

Chapter 1

Militarization, surveillance and terror: the foundations of rule in a rentier-militarist state

Prologue: Managing the "still unmastered past"

In April 1978 Admiral Sudomo, the Commander of the Indonesian armed forces security organization Kopkamtib, was a practical military bureaucrat with a practical administrative problem. Sudomo was a tough navy man intensely loyal to President Soeharto. Like Soeharto, Sudomo had cultivated the ethos of "para" toughness by taking the paratroop-commando course at the age of 40. Now after five years as day-to-day head of Kopkamtib under Soeharto he was finally Commander in his own right, and faced with the difficult problem of judging the political opinions of tens of thousands of alleged former communist political prisoners, and more than a million of their unincarcerated family and former comrades.

The problem was a large one. Before October 1965 the Communist Party of Indonesia [PKI] had claimed three million members, and was undoubtedly the largest party in the world outside China and the Soviet Union. Some twelve million people were said to have belonged to organizations regarded as aligned, openly or otherwise, with the party - organizations for farmers, unionists, women, young people, film-makers, performers, artists, writers, religious groups, and ethnic groups. A whole vertical slice of Indonesian society had, in one way or another, been red.

In the months after October 1965 the problem had been dealt with directly: as a matter of policy the army under its new leader, Major-General Soeharto, had killed or sponsored the killing of a vast and unknown number of "reds": apart from those on lists of notables, anyone who was, or could be plausibly labelled as being, a member of the party or one of the aligned organizations was fair game for elite army death squads or Islamic youth groups egged on by the Army.

Just how many died in the months of the holocaust is unknown. The Australian Prime Minister of the day, Harold Holt, summed up the judgement of the Army's foreign backers when he assured the well-lunched members of the River Club of New York in July 1966 that

with 500,000 to 1,000,000 Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a re-orientation has taken place.

Two years later, the Central Intelligence Agency, which had reason to follow events closely, plumped for the lower of Holt's figures, and an Indonesian general in a better position than most to make an educated guess suggested a figure somewhere in the middle. At some point in the next fifteen years more than a million and a half Indonesians were arrested as alleged communists, or interrogated and classified as such.

In the years to come, after the killing abated, a kind of political caste system emerged, according to whose rules of pollution anyone associated with a Communist Party member by blood or marriage unto the third generation was to be regarded as communist until proven otherwise - if ever. Given the numbers still in prison, and the much larger number outside the camps still considered suspect, the government felt a need to differentiate between the "hard-core" believers and those who had seen the error of their ways.

For the preceding two years Sudomo's army and university psychologists had been

working on the problem. At last by 1978 Sudomo was able to announce to a New York Times correspondent, Henry Kamm, that "his people" had the solution: a battery of psychological tests, which, when applied to the major group of political prisoners "gave a 70 to 80 percent assurance of detecting communists". Sudomo, good nationalist that he was, proudly boasted that even the much-vaunted U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been unable to help:

I said to the Americans, "Don't you have a computer that we can put in someone's head so that we can know exactly what his ideology is? ... They don't have it!"

The battery was made up of three standard western psychometric tests, and two developed specifically for the unique Indonesian situation. The three western tests dealt with intelligence, firmness of conviction and capacity to influence others, and with political "tough/tender-mindedness". A team of military and academic psychologists had laboured to produce two all-Indonesian thematic differentiation tests. When the results of these tests were processed by computer, and combined with interrogation files and observations of the prisoners over more than a decade of confinement, it was said to be possible, with a high degree of reliability, to classify the chances of political "recidivism" from "diehard" to "zero". In due course the tests were presumably administered by the two hundred-odd assistants trained for the purpose - we do not know the details thereafter. In time, more than 100,000 former alleged communist prisoners were released, presumably after being processed in this way. Within a few years the same tests, or ones very like them, were being applied to a new wave of dissent - Muslims disenchanted with the New Order.

When the tapols were released in their tens of thousands, they moved from physical incarceration in concentration camps into Indonesian, and particularly Javanese, society through which the Army had woven a dense web of military and civilian surveillance institutions. In theory, this military surveillance network reached from the Armed Forces intelligence headquarters right down through each military and civilian administrative layer to the villages in the countryside and the kampung neighbourhoods of Java's crowded cities. In each village and kampung there was a Village Guidance NCO [Babinsa] forming one leg of the base level of political intelligence, officially charged with routinely giving "guidance"; reporting on whatever happens, especially anything "unusual"; reporting on "social forces" (meaning any formal or informal social or political or cultural or economic organization or grouping); and of course carrying out active intelligence work as directed.

Together with a nominally-civilian network of Neighbourhood Associations in the same villages and kampungs, and regular requirements for ex-prisoners to register and re-register for identity cards noting one's political background, the military intelligence system was designed to ensure that the ex-tapols simply exchanged one kind of prison for another.

Perhaps the machinery of surveillance was unevenly applied and less than competently administered, but we must conclude that the development and application of such psychometric tools was undertaken to meet a felt bureaucratic need. Ideologically motivated or not, military administrators were faced with a vast problem (entirely of their own making) to solve: how are the large but finite surveillance resources of the state to be deployed to deal with hundreds of thousands of tapols and militant Muslims and their families?

