"; also, their exact composition varies, sometimes including the judiciary and others, but always representatives of employers, the government (including police and military intelligence) and the FBSI.²⁰

This first attempt at Kopkamtib coordination of an intelligence- and security-coordinated corporatist approach was apparently inadequate. In mid-1982 Sudomo announced that *all* labour disputes should be notified directly to Kopkamtib.

It has become the task of Kopkamtib alongside the Ministry of Manpower (sic) to tackle cases of workers on strike in a preventive and repressive manner.²¹

As Sudomo moved over from Kopkamtib to the Department of Labour Power, one of the most technocratic and planning-minded of the senior intelligence officers, former Bakin Head Sutopo Yuwono, was installed as Director-General of the Department of Labour Power (1983-87). Under Sudomo and Sutopo, the Department of Labour Power, in coordination with Kopkamtib and other security agencies such as Intelpampol established a more comprehensive and sophisticated labour surveillance and intervention system.

In May 1983 Sudomo instructed all regional Binalindung offices

- 1.... constantly to monitor and follow industrial relations between employers and employees as part of the plan of detecting situations and building information on such relations.
2. Apart from regular routine reports, they are instructed to report every day to the Ministry on the situation in their area...to discuss developments concerning Collective Labour Agreements, strikes and any other unrest.²²

A month earlier Sudomo issued a Notice of Decision²³ which abolished the Early Detection Teams and the Labour Assistance Teams in favour of Labour Crisis Control Centres [Pusat Pengelolaan Krisis Masalah Ketenaga Kerjaan] as a means "of improving the implementation of development" by preventing labour conflict in a manner suitable to Pancasila Labour Relations.

Labour Crisis Centres were intended to prevent industrial conflicts arising, and, if such a "crisis" should occur, prevent its spreading, and "facilitate a quietening down and

20. INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit., pp.4-5. Note that the decision to abolish these teams in 1983 (see below) mentioned the existence of Interdepartmental Security Work Teams [Team Kerja Security Interdep].

21. *Kompas*, 16 January 1982, cited in INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit., p.6. See also Indonesia, Kopkamtib, *Formulir - Berita Nomor:TR.40/KOPKAM/II/1981*.

22. Indonesia, Menteri Tenaga Kerja, "Telex Nomor:46/M/V/1983. Tanggal 19 Mei 1983".

23. Indonesia, Menteri Tenaga Kerja, *Pembentukan Pusat Pengelolaan Krisis Masalah Ketenaga Kerjaan*, (KEP-130/MEN/1983, Tanggal 21-4-1983).

bargaining between the parties in dispute". The new organisations in the Ministry were to operate at two levels: a Policy Centre and Field Action Groups [Kelompok Aksi dilapangan - KAL].

The attachments to the announcement referred to the membership of two further bodies. The Labour Crisis Control Centre [Pusat Pengelola Tenaga Kerja] was to be chaired by the Minister, and to include representatives from various sections of his department, from the employer groups and FBSI. The second body was the Conflict Prevention Central Executive [Pusat Pelaksana Pencegah Konflik] - not mentioned in the general document. This regional-level body was controlled by Kopkamtib - which provided both the chairperson and the secretary. (See Table 8.2.)

A year later, Sudomo's department announced the establishment of Early Warning Posts [Pos Siaga Naker] for "24-hour non-stop [Eng.] monitoring and resolution of labour affairs" in the industrial concentration of Jakarta-Bogor-Tangerang-Bekasi (Jabotabek). These offices of the Department of Labour Power would be able to handle reports direct from the public, or as raised in the press.²⁴

Workers have been, in practice, regularly hauled before the local intelligence sections of the police, or before Kopkamtib officers.²⁵ Indoc reports the case of PT Textra in 1980, where not only did the Kopkamtib Area Special Executive act as the company spokesman against workers, but actually signed the employer's "Data on the Reason for the Dismissals".²⁶

This sketch of the structure of state intelligence and security activities aimed at controlling labour is incomplete and patchy. Yet, taken together with the evidence of periodic attempts at systematic gathering of information about particular groups of workers (see Chapter 10), it indicates the seriousness of the state's concern about labour, and the ways in which intelligence activities are likely to expand in the near future, whether the auspicing organization be military or otherwise.

