SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
22 September 1994

66 B-52s for Nuclear Deterrence

Senator Nunn: Dr. Deutch: The NPR recommends that 66 B-52s be retained for nuclear deterrence.

- Are these additive to bomber requirements for conventional missions under the NPR? If not, does this presume that the US is less likely to require a nuclear alert in the midst of an MRC action than during peacetime?

- What are the presumed weapon loadings for these 66 B-52s? How many Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) and/or Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) would each B-52 carry? How many gravity weapons would each carry?

- If the Congress continues to convert nuclear-armed ALCMs to conventional weapons, will this action affect total bomber requirements for nuclear deterrence?

Dr. Deutch: The NPR numbers are not additive to the DPG guidance of 100 deployable heavy bombers. Should world tensions increase to such a level that the NCA deems it necessary to generate heavy bombers while the United States is engaged in a regional conflict than it would be possible to recall the bombers to the CONUS to generate to a SIOP alert status. It is important to realize that although one leg of our TRIAD would be involved in conventional operations, we will still have both our ICBM and SLBM forces remaining as a significant and responsive nuclear deterrent should any nation attempt to take advantage of our involvement in a major regional conflict.

The current aggregate planned loads for the B-52s in the current inventory of.

Current Air Force plan is to convert another augmenting our current inventory of.

The conversion to Conventional Air-launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM) from ALCMs does not affect the requirement for 66 B-52 aircraft as stated in the NPR. The slated for conversion leave an ample number of cruise missiles for SIOP execution.

Obtained Under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen

Maj ARKO, USAF/XQFC/5-4709
Question #3: At present, the START I Treaty has been ratified but has not yet entered into force. START II has not been ratified, and will not be prior to the entry into force of START I. Yet START II has tight time-lines for force reductions. If Congress were to prohibit reductions substantially below the START I limits until START II is ratified, the time available between START II ratification and the 2003 deadline would be compressed. At what point between today and 2003 does the delay into force of these Treaties jeopardize the ability of either the US or Russia to physically comply with the dismantlement provisions? At what point would complying with the dismantlement timetable begin to impose large additional costs on both DoD and DoE?

(U) The NPR's strategic force structure decisions are premised on entry into force and implementation of START II. We are committed to reaching the limits outlined by this treaty, and are proceeding with early deactivation, as soon as START II is ratified and entered into force by both the US and Russia. As Secretary Perry stated in his March 1994 speech at George Washington University, "as a hedge, we have not begun implementing the START II reductions and will not do so until Russia undertakes comparable reductions." Although under START II we will implement NPR decisions unilaterally, we have encouraged the Russians to view our decisions as an opportunity for them to take comparable actions.

(U) To comply with START II, modification of the Minuteman III to a single warhead ICBM requires the longest lead time -- approximately four years. Therefore, conversion of MM IIs must begin no later than the end of 1998 to meet the 1 Jan. 2003 START II deadline.

(U) Under the plan developed for the Nuclear Posture Review, the four non-backfit Trident submarines will be removed from service in a phased manner over several years. This inactivation requires a period of two years with shipyard facilities as the limiting factor. The exact timing for disposition of the non-backfit Trident submarines is still under consideration.

(U) Compression of the planned reduction/elimination schedule imposed by Congressional delays would likely result in some increased cost in terms of manpower requirements, weapon system serviceability, transportation and storage requirements, and contracts. Specific cost impacts cannot be accurately determined without knowing when and to what degree Congress would prohibit reductions.

(U) Even before the recent entry into force of START I, Russia, like the United States, had begun to deactivate and dismantle its strategic nuclear systems to be eliminated under START I. We therefore do not anticipate that Russia will have a problem complying with START I final limits, which will take effect in seven years. (DELETED)

Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, we are working with the Russians to gain a better understanding of their dismantlement needs and to provide them with assistance that will facilitate elimination of their strategic nuclear systems.
UNCLASSIFIED

Question #5: Please provide a table showing how the proposed NPR nuclear force structure would be assessed using both START I and START II counting rules. Will the proposed NPR nuclear force structure be closer to the START I and START II force limits than the nuclear posture proposed by the previous administration?

The following table shows how the proposed NPR nuclear force structure would be assessed using both START I and START II counting rules.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Number of Delivery Vehicles</th>
<th>START I Number of Accountable Warheads</th>
<th>START II Number of Accountable Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>450-500</td>
<td>450-500*</td>
<td>450-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident D-5</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td>1680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52H</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>up to 1000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1B</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>966-1016</td>
<td>3912-3962</td>
<td>up to 3500**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assumes all missiles are downloaded to one warhead according to START I procedures.

