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ROBERT B. SOLOMON  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Chief of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution:</th>
<th>Copy Number:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>1 - 16 (including Annexes C through E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCADC</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCMAC</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCRED</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSO</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRWESTCOM</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGFMFPAC</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAC</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRAAC</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense University</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air War College</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSHRC(HQ) Maxwell AFB</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP JSTPS</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Staff</td>
<td>17 - 25 (including Annexes C through E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Staff</td>
<td>47 - 65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I
1978

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96851
1979
FOREWORD

Events in the Pacific Command during 1978 not only revealed the dynamic nature of the Pacific-Indian Ocean environment, but also illustrated the need for continuous evaluation of U.S. diplomatic, economic and military policies in the area. Perhaps the most significant event was the announcement by the President that the United States would recognize the People's Republic of China on 1 January 1979. Although long expected, the announcement was nevertheless a shock to a long-standing ally--the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The military strength of the Soviet Union and its ability to project military power throughout Asia and the Pacific continued to increase in 1978. Although Soviet policy underwent little change, its pressures seemed greater, more diverse and more sophisticated.

Europe may receive priority in the military planning of the Soviet Union, but an objective observer in the Pacific could see a relentless expansion of Soviet military programs in the Far East, where about one-third of all Soviet forces are deployed. In Africa and the Middle East, the revolution in Afghanistan, unrest in Iran, and growing influence in Ethiopia and South Yemen provided the Soviet Union with a strategic position astride the southern approaches to the Suez and adjacent to major oil fields in the Middle East. From this position, the Soviet Union has an increased potential to exert military pressures and political influence in the world's largest oil-producing area and to interdict commercial sea lanes from the Persian Gulf which are vital to us and our allies.

In view of this steady emergence of the Soviet Union as a world-wide power, it was particularly reassuring that the year ended with the successful renegotiation of our military bases agreement in the Philippines. Continued use of these bases is a vital component of forward deterrence in the Western Pacific and they enhance our ability to react to contingency situations in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Measures were also taken in 1978 to bolster the Northeast Asian link of our forward defense posture following the 1977 announcement that U.S. ground combat forces would be gradually withdrawn from South Korea. We worked closely with the Koreans to improve and strengthen their armed forces and, as an indication of U.S. intentions, conducted the largest command post and
field training exercise ever held in South Korea. This exercise demonstrated our ability to augment rapidly the combined U.S.-Korean in-country forces with U.S. units in the theater and from the continental United States. In addition to the realistic and valuable training gained, the exercise was also a signal to allies and potential adversaries that the United States is intent on remaining a major Pacific power.

This signal was especially welcome to Japan, whose constitutionally-mandated defensive military posture is the basis for its primary reliance upon a security relationship with the United States. Encouraging signs have emerged that Japan is willing to accept greater political and economic responsibilities for regional leadership, while public dialogue on defense matters has become more audible. Japan continues to be very sensitive to the nuances of U.S. foreign policy, whether actual or perceived.

As recorded in previous editions of the CINCPAC History, the continued forward presence of U.S. military forces will be seen by many countries in the Pacific Command area as a measure of our determination and commitment to help maintain stability in this vast area. While military forces are only one component of our national power, it is the military component that must be strengthened, and soon, if we are to maintain the stature of the United States in the world community as a Pacific power.

M. F. WEISNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. Annex B of the 1976 history was the terminal history of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E to this (1978) history is the terminal history of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command covering the period 1 January 1978 to 30 April 1979. The designations of Annex A (MACV), Annex B (MACThai) and Annex E (TDC) are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea will retain the designations of Annexes C and D respectively. The Annexes are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

The 1978 CINCPAC history is published in three volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume III. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as ALFA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters.
UNCLASSIFIED

Chapters II, VI, IX, and X were written by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman wrote Chapters I, III, IV, VII, Section III of Chapter XI, and supervised the physical layout of the product. Chapters V, VII and Sections I, II, and IV of Chapter XI were written by Eileen O. Behana, Historian Trainee. The index was a joint effort and the glossary was compiled by Mrs. Behana.

The manuscript was typed by Shirley A. Streck and Dolores A. Romine. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.

[Signature]

CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter of Promulgation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER I--THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND**

**SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND**

**SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF**

Key Personnel Changes in 1978

**SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL**

- Commanders' Conference
- Unified Command Plan Boundaries
- Department of Defense Organization Studies
- Army Command Relations in the PACOM
- U.S. Forces Japan Organization Structure
- CINCPAC Command Center Modernization
- PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System
- Crisis Action Procedures
- Joint Interoperability
- Airborne Command Post Activities

**SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS**

- Forces and Basing in Korea
  - Residual Force Structure
  - Withdrawal Offset Measures
  - Combined Forces Command
  - United Nations Command Rear (Japan)
- Forces and Basing on Taiwan
- Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
  - Land Surveys and Usage
  - Military Civic Action Teams
CINCPAC Numbered Plans
Unnumbered CINCPAC Contingency Plans
OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND (Pacific)

SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES
U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Planning
SAACLANT-CINCPAC Agreement for the Protection of Shipping in the
Indian Ocean
Use of Marine Corps Assets in Support of NATO
Perceptions of U.S. Staying Power and Strength in the PACOM
Quarterly Report of Major Issues and Activities
Orientation of the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions
COMMANDO NEST Program Declassification
Nuclear Weapons
Indian Ocean Arms Control

CHAPTER IV--MILITARY OPERATIONS
Readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM
Indian Ocean Operations
RUBY SURVEY
B-52 Surveillance
Sea of Okhotsk Operations
Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports
Australia
Fiji
New Zealand
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Tonga
Tuvalu
Western Samoa
PONY EXPRESS
Aerial Surveillance of Foreign Ships
P-3 Operations
Singapore
Kenya
First AWACS Deployment to the PACOM
Six-Month Marine Temporary Additional Duty Deployments
Operational Tests
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN
Exercise Scheduling

SECRET

xi
SECRET

IVORY ITEM 222
ELITE TROOPER 78 223
NIFTY NUGGET 224
STEADFAST 78 225
Telephone Notification Exercise 225
PORT ARMS 226
FORCE LIST 78 226
TEAM SPIRIT 78 227
ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 78 232
Exercises in Taiwan 235
Combined Exercises Near the Philippines 238
Combined Exercises with Australia and New Zealand 241
GRAND LEGEND 241
BEACON SOUTH 241
CAPTIVE LIGHTNING V 242
SAND GROPER 242
USN P-3 Aircraft Ditching 244
C-117 Ditching Near Guam 246
Search and Rescue Agreements 246
Operations and Communications Security Monitoring 247
Tropical Cyclones 247
Disaster Relief 248
Research and Development Objectives 266
Casualty Resolution 257

VOLUME II

CHAPTER V--LOGISTICS 261

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY 261
Joint Operations Planning System 261
Revision of CINCPAC OPLAN 5001 261
CONUS/Surface Movement Under OPLAN 5027N 264
Logistics Support for Exercises 266
Exercise ELITE TROOPER 78 266
Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 267

SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 269
Interservice Support 269
Sixth Annual PACOM DRIS Conference 269
FY 78-80 Plan 269
DOD DRIS Manual 270
PACOM DRIS Facts and Figures 270
PACOM DRIS Study Digest 270

SECRET

xii
SECRET

PACOM Calibration Consolidations 270
GAO Survey of Interservice Support 273
Fuels and Energy 274
Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices 274
PACOM POL Storage Facilities 276
POL Consumption versus Throughput 278
AVGAS in PACOM 278
POL Storage at Diego Garcia 281
Wake 284
Hawaii 284
Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System 285
Supply and Services 285
PACOM War Reserve Assets 285
War Reserve Stocks for Allies 286
Wartime Logistics Support to ROK Forces 286
War Reserve Materiel on Taiwan 288
Programmed Depot Maintenance on Taiwan 290
Munitions 292
AIM-7E Missile Allocation 292
PACOM Munitions Summary 294
West Coast Ammunition Port Capability 294
Excess U.S. Government Property Disposal 296
Philippines 296
Thailand 297
India 298
Indonesia 298

SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS 299
MAC Routes in the Pacific 299
MAC Air Division Structure in the Pacific 300
MAC Space Available Travel to Thailand 300
MAC Flights to Diego Garcia 301
Pacific Airlift Management Office Users Conference 302
Korean Flag Shipping 302
PACOM Surface Shipping Conference 303
PACOM Watercraft Study 304
PACOM/JCS Joint Transportation Board Meeting 306

SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING 309
Enewetak Cleanup 309
Guam Land Use Plan 310
Facilities in Korea 310
U.S. Air Force Facilities 310
USMC TACAIR Beddown 311

SECRET
SECRET

CMS at CINCPAC
Communications Security Requirements-Korea
Classified Message Routing-Korea

SECTION III--AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
PACWRAC
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)
Cruise Missiles Systems
Message File Retention
PLAD Review
MINIMIZE in PACOM-1978
Tsunami Warning Communications
ADP Training
WWMCCS Graphics Terminals
Military Message Experiment (MME)
ADP for Tactical Air Operations-Korea
WWMCCS ADP Support-Japan

CHAPTER VII--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--GENERAL
Security Assistance Roles
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar
PACOM Security Assistance Conference
Security Assistance Reporting Requirements
PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop
Training of Security Assistance Personnel
Excess Ship Transfers
Missiles for Australia and Japan

SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS
Afghanistan
Australia
Bangladesh
Program Management
Assistance to Bangladesh Navy
Burma
Military Training
Request for Recoiless Rifles
Republic of China
Overview
F-5E/F Coproduction Program
Request for Submarines
MK-46 MOD-2 Torpedoes
F-5 Aircraft 448
A-10 Aircraft 448
Pakistan 449
  Overview 449
  Support for Pakistan Navy 451
  Fighter Aircraft 452
Philippines 454
  Department of Defense Equipment Survey Team 454
  105mm Howitzer Ammunition 459
  Munitions Management Team Visit 459
  F-8 Aircraft 460
  T-28 Rehabilitation Program 462
  Infrared Countermeasures 463
  IMET Funding 463
  MAP Fund Support of JUSMAG Open Mess 464
Singapore 465
  Overview 465
  Grenade Launcher Coproduction 465
  A-4 Aircraft 467
  Crew Chief Familiarization 468
Sri Lanka 471
  IMETP 471
  GSL Ship Request 473
Thailand 473
  Overview 473
  Aircraft Procurement Actions 475
  Ammunition in Thailand 480
  Incendiary Munitions 480
  Thailand FAD 481

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 483

SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 483
CINCPAC Headquarters 483
  Performance Ratings for Civilian Personnel 483
  Federal Day 1978 Awards Program 483
  Upward Mobility Program 483
  Activity Training Plan for FY 79 484
  Employment of the Handicapped and Disabled 484
  Pay and Allowances 484
PACOM Country Activities 485
  General Accounting Office Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans 485
SECRET
SECRET

GAO Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans and Benefits—Japan 486
Army Realignment Personnel Actions—Japan 487
Labor Cost Sharing—Japan 488
Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees—Korea 489
U.S. Forces Local National Employee Severance Pay (NAF Activities)—Korea 490
Revised Wage Schedules and Benefits for U.S. Forces LN Employees—Philippines 490
Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees—Taiwan 491
Pay Rates for Non-U.S. Citizens Employed in Foreign Areas 492
PACOM Third Country National Employment 493

SECTION II—MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES 495
Military Awards—CINCPAC Staff 495
Military Customs Program 495
Department of Defense Dependent Schools 496
FY 79 Combined Federal Campaign—Pacific 497

VOLUME III

CHAPTER IX—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 499

SECTION I—SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 499
PACOM Data Systems Center 499
PDSC Composition 499
PDSC Hardware 500
PDSC Software 502
Hughes Report Observations 502
Contract Negotiations 502
Funding the Contract 503
Hardware Delivery 504
GSA Contract Support 504
IPAC Relocation 505
IPAC Personnel Augmentation 505
Defense Analysis System (DAS) 506
PACOM IDHS/IDHSC Activities 507
Secure Facsimile Capability 507
Delegated Production Program 508

SECTION II—COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 511
Support to Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 511

SECRET

xviii
Photo Reconnaissance and Processing
Contingency Operation
NPC Activation
Korea Photo Reconnaissance
ELINT Exploitation
OEE Processing
EWIR Improvement
Radar Fingerprint Support
Korea OEE

SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE
PACOM Target Management
Nuclear Targeting
LNO Planning
PACOM Defense Plan
OPLAN 5027N
PANWAS
NOMS
Cruise Missile Planning
NKTL Refinements
AFKTTL
SKCATL
IOCTL
Fleet Support
Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Materials Conference
TI/TTM Activities
TAPA
ATTG Production
ATTG Production South of the Sahara
CPFL Actions
AIF Actions

SECTION IV--INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES
Intelligence Exchange Between ANZUS Members
Indian Ocean
Bilateral Intelligence Exchanges
Mutual Support and Coordination in the PACOM
National Disclosure Policy

CHAPTER X--POLITICAL-MILITARY HIGHLIGHTS

SECTION I--OVERVIEW
Selected Chronology 1978
Recapitulation of Chronology
SECTION II--CINCPAC'S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS
- Terms of Reference
- Chiefs of Mission Conferences
- CINCPAC's Trip to South Asia
- Asian Perceptions
- State Department Recapitulation

SECTION III--PHILIPPINE BASES NEGOTIATIONS
- Replacement Cost of Philippine Bases
- Political Overview
- Mutual Defense Board (MDB) Meetings
- Military Bases Agreement (MBA) Negotiations
- Military-to-Military Talks
- The Diplomatic Level

CHAPTER XI--SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--LEGAL
- Legal Support in Thailand
- 1978 PACOM Legal Conference

SECTION II--CINCPAC BUDGET

SECTION III--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE
- Management of Studies and Analyses
- Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Activities
- Analyses in Support of CINCPAC
  - A System to Determine the Statistical Range of Outcomes of Limited Nuclear Options
  - Economic Importance of Asia and Japan
  - Korea Sea Lines of Communication Study
  - Persian Gulf Study
  - Strike Study
  - Japanese Logistic Study
  - Soviet Non-Military Fleet Study
  - Analysis of the Strategy During Exercise NIFTY NUGGET
  - Sea Lines of Communication Review
- Analysis Support to Subordinate Commands
  - Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness
  - Weapons Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Values Methodology (WEI/WUV)
- Japanese Air Defense Study - KEEN WIND
- Support to Taiwan Defense Command
- Analysis Support to Korea
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral M. F. Weisner, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Command</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Relationships in PACOM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Organization</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Unified Commands and CINCPAC Representatives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command Personnel</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Component and Subordinate Unified Command Staff Personnel</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group Personnel</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel Assigned Strength in PACOM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Forces</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Ground Units</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Naval Air and Ship Units</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Units</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key CINCPAC Staff Personnel</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Strengths of CINCPAC Staff Directorates</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Far East Ground Strength</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Naval Strength</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Communist Far East Air Forces</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Communist Far East Missile Forces</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather Chart--Typhoon RITA</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather Chart--Tropical Cyclone 21-78</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. MIAs Returned</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULK POL Data, PACOM</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 POL Issues</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM POL Issues</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Routes</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Military Assistance Programs</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Country Security Assistance Program</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Afghanistan</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Australia</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Bangladesh</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Burma</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Republic of China</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--India</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Japan</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Korea</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Malaysia</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Pakistan</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Summary--Philippines</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

PACOM assigned strength changed only slightly in 1978, as shown in the tables below. Principal increases were in the Navy and Marine Corps forces.