24. "Pos Siaga Naker Siap Bantu Pengusaha dan Karyawan", *Kompas*, 8 June 1984.

25. See many examples reported from the late 1970s onwards in INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., *Indonesian Workers...March 1983 Update*, op.cit. *Kronologi PT Central Star Knitting Corporation*, (Bogor: FBSI, Januari 1983) shows the involvement of the local Police Security Intelligence [Intelpampol] unit. In the case of striking workers at P.T. U.I.P.I. at Cimanggis, Bogor, a territorial operation was carried out by government apparatus consisting of: Village Guidance NCOs [Babinsa], Village Social Leadership NCOs [Binmas Desa], District officials [Kecamatan], Village Heads [Kepala desa], and local Neighbourhood Association [RT/RW] officers coordinated by the Military District Chief of Staff [Kasdim] 0621 Bogor Kabupaten, Social and Political Regional Staff, as well as the Cimanggis Police Commandant. (Ibid., p.11)

26. See INDOC, *Indonesian Workers...*, op.cit., pp.5-22. This case parallels Korean reports of the KCIA signing labour dispute settlements as a party to the dispute. See Choi Jang Jip, *Interest Groups and Political Control in South Korea: A Study of the Labor Unions in Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980*, (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, August 1983). In Indonesia, one constant means of harassment of labour organising is the accusation of involvement (even of workers unborn in 1965) in the 30th September Movement/Communist Party of Indonesia. See, for example, *Kronologi P.T. Central Star Knitting Corporation*, op.cit., pp.18 ff.

Sifting the dust of history: mass surveillance techniques

The rationalization of domination by applying social scientific techniques to intelligence and security work is fundamental to the Indonesian apparatus. The essence of this approach is the slow, patient accumulation of seemingly banal information about citizens and the normal events of their everyday lives: the dust of history. As the store of knowledge accumulates, first locally, then after filtering and an unknown degree of analysis, at the centre the patterns become clear. Both the raw data and the analyzed patterns are resources for the intelligence apparatus.

So far we have noted the use of social research survey techniques in Army territorial work, and the use of psychologists in interrogation. The Seskoad manual also uses of sociological theory of a certain bent in confirming and adumbrating the ideological predispositions of the officer corps. The final, but fundamental service of social science to the intelligence state is in the area of surveillance - in the broadest sense of systematically acquiring, recording and analyzing information about the identity and lives of Indonesian citizens.

A wide range of surveillance facilities specifically oriented to security requirements has already been noted in the preceding chapter²⁷. The most important, which go together to form the base level of intelligence are the lowest-level of the Army's Territorial Apparatus - the *Koramil* [Military Sub-District Command] and the *Babinsa* [Village Guidance NCO]; the *Hansip* [Civil Defence Force]; and through the system of neighbourhood and kampung community associations [*Rukun Tetangga* and *Rukun Kampung/Warga*] introduced during the Japanese occupation and based on the Japanese system of *tonarigumi*.²⁸

This section will discuss the use of sociological and psychological questionnaires for purposes of political surveillance. Four cases will be considered: East Timor, Tanjung Priok, former Communist political prisoners, and industrial workers.

East Timor: surveillance in war

As already above, the Seskoad model placed great emphasis on surveillance of the population, as did the Established Procedures and instruction manuals issued to Babinsas in East Timor. The models of territorial survey reports at *Kodim* and *kabupaten* level in the context of Regional Management and Territorial Management programs²⁹ make clear the range of intelligence macro-concerns - the application of the *Ipolekososbudmil* concept of social conditions. Just how such models of district reporting were executed is another matter - how intensive and reliable the information acquired and how skilled and perceptive its analysis may have been is not known, and may well have varied according

27. There is of course another range of surveillance modes carried out by the state, but which are not explicitly dedicated to security controls: registers of births, deaths and marriages, population censuses, taxation records and so forth.