The sheer scale of the surveillance operation is astounding - and this was the case

even before the release of the tapols. If the tests' administrators are to be believed, each prisoner under went a battery of tests, the results of which were then scored and computer-analyzed, and then correlated with the results of observations during the period of incarceration (implying the existence of some system of individual surveillance and record-keeping during detention), and records of interrogation - which in some cases must have begun a decade or more before. Moreover this process was repeated on several occasions for each prisoner if Sudomo is to be believed. It is of course probable that in many cases records did not exist or had been misplaced or observations conducted in a completely useless way. But there is no reason to believe that something like what has been outlined did not actually took place, and that at least an attempt made to apply the results to the establishment of a grass-roots surveillance regime covering ex-tapols returning to their villages and kampungs.

If it is true that more than 1.7 million (the figure varies) "G30S/PKI" [September 30th Movement/Communist Party of Indonesia]-connected people have been processed by the intelligence agencies in the past, then records must have been kept on at least a sizable proportion of them. Whether retained in manual card systems or in computer data banks, then in combination with data-gathering through questionnaires like this such activities represent an enormous ongoing surveillance capacity. One is left with an image of a densely woven mesh of prosaic and routine surveillance, carried out by a obsessive and relentless, if sometimes comically inept, military bureaucracy motivated at the top by a mixture of vindictiveness, ideological zeal, and gulping bad faith powered by concerns to protect positions of privilege and suppress the memory of the past.¹

Thesis framework: theoretical concerns

In Indonesia in the New Order period under President Soeharto from 1966 until the late 1980s, three separate political processes have come together to yield a distinctive and institutionalized pattern of control of the Indonesian population: militarization, comprehensive domestic political surveillance, and intermittent, but persistent, state terror. This thesis is a study of the central element of all three processes: the organizations that make up the Indonesian intelligence complex in the late New Order period.

The empirical part of the thesis (in Part 2) provides an account of the structure and operations of Indonesian intelligence and security organizations in the latter part of the New Order, and an account of their relationship to the broader political and economic framework of rentier militarization.

However it is not possible to understand the Indonesian case study without looking at wider patterns of militarization, state terror and institutionalized political surveillance in the form of domestic political intelligence agencies. The approach in the first part of the thesis engages with these broader concerns of social theory and the implications of the Indonesian example for the rest of the world.

Militarization

In the present world order, which remains defined by Pax Americana, the militarized state is the norm in the Third World, not the exception. And these states are in fact only part-states, by and large quite unable to survive in anything like their current form if excised from their location within the wider imperial economic and political pattern. The

1. The matters dealt with in this prologue are presented in greater detail in Chapters 6, 8 and 10. Citations are omitted here.

preoccupation of the thesis with militarization and its consequences, in Indonesia and elsewhere, comes from the sheer scale of death and the institutionalized threat of violent death in the latter half of the twentieth century. Of the 10,700,000 people in the world who died as a result of fighting within or across national borders between 1960 and 1982, more than half had lived, before their premature deaths, in East and Southeast Asia.²

How have the majority of countries in East and Southeast Asia been drawn into the historical process of rapid militarization? Why is it that the governments of the region have, in the past quarter century, diverted huge amounts of scarce resources to the finally wasteful activity of paying standing armies and buying ever-increasing amounts of weaponry? Why have those armed forces come to threaten their own populations more than neighbouring states? Why is it that more than half of the countries of the Third World have some form of military government? The first of the three core parts of the framework of the thesis, therefore, is that of militarization: of Third World states and their industrialized patrons within a system of global militarization. That global system expresses itself through three main types or modes of contemporary militarization: the familiar *national* form; the *imperial or extended* form typified by the United States and the Soviet Union; and the *indirect* form, of which the most important example in for the subject of this thesis, is Japan.

While the ranks of military regimes are legion, they are mainly short-term in nature, alternating with more or less nervously civilian governments, or passing the burdens of office to others in khaki. But there are at least two important Asian exceptions. Indonesia has had a military government since 1966, continuously led by the same man - an almost unparalleled degree of militarized stability. And South Korea remains highly militarized, even though an elected (albeit military) president came to power in 1986 after twenty five years of military rule.

Surveillance

The second of the core concepts, surveillance, is taken from the work of Michel Foucault³. Linked with militarization and terror, surveillance is the key to understanding the nature and importance of intelligence agencies in contemporary Third World politics. Indeed, intelligence agencies epitomize the technically rational application of modern surveillance possibilities by the state.

The roots of the issue of surveillance take us back in European history. After the internal pacification of Western European societies following the inter-related "military" and "fiscal" revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a dramatic shift in the nature of social control set in - the onset of the disciplinary society. This new social form was characterised by an increasingly dense mesh of norms of conduct managed by an ever-larger group of professionals whose authority was sanctioned by the state on the basis of a claim to specialized bodies of knowledges or disciplines, in the double sense. Most importantly this entailed the construction of an intellectual- and state-administrative machinery for the categorization, recognition, detection, and punishment of "deviance" - a "governmentalization of power" and social discipline.

2. Ruth Lever Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditure, 1985*, (Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Publications, 1985), pp.10-11. See also Table 2.1 below.

3. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, (London: Allen Lane, 1977).

Surveillance in turn is linked, in the work of Anthony Giddens⁴, to a refurbished notion of totalitarian rule, most importantly involving an "extreme focussing of surveillance", coupled with terror. Given the nature of contemporary Third World militarized state-forms, it useful to review Giddens' model of totalitarian rule in the light of the Japanese experience of emperor-system fascism. The Japanese model of an integrated transnational system of power between the home countries and the colonies, with varying types and levels of surveillance and terror at the centre and periphery of the system, is the best guide to the current hierarchical world-system of militarization. A central argument of this thesis is that Indonesian politics since 1965 are best understood in terms of a totalitarian ambition, albeit somewhat one which is unsystematic in conception and thwarted in practice. To this end it is helpful to re-think the questions of totalitarian rule and fascism.

