

Policy Forum 10-059: Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to “Common Security”



The NAPSNet Policy Forum provides expert analysis of contemporary peace and security issues in Northeast Asia. As always, we invite your responses to this report and hope you will take the opportunity to participate in discussion of the analysis.

Recommended Citation

"Policy Forum 10-059: Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to “Common Security”", NAPSNet Policy Forum, December 09, 2010,
<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/strategy-f-r-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-as-a-step-to-common-security/>

Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to "Common Security"

Policy Forum, December 9, 2010

Yuasa Ichiro

This article was presented at the “International Workshop for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region: for Civilian Control of the Security Sector” organized by People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, The Center for Peace and Law of the Institute of Legal Studies at Inha University, Pacific Freeze, Peace Network and Civil Peace Forum and Sponsored by the Beautiful Foundation. This article and more information about the workshop is available at:

CONTENTS

[I. Introduction](#)

[II. Article by Yuasa Ichiro](#)

[III. Statement of Support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone](#)

[IV. Nautilus invites your responses](#)



I. Introduction

Yuasa Ichiro, President of the Peace Depot, writes, "The formation of a NEA-NWFZ will be a significant initial step to establish a non-military security in Northeast Asia. Through the multilateral treaty talks, confidence among concerned nations will be built. It could also be an opportunity to pave the way to an agreement of no attack and renunciation of war. This is indeed a process toward a "Common security" in the region and I strongly believe that the cooperation of citizens in the Asia-Pacific area to this end would contribute greatly to reduce the military expense."

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by Yuasa Ichiro

-“Strategy for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as a step to "Common Security"”

By Yuasa Ichiro

1. Cold-War structure still exists in Northeast Asia

There are many countries in Northeast Asia whose military expenditure is relatively large. China, Japan, and South Korea (ROK) are one of such examples. A large number of U.S. military bases are also concentrated in Japan and ROK. In addition, it is considered that DPRK spends as much as 30% of its annual budget for the military. Northeast Asia is, therefore, one of the regions where large financial resources are wasted as military expenses. A historical background of this situation is that Northeast Asia is the only region in the world where the cold war structure still exists. Even 20 years after the end of cold war, the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, has never ended. The military demarcation line of 38 degrees north managed under the armistice pact symbolizes this situation. As a result, the structure of a vicious circle - "security dilemma" - is still maintained in Northeast Asia, and military tension has not ceased to exist.

The ROK patrol combat corvette (PCC) Cheonan sank near the NLL (Northern Limit Line) in the West Sea on March 26, 2010. This incident most signifies continuing military tension in Northeast Asia. The final report by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) released on May 20, 2010 concluded that the PCC was sank because of a non-contact explosion caused by a DPRK torpedo presumably fired by its submarine. Afterwards, the U.S. and ROK are repeating large-scale joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea. At the time of the accident; however, the ROK and the U.S. forces were jointly conducting their annual military exercise, Foal Eagle. Moreover, ROK's refusal to disclose all the basic information such as Cheonan's wake record and communication record has made many of us still suspicious of the explanation offered by the ROK government. I would like to stress here that this incident occurred, whatever its true cause is, against the background under which the Korean War has not ended, and military confrontation centered on the military demarcation line has continued.

This "security dilemma" is partly led by a strong belief that the military force can secure peace. Needless to say, the U.S. military is the most notable representation of this belief. The U.S. military maintains more than 700 military bases in the world, and deploys about 200,000 soldiers overseas. Five countries (Japan, ROK, Germany, Italy, and UK) are now playing a major part by offering large bases. More than 90 percent of the U.S. overseas bases are concentrated in these countries. Eighty thousands U.S. soldiers are now stationing in Japan and ROK. The presence has put great pressure on DPRK, which indulged in military brinkmanship such as a test launching of Taep'o-dong missiles and nuclear explosion tests in 2006 and 2009. This in turn gives Japan pretext for the buildup of a

more intense missile defense system and search for the use of right to collective defense.