28. See John Sullivan, "Kampung and state: the role of government in the development of urban community in Yogyakarta", *Indonesia*, 41 (1986), p.67. Sullivan is at pains to emphasize the extent to which the Jogjakarta *rukun tetangga* and *rukun kampung*s he studied were regarded by kampung people as non-state, community organisations. Yet, as he points out, in 1965 they were a crucial component in the violent re-ordering of these communities. It would be helpful to know whether the impression of overall community ownership of these organisations gained by Sullivan holds true for other parts of Indonesia. For ex-tapols and their families, surveillance has been constant and intimidating since 1965. Certainly, Anderson and McVey note that the *rukun tetangga* were an "intelligence and security" affair in 1965. See Benedict R.O.G. Anderson and Ruth T.McVey, with Frederick Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971 [1966]), p.74. For a resume of the situation in the late 1980s see Asia Watch, op.cit.

29. See Appendices 4 - 6.

to both the competence of the officers, the security situation in the area, and the degree of performance pressure from above. But given the depth of elaboration of the model, there is every reason to believe that where necessary, the surveillance machinery would do its job.

The East Timor manuals also set out recommended surveillance procedures, this time at the micro-level for Koramils or Village Guidance Teams and NCOs. One 1982 Instruction Manual stressed the need for information resources for understanding villages:

Looking at the "inner workings" of every village:

Instruction manual No. JUKNIS/01/XI/1981 concerning the keeping of a book for the Babinsa's data and events, explains that in order to know a village well, it is essential to have data and notes on events within the village. These include:

- a. Sketch map of the old village (pre-upheaval).
- b. Sketch map of the present village.
- c. Village security system.
- d. Genealogy of the chieftain.
- e. List of village government officials.
- f. List of catechists.
- g. List of other community figures.³⁰

The next manual in the series offered an example of a successful Fretilin operation to establish a secret network inside the Indonesian security net. The first step in avoiding a repetition of such an event, according to the manual, was to intensify control of the population:

Every single activity of the population must be known exactly, in the following ways:

- a. Appoint reliable people as *Katuas* [elders] to help neighbourhood chiefs [heads of rukun tetangga]. Arrange it in such a way that each *katuas* has responsibility for 10-15 families. Each *katuas* must be able to know exactly the activities of the families under his guidance; for example, when they go into their field, go to collect wood, get permission to go to another village, to tend flocks, go to market, and so on.
- b. Appoint an 'informer' in each of these groups of 10-15 families led by one *katuas*. This informer should be able to follow, secretly, all the activities of these 10-15 families.
- c. Every time anyone goes out of the village, he/she must have a travel pass [surat jalan], and every person who comes into the village from another village must report.
- d. Inspection posts must be set up to keep a check on everyone who enters or leaves the village.
- e. Maintain an element of surprise by holding extraordinary roll-calls, or by having

30. Instruction Manual No. JUKNIS/04-B/IV/1982, in Budiardjo and Liem, op.cit., p.212.

check-ups on the population by the *katuas*, to check whether anyone has left the village without permission or whether anyone has arrived from another village without reporting.

- f. Take other actions, according to the circumstances in each village, for the purpose of intensifying control over the population. For instance, house-to-house visits, and patrols inside the village to prevent illegal meetings from taking place there.³¹

The message is clear: knowledge of the population is a prerequisite to sustained control. The type of knowledge is of a common-sense kind, and there is no particular pretence of "scientific" accuracy or understanding. They are fairly standard intelligence approaches to a low-intensity battle zone.