Domestic political intelligence agencies are the logical outcome of these processes in politics. By the late twentieth century virtually every nation-state had developed some type of surveillance bureaucracy for political purposes, in addition to those involved in externally-oriented activities, military or otherwise. The activities of such agencies are almost always adversarial, if not hostile; and may be either covert or open in form and aim, passive or disruptive and aggressive towards their targets. Domestic political intelligence agencies carry out a range of activities, which they may share with state and non-state-agencies. These activities include surveillance, political intervention (including terror), ideological propagation and maintenance, and political steering. Virtually all nation-states have agencies of this type, and indeed they show a striking isomorphism in terms of type and form around the world.

The experience of liberal democracies, as well as other state forms, shows a constant tendency, unless otherwise checked, for such agencies to become autonomous and insulated from effective control either by social groups or other parts of the state executive, the legislature or the judiciary. Increasing levels of agency autonomy permit, and by temptation encourage, a shift from more passive intelligence activities to aggressive counter-intelligence in domestic democratic politics.

The totalitarian variant is but the extreme of a more general pattern of the rationalization of domination.⁵ This pattern is built upon the capacity for increased and more effective surveillance, but is also dependent on the subsequent development of further forms of state intervention based on information derived from systematic surveillance of the citizenry. Intelligence agencies vary in their precise role here, and clearly are deeply involved in the surveillance and intervention aspects. However on occasion they may become - or seek to become - more deeply involved still in this wider pattern of rationalization of domination through a claim to insight into structural understanding of the society, the direction of social change, and the means of rectifying what are deemed undesirable changes.

Domination in and through a state will always be based on a shifting balance between outright coercion, ideology, and increasingly, what Foucault called the "disciplinary technologies of power". Domestically-oriented intelligence agencies are

4. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).

5. "Rationalization" is used here in the sense developed by Weber, referring to the systematizing of an activity, the removal of extraneous or inhibiting elements, and the development of the logic within a pattern.

involved in all three activities, but especially the last.

Terror

The third core concept, terror, is closely linked to the activities of intelligence agencies in most Third World countries. There, all talk of the "disciplinary society" is premature, even though the surveillance aspect of politics flourishes. Terror is remarkably little acknowledged as either a form or a persistent principal element of rule in general studies of Third World politics. Remarkably, this is the case even though the list of Third World countries cited for "violations of human rights" - a euphemism for arbitrary execution, harassment, torture, extreme intimidation, exile, imprisonment without trial - grows ever longer. Terror, usually discussed in relation to the almost inconceivable histories of Nazism and Stalinist Russia, is in fact a normal element of rule in many if not most Third World countries. Few non-industrial countries have been spared the plague of torture in the past thirty years. The intensity, the ferocity, of the impulse of state terror varies from time to time, country to country, target group to target group.

However, despite its terrible physical aspects, as a form of rule terror is primarily a cultural and psychological matter, and as such, is constituted by processes of cultural construction. The fundamental requirement for terror to take hold, to become a form of rule is the diffusion of suspicion of The Other as a normal state, a corrosion of solidarity. Deformation of the language of everyday talk accompanies this process, leading to what has been described as a "semantic delirium". Ordinary words may become laden with explosive connotations. Fantasy - of power or powerlessness may emerge: agents of the state begin to speak with a quality of baroque excess; and would-be victims are enervated by gossip and rumour. Equally, state agents may unconsciously protect themselves with a de-amplified language that permits a certain degree of denial (to the self) of what is actually happening. Torture itself, as a theatre of state power, also turns out to hinge on matters of language: the centrality of the question, the confession, and the obliteration of the world that accompanies such pain.

Studies of the activities of death squads and intelligence agencies in different parts of the world show a remarkable similarity in the processes of abduction, detention, torture itself, and return to society - whether as a living person, as a body, or as a member of another category, the disappeared. This derives from the fact that these activities are in fact rituals, or more precisely pseudo-rituals of the totalitarian state, and as such show the remarkable similarities of ordered sequences of symbolic events like rites of passage of separation, transition and incorporation. It becomes clear, when looking at accounts of torture, that the generation of an effective culture of terror involves an assault on prior certainties of the ground of knowledge, or rather, the creation of what has been called an "epistemic murk". Most important in this process is access to "the space of death", a reality known to both victims and torturers, and a crucial part of the fiction of power of the latter.

A final consideration in the construction of cultures of terror is memory, the inflection of the remembered, constructed past on the acts of the present and the considerations of the future. Terror and memory are intertwined: terror has its effects precisely in the realm of memory, memory re-charges the effects of the original act. Levels of terror can vary, and as current active terror diminishes, the effects of past acts may be sustained by state-orchestrated symbolic reminders. The mixing of such rehearsals of past acts and the selective suppression of alternative histories can become a powerful means of sustaining terror as a form of rule using only low-level acts of terror. In

Indonesia in the late 1980s, the holocaust of the months after late October 1965 was a matter of guilty or nightmarish memory for many, a whispered fable for many more. Yet it is none the less powerful an element of rule when reinforced by the selective use of extreme violence against particular groups unaccountably deaf to the siren calls of Guided Development.

