

Appendix 2

Intelligence career paths

In this Appendix I will sketch the main groupings in the Indonesian intelligence world in the New Order period, and discuss what appear to be typical career groups and paths. This will, to some extent, mean covering ground already presented, but looked at from a slightly different angle. However, the detailed evidence for most of what I have to say here lies in the biographies of men involved in intelligence set out in Appendix 1.¹

The three major divisions are obvious enough: a large number of military men against several small groups of significant civilians; the predominance of the Army against the other services; and generational groupings within the Army. Beyond these broad divisions, I will look at competing streams within the Army in the New Order period: Mainstream Army Intelligence and the Military Police streams; the career patterns of intelligence professionals under Moerdani; the role of combat/Special Forces officers in intelligence in the 1970s and 1980s; and the distinctions suggested in the 1970s between what have been called "principled" (or technocratic) versus "pragmatic" or manipulative approaches to intelligence agencies' political interventions.

Military and civilian intelligence roles

It is clear that the great bulk of intelligence posts since 1965, as well as before, have been filled by serving or retired military officers - it is a thoroughly militarized system. The principal intelligence organizations throughout the new Order period have either been military in nature, or, as in the case of Bakin, dominated at the higher levels by military officers. That said, let us begin this discussion by looking at the small number of civilians who do come into the picture at different times in the story.

There are, in fact, two principal groups of civilians who have played an important part in intelligence affairs in the New Order period. The two groups are quite different in character, and appear in very different circumstances. The first group of civilians belongs to the last days of Guided Democracy and the early years of the New Order - the Opsus intellectuals and rightwing activists in their circle. The second group centres on the intelligence and social affairs personnel within the Attorney-General's Department, and related departments such as Home Affairs.

Opsus and other early New Order networks

As discussed in Chapter 9, Opsus personnel consisted of at least two different groups - army officers, political intellectuals and activists, on the one hand, and a diverse menagerie of operatives, businessmen, thugs, goons, and other criminals used for particular purposes. Little is known about the last group. Some were those who Ali Moertopo* attracted to his side after their defeat in other political causes - such as the businessman and journalist Des Alwi*, adopted son of Sutan Sjahrir, who had been involved in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion.²

1. All individuals for whom there are biographical entries in Appendix 1 are marked with an asterisk.

2. It is also said that Moertopo took over personnel from Subandrio's Central Intelligence Board [BPI]. Few details have come to light, and most names mentioned in connection with BPI are either military or police officials - see R.Sugeng Sutarto*. The only civilian name associated with the BPI amongst those listed in Appendix 1 is that of the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the BPI, Kartono* Kadri, who had been involved in the Attorney-General's Department in the 1950s. Kartono will be discussed below, in the section

The best known are the Indonesian-Chinese mainly Catholic former student activists associated with the Centre for International and Strategic Studies [CSIS] - Harry Tjan Silalahi*, Jusuf Wanandi* [Liem Bian Kie], Sofjan Wanandi [Liem Bian Khoen]. CSIS provided institutional cover and academic legitimation, and the diverse business enterprises linked to Opsus and these individuals provided the finances.³ Tjan and the Liem brothers came into Moertopo's world from the circle of Catholic lay and clerical activist cadre trained and cultivated by Father J. Beek S.J*. Not only did Beek provide much of the energy and vision for this circle which linked to that of Moertopo, but he also ran his own intelligence network through the alumni of Catholic cadre training courses. Opsus, in this sense, not only sat astride the military-civilian nexus, but across more than one state-"private" set of intelligence operations.⁴

