POLICY PROPOSAL

From Peace on the Korean Peninsula
to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

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Executive Summary

The authors of this policy proposal identified some major end goals, based on discussions at the SEJONG-RECNA workshop. For us, these major end goals are the absolute minimum outcomes if peace and long-term security are to be secured for the region. These end goals include the need for a final peace settlement of the Korean War; a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to agree on cooperative security principles and approaches; the establishment of a permanent Northeast Asian regional security forum or organization; the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia; and the implementation of a regional energy security system to promote peaceful and sustainable energy development for all countries in the region.

Even if these major end goals were shared among stakeholders regarding a peaceful and denuclearized Korean Peninsula and correlated regional sustainable peace and security, disagreement exists as to the means through which these goals might be fulfilled. Much of the policy dialogue is anchored in national interests and limited by partial perspectives.

Taking the full complexity of the situation into account, this report presents a comprehensive framework and develops a set of short and long-term policy options that aim to realize a comprehensive regional security framework and specific strategic goals such as denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and settling peace on the Korean Peninsula. Specific pathways that may lead to these outcomes are also explored.

The resulting policy options are summarized below:

Korean and Northeast Asian Peace and Regional Security

1. End the Korean War by:
   - Taking the first steps that set in motion a peace process that creates conditions that generate trust, peace, and thereby enable the end of war and the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula; and
   - Taking the first measures to initiate cooperative approaches to realizing comprehensive peace and security in the Northeast Asian region.

2. Conclude a peace treaty for transforming the armistice into a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by:
• Negotiating a peace treaty to build a lasting and stable peace regime, as stated and envision in the 2018 Inter-Korean Panmunjom Declaration and the U.S.-DPRK Singapore joint statement.

• Participation by South Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), the United States, and China

3. As early as possible, the US, Japan, the ROK and the DPRK should commit to negotiating a Northeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation aimed at achieving reconciliation and lasting security, peace, and prosperity for the whole Northeast Asian region.

• This initiative can be strengthened by efforts to promote wider membership and commitments from China, Russia and Mongolia as well as the international community.

4. Establish a permanent Northeast Asian regional security framework to:
   • Promote dialogue and negotiations on peace and denuclearization within the region; and
   • Advance and develop cooperative security approaches to deal with all sources of conflict within the region.

5. Establish an NWFZ in Northeast Asia.

Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula

1. Support the September 19 military-to-military cooperation measures promoted by the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 by:
   • Offering training and joint operations in modern mine removal techniques that support humanitarian retrieval of combat and civilian casualties and their forensic identification;
   • Offering to engage in joint hydrographic research to map the east and west coast seabeds to facilitate acoustic detection of illicit use of fishing resources by non-Korean vessels; and
   • Undertaking joint maritime search-and-rescue training exercises.

2. Envision changes in ROK and DPRK conventional-force postures that support peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by:
   • Reconfiguring their respective military forces to reduce the threat to each other and reduce the prospective military role by the United States in an inter-Korean war so that over time, there is less and less rationale for US military forces based in Korea to retain capacities for redeployability or ranges that might entangle inter-Korean military affairs into great power military contention in the region at large, especially in naval and aerial units.
   • Examining closely the military implications of reduced dependence on nuclear extended deterrence, and the adjustments in conventional forces needed by the two Koreas to facilitate a reduced role of nuclear threats that will accompany a negative nuclear security assurance to the DPRK from the United States; and from the other nuclear-weapon states
to both Koreas should a NWFZ be established in the Korean Peninsula or in Northeast Asia.
3. Demonstrate both Koreas’ commitment to reducing hostility to each other.
4. Assist the DPRK in setting up an export control system that meets international standards and would cover items such as small arms and/or dual use equipment.

**Dual-Track Approach to Establish Both a Comprehensive Security Framework and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia**

**(a) Comprehensive Security Framework**

1. Aim to moderate and reverse the nuclear arms buildup in the region under a Northeast Asian comprehensive security framework.
2. Enhance the role of civil society in creating a regional comprehensive security zone by promoting cross-border cooperation and shared “trans governmental” coordination and harmonization of standards in market and other institutional governance of shared social life.
3. Increase regional energy security by convening a regional energy planning and infrastructure task force of senior officials and private energy investors and utility managers to develop common strategies and collaborative projects that exploit or create regional energy interdependence in ways that increase comprehensive energy security.

**(b) NWFZ in Northeast Asia**

1. Design and then establish a Northeast Asia NWFZ to address the specific nature of existing and potential nuclear threats within the region through the following provisions and measures:
   - A requirement that all signatories in this NWFZ complete the verified dismantlement of any nuclear weapons and related facilities within a designated time period of 18 months from treaty entry into force (consistent with similar provisions in the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons);
   - Prohibition of conventional or other attacks on civilian nuclear facilities;
   - Prohibition of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles;
   - Establishment of a regional verification agency similar to the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC);
   - Multilateral control of enrichment facilities and fissile materials and stockpiles;
   - A possible ban on the reprocessing of irradiated uranium or thorium; and
   - Full transparency of all past and present nuclear-weapon facilities and programs.
2. Undertake confidence- and trust-building approaches to maximize the prospects for successful negotiation of regional denuclearization and the conclusion of a legally binding NWFZ treaty, including:
• Adoption of a reciprocal step-by-step approach rather than an all-or-nothing approach, including the training of DPRK officials and technical officers on obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obligations in relation to nonstate actors;
• Separation and separate treatment of the issue of chemical and biological weapons from the issue of nuclear weapons;
• Study tours of other regions where NWFZ treaties are in force, including Latin America, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; Track 1.5 and Track 2 regional consultations on NWFZ options; and
• Negotiation of secure regional real-time military communication systems to support crisis avoidance, management and resolution.

Developing Regional and International Support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ in the context of a Comprehensive Security Framework
This end-state should be realized by undertaking the following measures:
1. The three neighbouring nuclear-weapon states—the United States, China, and Russia—should support a regional Korean/Northeast Asia nuclear weapon free zone through legal provisions within the main body of the treaty requiring them to enter into binding commitments not to
• Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties;
• Station or deploy nuclear weapons within the zone; and
• Assist treaty parties in development, research or acquisition of nuclear weapons.
2. Building wide support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ proposal by incorporating it into a larger vision of peace, denuclearization, and human security for this region including:
• The development of a comprehensive security framework to be presented in ways that can be readily understood and appreciated at governmental, media, and civil society levels; and
• Greater coordination and communication among actors such as NGOs, experts, political representatives, and the media about issues associated with comprehensive security framework.

Possible concerned actions to be taken by Japan and the ROK
1. Japan should initiate direct dialogue with the DPRK based on the spirit built in the 2002 DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration, which includes normalization of relationships between the two countries;
• Japan and the DPRK should discuss abduction issues in the context of normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries; and
• Deferred Japanese economic cooperation with the DPRK should be discussed in the context of a multilateral settlement that realizes the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
2. Japan and the ROK should reexamine security policy dependent on nuclear deterrence and explore an alternative security policy built on the new regional security regime proposed here:
   • Japan, as the only nation that has experienced an attack with nuclear weapons, should start to reexamine its security posture, which is highly dependent on the US “nuclear umbrella,” that is, nuclear extended deterrence based on the US-Japan Security Treaty.
   • This effort should consider emerging technologies that could undermine effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
   • The ROK too should reexamine its dependence on US nuclear extended deterrence to help facilitate the denuclearization and peace settlement of the Korean Peninsula.

3. Japan and the ROK should be prepared to multilateralize the peace and denuclearization process in Northeast Asia after a critical give-and-take deal is concluded in the US-DPRK negotiations and this deal is implemented in a parallel, simultaneous-action manner by the United States and the DPRK.

4. Japan and the ROK should consider joint collaborative projects to reduce nuclear threats during the denuclearization process such as “cooperative threat reduction” initiatives, addressing also the safety and security risks of civilian nuclear fuel cycle programs in the region.

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1. Introduction

One of the most urgent tasks in the nuclear world is finding a way to denuclearize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Korean Peninsula. Admittedly, the challenges are enormous, but, once the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is initiated, the goal of a cooperative security regime in Northeast Asia, including a nuclear weapon free zone, becomes more credible.

