

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOR EAST ASIA: U.S. VIEW

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"Partnership for Peace: Building Long-term Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia"

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INFLIGATIONS OF THE NEW MISKI ADMINISTRATION
FOR EAST ASILE US, EVERBLY DEVER MICHCHE
ABSTRACT
Given a lengthy political transition process and a skeletal foreign policy team now in place in the United States, Asians and others will need to be patient in its expectations of Bush administration foreign policy. However, a general bipartisan consensus exists concerning commitment to U.S. allilances, maintaining U.S. military presence worldwide, promoting democracy and human rights, and supporting the trend towards globalization. The security/military background of the expected Bush Administration East Asia foreign policy team will lead to a less idealistic, more "results-oriented" approach to policy. The senior leadership will likely be more muted publicly in its diplomacy, preferring to consult quietly on issues of mutual interest or disagreement, while its instinctive averagement, while averagement, while its instinctive averagement, while its inst

INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT
Before examining the implications for East Asia of the new Bush Administration, some context is needed.
First, a misperception seems to persist in Asia, and perhaps elsewhere internationally, that the U.S. presidential political system is like parliamentary systems around the world-on January 20, an old team goes out, a new team comes in, fully formed, complete, organized, and set to govern. Unfortunately, in America, this is not the case. On January 20, an ewp resident is in deed installed, but he brings with him little else. A notationing administration takes with it all its senior policy-makers and many more junior functionaries from U.S. government departments. When the new president's beam arrives, White House offices are empty of all remnants of the previous administration, including all files, computer hard drives, even pens and paper.

The presence of many veterans of federal government in the new Bush Administration has enabled the new team to other a relatively smooth transition over the past six weeks. Nonetheless, the more process of installing a new government ensures a lengthy transition period, involving literally thousands of political appointments, background checks, Congressional hearings for senior appointees), policy reviews, and promulgation of new procedures. Given this reality, our international friends will have to recognize that patience is a virtue, as the process of emplacing and empowering a full foreign policy team, and determining its policy, will take a political appointments, background checks, Congressional hearings for senior appointees), policy reviews, and promulgation of new procedures. Given this reality, our international friends will have to recognize that patience is a virtue, as the process of emplacing and empowering a full foreign policy team, and determining its policy, will take a political appointment, background checks, Congressional hearings for senior appointees), policy reviews, and promulgation of new procedures. Given this reality, our i

BACKGROWN OF PLATERS
Given that the team is not yet officially in place, and given the imperfect science of examining past statements and positions for clues of future behavior in government, speculation about future policy is fraught with uncertainty, and may often reflect the biases of the observer as much as the observer. Nonetheless, it should be possible to make reasonable judgments of the general proclivities, instincts, and inclinations of individuals from careful consideration and the personalities, background, and record of those involved. Such president Bush himself has very limited international experience and has only traveled to Asia once, more than two decades ago when he visited his father in China. He is expected to rely enormously on his key advisors to guide him on foreign policy for the foreseen future. The rest of his senior foreign policy team so far is equal part European and Asian specialists, although Europeanists remain in the most senior slots in the White House, State Department and Pentagon. The deputies in State and Defense, however, have exten

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Secretary of State Colin Powell's wartime service in Vietnam and brief tour in Korea in the 1970s). While their perceptions and institucts were developed during the Cold War, to assume that they retain an indeological or bipolar view of the international scene would be mistaken. It may be the case, though a set unproven, that have the very developed understand, appreciate, and adapt to the subtleties of the new array of security challenges, such as cyber security, global terrorist networks, infectious diseases, internal and external migration, environmental degradation, etc., is yet undetermined.

The profile of the expected new senior Asia team stands in contrast to their predecessors. One will notice that senior members of the Clinton team tended toward professional diplomate, academics, and lawyers, while what one might call "security practitioners" dominate the Bush team. Powell, Deptty Secretary of State-designate for East Asia and the Pacific James Kelly, and National Security Council Asia chief Torkel Patterson each served in the military in their formative years. Along with Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Undersecretary of Defense of Patterson each served in the military in their formative years. Along with Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Paul Wolfowitz, who served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the first Bush Administration, they each have substantial Pentagon experience, and indeed were weaned in th

instincts to Asia as much as to

instructs to Asia as much as to Europe.