A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 January 1978</th>
<th>31 December 1978</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>53,208</td>
<td>53,424</td>
<td>+216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>155,030</td>
<td>157,406</td>
<td>+2,376</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>70,126</td>
<td>73,253</td>
<td>+3,127</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>40,074</td>
<td>39,450</td>
<td>-624</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>318,438</td>
<td>323,543</td>
<td>+5,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents in 1978 and the amounts of change from the year before are shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 Dec 78</td>
<td>Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>9,042</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The date of information on these charts is as of 31 December 1978, unless otherwise indicated. The chart showing the CINCPAC staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

1. Strengths were derived from the Force Status and Identity (FORSTAT) report.
COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1. a. Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) is the Commander-in-Chief, unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC is to achieve the national objectives of the United States and to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and to ensure the security of the Pacific area. The CINCPAC, in accordance with instructions from the National Security Committee of the United States, is responsible for the accomplishment of this mission.

b. CINCPAC exercises operational control over all forces assigned to him through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces established for the purpose of the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States as the Military Assistance Representative (MAR) to the following organizations:
   a. ANZUS Council U.S. Military Representative
   c. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Principal Advisor on military matters to the U.S. Ambassador who serves as the Chairman of the U.S. representation.
   d. BSC-U.S. Combined Forces Command, Member, Military Committee, Pacific Area.

2. a. PACIFIC COMMANDER COMMANDERS:
   a. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC). The PACIFIC Commander is responsible for the accomplishment of his mission in the Pacific area.

3. a. The Commanders of the PACIFIC Command are responsible for the accomplishment of their mission in the Pacific area, and their authority is vested in the commander of the PACIFIC Command.

The mission of the PACIFIC Command is to achieve the national objectives of the United States and to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States in the Pacific area. The CINCPAC, in accordance with instructions from the National Security Committee of the United States, is responsible for the accomplishment of this mission.

4. a. CINCPAC exercises operational control over all forces assigned to him through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces established for the purpose of the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

b. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States as the United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (OICUS JAPAN), United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States as the Pacific Area Command (PACOM), commanded by Commander United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

5. a. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) is the Commander-in-Chief, unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his mission. The mission of CINCPAC is to achieve the national objectives of the United States and to support and advance the national policies and interests of the United States and to ensure the security of the Pacific area. The CINCPAC, in accordance with instructions from the National Security Committee of the United States, is responsible for the accomplishment of this mission.

b. CINCPAC exercises operational control over all forces assigned to him through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces established for the purpose of the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States as the United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (OICUS JAPAN), United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

e. CINCPAC is accredited to the United States as the Pacific Area Command (PACOM), commanded by Commander United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

6. a. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (OICUS JAPAN), United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.


b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.


b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.


b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.


b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.


b. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

c. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

d. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for the accomplishment of the mission assigned to him.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 5.
## SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
### KEY PERSONNEL

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<td><strong>Commander</strong> (Joint Commander)</td>
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<td>GEN John W. Vessey, Jr.</td>
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<td>LT GEN Charles A. Gabrielle</td>
<td><strong>Commander Air Force</strong></td>
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<td>MAJ GEN Robert E. Kingston</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td><strong>Assistant Chief of Staff</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>COL Lynn W. Wedlund</td>
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<td><strong>Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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<td>COL Thomas E. Spencer</td>
<td>COL Paul W. Hanley</td>
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<td><strong>Secretary Joint Staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>Legal Advisor</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Joint Casualty Resolution Center</strong></td>
<td>COL James F. Torn</td>
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<td><strong>Joint Casualty Resolution Center</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Joseph R. Rutkowski</td>
<td><strong>CINCPACREP PHILIPPINES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Fifth and Deputy UN Representative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Commander 15 Air Force</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Henry L. Daniel</td>
<td>MAJ GEN Frederick L. Poston</td>
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<td><strong>US Defense Representative</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assistant Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ GEN</td>
<td><strong>CINCPACREP AUSTRALIA</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>COL Jack L. Defour</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>CINCPACREP CO NAVAL AIRGROUP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assistant Chief of Staff</strong></td>
<td>CAPT Neil D. McVeigh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistant Chief of Staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>CINCPACREP INDIAN OCEAN</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Assistant Chief of Staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>CINCPACREP joint strategic target planning STAFF/STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND</strong></td>
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<td>COL John K. Sinden</td>
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<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chief of Staff</strong></td>
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**Source:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 8.
# U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups

## Far East Region - Key Personnel

### Military Assistance Advisory Group, China

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Col. Bradley S. Thompson</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Plans/Programs Section</td>
<td>Maj. Leigh F. Birtley</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Army Logistics Section</td>
<td>Col. Joseph H. Cheek</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Navy Logistics Section</td>
<td>Col. J. W. Sell</td>
<td>USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Air Force Logistics Section</td>
<td>Col. Joseph F. Melchior</td>
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### Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan

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<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine Specialist</td>
<td>Col. Richard A. Milburn</td>
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### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Col. William E. Hanes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief</td>
<td>Maj. Gary H. Thomas</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Army Division</td>
<td>Col. John F. Brinkman</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Navy Division</td>
<td>Capt. John F. Bickly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Air Force Division</td>
<td>Col. Robert H. Badiani, Jr.</td>
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### Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Maj. Eugene S. Korpale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Management Division</td>
<td>Maj. W. Robert Prissner</td>
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<td>Chief, Logistics Division</td>
<td>Maj. Thomas H. Main</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Air Force Service Section</td>
<td>Col. Feliciano P. Soriano</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Support Division</td>
<td>Maj. John T. Garcia</td>
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### Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea

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<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
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<td>Joint Staff Officer</td>
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<td>Senior Army Assistance Officer</td>
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<td>Senior Marine Assistance Officer</td>
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### Office of Defense Cooperation, India (ODIC)

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<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
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### Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP)

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<td>Chief, Navy/Marine Division</td>
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<td>Chief, Plans and Programs Division</td>
<td>Maj. Raymond K. Rennova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief, Communications/Electronics Division</td>
<td>Maj. Curtis H. Deneen</td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 9.
# CINCPAC, COMPONENT & SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 25.
### MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

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<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**</td>
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<td>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM</td>
<td>53,424</td>
<td>157,406</td>
<td>73,263</td>
<td>230,669</td>
<td>39,450</td>
<td>323,543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All military figures are derived from the FORSTAT reporting system effective date 31 December 1979.

* Forces assigned PACOM component commanders.

** Forces physically located in PACOM area but not assigned PACOM component commanders.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 22.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY/MARINES</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Army Headquarters</td>
<td>Numbered Fleets</td>
<td>2. Numbered Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>3. Air Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>16 Cruisers</td>
<td>1. Composite Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Air Defense Brigade w/ 12 HAWK Batteries</td>
<td>18 Destroyers/Frigates</td>
<td>2. Tactical Airlift Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Separate Aviation Companies</td>
<td>10 Submarines (SSNs)</td>
<td>3. Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 Submarines (SSNs/SSNs)</td>
<td>4. Aerial Reconnaissance Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 Amphibious Warfare Ships</td>
<td>1. Special Operations Units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Carrier Air Wings</td>
<td>1. Helicopter Units</td>
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<td></td>
<td>30 Fighter Attack Squads</td>
<td>1. Tactical Reconnaissance Units</td>
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<td>10 Reconnaissance/Warfare Units</td>
<td>1. Special Operations Units</td>
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<td>7 Early Warning Units</td>
<td>2. Motorcycle Squadrons</td>
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<td>16 Carrier AAW Squads</td>
<td>1. Airborne Command and Control Units</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 LAMPS Squads</td>
<td>1. Tactical Fighter Training Aggressor Squad</td>
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<td>17 Patrol Squads</td>
<td>2. Reconnaissance Units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Tanker Detachments</td>
<td>2. Reconnaissance Units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Light Photo Squads</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 HH-134Q Relay (TAC AHS) Aircraft</td>
<td>1. Reconnaissance Units</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 SRTA Squads</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Naval Special Warfare Group</td>
<td>1. Reconnaissance Units</td>
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*Includes Naval Air Units deployed to PACOM/COMUS.*

**IN PACOM BUT NOT OPCOM TO CINCPAC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY/MARINES</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Engineer Group</td>
<td>1. Air Division (SAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Signal Brigade</td>
<td>9. Strategic Air Command (SAC)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General Support Group</td>
<td>1. Air Refueling Squads (SAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Heavy Boat Co</td>
<td>1. Bomber Squadrons (SAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Area Units in the Pacific</td>
<td>3. Strategic Reconnaissance Detachments (SAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army National Guard Units</td>
<td>1. Weather Reconnaissance Units (NWC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>1. Test Group (APHC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve Units</td>
<td>1. Tactical Fighter Squadrons (Air National Guard)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Civil Affairs Group</td>
<td>Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Engineer Construction Battalion</td>
<td>Air Force Weather Service Units (AFWS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>Air Weather Service Units (MAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 10.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

KOREA
- EIGHTH U.S. ARMY
- 1 CORPS
- 2ND INF DIV
- 28 B CAV
- 24 ORA/BATT
- 22 ACH-46G
- 10 BLK-31
- 81 BLK-25A
- 37 CH-21H
- 6 CH-47A
- 55 CH-47A

EASTPAC
- 1ST MAR DIV
- 1ST MAW
- 1ST CAV
- 1ST PSC

JAPAN
- 3RD MAW DIV
- ELEMT OF 1ST MAW
- (OKINAWA)

OAHU
- 25TH INF DIV
- 24 OH-58A
- 24 AH-1G
- 24 CI-1H
- 14 OH-58A
- 9 CI-1B
- 8 AH-1G
- 6 CI-1H

DEPLOYED WITH FLEET
- 1ST MAW (ARG ALFA)
- 2ND BCT (ARG BRAVO)
- 1ST BCT (ARG BRAVO)
- 1ST BCT (ARG BRAVO)
- 2ND BCT (ARG BRAVO)
- 3RD MAR DIV (ARG BRAVO)

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 13.
Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 19.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1978

Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, continued to serve as CINCPAC throughout 1978. In August his appointment was extended until the summer of 1979. As Executive Assistant to CINCPAC, COL Andrew L. Cooley, Jr., USA, replaced COL E.L. Trobaugh, USA, on 24 August.

Chief of Staff

(U) LT GEN M.L. Boswell, USAF, assumed the office of Chief of Staff effective 1 July, replacing LT GEN Leroy J. Manor, USAF.

ICA Adviser and Deputy Political Adviser

(U) Mr. Gunther K. Rosinus, FSIO-2, became the International Communications Agency's Adviser and Deputy Political Adviser on 31 December, replacing Mr. J.T. Pettus.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Francis W. Ethun, USAF, became Joint Secretary on 1 August, replacing COL Alan Coville, USAF.

Director for Personnel

(U) On 8 June BGEN Andrew P. Chambers, USA, replaced BGEN James H. Johnson, USA, as Director for Personnel. General Chambers also replaced General Johnson as CINCPAC's Inspector General.

Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN William J. White, USMC, became Director for Operations on 1 April, replacing MAJ GEN Norman W. Gourley, USMC.

Deputy Director for Plans

(U) BGEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, replaced BGEN J.R. Sadler, USA, as Deputy Director for Plans on 11 July.
UNCLASSIFIED

Surgeon

(U) RADM D. Earl Brown, Jr., MC, USN, became CINCPAC Surgeon on 24 July, replacing RADM G.E. Gorsuch, MC, USN.
UNCLASSIFIED

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL

M.L. BOSWELL
LT GEN
Chief of Staff
USAF

WILLIAM E. MC LEOD
MAJ GEN
Deputy Chief of Staff
USA

LEO J. MOSER
FSO-1
Political Adviser
CIV

GUNTHER K. ROSINUS
FSIO-2
International Communications Agency Adviser and Associate POLAD
CIV

ALFRED J. LYNN
GS-1S
Chief, Office for Public and Governmental Affairs
CIV

COL FRANCIS W. ETHUN
Joint Secretary
USAF

ANDREW P. CHAMBERS
BGEN
Director for Personnel and Inspector General
USA
### Authorized Strengths of CINCPAC Staff Directories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 January 1978</th>
<th></th>
<th>31 December 1978</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>CIV</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for Public and Governmental Affairs</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Directorate</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Directorate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Directorate</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plans Directorate</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications-Data Processing Directorate</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Analysis Office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>344</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM ADP Systems Support Group</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Center Pacific</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13b</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>515</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Headquarters CINCPAC FY 78/79 Joint Table of Distribution approved by JCS 131722Z Jan 78.
b. Three General Schedule, ten local wage rate.
SECRET

SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Commanders' Conference

Periodically the Chairman of the JCS convened a conference of the unified and specified commanders and the Service Chiefs. The 1978 conference was held at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command 13-15 November, and was attended by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Weisner presented his thoughts on PACOM area interests and the "Swing Strategy," a subject discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this History. Quite a bit of the time was addressed to Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, a JCS-sponsored, biennial, worldwide Command Post Exercise that had been conducted in October. Other subjects included strategic command, control, and communications; the strategic balance and SALT; regional discussions regarding Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Atlantic Command, Korea, and Latin America; command relationships; and the defense program and budget for the years FY 80 to 84.¹

Unified Command Plan Boundaries

The Unified Command Plan, published by the JCS, was the basic charter of the unified and specified commands. It was based on decisions made by the President and the Secretary of Defense. It outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various commands. Revisions to this plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, by which geographic boundaries were set, and by which basic missions were assigned. The last change to the plan had been effective 1 May 1976.