Intelligence and prosecutors

The second group of civilians, centring on the combination of intelligence and prosecution, involves a mix of straight civilians, and officers working in civilian positions, either on retirement or while serving. The connection between intelligence and the prosecutor's office is a strong one in recent years, although there was a degree of overlap in the colonial administration, and in the Guided Democracy period⁵. The career of Soegiharto* is an excellent example from the early New Order period. As a major-general in April 1966 Soegiharto moved from the position of Soeharto's Intelligence Assistant after the coup to that of Attorney-General. Prior to that he had been consul-general in Singapore for four years, and Ambassador to Burma for three, and after leaving the Attorney-General's post went back to the diplomatic life. A transition generation figure in this stream is Mulia* Datuk Rangkajo SH, a military lawyer involved in the Mahmillub prosecutions (including that of Njono) in 1966. After a period at the UN Mulia went back into the prosecution team for Kopkamtib before moving over to the Deputy Attorney-General (Intelligence) position in 1978. The Military Academy generation in the military stream includes Nugroho* (Bais director of Internal Affairs at the same time) and Soekarno* who succeeded him as Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence in 1988.

Generally it appears that in the later New Order, civilians have been kept out of the most senior legal intelligence positions. But this may not be a permanent matter, since there are number of people who appear to be civilians at the level of Deputy under the Deputy Attorneys-General for Intelligence or Special Criminal Affairs, most with law degrees.⁶ It is likely that in future, posts such as that of Deputy Attorney-General

dealing with the connection between intelligence and prosecutors.

3. On CSIS see Ken Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study*, (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974); and David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984); and Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, (Melbourne: Fontana/Collins).

4. Another network contemporary with Beek's, and competing with it in the 1964-1966 period, was the Gerakan Pembaharuan, an anti-Soekarno underground cell network controlled from outside Indonesia by Professor Sumitro Djohadikusumo.

5. See, for example, Kartono* Kadri.

6. It is of course not certain that they are civilians. Military men may well have law degrees, but it is unlikely that so many military lawyers would be transferred. See R.Irawan Bratakusumah*, H.B. Hutadjulu*, Soengeng Soemartopo Marsigit*, Adam Nasution*, R. Poerdiono*, Gunawan Pramudjono*, Rahim Ruskan*, and M. Simatupang*.

(Intelligence)⁷ will be filled by civilians as the number of lower-ranking Attorney-General's officers trained in an intelligence approach under Nugroho and Soekarno increases substantially.⁸

In other parts of the intelligence apparatus, civilians are limited to junior or middle-ranking positions. It is not clear whether the State Coding Institute [LSN] has significant numbers of civilian cryptography analysts⁹.

The Army over other services

Although each of the services in the Armed Forces has an intelligence branch, the most important service intelligence branch is that of the Army. Moreover, the principal headquarters and national level intelligence organizations appear to have disproportionate numbers of Army officers at their upper levels. The Navy and Air Force exceptions are small in number. The area where Navy and Air Force officers are most important is in signals intelligence - in the State Coding Institute [LSN]¹⁰ and as the Assistant for Communications and Electronics to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff [Askomlek Kasum ABRI]¹¹. It may be that these senior signals intelligence positions are held in rotation between the services, but the claims of the externally-oriented advanced technology services over the Army would be persuasive.

Outside of these specialized areas, the part played by Navy and Air Force officers at higher-level intelligence has been limited. The known exceptions are small in number. Admiral Sudomo* was effective head of Kopkamtib for a decade, and is sometimes described as Soeharto's most loyal political officer, after an association going back to the early 1960s. However the pre-eminence of this naval officer does not seem to have led to any general expanded naval role in intelligence and political affairs. Only three other naval officers appear in the biographical listing from the mid-1970s onwards.¹² Amongst senior intelligence figures, only two Air Force officers have emerged. Air Force Major-General Tedy Roesdi* Hayuni has figured prominently, moving from a base in Bais to hold, in addition, the powerful position of Assistant for General Planning for the Armed

7. It is not clear whether a similar pattern is present within the Social and Political Affairs Directorate-General of the Ministry of Home Affairs. See H.R. Soedirman*, Director of Security Affairs. There are certainly large numbers of military appointments in Social and Political Affairs, but it is not clear if Soedirman is military or civilian.