Under the context of increasingly globalized economy, the realignment of the U.S. military is ongoing to sustain it as a global force whose main mission is to respond to threats and defend American national interests in any region of the world. This move is often called a "Lily Pad Strategy." Flexibility and mobility are its leading principles. Just imagine a frog hopping around lily pads freely and promptly, and moving to any place of a pond. U.S. bases in ROK and Japan are regarded as main operating bases with substantial infrastructure set in place. The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and the relocation of Futenma air station to Nago are a major requirement for the global realignment of the U.S. military.

In addition, China's military expenditure grows about 15% per year on average for past 20 years. Especially, the reinforcement of its sea power is remarkable, and China has strengthened an "anti-access strategy" in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The U.S. military has countered this move by doubling the number of minesweepers deployed in a naval base at Sasebo and ordering more frequent patrols of its attack nuclear submarines around Okinawa.

All of this shows a "security dilemma." The nuclear development of DPRK continues, the US-Japan-ROK military bond becomes tighter, and China and Russia do not stop the modernization of their military forces. This is a vicious circle under which mutual mistrust generates regional nuclear arms race. This scenario gives us no other choice anything but a never-ending military tension. We cannot even imagine a road to the reduction of military expenditure unless we overcome this structure.

2. Road to "Common Security"

It is time to shape our own "common security," a comprehensive framework of multilateral dialogue and cooperation to help us overcome this "security dilemma" which only encourages reprisal. It is by the Palme Committee (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues) in 1982 that the concept of "common security" was introduced. Its assumption is that all the countries are guaranteed the right to security, for which "common security" must be formed through multilateral dialogues. Its main principles are as followed.

- The military force is not a right tool to solve disputes among nations.
- When a policy of a country is announced, self-control must be imposed.
- Security cannot be achieved by military supremacy.
- Arms reduction in both quantitative and qualitative sense is necessary for common security.

This idea opened a path to the end of cold war. The Berlin Wall was struck down and the EU was formed. It also gave birth to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995. To our regret, we have not seen anything like this in Northeast Asia. On our part, we had to reconsider the rationale for U.S.-Japan Security Pact and the Japan's Self-Defense Forces since both of them had been formed to deal with the cold war. However, the Japanese government distracted our attention from this fundamental question by capitalizing on shockwaves made by the U.S.-led Gulf War to punish Iraq that had invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Helping the U.S. wage war on Iraq was wrongly alleged as an "international contribution" for which overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces was justified. To make things worse, both U.S. and Japanese governments redefined the Security Pact in the mid-90s to turn it into a "global alliance."

It is now time to make efforts to shape our "common security" through multilateral dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia. The fact can be a stating point that the history of Japanese pacifism for past 65 years after the WWII has raised Japan's international reputation. This helps Japan

advance its diplomacy on the basis of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The Japanese government can and should declare a demilitarized diplomatic policy under the cooperation with international organizations such as the United Nations. This is a large task that Japan's civil society must take on.

Next, I would like to explain a model Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) with a verification system. This can be a step to "common security" in this region.

3. Issues over denuclearization in Northeast Asia

In the beginning of the 1990s, the end of Cold War offered a great opportunity to change the existing military configuration and nuclear strategy in Northeast Asia. Against this background, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was released on February 20, 1992. This epoch-making declaration commits both countries not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. Although this is not regarded as one of NWFZs, it was de facto fourth NWFZ in the world. However, we have seen only a little progress since then. A verification system has not been established, and a protocol for the negative security assurance by surrounding nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and U.S.) has not been negotiated. Only two years after the declaration, the US-DPRK relations became extremely critical. It is really regrettable that there are almost no actors in this region to iron out the practical details to achieve the spirit of the declaration.

