NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, October 10, 2006

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NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, October 10, 2006

NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, October 10, 2006

I. NAPSNet

Preceding NAPSNet Report

I. NAPSNet

1. Speculation About Success of DPRK Nuclear Test

New York Times (“BLAST MAY BE ONLY A PARTIAL SUCCESS, EXPERTS SAY”, 2006-10-10) reported that the test appears to have been a nuclear detonation but was fairly small by traditional standards, and possibly a failure or a partial success. Scientists say that throughout history, the first detonations of aspiring nuclear powers have tended to pack the destructive power of 10 to 60 kilotons. But the strength of the DPRK test appears to have been a small fraction of that: around a kiloton or less. It will probably take several days to determine with confidence if the explosion was, in fact, nuclear. Sensors have not detected radiation leaking from the blast site. But federal and private experts said it seemed unlikely that the DPRK had faked an underground nuclear blast with a large pile of conventional high explosives. Dr. Coyle, the former director of nuclear testing at Livermore, said small tests were more likely to leak radioactivity than large ones, because the intense heat and gigantic shock waves of bigger blasts tended to melt and pulverize nearby rock into impregnable barriers.

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2. US on DPRK Nuclear Test

Associated Press (“WHITE HOUSE REJECTS NORTH KOREA TALKS”, 2006-10-10) reported that the Bush administration rejected direct talks with the DPRK. The White House said, meanwhile, there is a “remote possibility” that the world never will be able to fully determine whether the DPRK succeeded in conducting a nuclear test. While acknowledging that the action was provocative, White House press secretary Tony Snow suggested that it’s possible that the test was something less than it appeared. The intelligence community is continuing to assess the explosion, but even if Pyongyang is confirmed to have nuclear weapons, experts say it’s unlikely the DPRK has a bomb design small and light enough to be mounted atop a missile. Asked about the possibility of U.S. military action against the DPRK, including a possible naval blockade, Bolton said, “Well, we’re not at that point yet. We keep the military option on the table because North Korea needs to know that, but President Bush has been very clear he wants this resolved peacefully and diplomatically.”

(return to top) New York Times (“BUSH REBUKES NORTH KOREA; U.S. SEEKS NEW SANCTIONS”, 2009-10-10) reported that at an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, the United States pressed for international inspections of all cargo moving into and out of the DPRK to detect weapons-related material, and a ban on all trading in military goods and services with the country. President Bush warned the DPRK that he considered its activity a potential threat to American national security. (return to top)

3. Conflicting Responses to DPRK Nuclear Test

New York Times (“DISSENSION EMERGES ON RESPONDING TO NORTH KOREA”, 2009-10-10) reported that following a unanimous condemnation of the DPRK’s apparent nuclear test, signs of disagreement appear among its neighbors today. Japanese officials pushed for tough sanctions and raised the possibility of military action, which the PRC called unthinkable. Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, declared that his government was considering “all possibilities,” while officials in the PRC and ROK were saying that they would oppose any use of force. The official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, reported that President Hu Jintao joined in the international condemnation of the DPRK’s atomic test, but said that the nuclear standoff should be defused through dialogue. Meanwhile, the Yonhap news agency quoted an unnamed DPR Korean official who said the nuclear test was “an expression of our intention to face the United States across the negotiating table.” Yonhap did not say how or where it contacted the official, or why it did not give the official’s name.

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4. Military Response to DPRK Nuclear Test

Chosun Ilbo (“N.KOREA ‘TESTS NUKE’”, 2006-10-09) reported that the Japanese government set up a crisis management taskforce in the prime minister’s official residence at 11:30 a.m., right after the news of a test came out. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who is on a trip to the ROK, told Japanese reporters, “I asked the Chief Cabinet Secretary to confirm related facts. We should keep in touch with the U.S. and China to collect and analyze information.” The ROK military is reportedly considering raising Watchcon (military indications and warning) over the test a step higher. “We are considering whether to raise Watchcon from the current 3 to 2,” an official with the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. “It will be decided by factors such as the North Korean military’s movement.” But there is apparently no plan to raise the defense readiness — or defcon — status, as would be done in case of war. An increased watchcon level boosts surveillance activities of the DPRK by U.S. surveillance satellites and U-2 planes.

