SECURITY IN ASIA The 45th meeting of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" was held in Hiroshima from Japan 23-29, 1995. Working Group 5 dealt with security in Asia. The working group covered three main topics via commissioned and proffered papers, and in dialogue, viz: nuclear proliferation, conventional arms trade, and confidence building. The following report was prepared by Peter Hayes of Nautilus Institute, rapporteur of Working Group 5. Although it reflects extensive discussion and editing in conjunction with Working Group chairpersons, participants and commentators in plenary session, by Pugwash convention the rapporteur is solely responsible for the contents of the report. Copies of other Pugwash 1995 Working Group reports can be obtained from the Pugwash Secretariat at email: pugwash@qmw.ac.uk WORKING GROUP 5: Rapporteur's report (Peter Hayes) 5a. Nuclear Proliferation: Non-introduction of Nuclear Weapons by Nuclear Powers; Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones 1. Nuclear Proliferation The propensity of states to proliferate nuclear weapons varies across the subregions of Asia-Pacific as a function of external and domestic factors. In South Asia, for example, domestic politics combined with strategic imperatives in India and Pakistan virtually ensures that it will be difficult to achieve nuclear non proliferation in the foreseeable future. In Southeast Asia, the issue is more amenable to immediate action because there are no great power nuclear weapons in the region, and no proliferating states--but by the same token, the problem is also less urgent. In Northeast Asia, the threat of nuclear proliferation by currently non-nuclear states--especially but not only by the DPRK, but also by the ROK and Japan--has receded in recent months due to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Although not discussed, Taiwan does not represent a current threat of nuclear proliferation in contrast to Northeast Asia where the situation had been quite ominous until recently. The strategic significance of horizontal proliferation and the efficacy of positive versus negative methods of achieving non proliferation goals were the subject of extensive discussion. In Asia, "fuzzy" proliferation by threshold states for political leverage (rather than full-scale testing and deployment) seems to be a preferred proliferation path. This ambiguous path to proliferation poses different challenges for the NPT regime than straightforward proliferation and demands fundamental solutions to underlying security dilemmas rather than mechanical application of fissile material safeguards or nuclear export controls. In Northeast Asia, some participants held that external pressure (especially American) on the DPRK may be counterproductive and likely to backfire in a self fulfilling prophecy. Others suggested that US security assurances to the DPRK were the key to obtaining DPRK cooperation rather than confrontation with the NPT and the IAEA, although much remains to be achieved in this regard. The reality and significance of the DPRK proliferation threat also remains uncertain. Relatedly, solutions tailored to regional circumstances (such as delays in special inspections in the DPRK case) may affect the global NPT regime in positive and negative ways, the net effects of which are still indeterminate. Vertical proliferation (by the United States, China and Russian Federation) was not treated as a major driving variable in horizontal proliferation, although it was mentioned in some specific cases. Some held that implementing existing commitments and new measures to control and disarm nuclear weapons by the great powers are essential at a global level and that this task should not be attempted at a regional level. Others suggested that non-nuclear states must not wait for global nuclear arms control by Russia and the United States to eventuate before regional controls on great power nuclear forces are imposed. In either case, it is essential to clarify how the United States and the Russian Federation could bring China (along with the United Kingdom and France) into global nuclear arms control discussions. Equally, it is obscure what changes by the United States and/or Russia might induce China to participate in regional or global nuclear arms discussions given its own strategic preferences and threat perceptions, those of the other two great powers, and the fears in non nuclear states of China's aspirations for regional influence. China itself states that adherence to an absolute no first use declaration by all nuclear powers is an essential first step, followed by negotiations for step-by-step reductions in nuclear arms all the way to zero. But clarification is needed from China as to whether such negotiations must wait until US and Russian forces are reduced tenfold from the levels proposed under START II to approximately the same levels as China. Meanwhile, increased transparency with regard to China's nuclear forces would build confidence in the region as to China's intentions. The recent Chinese test and planned resumption of French tests have complicated global attempts to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They have also hindered attempts to obtain US and French ratification of the Raratonga treaty (with additional fallout in other regions as to the legitimacy and desirability of non proliferation). Although safety considerations were mentioned, there appears to be no logical rationale--technical, strategic, political or otherwise--for these tests, whereas there are many reasons why they should not be conducted in the aftermath of the NPT review conference. Cancelling proposed nuclear tests would be a major step forward toward achieving a nuclear free world. The use of bilateral versus multilateral instruments of achieving nuclear non proliferation also varies considerably across regions. In South Asia, bilateral negotiations have predominated. Multilateral negotiations hosted by non-partisan states might be helpful in this region. In Northeast Asia, the existing bilateral US alliances with ROK and Japan on the one hand, and the new bilateral relationship with the DPRK on the other, have been supplemented with new, multilateral institutions such as the