8. Such a pattern would follow the South Korean model, where the numbers of intelligence-trained members of the Public Prosecutor's Office (with a corresponding characteristic outlook) increased to the point where by the late 1980s substantial numbers of intelligence positions were being taken by members of that office - most notably with the appointment of Soh Tong-kwon as Director of the Agency for National Security Planning [the former KCIA] in mid-1989. Interestingly, Soh came to the position after a career as a prosecutor. Soh was Roh Tae-woo's hardline replacement for Army intelligence general Park Se-jik, who was judged too soft in dealing with the North Korean trips of Moon Ik-hwan and others in the summer of 1989. See *Korea Annual 1989*, (Seoul: Yonhap, 1989), pp.651,667.

9. See St.Yusar Abidin*, Goenartomo*, Mahidin Malik*, Sudarto*.

10. See Rear Admiral Soebardo*, head of LSN from 1986.

11. See Air Vice-Marshal Tedjo Suwamo* [Askomlek Kasum ABRI] 1978-1984, and his successor, S. Soebago*, 1984 - . Note the long tenure. The last Army officer to hold the position was Major-General Drs. Suryadi*.

12. See Rear-Admiral Koesnadi Bagda*, Head of Pusintelstrat until Moerdani took over in 1977; Vice-Admiral Sudibyo Raharjo*, formerly of Bais and now Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; and Rear-Admiral Sumitro*, Assistant for Intelligence to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff from 1988.

Forces [Asrenum ABRI]. And Marshal Kahardiman* was, until its abolition in 1989, the Coordinator of the secretive Operation Order [Opstib] under Moerdani's Kopkamtib auspices, after a career that had placed him as head of the Kopkamtib Secretariat by 1981.

Since the days of the Revolution, the police have had an intelligence stream, leading, through various changes of form and name, to the present Directorate of Police Intelligence and Security [Intelpampol]. Since the integration of the police into the Armed Forces, a senior police officer has been on the general staff of the Armed Forces/Minister for Defence and Security [Askamtibmas]. There is not much evidence about the role of police intelligence prior to the New Order, or of typical careers.¹³

In the New Order period, however, police intelligence seems to have grown. Again, there is little evidence about career patterns, but two examples give some indication, both from the Police equivalent of the Army's National Military Academy generation. Momo* Kelana (born 1943) spent several years as an intelligence section head in different parts of Irian Jaya in the run-up to the Act of Free Choice in 1969, and went on to combine intelligence and police academic law positions in the early 1970s, when information about him fades out in mid-career. The important point to notice is the placement of promising junior officers in police intelligence positions in the provinces. The second example is Major-General Muslihat* Wiradiputra (born 1936). Like Momo Kelana, Muslihat has combined police intelligence work with substantial legal studies. But unlike Momo, the information about Muslihat is most detailed about the higher parts of his career, which in the 1980s show him moving (although the dates and sequences are not clear) through a series of positions at Police Headquarters within the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, ending as its head, before moving to become Chief of Police in Central Java - and one level below the top of the police hierarchy. Very little is known about other senior police officers, especially the Assistants for Public Order and Security at Armed Forces Headquarters, but at least one, Jacky Moerdono* (1988-), is said to have a police intelligence background.¹⁴

Streams of Army intelligence officers

This leaves us with the question of the make-up of the largest group, the Army officers. If the Army intelligence officers of the New Order are taken as a whole, disregarding those who had retired or been pushed out or died, then there are a number of clear groupings. The single most important division, here as in other parts of the Indonesian military, is *generational*, between those who were formed in the period of the Revolution, and those who formed their fundamental organizational outlook in the 1960s and 1970s.