Uncertain will be the Pentagon's role in this debate. Secretary Rumsfeld has not spoken much on the issue of military intervention, but tends toward alleviating the operational tempo of soldiers and focusing on the hard military needs necessary for traditional warfighting.

With regard to the Pentagon's role in this debate. Secretary Rumsfeld has not spoken much Secretary Rumsfeld decides to engage on Asian matters not in his specialty, and the degree to which Asia specialist Wolfowitz is willing and able to engage on the issues given his other responsibilities. Defense has yet to name its undersecretary for policy, let alone its senior Asia director, so any assumptions about their proclivities are obviously impossible. Regardless, the State Department institutionally has the advantage, and given the players there, State will take a stronger bureaucratic lead on Asian affairs than was the case during the Clinton Administration.

JAPAN: A STRONGER, DEEPER, BROADER ALLIANCE

Placing strong U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe at the center of U.S. foreign policy around the world, the prospective Bush team has affirmed a strong desire for increased cooperation, coordination, and consultation with allies and friends to address issues of mutual

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Within the circle of other Asia policymakers expected in the new Administration, expertise and experience is clearly oriented toward one country in particular; Japan. This is in contrast to the Clinton foreign policy team, which from the beginning seemed to fill its Asia team with China specialists and focused its attention on China. One might only not be the leading figures in the group. Besides the deputy secretary of state-elect, other members of the study group included such familiar names in the new administration as Paul Woolnowitz, James Kelly Particularly Particul

KOREAL CONTINUITY WITH CAUTION

Colin Powell has confirmed that a review of U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsulai is underway. Some reports have suggested that the new Administration is hostile to the Agreed Framework and is prepared to take a harder line toward North Korea than the Clinton Administration displayed, particularly in its waning days. Indeed, some senior officials in the new Administration have been on record as opposing the Agreed Framework and chastised President Clinton for a perceived dedication to legacy over propriety in pursuing aggressively a last-minute missile agreement with the DPRK. The troubled Bush-Kim summit in early March suggested confusion in the Administration sort or continuing the new Administration for a perceived dedication to legacy over propriety in pursuing aggressively a last-minute missile agreement with the DPRK. The troubled Bush-Kim summit in early March to determine the Devery expectation concerning the new Administration for a perceived dedication to legacy over propriety in pursuing aggressively a last-minute missile approach to dealing with North Korea was a bipartisan document. The Administration's respect for the advice of allies suggests that Korea's opinion will be duly noted during the review process. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group process, despite rumors to the contrary, is alive and well, and members will meet in early March to determine how best to proceed on a coordinated policy. The Administration correctly of the propriets of the contrary, is alive and well, and members will meet in early March to determine how best to proceed on a coordinated policy. The Administration correctly of the propriets of the peninsula early in its administration. Nonetheless, the new team is very sensitive to continued military, particularly missile, activity in the North, and will seek necessarily to balance its political and military assessments of progress on the peninsula.

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determine how best to proceed on a coordinated policy. The Administration certainly does not want a crisis on the peninsula early in its administration. Nonetheless, the new team is very sensitive to continued military, particularly missile, activity in the North, and will seek necessarily to halance its political and military assessments of progress on the peninsula.

PRC/TAIWAN: **ONE CHINA** WITH AN EIGE

The Bush team clearly recognized that relations with the PRC, including the Taiwan issue, would push itself to the forefront of the Administration's foreign policy agenda early in its term. Human rights matters, Taiwan arms sales, and WTO accession are among the more visible issues to be addressed in the first months. However, no one could have predicted the EP-3 surveillance plane incident or its effect on relations so early in the new administration's term. The incident created new tensions and pushed relations with China to the forefront of anticinal and international attention.

Regardless of the incident, the new administration fully appreciates the importance of effectively managing U.S. relations with the PPC for regional security, but its members have a different fundamental outlook on the relationship than was the case under Clinton. The Japan-centeric realistic perspective of the new team suggests a hard look at relations with China within the context of overall U.S. security interests in the region. As Colin Powell stated in his confirmation hearing, has a long the properties of the region and the region have a state in the process of murturing a constructive constructive process. The region of the region have a state in this process of murturing a constructive relationship. And we will want to work with ... our friends and allies in responding to a new and dynamic China.*

One can be certain that the term "constructive strategic partnership," in whatever form, is a deed letter. As indicated in Powell's remarks, China is not viewed as an enemy but as a serious potential adversary and irritant to

wighint on this and other fronts in the bilateral relationship.

