## **Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases**

f: 88.2. M. Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz. and H. S. Rowen April 1954 R-266 (Second Printing June 1962) . A REPORT PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

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As a result of the growing stockpile of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union after World War II, the U.S. military decided to modify its system for strategic-base selection. Post-war Russia continually increased its military capabilities increasing the threat to U.S. global power. In order to balance these changes, the U.S. evaluated and made changes to its system of selecting bases in order to detect the most vulnerable and extend the most effective.

This report examines the critical factors in strategic-base selection in general and specifically in the basing of the 1956-61 bombing force.

"Uncertainties of political alignment may make it necessary to distribute the bases among many distinct political entities. This dispersal, however, may have the advantage of reducing vulnerability to enemy attack." (p xi)

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Nautilus Institute 608 San Miguel Ave., Berkeley, CA 94707-1535 | Phone: (510) 423-0372 | Email: nautilus@nautilus.org