Over the course of 2018-2019, inter-Korean dialogue has resulted in political détente and military confidence-building measures on the peninsula. The drastic change of political atmosphere surrounding the Korean Peninsula started from the Panmunjom Declaration by President Moon and Chairman Kim in April 2018 in which the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the DPRK agreed to “make joint efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula” and “actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” They also “confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”

Furthermore, in the 2018 Pyongyang Declaration, the leaders of the ROK and the DPRK stated that “(t)he two sides agreed to expand the cessation of military hostility in regions of confrontation such as the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] into the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations.” It also emphasized that “(t)he two sides agreed to cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

After the historic US-DPRK summit meeting in Singapore in June 2018, President Trump and Chairman Kim signed a statement reaffirming, as was declared in the April 27 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, that President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Both leaders also agreed that “the United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”

2 2018 Pyongyang Declaration http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=319608&srchrFr=&amp%3BsrchrTo=&amp%3BsrchrWord=&amp%3BsrcrTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm=&page=1&titleNm=.
3 Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit
Although the second US-DPRK summit at Hanoi in February 2019 meeting did not produce a written agreement, it “offered neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown.” Furthermore, substantial parts of the 2018 Pyongyang Declaration are still alive. For the first time in the last several decades, “the two Koreas may come to terms with each other, making it impossible for third parties, including the United States to go to war in Korea.”

On June 30, 2019, President Trump staged a surprise visit to the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) and was greeted by Chairman Kim. President Trump, Chairman Kim, and President Moon had a short meeting and expressed their wish to pursue the negotiations. The working-level negotiation between the United States and the DPRK is expected to resume soon.

We need to objectively assess the negative impacts of the Hanoi summit, but at the same time, we also need to consider and prepare constructive policy initiatives for “the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations” that would promote “the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and a permanent peace settlement there.

New developments taking place on both sides of 38th parallel can be described as a great transformation. How can we encourage the continuation of this great transformation? How can we dismantle the core structure of the hostile confrontation after seven decades of division in the Korean Peninsula?

With these questions in mind, the Sejong Institute in the ROK and Nagasaki University’s Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA) in Japan co-hosted, in cooperation with the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA), a two-day workshop on policy proposals for the denuclearization process. Twenty-six experts from South Korea, Japan, the United States, China, Russia, Germany, and Australia participated. Our policy proposals are a product of intensive discussions and a constructive exchange of critiques.

It is apparent that there is no quick fix or complete solution. Many obstacles and implementation
challenges are ahead. Although we have to admit this reality, in the aftermath of the irresponsible and dangerous military threats exchanged between the United States and the DPRK in 2017, it is also obvious that war is not an option. Negotiations are a necessity, not a choice. Once regional leaders, through bilateral and multilateral dialogue and diplomacy, recognize that a broad consensus exists that “a multilateral security cooperation arrangement needs to be institutionalized, whether to complement the existing security order or to create a new one,” we will have a chance to move forward to establish “a framework for reconciliation, peace, stability and co-prosperity”7. To realize this desirable end-state, this report also identifies and describes an array of policy options and proposed actions that the ROK and Japan should also undertake in concert, recognizing that cooperation between these two states is an essential element of a negotiated, multilateral strategy in the creation of comprehensive security in the region, including the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

To this end, political steps are urgently needed to change policies so that they build trust, commitment, and momentum to achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict with the DPRK.

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2. End Goals for Korean and Northeast Asian Regional Security

The SEJONG-RECNA workshop identified a number of wider end goals for Korean and Northeast Asian peace and denuclearization and for regional security. The workshop concluded that several major end goals need to be established if peace and long-term security are to be secured for the region: a final peace settlement of the Korean War; a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to agree on cooperative security principles and approaches; the establishment of a permanent Northeast Asian regional security forum or organization, which would meet annually; and the establishment of a regional energy security system to promote peaceful and sustainable energy development for all countries in the region. More specific proposals that would contribute to, or provide pathways for, these major goals are discussed in following sections.

Two of the key barriers to diplomatic negotiations aimed at peace and stability in the region have been the high levels of hostility and distrust reflected in military confrontation dating back to the Korean War and the absence of channels for regional dialogue. The result has been an undue reliance on external bilateral military alliances to address perceived security threats.

The failure to negotiate a final peace settlement of the 1950-53 Korean War continues to reinforce North Korea’s sense of being besieged and continues to undermine trust in current negotiations on denuclearization, especially in the context of continued imposition of severe economic sanctions. North Korea has frequently highlighted the need for an end to the “hostility” it perceives on the part of the United States, particularly in the form of recurrent annual large-scale joint US-ROK military exercises near the DMZ. In 2018, however, both the United States and DPRK took unilateral initiatives to open the window for diplomatic approaches to the issues. The United States and the ROK temporarily suspended their large scale joint exercises, and North Korea suspended its nuclear and long range ballistic missile testing.

The April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in called for “bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice” and “establishing a robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” as a matter of urgency.\(^8\) At the June 2018 Singapore summit between Kim Jong-un and President Trump, both leaders similarly declared their intention to “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”\(^9\) A final peace settlement of

\(^8\) 2018 Panmunjom Declaration between Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in
http://www.korea.net/Government/Current-Affairs/National-Affairs/view?subId=641&affairId=656&pageIndex=1&articleId=3412

the Korean War, either through restructuring of the UN Command under which the war was fought, or through a new multilateral peace commission involving other countries, is essential if the long-standing distrust and hostility between the parties is to be overcome.

While the Hanoi summit was inconclusive, both the United States and the DPRK have continued to declare their willingness to negotiate. One of the most important initial steps is to declare and conclude a final Korean War peace settlement. Conclusion of such an agreement would pave the way for a raft of measures to reduce, defuse, and eventually eliminate high-risk forms of military deployment and confrontation, particularly in and close to the DMZ.

The negotiation of a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for Northeast Asia would be an important step toward agreement on principles and approaches for ensuring peace, denuclearization, and security in the region. It could incorporate such principles as mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, settlement of differences by peaceful means, renunciation of the use of force, and economic and environmental cooperation. An important central principle that such a treaty could seek to incorporate would be that of cooperative security. This would encourage member states to adopt defense and security postures that do not undermine other states’ security or provoke deadly arms races but rather serve to enhance the joint security of regional states. It could also serve to insulate the region from externally imposed great-power conflicts or wars with devastating humanitarian and economic consequences. An important precedent for the value of such a treaty is the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.10 In the aftermath of the devastating Indochina Wars from 1946 to 1975, this treaty provides cooperative security guidelines for members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and contributed to the eventual negotiation of the 1995 Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok) Treaty. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation now includes not only all the regional states, but countries outside the Southeast Asian region, including Northeast Asian countries (North Korea, South Korea, and Japan), China, India, and the United States. It has also been endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the European Union.

The 2005 six-party talks involving the two Koreas, Japan, the United States, China, and Russia, while not ultimately successful, did show at least that agreement is possible on the concept of setting up a Six-Party Northeast Asia Security Council. This was reflected in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint

Statement that referred to the Parties’ agreement to “explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.” Other regions that have been successful in undertaking dialogue on regional security issues and establishing NWFZs to restrain regional proliferation and external nuclear threats from nuclear-weapon states stationing or deploying nuclear weapons within their region have benefited from the existence of regional organizations or forums. Such regional bodies have facilitated negotiations on regional denuclearization either directly or indirectly. This was certainly the case with the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in relation to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the South Pacific Forum in relation to the Treaty of Rarotonga South Pacific, and, as noted above, ASEAN in relation to the Treaty of Bangkok. Northeast Asia has long suffered from an absence of regional mechanisms and forums for intraregional security dialogue, a shortcoming that has left the region at the mercy of adversarial bilateral alliances. The recent breakthroughs in inter-Korean and US-ROK-DPRK dialogue have opened windows of opportunity for a resumption of debate on the desirability of establishing a permanent Northeast Asian regional security forum or organization that might meet on an annual basis or more frequently as necessary. Such a body could not only seek to find permanent solutions to peace and denuclearization issues on the Korean Peninsula, but also could address region-wide issues involving Japan and neighboring states.

Within any wider denuclearization arrangements or regional NWFZ, there will need to be an assurance to all parties of access to energy resources. There will be regional needs for assistance to all parties in moving towards sustainable energy sources and usage, especially renewable forms of energy. In addition, a new regional energy security system will need to assure the right of the DPRK to access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A regional arrangement for nuclear energy can cover the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. In the case of uranium enrichment, this would need to be managed and controlled at a regional rather national level although there is little commercial need to add new enrichment capacity worldwide. In the case of reprocessing, there should be an agreement to ban it as unneeded and dangerous because it provides direct access to weapon usable plutonium. It would be preferable to agree on a ban on both reprocessing and enrichment, as agreed in the 1992 joint declaration between the ROK and the DPRK. In terms of nuclear facilities, IAEA safeguards could be complemented and strengthened by the establishment of a regional verification body similar to the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of

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Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which monitors regional compliance with nonproliferation obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT.

