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Jungmin Kang, Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, write, “Having tested and failed, the DPRK can no longer rely on opacity as the basis for having a credible nuclear force, at least sufficiently credible to threaten its adversaries with a nuclear explosion. The DPRK might believe that a half kilotonne “mininuke” still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence and compellence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”

Julia Choi and Karin Lee, from the National Committee on North Korea (http://www.ncnk.org ), write, “According to the New York Times, prior to the nuclear test an anonymous U.S. official indicated that a North Korean test would trigger extensive U.S. sanctions: ‘We’ll end up going to full-scale sanctions; the only debate is what “full-scale” means.’ With the adoption of Resolution 1718, the meaning of ‘full-scale’ should soon become clear.”

This is the full text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution passed in response to the DPRK nuclear test on October 9th, 2006. Also included is a summary of the response of North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Gil Yon to the resolution.

Nathaniel Aden, researcher at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, writes, “Whereas North Korean coal and electricity exports are sold at sub-market ‘friendship prices,’ Chinese coal and oil products have been sold to North Korea at premium prices? Chinese Customs data suggest that Beijing is taking a pragmatic, market-oriented approach to trade with its reclusive neighbor, while the increasingly asymmetrical energy embodiment of bilateral trade may reflect dilapidation of North Korea’s non-military industries.”

To see the presentation here.

James L. Schoff, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, writes, “Japan’s policy decisions… are beyond Washington’s control, but they are not beyond its influence. Particularly as Japan prepares for a leadership change this fall, now is an opportune time for U.S. policy makers to take stock of current trends and to work with their Japanese colleagues to better incorporate North Korea policy into a larger regional framework that serves our collective long-term goals.”

Hiromichi Umebayashi, Founder and President of Peace Depot, a non-profit organization for peace research and education in Japan, ‘reports that a study using FOIA “has established for the first time the actual patrol patterns of the U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in the Sea of Japan engaged in missile defense duties.” Umebayashi concludes that “the plan is to integrate Aegis ships long-range surveillance and tracking data in the Sea of Japan, the interceptor missile launch control system and the battle management system. Accordingly, the Japan Sea patrols are a crucial component in exercises to develop the core of the whole integrated system US National Missile Defense system.”

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, writes, “while the United States is chasing the DPRK regime’s loose change in the short term to apply pressure, the regime is investing in minerals development, niche markets for exporting cheap labor or embodied labor, a boot-strapping service sector, and real estate development on the DMZ that combined, represent a long-term and slowly growing economic foundation for a nuclear-armed DPRK.”

Sheila A. Smith, research fellow in Politics, Governance, and Security in the East-West Center Research Program and project director of Shifting Terrain, writes, “to be successful new initiatives for managing the presence of American forces in each of these societies will need to conform to domestic law and meet public expectations for government accountability. National governments in Asia’s democracies must balance their national security goals with these new norms of democratic practice.”

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies writes, “following DPRK leader Kim Jong Il’s instruction in March 2003, which allowed for the transformation of farmers’ markets into consolidated markets, the Unification Market opened as the largest market in Pyongyang on September 1st of the same year. With 1,500 booths spanning over 6000 sq. meters, the market is divided into three zones — agriculture produce and fish products, food and clothing, and metal utensils and appliances — with each zone housing a management office, money changer, and a food court, which offer a variety of conveniences to the customer.”