The Timor evidence may appear to be distorted: after all, these manuals were instructions to correct defects in territorial control after seven years of intense counter-insurgency warfare. Yet, they follow the model laid down for such operations in the key *Seskoad* manual of the time. Both the *Seskoad* and Timor manuals appear to reflect the experience of control of Central and East Javanese rural populations which were once centres of Communist commitment.³²

At the centre of Indonesian society one important source of evidence on intelligence surveillance techniques and concerns has been *Kopkamtib* questionnaires that have come into the public domain. Questionnaires of some kind have long been a regular territorial intelligence tool. Students returning to Indonesia from study abroad have reported answering them. Thomas reports that all civil servants, including teachers, have had to pass a "political screening committee" before their appointments are finalized:

A key instrument in this screening procedure is a questionnaire on which the individual lists organizations to which he and members of his family have belonged. Furthermore if he applies for permission to travel abroad, he must also receive clearance for the trip.³³

Such questionnaires are also used in East Timor. According to Budiardjo and Liem: Anyone wishing to obtain a work permit, a travel pass, an identity card, or even a marriage licence, must first complete a fifteen-page questionnaire in the presence of the *Kotis* [Tactical Command] officer. The questionnaire not only covers all imaginable aspects of a person's private life [but also their family] going back several generations. It also includes numerous questions about political attitudes: a person's behaviour and response on August 11, 1975 (the day of the UDT coup) and activities before and after that date, on December 7, 1975 (The day of the Indonesian invasion) and before and after that date. "How would you behave towards people who oppose *integrasi*?" and "What would you do if you met a *Fretilin* guerilla?"

31. Instruction Manual No.JUKNIS/04-B/IV/1982, in *ibid.*, p.219.

32. One academic working in these regions of Java recalls visiting a *kabupaten* *sospol* office and seeing wall maps and files of the region marked in great detail as to the political character of the population. [PS/51]

33. R. Murray Thomas, "Indonesian education: communist strategies (1950-65), and governmental counter-strategies (1966-80)", *Asian Survey*, XXI,3 (1981), p.385.

Answers are "legally binding" and there are penalties for making "false statements".³⁴

Penetrating labour

However, the most important source of evidence of intelligence mass surveillance practices is a set of Kopkamtib questionnaires administered to workers in industrial disputes. The two questionnaires discussed below appear to have been produced by the intelligence units of the Kodams concerned - in South Sumatra and Jakarta Special Region in 1980 (Appendix 4) and 1985 (Appendix 5). The first questionnaire (Appendix 7) was applied to workers in the oil industry in Sumatra, and then apparently in all "vital industries" - i.e. "state-run and private enterprises connected with oil, sea, rail and air transport, mining, chemical manufacturing, electricity, sugar and rubber production, postal services and banking".³⁵ The second questionnaire (Appendix 8) was applied to striking workers in a company in the Jakarta region in 1980.

The Sumatran questionnaire was administered in the first instance by management to workers, who were required to answer in writing, and who were then examined orally, either by management or a Kopkamtib officer.³⁶ It is not known how the Jakarta questionnaire was administered. The two schedules differ in their concerns and approach. The Jakarta 1980 questionnaire springs very much from the context of an industrial dispute in which intelligence units were intervening. Its mimeographed text refers specifically to the company in question, and mixes questions about the worker and his or her opinions about the industrial situation at the plant (opinions about work regulations, wages, social security arrangements and the motives for conflicts) with questions of fact about the company, its ownership and management, number and type of employees, wage levels, social security, collective labour agreements³⁷ and employee responses to management actions. Just why the questionnaires are mixed in this way is not clear. It may be a matter of subtle indirect interrogation to induce the worker to reveal opinions by asking about matters of fact. But it is more likely simply a matter of inappropriate and incompetent questionnaire design.

The 1985 Sumatran oil workers' questionnaire is more focussed on the biography and opinions of the worker, and would yield considerable information from even a small number of workers - because it reaches back in time and generation and across family and friendship links in the present. As in much Indonesian political thinking, the questionnaire operates on a caste theory: guilt spreads over generations and contemporary branches of a family and their affines. It seeks a history of the person's organizational commitments - religious, political and otherwise; and some measure of the attitudes behind the actions. In this the questionnaire seems more like those reported in Timor and elsewhere.