** No final determination has been made about B-52H weapon loadings under START II.

*** All B-1Bs will be reoriented to a non-nuclear role and will not count toward the START II accountable warhead limit.

Under START I counting rules, the NPR force structure would be lower than previous force projections, which called for about 6000 accountable warheads. However, the NPR force structure is projected for the year 2003 and is premised on START II being in force. Under START II counting rules, both the NPR force and previous force projections would result in about 3500 accountable warheads. However, under the NPR force, the number of delivery vehicles (ballistic missile launchers and bombers) is over 120 fewer than previously planned.
Senator Exon: Dr. Deutch: The Nuclear Posture Review recommends building down the US strategic nuclear force to a specified level by 2003. What is the projected timetable for this draw-down? Will the Administration seek to reach NPR force levels prior to 2003? Is the draw-down dependent upon actions or force reductions in Russia and other formerly Soviet states? If so, what will drive the pace of the US draw-down, and when will key decisions need to be made?

Dr. Deutch: The Nuclear Posture Review established the START II Treaty compliant force structure for the United States. Draw down to this force structure is based on the assumption of START II ratification and entry into force.

The projected timetable for draw down to the 2003 NPR force is scheduled for completion by the START II deadline of 1 Jan 2003.

To comply with START II, modification of the Minuteman III to a single warhead ICBM requires the longest lead time approximately four years. Therefore, conversion of MM IIIIs must begin no later than the end of 1998 to meet the 1 Jan 2003 START II deadline.

Under the plan developed for the Nuclear Posture Review, the four non backfit Trident submarines will be removed from service in a phased manner over several years. Inactivation of the four ships would occur with [deleted].

This inactivation requires a period of two years with shipyard facilities as the limiting factor.

Since it is possible the administration will accelerate the draw down to meet START II limits by 31 December 2000, the services must plan accordingly. Therefore, in order to physically comply with a START II date of 31 Dec 2000, the U.S. must begin downloading Minuteman IIIIs by 1 January 1997. Also, a delayed entry into force of START II beyond 2001 would jeopardize our ability to meet dismantlement requirements for the non backfit Trident submarines.

The draw down is dependent upon ratification and entry into force of START II and no major policy reversals in Russia.

The pace of the draw down will be determined by the physical limitations of weapon system serviceability, transportation and storage requirements, manpower requirements, and contracts.

PDD-30 signed by President Clinton concurring with the NPR recommendations is the decision document.

Maj Tom Billick, USAF/KOXI/7-7345
LCDR G. Jackson, USN/N514D/3-3911
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
22 September 1994

Exon Q.23

Senator Exon: Dr. Deutch: The NPR recommends 20 B-2 and 66 B-52 bombers to carry out required missions. Are these total numbers of bombers in the inventory or deployable bombers available for action? If these numbers are necessary to carry out nuclear missions, how will these systems serve in both a nuclear and conventional role during major regional contingency? If bombers are being used in a conventional role, will it not preclude them from standing nuclear alert (and vice versa)?

Dr. Deutch: The NPR numbers are total numbers of bombers in the Air Force inventory while deployable bombers are those that are designated as Combat Coded (CC) aircraft with sufficient spares and equipment to support sustained forward deployed operations. If needed, all available combat coded bombers can deploy, but we anticipate needing 100 for two MRC support. If world conditions dictate, the NCA can direct the remaining nuclear capable bombers, or recall additional deployed bombers, to stand SIOP alert. Although execution of our MRC strategy may stretch our bomber resources, the final decision by the NCA will balance the needs of the combatant commanders with the requirements to reinforce the United States nuclear posture.

Maj Arko, USAF/XOFC/5-4709
**Question #24:** Bombers are projected to continue to play an important role in the nuclear triad. The NPR notes that bombers help guard against catastrophic failure of the submarine leg of the triad. Given the key role of bombers, is it not prudent to spread these assets at more than one base to increase their security? Will the Administration pursue a basing policy that provides adequate security for the strategic bomber force?