KEDO. Although this shift has created a more auspicious atmosphere for regional (and bilateral) non proliferation diplomacy to resolve basic security dilemmas without war or confrontation, some participants questioned whether the US bilateral alliance system could be an enduring long term foundation for a cooperative security framework for the whole region. Indeed, a new security framework to replace the MAC system and eventually to end the Korean Armistice may be an outcome of the nuclear confrontation with North Korea. It appears that the US bilateral alliance system will soon reach the end of its useful life and that a cooperative, inclusive, and comprehensive security system tailored to regional circumstances will be needed in the medium to long term to manage regional insecurities and to build trust and confidence between states in the region. Establishing an ASIATOM modelled after EURATOM was explored briefly. Such an institution might be useful to manage jointly nuclear reactor safety or radioactive waste disposal. Conversely, thorny issues such as multinational ownership of fissile material might offset the advantages of an ASIATOM and require additional investigation. Cooperative engagement to induce DPRK to fulfill its NPT commitments represents a major shift in the NPT regime as it admits that the big powers are limited in their ability to coercively enforce non proliferation commitments by NPT parties. Also, racist or bigoted stereotyping of potential proliferants can divert attention from the underlying causes of nuclear proliferation (such as great power threats or local power imbalances) and even increase the determination of proliferating states to acquire nuclear weapons. Likewise, an essential antidote to nuclear proliferation is sustained education in each country about the catastrophic experience of nuclear attack at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ultimately, the building blocks for enduring non proliferation regimes in each region can be only the authentic expression of free will by the peoples of each nation. There are no short cuts to non proliferation, and externally imposed controls will fail, sooner or later. 2. Non-introduction of Nuclear Weapons by Nuclear Powers Unfortunately, three great powers in the region are nuclear- armed and have in range (Russia and China) or reserve the right to reintroduce tactical and theater nuclear weapons into the region (United States). It is essential that the declared policies of the United States, Russia and Britain to not forward- deploy nuclear weapons be formalized; and that France and China sign an agreement banning such forward deployment. Some participants argued that it is essential to denuclearize the oceans as well as national territories, or NWFZs may be meaningless. Conversely, no nuclear powers habitually forward deploy nuclear weapons on delivery systems to visit non nuclear states in the region, although two (and possibly China as well) use the oceans to deploy missile firing submarines. It is important that the legitimacy of using international waters and airspace for nuclear weapons deployment be tackled in regional arms control regimes although success in this regard will take time given the related maritime legal issues on the one hand, and the nuclear powers desires to use the oceans for maintaining a relatively invulnerable nuclear force of last resort for retaliatory purposes on the other. Leaving aside the issue of whether, how and when NWFZs should cover the high seas, it is clear that not only military bases must be monitored and verified to ensure that nuclear weapons are not present in such zones; but that dual capable delivery systems must be inspected also to ensure that nuclear weapons are not transiting territories that are party to a NWFZ. This requirement raises politically and technically difficult problems for verification, especially in relation to visiting warships and aircraft. The issue of transit would have to be fudged, ignored, or resolved if non-introduction of nuclear weapons is to be ensured. In this regard, the continuation of the US neither-confirm- nor- deny (and the silence of other nuclear powers regarding their willingness to permit verification of the non nuclear status of their own aircraft and warships) is a major obstacle. In particular, unless the United States is willing to transgress its neither-confirm-nor-deny policy in a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, neither Russia nor China could be expected to allow such a zone to extend to their own territory, nor even to respect a zone limited to only the national territories of the two Koreas plus Japan. 3. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) The characteristics of existing and proposed NWFZs suggest that this instrument may be useful in building confidence that nuclear weapons will be removed from regions of Asia Pacific, and will be neither fired from nor at the areas covered by the NWFZ. Experience indicates that NWFZs take years, even decades, to negotiate; and even longer to fully implement (the Raratonga NWFZ still awaits US ratification). Indeed, part of the value of the NWFZ is to initiate a "habit of dialogue" in regions defined by wars, historical animosities, and continuing conflicts that block institutionalized communications at even the most basic levels. The region most immediately amenable for a new NWFZ appears to be ASEAN (which is currently negotiating a treaty text); followed by Northeast Asia (by, for example, implementing and then extending the already declared NWFZ in the Korean Peninsula to encompass Japan); and lastly, South Asia (where the proliferation dynamic appears to be more intractable than in the other three regions considered by the group). In each case, however, specific political, geographical, and military circumstances pose great difficulties for achieving NWFZs. Russia is preoccupied with its Asian CIS partners and may be resistant to a NWFZ that affects Russian territory and weapons systems. Japan too might resist a NWFZ limited to existing non nuclear states in the region (two Koreas plus Japan) because it would challenge the notion of US extended deterrence via the US-Japan treaty. Similarly, the Taiwan issue could complicate