At that time the boundary between the Atlantic and Pacific Commands had been moved westward, from 62°E to 17°E, giving CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean. Besides that ocean, the enlarged command included the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden, excluding the Malagasy Republic. It included the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives. All land areas of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, remained in the European Command Area. Africa south of the Sahara and the Malagasy Republic remained unassigned in the Unified Command Plan. (The JCS retained responsibility for unassigned areas; the CINC of the Readiness Command, when directed by the JCS, was responsible for contingency planning, joint task force headquarters, and forces for the conduct of operations in unassigned areas.)²

In 1976 the JCS had forwarded a study on an assessment of U.S. military

1. JCS 7159/3119542 Jul 78 (EX) GDS-84; Point Paper Synopsis, CINCs' Conference, 13-15 Nov 78, n.d. (U).
interests in Africa south of the Sahara and asked for comments by the unified and specified commanders. One question was whether the area should be assigned to a unified or specified command, and, if so, to which command. CINCPAC's first choice for such assignment was the Readiness Command with the European Command second choice. He did not believe either CINCLANT or CINCPAC should be assigned the area, citing existing commitments, lack of current responsibility for any part of the African continent, and the absence of significant traditional ties between countries in already assigned areas and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.  

On 15 May 1978 the JCS asked the CINCs of the Atlantic, European, Readiness, and Pacific Commands for their evaluation and comments regarding whether Africa south of the Sahara should be assigned to a unified command for planning only or for normal operations, whether planning considerations and options identified by the JCS in a paper dated 1 May were appropriate and complete, and an appraisal of each command's ability to assume responsibility for the Africa area either for planning only or for normal operations.  

CINCPAC forwarded his reply on 3 June. He repeated his earlier position that the area should be assigned to a unified commander for normal operations. Such an assignment would "provide for full capability for intelligence, planning, and operations. The potential for major world power conflict is increasing in Sub-Saharan Africa and warrants emphasis beyond planning only. Potential for U.S. involvement will increase as long as Soviet Union and Cuban interests are served by their presence in the area. Restricting unified command participation to planning only unnecessarily limits flexibility and adequate intelligence collection."

CINCPAC believed that rather than considering the huge area of the Sub-Saharan as an entity it should be recognized as a diverse region of dissimilar cultures, political goals, and economies. Appropriate scenarios should be developed for employment of military force. Soviet involvement was proceeding at a fast rate, and the ability of the United States to respond in the future would be dependent upon the thought devoted at this time to planning for specific countries. "Soviet intentions dictate that our planning capability not be self-limited to broad conceptual planning but include sufficient country-peculiar operational constraints to provide a basis for suitable and effective military operations."

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 145-151, which also contained some general information on the area and a map.  
2. JCS 2350/151812Z May 78 (SS), GDS-86.  
3. CINCPAC 032256Z Jun 78 (SS), GDS-86.
CINCPAC recommended that responsibility for either planning only or normal operations for the area not be assigned to CINCPAC, as he had stated the previous year. He listed his reasons:

PACOM area of responsibility presently largest of unified commands; present commitments tax available resources; lack of current area responsibility for any part of the African continent; no substantial ties between presently assigned countries and those of Sub-Saharan Africa;

CINCPAC continued that recent events in Zaire involving French, British, Belgians, and other Europeans pointed out the necessity for coordination with European nations in African operations. "Such coordination could more readily be effected on a continuing basis by a command other than the PACOM. Whichever command is assigned Sub-Saharan Africa should have the capability to rapidly coordinate with Western European nations whose interests are involved," CINCPAC concluded.

When the CINC of the Atlantic Command replied to the same JCS questions he had recommended, among other things, that all of the oceans around Africa be assigned to a single unified commander, CINCLANT, by moving the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary eastward. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on this recommendation.

CINCPAC did not agree, noting that the 1976 change in boundary had been made to reduce the ambiguity of multiple command arrangements, a concept CINCPAC believed was still valid. CINCPAC said that the rationale of the 1976 boundary change had highlighted the need to deal with the Indian Ocean as an entity. It allowed the National Command Authorities and the Defense Department a focal point that would concentrate on political and military problems peculiar to that area. It had eliminated one CINC from the area, which simplified area

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 281859Z Jun 78 (5), GDS-86, which cited CINCLANT 191254Z Jun 78.
coordination requirements. CINCPAC said that closure of the Suez Canal would require lengthy transit around the Cape of Good Hope by U.S. Naval Forces to the European Command's Middle East area of responsibility. Closure of the canal would also require PACOM forces for Middle East contingency operations. Even if the canal should remain open in a conflict situation, augmenting PACOM naval forces still almost certainly would be required. CINCPAC noted that the Soviet Indian Ocean presence was primarily naval, and the majority of those forces transited to and from the Indian Ocean through the PACOM area. A U.S. Naval presence in the Indian Ocean under a single unified command provided greater responsiveness and flexibility in reacting to Soviet naval initiatives.1

CINCPAC noted that JCS guidance stated that command organization on a geographic basis was the most commonly used method of command organization for implementing strategic plans of the JCS. CINCPAC believed that the Indian Ocean as a geographic entity was clearly a more practical basis for planning than "oceans around Africa," as had been suggested by CINCLANT. "Placing entire Indian Ocean under single unified commander is best way to insure centralized direction of forces and effective coordination with allies."

CINCPAC noted that steaming distances from those support facilities were less than half the distance from the U.S. East Coast or the Mediterranean via the Cape of Good Hope. Assignment of the Indian Ocean to one unified commander also fixed responsibility for continuing operations. CINCPAC noted the deployment of three Indian Ocean task groups a year, one of which included a carrier, and the continuing P-3 maritime air patrols.

CINCPAC said that NATO's dependence on Middle East oil was matched or exceeded by the dependence of Asian friends and allies of the United States on that source. A significant factor in the PACOM nations' perceptions of U.S. resolve to remain an Asian power was CINCPAC's continued exercise of primary responsibility for protection of their vital Indian Ocean sea lines of communication. "Assignment of Western Indian Ocean to another unified commander (with primary responsibility to NATO) would, in the eyes of Asian nations, convey a weakening U.S. national resolve in Pacific/Indian Ocean. A 'remote' military command would be less responsive to needs and concerns of Pacific allies."

CINCPAC noted that existing Command Arrangements Agreements among CINCLANT, CINCEUR, and CINCPAC were sufficient to support any contingencies in the Western Indian Ocean. Moving the boundary would require complete re-

1. CINCPAC 041115Z Jul 78 (3), GDS-86.
negotiation of those agreements, a lengthy and unnecessary task. It would also
require significant revision to the Radford-Collins agreement.

(C) Moving the boundary would also split responsibility for the busiest
corner of the Indian Ocean, the intersection of the Persian Gulf-Cape Town,
and the Red Sea-Singapore sea lines of communication.

(C) CINCPAC provided a number of other specific reasons he believed the
boundary was best left alone. He concluded:

CINCPAC clearly does not agree with recommended change
to LANTCOM/PACOM UCP boundary and as noted in.../His 3 June
message to the JCS cited earlier/ believes that requirement
for planning and operations in Sub-Saharan Africa can be
accomplished without changes to the UCP boundaries.

(U) There was no change to the Unified Command Plan in 1978.

Department of Defense Organization Studies

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr., chaired a steering
committee that had general direction over a number of studies of the organiz-
ation and functions of the Defense Department that had been ordered by President
Carter in 1977. One of the studies was under the direction of Richard C.
Steadman, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs and head of President Carter's Defense transition team, who
was in 1978 a member of a New York investment firm. His report concerned the
National Military Command Structure and was referred to as the Steadman report.
A second study was entitled "Departmental Headquarters," and was under the
direction of former Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius, who had just taken over as
head of the Air Transport Association when he was asked to conduct the DOD
study. A third study, an assessment of Defense Department resource management,
was directed by Donald B. Rice, President of the RAND Corporation; this was
not expected to be completed until 1979. A fourth study was added in September
1978. This was a review of Defense agencies and was directed by MAJ GEN
Theodore Antonelli, USA (Ret.); this study was also expected to be completed
in 1979.2

(U) Mr. Steadman met with CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and the Deputy CINCPACFLT
on 22 and 23 March. Discussions covered a broad range of topics related to

1. Ibid.
2. J564 HistSum Dec 78 (U); JCS 4152/280042Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84; JCS 7821/
201354Z Nov 78 (G), GDS-84.
organizational and command relationship issues. (He had visited the head-
quarters earlier, in December 1977, at which time he had been provided a
PACOM planning overview brief, an orientation brief, and a command and control
demonstration. Discussions with CINCPAC staff planners had followed.)"}

(U) Both the Steadman and Ignatius studies were submitted to the Secretary
of Defense on 12 July. CINCPAC was sent copies of both reports and asked to
comment on them. He considered responses from his component commanders and
the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group in the preparation of his response.

(U) The material that follows will concern first, the Steadman report,
and then the Ignatius report, with the conclusions of those reports followed
by CINCPAC's position on those conclusions, followed by the JCS position.
Both studies had agreed that the Defense Department was well managed; CINCPAC
therefore believed that a major reorganization should not be pursued until
there was conclusive evidence that such a reorganization was needed.2

(B1) Steadman recommended that the JCS should review the Unified Command
Plan at intervals not to exceed two years. CINCPAC thought that specified
periodic review was unnecessary and could result in change for change's sake.
The JCS agreed with Steadman, however.

(B2) Steadman recommended that unified and specified commanders be selected
on the basis of highest qualified with consideration to mission and forces
assigned, rather than Service affiliation. Nobody disagreed.

(B3) The report recommended that the CINCs' military-diplomacy role should
be an important consideration in Unified Command Plan organization and functions.
CINCPAC strongly agreed, noting that the existing system met recommended cri-
teria. The JCS also agreed.

(B4) Steadman said there was no need for the unified commands to cover the
world. CINCPAC agreed, but noted that he believed that Sub-Saharan Africa
should be assigned to a command for normal operations. (This subject is
addressed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter.) At first the JCS noted
that they agreed with Steadman, but they later began examining alternatives.

(B5) Steadman recommended examination of the components to identify re-
dundancies in personnel and logistics, and asked if it was feasible to con-
solidate. CINCPAC advised that those functions were examined on a continuing
basis on areas that supported the unified commander. Any consolidation should

1. J564 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. Ibid., CINCPAC 0903132 Aug 78 (B), GDS-84.
take into account unique Service requirements and missions. Also, reduction in component staffing could lead to a matching increase in the staffing of the unified command in order to perform administrative, as opposed to operational functions, being performed by the components. The JCS said that major military headquarters had already been reduced to the minimum levels consistent with operational requirements, but that they would watch for further opportunities for more efficient operations.

(C) CINCPAC strongly supported the study's finding regarding the CINC's overview responsibility for regional Security Assistance Programs. His role in rendering military judgment on regional defense issues was inherent in discharging regional security commitments. In carrying out the security assistance task, CINCs played a key role as spokesmen for strategic defense interests with regional countries.

(U) Next in the Steadman report were a number of conclusions regarding the PACOM specifically.

(C) Steadman recommended that the PACOM should retain its existing assigned areas and responsibilities. Both CINCPAC and the JCS agreed.

(C) Steadman recommended that planning, practices, and attitudes regarding crisis or wartime command arrangements for U.S. Forces Korea should be flexible to permit alternative arrangements to include the existing command organization, direct command by Washington, or a combination of the two. Where organizational decisions could not accommodate those alternatives, they should be made in favor of the assumption that there would be a unified command reporting directly to Washington. CINCPAC agreed, in general, but noted that existing arrangements were satisfactory and should be retained. Through the United Nations Command and the Combined Forces Command there were already provisions for direct reporting to the JCS. CINCPAC believed that the creation of a Northeast Asia or Korean unified command would fragment current PACOM theater-assigned forces and reduce PACOM's war-fighting capability.

(C) Steadman said that the Army component should not be reinstated unless a convincing argument was made that this would be demonstrably more effective than existing arrangements. CINCPAC strongly disagreed with this recommendation, and said it could have been stated in a more positive light. CINCPAC outlined a number of reasons why he believed that early action was needed to restore his Army component. The JCS agreed with the view that the command structure should change only if there was significant management or command and control improvement. But the JCS went on to review the Army's plans and subsequently supported the idea of reestablishing the Army component. As discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter, however, the Secretary of
Defense did not approve the organizational change recommendation of the Army, permitting only the consolidation of two headquarters agencies in Hawaii (U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii) into what was to become the Army's Western Command.

Steadman recommended that the Readiness Command should have greater Naval and Marine forces participation in its joint training exercises. CINCPAC agreed, but noted that an increase in exercise requirements could not be supported within existing operating levels, funding, and PACOM exercise commitments. The JCS agreed, also noting asset and funding limitations.

Also regarding the Readiness Command, Steadman believed that command should be given a broader, more active role in developing joint doctrine for all forces. CINCPAC agreed, but noted that all unified and specified commands had unique considerations pertinent to their areas of responsibility. Problems varied because of the nature of crises, the forces available, and differing geography, and were best handled at Service component level. CINCPAC believed that primary responsibility for all joint doctrine development should remain with the JCS.

Regarding management of crisis or wartime situations, Steadman believed that the chain of command to be used should be clearly enunciated at the outset. If any element was to be by-passed, it should remain fully informed of developments. CINCPAC agreed, but he also believed that any by-passed levels of command should be provided a channel to introduce recommendations into the decision process.

Steadman recommended that the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of the forces under his command. CINCPAC believed that changes in the role of the CINCs and the Chairman of the JCS in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System should be approached with "considerable caution." While they should provide input and have strong influence regarding force levels and thus generalized input on resource allocation, program and budgeting analysis should be left to the Services. Increased analytical requirements for the unified commands would require more staff personnel with special skills, which would also mean an additional staff layer. CINCPAC said that one area for improvement was the development of a feedback loop from the Services to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. After receiving Consolidated Guidance, the Services could comment on their ability to do the job within the resource constraints imposed. The JCS agreed that the CINCs should be active participants, and believed they were increasingly active already. The quarterly reports from the CINCs to the Secretary of Defense and the European Command's Master Priority List were examples they cited. The CINCs were also involved
in various documents in the Joint Program for Planning. The JCS believed, however, that all CINCs should develop a submission similar to the Master Priority List of the European Command. There was general agreement between CINCPAC and the JCS that the CINCs should not get into programming and budgeting analysis.