As the new Asia team is instinctively suspicious of China, it is also more support as 'One China' policy, and abide by the Three Communiques. They will remain as committed as ever to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan matter and will seek to provide for Taiwan's 'sufficient self-defense capability' in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act ever as it promotes dialogue between the you's committed as ever to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan matter and will seek to provide for Taiwan's 'sufficient self-defense capability' in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act ever as it promotes dialogue between the you's relationship. The recent robust package of arms sales to Taiwan, including desel submarines, P.3 aircraft, and Kidd-class determines, P.3 aircraft, and Kidd-class determines release the relationship of the training and the promotes and the relationship of the training and the promotes and the relationship of the relations

MULTIAIERALISM
Members of the new team have said very little concerning their view of multilateralism. They have indicated privately that they will maintain the traditional U.S. policy of emphasizing bilateral relations while seeking vehicles for trilateral, quadrilateral or other dialogue to address specific regional security matters as appropriate. No new initiatives have been broaded, and there is no indication that are indication either way of the new team is sopian or ICINCPAC Administrations.

No ris there any indication either way of the new team is collisional promoting the development of "security communities" through enhanced multinational engagement and, potentially, operations between regional militaries. The program continues to proceed through a Congressional earmark and is unlikely to be short-circuited with the change of a disministrations.

Has ASSAN Regional Forum did not exist whem namy members of the new team is still eld power. Nonetheless, it evident that their impulse is not to circumvent the forum but to make it a more active body for addressing the real challenges faced in the region, including the

PROLIFERATION AND MISSILE DEFENSE

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The United States has identified proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as one of the primary future threats to regional security. The new team understands well this increasing threat and favors a robust program to counter it, including development and deployment of national and theater missile defenses. Given the strong bipartisan support in Washington for missile defense, right up to the president, the question is not whether but how the administration will implement this policy. The future of the 1972 ABM Treaty is uncertain. Senior members of the new administration are on record as considering the treaty a relic of the Cold War that at best should be altered to account for the new challenges posed by missile proliferation. Secretary Powell has called for development internationally of a new strategic framework for a new era. As he stated at his confirmation hearing: "We believe that the ABM Treaty in its current form is probably no longer relevant to our new strategic framework, and we hope to persuade the Russians of the need to move beyond the ABM Treaty."

Secretary Rumsfeld led as special commission in 1998 that brought the missile threat into sharp relief: he is on record as recommending abrogation of the ABM Treaty and developing a robust missile defense system. This is contrasted with the inclination of the Clinton Administration, which sought to amend not end the Treaty to allow deployment of a limited system. The Bush Administration has made no decisions on its preferred approach to missile defense, including the future of the ABM Treaty, but its apparent instincts seem to lean towards at least a mending if not abrogating the Treaty.

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The new administration recognizes the wave of international opposition that has developed over missile defense, the implications of U.S. defense plans will depend any least the views of other key U.S. allos and friends will also play a large role and will depend on U.S. commitment to true dialogue and consultation over a new international strategic framework. U.S. dialogue with Russia and NATO allies is on-going. There are also indications that the new administration is open to comprehensive talks with the PRC on issues concerning strategic forces, including nuclear capabilities, missile defense on the control of the Clinton of the Cl

is difficult to predict the range of international developments that may occur to affect even the best intentions of the new administration's approach to Asia.

Once CUNCLUSION

President Bush has characterized his administration's foreign policy approach as sale on "consistency, patience, and recognizes the important of continuity for effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Given that the new team is not yet in place, it is premature to make any airtight assumptions about the long-term course of the administration since the team itself does not yet know its own mind on many issues.

In examining the new team's background and public statements during the campaign and early in its term, however, one might sum up expectations for its policy towards Asia as being based on the "three R's:" restraint, reciprocity, and results - "restraint" in intervening in international conflicts, "reciprocity," to ensure that U.S. acts of good faith and good will are matched appropriately by other powers; and "results," to affirm similarly that the best proof of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land, which is three months in might add a fourth "R"- "reclaves"—dipen among and early in its unsuppose the propose of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land, but there months in might add a fourth "R"- "reclaves"—dipen among and early in its unsuppose to the propose of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land, but the months in might add a fourth of the propose of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land, but the propose of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land of the propose of a successful policy is not the hope but the achievement of the desired end. Some in Asia over the land of the propose of a successful policy is not

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