greatly negotiations aimed at creating a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, as could the territorial disputes between other non-nuclear and/or nuclear weapons states (as in the South China Sea). Also, the contentious issue of the linkage between the sophisticated nuclear power programs of the non-nuclear states in the Northeast Asian region (and their respective plutonium production, reprocessing, and recycling programs) with proliferation capabilities and intentions would have to be addressed (or ignored) to implement even a limited NWFZ in the latter region. Additionally, there are obstacles to extending NWFZs to cover the territory or delivery systems of existing great powers in the region, given the political and technical a-symmetries of interest and capabilities. Yet unless some such coverage is achieved in Russia and China, it is dubious whether Japan and South Korea would be willing to forego extended deterrence from the United States, casting doubt on the feasibility of any regional scheme (as against a great power guaranteed NWFZ for Korea only). Conversely, as noted earlier, China's nuclear capabilities are an important factor in regional threat perceptions and therefore, in the feasibility of a NWFZ in South Asia, Southeast Asia, or Northeast Asia. A NWFZ which does not constrain the deployment of Chinese theater nuclear weapons from being delivered against the region may be unattractive to the two Koreas and Japan. In spite of all these obstacles, the time has never been better to create a NWFZ in Northeast and Southeast Asia and Pugwash could contribute greatly by examining the lessons and experience derived from other NWFZs and applying them to the concrete conditions of Asia-Pacific. 5b. Arms Build-up in the Region: Causes and Steps Towards Reversal It is undeniable that Asia-Pacific has emerged as a major arms market since the end of the Cold War, and that a substantial and increasing share of arms sales of all kinds is to this region. Relatedly, more states are producing more weapons locally and for re-export; and more high technology weapons are acquired or built in the region due to the post-Cold War fire- sale (especially by Russia), and heavy investment in strategic industries by latecomers such as South Korea, Singapore, India, and others. It is less clear what factors motivate this buildup. In some cases (such as Korea), it is driven by a classical "action- reaction" arms race. In others, the dramatic shift in the global strategic environment associated with the decline of the former Soviet Union, US troop withdrawals and drawdowns, and the increase in China's capabilities have created additional uncertainty, in turn prompting preoccupation with defenses (as in Southeast Asia). Much of the buildup is based on the new wealth of rapidly growing Asian states, many of which have more defense funds available for arms even though their military expenditure is a constant fraction of GNP and/or public expenditure. However, these "strategic" logics also interact with political- economic factors including: the suppliers domestic military- industrial complex and associated drive to export to save jobs and hard-sell marketing techniques to earn foreign exchange; the transmission of values and acquisition preferences via alliances and security training programs; interservice rivalry and the grab to maintain or increase one's share of the budget; payoffs to corrupt politicians and/or military leaders; needs associated with campaigns to suppress actual or threatened insurgences; increased demands on the military to police border controls against illegal flows of drugs, natural resources, or migrants, etc. Due to the diversity of underlying causes--which be combined in specific instances--there can be no single approach to reversing the buildup. At the very least, however, there is a strong case for adding disarmament to the conventional arms control agenda of regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. A regional institution to restrain arms trade in the region might also treat equally and consistently all suppliers and recipients, and be more effective than global regimes such as MTCR which rest largely on the exercise of great power rather than universal adherence to non proliferation norms. Military CBMs may be a good starting point for ameliorating some of the strategic, external causes of the arms buildup, starting with observance of obligations to file reports to the existing UN register of arms trade, and possibly an expanded set of commitments under a regional register. States may also find it helpful to re-examine doctrines of offensive defense which, if buttressed by continuously enhanced ability to project power, can drive the threat perceptions of neighboring states. 5c. Creating Regional Confidence-building Measures and a Security Forum A strong argument was made that the right starting place for regional confidence building is the improvement of relations between great powers in the region. This task entails building mutual trust by settling the disputes which have historically created tensions between them, normalizing their relations, and creating new channels and fora for communications between them at a regional level. The region as a whole is now the most dynamic in the world. Many of its security problems are linked to the process of globalisation and its success or failure to develop peacefully will have enormous impact--possibly determining impact--on global outcomes. China has a major impact on regional security concerns in the long run. Its sheer size, and its domestic economic, demographic and environmental problems--combine to pose a fundamental security dilemma for the region as a whole: what security and economic structures can accommodate China's needs for a smooth political succession, sustainable development and a stable strategic environment without threatening other states in the region? China also poses a set of specific security concerns in the short run. China's position with regard to nuclear testing and arms control on the one hand, and its evident difficulties in ensuring that all central agencies and provincial authorities fulfil consistently its international commitments concerning matters such as nuclear