Steadman said that the Secretary of Defense should designate the Chairman of the JCS as his agent to supervise the CINCs. CINCPAC agreed that the Chairman's role in representing the CINCs' views to National Command Authority decision makers might be expanded. He said, however, that existing relationships between CINCPAC and the Chairman worked well and did not require formalization. He did believe, however, that a formal role for the Chairman in the decision-making process was desirable. The JCS agreed that the roles of the JCS and its Chairman should be enhanced with respect to the CINCs. A Defense Department directive should be reviewed with a view towards permitting them a more active role in assuring the combat readiness of U.S. Forces worldwide. Also such a directive could be amended to formalize the existing role of the Chairman as an interface with the Secretary of Defense in transmitting orders and instructions to the CINCs. The JCS stopped short of full agreement with Steadman, however. They noted that Section 142 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code prohibited the Chairman from exercising military command over the JCS or any of the Armed Forces.

Steadman recommended that the Services, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should conduct an in-depth review of readiness capabilities reporting. CINCPAC was not convinced that the existing system needed major revision, although more standardization among the Services in Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) reporting would be helpful. In addition to the FORSTAT, narrative non-standard reports were also useful, CINCPAC said, in assessing levels of joint readiness. Many factors affecting readiness were not quantifiable in a standard sense, and thus reports attempting to do so could be misleading. The JCS concurred with the Steadman view that definite improvements were possible and the issue was being studied by the Defense Department's Readiness Management Steering Group. Also several JCS studies were under way to improve their ability to articulate readiness information and identify limitations. One related action was Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, which is also discussed elsewhere in this History.

Steadman said that the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, should be given a formal role in resource allocation planning and decisions. CINCPAC believed that changes in the role of the CINCs in the matter of planning, programming, and budgeting resource allocation should be approached with considerable caution, as he had discussed above. The JCS believed that the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, should have an expanded role in resource alloc-
tion planning decisions. They believed that an appropriate role for the JCS should be at the macro-management level, rather than from a detailed analysis perspective. They might focus on high areas of risk associated with existing and projected force capabilities to execute national military strategy, establish the degree and relative importance of each big area, and recommend priorities in resource allocation.

Steadman recommended that the Secretary of Defense, his deputy, and selected key assistants should regularly review existing military operational planning. CINCPAC disagreed with this recommendation. It was highly doubtful that such an advisory group could accomplish more than the Service Chiefs. It would result in two, perhaps competitive, sources of influence, neither as powerful as the existing dual-hatted Service Chiefs. There was a risk of "fractionating" existing Service cooperation, reversing the current joint approach to operations and advice. Much of the progress toward unity of action accomplished since 1947 would be jeopardized. It imposed yet another layer of review, analysis, and interpretation. Revision of the National Security Act would be required. The JCS agreed with Steadman that there was a requirement for a review of broad operational planning concepts to assure consistency with policy guidelines and to keep officials in the Office of the Secretary informed as to operational capabilities. Overview briefings and ensuing dialogue should satisfy the requirement, the JCS believed.

The Ignatius report had been concerned primarily with the Defense Department's decision-making processes. It had recommended using the Armed Forces Policy Council, as it had been chartered, to offer the Secretary regular and frequent advice on the formulation of Defense policy, restricting membership to civilian and military statutory authorities. CINCPAC believed that this seemed to run counter to the Council's role as originally chartered, which was to offer regular and frequent advice in the formulation of broad defense policy. The study implied, CINCPAC believed, that the Council should become more involved in specific military Service policy and subsequently monitor that policy implementation. This function, he believed, belonged with the Military Services. The JCS concurred with Ignatius, noting that stricter enforcement of the directive that outlined the organization and functions of the Council could result in production of more useful advice to the Secretary.

Ignatius proposed establishment of a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. CINCPAC disagreed. He said that the Under Secretaries appeared to be given too much to do, particularly the Under Secretary for Policy. Charging him with the business of reviewing military plans imposed yet another layer of review, analysis, and interpretation. Establishment of a new and separate planning office with responsibilities in
contingency planning was inconsistent with the stated aim of the study, which was to reduce layers of staff review and approval. "Military planning is properly developed to achieve military goals, although recognize that political coloration may be added at highest levels during decision process. Contingency planning should remain responsibility of uniformed military." The JCS, however, in disagreement with CINCPAC, strongly endorsed creation of a Policy Planning Officer under the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

Ignatius encouraged a continuation of the effort under way to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area. CINCPAC said that such recommendations were "always appealing," but noted that reductions of that nature could sometimes encumber subordinate commands with increased work loads that detracted from their ability to perform their basic military missions. Any proposed reductions should be carefully reviewed in that light. The JCS also agreed, but believed that there were practical limits to further reductions. Any further reductions should be carefully weighed for their overall impact and the degradation of functional capability.

Ignatius recommended establishment of a formal role for the Service Under Secretaries oriented to common liaison functions with the Office of the Secretary. CINCPAC believed that however the Service Secretariats were finally reorganized, the logistic element of each Service should be generally uniform in title and scope of responsibility. "In previous reorganizations this has not always been the case." The JCS deferred on this subject to the Service Secretaries. 1

When the Armed Forces Journal reported on the Steadman and Ignatius studies in its August 1978 issue, it described the team that performed the studies as a "refreshing contrast" to the mammoth 1970 Defense Blue Ribbon Panel, which had hundreds of recommendations. Steadman and Ignatius offered only a few recommendations (Ignatius exactly 13). The Journal quoted "one student of reorganization" as saying that the Defense Department implemented perhaps 100 of the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations, "all of them except the ones that were important." 2

Army Command Relations in the PACOM

In 1973 the former Army component command of CINCPAC, the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), had recommended through Army channels that it, USARPAC, be disestablished. CINCPAC repeatedly voiced his serious reservations about the

1. Ibid.
capability of the proposed new Army structure to discharge its responsibilities. Nevertheless, on 31 December 1974 USARPAC was disestablished and in place of an Army component command in Hawaii there was a CINCPAC Support Group. This was, at the time, a 145-man field operating agency of the Department of the Army, which provided liaison, advice, assistance, and coordination authority on PACOM Army matters to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. It was responsive to CINCPAC's directive authority in the field of logistics. CINCPAC exercised operational command of the 25th Infantry Division, located in Hawaii, through the Commander, CINCPAC Support Group.¹

(U) The transition had been well planned and was well executed. Much of that success had been attributed to the positive attitude of all concerned and the fact that action officers had worked on the reorganization. Also, in its first year the CINCPAC Support Group had performed well in crisis situations, such as the last days of Phnom Penh and Saigon and the refugee center on Guam. "The fact that this unique organization was workable notwithstanding, CINCPAC still believed in the requirement for Service component commands in the PACOM."²

(DECL) The CINCPAC Support Group also came to hold the opinion that the Army in the PACOM should be reestablished as a single Major Army Command, a component command. In mid-March 1978 the CINCPAC Support Group commander briefed CINCPAC on the plan and CINCPAC indicated his support for the concept.³

(DECL) The plan, which was called Pacific Phoenix, Phase I, to be implemented on 1 October 1978, was to involve activation of USARPAC as a Major Army Command (MACOM) by consolidating the assets of Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii and the CINCPAC Support Group to form Headquarters, USARPAC. Missions of the new headquarters would be consolidation and realignment of existing missions of those two headquarters, less installation support. It would be responsible for matters outside the jurisdiction of Japan and Korea, but would be capable of assuming responsibilities for centralizing Army functions within the Pacific or assuming added responsibilities from the Eighth U.S. Army as the drawdown in Korea progressed. The CINCPAC Support Group role in Taiwan would continue, as would relationships with MAAGs and Missions.

(DECL) Phase II would subordinate U.S. Army Japan to USARPAC. Concurrently, Headquarters IX Corps would be withdrawn from Japan and integrated with the headquarters in Hawaii, if this was considered appropriate at the time.

2. CINCPAC Command History 1975 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, p. 34.
3. J564 HistSum Dec 78 (DECL), DECL 1 Jan 87.
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Phase III was to be subordination of the Army in Korea to USARPAC. Consideration was to be given to consolidation of Headquarters, Eighth Army with Headquarters USARPAC in Hawaii. 1

As part of the staffing process the Department of the Army asked for CINCPAC's comments or objections to reestablishment of USARPAC. Also as part of that process, the Army retransmitted to CINCPAC a lengthy message from the CINCPAC Support Group that provided additional rationale for approval of the plan. That rationale included a number of thoughts. There should be the same component headquarters in peacetime as in war. The PACOM should be viewed as an entity rather than an amalgamation of fragmented areas with emphasis (at that time) on Northeast Asia. While the current primacy of interest was in the Japan and Korea area, there were other areas in the PACOM that were potential flash points. Disestablishment of USARPAC had become widely regarded by senior officers as a mistake. Reestablishment of an Army headquarters in the Pacific was consistent with the resurgence of U.S. interests and emphasis on the Pacific. CINCPAC had attempted to use the CINCPAC Support Group as an Army component, but the group did not have the authority, command, or resources to be completely responsive to CINCPAC requirements. The peacetime nicety of exercising "componentship" through negotiation and coordination with other Army MACOMs was unacceptable in war and had severe disadvantages during peace. Phase I could be accomplished within programmed FY 79 personnel resources. Finally, the Army noted, CINCPAC supported the reestablishment of an Army component at the earliest possible opportunity. 2

CINCPAC advised the Department of the Army directly that he "strongly" supported the reestablishment of USARPAC in Hawaii. CINCPAC said: 3

Reestablishment of USARPAC headquarters clearly in best U.S. national interest. Would provide significant benefits to PACOM and in my opinion would be beneficial to U.S. Army. Inter alia it would provide:

...Adequate U.S. Army representation PACOM wide including contingency planning purposes and, very importantly, it would enhance Army to Army relationships with other friendly and allied nations.

1. Ibid.; J564 Point Paper [6], 14 Jun 78, Subj: Pacific Phoenix-CSG Study on Army Reorganization in the Pacific (U), and its enclosure, the Executive Summary of the CSG study (U), GDS-86.
2. HQDA 161840Z Jun 78 [5], GDS-86; HQDA 162156Z Jun 78 [5], GDS-86, which retransmitted CDRUSACSG 152300Z Jun 78.
3. CINCPAC 230044Z Jun 78 [5], GDS-86.

SECRET

33
SECRET

Increase overall operational efficiency, especially in transition to and conduct of general war.

Visible indication to America's friends, allies and potential adversaries of continuing high level U.S. interest in the Pacific area.

(U) CINCPAC kept the JCS informed during this whole period by providing copies of his communications and retransmitting Army messages.

(NS) On 26 July the Honolulu affiliate of CBS-TV queried the Commander of the CINCPAC Support Group regarding reactivation of USARPAC. The essence of his response was that the matter was being studied by the Department of the Army.1

(NS) On 26 July the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations advised Army Commanders in Japan, Korea, and Hawaii of the intention to have the plan briefed to a Department of the Army Select Committee on 3 August, recommending approval. The message noted that no changes in the current MACOM status of either Eighth Army or U.S. Army Japan were warranted at that time. He solicited the comments of those two commands.2

(NS) Coincidentally, at about this same time, comments were being prepared at CINCPAC headquarters on the National Military Command Structure (Steadman) and Departmental Headquarters (Ignatius) studies. (These organizational proposals are addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.) One of the studies' recommendations dealt negatively with the proposal to reestablish USARPAC. CINCPAC objected to the negative cast of the recommendation and strongly supported reestablishment in a message on 9 August.3

(NS) The Army's Select Committee, chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, met on 3 August and approved the reestablishment of USARPAC effective 1 October 1978, contingent upon reflecting a definite timetable when the U.S. Army Japan would move under USARPAC. The Army asked CINCPAC for his comments on the revised plan. The several revisions concerned 1 October 1978, 1 April 1979, and 1 October 1979 as options for subordinating U.S. Army Japan to USARPAC. The existing USARJ/IX Corps title was to be retained and the U.S. Army Japan was to continue as an Army component to U.S. Forces Japan. The three-star IX Corps billet was to be retained in Japan. These were to preserve the momentum

1. SSO Hawaii 300515Z Jul 78 (BOM), GDS-84 or upon public release.
2. SSO ACSI DA 262300Z Jul 78 (BOM), GDS-90.
3. CINCPAC 090313Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-84.

SECRET

34
in bilateral planning and similar relations with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces.¹

(U) The Army sent a similar message to Army commanders in Korea, Japan, and Hawaii outlining the revised plan, soliciting comments, and noting some additional uni-Service management considerations relating to the selection of options.²

(§) CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan's comments on the revised plan. COMUS Japan had no objection to the Army's plan, but expressed his concern about the possible impact of personnel reductions at Camp Zama that could occur as a result. His position was that any sizable withdrawal of U.S. Army personnel would raise questions in Government of Japan circles about U.S. intentions and the strength of commitments under the U.S.-Japan treaty.³

(§) CINCPAC relayed these concerns to the Department of the Army, deferring to the CINCPAC Support Group on timing, dates, and uni-Service matters. The CINCPAC Support Group commander's response to the Army supported the USARPAC concept and recommended subordination of U.S. Army Japan to USARPAC on 1 October 1979.⁴

(U) On 20 October 1978 the Support Group advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of the Army had approved and signed the Pacific Phoenix study. CINCPAC's Executive Assistant advised that CINCPAC would "weigh in" if the study got in trouble during staffing in the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On 24 October the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations asked CINCPAC to do just that.⁵

(§) CINCPAC responded with a message to the Chairman of the JCS (with a copy to the Secretary of Defense) in which he "most strongly" recommended reestablishment of USARPAC. CINCPAC's rationale was as he had stated in his 23 June message to the Department of the Army, noted above. He added comments about the desirability of the reestablishment, which would provide directive and management authority vested in a single commander with resultant management efficiencies interacting with CINCPAC and his Air Force and Navy component commands. Also, there would be demonstrable improvement in CINCPAC's operations

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1. SSO ACSI DA 071856Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86.
2. SSO ACSI DA 080150Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86.
3. SSO CINCPAC 110213Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86; AFSSO 5AF 120235Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86.
4. SSO CINCPAC 152018Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86; SSO HAWAII 141824Z Aug 78 (BOM), GDS-86.
5. SSO ACSI DA 242219Z Oct 78 (BOM), GDS-84.