Twists and turns have continued for 20 years afterwards. In order to denuclearize DPRK, Six-party talks started in 2003 and reached a joint statement in September 2005, which is really valuable. However, the U.S. and DPRK no sooner come close to the solution of the problem than put emphasis on the difference of their respective recognition when they reach the final phase of the negotiation. We have not yet found a path to the solution.

The collapse of financial institutions in the U.S. led to the economic slump on the world scale in 2009, and hunger and poverty became pressing problems. It was under such situation that American constituents gave birth to a new administration. President Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, and a resolution calling for a "world without nuclear weapons" adopted in a world summit for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation held for the first time by the U.N. Security Council has created a very strong political momentum toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. Also in Japan, an administration that advocated the creation of an "East Asian Community" came into power. The then Prime Minister Hatoyama said in the UNSC summit in September 2009, "the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone, when coordinated between the five nuclear-weapon States (P5) and non-nuclear-weapon States in the region, would also contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and consequently to global and regional peace and security as stated in today's resolution." Though this remark is still too general, it is significant that the head of Japanese government emphasized a case for NWFZ in such an international fora. We must seize this opportunity to facilitate the move towards a NEA-NWFZ and thus contribute to global nuclear abolition.

4. Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)

The NWFZ is a system of international law that aims to create the situation under which nuclear weapons are excluded in a geographic zone. There are two requirements. The first is that nations in the zone are prohibited to develop, manufacture, and deploy nuclear weapons. The merit of such an arrangement is that it can be based on existing policies that three countries in Northeast Asia - Japan, ROK and DPRK - have already advocated. "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992 is still effective, which was confirmed in a recent Six-party Talk meeting. Japan has the "Three Non-nuclear Principles," which commit Japan not to manufacture, possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons. Also, Japan's Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 prohibits

the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The new administration in Japan that emerged in September 2009 has sworn to preserve the non-nuclear principles and conducted an investigation on secret agreements between Japan and the U.S. concerning the introduction of nuclear weapons. The first requirement would be met if these policies are followed.

Another requirement is Negative Security Assurance (NSA), which is a guarantee given by surrounding nuclear weapon states not to attack (or threaten to attack) non-nuclear states by nuclear weapons. In the context of a NEA-NWFZ, it is necessary that China, Russia, and the U.S. (though its soil is located far from Northeast Asia region) provide NSA. When these two requirements are met, the NWFZ can be established. Citizens are assured to live under "non-nuclear umbrella," not under "nuclear umbrella."

Even though the governments have never proposed a concrete plan regarding this initiative, non-governmental organizations have made various proposals. In 1995, Dr. Hironich Umabayashi (special advisor to Peace Depot) proposed a NEA-NWFZ with "three-plus-three" configuration. The first three is non-nuclear weapon states (Japan, the ROK, and DPRK), while the last three is nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and the U.S.). A model treaty was also introduced in 2004 through joint works with Korean NGOs, notably Peace Network. Nuclear weapons states are included in this three-plus-three framework from the outset. Thus, this model is considered to be most realistic, given the current political situation in this region. It is no coincidence that these six nations are also participants of the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of DPRK. For instance, the Japan and ROK government can put the "three-plus-three" proposal on the table of the fifth working group of six-party talks as an agenda.

Japan and the ROK have thus far maintained their military alliance with the U.S. and depended on U.S. nuclear umbrella by capitalizing on DPRK's alleged nuclear possession and military tension in Northeast Asia. However, at the time when five nuclear weapon states (P5) have begun to declare their intention to aim at a "world without nuclear weapons," the non-nuclear weapon states that actually depend on nuclear weapons for their security (Japan and the ROK) should strengthen this momentum by materializing security policy without nuclear weapons. The establishment of a NEA-NWFZ is the most adequate answer to this question. Only through this, we can make a radical step towards the global abolition of nuclear weapons. Japan's new administration led by the Democratic Party has advocated a diplomatic policy one of the cores of which is the creation of an East Asian Community. Thus it is very logical to propose a NEA-NWFZ plan as a way to step out from the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