The second division is *organizational affiliation*. Amongst the 1945 generation there were at least two major streams: intelligence officers who came through Army Intelligence proper, and those who came through the Military Police. In their later years, both of these groups tended to cluster in Bakin, even at a time when the higher levels of Bais were filling with young professional intelligence officers. In later generations, there are those who appear to have been involved in staff and territorially-based intelligence

13. See, for example, R. Muhammed Umargatab*.

14. Past assistants for Public Order and Security include Djueni*, Muhammed Hassan* (who replaced Hugeng Inam Santoso as Police Chief), and Drs. Soekartono*.

work for most of their careers, and those who have been primarily combat or special forces officers who have also had an intelligence role, either within special forces or at a national level. Others have come into intelligence work after a period in the presidential security force. There is also a group of intelligence officers who are concentrated within the stream of Army and civilian social and political positions.

Finally, there is a division, although by no means either clear or fast, between intelligence officers following different *political and organizational styles*. Here the most important example is that between "principled" and "pragmatic" used by Jenkins¹⁵ to distinguish two competing streams within Bakin in the early 1970s, exemplified by Sutopo Yuwono and Ali Moertopo respectively. In fact these streams might better be labelled "technocratic" and "cowboy"/manipulative.

Generations

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, virtually every politically significant intelligence officer had entered the military during the Revolutionary period. Many, but by no means all¹⁶, had been trained by the Japanese in the Peta. A small number had received special training from the Japanese, with a strong emphasis on intelligence and territorial control in the Yugekitai - Special Guerilla Defence Corps.¹⁷ The most important example of the latter was Zulkifli Lubis*, a dominant figure in intelligence circles through the Revolution and the 1950s although not significant after his marginalisation by Nasution and Sukendro*, and Lubis' subsequent involvement in the PRRI rebellion.

Until the 1980s, a very high proportion of officers who had held senior positions in Bakin were from the 1945 generation. In 1987, the head of Bakin was Yoga Soegama*, trained at the Japanese Imperial Military Academy, and his deputy was Rujito*, a Peta *chudanchō*, both of whom were aging.¹⁸ By contrast, the successor to both, Soedibyo*, comes from a much younger generation (b. 1937), leaving the Army Technical Academy in 1960.

By the end of the 1980s, the first generation of officers to graduate from the National Military Academy [AMN] and Army Technical Academy [Aketkad] reached the top of the intelligence world, as well as the Armed Forces as a whole. By that time officers graduating from these two institutions between 1959 and 1963 held the positions of Commander of the Armed Forces (Try Soetrisno*), Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (Edy Sudradjat*), Chief of the Armed Forces Social and Political Staff (Soegiarto*, Harsudiono Hartas*), Assistant for Social and Political Affairs (Asmono* Arismunandar), Armed Forces Assistant for Operations (I Gde Awet* Sara), Kostrad Commander (Sugito*), Deputy Attorney-General for Intelligence (Nugroho*, Soekarno*), Head of

15. David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).

16. One of the most important exceptions was Ali Moertopo*, who came into the Indonesian National Army from the Hizbu'llah [Allah's Army] in Central Java, the Islamic volunteer reserve corps sponsored by the Japanese in December 1944. On Hizbu'llah, see Harry Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, (Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958), p.179.

17. *Boei Giyugun Tokusetsu Yugekitai, or Iggo Kimmutai*. See Zulkifli Lubis* and Sunarso*.

18. But see also Aswismarmo* (b. 1925), Jono* Hatmodjo (b. 1926), Ali Moertopo* (b. 1924), Nichlany* Sudardjo (b. 1926), Junus Samosir* (b. 1924), Soedirgo* (b. ?) (purged in 1968 however), Sunarso* (b. ?), and Sutopo Yuwono* (b. 1927) - and possibly Warin Dijo Sukisman* (b. ?).