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and war-fighting capability, wherein the Army would function in an efficient manner in relation to the unified command. It would provide a single Army authority, focused on the Pacific area, dealing with total theater political-military perceptions and strategy, and translating those into coherent plans, responsive readiness programs, and realistic, sharply focused training of theater-oriented ready forces.\(^1\)

\(^{(C)}\) The Secretary of the Army approved the proposal on 16 October and the question moved to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, was briefed on 31 October. It appeared, however, that no decision would be made by the Secretary until he had completed a Pacific trip. By this time the planned activation date for USARPAC had been slipped three months, to 1 January 1979. The Secretary of Defense visited both Korea and Japan in November, accompanied by the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, David E. McGiffert, and Mr. Armacost.\(^2\)

\(^{(G)}\) COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC that the Secretary had seemed disinclined to support the Army's proposal, while COMUS Japan noted that the issue was not raised. At talks at CINCPAC's headquarters, both Messrs. McGiffert and Armacost seemed favorably inclined, with some reservations, but the Secretary did not seem convinced. His objections appeared to center around going back to doing things as they had been done during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Also, he had difficulty in seeing a good operational role for USARPAC in view of the withdrawal of ground combat forces from Korea and no Army combat forces in the PACOM (except Hawaii). One of his fundamental questions was what combat forces would USARPAC command.\(^3\)

\(^{(U)}\) A 21 November message from Deputy Assistant Secretary Armacost to Admiral Weisner alluded to their conversation on the subject and noted that indications were that all of the Services supported reestablishment and that the JCS as well as the International Security Affairs position papers would reach the Secretary during the early part of the week of 27 November.\(^4\)

\(^{(S)}\) The Secretary of Defense announced his decision on 26 December. He did not approve the proposal to reestablish USARPAC, saying he was not convinced of the need to do so. He said that there may be substantial benefit in the

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1. SSO CINCPAC 280155Z Oct 78 \(^{(C)}\) (BOM), GDS-84.
2. J564 HistSum Dec 78 \(^{(G)}\), DECL 1 Jan 87.
3. Ibid.; SSO Korea 091113Z Nov 78 \(^{(G)}\) (BOM), GDS-84; SSO Zama 090615Z Nov 78 \(^{(G)}\) (BOM), GDS-84; J564 Talking Paper, 17 Nov 78, n.s. (U).
4. OSD 212342Z Nov 78 (U) (BOM).
consolidation of the two headquarters in Hawaii, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, and he approved such consolidation. The commander, however, was to be retained at the two-star level. He did not approve the realignment of the U.S. Army Japan "at this time."1

(U) The Department of the Army provided all concerned with an announcement of the Secretary's decision on 28 December. Three functions were anticipated to be performed by the new headquarters. It would function as the Army's MACOM for Army units and installations in the Pacific, less Korea and Japan. It would serve as the Army component commander of the PACOM responsible for matters not currently assigned to Army components of subordinate unified commands. It would command and support assigned and attached active and reserve units, installations, and activities.2

(U) The Army's plan for detailed development of the revised Army command structure was expected to be completed by mid-January 1979. (The new command, which became the U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), was not activated until 23 March 1979. It was staffed by personnel from the CINCPAC Support Group and some members of the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, which continued to exist as a separate command, subordinate to the Western Command.)

U.S. Forces Japan Organization Structure

(3) On 13 April the JCS tasked CINCPAC to review the merits of a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense that proposed a fresh look at the U.S. military organizational structure in Japan to determine if it needed some modification in view of Japan's growing strength and the evolving U.S.-Japan security relationship. Specifically, the request was to:3

- Determine ways to increase our capability to engage more actively and directly with key players in defense cooperation, that is, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Defense Agency, and the U.S. Embassy.

- Determine if greater equality in U.S.-Japan defense relationships could be achieved by moving COMUS Japan and certain key USFJ headquarters elements from Yokota Air Base to downtown Tokyo.

1. SECDEF Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army (S), 26 Dec 78, Subj: Army Command Structure in the Pacific (U), DECL 21 Dec 84.
2. HQDA 282325Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. JCS 3877/131617Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
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- Determine if COMUS Japan would have more time and flexibility to concentrate on bilateral matters if we ceased dual-hatting COMUS Japan as Commander, 5th Air Force.

- Consider alternating the three-star COMUS Japan billet between the Air Force and the Navy to reflect an increasing need for bilateral naval coordination.

(U) CINCPAC tasked his component commands, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and COMUS Japan for their comments and recommendations.¹

(△) The Commander of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group favored relocation to downtown Tokyo. He did not believe COMUS Japan should be dual-hatted. He believed COMUS Japan should devote full time to the critical aspects of bilateral matters and interface with the U.S. Embassy. Also, he said, "Dual-hatting COMUSJAPAN places one individual in a position to strongly influence the outcome of tri-Service matters in favor of uniservice objectives." He believed incumbency should be rotated among all of the Services, not just the Air Force and Navy.²

(◇) CINCPACFLT replied that the existing Navy initiatives and relationships were active, growing, and producing positive results, and he did not support changing them. He did not support relocation because of the cost and manpower constraints. He also said that the force level preponderance of the Naval service in Japan provided rationale for rotating the three-star billet or making it a Navy billet, but it was doubtful if the Navy could provide a three-star admiral, either permanently assigned or rotational. In light of continuing pressures to reduce the number of flag and general officers it did not appear prudent to initiate a change that would increase the number of such billets in Japan.³

(●) CINCPACAF favored the status quo. He said that informal discussions with the USFJ staff indicated no problems in actively participating with members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Defense Agency, or the U.S. Embassy. He opposed the relocation to downtown Tokyo because of political issues, costs, and manpower requirements. He saw no problem in the dual-hatting of COMUS Japan and noted that the Chief of Staff was a full-time rotating billet (Army and Navy).⁴

1. CINCPAC 141910Z Apr 78 (△), GDS-86.
2. CDRUSACSG 252335Z Apr 78 (△), GDS-86.
3. CINCPACFLT 290147Z Apr 78 (◇), GDS-86.
4. PACAF 030400Z May 78 (∗), GDS-86.

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He did not support relocation of the headquarters because of costs and manpower. He listed the principal meetings that involved U.S. and Japanese; most were very infrequent and the daily USFJ staff division liaison/working visits involved a 15-minute helicopter flight from Yokota to Tokyo. COMUS Japan noted that as a matter of information, and prior to this study of the matter of a move, the subject had been raised informally at the Embassy as an aftermath of a visit by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. At that time both the Political Counselor and the Ambassador had expressed in similar terms the view that such a move would be inappropriate and inadvisable. The ability of the existing staff to handle the total range of subjects of mutual U.S.-Japanese interest in a "timely, creative manner" had presented no difficulty. He outlined a number of the specific construction and personnel requirements and estimated costs of relocation.1

CINCPAC considered all of these inputs when he prepared his reply of 6 May. He opposed the proposed change in either location or organizational structure for the Japan command. First he pointed out that existing utilized channels, forums, and other official and informal exchanges at all levels provided for an effective U.S.-Japan defense relationship. Examples were the daily staff liaison/working visits mentioned by COMUS Japan, the working breakfasts of COMUS Japan and the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council; the bimonthly meetings of the USFJ and the Japan Defense Agency, Joint Staff Office; the Security Consultative Committee; the Security Consultative Group; and CINCPAC exchange visits with the Joint Staff Office. CINCPAC described the coordination of defense issues among key officials from USFJ, the Embassy, and the Japanese government as "effective and responsive." He said, "Substantive bilateral planning is in the offing, and this should lead to further dialogue which will impart to the Japanese a sense of active U.S. commitment to our security partnership with Japan. CINCPAC will continue to promote ongoing multi-level talks/cooperative efforts with the Japanese."2

CINCPAC continued that relocation to downtown Tokyo would enhance geographic accessibility to Government of Japan and U.S. Embassy facilities. Increased accessibility, however, was not the solution to the problem of convincing the Japanese that they did, in fact, enjoy parity with our allies in

1. COMUSJAPAN 270728Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 062230Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
Europe and elsewhere. "They will perceive an improvement in equality of their status in all aspects of their security relationship with the United States only in a comparison with other nations with whom we have a security relationship."

A move to downtown Tokyo would create major problems as well. The movement of key USFJ elements would require an 80 percent increase above the current manpower authorization. Relocation and new construction costs for headquarters and support facilities would be an estimated $90 million. Housing and schools would not be available initially and the 2 to 3-hour commute from Camp Zama or Yokota Air Base on a daily basis would be an unacceptable burden to assigned personnel.

CINCPAC commented on dual-hatting of COMUS Japan. He said the arrangement had not prevented timely handling of expanding bilateral relationships with the Japan Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency, and Japan Self-Defense Forces. It was doubtful if any of the U.S. Services could provide an additional three-star officer to fill a new COMUS Japan billet. In any case, however, rotation of the USFJ Chief of Staff promoted even-handed espousal of Service interests. The existing composition of the USFJ staff provided for the application of a range of skills, experience, and competence to handle problems of all Services. Existing USN-Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force coordination, which was active and growing, insured effective bilateral naval coordination.

CINCPAC concluded that "any gains to be realized from these proposals are substantially outweighed by the disadvantages within existing manpower and funding constraints and pose exceptional practical difficulties in implementation."

CINCPAC heard nothing further on the subject in 1978.

CINCPAC Command Center Modernization

As discussed in previous editions of the CINCPAC Command History, a new and larger Command Center was to be constructed to improve facilities for current operations and accommodate other planned system improvements. The modernization programs concerned buildings 4 and 80 and required relocation of some tenants of those buildings during the reconstruction work. By 16 August most of those moves were complete, except as noted below. The public bid opening was held on 17 May 1978. The Teval Corporation was awarded the contract with a low bid of $2,877,643.

1. Ibid.
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(U) Tests of the Pacific WWMCCS Regional ADP Center had not been completed by the end of the year, resulting in another delay in the movement of nuclear support personnel from Fort Shafter to lower floors of the Command Center not affected by the alterations. The move had been originally scheduled for 12 October, but would be delayed until 1979.1

(2) On 21 December four members of the Command Center Operations Watch Team relocated to an interim command center facility immediately adjacent to the regular command center and were to operate from that location for the duration of the modernization program. The four were the Duty Director of Operations, the Surface and Air Operations Officers, and an enlisted clerk. Previously, on 2 November, the Emergency Action Officer and NCO of the Watch Team relocated to the Alternate Command Post at Hickam AFB.2

(U) The new Command Center was scheduled to be completed during July 1980 and at the end of the year was moving along on schedule.

(U) A Project Manager's Office had been created in the Headquarters to be the CINCPAC single point of contact for the modernization project, effective 6 November. The office was staffed by representatives of the Operations, Intelligence, and Communications-Data Processing Directorates. The office was headed by J330.3

PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System

(2) One of the features of the modernized Command Center was to be the PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System (PACAIDS). CINCPAC, his immediate staff, and the Command Center Watch Team were physically separated from the functional groups that supported them during crises. Those functional groups were the Operations Planning Group, the Logistics Readiness Center, the Nuclear Operating Center, the Intelligence Center Pacific, the Emergency Action Booth, the Joint Reconnaissance Center, and the offices of the Directors for Intelligence and Operations. In order to pass information from one group to another it was necessary to employ messengers or use telephones. There was considered to be a danger that individual perceptions of the crisis situation would be different, amplifying ambiguity and interfering with the decision-making process. This would be true also in the modernized Command Center, and

1. J330 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. J3321 HistSum Dec 78, DECL 31 Dec 84; CINCPAC 200227Z Dec 78 (2), DECL 31 Dec 84.
3. J330 HistSum Dec 78 (U).

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41
PACAIDS was sought as a remedy.\(^1\)

\(^{(59)}\) PACAIDS was a video and audio distribution system that used a matrix routing to interconnect users. It was to be assembled from "proven, off-the-shelf" equipment. CINCPAC and his Battle Staff would receive visual information on cathode ray tubes and large group displays. An assortment of input and output devices located throughout the headquarters would allow the interchange of information. Those devices would be located among the supporting functional groups listed above. The input devices included Visual Information Processors associated with the Honeywell H6060 WMMCCS ADP Processor, UNIVAC 1652 alphanumeric terminals associated with the PACOM Data Systems Center, a Vector General graphic terminal, a Naval Environmental Display Station terminal, existing commercial television sets, television cameras, and action officer briefing consoles. The output devices were to be integral parts of the system itself. Two large group displays were to be located on the front wall of the Command Center. They were to consist of two 13' x 11½' screens and associated rear view projection devices capable of displaying images and digital information received through the new system. The screens would also be capable of projecting transparencies. A control console in the Command Center would contain small TV monitors to preview information available within the system. According to directions from key staff officers, the proper displays would be shown on the large screens. It was expected to be a major advancement in the ability to present all of the crisis action organizations with the same picture of all of the information available.\(^2\)

\(^{(25)}\) Security of information on the link from PACAIDS to the Intelligence Center Pacific was studied, and on 21 November the Navy's Telecommunications Command confirmed that [REDACTED] could be made available to CINCPAC for encrypting that IPAC link, but the earliest availability date was the summer of 1980. On 13 December CINCPAC advised the Navy of the acceptability of the

\(^{(U)}\) Funding continued to be a problem. The original funding request had been submitted in 1975 at the same time the modernization construction project was submitted, but delays in the technical analysis and cost estimate process, and subsequent delays in JCS validation, had left the system lagging behind completion of the Command Center. On 15 December CINCPAC learned from the Naval Electronic Systems Command that $1.4 million of the $1.735 million that had been requested had been funded. On 23 December CINCPAC requested full

1. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S78 of 24 Feb 78 \(^{(S)}\), Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (U), XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 08.
2. Ibid.
3. J330 HistSum Dec 78 (U); J3 HistSum Aug 78 \(^{(S)}\), REVW 31 Aug 98.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PACAFDS FY 78 funding (Other Procurement, Navy funding) from the Chief of Naval Operations.\(^1\)

**Crisis Action Procedures**

(U) The JCS implemented new time-sensitive operation planning procedures on 8 September to support the crisis action system portion of the Joint Operation Planning System. These planning procedures and reporting techniques replaced the use of the Deployment Reporting System in time-sensitive operations. The new JCS directive was SM 725-78. Upon direction of the JCS, the CINCPAC staff and PACOM subordinate units would use these procedures during the course of action development and execution planning phases of a crisis.\(^2\)

(U) See also the discussion of Exercise FORCE LIST 78 in the Operations chapter of this history.