Just how efficient it would be is questionable. A politically astute person would produce, as the editors of *Inside Indonesia* point out, the "right" answers. But then that may well overestimate the political skills of the subjects - what would be the "right"

34. Budiardjo and Liem, op.cit., pp.102-3.

35. "Intelligence test", *Inside Indonesia*, 8 (October 1986), p.8. The translation here is taken from that source.

36. The spate of sackings in the oil industry in late 1985 is thought to have been related to the prior use of the questionnaire - although there is no firm evidence reported on this.

37. The use of the Dutch term [Collective Arbeids Overeenkomst] is one of the few Dutch examples in 1980s intelligence texts.

answer to some of the questions? It may also underestimate the skill with which the questionnaire can be interpreted - although doubtless it will usually be read at face value in the first instance. An automatic assumption of incompetence is inappropriate.

The editors of *Inside Indonesia* also suggest that the questionnaire "is testing the success of New Order propaganda". To be sure it is, but the questionnaire is likely to be working on the assumption of widespread, but limited, success, and represents a determined effort to identify recalcitrant learners in order to allow more direct coercive means to be used.

But the very fact that the ideological questions were thought important enough to ask, and the ideologically unconvinced significant enough to be sought after, reminds us of the importance the Indonesian state places on thought control.

A final question about the labour questionnaires is to ask what was actually done with the data? It may be that it was all something of an intelligence section waste of time - that the Sumatran questionnaire was used only for the immediate purpose of picking out some appropriate "PKI" scapegoats to balance more serious repression of Muslims, or to give confidence to anxious foreign investors (as suggested by *Inside Indonesia*). Certainly the 1980 Jakarta questionnaire was used in the context of an intelligence intervention on the side of management in an industrial dispute. But it is also possible that the data acquired are to be fed into a proper database of the politically-relevant population as a whole. This may sound absurd - yet that is precisely what has been done in Britain and Western Europe, and is probably the norm in the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Social science against Islam

Some of these questions can be clarified by looking at the evidence of a still more scientized approach to mass surveillance: the application of standardized psychometric tests to captive (literally) populations of militant Muslims and former Communist political prisoners.

A.M. Fatwa provides important testimony of such an approach to the surveillance of Muslims prisoners after Tanjung Priok in 1984. At Cimanggis prison, where Fatwa was imprisoned with two hundred others after Tanjung Priok, interrogations with each prisoner were again carried out by a team of intelligence officers and psychologists.

At first sight it seemed to be a scientific approach to humanity, but there were almost three hundred questions, a large part of which were aimed at snaring for interrogation. This felt psychotic - the interview was carried out by another psychologist as well as an intel officer who mixed up discussions of a scientific exchange of views with interrogation. Yet when this exchange of views touched on the Tanjung Priok incident, for example, the truth came out of them in an unconscious way, which they usually concealed.³⁸

The use of psychologists indicates that the Indonesian intelligence services have followed those in industrial countries in attempts at scientizing their strategies of political dominance. What Fatwa is describing appears to be a mass survey of Tanjung Priok prisoners using a battery of questions in an encounter that combined aspects of a calm "scientific" interview and a harassing interrogation. Just what the 300-odd questions were about would be interesting to know. They may have dealt with the prisoner's background, motivations and perceptions of the Tanjung Priok events, and views on the Indonesian

38. Fatwa, *op.cit.*, p.51.

state. Equally though, given that psychologists were involved, and given the large number of questions involved, the psychologists may have been administering one or more psychological tests.

