Nuclear Posture Review
Key Issues
For Review By The
Strategic Advisory Group

Brig Gen Tony Tolin
Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy, J-5

Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen

CLASSIFIED BY: DJ-5
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

15 Mar 94
Overview

- Purpose
- Organization
- Key Questions
- Schedule
Nuclear Posture Review: A Complex and Challenging Task

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

- PHYSICAL SECURITY
- FORCE STRUCTURE
- FARR
- CTBT
- ARMS CONTROL
- MISSILE DEFENSE
- ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH
- PROLIFERATION
- NPT
- C3I
- DoE
- NATO
- BUDGET
- SAFETY
- DECLARATORY POLICIES
- BASING
- THREATS/SCENARIOS
- INDUSTRIAL BASE
- STOCKPILE
- ALLIES
- NON-STRATEGIC NUKES
- CBMs
- RESPONSE OPTIONS
Purpose Of The Nuclear Posture Review

☐ Statement of purpose: "To examine the role of nuclear forces in the security policy of the United States in light of the new and enduring dangers of the post-Cold War era, and to recommend to the Secretary of Defense a revised nuclear posture (policy, strategy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, and supporting infrastructure) to fulfill that role." (Terms of Reference for the Nuclear Posture Review, October 29, 1993)

☐ First such review in 15 years

☐ Planning horizon
  ☐ Look out 10 years
  ☐ Affect forces 20 years
  ☐ Cast shadow 25 years

☐ Many individual "small" decisions are being made which affect U.S. nuclear posture - we need to make them in the context of a long-term plan
Organization Of The NPR: DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort

- Steering Group
  - Dr. Ashton B. Carter, ASD Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Co-Chair
  - MajGen John Admire, Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Co-Chair
  - Dr. Harold Smith ATSD (AE)
  - Dr. George Schneiter, Dir. Strategic & Space Systems OUSD/A
  - Dr. Larry Gershwin, NIO(SP), CIA
Organization Of The NPR: DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort

☐ Six Working Groups
  ☐ Define issues
  ☐ Analyze options
  ☐ Prepare recommendations
  ☐ Prepare implementing documents

☐ Working Group Participants:

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<th>NSS</th>
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## Nuclear Posture Review

**Working Group Participants**

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* Working Group Members at Action Officer Level
** CINC Staff Being Provided Background Information and Key Issues via Fax
*** DOE, NSA, and NSS Will Provide Representatives As Required
Working Groups

- **Group 1**: Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Security Strategy
- **Group 2**: Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure
- **Group 3**: Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control
- **Group 4**: Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control
- **Group 5**: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy
- **Group 6**: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Threat Reduction Policy with the Former Soviet Union
Working Groups

- **Group 1:** Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Security Strategy  
  Chairman - Franklin C. Miller, DASD (Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy)

- **Group 2:** Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure  
  Chairman - Dr. Frank Dellermann, Director, NS&CP (Strategy, Forces and Operations)

- **Group 3:** Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control  
  Chairman - Col Terry Schwallin, Chief, Nuclear Operations/Command and Control Division, J-36, Joint Staff

- **Group 4:** Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control  
  Chairman - William Kahn, Director, NS&CP (Safety and Security)

- **Group 5:** Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy  
  Chairman - Dr. Mitch Wallerstein, DASD (Counterproliferation Policy)

- **Group 6:** Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Threat Reduction Policy with the Former Soviet Union  
  Chairman - Dr. Susan Koch, Senior Advisor, OASD/NS&CP
Nuclear Posture Review: The Basic Issues

☐ Declaratory Policy

☐ Counterproliferation

☐ Force Structure

☐ Strategic forces
☐ Non-Strategic forces and weapons
☐ Basing

☐ Operations Policy

☐ Alert
☐ SSBN crews

☐ Relationship to Arms Control
Key Issues:
Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure

1. What are our force needs in these four key categories:
   - Survivable strategic retaliatory forces in the same circumstances
   - Flexibly targetable prompt strategic force
   - Non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)

2. Can strategic forces do the military missions accomplished by NSNF?
   - If yes, are there other reasons to retain NSNF?

3. What factors would lead us to reconsider National Missile Defense (NMD)?
   What implications do these factors have for our BMD program?

4. Are there new technologies/qualitative breakthroughs possible in our nuclear forces that we should develop or deploy?

5. What are the breakpoints in scale where specific force elements (and their supporting industrial, technology, and training bases) become uneconomical or unsustainable?

6. At what point must we consider replacement of our current nuclear forces?
7. Should the customer plan provided to DoE regarding DoD's future requirements from the nuclear weapons complex be changed from the existing plan (NWSM of December 1993)? E.g.,

- Maintain an [in subsequent years]
- Maintain the ability [per year]
- Support limited life components including tritium and tritium supply
Key Issues:
Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control

8. Should changes be made in the planning assumptions and operational practices of the strategic nuclear forces and C3I in the post-cold war environment? In particular, should [redacted] become the dominant execution policy?

