JAPAN AND THE NAVY THEATER-WIDE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

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JAPAN AND THE NAVY THEATER-WIDE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMby David C. Wright and Eryn MacDonald (1)EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe United States is currently developing the first phase (Block I) of the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) missile defense system. Japan has agreed to cooperate in developing the second phase of the system (Block II), japanese involvement in the NTW program appears to be driven primarily by two things: concerns about Japanese vulnerability to missile attacks by North Korea and China, and a desire to be a good alliance pattern by agreeing to US requests to cooperate on developing the second phase of the system. Conduct a costbenefit analysis to decide what its involvement in the program should be. It will likely find that the monetary and security costs of helping to develop and deping VTW are potentially quite high. At the same time, since NTW is an exo-atmospheric hit-brief system and understate the potential costs. When assessing its continued involvement in the project, Japan must include a realistic view of both its costs and benefits and understate the other alternatives might better serve harvenees interest. For example, it might be worth investigating whether another collaborative project could provide the same alliance benefits while avoiding some of the strategic costs. One possible alternative might be development of a boost-phase system, which could be less threatening to China

For example, it might be worth investigating whether another collaborative project cours provide the same ansate events are sevened and the sevene and the s

JaPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN NAY THEATER-WIDE Japan sees an unmber of potential bendits in cooperating on the NTW system. Some in Japan would like to deploy a missile defense system against potential ballistic missile threats in the region. The threat that is most commonly sited is the North Korean Nodong missile, which is believed to have a range of up to 1300 kineters. Such a range would allow it to reach all of Japan. Supportests of the system any missile defense system against potential ballistic missile threats in the region. The threat that is most commonly sited is the North Korean Proceptions that it could split the US-Japanese alliance by threatening attacks on Japan in a time of crisis. It would also help Japan carry out its role of protecting US forces in the region. A second potential missile threat—from. Chinese intermediate-range missile—is rarely stated publicly as a rationale for NTW, although some in Japan in a lime of linese missile. Japan is also interseted in cooperation on NTW to respond to strong US pressure to assist with it development of the system. Japanese involvement in the program. A related reason for Japanese involvement is that cooperation on NTW to respond to strong US pressure to assist with is development of the system. Japanese involvement in the program. A related reason for Japanese involvement in the program. However, Japan was reluctant to formally commit to c-development of NTW until the August 1998 launch of a healthy US-Japanese ealliance. Even among Japanese of Grials who are skeptical of NTW's capability, there appears to be a strong feeling that Japan simulation in Vorth Korea. It both created political pressure to take action on the program. However, Japan was reluctant to formally commit to c-development of NTW until the August 1998 launch of a mellise. Johnes avoid have like development of NTW with the voide astrong feeling that Japan simulation of Chinese missile by North Korea over Japanese see durgency over the missile threat from North Korea. It both created polit

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TVIENTURE COSIGN OF PARATESE INVOLVEMENT IN NIM As the NTW project moves into later stages, sepscially deployment, the cost to Japan is expected to rise considerably and become a significant percentage of Japan's military budget. This could force Japan to consider the trade-offs and decide whether to continue its support of the project. In addition, NTW affects two important relationships that Japan must manage-one with the United States, which is outshing for the project. and one with China. which onnewes it

the project. Piper noves muy are sauges, specumy depunds, use cost of plant is expected of the constance for expected of plant is expected of the constance for expected of plant is expected of the constance for expected of the constance fore expected of the constance for expe

Chinese territory. Thus, it appears that while China is currently modernizing its missile force, the scope and pace of that process will certainly be affected by its view of its security environment, including US and Japanese missile defenses. This could result in Japan facing more intermediate-range missile that it otherwise would. On the other hand, such a missile expansion could result from US plans to build NTW, whether or not Japan is involved in the development, but Japanese involvement is certain to increase tensions between the countries. An additional concern among Chinese analysis is that NTW technology could be transferred to Taiwan, or that NTW could be used during a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. Japanese officials argue that Japan's only role in a crisis in the Taiwan Straits would be protecting US troops, and not direct involvement in the development, but 1997 revised defense guidelines between Japan and the United States, which refers to "situations in areas surrounding Japan" and does not exclude Taiwan. As a result, in the Chinese view, Japanese involvement in NTW seems to link Japan to the Taiwan issue in a direct way.