There are two interesting aspects to this. The first is that it should have been Islamic prisoners to whom these tests were apparently administered. Muslims, presumably, have motivation and psycho-social characteristics that are inexplicable in any other terms - or in those that they offer themselves. As already seen, the Indonesian military suspicion of Islam runs deep. The second point follows on: in the Seskoad account this suspicion emerges in sociological language giving a scientific flavour to the critique of "extremism". Social science in the service of the state is neither a novelty nor unusual. Fatwa himself makes the point made by many Muslims in Indonesia: the intelligence-security apparatus appears to be attempting to replicate the mode of analysis and intellectual-political strategy of the turn of the century Dutch Islamist and security specialist Snoucke Hurgronje.³⁹

At one point, Fatwa was interrogated in prison by an intelligence officer, and three psychologists. One of the subjects under discussion was corruption. "Why", asked a young psychologist, "wasn't Dharsono able to just go along with corruption"? Weren't Dharsono and company just victims of the "post-power syndrome" [Eng.]?⁴⁰ The use of the English term "post-power syndrome" by Fatwa's psychologist interrogators is revealing. While it is true that the term has a currency in Indonesian political discourse⁴¹, its use is a perfect example of the appropriation of the aura of scientific terms (in this case pseudo-psychology) to define a discourse in such a way that denigrates one's political opponents. Here, the point of the term is that those former state officers, particularly military men, who have become critics of the regime they once served, are suffering from a particular and recognizable psychological pattern of bitterness or even quasi-illness. This approach obviates the need to respond to their overt claims that erode the New Order's claims to legitimacy.⁴²

Communists: fantasies of science

Tanjung Priok was by no means the first occasion on which such psychological testing had been used.⁴³ In 1978 Kopkamtib developed a set of psychological tests which

39. For Fatwa, the security approach treats Islam in the way that Snoucke Hurgronje developed, "which applied to the Ummat Islam essentially separated the political life of the Islamic community from its religious teachings". Ibid., p.26.

40. Ibid., pp.46-47.

41. See, for example, Admiral Sudomo's use of the term to refer to the "sakit hati" retired officers who made up much of the Petition of 50 Group. See David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p.249.

42. One small note on changes in the language of the Indonesian state is in order here. As Anderson pointed out in his introduction to "Report from East Java", *Indonesia*, 41 (1980), by an anonymous intelligence officer in late 1965, the intelligence language of that period was shot through with a melange of imported English and Dutch terms. By the 1980s, documents like the Seskoad manual and the other sources considered in this chapter have by and large completed formal decolonisation by dropping the Dutch elements. But more importantly perhaps the large number of English-language terms are overwhelmingly culled from the esoteric lexicons of the social scientists or their military counterparts.

43. After the 1978 controversy about to be described, the head of the joint Dutch-Indonesian project, Professor F.J. Monks at the University of Nijmegen, defended the project in a revealing way:

"In fact, it is known that all (Indonesian) psychologists over the age of forty have taken part in the formulating the tests for political prisoners. One can speak of a tradition of involvement in these tests...".
cited in "Psycho-deception: enquiry ends in cover-up", *Tapol Bulletin*, 34 (1979), p.15. One ex-tapol, Panda Nusa, reports that on the carceral island of Buru, violent interrogations of tapols were sometimes accompanied by psychological tests. See his Panda Nusa, "The path of suffering: the report of a political prisoner on his journey through various prison camps in Indonesia", *Bulletin of Concerned*

it then applied to large numbers of Category-B political prisoners to determine the level of surveillance required for each prisoner after release.⁴⁴ The then Head of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo told Henry Kamm of the *New York Times* that it had taken two years to develop a psychological test which, when applied to Category-B political prisoners "gave a 70 to 80 percent assurance of detecting communists".⁴⁵ The tests were developed by the ABRI Mental Development Centre [Pusbintal ABRI] in cooperation with psychologists in the United States and at the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands.⁴⁶

Accordingly the five tests employed included a basic intelligence test, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule to measure the firmness of convictions and ability to influence others⁴⁷, and the Eysenck test of political "tough/tender-mindedness". Two tests were specifically developed for the Indonesian situation, and were described by the Head of ABRI Mental Development Centre, Major-General Sumitro, as "thematic differentiation" tests, although he did not disclose their content.

