

## **Chapter 10**

### **Inter-agency relations and the coherence of the state**

Given the broad and diverse set of agencies and sections operating over what is largely common ground described the previous two chapters, we would naturally expect there to be conflicts over responsibilities, lines of authority, resources and "ownership" of projects. This is indicated in the name of Bakin itself (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency)<sup>1</sup>. The problem of coordination is not only a "technical" bureaucratic matter soluble by explicit operating procedures for sharing of information, plans and processes of consultation. It is also a matter of the political relationships between and through the individuals and groupings that make up these agencies. Mutual mistrust, competing policy goals, and competition for resources and political advantage in the wider political sphere all serve to lower the level of coherence and unity of "the state" - or, in this case, a particular functional section of the state.

This chapter presents a brief review of the limited evidence available about two aspects of the question of coordinating this part of the Indonesian state. First, two levels of explicit intelligence coordination are examined: regional and central. At the regional level, (and possibly below) the rather shadowy civilian and military Intelligence Coordinating Staff at the Military Area Command [Kodam] level appears to provide a specialist intelligence back-up to the better known Regional Leaders Conference [Muspida]. At the central level the clear references to coordination in the names and official missions of Bakin and Bakorstanas suggest that inter-agency coordination is a recurring problem. In the second half of the chapter the question of organizational rivalries amongst intelligence agencies, and between intelligence and other parts of the state is discussed.

This relative incoherence of state organs is experienced by the agencies concerned as a loss of optimum effectiveness. To their antagonists and victims it means that there are opportunities for manoeuvre, cracks in the apparently monolithic and omnipotent behemoth, resources for counter-acting state power - power that is enhanced by the immobilization of political will and hope that comes from unwitting acceptance of the state's own claims to unfettered dominion.

Most historical accounts of intelligence and security agencies offer examples of lack of coordination between different bureaus, competition for the favour of the sovereign, manipulation of information, privatization of state resources for personal or factional ends, and clashes of political and organizational style, morality and policy objectives. Indonesian security and intelligence agencies offer ample testimony to all of these, and measures to vitiate their negative effects for the state as a whole (or the dominant interpretation of that interest) have been recurrent.

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1. See also the suggestion by Napitupulu that an agency was established, at least on paper, in 1958 to deal with coordination problems. See P. Napitupulu, *Intelligence (Fungsi dan Peranannya)*, (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1966). This is discussed in Appendix 3 below.

## Intelligence coordination

Indonesian security managers have been aware of the problems of coordination between agencies for some time, although there seems to be increasing attention to the issue. Solutions have been sought at both the regional or local level, and at the centre, through a series of coordinating meetings and agencies. The number of known coordination vehicles at the local level suggests a continuous problem with no simple solution.

### *Local intelligence coordination*

Two small recent press reports give some insight into this problem at a regional level through a system known as the Intelligence Coordinating Staff [Staf Koordinasi Intelijen - SKI]. However, while both reports refer to the operation of the SKI system in East Java, they differ markedly as to its nature. The first report describes a very small, upper echelon meeting:

The Coordinating Staff [SKI] meets every two weeks at the provincial offices of the Director-General for Social and Political Affairs, the Assistant for Intelligence (in the Military Area Command), the Assistant for Intelligence to the High Prosecutor, and Police Security Intelligence [Intelpampol, Intelijen Pengamanan Polisi].<sup>2</sup>

The second report concerns a large assembly of civilian and military intelligence staff:

Speaking to 191 members of the East Java Intelligence Coordinating Staff [SKI] in Surabaya, Kopkamtib commander for East Java Major-General Sugeng Subroto [the Kodam commander] said SKI was the forum or vehicle which was coordinating in nature for the entire intelligence machinery in the region, both civilian and military. With SKI, there could be mutual provision of information, consultations, and evaluation of problems arising in the region, whether they involved security or development. Hopefully, through SKI there could be integration [keterpaduan] in handling problems in these areas.<sup>3</sup>

The difference in the size of the two reported meetings means that the make-up of the SKI is quite unclear. However, both reports are revealing: the first, for the make-up of the groups to be coordinated (no mention of Bakin in either); the second, for the large size of the assembled intelligence officials for East Java.

A second, and broader, arena for intelligence and security coordination is the

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2. *Indonesia Reports*, 21 (June 1987), citing the *Surabaya Post*, 17 November 1986. Note that the sentence does not quite make sense as written. Presumably the SKI is made up of individuals from the four offices mentioned. The same issue of *Indonesia Reports* refers to a similar body as Bakorin - Badan Koordinasi Intelijen (p.12).