and not direct involvement in defending Taivan. However, Chinese concerns arise in part from the ambiguity in the geographical extent of the 1997 revised defenses guareanese between Japan and use United States, which revises as set of the senses of ink Japanes involvement in APR seems to link Japanes involvement in APR seems to link Japane and use on not exclude Taivan. As a result, the Chinese view (Japanes involvement in APR seems to link Japane) to the Taiwan issue is an advect way. Japanes involvement in the NTW program, saying that it will be destabilizing in the Asian region and that the system will violate the ABM treaty. (15) Indeed, co-development of NTW could become problematic for Japan since it will be helping the United States develop a mission defense that Russia considers lingal under the Anti-Ballistic Missal ABM) Treaty. The system is the advectory as a strategion and that the system will violate the ABM treaty. (15) Indeed, co-development of NTW could become problematic for Japan since it will be helping the United States develop a mission defense that Russia considers lingal under the Anti-Ballistic Missal ABM) Treaty. These systems were designed with capabilities that are considered lingal under the treaty in Septement size as a strategion wish defenses on agreements internated to carfit the distinction between the heares. One agreement covers mission advectory as seeds of 3 km/s or less, and the second covers defense systems with higher speed interceptors. The first agreement states explicitly that, with certain test restrictions, the low-speed systems are considered legal under the treaty. Under this agreement, both THAAD and meta-metal treaty in Septement and the states as a state and work of the marcalino" agreement states developed systems are considered legal under the treaty. Under this agreement, both THAAD and metal states and the local to the states as a state states as a state as a state states as a state as a state states as a state as a state as a state as a state astates astate

speeds of 3 km/s or less, and the second covers defense systems with higher speed interceptors. The first agreement states explicitly that, with certain test restrictions, the low-speed systems are considered legal under the treaty. Under this agreement, both THAAD and apparently NTW Block 1 would be legal. However, the countries were unable to agree on the acceptability of higher speed systems. The high-speed agreement lays out what the two countries could agree on but does not specifically state that these systems are legal. A Clinton administration official who took part in the negotiations has said that the two countries reached a statemate on the issue(16) Indeed, the US Department of State released a fact sheet on 26 September 1997 about the high-speed agreement that states "Determining the Treaty compliant, Russin has not agreed TUD systems." The systems. State is that the two countries that the two countries reached as statement makes clear the agreement does not specific the legal (17) This statement makes clear the agreement does not specific the legal (17) Tub systems. TW to be treaty compliant, Russin has not agreed to the specific the legal (17) this statement that the system. The systems. The s

TMD systems will remain the national responsibility of each Party. (1) / Ins statement maxes clear the agreement of a US national missile engine or ungenerous systems. In the same max states same states are states are under the same states are states are states are under the same states are state

Inspenses introventient in the river program appears to be driven primarily by two things: concerns about its vulnerability to missile attacks by North Korea and China, and a desire to be a good alliance partner by agreeing to US requests to cooperate on development of the system. However, as the NTW program proceeds, Japan will be forced to conduct a cost/benefit analysis to decide what its involvement in the program should be. As discussed above, the monetary and security costs of helping to develop and deploy NTW are potentially quite high; the security costs appear to be understated in the current Japanese debate. In addition, the benefits of having NTW in the face of an actual missile attack may be low if it cannot provide Japan with a reliable defense against missile attacks from either China or North Korea. The current debate appears to overstate these potential benefits. Instead, the primary benefit to Japan appears to be maintaining the health of the alliance by agreeing to US requests for cooperation. From Japan's point of view, however, it seems that a fair question would be whether the two countries could instead collaborate on a different project that diffor carn missile than NTW, ince it allow of a boost phase missile defense system. Such a program could allow cooperation on many of the same technical areas already outlined for NTW, and could be more effective at intercepting North Korean missile than NTW, ince it allow and the composition countermeasures. Moreover, such a defense system might have a relatively short range and therefore not threaten Chinaes intermediate- and long-range missiles, which could be based at locations out of range of the interceptors.(19) Of course, while developing such a defense. Such a defense system, point would be defense. Such a defense segants Chinaes missiles as real target of such a defense. Such a defense segants Chinaes missiles as real target of such a defense. Such a defense segants Chinaes missiles as real target of such a defense. Such a defense sega

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