**Joint Interoperability**

(U) With the increased emphasis from Washington on interoperability and the PACOM awareness of the need to insure effective command and control for joint and combined operations, the CINCPAC Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Working Group established a committee to study and address interoperability questions. It acted as CINCPAC's focal point to review all documents and programs on the subject and developed specific recommendations for the C4 Executive Steering Committee on the role PACOM should play and the actions the command should take in order to support actively the programs designed to improve theater interoperability. The committee's membership included representatives from four divisions of the Operations Directorate; the Intelligence, Logistics-Security Assistance, Plans, and Communications-Data Processing Directorates; and the Airborne Command Post.\(^3\)

**Airborne Command Post Activities**

(U) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post maintained the ground alert status that had begun in January 1970, prior to which it had maintained a continuous airborne alert for some years. The CINCPAC Airborne Command Post was called BLUE EAGLE.\(^4\)

There were four EC-135C aircraft assigned to the operation, with two or three mission-configured aircraft available for service at any time, and

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1. Ibid.
2. J3321 HistSum Sep 78 (U).

CONFIDENTIAL

43
with one non-mission configured aircraft available for aircrew training. Aircraft returned periodically to Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, for depot maintenance.

(S) There were two kinds of training exercises throughout the year. BLUE EAGLE TWO was an alert training exercise in which the aircraft taxied to a runway hold area; BLUE EAGLE FOUR was an exercise that launched the aircraft on a local flight. For each the standard of completion was to be less than 15 minutes. The 51 BLUE EAGLE TWO and 36 BLUE EAGLE FOUR exercises conducted in 1978 were all within the 15 minutes allowed; only six exercises all year took over nine minutes. No exercises were conducted in February.1

(U) Typically, also, the five Battle Staffs deployed to the Western Pacific area, with about two of the staffs going out each month. The more routine deployments stopped at Andersen on Guam, Osan in Korea, Yokota and Kadena in Japan, and Clark in the Philippines. In 1978 certain Airborne Command Post deployments included stops at Taipei Air Station on Taiwan, Elmendorf and McChord AFB in the United States, Kunsan in Korea, and Richmond Royal Australian Air Force Base in Australia.2

(U) Among the four local sorties flown in the Hawaiian orbit area in April, one sortie was flown in support of Exercise POLO HAT, 78-2, and another in support of Exercise ELITE TROOPER 78.3

(U) Distinguished visitors throughout the year included senior CINCPAC staff officers and various officers from Hawaii and Washington agencies, some of whom deployed with the aircraft. In September those distinguished visitors included the Japanese Defense Agency Command Center Overseas Study Team and the Navy’s Monterey Post-Graduate School for Telecommunications Tour Group.4

(U) In September work commenced to accommodate the temporary relocation of the CINCPAC Command Center Emergency Actions facility to the airborne ground unit for the duration of the Command Center renovation program.5

(S) There were five specific ABNCP modernization proposals on which some action was taken in 1978. First was the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Operations Ground Facility WWMCCS Interface. WWMCCS was the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, which had been under development for many years.

1. ABNCP HistSums Jan, Mar-Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
2. ABNCP HistSums Jan-Jul 78 (U), DECL 31 Dec 84; ABNCP HistSums Aug-Dec 78 (U).
3. ABNCP HistSum Apr 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
4. ABNCP HistSums Feb-Jun, Aug 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84; ABNCP HistSums Sep, Oct 78 (U).
5. ABNCP HistSum Sep 78 (U).
The JCS had validated Required Operational Capability 6-75 for this interface in October 1976 and had recommended the use of FY 77 funds. Modifications to the WMMCCS ADP software needed to transmit updates were determined to be too complex. A compromise solution called for the installation of a remote line printer in the Airborne Command Post ground operations facility, which would allow direct receipt of major changes and constitute a significant improvement in data handling for the Single Integrated Operation Plan. In response to a CINCPAC memorandum of February 1977, the WMMCCS Project Management Office had proposed acquisition and installation of a remote line printer (Model 300T) at the Airborne Command Post. The equipment had been ordered before the end of 1978, but operational capability would be dependent on equipment delivery and software development.¹

In October 1976 the JCS had also validated a Required Operational Capability (ROC 7-75) for a CINCPAC Airborne Command Post WMMCCS ADP Interface. Cancellation of the Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System, Phase III, however, had forced acceptance of an interim procedural solution. The Worldwide Airborne Command Post was asked to develop a long-range solution. Representatives from the Air Logistics Center at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, conducted a fact-finding and site survey in October 1978. Results were expected to be published early in 1979.²

CINCPAC advised on 21 November that the SAC requirement only partially fulfilled his Airborne Command Post ADP interface. He suggested refinements to the system in that 21 November message and in another message on 22 December.²

(U) Expansion of the Airborne Command Post's ground-air UHF communication system had been validated as Required Operational Capability 8-75 by the JCS in April 1977. PACAF, in December 1978, had recommended Government Furnished Equipment to satisfy the requirement. The Air Force was determining how best to meet CINCPAC's needs, but full operational capability was not expected to occur before FY 81.³

Airborne Command Post communications upgrade was the subject of CINCPAC Required Operational Capability 12-76. On 8 November 1976 the JCS had directed the Air Force to develop preliminary estimates and Technical Analysis and Cost Estimates in consultation with the other Services, the Defense Communications Agency, the National Security Agency, the CINC of the U.S. Readiness Command, the...

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1. J3411 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 23 Jan 81.
2. J3411 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 23 Jan 81, which cited CINCPAC 210547Z Nov 78 and 220035Z Dec 78.
3. J3411 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
and CINCPAC. These TA/CE had been completed in February 1977 and the JCS had validated the requirement on 27 March 1978. Operational capability, however, would be dependent on the availability of the VINSON/PARKHILL communications equipment, which was estimated to be in the fall of 1979.\footnote{1}

(U) The fifth modernization proposal concerned a long-haul secure voice requirement for the Airborne Command Post. The requirement had been submitted to the JCS in July 1977, but was subsequently returned with no action. CINCPAC submitted a reclama in November 1978. The JCS acknowledged the reclama on 5 December, reaffirming that the requirement would be satisfied by one of several development programs, but that no program would be initiated to address this requirement specifically. The capability would not be available before 1983.\footnote{2}

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1. J3411 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 23 Jan 81.
2. J3411 HistSum Dec 78 (U), which cited CINCPAC 170450Z Nov 78 and JCS 051432Z Dec 78.

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SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

Forces and Basing in Korea

(U) President Carter had promised as a candidate to withdraw, eventually, U.S. ground forces from Korea. The plan involved nearly 32,000 troops and covered a period of four or five years. Early in his presidency he announced that he was proceeding with plans to withdraw the forces, despite some protests from the military community. The first 3,436 troops were actually withdrawn by December 1978, although the planning actions for further withdrawal actions that had taken place during 1977 were slowed in 1978.1

(UN) On 21 April 1978 President Carter publicly announced a slowdown of the withdrawal of the first increment. The JCS provided the essentials of the modification on 25 April and requested answers to several questions, including refinement of the units to be withdrawn. The Presidential modification directed the withdrawal of 2,600 "non-combat" personnel by 31 December 1978; withdrawal of one combat battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division in December 1978, and retention of the other two combat battalions of the brigade until 1979.2

(UN) CINCUNC subsequently, on 9 May, provided refined data on the changed withdrawal schedule for the first increment and also refined earlier responses to the questions that had been addressed. He was able to meet the general guidance by identifying 3,386 manpower spaces to be withdrawn by 31 December 1978, and 2,614 spaces for 1979. The refinement included the equivalent of one combat battalion in the 1978 package, but still retained the critical anti-

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRB), Vol. I, pp. 41-54; J03/74 Chronology, Dec 78 (U).
2. JCS 6844/250001Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINCUNC 270930Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 280124Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 290435Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
tank assets by forming two provisional TOW companies.\(^1\)

\(\text{\(\ast\)}\) CINCPAC again supported CINCUN to the JCS; he also requested a more specific period (the month and year) for completion of the 1979 element. This date was needed to facilitate the required planning.\(^2\)

\(\text{\(\ast\)}\) On 1 May the Secretary of Defense testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said the main points he wanted to stress were as follows. Korea policy and programs had been the subject of exhaustive review with all appropriate senior officials of the United States participating. The recent adjustment resulted from the continuation of that high-level review. He said we had consulted extensively with our Korean and Japanese allies on our plans. The United States remained firmly committed to the security of the region and the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; nothing in the planned ground force withdrawal changed that. He asked for prompt Congressional action to allow the transfer of capabilities to the Koreans. "South Korea and our other friends in the area will be reassured regarding our intentions."\(^3\)

\(\text{\(\ast\)}\) See the Security Assistance chapter of this history for 1978 actions.

\(\text{\(\ast\)}\) Related to further drawdowns, however, was a Senate amendment that addressed U.S. policy on Korea. It evolved out of one Senator's plan to introduce an amendment strongly critical of the President's withdrawal policy and a compromise effort designed to avoid condemning the President's policy while still reassuring the skeptics and stressing the importance of careful and prudent assessments at each stage of the withdrawal in consultation with Congress. The amendment said that prior to any further withdrawal the President should report to the Congress on the effect of any proposed withdrawal plan on preserving deterrence in Korea, the reaction anticipated from North Korea.

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1. CINCUNC 090050Z May 78 (\text{\(\ast\)}), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 100039Z May 78 (\text{\(\ast\)}), GDS-86.
3. SECDEF 300152Z Apr 78 (\text{\(\ast\)}), GDS-84.
4. SECSTATE 189479/272042Z Jul 78 (\text{\(\ast\)}), E.O. 11652: N/A.

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On 12 October, following Presidential approval of FY 79 security assistance legislation on 26 September, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to withdraw the remainder of the 1978 increment (called Increment 1A). They requested a revised timetable for units identified for withdrawal in 1979 (Increment 1B). Consideration was to be given to the legislative requirements for a report to Congress 120 days prior to initiation of the 1979 withdrawals.
(U) On 20 December the Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army (COMUS Korea) advised CINCPAC, the JCS, and the Department of the Army that there was some confusion about what actually constituted the 6,000-space first increment, so he provided a detailed list in order for all to use the same data. It concerned a total of 2,048 divisional and 516 non-divisional people for a grand total of 2,564 in Increment IB. Thus, by the end of 1978, Increment IA had consisted of 3,436 spaces, Increment IB would consist of the 2,564 spaces, and there were 27 more miscellaneous spaces released, for a first increment grand total of 6,027.1

(5) Earlier, on 12 September, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had announced a proposal to establish a Republic of Korea Review Committee, which was subsequently renamed the Korea Review Group (KRG). CINCPAC had immediately agreed with the idea of a group to deal with issues associated with the ground forces withdrawals and believed there should be representation from COMUS Korea, the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea; and CINCPAC.2

(5) On 14 November the Secretary of Defense announced the establishment of the KRG, provided terms of reference, and outlined requirements for flag/general officer membership. He invited CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, and CHJUSMAG-Korea to send representatives. The charter authorized the KRG to deal with policy pertaining to U.S. ground combat force withdrawals from the ROK, technical and security assistance to the ROK, U.S. strategic interests in the ROK, and responses to legislative concerns and inquiries regarding that country.3

(5) Subsequently, the Secretary announced a senior civilian/flag officer meeting of the KRG to be held on 6 December, again in Washington. CINCPAC was represented by his Deputy Director for Plans and officers from the Plans and Logistics-Security Assistance directorates. That group discussed PCETT and rehabilitation costs, policy and problem areas in training, the Military Balance Reassessment, reports to the Congress, procedures for the KRG, JUSMAG-Korea manning, restoration of Army equipment, reentry forces and War Reserve Material for the 2nd Infantry Division, aircraft co-assemble, first increment

1. J5321 HistSum Dec 78 (U); CDR USAEIGHT SEOUL 200616Z Dec 78 (U).
2. J5312 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited CINCPAC 124406Z Sep 78.
3. J5312 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 4 Jan 85; SECDEF 141639Z Nov 78 (U).
procedures for the transfer of equipment, and future trends. It was anticipated that the group would meet quarterly.¹

Residual Force Structure

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CINCPAC considered the comments of his component commanders and the

1. J5312 HistSum Dec 78, DECL 4 Jan 85.
3. J5321 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUS Korea 080958Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.
U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group when he provided his thoughts to the JCS on 28 February.\textsuperscript{1}

\begin{quote}
CINCPAC prefaced his message with the comment that COMUS Korea had formulated his recommendations based on "economic factors, reentry capabilities, and logic." CINCPAC emphasized that although Army spaces could be further reduced, "it is extremely important that we avoid structuring an organization that can only perform in peacetime and does not provide nucleus for expansion in wartime." CINCPAC strongly supported the Army's retention of medical functions and the Petroleum Distribution System-Korea. CINCPAC commented on specific proposals in the fields of intelligence, communications, and transportation. He recommended that the Army retain the functions of the Korean Procurement Agency, the Defense Property Disposal Region-Korea, and the Troop Support Agency, but that the spaces for those functions be exempted from any residual ceiling.
\end{quote}

\\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea for his views on the timing of the final decision and to initiate a study of the logistic support function. On 18 July COMUS Korea replied that the final decision need not be made until the with-

\begin{enumerate}
\item J5321 HistSum Feb 78 \textsuperscript{(S)}, GDS-86; CINCPAC 280009Z Feb 78 \textsuperscript{(S)}, XGDS-2.
\item Ibid.
\item JCS 5403/101332Z Jul 78 \textsuperscript{(C)}, GDS-84.
\end{enumerate}

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52
drawal of the second increment was completed. He said that the logistic support function would be better defined as increments one and two were completed, and would allow for further refinement. By then the command restructure would be completed. Also, the intelligence and communications units would be down to near their residual force levels which would permit further evaluation of their missions.¹

CINCPAC supported the COMUS Korea view and rationale and stated again that it was important to avoid reduction in size of a residual force that could only perform in peacetime and did not provide a nucleus for expansion in wartime.²

On 10 October COMUS Korea provided the results of his reexamination of the logistic support function, noting that it was doubtful that all logistic and support functions could be accomplished if the residual package was required to take any further major reductions. He did identify some 88 spaces that met the criteria established by the JCS, but transfer to civilian contractors would require high skill levels, be costly, and might not provide support during hostilities. CINCPAC supported COMUS Korea's recommendations in a message of 4 November. He said the residual force levels outlined by COMUS Korea in February were the realistic minimum required to provide adequate logistic support to the Army residual force without adversely impacting on contingency response capabilities.³

Withdrawal Offset Measures.