DPRK carried out nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009, and has declared a de facto nuclear possession to defend its political regime. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that the country will stick to nuclear possession until the last minute. However, nobody has confirmed that DPRK has already acquired the technology to deploy nuclear warheads as a working weapon. Six-party talks will resume sometime in the future, but DPRK will understandably consider it is unfair that only the country is asked to abandon its nuclear arsenal while nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states which depend on nuclear umbrella (Japan and ROK) stick to nuclear weapons. Japan and the ROK should propose a NEA-NWFZ to overcome this mutual mistrust and make DPRK feel like dismantling its nuclear arsenal at ease. If a NEA-NWFZ is established, DPRK does not need to rely on nuclear weapons. I would like to note the following remark made by a North Korean official at the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly on October 12, 2009: "The DPRK is of the position to replace the present unstable armistice status with durable peace arrangement on the Korean peninsula, liquidate the remnants of the Cold War, the last of its kind in the world, and eventually denuclearize the whole Korean peninsula."

So far, there have been five NWFZs established in the world. Especially, almost all of the land in the Southern Hemisphere is covered with NWFZs. The number of nuclear weapons on the earth is still exceeding 23,000. However, citizens living in the Southern Hemisphere are liberated from the threat of nuclear weapons. The Central Asia NWFZ treaty was signed in September 2006 and entered into force in 2009. Next, Northeast Asia should follow this path.

5. International cooperation among Parliamentarians, Mayors and Citizens

In order to achieve a NWFZ, a stronger public opinion to take initiatives toward a "Common Security" to overcome a security dilemma is needed. Such public sentiment would influence on the governments of concerned nations. Thus, the first thing to do for the civil society is to stir up the public opinion among the parliamentarians, political parties, mayors and citizens of each nation.

First, it is vital to build a wider support among parliamentarians, who could directly influence their government. In August 2008, the Disarmament Study Group of the Democratic Party of Japan released a draft NEA-NWFZ Treaty. Such initiatives should be bipartisan, and establishing a Japan-ROK parliamentary network is also crucial. In November 2009, MP Hideo Hiraoka (Democratic Party of Japan) visited Seoul and meet ROK parliamentarians from various parties. It was not only the first meeting of the parliamentarians of two nations on a particular theme of NEA-NWFZ, but also the first conference organized by the PNND (Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament) Korea. Bipartisan parliamentarians of four parties including the ruling Grand National Party participated.

I was impressed by the following remarks by one parliamentarian of Grand National Party: "I have had preconceptions that the nuclear issue was one of the left-wing people's concerns. However, the situation has been changed now due to the coming into power of Obama administration and then, the Democratic Party of Japan. DPRK would not give up their nuclear arsenals if other nations rely solely on tough measures. I have been insisting at every opportunity that the approach toward DPRK should involve more flexible measures such as a humanitarian aid."

In February 2010, four ROK parliamentarians visited Tokyo to participate in an international conference on a NEA-NWFZ. Their Japanese counterpart and NGOs were also attended the conference. This conference was co-organized by PNND Japan and PNND Korea. It was confirmed that such cooperation would continue in the future.

The issues of disarmament and security are closely related to the lives of people living in local communities. Therefore, it is also vital to gain a support from local authorities who are obliged to protect their residents' lives and safety. In Japan, 1510 out of 1831 local authorities have declared its nuclear-free status. One of the major objectives of National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities (JNFLA), a network of 260 local authorities, has been a promotion of the NEA-NWFZ initiative. Resolutions to call for an establishment of a NEA-NWFZ have been repeatedly adopted by its General Assembly and submitted to the Government of Japan, the UN Secretary-General, heads of the P5 and so on.

On May 6, 2010, six Japanese and Korean NGOs jointly held a workshop entitled "A Northeast Asia NWFZ Can Boost a 'World without Nuclear Weapons' ?Joint Call by Parliamentarians, Mayors and Citizens" as a side event of the NPT Review Conference in New York. The co-sponsoring organizations other than Peace Depot Japan are Peace Boat (Japan), SAY-Peace Project (Japan), Peace Network (ROK), People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK), and Nautilus ARI (ROK). One of the highlights of this workshop was appeals by mayors as the delegation of JNFLA.