3. *Indonesia Reports*, 26 (January 1988), pp.27-28, citing the *Jawa Pos*, (24 September 1987). The editor of *Indonesia Reports* comments:

This story makes clear that the system of SKIs through the country differs from the Army's Kopkamtib hierarchy. This seems connected to a coordinated push for Kopkamtib's entry into troublesome economic development issues, rather than the ad hoc approach of the past. If carried out in a thoroughgoing way, this could lead to a substantial practical and doctrinal expansion of ABRI's "dual function". Heretofore, an economic component of in ABRI's "socio-political" role has been unelaborated and downplayed. The apparent energizing of the SKI's thus suggests dissatisfaction among "young generation" Army officers about a wide number of aspects of economic development implementation, if not the strategy itself. The concern suggested here seems to extend well beyond the more traditional but limited anti-corruption role with which Kopkamtib has been tasked in the past.

The rise of an economic dimension of the intelligence-security apparatus will be discussed further below.

Muspida, the Regional Leaders Conference [Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah]<sup>4</sup>. (See Figure 10.1.) The Muspida were established in 1967 after the abolition of the Old Order's High Command [KOTI] and Regional Authorities [Pepelda] with the explicit purpose of guaranteeing unity of action, coordination and integration to overcome disturbances and obstructions to the smooth implementation of government policies and programmes.<sup>5</sup>

A 1982 Seskoad commentary on the Muspida legislation is more specific:


In the context of cultivating security and order, policies and implementation by officials does not stop the possibility of overlapping [English] with each other and misunderstandings. A body is needed to coordinate, misunderstandings, to facilitate

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4. A second level of Leaders Conferences exists at the Kabupaten level, with comparable make-up and responsibilities. See Indonesia, Seskoad [Sekolah Staf dan Komando] (1982), *Vademecum: Pengetahuan Pertahanan Keamanan*, (Bandung: Markas Besar, TNI-AD, Sekolah Staf dan Komando, Cetakan Dua, 1982), p.380.

5. Presiden Republik Indonesia, *Penjelasan Instruksi Presiden Nomor 05 Tahun 1967*, reproduced in Indonesia, Seskoad, op.cit.

Figure 10.1  
Regional Security Coordination System  
[Siskamwil]



explanations and actions between regional leaders, particularly about limits of authority and jurisdiction, and each others' duties and responsibilities.<sup>6</sup>

At the regional level, the Muspida is made up of the Governor, the Kodam Commander, the Police Chief, and the High Prosecutor.<sup>7</sup> The Muspida's authority is limited to providing advice and assistance to the Governor in coordination matters, in estimating the intensity and extent of security disturbances, and in securing government policies and programmes.<sup>8</sup> In the past, the chair of the Muspida was always the Kodam Commander, although in recent years, the governor (more often than not a military man in any case), has taken the chair.

In his role as chairman of the Muspida, the military commander had all the backup powers and could, if necessary, issue instructions to the governor, the police chief and the public prosecutor.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the Muspida itself there is a secondary body attached to it - the Regional Security Authorities Body [Badan Pengamanan Penguasa Daerah], specifically concerned with political questions and policy, made up of ABRI members.<sup>10</sup> Just how that body fits with the small version of the Intelligence Coordinating Staff reported above, is not clear.

In the East Timor war zone intelligence coordination was most important to the Indonesian forces. In the course of setting down an extremely well-informed and detailed set of standing orders on Fretilin political and military tactics and strategy, the then Commander of Military Resort Command [Korem] 164/Wira Dharma, (then) Colonel Rajagukguk stressed the need for integration of the whole Indonesian state apparatus in Timor. This *Established Procedure [Protap] on Intelligence* noted that

Territorial intelligence activities to back up anti-guerilla operations in East Timor require that special emphasis be placed on extraordinary support procedures so as to ensure that all efforts and activities undertaken are well and truly coordinated. This instruction is intended for every section of the apparatus which is directly connected with the life of the community.<sup>11</sup>

Rajagukguk's emphasis (after six years of continuous counter-insurgency campaigning) makes clear that coordination remained inadequate.

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6. Ibid., p.379.

7. There have been some small variations in make-up over the years, according to the needs of different regions, and as the overall military command structure has altered.