[Major-General] Sumitro said that the tests were fed into a computer and supplemented with interrogation files and observations about the prisoners recorded during their detention. This determined a classification into one of four classes, ranging from "diehard", through to "not so hard", an even lower degree and, finally, category "zero".⁴⁸

The scale of the Kopkamtib application can be gathered from the fact that Sumitro claimed that some 200 assistants had been "specially trained" to administer the tests.⁴⁹

The evidence from this episode clarifies the type of tests used six years later after the Tanjung Priok affair, and the purposes for which they were used. Islamic "diehards" needed to be identified, and there was undoubtedly a set of accompanying psycho-social

Asian Scholars, 19,1 (1987), p.20.

44. The original purpose was to screen out "diehard" communists and withhold them from the release programme. This was dropped after the psychological testing drew international protests.

45. *New York Times*, 12 April 1978, cited in "Psychotests: foreign scientists involved?", *Tapol Bulletin*, 27 (1978), p.4. Admiral Sudomo proudly told Kamm of Indonesia's pioneering role: "We asked the CIA, 'Maybe you have some equipment to detect if he is a communist'. They don't have it."

46. In one interview after the controversy provoked by his earlier interview with Kamm, Sudomo found himself caught between his pride that it was an essentially Indonesian effort, with some foreign comment, and an awareness that the misuse of science was a political problem outside Indonesia:

I myself was present at the designing of the test..But it is not true that we gave the Dutch psychologists the opportunity to draft the questionnaire. The Indonesian psychologists talked with other psychologists in the Netherlands, England and America, and returned after that. The questionnaire was composed later, and by Kopkamtib really, not by Indonesian psychologists.

See "Sudomo speaks again", *Tapol Bulletin*, 33 (1979), p.7.

47. This American test required adaption to be used appropriately in Indonesia. The item-analysis this required was carried out on a Nijmegen University computer under the supervision of a Dutch industrial psychologist. See "Psycho-deception: enquiry ends in cover-up", *Tapol Bulletin*, 34 (1979), p.15.

48. *New York Times*, 26 April 1978, cited in "Psychotests: Foreign scientists involved", op.cit., p.4.

49. Those involved at Nijmegen included Prof. F.J. Monks, A.H.Boon van Ostade, and J. Jaspers (later at Oxford University); and from the University of Indonesia, "Dr. Fuad Hassan ... who has titular military rank and who supervised the compilation of the questionnaire used on the tapols, Mrs Saparinah Sadli, who worked on the list of questions after visiting Buru in 1971, Drs. Sudirgo Wibowo who worked on item-analysis needed for the questionnaire; Mrs Yusuf Nusjirwan, who undertook an investigation of attitudes of women tapols in Bukit Duri in 1966, Drs R. Sumarto, a psychologist actively involved in preparing the test, is now a Brigadier-General in the Army, and Professor Ma'rat who, besides being Dean of the Bandung Faculty of Psychology since 1976, works for the Army's Psychology Institute in West Java." See "Psycho-deception...", op.cit., p.15.

analyses ruminating on the dangers latent in the combination of "rightwing Islam" and Eysenck-style political tough-mindedness.

The two episodes raise some general issues. The first point is to note, once again, the use of scientific technique as ideological support. Scientizing politics has been a repeated approach of the New Order state. Considerable financial and intellectual resources were devoted to the development of the new tests and to the adaptation of those of foreign origin, suggesting that the psychologists involved were concerned that their work pass muster by academic norms.

But beyond that there is a certain fantasy of control and surveillance. Sudomo told a Dutch journalist:

I said to the Americans, "Don't you have a computer that we can put in someone's head so that we can know exactly what is ideology is?"⁵⁰

Sudomo may well have been smiling as he said it, but the quality of fantasy is evident all the same. The fantasy is linked to the rigours of "science" and "measurement", but beneath the affectless language of science, there is both the passionate sense of the "otherness" of the object of surveillance that must be registered and restrained, and the eternal hope of the technical fix to mask the reality of repression.