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5. PRC Analyst on DPRK Nuclear Test

New York Times (“ANGRY CHINA IS LIKELY TO TOUGHEN ITS STAND ON KOREA”, 2006-10-10) reported that although relations between the PRC and DPRK have been increasingly tense, it was not until moments after the DPRK apparently exploded a nuclear device, that the PRC accused it of a “brazen” violation of its international commitments. The wording is just one indication that a nuclear test would cross a red line for the PRC, which has devoted years of painstaking diplomatic effort, and staked its delicate relationship with the United States, on the premise that it could deliver a peaceful, negotiated solution to the nuclear standoff with the DPRK. However, there is unlikely to be a major policy change, says Shen Dingli, a leading security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai. The PRC’s priorities remain, first and foremost, promoting internal economic development, having concluded long ago that generating high growth in its gross domestic product requires a benign relationship with the world’s major powers, secure borders and open markets — in a word, stability. “The core of the issue is not nuclear weapons,” says Shen. “The core of the issue is peace and stability. That is still strongly in China’s interest.” Even peaceful change in the DPRK could bring a new pro-American government to the PRC’s northeastern border as it faces continuing uncertainty over how to handle the pro-American government in Taiwan, off its southeastern coast.

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6. Fallout of DPRK Nuclear Test on Inter-Korean Economic Projects

Korea Times (“TESTS THREATENS TO END S-N PROJECTS”, 2006-10-09) reported that the Hyundai Group’s inter-Korean businesses are facing the threat of a complete shutdown in the wake of the DPRK nuclear test, despite its efforts to keep them alive. One of the most heavy burdens on Hyundai Group is direct or indirect pressure to stop its business from the conservative sectors of society, being amplified by the nuclear test. The United States is also likely to impose additional economic sanctions against the DPRK, forcing Seoul to seriously consider following suit or risking a schism in its alliance with Washington. If any of its businesses were shut down, it is expected to deal a blow to its bottom line and wreak havoc on its future business plan drawn up on the basis of better business with the Mt. Kumgang tours and Kaesong Industrial Park operations. Currently, inter-Korean trading volume totals $1 billion per annum with a huge drop being a distinct possibility. The Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business expressed anxiety that the situation may halt the eagerness of companies which were willing to invest in the DPRK.

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7. Question of Aid Diverted for Nuclear Test Bunker

Yonhap News Agency (“SUSPICION OF DIVERTING THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO NORTH KOREA FOR AID PROJECTS FOR THE NUCLEAR TEST”, 2006-10-09) reported that Assemblywoman from the Grand National Party, Song Young Sun, argued on October 9, 2006 that materials and equipment provided for the LWR project and for railroad and road reconnection project were used to construct a bunker for the nuclear test. Through a press release, Assemblywoman Song, a member of National Information Committee, added that “These materials and equipment are currently unable to locate.” She said that among the equipment brought to the DPRK for the railroad and road reconnection project, an estimated value of 209 million won, were “excavators (28), bulldozers (27), rock drillers (108), and pumps (30), many of which could be diverted for military use.”

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8. Vladivostok Fear Radiation After DPRK Nuclear Test

Interfax (“RUSSIANS FEAR RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION AFTER NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR TEST”, 2009-10-10) reported that People in Russia’s Vladivostok rushed to buy radiation meters after the DPRK’s announcement of a nuclear test. The Far East Maritime Territory shares a short border with the DPRK. “People want to know how much they were exposed to radiation during the day, and how high the radiation levels are now,” said Ivan Skogorev, the general director of the Primtekhnopolis company in charge of monitoring radiation levels, dealing with the aftermath of radiation accidents, and radiation safety at storage facilities.