The following four goals seek to embody a new approach to achieving trust, confidence-building, and adoption of cooperative security approaches in achieving peace and denuclearization throughout the region.

Proposal 1: Conclude a final peace settlement of the Korean War as:

- A crucial first step toward establishing the conditions for trust, peace, and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula; and
- A key step toward developing peace, denuclearization, and cooperative approaches to security in the wider Northeast Asian region.

Proposal 2: Negotiate a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Northeast Asia among the regional states by:

- Including the US, Japan, ROK and DPRK as the initial signers; and
- This initiative can be strengthened by efforts to promote wider membership and commitments from China, Russia and Mongolia as well as the international community.

Proposal 3: Establish a permanent Northeast Asian regional security organization or forum to:

- Promote dialogue and negotiations on peace and denuclearization within the region;
- Advance and develop cooperative security approaches to deal with all sources of conflict within the region; and
- Advance the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ, promoting the move to a world free of nuclear weapons.

Proposal 4: Establish a regional energy security system to:

- Promote and oversee regional development of peaceful and sustainable energy resources within the region, and
- Establish regional energy coordination, monitoring, verification and governance mechanisms and agencies within the region.
3. Peace and Security in the Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula is poised either to transform the Cold War system that divided the Korean nation and to commence the construction of peace between the two Koreas based on cooperation and trust, or to plunge back into military confrontation and tension with the risk of war and even nuclear war.

Since 1953, the two Koreas have oscillated between confrontation and containment. On three occasions, they veered sharply towards outright war—1976, 1994, and 2010. In 2017, the leaderships of the DPRK, the ROK, and the United States made implicit and explicit threats to destroy each other by military and nuclear attacks. The leaders of the DPRK and the United States were reduced to puerile comparisons of their nuclear launch buttons and nuclear weapons delivery platforms were fired from and deployed around the Korean peninsula—an extraordinarily irresponsible display of threatening rhetoric from both sides.

The long-term standoff was interrupted by brief moments of inter-Korean contact and reconciliation in 1991-92 and 2007. But the standoff in Korea and the enormous military forces deployed in the tiny peninsula make Korea one of the most dangerous, if not the most dangerous, places on Earth. Should war break out, the resulting violence would annihilate humans and nature alike on a scale not seen since World War II and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Given the multiple and complex domestic, regional, and global forces at play in Korea, no one could have predicted the astounding progress made to reduce tension and to lay the foundation for long-lasting co-existence and eventual peace between the two Koreas. This breakthrough was brought about by the peaceful candlelight revolution in South Korea and the demise of the corrupt presidency of Park Geun-hye and subsequent election of the Moon Jae-in administration in May 2017. This radical shift laid the social and political foundation for three inter-Korean summits and three US-DPRK summits, and it initiated unprecedented diplomacy between the great powers and the two Koreas on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Moon Jae-in’s adroit Olympics diplomacy supplemented by “intelligence diplomacy” among the DPRK, the ROK, and the United States facilitated the shift in US strategy from primary reliance on military threats, including displays of “strategic” nuclear-capable weapons in and around Korea, to one of “maximum pressure” based on sanctions. Similarly, Moon’s approach helped change the DPRK strategy from rapid-fire nuclear and missile testing to a freeze on such testing in return for a freeze on US-ROK military exercises that rehearsed attacks on and decapitation of the DPRK
leadership. As a result, tension subsided, nuclear threat-mongering ended, and serious albeit
difficult negotiations began between the United States and the DPRK on dismantling the DPRK’s
nuclear fuel cycle and its nuclear weapons.

What made possible this period of relative calm? Some attribute it to the fear induced by each
side’s military chest-thumping and risk-taking. More likely is that the inter-Korean operational arms
control agreement and implementation of key measures have ensured that no incidents occurred
along the DMZ and built confidence that the conditions that existed at the time the Armistice was
signed might be restored, at least in part. 13 This left to the future further military-to-military
discussions between the two Koreas on the deepening and expansion of the military measures that
would build confidence that neither side intends to attack the other. But it also prefigures
redeployment or demobilization of offensively postured forces and reduction in military forces over
time in ways that would facilitate a focus on the creation of a prosperous shared future rather than
one based on military forces, isolation, and the crushing effects of economic sanctions against the
DPRK.

13 The July 1953 Armistice Agreement set limits on the introduction of new military forces and weapons systems
into either Korea; and also established a demilitarized zone. Over the decades, both sides have introduced many
new military forces and weapons, and the “DMZ” has become one of the most heavily fortified areas on Earth. The
current round of inter-Korean arms control measures “restores” some elements of the Armistice within the DMZ and
the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon. However, restoring the spirit of the original agreement entails redeployment
and disarmament of many offensive military forces in the two Koreas; and of course, the denuclearization of the
entire Korean peninsula, not just the disarmament of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons.
## Details of the agreement

<table>
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<th>Classification</th>
<th>Major contents</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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| Suspension of hostile activities | - (Ground) Ceasing all live fire artillery drills & field training exercises of regiment level and above within 5km of the MDL  
- (Sea) Ceasing all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises from Deokjeok-do to Cho-do in the West Sea and Sokcho to Tongchuan in the East Sea; Closing all gunports within the zone and installing covers on the barrels of coast artillery and shipguns  
- (Air) Banning tactical live-fire drills in the East and West No Fly Zones | As of Nov. 1 |
| Designation of No Fly Zones | - (Fixed-wing aircraft) East 40km & West 20km / (Rotary-wing aircraft) 10km / (UAVs) East 15km & West 10km / (Hot-air balloons) 25km | As of Nov. 1 |
| Changing operational procedures | - (Ground & Sea) Initial warning broadcast → Secondary warning broadcast → Initial warning fire → Secondary warning fire → Military action  
- (Air) Warning radio & signal → Interdiction flight → Warning fire → Military action | As of Nov. 1 |
| Withdrawal of GPs | - Withdrawing GPs (11 in both South and North Korea) located within 1 km of the DMZ as a pilot case | by Dec. 31 |
| Demilitarization of the JSA | - Forming a South-North-UN Command trilateral consultative body, and removing mines (Oct.1 – 20) → Withdrawing personnel & firearms (5 days) → Joint verification (2 days)  
- Freedom of movement allowed for visitors & tourists within the JSA | As of Oct. 1 |
| Joint use of Han River Estuary | - Designation of a 70km-long Joint Utilization Zone (Gimpo Peninsula–Southwest of Gyeong-Do in the South / Yeonan-kun Haenam-ri–Panmun-kun Imha-ri in the North)  
- Joint field survey on the Joint Utilization Zone by end-Dec. | by Dec. 31 |
| Consultations at the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee | - Matters including of large-scale military exercises, military buildup aimed at the other side and reconnaissance activities  
- Establishment of the West Sea Peace Zone & the pilot joint fishing zone; devising measures for passage of NK vessels via direct routes in Haenyeo & Jeju Straits | |

Source: Blue House 2018 pamphlet, scanned by authors with permission.
These operational arms control measures were implemented swiftly after the first two summits between Moon and Kim—at Panmunjom on April 27 and May 26, 2018—laid the groundwork for the third summit, held on September 18-20 2018 in Pyongyang. On September 19, military officials from both Koreas signed an “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain.” The agreement established buffer or “peace” zones near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that runs down the center of the Demilitarized Zone on land and extends into the western disputed sea on both sides of what UN Command calls the Northern Limit Line. In these zones, no artillery firing, major exercises, or new weapons are allowed. No-fly zones were created for helicopters (10 km), drones (15 km)—and no North Korean drones have been observed in the South since this agreement was struck), and fixed-wing planes (20 km on the eastern DMZ and 40 km on the western side). Joint fishing areas were created in the western sea. Naval guns have been lowered; artillery bunkers on land have been shuttered. North and South Korean teams are working together to retrieve the remains of those killed in combat zones in the DMZ. Guard posts have been dismantled. The Joint Security Area has been restored to its pre-1976 status, removing the division along the MDL and all weapons.

Even the lighthouse on Yeonpyeong Island—the island bombarded by North Korean artillery in 2010—was relit in May 2019 to enable ships and fishing vessels to navigate safely. However, it
shines only southward to avoid any risk of provoking the DPRK, symbolizing the danger of war that continues to stalk the two Koreas.