Bakin (Soedibyo), Bais Deputy (Arie Soedewo*, Nugroho*), Secretary-General of the Department of Home Affairs (Nugroho*), and Deputy Chairperson of the People's Legislative Body/People's Consultative Body [DPR/MPR] (Saiful Sulun*) after a long career in intelligence.¹⁹

The transition generation between these two principal Army generational groups in the intelligence field is linked together in part through their training experiences in the early years after the Revolution, especially at the Army Officers' Education Centre [P3AD] in Bandung in the first years of the 1950s. Here, as in so many other respects in a military force he has tried to shape in his own image, Moerdani (born 1932, P3AD 1950) is the key example. He saw some fighting in the Revolution, but was distinctly not of the Generation of '45. A P3AD classmate, M.I. Sutaryo*, was his Deputy Head of Bais, and then Head after Moerdani's retirement. Edy Nalapraya* (born 1931), after heading the Presidential Security Detachment, spent 10 years overseeing the vital Jakarta region, first as intelligence chief, then as Kodam Commander, and then again Deputy Governor from 1984-87. By the late 1980s these officers were facing retirement, but an important group of them were winding up careers either in senior intelligence positions, or moving on to significant positions in the civilian hierarchy, such as department head.²⁰

Looking from the perspective of the late 1980s, then, generational groupings remain the first organizing principle, in this section of the Indonesian military as in others. However, this is not a simple matter of age and organizational cohort as such, as much as an expression of the effects of particular mixes of political experiences, training, and organizational environments.²¹

Organizational affiliation

Within each of these two major generational groupings there are reasonably distinct streams characterized by organizational affiliations. Of those who survived from the revolutionary generation to the New Order, two major groupings were clear, one centred on Army Intelligence proper, and the other on the Military Police Corps [CPM]. Both groups had their origins in the "A" Group brought together by Zulkifli Lubis in 1947 within Bagian V of the Ministry of Defence by Amir Sjarifuddin.

The Army Intelligence stream was the larger grouping, including both those who served predominantly in territorial positions and those who worked for longer periods in staff positions in the 1950s - as exemplified by the 1950s careers of Ali Moertopo* and Sutopo Yuwono*. But by the early to mid-1960s, virtually all of the revolutionary generation Army intelligence officers who had made any substantial impact had moved to

19. The oldest of these officers (Try Soetrisno) was born in 1936, and most were born between 1938-41. All graduated from AMN or Aktekad before 1963. A slightly younger group of high-flying special forces officers graduated behind them: Sintong Panjaitan*, Kuntara*, and Rajagukguk*. The two groups together have been important in the Army intelligence and elite combat forces active in East Timor.

20. Apart from Moerdani*, the key examples are Rudini* (a Dutch Military Academy graduate, rather than P3AD), moving from Army Chief of Staff to Minister for Home Affairs; M.I. Sutaryo*, Deputy Head and then Head of Bais; Chalimie Imam Santoso*, moving from Assistant for Social and Political Affairs to the highly security-oriented Head of the Department of Transmigration; Keceng Irawan Soekarno* as Deputy 3/Bakin; Soelarsa*, former Army Assistant for Security, and Kodam V/Brawijaya commander, moving to head the Directorate-General of Immigration.

21. See, for example, comments made about Rujito* as Deputy Head of Bakin and his successor Soedibyo*.

national level institutions of one kind or another.²²

The parallel intelligence path out of the Lubis group was through the Military Police Corps [CPM]: most importantly Parman*, Nichlany*, Wijoyono* Adiwino, Sunarso*, and Soedirgo*²³. Parman was the highly effective head of Army Intelligence when he was killed on 1 October 1965. Soedirgo, just back from Fort Leavenworth, occupied the same position until May 1967, and was Deputy Head of the newly created Bakin when he was arrested for alleged involvement in the September 30th Movement. Nichlany rose through the Military Police ranks to become a Bakin Deputy (Operations) under Soeharto and then under Sutopo Yuwono, until the fall-out from the Malari Affair saw him exiled to the US as Defence Attache. Sunarso's middle career is not clear until, as with most of these officers, he emerged through Kopkamtib in 1965-66 and developed a specialty in Chinese affairs. And Wijoyono was Deputy Head of Pusintelstrat before it was dissolved in 1983 and replaced by Bais.