Thirdly, we must conclude that the development and application of such psychometric tools was undertaken to meet a felt bureaucratic need. Ideology or not, military administrators were faced with a vast problem (entirely of their own making) to solve: how are the large but finite surveillance resources of the state to be deployed to deal with hundreds of thousands of tapols and militant Muslims and their families? Here it is helpful to recall the way in which the Seskoad manual sought to scientize the question of domestic threat assessment by the bureaucratic specification of indicators of threat.

The final point to notice is the sheer scale of the surveillance operation involved - even before the release of the tapols. If the tests' administrators are to be believed, each prisoner under went a battery of tests, the results of which were then scored and computer-analyzed, and then correlated with the results of observations during the period of incarceration (implying the existence of some system of individual surveillance and record-keeping during detention), and records of interrogation - which in some cases must have begun a decade or more before. Moreover this process was repeated on several occasions for each prisoner if Sudomo is to be believed.⁵¹ It is of course probable that in many cases records did not exist or had been misplaced or observations conducted in a completely useless way.⁵² But there is no reason not to believe that something like what has been outlined actually took place, and at least an attempt made to apply the results to the establishment of a grass-roots surveillance regime covering ex-tapols returning to their villages and kampungs.

If it is true that more than 1.7 million (the figure varies) "G30S/PKI"-connected

50. Cited in "Sudomo speaks again", op.cit., p.7.

51. "The test is carried out every six months. For instance you may have result A, and after six months, result B. Then we compare - has he changed or not, etc." Ibid., p.7.

52. This Kopkamtib political testing does after all involve, albeit in a ghastly application, an element of academic grantsmanship, and proponents' claims ought to be discounted somewhat.

people have been processed by the intelligence agencies in the past, then records were kept on at least a sizable proportion of them.⁵³ Probably such records on the great majority were kept in the first instance at a local level. But in recent years it would have become possible and desirable (from the intelligence agencies' point of view) to computerize such records - exactly as has been done elsewhere. Such a step would, especially in combination with data-gathering like this questionnaire, represent an enormous ongoing surveillance capacity. Just where such capacities would be organizationally located is not known - and would certainly be the subject of much competition and jealousy. Which agencies have been developing such computer capacities? Here again: just what are the responsibilities of the Assistant for Electronics and Communications, and, for that matter, the Data Gathering and Processing Bureau in the Ministry of Defence and Security, and other electronic intelligence gathering and processing bodies?

When considered in the context of modern information technology already widespread in Indonesian society, one is left with an image of a densely woven mesh of prosaic and routine surveillance, carried out by an obsessive and relentless, if sometimes comically inept, military bureaucracy motivated at the top by a mixture of vindictiveness, ideological zeal, and gulping bad faith powered by concerns to protect positions of privilege and suppress the memory of the past. The image of the European or Czarist nineteenth police state with its vaults of carefully transcribed agents' reports and analyses is as nothing to the prospect what is ushered in by mass bureaucratic surveillance of large minorities recorded and processed on elementary computer data-base programmes.

53. In 1985, the Ministry of Home Affairs senior intelligence figure, Director-General for Social and Political Affairs, Hari Sugiman, announced that all ex-tapols were to be re-registered to see whether they should be allowed to vote in the 1987 elections. At that time Sugiman said some 1.7 million "coup participants" were to be re-registered. Registration to that date had some 1,459,107 on the books, including 363 Category-A prisoners (tried), 34,718 Category-B prisoners, and 1,424,026 Category-C prisoners. Many in this last group may never have actually been arrested, but are still considered ex-tapols. See "1.7 million ex-tapols are being re-registered", *Tapol Bulletin*, 70 (July), p.1.