THE AUGUST 1976 INCIDENT REVISITED—THE LAST NEARLY NUCLEAR WAR IN KOREA

PETER HAYES MARCH 2, 2018 I.  INTRODUCTION This essay by Peter Hayes suggests that the August 1976 crisis presents important parallels to today’s situation in Korea that bear on the risk of war and the use of nuclear weapons in a renewed Korean conflict.  Writes Hayes, “Since 1976, no American president has allowed such a […]

RADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ACCIDENT OR ATTACK AT NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN CHINA

DAVID VON HIPPEL AND PETER HAYES FEBRUARY 22, 2018 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, David von Hippel and Peter Hayes conclude that: “A worst case” event involving one of the Ling’Ao spent fuel pools could yield exposures sufficient to cause hundreds of thousands of premature cancer deaths and almost certainly require the abandonment of one […]

US FORCES KOREA: NONCOMBATANT EMERGENCY EVACUATION INSTRUCTIONS

PETER HAYES FEBRUARY 8, 2018    I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Peter Hayes describes US Force Korea’s “NONCOMBATANT EMERGENCY EVACUATION INSTRUCTIONS” issued in 1967, 1983, and 2010.  He concludes that: “These documents provide a realistic sense of the demanding, time consuming, and complicated task of evacuating noncombatants from Korea, and suggest it would be difficult […]

PEACEMAKING IN PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: COMPREHENSIVE MOVES TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA CONFERENCE SYNTHESIS REPORT

PETER HAYES AND BINOY KAMPMARK JANUARY 25, 2018 I.  INTRODUCTION   In this synthesis report, Peter Hayes and Binoy Kampmark summarize and assess deliberations between policymakers, analysts and experts on the subject of a future nuclear-free Korean Peninsula at the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), Seoul, the Republic of Korea (ROK), on December 11 and 12, […]

NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR

PETER HAYES JANUARY 18, 2018  I.  INTRODUCTION   In this essay, Peter Hayes concludes that: “Each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves—and considered together, it is obvious […]

HISTORICAL IMPLICATION OF SPENT FUEL RISK: PERSPECTIVES FROM NAGASAKI

FUMIHIKO YOSHIDA AND TATSUJIRO SUZUKI DECEMBER 28, 2017 I.  INTRODUCTION   In this essay, Fumihiko Yoshida and Tatsujiro Suzuki conclude that: “nuclear weapon states and nuclear-umbrella states which own spent nuclear fuel must face the risk of possible military attack (or terrorism) on spent fuel. For those who depend on nuclear deterrence, confronting such spent […]

READING KIM JONG UN’S LIPS: WHAT IS HIS PLAYBOOK AND INTENTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

READING KIM JONG UN’S LIPS: WHAT IS HIS PLAYBOOK AND INTENTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS? PATRICK MCEACHERN DECEMBER 20 2017 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Patrick McEachern argues: “Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un began his reign with an unambiguous and tested first generation nuclear weapons capability.  Contrary voices publicly articulating the trade-offs associated […]

NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

NOBUYASU ABE DECEMBER 8, 2017 I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Nobuyasu Abe concludes that “it may be useful to have international arrangements to share the supplies and material in case of [a nuclear terrorist attack] emergency. Cooperation among regional neighbors is a logical conclusion given the advantage of having emergency supplies in the nearby neighborhood. […]

VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM OF NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL: THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE

JUNGMIN KANG NOVEMBER 30, 2017    I.  INTRODUCTION In this essay, Jungmin Kang estimates inventories of radioactive material in spent fuel pools in South Korea that might be attacked by terrorists.  He analyses radiological plumes under prevailing winds at different seasons.  He concludes that: “Cooperation among relevant countries in the region to reduce the risk […]