Figure 3

Source: Yeonpyeon-do Island Deuendae Park, Incheon Metropolitan City.\footnote{http://eng-itour.incheon.go.kr/foreign/eatdrink/spot.detail.do?cid=49352&bbsid}

One of the key measures of the agreement was the one to revise what it referred to as military “operational procedures,” that is, the rules of engagement on each side. After 2010, the ROK had shifted to a more offensive doctrine, known as “proactive deterrence,” that entailed immediate and massive retaliation for DPRK attacks. Revision of these procedures and detailed implementation to reduce the risk of war requires regular contact and dialogue not only via restored hotlines, but in the Korean Joint Military Committee. Yet it has proven difficult to convene
this committee due to North Korean reluctance to attend in the context of inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK negotiations.

Thus, the military agreement and its immediate implementation have created time and space for dialogue—most importantly, between the United States and the DPRK. In effect, the agreement has tamped down the tension and reduced greatly the risk of war. But the agreement has not yet advanced to the point where each side is willing to address how it is postured to destroy the other with conventional forces. Nor has it specified what measures need to be taken to shift from an offensive to defensive posture. This agenda, in turn, is held hostage to the fundamental conflict in Korea—the contested sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula with neither Korean state ready yet to relinquish its claim over the other and to coexist as long as it takes for rapprochement at many levels and in many dimensions to dissolve the core conflict, and ultimately, for the two Koreas to reunify in some form of confederation.

This standoff gives rise to the security dilemma that continues to grip the Koreas in a vice made of nuclear and conventional weapons. The United States and UN Command are concerned that the inter-Korean arms control measures on conventional forces may distract the ROK from focusing on nuclear disarmament of the DPRK as the first priority, whereas the ROK sees reduction of the confrontation and hostility that could lead to war and nuclear war as the pathway to peace and eventually to full North Korean nuclear disarmament.

This predicament, and the various drivers outlined above, lead to the following policy proposals to enable the two Koreas to expand and deepen peace-building in Korea in ways that support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventually displace the Cold War system that still prevails.

Proposal 1: Support the September 19 military-to-military cooperation measures by:

- Offering training and joint operations in modern mine removal techniques that support humanitarian retrieval of combat and civilian casualties and their forensic identification;
- Offering to engage in joint hydrographic research to map the east and west coast seabeds to facilitate acoustic detection of illicit use of fishing resources by non-Korean vessels;
- Undertaking joint maritime search-and-rescue training exercises
- Engaging in joint forest fire surveillance and firefighting techniques and operations, including training and mutual support;
• Examining measures under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to identify which of these might be tailored and adopted by the two Korean militaries;
• Conducting joint monitoring and verification missions to ensure that the measures in the military agreement are sustained;
• Creating opportunities for dialogue between the Korean militaries at many levels and in many channels—some bilateral, some multilateral—ranging from meetings of retired military officers in rear areas to high-level dialogue about what is entailed in shifting from “escalation dominance” to escalation management and war avoidance as the primary principles for military planning and operations.

Proposal 2: Continue North-South summitry by:
• Following through and checking that implementation matches commitments made and referring disputes to resolution mechanisms where needed;
• Mandating and directing that operational-level military-to-military dialogue and mutual and reciprocal actions occur to set new priorities designated by the leaders on further adjustments to military doctrines, practices, and postures;
• Identifying and committing to “breakthrough” trust-building steps such as willingness to allow transparency and inspections in new ways and locations to demonstrate seriousness of intent;
• Relentlessly pursuing an inter-Korean peace declaration that ends the Korean War; and
• Committing to constitutional amendments to end the competition between the two Koreas for sovereignty.

Proposal 3: Expand South Korean sovereign control of ROK military forces by:
• Accelerating the transfer of operational wartime control of the ROK military to the ROK from the United States; and
• Exploring the future of UN Command to create a replacement for the original “The July 27, 1953 Armistice Agreement” that would include not only the four primary participants in the Korea War (the two Koreas, the United States, and China) but also Russia, Japan, and the UN Command allies, all of whom have the ability to contribute in their own ways by engaging the DPRK on a political and military basis.

Proposal 4: Envision changes in ROK and DPRK conventional-force postures that support peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by:
• Providing educational programs, study tours, and dialogue on training, structural adjustment programs, and investment strategies that create jobs and redeploy military
infrastructure and factories in a productive manner that would be required for significant demobilization of troops from the DPRK People’s Army, given the transition experience of other communist states such as Vietnam, Russia, and China.

• Reconfiguring their respective military forces to reduce the threat to each other and reduce the prospective military role by the United States in an inter-Korean war so that over time, there is less and less rationale for US military forces based in Korea to retain capacities for redeployability or ranges that might entangle inter-Korean military affairs into great power military contention in the region at large, especially in naval and aerial units; and

• Examining closely the military implications of reduced dependence on nuclear extended deterrence and the adjustments in conventional forces needed by the two Koreas to facilitate a reduced role of nuclear threats that will accompany a negative nuclear security assurance to the DPRK from the United States and to both Koreas from the other nuclear-weapon states should a NWFZ established in the Korean Peninsula or in Northeast Asia.

Proposal 5: Demonstrate the ROK’s commitment to reducing hostility by:

• Providing early sanctions relief to the DPRK in return for calibrated denuclearization steps;

• Using the ROK prerogative to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the DPRK; and

• Encouraging sanctioning states to change the timelines for review and relief from other unilateral and UN Security Council sanctions imposed on the DPRK.

Proposal 6: Assist the DPRK in setting up an export control system that meets international standards by:

• Sharing best-practice export controls including those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; and

• Providing training and support for the DPRK to commence its reporting to the UN Security Council’s 1540 expert group and on implementation of its obligations to control the proliferation activities of nonstate actors.
4. Dual-Track Approach to Establishing Both a Comprehensive Security Framework and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

Four trends in Northeast Asia have opened a window of opportunity to end the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and enhance regional peace and security:

1. The emergence of a “Kim Jong Un era” in the DPRK, including: a) the consolidation of his power in the DPRK; b) his acquisition of a sufficient nuclear-weapon capacity to project a credible nuclear threat at least to South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and parts of the United States, especially Guam and Alaska; c) his conclusion that the DPRK must henceforth focus on economic reconstruction; and d) his initiative in reaching out to President Trump in 2018.

2. The rise of the progressive and pragmatic ROK leadership of President Moon Jae-In, who has skillfully used diplomacy and demonstrated a strong political will in actively pursuing improvement in the inter-Korean relationship at many levels simultaneously while remaining in step with the United States.

3. The personal instinct of US President Donald Trump that he can deal with Kim Jong Un and achieve a foreign policy success.

4. China and Russia’s disinclination to allow the United States to reassert its dominance in Northeast Asia by being the sole great power with effective influence over the two Koreas, thereby lending both Koreas effective leverage over their great-power allies or partners, and giving the two Koreas more space to deal with each other.

The competitive relations in the region between the great powers makes the current framework for maintaining regional peace and security—or insecurity—fluid and unpredictable. This includes how the nuclear threat affects and degrades these relationships.

To stabilize these complex dynamics, a dual-track approach is needed to link the creation of a comprehensive security framework involving the great powers with a NWFZ. The zone could be inter-Korean or regional in scope. However structured and however phased, the specific steps that must be taken are well known and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization road map is well defined.15


The timelines for North Korean nuclear disarmament are not fixed. Some argue that DPRK denuclearization may be achieved rapidly—in as little as one year. Others hold that it may take as long as a decade. Irreversible steps that would make reconstituting a nuclear arsenal in the DPRK extremely challenging are possible in one year with verification. But a complete denuclearization, including return by the DPRK to good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reentry into the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), would require at least five years and likely much longer. On the US side, US-ROK denuclearization is simply a matter of changing deployment patterns and other steps to demonstrate that the nuclear threat is no longer aimed at the DPRK by these two parties. The simplest way to achieve this outcome is to allow DPRK inspections of US military bases in the ROK (US nuclear weapons were removed in 1991-92) as part of reciprocal monitoring and verification scheme. These physical realities in turn set minimum and maximum times in which a comprehensive security process should be set in motion.

(a) Comprehensive Security Framework

Section 3 examined the integral link between the rate, pace, and sequencing of DPRK denuclearization with that of the inter-Korean peace-building and operational arms control and disarmament process. However, the outer limit of the scope of this inter-Korean process and the speed with which it can proceed is set by the rate and magnitude of the steps taken in the denuclearization process, which in turn depends upon the results of the US-DPRK dialogue. The two are inextricably linked for the simple reason that the North Koreans perceive—not without good reason—that the United States is their main enemy and therefore must be their primary interlocutor.