and missile exports on the other, generate distrust and suspicion as to China's strategic objectives in the whole region. For its part, China perceives that a regional multilateral security framework between states in Asia-Pacific might be more stable and preferable in the long run to the emerging security multilateralism (which is constructed primarily on the basis of bilateral military alliances with the United States on the one hand, and forces China to shift from bilateral negotiations--in which it is dominant in each case--to multilateral negotiations on a range of security concerns on the other--where it is not). The problem with the stance from the perspective of small and medium powers in the region is that such an arrangement could boil down to a big power concert of the kind which have historically adjusted to change via war. In modern conditions of restraint imposed by nuclear threat, such concerts have displaced conflict from the military into other spheres. In this way, negative relations ensue which are antithetical to the building of a community and the region is trapped in a kind of security statis built around nuclear threat. Other regional powers are also the source of great concern to China and to other small and medium states in the region. In particular, the rising power and military capabilities of Japan, India, and Indonesia etc. are viewed as problematic to neighbouring states. The United States is also viewed by some in the region as a source of instability due to its history of intervention in Korea and Vietnam, its military dominance in the western Pacific, its long-standing division of the region against itself during the Cold War, and its on-going proclivity to inject global issues into regional relations. The residual military might and nuclear forces of Russia are also worrisome to the region. New mechanisms are needed to ensure that the security concerns not only of Russia but of Asian CIS states are represented in regional fora and agreements. In such difficult circumstances, ASEAN is the only example of successful example of loose regional organization in the region. There is no counterpart to ASEAN in Northeast Asia. In South Asia, SAARC is relatively moribund and new initiatives to revive multilateral security dialogues are badly needed. The nascent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could develop a substantive security dialogue and establish regional norms and procedures on specific security problems and transcend the nuclear threat system as a foundation of regional security. How the ARF will interact with the economic agendas of APEC (which has a different genesis and membership to ARF) must be clarified as APEC could also contribute greatly to regional interdependence and community building that could spill over into security spheres in positive ways. In the short term, limited confidence building measures or CBMs may be useful in the military sphere such as increasing transparency, regular dialogues, and establishment of new conflict resolution mechanisms to ease and resolve intractable territorial disputes or the generation of political will to use existing mechanisms (such as the International Court of Justice). Some argued that non governmental organizations should be more involved in security dialogues, and play a role in increasing transparency as well as monitoring and verifying restraint in arms trade as might be imposed on weapons such as anti-personnel mines. Relatedly, non governmental organizations should raise the linkage between suppression of human rights, internal instability and external security implications for other states in the region. Ultimately, identifying and pursuing common interests is the only way to overcome suspicions and to build mutual trust within the region. Ensuring that China has sufficient food and energy to support its population, for example, is a virtual prerequisite for regional security as a failure by China to manage its economic transition could easily spill over into the region. But achieving rapid development in China also will create regional problems on a large scale (such as acid rain). Such outcomes can be managed only on a regional multilateral basis, by dialogue, and by the creation of new multilateral institutions. Like China, other big states also have fundamental problems to resolve before security can be achieved in the region. For its part, Japan has still to come to terms with the region in relation to its responsibility for World War II at the same time as it seeks closer political and economic integration with the region. The United States wants to exercise regional leadership, but to do so with instruments designed for the Cold War rather than the new conditions that characterise the region. Throughout Asia and the Pacific, social agendas that were either unaffordable previously--or were suppressed by authoritarian regimes--are now unavoidable and pose enormous challenges to existing political regimes and administrative systems. Conversely, expanding the contact between civil societies outside limited official channels may offer many opportunities to improve mutual understanding and to overcome traditional antagonisms. A broader concept of security and confidence building is needed to address these concerns, most of which are not amenable to military measures, and many of which create the conditions for transnational interdependence and even redefinition of community and personal identities that transcend national limits and historical misgivings. Incremental, pragmatic, and tangible collaboration on economic and other, non-military common concerns may generate much more confidence, faster, than military-related CBMs in some areas. Of course, the two approaches are complementary rather than exclusive and should be pursued together in a pragmatic fashion. The tough security issues inherent in great power relations neither can be avoided nor put on hold. It is essential that non governmental organizations play an important role in defining the legitimacy of great power behavior, participate in the design of regional institutions, and demand that nuclear threats be reduced and nuclear arsenals eliminated. These issues are too important to be left to governments and experts.