8. Instruksi Presiden 5/1967, Pasal 6.

9. David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project) 1984), p.45-7.

10. Seskoed, op.cit., p.380; Instruksi Presiden, Pasal 2.

11. Kodam XVI/Udayana - Korem 164/Wira Dharma. *Established Procedure [Protap] on Intelligence No.01/IV/1982. Subject: Instructions for Territorial Intelligence Activities in East Timor*. Reproduced in Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor*, (London: Zed Press, (1984), p.205.

### *Central intelligence coordination*

At the centre there has been an increasing concern with intelligence and security coordination. The State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Bakin, has officially had a broad brief:

- 1) Intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert action [penggalangan], through both routine activities and intelligence operations, at home and abroad.
- 2) Coordinating, integrating and carrying out technical guidance for all other state apparatus intelligence activities outside Bakin, both at home and abroad, through Coordination Meetings.
- 3) Undertaking control of intelligence tasks in general.
- 4) Preparing and formulating general State policy on intelligence.<sup>12</sup>

Over the two decades of Bakin's history, the organizational emphasis has shifted amongst these goals. Little is known of its coordination activities in the early New Order days, although the specification of its tasks at that time probably reflected the concern of the inner Army leadership to preserve control of intelligence power centres at a time when the military as a whole was still split in its loyalties and purges were regular, and after a period where the intelligence services had been particularly important political tools for various masters. At the height of its "activist" period in the 1970s its pre-eminence meant that the coordination aspect was somewhat diminished, with the exception of the difficult relationship to Opsus. With the proliferation of intelligence centres outside Bakin, and especially the rise of Bais, and the subsequent operational restraints on Bakin, the coordination function has been somewhat revived. It is unlikely that the Bakin leadership (to the extent that it is unified) is able to exercise its general responsibility for overall direction of the intelligence apparatus untrammelled in the face of the range of bases of support for Moerdani in Bais, Attorney-General's, the Ministry of Home Affairs and elsewhere. How the independent activities of Bais and its function as the arena of coordination - and consequently, arbitration between competing policy lines - sit together is also not clear.

That may provide some insight into the need for a second, higher, central forum for coordination of security policy - the establishment of the position of Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security [Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan - Menko Polkam]. The Coordinating Minister is directly responsible to the President, and oversees the Ministers of the Interior, Defence and Security, Justice, and Information, the Attorney-General, the Commander of Kopkamtib, the Head of Bakin, and other bodies as necessary.<sup>13</sup> The appointment of Admiral Sudomo to the position in 1988<sup>14</sup> placed the position as firmly as possible in the intelligence-security stream of military political thinking. Sudomo had previously been the effective head of Kopkamtib for the best part of a decade, and then Minister for Labour Power.

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12. *Almanak Negara Republik Indonesia 1987*, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Alda, 1987), p.534.

13. *Almanak Negara...1987*, op.cit., p.478.

14. Previous incumbents were Generals (Ret.) Panggabean (1978-83), previously Minister of Defence and Security; and Surono (1983-88) previously Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces, and Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare.

The most recent attempt at increasing coordination and coherence of intelligence and security policy came with the replacement of Kopkamtib by Bakorstanas - the *Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability*. While the continuity with Kopkamtib's executive capacity and its autonomous intervention capacities are probably the most important characteristics of the organization for the present, the emphasis on coordination is clear, even if its precise meaning is not as yet. The head of Bakorstanas, the Armed Forces Commander will chair a body made up of representatives from all branches of the Armed Forces including the police, the Attorney-General, and all three Coordinating Ministers - including those for Economy and Finance, and the People's Welfare. In its coordinating activities, Bakorstanas will be attempting to provide coherence to the security and intelligence aspects of all parts of the state apparatus: as Rajagukguk instructed the East Timor part of the apparatus: "every section of the state apparatus which is connected to the life of the community".<sup>15</sup>

The totalitarian ambition of the project is clear. But what is more important to notice are the implications of such a comprehensive rationalization of security policy in terms of "economic stability" overcoming "obstructions to development". To the extent that these goals are taken seriously, then sooner or later the agenda of such discussions will move beyond standard issues of jurisdiction, "misunderstandings", cross-purposes and the like, and beyond the accepted understanding of "obstructions to development" posed by inharmonious labour relations and inappropriate democratic political principles and so forth. A broader theory of development could, for example, begin to identify obstructions caused by certain kinds of rentier activity - political or otherwise; or by economic policies that do not generate adequate employment opportunities (as opposed to profit maximization for controllers of capital); or which rendered the country's economy more vulnerable to the fortunes of the global economy. These are all positions which could conceivably held by senior military officers committed to retaining military control over an essentially capitalist economy, but one based on principles different from the current rentier-state.<sup>16</sup> In such circumstances the coherence of state policy itself comes to be seen as the problem, and "coordination" of security policy involves conflict over the foundation of the New Order state itself.