The continuation of Kim-Trump summit and the US-DPRK dialogue do not necessarily guarantee a diplomatic solution. However, it is crucial to use this window of opportunity before it closes. But the result of this dialogue is uncertain. Possible outcomes range from: a) zero denuclearization and reversion to “fire and fury” rhetoric and threat displays by both sides; b) tiny confidence-building measures that maintain the status quo of “freeze for freeze” on DPRK missile and nuclear testing on the one hand, and suspension of US-ROK large-scale military exercises and US deployments of “strategic” (that is, nuclear-capable) platforms by the United States in the ROK region (as shown in

Figure 3) on the other. Other permutations of “muddling through” are also conceivable.

Concurrently with the imperatives to advance DPRK denuclearization and inter-Korean conventional-arms reduction, the great powers are accelerating the modernization of their nuclear weapons and the deployments of such weapons in the Northeast Asian region and surrounding areas. They also are rapidly introducing disruptive technologies into already fast-growing conventional forces, thereby constituting a new “multipolar” great-power system spanning the Eurasian continent. This system incorporates ballistic missile defenses and space systems as well as forces deployed across the region itself. A regional comprehensive security system must address the risks and instability associated with these forces, not just those in and around Korea.

This Policy Proposal therefore envisions a regional security structure to be created over the next five years that would be associated with a deeper and more rapid denuclearization process and thereby with expanded inter-Korean conventional arms control and disarmament processes—the most optimistic outcome shown in Figure 4.

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Fortunately, the comprehensive regional security structure that would be necessary to create a “peace regime” at the regional level and within Korea is well understood. It entails the fulfillment of six conditions, all of which are necessary for the comprehensive security to be created, but the sequencing of which can be varied based on the political calculus of the parties to the regional peace regime. These are:

1. **Termination of the state of war.** This is clearly a major objective of North Korea. It should provide for a normalization of relations while providing support for the eventual unification of the peninsula. The agreement should provide for opening the border between the North and South and the pulling back of military forces in the Demilitarized Zone. The territorial disputes between the North and South, including at sea, should be settled, or, if that is not immediately feasible, the two parties should commit to their peaceful resolution. A complicated multilateral peace treaty is not required to terminate the state of war.

2. **Creation of a permanent council on security:** However, a new treaty should be concluded to establish a permanent council on security. Such a treaty would supersede the now moribund six-party talks\(^\text{19}\) mechanism by creating a permanent council and support organization to monitor the provisions of the treaty and to provide a forum to deal with future security problems in the region. In addition to the six parties to the treaty, other states from the region could be invited to join as full participants or observers. The treaty might take the form of a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, relegating the “peace treaty” that terminates the Korean War Armistice Agreement to a side agreement, or simply to national declarations or bilateral peace treaties. How such a treaty would work is explained in detail elsewhere in this Policy Proposal.

3. **Mutual declaration of no hostile intent:** This is a key objective of North Korea. This commitment must be embodied in the treaty and affect all the parties’ relations with each other.

4. **Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy:** The right of all parties to the treaty to have access to necessary sources of energy including nuclear power will need to be affirmed. Any limitations on North Korea will need to apply equally to the other non-nuclear parties to the treaty. A new multilateral framework might be appropriate to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle. North Korea will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized. Beyond a general commitment, this will probably need to be negotiated as a separate agreement.

5. **Termination of sanctions and response to violations of the treaty:** The parties to the treaty will need to commit to refrain from the use of sanctions on any other party to the treaty and to remove

\(^{19}\)“The six-party talks were a series of multilateral negotiations held intermittently since 2003 and attended by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the purpose of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. The talks were hosted in Beijing and chaired by China. North Korea decided to no longer participate in the six-party process in 2009. In subsequent years, other participants, notably China, have called periodically for a resumption of the process”. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks).
them from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state that violates its commitments under the treaty.

6. A nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ): The treaty would contain a section that would create a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, tailored to the specific circumstances of the region—the subject of a separate section of this Policy Proposal.

The most urgent issue is how best to kick-start the process that realizes these six conditions and thereby, the eventual creation of a comprehensive security framework given the current, rapidly deteriorating relations between the United States and China over issues not related directly to Korea or nuclear weapons, especially trade, sanctions, and technological leadership at a global level.

Proposal 1: For the next Kim-Trump summit

The DPRK is perilously close to losing trust in the negotiating process with the United States and separately, with the ROK. As the great power, the United States must make an offer on the peace and security front too big and too good for the DPRK to refuse. In turn, the DPRK must then make a major commitment to put nuclear facilities and weapon systems on the table, in a way that can be monitored and verified and, when enacted, is irreversible.

As all the great powers probably will have to provide guarantees to both Koreas in any realistic agreement, the fifth summit might be announced at the fourth summit. It would take place in early 2020 and could be a four-leader summit (that is, the leaders of the United States, the ROK, the DPRK, and China). The leaders would prefigure the signing a peace declaration to end the Korean War. Kim and Trump should make bold moves by:

- Committing to negotiate a Northeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that would aim to realize reconciliation, security, peace, and prosperity in the region, including a statement of non-hostility, creation of a standing security council, and six-party annual summits with a supporting infrastructure of meetings involving regional security ministers and other officials;
- Proposing a breakthrough reciprocal “next big step” such as a measure to dismantle the DPRK’s long-range missiles and rockets in return for creation of either a regional space launch consortium to include the DPRK or a joint ROK-DPRK space launch agency, with appropriate safeguards and compliance with MTCR, Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and other agreements governing access to space and missile proliferation; and
• Creating a task force to develop a regional and inter-Korean economic and energy development road map that provides timelines and specific commitments for provision of economic and energy support to the DPRK economy.

Proposal 2: Regional deployments of nuclear weapons
As part of the security dialogue under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, states should aim to moderate and reverse the nuclear arms buildup in the region by:

• Creating a regional task force to reduce the risk of nuclear war by examining how to engage in mutual restraint including regional limitations on the deployment of nuclear forces in the region;

• Studying the pros and cons of the adoption of no first use declaratory policies and force postures consistent with no first use, either individually or as part of the nuclear negative security assurances that would be given by the nuclear-weapon states that are parties to a regional nuclear weapon free zone treaty;

• Examining the potential roles of adjacent nuclear weapon free zones in moderating and limiting the use of nuclear threats not only against non-nuclear-weapon states but also among nuclear-weapon states; and providing opportunities to study and learn about the NWFZs in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia and the lessons that can be drawn from these zones for Northeast Asia;

• Reviewing under a UN rubric or as a part of a regional security dialogue how nuclear extended deterrence operates in existing NWFZs and the extent to which nuclear-weapon states have been willing to place portions of their own territories under such zones and to limit the operation of their nuclear forces within such zones.

• Convening a regional task force or eminent-persons group to report back to a regional security council on the potentially destabilizing effects of rapid introduction of disruptive new technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyberwarfare on nuclear command, control, and communications as well as nuclear delivery systems, and possible ways to restrain the offensive dimensions of these new technologies in conventional and nuclear forces deployed in the region.

Proposal 3: Enhance the role of civil society in creating a comprehensive regional security zone by:

• Promoting cross-border cooperation and shared “trans-governmental” coordination and harmonization of standards in market and other institutional governance of social life;
• Adopting nuclear weapon free zones at the city and provincial levels and implementing commitments to practices such as divestment from firms involved in financing, insurance, and production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; and
• Fostering a regional awareness of the precious world cultural heritage of the survivors and victims of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, especially in the younger generation, as part of a regional and renewed national identity in each country.

Proposal 4: increase regional energy security by:
• Convening a regional energy planning and infrastructure task force of senior officials and private energy investors and utility managers to develop common strategies and collaborative projects that exploit or create regional energy interdependence in ways that increase comprehensive energy security, including technical, geographic, ecological, economic, and cultural attributes of national energy security in each country in the region;
• Conducting training of DPRK energy practitioners on the requirements for information transparency and exchange in linking regional energy networks via the DPRK, such as regional power grids, pipelines, and energy-consuming infrastructure such as railways, roads, telecommunications, and ports; and
• Investigating collaborative approaches to overcoming desertification, acid rain, and other sources of transborder atmospheric pollution; establishing deposition monitoring stations in the DPRK that record air pollution levels with related training and support for participation in provision of data to regional environmental science networks; and providing support for DPRK reforestation programs aimed at ecological stabilization, transboundary biodiversity corridors, and creation of carbon sinks in the Korean Peninsula.