These theoretical concerns are important for a number of reasons. Remarkably few social theorists take the issue of contemporary militarization seriously. In so doing, they affirm the technocratic separation of social analysis from moral concerns which is so supportive of the anti-democratic tendencies of the modern state. Moreover they render their analysis partial and inadequate. The traditional concern of sociologists with "social control" should lead to the study of those parts of the state for whom social control, in the broadest and most literal sense, is their *raison d'être*. Indeed, these state surveillance agencies often consider themselves to be pursuing that quest in a highly technically rational form. Despite the current popularity of general surveys of "surveillance" and the "politics of the body" deriving from the work of Michel Foucault, there is remarkably little interest in linking such theorizing to the already rich store of empirical studies of state (and "private"/corporate) surveillance. As a result we are once again allowing a lacunae in our understanding of the social whole, with theorists lagging far behind the reality of state practice.

This particular failing is especially important because it concerns that part of the state which is singularly concerned with steering the whole, and which, if we wish to consider the "retrieval of democracy" will have to be brought under democratic control in forms which have yet to be established effectively anywhere in the world.

Rentier-militarization in Indonesia

Before the institutional character of the Indonesian intelligence state can be explored, it will be necessary to answer one central question: How is it that such a state can survive for so long? Not only has the New Order state endured for more than half of the total period of Indonesian independence, but Soeharto, in a quite personal sense, has held power for a far longer time than Soekarno, whose only extended period of executive primacy was Guided Democracy, and whose power even then was substantially limited by comparison with his successor.⁶

R. William Liddle's explanation of the resilience of the Soeharto regime over more than two decades provides a powerful model of the predominantly domestic orientation of recent work on Indonesian politics, concluding

The complex pattern of repression, performance legitimation, and symbolic legitimation has created and now sustains within and outside the political system, a solid basis of support that is likely to outlive Soeharto.⁷

However, *pace* Liddle, it can be argued that the explanation of the contemporary Indonesian state and economic structure has been overly pre-occupied with domestic factors, neglecting the explanatory importance of external factors.

6. This paragraph and those following summarize the argument presented at greater length in Chapter 6 below. See citations there.

7. R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: personal rule and political institutions", *Pacific Affairs*, 58,1 (1985), p. 87.

This thesis is in part a contribution towards an understanding of the contemporary Indonesian rentier-militarist state which stresses the external pre-conditions for its emergence and reproduction - and, in time, its possible transformation. This thesis takes as given a great deal of the mainstream analysis of Indonesian society and politics which stresses national and local explanatory factors - although there is room for a great deal of argument about the particulars.

Comparative analysis is fruitful usually because of the illumination that comes from mixing elements of like and elements of difference. But what is required is comparison within a global setting, which seeks to compare not two or more separate or independent entities, but two parts of a larger whole. The differences and similarities that are discovered may well be due to internal factors, unrelated to dealings with the outside, or at the other extreme, due virtually entirely to the location of the two part-societies in the wider whole - be it the international division of labour, the political ecology of the globe, or the location of each in planning for the next global war. Or some point in between. The same phenomenon - say, militarized capitalist growth - may in one case (Indonesia) be due to the subordinate integration of that economy into the dominant global system; whereas in another case (South Korea) it is due to a carefully managed neo-mercantilist distance from that pattern of domination. Comparison is always comparison within the wider pattern of global social relations, and set within an historical framework.

Robert Cox has mapped out three levels or spheres of activity which must be analyzed historically if we are to understand contemporary global social relations in any part of the world:

- (1) the organization of production, more particularly the *social forces* engendered by the production process;
- (2) *forms of state* as derived from a study of state/society complexes;
- and (c) *world orders*, i.e. the particular configurations of forces which successively define the problematic of war and peace or the ensemble of states. Each of these can be studied as a succession of dominant and emergent rival structures.⁸

A great deal of the difference in the economic development of Indonesia and South Korea in the past can only be explained by contrasting, on the one hand, their respective locations in the global strategic order, and on the other, the differences in the character of their insertion into the global division of labour.

Many of the same considerations apply beyond the purely economic. In the course of a bravura comparison of classic European and contemporary Third World state-formation, Charles Tilly reminds us that in the real world, legitimacy derives less from the assent of the governed than from the likelihood that the authority of one state will be confirmed by others. In the contemporary world-order, it is other national and supra-national authorities whose confirmation is crucial for the question of legitimacy. For Tilly, what marks out contemporary Third World state formation from its European precursors is the relationship between the acquisition of war-making capacity and subject populations on the one hand, and other states on the other. In Europe, he argues, armies were built up

through sustained struggles with their subject populations, and by means of a selective expansion of protection to different classes within the populations.

8. Robert W. Cox, "Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 10,2 (1981), pp.137-8. See also his "Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay on method", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 12,2 (1984), and *Production, Power and World Order: Social forces in the Making of History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

Agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves, making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, and to withdrawal of credit, services and expertise.⁹

The formation of Third World states in a system of nation-states reinforcing each other and projecting extra-territorial power to both support and modify each other meant that the requirement of a domestic process of adjustment and mutual constraint between social forces was often limited or even absent. The network of external military, economic, political or ideological support for peripheral states on an historically unprecedented scale provides the possibility that

the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories. To the extent that outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of those military organizations exercise extraordinary power within them.¹⁰

The argument is, of course, extremely general, and as a result under-estimates both the complexity of forms of transnational political-economic constraint and the degree of contestation of military power that has occurred in countries such as Indonesia. Yet in essence this describes precisely the situation in Indonesia under conditions of rentier-militarization.

For Indonesia, the combination of huge oil export revenues and fluctuating but substantial foreign aid revenues provided a material foundation without which the domestic florescence of a rentier-militarist state would have been impossible. Equally importantly, the survival of the Soeharto regime, and the pattern of its relationships with domestic social forces has been contingent on the location of that state in the wider world order established under American aegis after 1945. Most importantly, the United States orchestrated the allocation of Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular in the Japanese sphere of influence.