### **Organizational rivalries**

There is much that is not clear about the internal structure of the intelligence organizations, organizations, their formal inter-relationship, and the relationships in practice - including bureaucratic and personal conflicts and alliances. One of the few significant examples that is documented is the conflict in 1973-74 between Sumitro as Commander of Kopkamtib (and Sutopo Yuwono as Head of Bakin) and Moertopo-Yoga Soegama in the Bakin-Opsus network. But little is known of that conflict in institutional terms, or of any later bureaucratic politics in the intelligence-security system.

One important intra-military tension is that between the intelligence stream and the operations branch of the army. Perhaps the most spectacular example of that tension concerns the preparations of the plans for the full invasion of East Timor in December 1975 by Moerdani, after the collapse of the Moertopo strategy of domestic subversion in

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15. Budiardjo and Liem, *op.cit.*, p.205.

16. The three examples are in fact drawn from positions close to those of Park Chung-hee.

Timor and diplomacy towards Portugal and Australia:<sup>17</sup>

The invasion plans were drawn up by Maj. General Benny Moerdani without the knowledge or participation of key members of the operational staff. The deputy commander of the armed forces [Wapangab], General Suroso Reksodimedjo, who was as much in the dark as anyone else, registered his displeasure by going off shortly thereafter on the *haj*, leaving Murdani's group to complete the takeover. Suroso felt that as Wapangab he should have known what was planned. Suroso was not the only officer upset over the invasion. The Kostrad commander, Lt. Gen. Leo Lopilusa, who would in the normal course of events have played a central role in any such operation, was in Paris at the time and received a cable advising him that the invasion had gone through, without ever being asked if his troops were ready. Lopilusa confided to a retired colleague not long after the invasion, "I am only the manager of a funeral parlour. Only that! I am not involved. I am only in charge of the funerals of the men who don't come back...In the view of some senior officers from the operational side, Suharto was operating outside normal channels in bypassing Kostrad and relying on the Kopassandha [Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha, or Secret Warfare Force] and the intelligence community in such an operation. This view did not take allowance of the fact that in many ways an expanded Kopassandha had taken over some of the functions that were formerly the responsibility of Kostrad."<sup>18</sup>

Two things are important about this account for our purposes. Firstly, the theme of resentment between intelligence branches and operational branches is a recurring one in military sociology, in part because the divide roughly corresponds to the division between "political" streams and more strictly military professional streams (without having too many illusions about the latter grouping). While the "political" stream in Indonesia was broader (including, in the "core group" the "financial" generals such as Ibnu Sutowo, Humardhani and Surjo, and the "law/ administration" group around Sudharmono, Ali Said and Ismail Saleh - with Alamsjah perhaps "halfway" in between) the intelligence-security-special forces link to Suharto was dominant, and wholly politicized.

Jenkins presents the distinction in slightly different terms: those of a "pragmatic" vs. a "principled" outlook. In the early 1970s, and again in the later 70s and early 80s this divide corresponded roughly to a "palace/Hankam" divide:

And although it was no longer entirely accurate to speak of a Hankam-Palace cleavage, it was nonetheless true that the pragmatic officers tended to be those clustered around Suharto. The more "principled" group tended to be more closely associated with the army proper, or at any rate within its non-intelligence sectors.. There was in all this, an obvious correlation between "pragmatism" and "power holding" on the one hand, and "principle/removed from power" on the other. However, it would be wrong to see this as being no more than an "in" group, "out" group phenomenon.<sup>19</sup>

Jenkins also sees the same "pragmatic/principled" distinction operating, at least for

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17. See Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, (Melbourne: Fontana/Collins, 1980), pp.195-215.

18. Jenkins, *op.cit.*, p.24.

19. *Ibid.*, p.30.

a short time, within the intelligence field itself, in the early seventies, between Lt.Gen. Sutopo Yuwono as Head of Bakin and (then) Maj.Gen. Ali Moertopo as its Deputy Head.<sup>20</sup>

The distinction finally appeared to come down to three aspects: firstly, the Suharto group of "pragmatists" were more ready and willing to use any and all methods to defeat their political opponents; and secondly, they displayed a more thoroughgoing commitment to enhancing the position of the military in the society (at the expense of other social groups). A third distinction cuts slightly across these divides: Sutopo Yuwono, like Sayidman and Hasnan Habib, all of whom were pushed aside after Malari, has the "PSI" characteristic mix of intellectuality and professionalism.<sup>21</sup>

Moerdani's tenure at the head of the military involved the overcoming of these distinctions by a process of fusion: an intelligence-security apparatus which is highly politicized, but professional and technocratic in its approach to political control and social engineering; and a military hierarchy dominated at its senior levels by intelligence and security officers, which nevertheless has expanded and upgraded the elite conventional force structure.