(b) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia

An internationally recognized and legally binding regional nuclear weapon free zone treaty is an essential component of a Northeast Asian comprehensive security framework. Previous bilateral agreements and nonbinding declarations, such as the 1992 Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, have foundered on the failure to include legally binding treaty obligations, adequate verification and compliance requirements, and security assurances from the relevant nuclear-weapon states. NWFZ treaties in other regions, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin America, the Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific, the Bangkok Treaty in
neighbouring Southeast Asia, the Pelindaba Treaty in Africa, and the Semipalatinsk Treaty in Central Asia, have all been relatively successful in restraining both intraregional proliferation and the stationing and deployment of external nuclear weapons in their regions.

With increasing rivalry between the United States and China, Northeast Asia is especially vulnerable not only to proliferation within the region but also deployment of nuclear weapons by external nuclear powers, with associated risks of catastrophe for the region and the world in the event of miscalculation, pre-emption, or accidental nuclear launches by external nuclear powers. The need for such a region-wide NWFZ is further accentuated by the threshold capacity of Japan for rapid development and production of nuclear weapons, given its possession of large plutonium stockpiles and the technological capacity for quick production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as future potential deployment of short- and intermediate-range missile systems in the context of Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States. The perceived weakness of the nonproliferation norm in the ROK is also a matter of concern in this region, given its past record of undertaking enrichment research and its expressed desire to acquire plutonium reprocessing capability in the future.

Many of the conditions that have facilitated the successful negotiation of denuclearized zones in other regions of the world now exist in Northeast Asia. Both Koreas are currently engaging with each other—and with the United States, China, and Russia, on denuclearization, Korean rapprochement, and a settlement of the Korean War. Japan, for its part, has relinquished previous preconditions for negotiating with North Korea. However, bilateral and political declarations are no substitute for legally binding treaty commitments on establishing a verifiable regional NWFZ involving appropriate security guarantees from the relevant nuclear powers. Unless the treaty also includes expansion of the zone to include Japan, this may—in the short or longer term—jeopardize Korean Peninsula denuclearization initiatives given North Korean concerns or perceptions about US strike potential from Japanese bases and the absence of region-wide commitments to prevent nuclear threats or first use.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment capabilities, and demonstrated ballistic missile capabilities will need to be addressed through stringent provisions requiring verified time-bound dismantlement of such weapons and capabilities. Four other existing NWFZs have similarly faced the presence of nuclear weapon in various forms, including Latin America at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis; the South Pacific in the form of extensive British, US, and French nuclear testing; Africa in the form of South African nuclear-weapon possession under the apartheid regime; and Central Asia with Russian nuclear testing and missile deployment in Kazakhstan. In
Southeast Asia, the United States had deployed nuclear weapons including those for anti-
submarine warfare in the Philippines. In all these cases, dismantlement of nuclear facilities, 
destruction or removal of nuclear weapons, or discontinuance of nuclear-weapon testing or 
stationing was achieved prior to the NWFZs coming into force. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, 
the concurrent need for treaty-bound security assurances will mean that nuclear-weapon 
dismantlement will need to proceed within a time-bound period following the treaty’s entry into 
force. Consistent with the legal precedent of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 
such a time-bound period for verified dismantlement should be 18 months. In addition to the 
need for regional verification and compliance systems tailored to this region, there needs to be a 
special provision to safeguard existing civilian nuclear facilities from conventional attacks. This 
might take a form similar to that in the Pelindaba Treaty, which specifies in Article 11 that “each 
Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by 
conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the African nuclear weapon free 
zone.” This would be applied to the DPRK once it was compliant with its obligation to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons and related nuclear facilities during a time-bound period for verified and 
complete disarmament.

Both the NPT and the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons refer to the right and 
desirability of regional groupings to establish NWFZ zones. The five NPT-recognized nuclear-
weapon states have all demonstrated previous preparedness to respect and offer security 
assurance to regional NWFZs. They have signed the relevant security assurance protocols for four 
of the five existing zones in populated regions and are believed to be about to sign the protocols 
for the remaining one, for Southeast Asia. The three main regional states—North Korea, South 
Korea, and Japan—can and should exercise their sovereign power to work toward establishing such 
a zone for Northeast Asia. While this will also require consultation with allies, membership in 
military alliances has not necessarily been an obstacle to the establishment of NWFZs in some 
other regions (for example, the South Pacific and Central Asia). In the absence of an existing 
regional security forum, the three states could take the step of holding a regional summit to discuss 
a regional road map for denuclearization, non-proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks in the 
region. Japan and South Korea could take a leading role in convening such a summit, especially 
since Japan has now relinquished previous preconditions for meeting with North Korea. To lay the 
groundwork for such a regional summit, regional entities such as the Northeast Asian UN Global 
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), or the UN University could organize a series 
of informal discussions at both diplomatic and civil society levels between regional actors, as well

21 http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba/text#.
as in consultation with the United States, China and Russia. Such dialogues might be conducted in Mongolia under its “Ulaanbaatar” process.

Given the high level of distrust that has plagued previous diplomatic efforts to resolve Northeast Asian nuclear and security issues—exacerbated and perpetuated by the failure to conclude a final peace settlement of the Korean War—confidence- and trust-building initiatives are urgently needed to take advantage of the recent windows of opportunity opened by the ROK-DPRK and US-DPRK summits. There was broad consensus among regional experts at the SEJONG-RECNA workshop that a number of key trust- and confidence-building approaches are essential. In the ongoing negotiations, a step-by-step reciprocated approach is needed, rather than insisting on complete unilateral denuclearization up front if negotiations are to continue. Each side needs to demonstrate willingness to proceed with phased steps involving both denuclearization and military de-escalation, thereby encouraging confidence in proceeding to the next step. There is a risk that the progress already achieved could be reversed by insistence on all-or-nothing conditions. To enhance trust in the current diplomatic process, there should also be a review of the existing coercive UN economic sanctions regime, recently renewed for another 12 months, to reflect a more calibrated willingness to gradually lift sanctions in accord with demonstrable steps towards denuclearization. Positive assistance could also be provided to North Korea to enable its officials to be better trained in a range of internationally agreed procedures to avoid nuclear weapons falling into the hands of nonstate actors. At the same time, there are a number of practical North-South reconciliation initiatives that can be supported and pursued at both governmental and civil society levels.

In the context of debates and deliberation on national and security policies and doctrines, it is useful to develop and update model treaties that seek to show how concerns over implementation, verification, compliance, outcomes, and governance can be addressed and incorporated. While much research has already been conducted, RECNA, the Sejong Institute, PSNA, and partner research groups and institutes should pursue further research on the specific nature, scope, boundaries, and negotiation pathways for a Northeast Asia/Korean NWFZ.

The following proposals relate not only to the regional coverage of a Northeast Asia NWFZ but also to the ways in which it will need to be designed to meet the special features of this region and to the major steps that will need to be taken to bring it about, including a regional summit and a number of confidence- and trust-building approaches that could and should be pursued.

Proposal 1: Establish a legally binding Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (NWFZ):
• Verified by the IAEA and multilateral regional agencies similar to ABACC
• Underpinned by commitments to refrain from using nuclear weapons or threatening to do so and security guarantees from the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states (United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom, and France);
• Covering the wider Northeast Asian region, including not only the Korean Peninsula but also Japan and Mongolia; and
• Potentially first applying to the Korean Peninsula but incorporating provisions for Japan (and potentially Mongolia) to join at a later stage in accordance with a comprehensive road map for denuclearization in the region.

Proposal 2: Design of a Northeast Asian NWFZ to address the specific nature of existing and potential nuclear threats within the region through the following provisions and measures:

• Verified dismantlement by all signatories, in this NWFZ, of any nuclear weapons and related facilities within a designated time period of 18 months from treaty entry into force (consistent with similar provisions in the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons);
• Prohibition of conventional or other attacks on civilian nuclear facilities;
• Prohibition of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles;
• Establishment of a regional verification agency similar to ABACC;
• Multilateral control of enrichment facilities and fissile materials and stockpiles;
• A possible ban on the reprocessing of irradiated uranium or thorium; and
• Full transparency of all past and present nuclear-weapon facilities and programs.