9. For each of the following, what should be the planning process and assignment of responsibilities, key planning assumptions, architecture of employment plans, and mechanism for providing national and SecDef guidance?
   - [ ] In regional contingencies
   - [ ] Counterproliferation planning

10. What changes in U.S. nuclear operating procedures can be made to enhance stability, contribute to strategic disengagement, and avoid accidental/unauthorized use?

11. What C3I programs and structure, including those related to continuity of government, should be emphasized?
Key Issues:
Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control

12. Is it practical and desirable for the U.S. to adopt the stated objective to make it virtually impossible, through physical means, for [redacted].

13. Should we implement all of the safety and use control improvements recommended by the Failsafe and Risk Reduction (FARR) Committee (Kirkpatrick Panel) (save those that are not possible under a comprehensive test ban)? Are there additional improvements needed beyond those recommended in the FARR report? Are all FARR improvements on schedule and funded? What new technologies should we invest in to enable [redacted].

14. How should we store and transport nuclear weapons (in storage, transport, and deployment; in peacetime and in crisis) to deal with evolving security threats?

15. What, if any, nuclear safety, security, or use control technology should we make available to China to gain increased assurance against a nuclear incident, accident, or unauthorized launch? Are there other countries that pose no immediate threat to the United States (e.g., India) for which we should consider such technology transfer?
Keys Issues:
Relationship Between Alternative Postures
And Counterproliferation Policy

16. How important are various elements of the U.S. nuclear posture (e.g., aggregate numbers, forward basing, pace of modernization, "extended deterrence," declaratory policy, etc.) in affecting the motivations of nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction?

17. In regional scenarios considered, what options does the U.S. have to deter and respond to use of (a) nuclear, (b) chemical, (c) biological weapons against U.S. territory, forces, and allies? Which of these options depends on employment of U.S. nuclear forces? What changes to our posture would strengthen our capabilities to deter or respond?

18. What effect on our capability over time to deter and respond to use of WMD would each of the following declaratory policy changes have?

- [ ] ____________
- Extended positive or negative security assurances (unilateral or in association with other nuclear weapon states)
- Renunciation of the positive or negative security assurances currently in force
- A pledge not to use ____________ in response to use of ____________
- Various proposed “nuclear free zones”
- Fissile material cutoff

19. What steps should we take (beyond our current counterproliferation policies) to deter or prevent terroristic use of weapons of mass destruction?
Key Issues:
Relationship Between Alternative Postures
And
Threat Reduction Policy With The Former Soviet Union

20. What cooperative measures affecting the U.S. nuclear posture could the U.S. propose to Russia that would reduce the probability of accidental/unauthorized launch, or avoid the dangers to stability of hair trigger postures?

21. What measures affecting the U.S. nuclear posture should the U.S. propose to improve control of U.S. and FSU nuclear weapons and fissile materials?

22. What should be the U.S. plans to hedge against:
   - START I not being fully implemented?
   - START II not entering into force?
   - Delayed or discontinued dismantlement of Russian tactical nuclear weapons?

23. What are DoD objectives in arms control beyond START II?
Key Issues:
Policy On The Role Of Nuclear Weapons In U.S. Security

24. Logic of U.S. nuclear posture: Security environment \( \rightarrow \) threats and scenarios \( \rightarrow \) attributes of a stable nuclear posture.

25. Long-term goals: enduring arsenal, reduced profile, "abolition," \ldots

26. International presence: nuclear isolationism, nuclear "umbrella," international "coalition" deterrent, and "nuclear power projection"

27. Declaratory posture
   - First use/no first use
   - Extended positive or negative security assurances: expand/renounce
   - Use/no use of nuclear weapons in response to \( \ldots \)
   - Various proposed "nuclear free zones"

28. Prompt response/no prompt response
Products

- Five DepSecDef/VCJCS decision briefings on Key Issues
- SecDef decision directives
- Briefings to the President
- Presidential Decision Directive to replace
  - NSDD-13
  - PD-48
- Revised guidance documents
  - Revised NUWEP
  - Revised JSCP, Annex C
- White Papers/Speeches
Schedule

- SecDef announced NPR start 29 October
- Periodic progress reports to SecDef, Co-Chair briefs to other agencies, and DoD coordination of conclusions
- SecDef final report to President in early Summer
- Expect full implementation of any new U.S. policies within 12-18 months after NPR completion
# Nuclear Posture Review Schedule

**October 1993 - February 1994**

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<th>Interagency</th>
<th>President (VP/NSA)</th>
<th>Congress Allies Public Affairs Outside Experts</th>
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# Nuclear Posture Review Schedule

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**UNCLASSIFIED WORKING PAPERS**

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**UNCLASSIFIED WORKING PAPERS**  21
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**April 1994**

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## NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
### MAY 1994

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**DoD Coordination**

**SECDEF CJCS**

**Interagency**

**President (VP/NSA)**

**Congress Allies Public Affairs Outside Experts**

**Unclassified Working Papers**

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