In no way does all this suggest that there has been no domestic legitimation. Rather, it is to argue that the requirement to achieve such legitimation has been greatly minimized by the external context. The peculiar quality of rentier-militarist regimes, understood in this externally-oriented sense, is their relative capacity to ignore, or at least postpone, cultivation of domestic support and the class compromises which that process requires. The *external* rentier-character of New Order state formation has generated a considerable degree of freedom of the state from constraint by the subject population. Moreover, the legitimation that has finally mattered in Indonesia, other than that of the army as the governing group, has been the balance of opinion of state-managers in Washington and Tokyo. That external legitimation, coupled with the material basis of the external rentier-economy, has made possible the hypertrophy of the state vis-a-vis other social organizations and the capacity of the state to ignore any need for serious negotiation with subject populations - to say nothing of holocaust and terror.

The Indonesian intelligence state

9. Charles Tilly, "War and the power of warmakers in Western Europe and elsewhere, 1600-1980", in Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung and Carlos Portales (eds.), *Global Militarization*, (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p.83.

10. Charles Tilly, "War-making and state-making as organized crime", in Peter Evans, Dieter Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.186.

Within the Indonesian military, the professional intelligence stream epitomized by General (Ret.) Benny Moerdani has been dominant since at least the early 1980s. President Soeharto established the oldest surviving agency, Bakin, in the early days of the New Order and was its head for much of its first decade. Political intervention - violent, intimidating, cajoling, seducing, or all these together - against a wide range of regime opponents was the hallmark of the "political modernization" campaigns carried out by Moerdani's mentor, Ali Moertopo, to establish Soeharto's dominance in the first decade of the New Order. And after the liquidation of the left in 1965-66, a massive apparatus of surveillance and political "cleansing" reaching into every village and city block was established to monitor and control the activities of millions of citizens associated with once-legal organizations - or their relatives and descendants by blood or marriage. By the mid-1980s the Soeharto regime's critics, most notably Muslims disenchanted with "development", were speaking of the *negara intel* - the Indonesian intelligence state. Just as the dominance of the military within the state yields the familiar Third World militarized state, so the particular character of the militarized state in Indonesia is given by that stream of the military which is dominant - the intelligence stream.

The agencies of surveillance in Indonesia are both military and civilian, although all are set within a framework of a thoroughly militarized state. These surveillance capacities are matched by political intervention capacities, either within the same agency or another - for example through the military's long-running instrument for selective application of effective martial law, Kopkamtib. Over the life of the New Order state, these agencies have changed in structure, assigned role, and political significance. In general however, there has been a clear pattern of centralization and professionalization of intelligence and of socio-political control generally, associated in particularly with the tenure of General Moerdani as Armed Forces Commander. What is striking is that in the Indonesian case this has been achieved concurrently with an expansion and professionalization of the conventional externally-oriented military forces structure. In addition there has been at least an attempt at scientizing the instruments of interrogation and surveillance of Communist and Islamic political prisoners and former prisoners, and possibly that of workers involved industrial disputes.

In the Indonesian state, the intelligence apparatus attempts to carry out four activities to benefit the aims of the state as a whole: *repression*, *surveillance*, *ideological correction*, and *steering*. The first two activities are well-known and expected, the last two less so. The repressive role of the Indonesian intelligence agencies has often been documented, but surveillance has received less systematic attention, even though it is rather more important. The instruments of state surveillance are multiple, confused, and for much of the population, probably low-level, passive and somewhat ineffective. However, in intention they are not so, and for particular large sections of the Indonesian population they are effectively and comprehensively applied, and in such a way that they have implications for the remainder of the population.

The Indonesian example helps to delineate different intelligence regimes. Militarization can proceed without the development of a domestic political intelligence capacity. It is also possible for a state to be extensively militarized and possess an extensive surveillance regime, but not use terror against its own population. What marks out the Indonesian case is the presence of all three elements - militarization, domestic political surveillance, and terror.

By the late 1980s in New Order Indonesia, the primary terror was, for many

Indonesians, a matter of memory rather than direct experience - the memory of the holocaust in the six months from late October 1965 when upwards of 500,000 people were murdered by military forces or civilians supported and encouraged by the Army. Terror since that time has taken four forms, each far less comprehensive than the New Order's constitutive killings, but carrying potent effects for the population at large. In early 1983 the Strategic Intelligence Agency developed a plan for the murder of alleged petty criminals. In the next year approximately 5,000 were killed by army and police death-squads using techniques that were "secret but open" that had the effect of heightening fear and mystery. In East Timor and Irian Jaya the Armed Forces have on numerous occasion committed appalling atrocities. In the government campaigns against Muslims who refuse incorporation into the Pancasila scheme of things, torture of those in custody has been widespread. And finally, as a means of invoking the spectre of the constitutive holocaust, prisoners allegedly involved in the September 30th Movement and/or the Communist Party of Indonesia who have been under sentence of death since the late 1960s have been apparently arbitrarily executed.