Proposal 3: The two Koreas, Japan, and Mongolia hold a regional summit to discuss a regional road map for denuclearization, non-proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks in Northeast Asia, with

• Japan and South Korea taking the lead in convening the summit as a priority initiative;
• Japan preparing the way by a reaffirmation of its three non-nuclear principles;
• Preparation for such a regional summit by first holding informal discussions between all parties at both diplomatic and Track 1.5 levels; and
• Consultations on such a regional summit with the UN secretary-general and with China, Russia, and the United States as the principal allies/partners of the regional states.
Proposal 4: Confidence- and trust-building approaches to maximize the prospects for successful negotiation of regional denuclearization and the conclusion of a legally binding NWFZ treaty, including:

- Adoption of a reciprocal step-by-step approach rather than an all-or-nothing approach, including training of DPRK officials and technical officers on obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in relation to nonstate actors;
- Separation of the issue of chemical and biological weapons from the issue of nuclear weapons;
- Study tours of other regions where nuclear weapon free zone treaties are in force, including Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific;
- Track 1.5 and Track 2 regional consultations on NWFZ options;
- Negotiation of secure regional real-time military communication systems;
- Breakthrough unilateral gestures, such as invitations for DPRK inspections of ROK/US facilities in South Korea to verify that all US nuclear weapons have been withdrawn; and
- Further reconciliation measures between North and South Korea in accord with the Panmunjom Declaration.

Proposal 5: Further research to assist policy development and negotiation of a regional Northeast Asia NWFZ including:

- Adapting existing model treaties to reflect the specific current conditions in the region in the context of the Panmunjom Declaration and recent summits, as well as new nuclear and military developments within the region, including missile defences and potential deployments of intermediate-range missiles;
- Verification systems, particularly establishing a regional verification agency;
- Clarification of the legal and diplomatic steps require to implement a NWFZ in this region; and
- the practical modalities for negotiating the zone.
5. Developing Regional and International Support for a Northeast Asia NWFZ in the Context of a Comprehensive Security Framework

Beyond the specific proposals in the preceding sections above relating to a regional approach in Northeast Asia to a Comprehensive Security Framework and NEANWFZ, a number of further proposals advanced in the SEJONG-RECNA workshop are seen as necessary to generate wider support for the zone within the region and internationally. These proposals include the possible need to make key nuclear-weapon states direct parties to any treaty; the possibility of holding a regional Asia-Pacific conference on the humanitarian and environmental impacts of any nuclear conflict in the region; the need for contextualizing the NEANWFZ concept and proposal within a wider vision of the peace, denuclearization, and human security benefits of establishing such a zone within a comprehensive security framework; and encouragement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and sympathetic governments to advance discussion papers at the 2020 NPT Review Conference on the desirability of establishing such a NEANWFZ.

The critical regional importance of securing credible security assurances against using or threatening to use nuclear weapons should be ensured — possibly by including the three NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states—the United States, China and Russia — as direct parties to the treaty rather than the previous precedent of relying on protocols to the main treaty. This would avoid the lengthy delays that have frequently occurred in nuclear-weapon-state final ratification of treaty protocols and would ensure that regional states would benefit immediately from negative security assurances. Those assurances are a crucial aspect affecting whether regional states, particularly North Korea, would be prepared to join a NWFZ at the very outset. Direct inclusion of the United States, China, and Russia in the treaty would require special legal drafting to identify the binding provisions that would particularly apply to these states, including provisions that would provide binding guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons and the stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons within the region. Further research, however, is needed on the relative legal and political advantages and disadvantages of having the relevant nuclear weapon states join as direct parties compared to securing their prompt accession to binding treaty protocols signed at the same time as the main treaty.

As in the case of the three intergovernmental conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in Oslo (2013), Nayarit (2014), and Vienna (2014), which raised new global awareness of the unappreciated global impacts of even a limited nuclear war, and which paved the way for the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a regional conference on such impacts
within the Asia-Pacific region would help raise awareness at both governmental and society levels of the stakes and catastrophic risks involved in continued reliance on nuclear weapons as part of regional security arrangements. Indonesia, as a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and a leading force in the establishment of the Southeast Asia NWFZ, and New Zealand, as an active member of the New Agenda Group within the United Nations, could be expected to be supportive by becoming co-convenors. Japan, as the only country to experience nuclear attacks in war at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, would be crucial in enabling wider regional understanding of nuclear-weapon impacts, as indeed was the case at the 2014 Vienna Conference on humanitarian impacts, at which hibakusha survivors of the atomic bombings provide moving testimony on the human impacts of such weapons. Highlighting the experience of the Korean survivors would be an important contribution to shared understanding of the meaning of these terrible events.

Such a conference could commission new research on the humanitarian and environmental impacts of a limited nuclear war in the Asia-Pacific region similar to the research already conducted by Toon, Robock, Turco, Bardeen, Oman and Stenchikov (2007) on the consequences of a limited nuclear conflict in South Asia. This would encourage better regional understanding among policy-makers, the media, and wider society of the likely regional and global humanitarian and environmental consequences of even a limited nuclear war in Northeast Asia.

There is still an underappreciation across the whole region of nuclear risks and consequences, and there is a need to communicate a positive vision of what can be achieved through establishing a regional NWFZ and pursuing principles of cooperative security rather than military and nuclear confrontation. This vision will need to be pursued by a coalition of civil society groups, experts, politicians, and opinion writers. Support also should be actively sought through the UN and sympathetic governments beyond the region, such as Indonesia and New Zealand.

Article VII of the NPT explicitly includes reference to the “right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Successive NPT review conferences have sought in particular to create a Middle

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22 Regarding humanitarian and environmental impacts of a limited nuclear war, the expert study organized by Hiroshima City was published as “Report from the Committee of Experts on Damage Scenarios Resulting from a Nuclear Weapons Attack” (Nov 2007). This study includes a scenario for a 1 kiloton explosion in a modern city caused by a terrorist.


Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Middle East, like Northeast Asia, is a region where nuclear proliferation has already occurred, in the form of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and where there are now fears that other states, such as Iran, may seek such weapons. Following previous NPT review conference decisions, a UN conference on a Middle Eastern WMD-free zone is to be held in New York in November. It seems timely for NGOs and sympathetic governments to advance discussion papers at the NPT 2020 Review Conference on the feasibility and desirability of a NWFZ in the Northeast Asia region.

Further, as proposed in Recommendation 7 of the March 2019 Kyoto Appeal of the Eminent Persons Group (established by Fumio Kishida, the Japanese foreign minister), there should be a renewed commitment by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states to pursue legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone treaties. While nuclear-weapon states have generally been prepared to offer such security assurances to NWFZs, they often have been slow in actual ratification of the relevant NWFZ treaty protocols and have so far been reluctant to offer such assurances more generally to all non-nuclear-weapon states who are parties to the NPT. The failure of nuclear powers to offer such assurances most certainly creates disincentives for some states who perceive themselves to be under nuclear threat from a nuclear-weapon state to join or remain in the NPT, as was most likely the case for DPRK, and may well become the case for Iran.

Proposal 1: The three neighbouring nuclear-weapon states—the United States, China, and Russia—should support a regional Korean/Northeast Asia NWFZ through legal provisions within the main body of the treaty requiring them to enter into binding commitments not to:

- Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties;
- Station or deploy nuclear weapons within the zone; and
- Assist treaty parties in the development, research, or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Proposal 2: In cooperation with civil society, Japan and South Korea should seek to convene an Asia-Pacific conference on the regional humanitarian and environmental consequences of a potential nuclear conflict in the Asia-Pacific, with agenda items that would include:

- Cooperation with other like-minded countries such as Indonesia and New Zealand in co-convening the conference;
- Commissioning relevant research to inform the conference on the humanitarian and environmental impacts of even a limited nuclear conflict in the Asia-Pacific region; and

25 For the Kyoto Appeal, see: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000469293.pdf.
• Gathering testimony from survivors of nuclear attacks and testing within the Asia-Pacific region.

Proposal 3: To gain wider support, the Northeast Asia NWFZ proposal should be part of a larger vision of peace, denuclearization, and human security for this region including:

- The development of a comprehensive security framework to be presented in ways that can be readily understood and appreciated in government, media, and civil society; and
- Greater coordination and communication among actors such as NGOs, experts, political representatives, and the media about issues associated with comprehensive security framework.

Proposal 4: At the Track 2 level, there should be encouragement of government experts and associated advisory panels (such as Japan’s Eminent Persons Group) to prepare working papers on:

- the feasibility and desirability of establishing a NEANWFZ for circulation at the 2020 NPT Review Conference; and
- and seeking the inclusion of negotiations towards a NEANWFZ in the NPT Action Plan possibly arising out of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

Proposal 5: In accord with Recommendation 7 of the Kyoto Appeal of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states should pursue the realization of legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon state that are:

- parties to the NPT; and
- parties to nuclear weapon free zone treaties.

