NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Recommended Citation


**POSITIVES**

If the state of nonproliferation and arms control at the beginning of the second post-cold-war decade, one reaches a mixed conclusion. On the one hand, any review of developments in these areas since the fall of the Berlin Wall shows a remarkable rise of positive events, including the indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the safeguards system by the IAEA, a decision to extend the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) indefinitely in 1996, and a string of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, in particular the 1990 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. If the large-scale nuclear weapon reduction and proliferation has at any rate been more or less completed and the early 1990s reflects changes in the international environment and in national perceptions of security and threat. International relations turned out to be more complex and more dangerous after the cold war, and the world has entered a new phase in arms control and nonproliferation, a phase that cannot be characterized as an improvement.

**Challenge and opportunities**

Despite the skepticism of many experts, legal foundations, and manifestations of nonproliferation and arms control to security and stability are widely understood. These need not be limited to arms control as both the unilateral nuclear disarmers of the early 1990s and the 1990s policy program. But where serious legal funding and verifiable agreements were not the 1990s added value they provide. It is no secret that any purpose of any change to is to further the achievement of national security, military, and economic interests. In its 1995 report, the IAEA demonstrated that an NPT review conference that included the United States, Russia, and China, and dealt with non-compliance. Whether these challenges are seen as reasons to eschew regimes in favor of alternative security strategies or as opportunities to strengthen existing instruments will determine the contours of the future.

This being said, it remains that the considerations discussed above under the heading of CHANGING CONDITIONS factor into state thinking regarding the reliability of regimes, the value of formal arms control arrangements, and the merits of nuclear non-proliferation.

**NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL**

The Russian Federation has made a number of efforts to foster the development of arms control and nonproliferation regimes, in particular to institutionalize its undertakings through the adoption of national export control legislation and regulations. In the missile realm, however, while committing to abide by the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, it is not a

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Older solutions to older problems are being increasingly questioned in terms of their relevance to new threats. In the United States politically relevant forces who never were enthusiastic about arms control in the first place and always skeptical that

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