Each leg of the nuclear TRIAD, the bomber leg included, provides a hedge against a catastrophic failure of either of the two remaining legs. Therefore, it is prudent to spread bomber assets at more than one base. Currently, SIOP-committed bombers are based at (DELETED). Our NPR projected 20 B-2s to come on line as part of the FY2003 force structure and will be located at Whiteman AFB MO. Another base (DELETED) would be used as a forward operating location for B-52s in the event that bombers are generated for the SIOP. In any case, survivability for the bomber force will also depend upon a timely decision to generate.
Question #25: To what extent does the NPR change the basic deterrence principles that guided us during the Cold War? In particular, I am anxious to find out whether the Administration has sought in any way to decouple strategic deterrence from broader U.S. national security goals.

The primary role of nuclear weapons continues to be the deterrence of aggression against the United States and our allies. However, nuclear weapons are playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any time in the nuclear age. For many years we did not believe that we could mount a credible deterrent against the Warsaw Pact without the use of nuclear weapons. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the overwhelming conventional threat has also disappeared. However, the threat of nuclear attack remains, and we feel that a reduced nuclear force structure is required for the foreseeable future.
Question #26: Since the end of the World War II, we have tended to view nuclear forces in a positive way -- as the ultimate guarantor peace between the major powers. To what extent does the Administration want strategic forces to continue playing such a positive role in the future?

An examination of the remaining nuclear threat from Russia and the non-Russian republics that possess nuclear weapons as well as the emerging threat from other countries around the world indicate that the United States will continue to need nuclear weapons for deterrence for the foreseeable future, although nuclear weapons are playing a smaller role in US security than at any time in the nuclear age. We will retain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any nuclear state, should it be hostile, and to convince it that seeking any advantage in nuclear weapons would be futile. This demands that the United States continue to maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size and capability to effectively hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile political and military leaders.
Question #27: Do you believe there is a level of strategic forces below which the United States should not go under any circumstances?

We must maintain a force large enough to deter any potential aggressor. For the START II time frame we have determined that that force is about 3500 deployed strategic weapons. At the September 1994 Summit Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to instruct their experts to intensify their dialogue to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces.
Question #28: To what extent, if at all, does the Administration accept the notion that nuclear weapons deter merely by their existence? Do you continue to believe that we must maintain credible options for employing nuclear weapons in order to maintain deterrence?

The primary role of U.S. nuclear weapons continues to be the deterrence of aggression against the United States, U.S. forces overseas, and U.S. allies. While deterrence is the purpose of our nuclear forces, deterrence is not viable without a credible capability to hold at risk that which a potentially hostile leadership values.
Question #29: Did the NPR deal directly or indirectly with the targeting of our strategic nuclear forces? Will there be a revised Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) as a result of the NPR?

In response to the changes in Europe, including the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, targeting guidance has been modified already to reflect the current political and military realities. Today, consistent with the threat situation, our nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country. Should a direct threat emerge which would require us to reactivate targeting, US nuclear weapons could be re-targeted quickly (as could Russian weapons), and we would hold at risk those assets valued by the leadership of any hostile state. By doing so, we would make clear that, because we were prepared to respond and were capable of doing so, those leaders should never attack us. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, the target base utilized to support the SIOP had been modified and reduced to reflect the changing realities of the potential nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies. The size of our nuclear forces has also been reduced. The Nuclear Posture Review carefully reviewed the changed environment, assessed the military modifications already in place, and made recommendations on further modifications to force structure and targeting guidance. These changes will continue the concept of deterrence.
Question #30: To what extent does the Administration link its plans for implementing the recommendations of the NPR to Russian implementation of START I and START II?

The NPR’s strategic force structure decisions are premised on entry into force and implementation of START II, which cannot occur until START I has entered into force. We are committed to reaching the limits outlined by these treaties, and to proceeding with early deactivation, as soon as START II is ratified and entered into force by both the US and Russia. We will not proceed beyond START I limits until START II is ratified by Russia. Although under START II we will implement NPR decisions unilaterally, we have encouraged the Russians to view our decisions as an opportunity for them to take comparable actions.
Question #31: Our nuclear allies, France and Great Britain, continue to view strategic nuclear forces as vital to international stability. Perhaps more important, many of our non-nuclear allies such as Germany and Japan continue to rely on the U.S. to provide an extended deterrent. Have you consulted with our allies on the NPR? What have you told them and what have they told you?