(U) As outlined in the 1977 History, a number of offset measures were studied to soften the impact of the withdrawal of ground forces. The U.S. Secretary of Defense told a press conference on 10 November 1978 upon his return from Seoul that the United States had partially compensated for the withdrawal by augmenting our air capability. He noted the arrival in November of 12 F-4Ds (the 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron). The aircraft were stationed at Taegu Air Base.⁴

The homeporting of U.S. Navy ships in the ROK was studied as a means of tangible reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment. In January 1978, however, CINCPAC advised the JCS that while homeporting would provide additional ships in the area where a contingency was likely to occur, there would be significant

1. J5324 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited COMUS Korea 1802002 Jul 78.
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 192035Z Jul 78.
3. COMUS Korea 102305Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 042203Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. CINCPACAF 230145Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; ADMIN CINCPAC 111940Z Nov 78 (U).
costs and disadvantages associated with the idea. He mentioned the lack of an adequate logistics and communications base; inadequate dependent support facilities, particularly housing; a lack of U.S. Navy training facilities to support homeported units; reduced operational flexibility for employment of homeported forces in the remainder of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean area because of time-in-homeport requirements; and increased personnel instability because of short tour lengths for unaccompanied personnel (who would likely comprise a larger than normal crew proportion because of the limitations of dependent support facilities). CINCPAC believed that the disadvantages outweighed the benefits and recommended no further action on homeporting, but he did support continuation of U.S. Navy port visits.  

(S) On 7 March the JCS requested a study of alternatives to homeporting and delineated a list of possible alternatives to be considered. After soliciting inputs from his component commands and COMUS Korea, CINCPAC's response addressed the individual JCS alternatives and then recommended that the scope of the study be narrowed to three: P-3 operations at Pohang Air Base, Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) Range development, and a tactical air bombing range (KOTAR--Korea Tactical Range). On 2 May the JCS approved narrowing the scope of the study.  

(S) CINCPAC provided guidance to CINCPACFLT, who addressed the P-3 and NGSF issues, and to CINCPACAF, who addressed the KOTAR. PACAF had previously worked on a low-key basis with the 314th Air Division in Korea to develop concepts for an instrumented tactical air bombing range.

(S) On 2 September CINCPAC forwarded the results of the study to the JCS. CINCPAC believed that the P-3 initiative was not cost effective within CINCPACFLT's estimated usage rate of 50 days per year. CINCPAC recommended that the issue be reevaluated after completion of the 'on-going U.S. Marine Corps tactical air beddown construction at Pohang in 1979, as costs for the P-3 initiative would be reduced considerably then.

1. CINCPAC 110900Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J5325 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited CINCPAC 062201Z Apr 78; JCS 7806/022013Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. J5325 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
(U) Exercises in Korea, an important offset measure, are discussed in the Operations chapter of this history.

(5) The study of ROK requirements for surface-to-surface missiles which took place in U.S. agencies in 1978 is addressed in the Security Assistance chapter of this history under the subject Joint Study Proposals. 2

Combined Forces Command

(5) A ROK-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC) was activated on 7 November 1978, the culmination of years of planning. For some years U.S. planning had considered an alternative command arrangement to the United Nations Command, but in 1977 that thinking was changed and the new command was developed as a compensatory measure in response to President Carter's announced program to withdraw the U.S. ground forces over the following five years. 3

(5) The planning that had been under way in 1977 continued at an accelerated pace into 1978. Year-end recommendations of COMUS Korea and CINCPAC concerning Terms of Reference, structure, command relationships, and milestones triggered several issues that required clarification and solution prior to development of a JCS position and subsequent recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

1. J5325 HistSum Sep 78 (5), GDS-86, which cited CINCPAC O20132Z Sep 78.
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One concerned the means by which the United States would control or constrain the ROK in the temporary absence of the CINCCFC. CINCPAC advised the JCS on 21 January that he saw little chance of imprudent commitment of U.S. Forces to combat operations during the absence of CINCCFC. He cited the history of conscientious compliance by the ROK with UNC policies, directives, and rules of engagement. That influence would be mutually reinforced with the U.S. Ambassador's representations to the ROK Government. Finally, there would also be a senior U.S. officer in command of U.S. Forces and responsible for reviewing the procedures of military actions.

A second issue concerned the rationale for assignment of nationality and Service of the CFC Chief of Staff and each Assistant Chief of Staff position. There was also a question of the use of the word "forces" in the command title. COMUS Korea provided information in this regard on 17 February, with CINCPAC's concurrence following on 24 February. COMUS Korea advised that the rank and nationality of the Chief of Staff had been agreed to at the Security Consultative Meeting held in July 1977. The rank, nationality, and branch of Service of each Assistant Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff had been developed by a ROK-U.S. Activation Committee. Considerations included nationality and Service balance, institutional expertise of the ROK, and, for the U.S. billets, use of existing U.S. Forces Korea personnel authorizations to the extent possible. COMUS Korea cautioned against changing nationality of the billets as Korea had already designated principals and deputies. The word "forces" in the title had been a quid-pro-quo item; it was considered a non-substantive issue.

The third matter was lingering concern by the Joint Staff regarding the Service affiliation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-5, the Plans billet. CINCPAC and COMUS Korea had previously (in 1977) recommended that the billet be designated a U.S. Marine Corps 07. Accordingly, the Director, Joint Staff requested CINCPAC's personal views on the Service affiliation of that officer, and any other comments concerning the new command he considered appropriate. CINCPAC, on 1 March, supported the idea of a U.S. Marine Corps 07 as the ACoS, C-5. He also expressed concern over the rank of the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, C-6 (Communications-Electronics). COMUS Korea had recommended a U.S. Army 06 for the billet; CINCPAC recommended that the billet be upgraded to 07 and Service affiliation be changed to U.S. Air Force to better balance U.S. Service participation. CINCPAC supported the previous COMUS Korea recommendations.

1. J561 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 212202Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J561 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUS Korea 221201Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 240323Z Feb 78 (U).
tion that the Air Component Commander be a U.S. Air Force O9. (Page 62 of the CINC PAC Command History for 1977 shows the proposed structure plan to include Service affiliation and grade of the CFC staff.)

Meanwhile, planning for the physical facility that would house the CFC continued. On 8 February COMUS Korea informed CINC PAC and the Chairman of the JCS that according to Minister of National Defense Ro Jae-hyun, President Park had approved a plan suggested by the ROK JCS to build a CFC headquarters building on Yongsan Compound, which was the site of the UNC/COMUS Korea/Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters.

The ROK envisioned that construction on the new headquarters would proceed day and night to insure early availability of the building. CINC PAC expressed approval of the concept in the presence of the Chairman of the JCS during a visit by the Chairman to PACOM headquarters in mid-February.2

The ground-breaking ceremony had been scheduled for 12 May. The U.S. Secretary of Defense had approved the proposed command structure with several reservations, and had taken no action to implement the activation plan until the plan was cleared with the Congress.

The JCS advised that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would transmit a briefing on the CFC to appropriate Congressional committees, which satisfied the requirement for consultation. Therefore, announcement of the CFC could be made in Korea, and ground breaking for the new headquarters could proceed as scheduled.3

The public announcement was prepared for release on 8 May. It contained the following mission statement:4

1. CINC PAC 012115Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J561 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINC UNC 091345Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4102/092146Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. COMUS Korea 290150Z Apr 78 (U).
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...To deter acts of aggression against the Republic of Korea and, in the event that deterrence fails, to defeat an armed attack.

In another earlier event, on 20 January COMUS Korea had indicated he intended to clarify the legal relationship between the UNC and the CFC through an addendum to the proposed CFC Terms of Reference. However, after a careful review of the legal and functional aspects of the issue, COMUS Korea concluded that an addendum was unnecessary. On 4 April CINCPAC agreed, and assumed that COMUS Korea would initiate action if subsequent CFC operational experience indicated a need to modify the Terms of Reference. 1

In one of the COMUS Korea messages regarding legal relationships, COMUS Korea had advised that, during negotiations with the ROK, CFC-UNC relationships had been discussed at length. The ROK understood and accepted the need for CINCNUS prerogatives in matters pertaining to the Armistice. COMUS Korea had said that the UNC must remain an identifiable entity, visibly capable of carrying out its truce-keeping mission. The Armistice Affairs Division, the UNC Liaison Group, and the UNC Rear would be retained as distinctly UN elements having no direct relationship with the CFC. 2

Regarding funding for the CFC, on 25 January CINCPAC advised the Department of the Army that the PACOM interposed no objection for the Army to assume funding as an exception to Defense Department Directive 5100.3. CINCPAC noted that the CFC was not a subordinate unified command, but a command that reported directly to National Command Authorities. The majority of the U.S. military on the ROK-U.S. military and civilian staff would be Army personnel. CINCPAC believed that funding by the Navy would cause unwarranted turbulence in determining and coordinating costs for "dual-hatted" functional areas and in administering the rights and benefits of UNC/USFK/Eighth Army U.S. civilian employees transferring to the CFC (from Army to Navy rolls). CINCPAC therefore requested that the Army take appropriate action to assume funding responsibility for the CFC. 3

1. COMUS Korea 200150Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUS Korea 220918Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 040420Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 150419Z Apr 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. COMUS Korea 220918Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCNUS Seoul 160455Z Jan 78 (G) (EX), GDS 31 Dec 87.
3. CINCPAC 250302Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-86.

SECRET

58
CINCPAC, on 7 June, requested that COMUS Korea address the reservations of the Secretary and provide comments and recommendations. COMUS Korea's reply of 10 July indicated that it was clear to the ROK that the role of the Deputy Chief of Staff did not extend into the UNC or the CFC Air Component structures.

COMUS Korea said that preliminary indications concerning the adequacy of the Terms of Reference, structure, command relationships, and other aspects of the command following Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS had been generally adequate. (See the Operations chapter of this history for a more detailed account of the exercise.) Specifically, however, in ULCHI-FOCUS LENS the flow of information to subordinate commands had been smooth and efficient. Intelligence support was adequate. The need existed for a secure conference facility at TANGO. The addition of a U.S. 07 to the intelligence staff would be helpful. Lastly, there was an urgent need to fill U.S. shortfalls in Manning.

COMUS Korea's message also noted that withdrawal of a U.S. 07 position from the 2nd Infantry Division to offset the addition of a U.S. Marine Corps 07 was best accomplished during the second increment drawdown, in light of the modification of the first increment schedule by the Administration in Washington.

CINCPAC concurred in the COMUS Korea response.

The number of flag and general officers for the commands in Korea was the subject of continuing study. The position of the Assistant Chief of Staff C-5 was to be filled by a U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general. On 17 May the Commandant nominated an officer to fill that billet and CINCPAC supported the nomination.

1. J561 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited JCS SM 438-77 of 23 May 78.
2. CINCPAC 070325Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUS Korea 100600Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCPAC 150117Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
nomination. COMUS Korea wanted that Marine officer present for duty in time to participate in Exercise ULCHI-FOCUS LENS, so Brigadier General Thomas R. Morgan was subsequently assigned and reported for duty in mid-June.¹

There was some confusion about the grade of the U.S. Forces J-3. The JCS had advised that only seven of the proposed eight general officer spaces would be approved for the two Korea headquarters in their FY 79 Joint Manpower Programs. In order to fill the deputy C-2 slot with a U.S. Air Force O7, the Deputy J-3 position was downgraded to O6. Since the major general position in J-3 was transferred to C-3, COMUS Korea was left for a time with no general officer in the J-3 position. This was rectified by General Vessey dual-hatting the O8 as both the C3 and the J3. When the Secretary of Defense had approved the C-5 position in May he had added the caveat that the additional space must be offset by at least one decrease during the early part of the withdrawal ("specifically, do not wait until the end of the ground combat force withdrawal"). CINCPAC strongly supported COMUS Korea's request that the JCS pursue with the Office of the Secretary of Defense the adding of a general officer to UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters.²

The request was subsequently denied by the Secretary of Defense.

On 18 May COMUS Korea had recommended that the first meeting of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Military Committee be held in conjunction with the 11th Security Consultative meeting, which was scheduled for 26 and 27 July in San Diego. On 14 June the JCS requested amplification of objectives and anticipated results of such a meeting. They suggested that if the plenary session was held it be a low-key initial organizational meeting. The military committee was composed of the Chairman of the ROK JCS, the Chairman of the U.S. JCS, an additional representative from the ROK, CINCCFC, and CINCPAC. CINCPAC agreed that the first meeting should be procedural. The JCS approved the idea of the meeting and scheduled it for the morning of 28 July. During that first meeting, Strategic Directive No. 1 was signed, providing CINCCFC with guidance and authority to activate the Combined Forces Command.³

Following the SCM, the U.S. Department of State advised that it had formally concurred in the CFC arrangements as set forth in the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee as agreed at the 10th SCM.

1. CMC 172226Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; COMUS Korea 220930Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 261919Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. COMUS Korea 150930Z Sep 78 (U); JCS 8604/202241Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 232410Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 290316Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. JCS 9974/140132Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; ADMIN CINCPAC 170207Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; J5113 HistSum Jul 78 (U); JCS 3330/181922Z Jul 78 (U).
(U) The official ceremony marking the activation of the CFC was held on 7 November. President Park said he rendered his "heartfelt compliments to
the government officials and military officers of our two countries for their
endeavors, through close cooperation, to solve the difficult problems attendant
on the formation of this command." He commented on the withdrawal of U.S.
forces, which he noted had begun, saying that forming the command in such cir-
cumstances clearly demonstrated that "our two countries are firmly determined
to deter another war on the Korean Peninsula no matter how adverse the situation
and conditions are." Secretary of Defense Brown represented the United States.
In his remarks he said the United States recognized our own responsibilities
for deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. "You may be assured that we will
continue to shoulder them. We shall couple the phased withdrawal of U.S. ground
combat troops with efforts to strengthen ROK forces, thereby preserving a favor-
able balance of power on the Peninsula."2

(U) General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, became the first CFC commander on
activation day.