Proposal 6: Research bodies working in this field should seek funding from relevant regional governments and foundations for commissioning specific research on the humanitarian and environmental impacts of even a limited nuclear war in the Asia-Pacific region, including:

- Building on the research on regional impacts already undertaken by Toon, Robock, Turco, Bardeen, Oman and Stenchikov; and
- Further updating and consolidating research on the experience of victims and survivors of nuclear-weapon use and testing in the Asia-Pacific region.
6. Japan and the ROK: Possible Actions

Today we are closer than ever before to ending the Korean War. The very favourable political situation in the Korean Peninsula, created by the US-DPRK summit declarations and the summit declarations between the ROK and the DPRK in 2018, is critically significant for the security of not only the ROK but also Japan. There is an absolute need for us to take constructive actions. All regional players—but China and Japan, in particular—should support a comprehensive security strategy in Northeast Asia, including the creation of a NWFZ to resolve the Korean problem.

Although ROK-Japan relations are often marred by politically sensitive and differing views related to territorial disputes, history textbooks, and “comfort women” and “forced labor” issues, these problems should not become an obstacle to a process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a future NWFZ. Instead, the two neighboring countries should take actions, both jointly and independently, to prevent a military conflict in this region and promote a sustainable peace by establishing a comprehensive security framework. To this end, we propose specific actions below.

1. Japan should initiate direct dialogue with the DPRK
   - Japan should start a dialogue with the DPRK based on the spirit of the 2002 DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration, which includes a commitment to normalization of relationships between two countries;
   - Abduction issues should be discussed in the context of normalization of a diplomatic relationship between the two countries; and
   - Deferred economic cooperation should be discussed in the context of a multilateral settlement that realizes the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and includes a suitable intermediary, such as the World Bank.26

2. The ROK should prevent military exercises and drills from escalating to political conflicts that damage the overall process of implementing the 2018 ROK-DPRK summit joint declarations by:

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26  2002 DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration says: “The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology. Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks.”
• Establishing bilateral or trilateral risk management mechanisms among the ROK, the United States, the DPRK, and Japan; and
• Using the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee established by the ROK and DPRK in their Inter-Korean Agreements in the Military Domain to be a core body to play risk management roles by coordinating officials from other military forces.

3. Japan and the ROK should reexamine security policy dependent on nuclear extended deterrence and explore an alternative security policy built on the new regional security regime proposed here:
• Japan, as the only nation that has experienced an attack with nuclear weapons, should start to reexamine its security posture, which is highly dependent on the US “nuclear umbrella”—that is, nuclear extended deterrence based on the US-Japan Security Treaty.
• This effort should consider emerging technologies that could undermine the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
• The ROK also should reexamine its dependence on US nuclear extended deterrence.
• The ROK and Japan should seek alternative measures to minimize the role of the US nuclear umbrella and eventually abandon it.
• This approach will contribute immensely to establishing a NWFZ in Northeast Asia based upon negative security assurance from the nuclear-weapon states.
• Jointly or independently, the ROK and Japan should launch efforts to determine how to reduce the roles of nuclear weapons in their security policies, taking advantage of the current positive security environment on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
• One option is to prepare working papers for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. This would be a significant contribution to global nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-dependent countries, Japan and the ROK, located in the region where nuclear confrontation has been a matter of serious concern in recent years.

4. The ROK and Japan reestablish bilateral (ROK-Japan) and trilateral (ROK-Japan-US) policy-coordinating frameworks to pursue and substantiate “Complete Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in a final, fully verifiable manner by:
• Having intensive and frequent policy discussions among the ROK, Japan, and the United States to create peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula;
• Restoring international trust and confidence in policy implementation by the key
players in the region;

• Setting aside controversial and emotional bilateral issues in order to prioritize their common security goal up front; and

• Considering reviving the so-called TCOG (Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group) process which was an invaluable policy-coordinating forum in the late 1990s.

5. The ROK and Japan should be prepared to multilateralize the peace and denuclearization process in Northeast Asia after a critical give-and-take deal is concluded in the US-DPRK negotiations and is implemented in a parallel, simultaneous-action manner by the US and the DPRK.

• In preparation for such a need, consider four-party talks (ROK, DPRK, United States, China) for a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula and a new six-party process to assure realization of both the 2018 summit declaration and agreements and the 2005 six-party statement with relevant updates.

6. Japan and the ROK should consider joint collaborative projects to reduce nuclear threats during the denuclearization process such as “cooperative threat reduction” initiatives, addressing also the safety and security risks of civilian nuclear fuel cycle programs in the region.

Similar to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) initiatives taken by the United States to reduce nuclear security risks in former Soviet Union, Japan and the ROK could help establish a program to reduce the security risks in denuclearization of DPRK. Possible measures include: (a) Improving material accounting and control measures of plutonium or highly enriched uranium in the DPRK; (b) Helping with disposition of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium owned by DPRK; (c) Employing scientists and engineers previously working on military programs in the DPRK; and (d) Exploring a regional (multilateral) framework might be appropriate to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
7. Conclusion

Northeast Asia is the region where “(t)he intensification of big power competition and rivalry between the United States and Russia, and more importantly between the United States and China, creates unprecedented challenges for regional stability.” Subsequently and unfortunately, “the increasingly competitive US-China geopolitical interests in this region could considerably hinder their potential cooperation to achieve DPRK denuclearization, peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula, and the NEANWFZ (Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone). At the same time, DPRK would seek to take advantage of the growing big power competition.”

For regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia, therefore, what is urgently needed is to share a recognition that the states and people in this region are at a crossroad of risks and hopes:

(1) The risks include:

(a) “unprecedented challenges for regional stability” triggered by geopolitical and strategic competitions among the United States, Russia, and China; and

(b) the possibility of more tests and the buildup of nuclear arsenals and ballistic missile capabilities by the DPRK.

(2) The reasons for hope include:

(a) the signing by the leaders of the ROK and the DPRK of the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Pyongyang Declaration, which included a commitment to “cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and also emphasized that “(t)he two sides agreed to expand the cessation of military hostility in regions of confrontation such as the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) into the substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean Peninsula and a fundamental resolution of the hostile relations;” and

(b) continuation of dialogue between the leaders of the United States and DPRK.

Considering this unprecedented historical crossroad, we need to contemplate what can minimize those risks and maximize hopes. As a result of the two days of discussions at the SEJONG-RECNA workshop, we are convinced that the optimum and practical policies laid out in this Policy Proposal “From Peace on the Korean Peninsula to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” will contribute to empowering a new dynamic that can lead us to a sustainable peace with mutual trust in this region.

28 2018 Pyongyang Declaration, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=319608&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm=&page=1&titleNm=_.

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Finally, we are reminded of U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s warning, in his address before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1961, that “(t)he weapons of (nuclear) war must be abolished before they abolish us.”\textsuperscript{29} By using the same kind of logic, we hope to abolish not only nuclear weapons but also nuclear risks in Northeast Asia before they abolish us.

Fumihiko Yoshida and Haksoon Paik

\textsuperscript{29} For the full text of this Kennedy speech, see \url{https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/united-nations-19610925}. 
8. List of participants in the SEJONG- RECNA workshop

From ROK

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・ Ildo Hwang, Assistant Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (ROK)
・ Jungmin Kang, Independent Nuclear Analyst / Former Chair of South Korea’s Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (ROK) / PSNA Member
・ Jinwook Kim, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
・ Myon Woo Lee, Vice President, Sejong Institute (ROK)
・ Haksoo Paik, President, Sejong Institute (ROK)
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From Japan

・ Seiji Endo, Professor, Seikei University (Japan) / PSNA Member
・ Satoshi Hirose Vice Director, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member
・ Byundug Jun, Professor, Nagasaki University (Japan)
・ Masakatsu Ota, Senior Feature Writer Section, Kyodo News / Visiting Professor, RECNA (Japan)
・ Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice Director, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member
・ Masao Tomonaga, Visiting Professor, RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Co-Chair
・ Hiromichi Umehayashi, Visiting Professor, Former Director of RECNA (Japan) / PSNA Member
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・ Toby Field Dalton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (USA)
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・ Peter Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute (USA) / PSNA Co-Chair
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・ Anton Kholopov, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (Russian Federation)
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