Limitations of the study

Something of should be said of what is *not* in this study. Four omissions are important, and deliberate. Although this is in part a study of Indonesian militarization, there is no detailed discussion here of the political involvement of the military in the state, doctrines of *dwi fungsi*, and the use of military officers in non-military positions. These are matters that have been adequately dealt with by a generation of foreign and Indonesian scholars. Without doubt there are gaps in that research to be filled in, and an updating to be carried on, but for the purposes of this thesis, the work of Anderson, Britton, Crouch, MacDougall, McVey, Mrazek, Sundhaussen, and Utrecht provides a platform from which to carry out a more limited and specialised research project.¹¹

The second deliberate omission was accepted more reluctantly. Although it is the argument of this thesis that Indonesian rentier-militarization has flourished under the aegis of Pax Americana, there is no detailed examination of the question of the part played by the United States in the fall of President Soekarno and the holocaust of 1965-66. The decision to omit this aspect was difficult: it is well known that there was a substantial US intelligence interest in Indonesia throughout the 1950s and 1960s; that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a major part in supporting, encouraging and

11. See Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "Current data on the Indonesian military elite", *Indonesia*, 48 (1989), and earlier more or less annual reports with the same title signed by the editors of *Indonesia*, of which Anderson was always one; Peter Britton, *Military Professionalism in Indonesia: Javanese and Western Military Traditions in Army Ideology to the 1970s*, unpublished MA thesis, Department of History, Monash University, February 1983; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, (revised edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), and "Patrimonialism and military rule in Indonesia", *World Politics*, XXXI,4 (1979); John M. MacDougall, "Patterns of military control in the Indonesian higher bureaucracy", *Indonesia*, 33 (1982), and "Military penetration of the Indonesian government: the higher central bureaucracy", *Indonesia Reports*, 14 (1986); Ruth T. McVey, "The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army, part I", *Indonesia*, 11 (1971), and "The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army, part II", *Indonesia*, 13 (1972); Rudolf Mrazek, *The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965: A Study of an Intervention, Volumes I and II*, (Prague, Oriental Institute, Dissertationes Orientales 39, 1978); Ulf Sundhaussen, "The military: structure, procedures and effects on Indonesian society" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucien W. Pye (eds.) *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), and *Social Policy Aspects of Defence and Security Planning in Indonesia, 1947-1977*, (Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, Occasional Paper No.2, 1980), and *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army: A Socio-Political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries*, (Townsville, Queensland: James Cook University, 1980).

provisioning the PRRI/Permesta Revolt in 1958; that US military and civilian intelligence agencies were extremely active in the Guided Democracy period in sustaining relations with the Indonesian Army elite, and in sharing their considerable expertise in intelligence techniques and psychological warfare.¹²

There can be no doubt that little of the truth of the events of 1965-66 has emerged in an undistorted form as yet. But for all of the importance and fascination of the question of the American role in one of the twentieth century's crimes against humanity it seemed to me impractical, and, as result, foolish, to add to the agenda of the thesis as it already stood. Yet this decision to omit the area almost whole does not mean that I consider it either unimportant or impossible to study. On the contrary.

The same considerations applied, although in a less conscious way, to the decision to abandon a serious attempt at an historical account of the development of the Indonesian intelligence apparatus. The deeper I moved into the subject (or rather, the closer I got to the subject - the people I interviewed) the more serious this omission appeared. This "decision" was in fact largely a matter of facing the inadequacies of research design, and, once the problem became clear during the interviewing period, of becoming reconciled to other priorities. But throughout the first thirty years of the life of the Indonesian nation, as well as the later period dealt with in this study, intelligence organizations were important political organizations. In the course of interviewing Indonesian military and intelligence figures - especially those who had retired - time and again the question of history was impressed on me. This was in part a consequence of their natural desire to have their story written down somewhere. Clearly, they were concerned about *their* version of the record. But there was also, especially amongst the older men, a concern just with the fact of the history as such - not just *the facts*. They were people whose biographies were fused with that of a nation, as well as a state, and concerned, perhaps in vain, to talk of the part played by individuals in high places (or dark ones) amidst the crushing conjuncture of structural forces that framed Indonesian society in their day.

The final omission concerns the relationship between surveillance and the ideological activity of the state: in particular, the state's promulgation of Panca Sila as the ideological foundation of the nation.¹³ The same state that mounted a comprehensive apparatus of surveillance also invested considerable resources in the development, publication and dissemination of written and other materials based on the principles of Panca Sila. School "ethics" textbooks, "instruction" packets and courses tailored for most occupational groups from bureaucrats and prostitutes, graphic and written adumbrations

12. Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the overthrow of Sukarno", *Pacific Affairs*, 58,2 (1985); Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, with Frederick R. Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971 [1966]); Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "How Did the Generals Die?", *Indonesia*, 43 (1987); W.F. Wertheim, "Whose plot? - new light on the 1965 events", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 9,2 (1979); and Frederick R. Bunnell, *The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-63*, Ph.D dissertation, Cornell University, 1969 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1969), and "The Central Intelligence Agency - Deputy Directorate for Plans, 1961 secret memorandum on Indonesia: a study in the politics of policy formulation in the Kennedy Administration", *Indonesia*, 22 (1976); Britton, *cop.cit.*, pp. 99-160; and David Ransom, "Ford country: building an elite for Indonesia" in Steve Weissman (ed.), *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1975).