In the later generations, the Military Police route seems to be taken a little less frequently, though there are several significant exceptions. For example, heading the Presidential Security Force is in itself a position that brings its incumbent into the intelligence world. One former commander of this force is a Bakin Deputy, Sardjono*²⁴. Reports from prisoners in the hands of Kodam-level Intelligence Task Forces [Satgas Intels] show a substantial level involvement by lower-level military police officers in the more brutal aspects of that work.²⁵

Amongst the later generations, there appear to be two principal groups of intelligence officers. One group, about whom very little is known, is made up of intelligence specialists. Their careers are obscure until they reach all but the highest levels of the main intelligence organizations, or unless some error is made that makes their name available to the world at large.²⁶ Their numbers are probably much more substantial than usually believed: Jenkins reported that each year the top ten or so graduates of Seskoad (major-level, from all services) are normally placed in intelligence work.

These officers are concentrated in the highly integrated line and staff organization created by Moerdani in Army intelligence: for the successful, from Assistant for Intelligence at the Kodam level to Korem command, and onwards through territorial intelligence and command positions, or into Bais proper, or possibly both by turns.²⁷ At

22. This group includes Harsoyo*, Jono Hatmodjo*, Lubis* himself, Moertopo* (although his rise to prominence out of the Diponegoro was on Soeharto's coat-tails), Rujito* (through Seskoad), Soebijakto*, Soegiharto*, Soelarso*, Kharis Suhud*, Sunarso*, Suwanto*, and Wijoyo Suyono*.

23. This group also included Wijoyono* Adiwino.

24. The identification of R.Sardjono* as the Sarjono* in Bakin is likely rather than certain. See also Pranowo*, another Military Policeman who headed the Presidential Security Force after Sardjono.

25. See Budi Permana*.

26. For example, the unfortunate Lieut.-Colonel Atang*, Intelligence Chief of Kodam XVII, captured in 1978 by the OPM in Irian Jaya, with substantial numbers of Kopkamtib intelligence documents.

27. See the brace of colonels appointed to Korem commands in the mid-1980s after a spell as Kodam Asintels: Muhammed Chan*, R. Pramono*, Hendro Priyono*, Umar Muhammed Said*, Endang Wagiman*. Of the colonels who were reported moving into Korem commands at that time, those with intelligence backgrounds (of whom there a large proportion) seemed to be connected in one or other of the posts to the major military-political trouble spots of the empire: East Timor, Irian, Aceh, and the capital city region.

the senior levels, this stream of officers is epitomized by Soediby, the Moerdani-aligned Bais Director for Intelligence Production and Head of Bakin.²⁸

The second stream of later generation officers involved in intelligence enters that field from a rather different position. These are the officers who start within the Army's special forces (Kopassandha/Kopassus, Kostrad, etc) before moving to intelligence positions either within those combat units or in larger territorial units or staff intelligence positions (and sometimes back to command special forces). Here the best example is Moerdani himself from the transition generation, but others include I Gde Awet* Sara, Edy Sudradjat*, Soegiarto*, Ari Bandiyoko*, and (in Sospol rather than straight intelligence), Hartas* Harsudiono. For this group (as for many of the transition and AMN generations), East Timor combat and/or intelligence experience appears to have been important.²⁹

With the rise of the intelligence/special forces cohort to command positions by the mid-1980s³⁰, one informed observer suggested the following desirable career track for an aspiring army intelligence officer:

After graduating from the Armed Forces Academy [Akabri], he should become a platoon commander with special forces preferably, with infantry as the next choice. Then normal appointment through that force, possibly with some intelligence responsibility in the territorial command or at Bais. Then entry to Seskoad as a major or possibly lieutenant colonel. After Seskoad, an intelligence staff job.³¹ The ideal run is to go from Seskoad into the "straight" military - Kopassus or Kostrad, not the territorial units. And that means East Timor experience. The lower the point of entry into the Kodams, the worse the future prospects. To go from Seskoad to Kodim commander is a bad sign - the most that can be hoped for then is a karyawan position as bupati. Intelligence graduates from Seskoad who have been marked for future promotion go to a Kodam as an Intelligence Assistant or into Bais.³²

28. Although very little is known about them, the careers of the following Deputies of Bais (at different points in the middle and late 1980s) at Colonel to Major-General range probably reflect this pattern: Kharis Rizal*, I Gusti Ngurah* Gde, Nugroho*, Panjaitan*, Panji Susilo*, Arie Soedewo*, Dodo Tambungan*.