In the workshop, the idea to utilize sister cities relationship was proposed as part of grassroots

diplomacy by local authorities to promote the idea of a NEA-NWFZ. As of today, 129 local authorities in Japan have entered a sister city agreement with ROK local authorities. In order to take advantages of such cooperative relationships, the first step could be a joint declaration by mayors in Japan and ROK which calls for the promotion of a NEA-NWFZ. I would also like to propose to hold an international conference with a view to strengthen cooperation among local authorities of two countries next year. The city of Daegu in South Korea, which is a sister city of Hiroshima, could be a venue.

It's been more than 10 years since we, Peace Depot, proposed an idea of NEA-NWFZ. Since then, we organized successfully many workshops and symposiums in Seoul, Tokyo, Shanghai, New York, and Geneva, with cooperation of a number of Japanese and Korean NGOs. In 2004, we released a Model NEA-NWFZ Treaty drafted by activists and scholars of both countries. We believe these efforts have successfully nurtured a common understanding in civil societies both in Japan and ROK about the significance of a NEA-NWFZ. Nevertheless, in order to move a step forward towards the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, either of the two countries, hopefully Japan, must build its political will to achieve the goal and put the issue onto the table of a diplomatic negotiation. In March 2009, Peace Depot and Peace Boat from Japan, and Peace Network and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy from ROK had launched a campaign calling for endorsements to the "Statement of Support for a NEA-NWFZ". This campaign aims at expressing the worldwide civil society's common will to support an establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Please see the list of the endorsements including individuals and groups from various arenas who we believe to have a great influence on this issue.

Among the endorsers, you will find names such as Douglas Roche, Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima; Tomihisa Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki. Organizational endorsers include IPB (International Peace Bureau), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK), NIHONHIDANKYO, Mayors for peace, and JNFLA.

In addition, it is also important to obtain support from China to a NEA-NWFZ. China has affirmed the negative security assurance and has enormous influence on North Korea

It is now vitally important to construct a multi-layered cooperation in various areas between Japan and ROK. There are five existing NWFZs in the world; however, none of them was established easily. It took as short as nine years from the time a government introduced the idea of NWFZ until the resolution to support it was adopted by the United Nations. In case of the African NWFZ Treaty, it took indeed as long as 35 years. Countries in a region almost surely have some difficult problems originated in their history. Existing NWFZ treaties would not have been established without tenacious efforts to continue dialogue among concerned nations to resolve such problems one by one, and to cultivate the soil of mutual cooperation. In this context, both Japanese and South Korean governments are now requested to declare their willingness to pursue a NEA-NWFZ Treaty publicly at the earliest possible date. In the NPT Review Conference 2010, the Japanese delegation never touched upon the issue of NEA-NWFZ, even though the government has expressed an eagerness to fulfill its responsibilities as the atomic-bombed nation. It is necessary to enhance our efforts to gain more public support and to appeal to our governments.

The formation of a NEA-NWFZ will be a significant initial step to establish a non-military security in Northeast Asia. Through the multilateral treaty talks, confidence among concerned nations will be built. It could also be an opportunity to pave the way to an agreement of no attack and renunciation of war. This is indeed a process toward a "Common security" in the region and I strongly believe that the cooperation of citizens in the Asia-Pacific area to this end would contribute greatly to reduce the military expense. Thank you.

III. Statement of Support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Statement of Support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

We, the undersigned, express our support for the efforts to establish a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ). We believe it is an urgent and timely initiative both for strengthening the global tide toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World and for achieving regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia.