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9. Financial Implications of DPRK Nuclear Test

South China Morning Post (“NORTH KOREAN TREMORS HARDLY DISTURB ASIAN INVESTORS”, 2006-10-10) reported that the immediate short-term reaction to the DPRK claim of a nuclear test was a predictable knee-jerk markdown of both ROK stock prices and the won, while dealers bid up the US dollar and gold. But what really stood out was the mildness of the markets’ response. Outside of the ROK, reactions barely exceeded normal daily trading ranges. And what fright there was in the market was short-lived. After rising initially, gold, the classic safe haven in troubled times, gave back much of its gains in European trading.

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10. US-ROK Security Alliance

Joongang Ilbo (“ROH GIVES GROUND ON NORTH AND WAR CONTROL”, 2006-10-10) reported that President Roh Moo-hyun continued to back slowly away from his commitment to “sovereignty” in the form of wartime military control over ROK forces. Yoon Tae-young, Mr. Roh’s spokesman, quoted the president as telling political party leaders yesterday that he would gather expert opinion in detail about the effect of the DPRK’s announced entry into the nuclear club on plans to regain wartime operational military control.

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11. Japan Remilitarization

The Associated Press (“JAPAN NOW SEEMS LIKELY TO RALLY BEHIND NEW PRIME MINISTER’S CALL FOR A STRONGER MILITARY”, 2006-10-10) reported that the DPRK’s claim that it tested a nuclear weapon appears likely to push Japan even further towards militarization. Many political analysts say the test, which has yet to be confirmed, could weaken public support for the pacifism Japan adopted after World War II and prompt it to seek a growing regional security role.

(return to top) The Associated Press (“ABE SAYS JAPAN MAINTAINS NUKE BAN POLICY”, 2006-10-10) reported that Japan’s prime minister said that Japan will stick to its policy of not having nuclear weapons despite the DPRK’s alleged nuclear test. “We have no intention of changing our policy that possessing nuclear weapons is not our option,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told a parliamentary session. “There will be no change in our non-nuclear arms principles.” (return to top)

12. PRC Party Leadership

Reuters (“HU PUTS RIVAL IN KEY CHINA CONGRESS ROLE: SOURCES”, 2006-10-10) reported that PRC President Hu Jintao has named his chief political rival to lay the groundwork for next year’s crucial Communist Party Congress in another sign of his growing confidence, sources with ties to the leadership said. Vice President Zeng Qinghong, fifth in the Communist Party hierarchy but wielding considerably more clout than his ranking suggests, is to head day-to-day preparations for the 17th Party Congress. His choice for this influential role is an indication that Hu, who is also party chief, is confident enough to enlist Zeng despite their simmering rivalry, said the sources.

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13. PRC Media Control

Financial Times (“CHINA ‘SOFTENING’ CURBS ON MEDIA”, 2006-10-10) reported that the PRC appears to be softening its stance on new rules banning foreign news agencies from dealing directly with local clients and imposing censorship on their products, according to Tom Glocer, chief executive of Reuters. In his first public comments on the issue, Mr Glocer made clear that Reuters did not accept Xinhua’s demand that it deal with local clients only through an agent appointed by the government news agency, calling the rules a “substantial threat”. However, he said he was reassured by public pledges from Wen Jiabao and other senior officials that the rules were not intended to change the way foreign media worked in the country.

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14. PRC Law Enforcement

Agence France-Presse (“CHINA’S POLICE ORDERED TO HIT THE STREETS “, 2006-10-10) reported that the PRC has ordered its national police to leave their desks and get out among ordinary people in a bid to help crime-threatened communities so far left to their own devices, state media has said. A “massive” redeployment of the 490,000-strong force will see police set up stations in remote rural areas where no law enforcers have been present before now, the Xinhua news agency reported.

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