Our nuclear and non-nuclear allies were fully consulted prior to NPR decisions being made and subsequently briefed on the decisions. The response of our allies to the NPR decisions was very positive. The NPR fundamentally recognized that the US does not have a purely national deterrent posture; it shares the deterrent protection of its nuclear arsenal with allies. A very progressive aspect of US nuclear posture is that it is, in part, an international nuclear posture. With input from allied countries, we concluded that there continues to be a nuclear element to NATO's defense posture and that the US will sustain its commitment to both NATO and Pacific allies.
**Question #34:** Admiral Chiles, Commander-in-Chief of STRATCOM, has argued that going below 500 ICBMs would shift the targeting burden to the bomber force in a way that would degrade their range, effectiveness, survivability, and flexibility. Admiral Chiles also cites a number of unique and positive attributes of single warhead Minuteman III force to justify not going below 500. To what extent have you factored these issues into your calculations?

Admiral Chiles and his staff were major participants during the entire NPR. USSTRATCOM staff participated in all NPR working groups and supported the NPR with valuable analysis. Admiral Chiles attended all high level NPR meetings. His arguments were very much a factor in final NPR decisions. USSTRATCOM supports the conclusions of the NPR.
Question #35: The NPR recommends retention of 500/450 Minuteman III ICBMs at three wings. What will determine whether we retain 500 verses 450 and when will this decision be made?

In negotiating START II, which prohibits multiple warheads on land-based ICBMs, the U.S. opted for a force of 500 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs. The NPR reaffirmed that requirement. The decision to retain 450 or 500 reflects a desire not to prejudice deliberations of the FY95 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. The U.S. currently has four ICBM bases, one with 200 MM III silos and the others with 150 MM III silos. If one with 150 silos is closed the number would be 500. If the wing with 200 should be closed then the number would be 450. The decision to close a base hinges on many factors, including the contribution of that base to U.S. warfighting capabilities. Final determination on missile basing cannot be made before completion of the 95 BRAC.
Senator Kempthorne: Dr. Deutch: Did the Nuclear Posture Review consider the relationship between ICBM reductions and next year's base closure commission? Is it true that one of our ICBM bases will have to be closed to reach the level of 500 ICBMs?

Dr. Deutch: The NPR's final determination of 450 or 500 Minuteman IIIIs at three wings takes into account the warfighting requirement of the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command and the Air Force's desire to consolidate the Minuteman III force at three wings for efficiency and cost effectiveness. The Department of Defense did not want to prejudice the base realignment and closure process; therefore, we provided the 450 or 500 numbers for ICBM force structure and have delayed any missile basing decisions until the BRAC process is complete.

It is not necessarily true that a base will have to close to reach a 500 Minuteman III force; we could spread missiles over the four existing bases, although this is not cost effective. However, to achieve the NPR recommended force of 450 or 500 Minuteman III missiles at three wings, we would either have to close a missile base or deactivate only the missile unit at a base with multiple missions. Whether associated with base closure or missile unit deactivation, it makes good fiscal sense to operate the same number of missiles out of three vice four wings.
Question #40: Earlier this year Chairman Nunn took an Armed Services Committee
delegation to visit with our counterparts in the Russian Duma. During our working group
discussions, we heard moderate, conservative and radical right Russian Parliamentarians
complain about the cost of implementing the START II agreement. The members of the
Duma that I talked with did not seem inclined to ratify START II. What is your
assessment of Russia's willingness to ratify START II?

We are aware that some members of the Russian Duma have criticized START II.
However, the Russian government still supports START II. In fact, at the recent summit,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of START II
once START I entered into force. Furthermore, since Russia has not begun yet its ratification
process, the treaty's benefits have not been fully presented. We believe that once these benefits
are known, the Russian people will see that START II is a balanced treaty and is in the mutual
interest of Russia and the United States.
Question #46: Secretary Deutch, in a major war, almost all of our active bombers would be dedicated to the conventional war. Indeed, as you know, because of the limited number of heavy bombers in our inventory the bombers are supposed to "swing" from one conflict to the next under DoD's current plans. Are there plans to leave any bombers on nuclear alert in the event our forces are engaged in a major regional conflict?

We have not had bombers on nuclear alert since September 1991, and have no plans to withhold any bombers from a conventional conflict. However, if the situation dictates, the NCA can direct that bombers be put on alert before, during and after a MRC. Though the execution of one or two MRCs would stretch bomber resources and may delay generation, USSTRATCOM is confident that the bomber force will be able to carry out its responsibilities.