Jenkins' account of the closed origins of the Timor invasion planning also provides part of the explanation, firstly for the invasion itself, and secondly, for its combination of extreme brutality and military incompetence. Organizational rivalries were costly in every sense. In this regard, the first two years of the Timor invasion replicated the experience of the smaller campaigns in Irian Jaya in 1962 and the West Malaysian landings of 1964, in both of which troops were dropped by plane or boat into extremely hostile environments (i.e. jungle, swamp, forest and/or unfriendly locals) either without adequate preparation or in the belief that the local people, Irianese or Malaysian would welcome them with open arms as liberators.<sup>22</sup>

## Conclusion

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20. Ibid., p.30. See comments by participants in these conflicts in the preceding chapter.

21. The long-standing character of one aspect of this divide was reflected in a comment of a former revolutionary intelligence colleague of Sutopo's - from another military-political stream - when he dismissed the intelligence chief in characteristic terms: "He's not a real fighter - he spent the Revolution in the headquarters". [PS/39]

22. This should not, however, detract from noting the subsequent effectiveness (at least temporarily) of ABRI campaigns in East Timor and Irian Jaya using Kopassandha/ Kopassus troops under the command of Moerdani acolytes such as Dading Kalbuadi. On military intelligence failures in the US context, see Richard Betts, "Analysis, war and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable", *International Security*, XXXI,1 (October 1978). On the military aspects of the early stages of the Timor invasion see Jill Jolliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, (Brisbane: University Of Queensland Press, 1978); James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1983); *Timor Information Service*, (Melbourne: 1976-1980), and Richard Tanter, "The military situation in East Timor", *Pacific Research*, January 1977. On the Malaysian landings see J.A.C.Mackie, *Konfrontasi*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974). It is worth recalling the comment made by the editors of *Indonesia* about Moerdani and the privileged position of the intelligence-security stream in ABRI:

Suffice it to say that the appointment as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who has never personally commanded any unit larger than a battalion is extraordinary and defies all the norms of professional modern militaries.

"Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 36 (1983), p.111.

His successor, Try Soetrisno, although starting out with the disadvantage of graduating in 1959 from the Army Technical Academy (Aktekad), served

"as Chief of Staff of Kodam XVI/Udayana under Soeweno and Dading Kalbuadi in the years 1977-78, during the major anti-population campaigns in East Timor that resulted in the loss, by firearms, starvation and related disease, of at least a hundred thousand lives."

"Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 40 (1985), p.140.

The problem of intelligence coordination is clear from the existence of organizational structures aimed at such a goal, or rectifying past inadequacies. At the local level it is clear that there is a coordination structure in place at the provincial level and possibly below. However the existing evidence is too slim to document much more than the bare existence of the structure. It is not clear to what administrative depth such coordinating structures are applied. More importantly, the pattern of authority on such committees is not clear: what, for example, is the relationship between military intelligence officers and civilian members? Does the military view, to the extent that it is clear or consistent, always prevail? Is there a difference in political styles and/or political goals? Is there any evidence to suggest that any of these regional or local bodies are effective transmission belts of local pressure upwards? Coordination can mean many different things.

Equally, despite the importance of the question, it must be said that as yet there is little systematic information to report on the internal politics of Indonesian intelligence agencies. In the course of the interviewing for this thesis, a certain amount of gossip and rumour about intra- and inter-agency fighting was collected. However, for the most part this was ignored as being too fragmentary and unreliable to be useful.<sup>23</sup> The well-known distinction between "principled" and "pragmatic" intelligence styles is still useful, but may be less helpful in the more bureaucratic days of the late New Order than in the manoeuvrings of the days of Moertopo and his rivals. Clearly, any real assessment of the internal intelligence apparatus politics of the late New Order will have to wait on an informed account of the political affairs of Moerdani, the architect of this apparatus.

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23. The one place where some of this material has been used is in a few of the biographical sketches in Appendix 1. There it is indicated as the opinion of particular informants.