29. Soeharto himself was a major proponent of the "para" stream of the army in the early 1960s, taking the paratrooper's course at an advanced age (no mean feat) - as did Sudomo*. On Soeharto's "para-mindedness", anticipating that of Moerdani, see Ruth McVey, "The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army, part II", *Indonesia*, 13 (1972), p.177. And Soeharto was also a precursor of the combat/intelligence model of the Moerdani years: on leaving Seskoad in late 1960 he was appointed First Deputy (Intelligence) to the Army Chief of Staff, a position which he retained when shortly afterwards he was appointed commander of the Army General Reserve force, later Kostrad. See Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, (Melbourne: Fontana/Collins, 1980), p.34.

30. For the predominance of this special forces/intelligence group within the Army at large see see "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite", *Indonesia*, (annually) 1984 - 1989.

31. It was reported that the top 10 or so graduates from Seskoad (irrespective of service) have been taken into intelligence.

32. PS/7.

Other patterns

One question that is worth pursuing in evaluating careers is the question of foreign military training for intelligence officers. For the older generation, foreign training, especially in the United States³³, was almost a sine qua non of promotion. The records are not clear enough to be sure which of the US training programmes were intelligence oriented.³⁴ For the younger officers the evidence is simply inadequate. Just because there is little on their slim public records is no reason to discount foreign training.

On the other hand, there has been an Army Intelligence School in Bogor since the 1950s, established with Dutch support. More importantly, a new Armed Forces Intelligence Development Centre was established later, also in Bogor. Together with the strong intelligence tradition at Seskoad and the National Defence Institute [Lemhannas]³⁵, this suggests that domestic intelligence training resources, both technical and political in intent, are substantial. It may well be the case that the professionalisation associated with Moerdani - and encouraged by the Pentagon - has produced the domestic supply of intelligence personnel it was designed to achieve.

In the 1970s, there was a difference of emphasis between two styles of Army intelligence work around the question of political intervention - or rather the manner in which political intervention was to be carried out by intelligence agencies. In Jenkins' terms, this was the contrast between the "principled " approach typified by Sutopo Yuwono, and the "pragmatic" or manipulative approach exemplified by Ali Moertopo (and at an earlier point, by Sukendro).

In subsequent years, after the demise of Ali Moertopo and the dissolution of Opsus, this distinction was less easy see. Most likely the two approaches had collapsed into an institution dominated by Ali's one-time protege, Moerdani. In fact, while Moerdani was more institutionally-minded than Moertopo, the "dirty tricks" and political manipulation continued, for example in the campaign against Sudharmono in 1988, and, in the case of the Petrus murders, more brutally. The workings within the institutions Moerdani constructed are less visible than in the cowboy days of the early New Order, and so, rather less is known of the personalities.

33. Other countries have provided intelligence training, both in the past, and in recent years. Yoga Soegama attended a British training programme (he had earlier been a translator for the British). Australia has admitted Indonesian officers to its intelligence training courses. And at least one senior officer, Saiful Sulun*, is reported to have attended an Intelligence Officer Advanced Course in Manila.

34. Although a few are clear enough, such as the United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird attended by Kharis Suhud in 1962, or the Security Course taken by Edy Nalapraya in Okinawa in the same year. In general, a report of attendance at Fort Leavenworth courses may mean more than straight staff and command courses.

35. The National Defence Institute [Lemhannas] was headed from 1978-83 by Sutopo Yuwono*, and from 1983 onward by Soebijakto*.