13. On Panca Sila see Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: the Indonesian state ideology according to the New Order government", *Asian Survey*, XXI,8 (1981); Syafruddin Prawiranegara, "Pancasila as the sole foundation", *Indonesia*, 38 (1984); Susan S. Purdy, "The civil religion thesis as it applies to a pluralistic society: Pancasila democracy in Indonesia (1945-1965)", *Journal of International Affairs*, 36,2 (1982); Douglas E. Ramage, "The political function of Indonesia's Panca Sila moral education", paper presented to the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, (n.d.); and Marc Bonneff et al, *Pantjasila: Trente Années de Débats Politiques en Indonésie*, (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de L'Homme/Archipel, 1980).

of the Panca Sila for military manuals, and most importantly, the coercion of all religious groups to accept Panca Sila as the sole foundation of Indonesian life - all these manifested the determination of the New Order state to attempt to influence - if not control - the thinking as well as the actions of its citizens. To be sure, for many Indonesians these were laughably shallow affairs, and the actual impact of the state's straining after hearts and minds unclear. But at the very least the apparatus of Panca Sila inculcation served as a kind of ideological fog unevenly blanketing the society, hindering the development or diffusion of alternative social ideas. Moreover, military manuals for social-political and intelligence operations made clear the concerns of the intelligence apparatus about the results of ideological deviance. The totalitarian ambition, thwarted though it may have been by ineptness, resistance and the sheer scale of the task, extended quite literally to matters of mind-control. However, all that is possible here is to draw attention to the question of the possible relationship between these twin concerns of the New Order state, and mark the area for future work.

Note: Research on intelligence

Any research study is necessarily limited, both in its aims and actual achievements. This study attempts analysis on of its empirical subject matter, intelligence agencies, on the basis of information that is clearly incomplete. It is very much a matter of the committee of five blind men describing their impressions of an elephant, with one discussing the texture of its skin, another its wonderful trunk, a third grasping its legs, a fourth swinging from its tail, and the last sitting atop the animal's head, and none of them able to see the whole beast. Another discouraging metaphor which came to mind during the work: it is as if the study of icebergs could only be carried out from above the water, and then only in darkness in high summer.

Research on organizations such as intelligence organizations is likely to be more limited in its results than studies of most other political organizations because of the desire and capacity of such organizations to keep their activities, and their personnel, structure and organizational agenda somewhat hidden. In fact intelligence organizations vary in this regard: some are in the phone book and report to legislatures regularly and publicly. Others are little known, even within other parts of their governments. But from my experience, and on the face of the evidence of other researchers on intelligence matters cited in this thesis, the experience of others, it is possible to carry out useful research in this area.

What is required, apart from patience, common sense, and a willingness to be wrong on more occasions than one would like, is an appropriate method of study. It is a commonplace of sociology that most of the discipline's research methods were devised to study people who could not resist inspection, beginning with the poor. In the case of intelligence agencies and like bodies what is needed is an investigatory research method to deal with groups and individuals who are able to deflect, deter and even punish attention to themselves.

There are no great secrets revealed in the course of this study. Indeed, most of the material cited comes from the public domain. The amount of material already in the public domain is very considerable: all that is required is some diligent searching and compilation. The small amount of material not publicly available came in the course of confidential interviews, and from documents generally not available to the public which were made available as a result of those interviews.

It may be that some parts of the information presented here are incorrect, or the analysis based upon that information inept or incomplete. So far as possible, information and opinions were assessed in the usual ways. There are places where confirmation has been either impossible or unsatisfactory, but wherever I have had serious doubts about the validity of information I have indicated those doubts. If I have had doubts about the reliability of an informant, I have either balanced the views of that informant against those of others, or indicated the nature of the problem.

There are, of course, places where more interviews, or re-interviews, would have been desirable. The process of interviewing began with a certain logic, based on guesses or deductions about who might know the answers to certain questions, and, within that group of possibilities, who might be prepared to talk to me about the matter. After that, access to such people depended very much on the avenue of approach to them, on introductions from trusted third parties, and on the predispositions of the people concerned. Some interviews were conducted in a cool, if not antagonistic atmosphere. Even so, such interviews were often helpful, intentionally or otherwise. But the great majority of the more than fifty interviews carried out for the project were conducted in a friendly and cooperative atmosphere, even when it was made clear that my political outlook and those of the person being interviewed did not coincide. I am grateful to the candour of such people, who were often simply concerned to have their views placed on the record. I hope that they are satisfied with the accuracy of the reporting, even though there may be inevitable differences over interpretations and frameworks of analysis. Other people shared their knowledge and insights at some personal or professional risk simply because of a sense of responsibility - intellectual, political, or professional.

The only real limitation that is imposed on the reader of the thesis as a result of the nature of the study is in the matter of citing sources of information which came from interviews. Interviews for this work were conducted in Indonesia, Australia, Japan and South Korea between 1985 and 1988. Those interviewed (or corresponded with) included academic specialists, government and opposition politicians, government officials, military officers (serving and retired), retired and serving intelligence agency officials, journalists, non-government political activists, novelists and artists, and students.

The conventional academic practice of citing sources by giving the names of those interviewed and the dates of interviews is desirable but, for the most part, has not been followed. In a very few cases, those who helped me have been named at specific places in the text; in other cases, especially those of fellow academics, a general expression of thanks has been given in the acknowledgements.

However, for the overwhelming number of people in Indonesia and elsewhere who provided information, all details of the source of the interview materials have been withheld, and in a few cases, further disguised. Most, though by no means all, interviews were given on the basis of such confidentiality. I feel confident that in many, if not most, cases the source of the information is irrelevant to assessing the significance of the information for the tale. On the other hand there are other places where added significance would come if the author of a quotation were given. There are certainly more places where the name could be provided with little difficulty or objection from the source.

But, as a little thought will show, the possible sources of information for most of these matters is relatively small. The number of people in Jakarta, Seoul or Tokyo who are in a position to provide such information is such that they are, for these purposes, very small towns. To name the small number who could be named without creating difficulties

for them then leaves open the probability that the names or positions of others could be inferred with reasonable accuracy.