Setting the goal of achieving a NEA-NWFZ will create a new positive dimension in the on-going Six Party Talks among the Republic of Korea (ROK), Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, China, Russia and the United States, by incorporating its goal of “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (Six-nation Statement, 19 September 2005) within the broader regional vision.

Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is an obligation not only of nuclear armed nations but of all nations, especially those whose security policy relies on a so-called nuclear umbrella. In this regards, all nations have the responsibility to find a path toward a security polity without nuclear weapons. A NEA-NWFZ will provide such a path for relevant nations in the region, including Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

A realistic scheme for a NEA-NWFZ would be a 3+3 arrangement, in which the ROK, the DPRK and Japan would form the central parties of the zone and the neighboring nuclear weapon states (China, Russia and the US) would support it through the provision of security assurances, as this would build upon the 1992 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

We call upon political leaders, both national and local, citizen groups, and individuals throughout the world, to express their support for a NEA NWFZ and to work together to realize it.

Endorser Organizations include (as of September 20, 2010):

Japan:

Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs)

Gensuikyo (Japan Council Against A- and H-Bombs)

Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Executive committee

National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities

Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations)

Peace Boat

Peace Depot, Inc

Physicians Against Nuclear War

Overseas (including International):

Blue Banner (Mongolia)

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)

Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament

Disarmament and Security Centre (New Zealand)

Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

International Peace Bureau

Mayors for peace
Nautilus ARI (ROK)
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
Peace Action (USA)
Peace Network (ROK)
People for Nuclear Disarmament, Western Australia
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK)
PND NSW Nuclear Flashpoints Project (Australia)
Hon. Tomoko Abe, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima (Japan)
John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Prof. Hyunback Chung, Sungkyunkwan University (ROK)
Dr Kate Dewes, Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch (NZ)
Prof. Seiji Endo, President, Japan Association of Peace Studies
Hon. Kenzo Fujisue, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
Commander Robert Green, RN (Ret'd)
Xanthe Hall, IPPNW (Germany)
Hon. Hideo Hiraoka, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
Wade L. Huntley, Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research
Hon. Satoshi Inoue, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
Hon. Tadashi Inuzuka, Member of the House of Councilors (Japan)
Prof. Katsuko Kataoka, Secretary General, JPPNW
Hon. Shoichi Kondo, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
David Krieger, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Prof. Kaneko Kumao, Former director of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Foreign Ministry of Japan
Mikyung Lee, Member of the South Korean National Assembly (ROK)
Suktae Lee, Former President of the Lawyers for a Democratic Society (ROK)
John Loretz, Program Director, IPPNW
Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group
Dr. Zia Mian, Princeton University
Prof. Kazumi Mizumoto, Hiroshima Peace Institute
Dr. Dovchin Myagmar, Director, Blue Banner (Mongolia)
Hon. Katsuya Okada, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
Prof. Sun-song Park, Dongguk University (ROK)
Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
Prof. Dingli Shen, Director of Center for American Studies?Fudan University (China)
Alice Slater, Director, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, NY
Prof. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Tokyo University, Peace Pledge Japan
Prof. Terumi Tanaka, Secretary General, Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations)
Tomihisa Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki (Japan)
Hon. Minoru Terada, Member of the House of Representatives (Japan)
Hideo Tsuchiyama, Chair, Organizing Committee of the Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Rhianna Tyson, Senior Officer, Global Security Institute
Senator Jo Vallentine (Australia)
Achin Vanaik, Member of the National Coordinating Committee of the CNDP (India)
Alyn Ware, Vice-President, International Peace Bureau
Patricia Willis, Coordinator, Pacific Peace Working Group

Convened by:
Peace Depot, Inc (Japan)
Peace Boat (Japan)
Peace Network (ROK)
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK)

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: bscott@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author's name, affiliation, and explicit consent.

View this online at: <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/strategy-for-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-as-a-step-to-common-security/>

Nautilus Institute
2342 Shattuck Ave. #300, Berkeley, CA 94704 | Phone: (510) 423-0372 | Email:
nautilus@nautilus.org