As a result almost all interview material is cited in numerical form, preceded by the prefix "PS", standing for Protected Source. My position then is that of most responsible journalists who must survive by subsequent evaluations of the information they provide from uncited sources and the interpretations they place upon that evidence. As I have already said, hopefully this will begin a process of inevitable correction of errors and enlargement of the theme. It is for others to decide whether this work reaches an acceptable standard, but I feel confident that it demonstrates that it is possible for work on this and like subjects to begin, and the task of enlargement and correction to follow in due course.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into three main parts. Part I presents a theoretical introduction to the thesis; Part II deals with the Indonesian case-study; and Part III presents a brief conclusion, and an afterword.

Part I of the thesis deals with the three key ideas of the thesis: militarization, surveillance and terror. Chapter Two is a brief discussion of the concept of militarization, its effects, a model of its empirical dimensions, and a typology of forms of contemporary militarization. Chapter Three deals with the idea of surveillance and totalitarian rule, emphasizing the place of surveillance and internal pacification in modern states. Special attention is paid to certain aspects of the Japanese experience of emperor-system-fascism as a guide to the contemporary Third World model of peripheral capitalist militarization.

Chapter Four deals with the most important forms of political surveillance in intelligence agencies, stressing the relatively uniform character of these agencies in most modern states. Their activities, as already suggested are primarily those of surveillance, repression and intervention, but the question of ideological formulation and political steering are also considered. Chapter Five is a discussion of terror as a form of rule, in situations of totalitarian rule and otherwise. It is emphasized that effective terror is culturally constructed in processes involving both the state and its victims.

Part II presents the empirical core of the thesis. It opens with Chapter Six on the global pre-conditions for the different types of militarization in Indonesia and South Korea, stressing the place of external factors (strategic and economic) as pre-conditions for the better-recognized internal developments in the two countries.

Chapter Seven is a discussion of Indonesian military force structure and budgets as a background to the subsequent exploration of the intelligence organizations of the state as a whole, which are, of course, controlled and dominated by the military. Militarization here is seen in the internal socio-technical and doctrinal characteristics of the military *qua* military. This chapter analyzes the development through the 1970s and 1980s of a dual emphasis in the Indonesian armed forces: the simultaneous development of a capital- and technology-intensive conventional combat force, with all of the common implications such force structures have for the national economy, together with a professionalization and deepening of the military-based apparatus of internal control.

The remainder of Part II deals with the structure and operations of the Indonesian intelligence apparatus, both military and otherwise in later New Order period. Chapter Eight is a survey of the structure of the military intelligence agencies. It opens with a discussion of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order [*Kopkamtib*] and its

successor organization, the Coordinating Body for Assistance in the Maintenance of National Stability [*Bakorstanas*], as the centrepieces of the intelligence and security complex. The remainder of this chapter deals firstly with the Strategic Intelligence Agency [*Bais*], and the Army Intelligence line organization reaching to the lowest administrative levels of Indonesian society which it caps.

Chapter Nine deals with (nominally) non-military intelligence organizations: the State Intelligence Coordinating Board [Bakin], the late Ali Moertopo's now-defunct Opsus, National Police Intelligence and Security, the Department of Home Affairs Directorate of Social and Political Affairs, the Deputy Attorney-General for Intelligence Affairs, the labour surveillance role of the Department of Labour Power, and signals intelligence work of the State Coding Institute.

Chapter Ten raises the question of how the diverse activities of these overlapping and often competing agencies are coordinated. This problem is evidently a persistent one, since there have been a number of different coordinating mechanisms established at various levels of the state.

Chapters Eleven and Twelve move from questions of structure to questions of intelligence operation. Chapter Eleven opens with review of one state theory of intelligence activities, as seen in military textbook models for Intelligence Operations, Territorial Operations and Social and Political Operations. The directives and models set down there are then compared with the large amount of evidence about the actual practice of surveillance and intervention operations by the armed forces' intelligence organizations. In Chapter Eleven the emphasis is on the place of terror in such operations, as seen in East Timor, Irian Jaya, the mass killings of alleged criminals in 1983-84, and campaigns against student and Muslim dissidents. In Chapter Twelve the emphasis is on surveillance-based operations: in the war zone of East Timor; in a comprehensive program of labour control; and in an increasingly scientized programme of questionnaire-based surveillance of former communist political prisoners and Islamic prisoners arrested in more recent times.

A number of detailed matters are presented in nine appendices of varying length. The first appendix provides biographical information on a large number of Indonesian military men and civilians involved in intelligence matters after 1945, and in particular in the 1970s and 1980s. Almost all the substantial information on these men (and they are all men) comes from open sources. Building on and collating the work of others provides a base for both tracking prominent individuals and noting more general patterns. Moreover, "naming names", even of those no longer active in intelligence circles, contributes in a small way to removing the immobilizing shroud of mystery and secrecy cultivated by intelligence agencies the world over. This mysteriousness, normally justified in *raison d'état* as a requirement of operating in the finally violent world of international anarchy also serves handily as a means of intimidating their own populations. Readers are urged to consult this appendix as an aid to the main body of the text.

Other appendices deal with career patterns within Indonesian intelligence; a note on the history of intelligence agencies in Indonesia; translated Indonesian army training manuals dealing with domestic political surveillance and assessment; translated questionnaires for the surveillance of workers; a relatively detailed budget breakdown of Indonesian military expenditure provided to the United Nations; and listings of the Assistants for Intelligence and/or Security to the heads of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence and Security, and Army.