(SEC) Japan had been interested in the activation of this command. On 17
August U.S. Forces Japan had presented briefings to both the Japan Defense
Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Questions had centered around the
CFC's relationship to the UNC and parallels to NATO. MOFA officials welcomed
confirmation that the UNC role would not be diminished. At the conclusion,
they expressed complete satisfaction with the scope and candor of the briefing.3

United Nations Command Rear (Japan)

1. SECSTATE 235976/191230Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. COMUS Korea 070650Z Nov 78 (U).
3. AMEMB Tokyo 15008/210517Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84.
(S) The Philippines assigned an officer to UNC Rear, arriving 15 March. Discussions with Australia were also under way, however, Australia decided not to assign an officer to the UNC Rear.4

(S) On 28 August the Chief of the UNC Liaison Group for France (in Japan) delivered official notification to the Commander of UNC Rear that the French government would not request accreditation to the UNC in Japan of that officer's replacement. The expiration date was 3 September 1978, the day the newly assigned officer assumed the duties as Armed Forces Attache in Japan. No explanation was provided.5

Forces and Basing on Taiwan

(U) Shortly after President Nixon's 1972 visit to the People's Republic

1. SECSTATE 014651/190053Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Seoul 804/310259Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 1868/020851Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEMB Tokyo 3694/070848Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
4. AMEMB Seoul 1272/150832Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEMB Seoul 2431/270559Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
5. CINCUNC Seoul 060600Z Sep 78 (C), GDS-86.

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of China, and the Shanghai Communique at that time, the first steps were taken to withdraw U.S. Forces from Taiwan. The communique affirmed the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan, and the progressive reduction of forces and installations "as tension in the area diminishes."1

(U) On 15 December 1978 President Carter announced that the United States and China had agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. The joint communique issued at that time said that the United States recognized the government of the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China, indicating that diplomatic ties would be ended with the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The communique added that within that context, the people of the United States would maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. All U.S. Forces would be withdrawn by 30 April 1979, and the Mutual Security Treaty was to be terminated by the United States effective 1 January 1980.2

(SYNOPSIS) Major force reductions had begun earlier in 1978, however. On 18 May the JCS advised that "highest authority" had directed that the Defense Department military and civilian presence be reduced to a ceiling of 660 personnel by 1 October. Department personnel assigned to the Army Technical Group or National Security Agency activities or attached to the U.S. Embassy (including the MAAG) were exempt from the ceiling. The 7602nd Air Intelligence Group and 500th Military Intelligence Group detachments were not exempt as had been previously requested by the PACOM. JCS guidance provided the basis for reduction decisions. CINCPAC was also requested to advise of any factors that would prevent accomplishment of the reduction as directed, or any personnel actions, such as termination of replacement flow, that could be required of Service military personnel centers to assist in reaching the ceiling.3

(S) CINCPAC followed up the JCS tasking with a message to COMUSTDC, designating him as the coordinating authority for U.S. personnel reductions and requesting several actions by TDC. CINCPAC also asked for the best estimates for completing contractor requirements

2. J03/74 Chronology Dec 78 (U).
3. J133 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; J5323 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 6939/191845Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
for War Reserve Munitions storage, aerial port operations and security, and administrative services; current strength and strength projected for 1 October; the status of Naval Medical Research Unit II relocation; the impact of reduction over a 4x-month period; recommended action by Service military personnel centers; and factors, if any, that could delay accomplishment of reductions as directed.1

(5) COMUSTDC's response of 27 May deleted the NAMRU II spaces, retained the Armed Forces Network, Taiwan radio station, and increased residual medical personnel from 8 to 15. CINCPAC saw a problem in the total reduction of NAMRU II, as it had been included in the 660 ceiling. (A rather detailed discussion of NAMRU II's facilities and operations was included in the 1977 CINCPAC Command History.) He requested that COMUSTDC reexamine unit personnel strengths to provide for retention of the unit. The PACOM also stated that the increase in hospital manning could be difficult to justify because of the projected Defense Department population and the availability of indigenous medical services. COMUSTDC responded on 30 May with a revised projection and provisions for the retention of NAMRU II.2

(5) When CINCPAC had designated him as coordinating authority, COMUSTDC strongly recommended that CINCPAC and the JCS delegate to him the authority to task on-island commands and units to perform tri-Service common use functions such as chaplain, military security police, veterinary, contract schools, etc. He said that the sensitivity and unique requirements with regard to implementing the realignments would appear to him to be adequate justification for this special, temporary authority. He acknowledged that such authorization would require careful coordination, and decisions would be subject to review by higher authority.3

Actions in the Washington arena required for the approval of COMUSTDC's request would be too lengthy for feasible use within the time constraints. As an alternative, CINCPAC proposed that any Service issues that could not be resolved by TDC as coordinating authority be forwarded to CINCPAC, with complete details on all of the factors involved and COMUSTDC's proposed actions.4

SYNOPSPIC On 2 June CINCPAC provided the JCS with the plan for reducing

1. CINCPAC 200341Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. COMUSTDC 270148Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 272201Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSTDC 301322Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. COMUSTDC 261007Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CINCPAC 272127Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
to meet the 660 ceiling by 1 October and reported that he envisioned no difficulty in doing so. He also requested maximum flexibility in distribution of manpower spaces within the general guidelines established by the JCS. The JCS reply of 9 June concurred with CINCPAC's proposals and authorized CINCPAC to approve adjustments in the end strengths within the 660 ceiling with the concurrence of the component or Service concerned.¹

² Shortly after receiving the first notice from the JCS of the 660-person ceiling, CINCPAC had recommended an immediate freeze on all personnel assignments and a hold on all personnel currently on PCS orders destined for Taiwan. He recommended that personnel actions and assignment instructions regarding the Taiwan drawdown be accomplished directly between the Service personnel centers and COMUSTDC. On 26 May the JCS implemented a personnel freeze on all personnel destined for Taiwan.²

³ The reductions to the 660 ceiling were completed by 1 October. Personnel were as shown on the accompanying chart. The lease on the NAMRU II facilities was extended to 14 October 1979.³

⁴ In September the JCS had requested CINCPAC's review and comments on an initial draft of Consolidated Guidance Study Number 9: Taiwan's Military Requirements in a Post-Normalization Environment. CINCPAC agreed to the general conclusion that the United States should continue to provide military equipment support. He also provided general and specific comments on particulars of the study, underlining the point that the validity of the study was weakened by its failure to address the detail of how to continue to provide security assistance to a country with which we had no formal political relationships. That was on 6 October. The study was returned to CINCPAC from the JCS again on 13 November for further comments. Previous CINCPAC comments had been well received by the JCS and specific points commented on by Admiral Weisner appeared in the final version of the study. CINCPAC provided his comments on the final draft on 25 November. On 1 December the JCS forwarded the paper to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, but the President's 15 December announcement of normalization placed the study in an undetermined status at the year's end.⁴

¹NAQODBN. The President's 15 December normalization announcement raised

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1. CINCPAC 020206Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 6101/091736Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J133 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 222222Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4505/260037Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. COMUSTDC 300136Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Taipei 06687/030856Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. J5311 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; J5311 HistSum Nov 78 (U), which cited CINCPAC 250306Z Nov 78; and J5311 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
Military Personnel--Taiwan

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1. COMUSTDC 310959Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSTDC 300136Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
   Note: At the end of 1972 there had been approximately 8,000 U.S. Forces assigned in Taiwan.
a number of questions in the military community concerning on-going programs. Certain of these will be addressed below. Right away, however, on 17 December COMUSTDC forwarded his OPLAN 506X for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. Forces on Taiwan. After review by the CINCPAC staff, the component commands, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, CINCPAC forwarded the plan to the JCS, recommending approval, with certain recommended changes. These changes included designation of COMUSTDC as the single on-island commander for coordination and control of withdrawal actions instead of his proposed assumption of Operational Control/Administrative Control; establishment of a three-phase, 120-day withdrawal schedule, and retention of certain intelligence assets until the last phase. The JCS approved the plan as modified and further directed that actions on unresolved issues be held in abeyance and that all Defense Department personnel and designated equipment be withdrawn by 30 April 1979. CINCPAC forwarded that approval and the plan was to be effective 1 January. CINCPAC further noted that additional modifications would be necessary as more definitive information concerning personnel and materiel disposition became available. He directed COMUSTDC to incorporate and publish appropriate changes expeditiously.1

(5) On 20 December CINCPAC had designated COMUSTDC, effective immediately, to be the single on-island military commander for coordination and control of withdrawal actions of all DOD personnel and activities. He directed COMUSTDC to insure that all communications on withdrawal actions were provided to CINCPAC and other interested commands.2

(U) On 21 December the Secretary of Defense suspended movement of all Department personnel, dependents, and their effects to Taiwan. PCS movements from Taiwan were to be determined by the individual Services in coordination with COMUSTDC based on operational need. In response to this message, the Chief of Naval Operations asked if Navy personnel could continue to be sent to Taiwan to join deployed ships or mobile units during port visits. The Secretary suspended this procedure effective 1 January 1979.3

(5) The Secretary of State provided directions for relations with Taiwan officials after 31 December, directing the discontinuation of all official relationships with Republic of China embassies and their personnel, although informal relations could continue. Official calls were to neither be paid nor

2. CINCPAC 202336Z Dec 78 (5), REVW 20 Dec 86.
3. SECDEF 8947/211346Z Dec 78 (U); SECDEF 1176/282120Z Dec 78 (U).
received, although social and other unofficial contacts could continue. American officials were directed to continue to treat diplomats from Taiwan with "all due respect and courtesy." CINCPACFLT had asked the CNO about the policy regarding passing honors between U.S. Navy and ROC Navy ships, and the acknowledgement of salutes from ROC merchant ships. He recommended that such honors continue to be allowed. The CNO, after checking with the State Department, said that no change in procedures was required, and that until further notice appropriate passing honors should be rendered.1

A concept plan for the relocation of NAMRU II from Taiwan to the Philippines had been approved by the CNO on 9 September and concurred in by CINCPAC on 8 December. The original concept plan had targeted 14 October 1979 as the date for the agency to leave Taiwan. That date was moved forward to 1 May as a result of normalization, and on 28 December 1978 the Secretary of State requested that the Ambassador in Manila begin negotiations with the Government of the Philippines as soon as possible.2

Ship visits to Taiwan ports following the normalization announcement came under study. Visits had been scheduled over the Christmas period and again over the New Year holiday period. The Chief of the General Staff, Admiral C.C. Soong, had advised COMUSTDC that he saw no problem with those of the Christmas period, but the ships were moored at buoys rather than dockside at the Admiral's request and liberty was restricted to the first night after arrival. The Admiral had reservations about the New Year period, however, as that coincided with the day on which the United States broke diplomatic relations. In view of that situation, CINCPAC advised the JCS on 23 December that the New Year visits had been cancelled through normal PACFLT-SEVENTH FLEET channels.3

On 21 December the Ambassador advised of a meeting between Admiral Soong and COMUSTDC and passed along the views expressed by the Admiral, which COMUSTDC described as "unrealistically optimistic," but which showed the importance the ROC military attached to a continuing military relationship with the United States. The Admiral had stated that his government desired to maintain the Status of Forces Agreement throughout 1979. He expressed a strong desire to retain some U.S. military presence in Taiwan following 1 May 1979. He believed this was necessary in order to provide sufficient and appropriate

1. SECSTATE 327074/3002592 Dec 78 (S), GDS 29 Dec 84; CINCPACFLT 232051Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 19 Dec 84; CNO 292120Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 325633/2802372 Dec 78 (S), GDS 27 Dec 84.
3. AMEMB Taipei 08545/2009322 Dec 78 (S), GDS 20 Dec 84; CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79.
liaison in matters concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty.¹

Admiral Weisner had not visited Taiwan since he had become CINCPAC, which was in August 1976. Visits by high-ranking U.S. officers had been discouraged. A request in July of 1978, for example, was turned down by the Secretary of Defense.²

The Admiral finally got there on 27 December. The President had sent a delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Admiral Weisner and his Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, RADM A.S. Moreau, Jr., USN, were in the party, as were other State Department officers and Mr. Mike Armacost of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The party flew from Honolulu on Admiral Weisner's plane, arriving in Taipei on the 27th. The motorcade, en route from the airport to the Grand Hotel, was surrounded by a mob of young people who assaulted the cars. Described in the press as "the most violent youth outburst ever experienced here," the youths pasted mud, splashed paint, threw eggs, placed national flags on the limousines, stepped on the roofs and hoods of the cars, and broke the glass in several. The front and back windows were shattered in the car in which Admiral Weisner, Admiral Moreau, and COMUSTDC, RADM James B. Linder, USN, were riding. About halfway along the route the officers departed that car and took a taxi to the TDC Command Center. Deputy Secretary Christopher was in a car with Ambassador Unger; they finally got to the Ambassador's residence. There were no personal injuries except some cuts from the breaking glass.³

The President said that he wanted the mission to be a success, but only if it could be carried on safely. If not, the party was to return to the United States. Admiral Weisner later noted that he was glad the decision was made to remain because the talks were important to both sides and he believed it was necessary that they be held at that time.⁴

The talks were held, although several times demonstrators gathered en route to one meeting COMUSTDC and his Chief of Staff were accosted by a group of about 100 who closed around their vehicles and kicked the sides and beat the windows. The Christopher party departed Taiwan as scheduled, without any further harassment.⁵

1. AMEMB Taipei 08602/211115Z Dec 78 (G), GDS 21 Dec 84.
2. JCS 241503Z Jul 78 (G), (BOM), GDS-86.
3. AMEMB Taipei 08765/281136Z Dec 78 (G), REVW 27 Dec 98; COMUSTDC 272308Z Dec 78 (G), DECL 84.
4. CINCPAC 30021Z Dec 78 (BOM), REVW 31 Dec 86.
5. CINCPAC Significant Events Log, 27-29 Dec 78 (G), REVW 28 Dec 98.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) For many years the status of negotiations regarding the political future of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a territory that had been assigned to the United States in trusteeship by the United Nations in 1946, had been of interest to CINCPAC. Support facilities in this area served as a hedge against the loss of other U.S. bases in the PACOM.

(U) The United States and the Northern Marianas had signed a covenant in 1975 to form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas at such time as the trustee agreement between the United States and the United Nations was terminated, scheduled for 1981.

(U) For the other islands, negotiations were still in progress. The U.S. President's personal representative during 1978 was Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt. Early in January he met in San Diego, California with the heads of the political status delegations of Palau, the Marshalls, and the Congress of Micronesia. One purpose of the meeting was to set the stage for the next full plenary negotiating session, the second was that the U.S. delegation presented a draft U.S. Free Association agreement for consideration by the Micronesians.

(U) Another informal meeting was held in Hilo, Hawaii, 7 to 9 April, this time involving Ambassador Rosenblatt and the heads of delegations from Palau, the Marshalls, and the Commission on Future Political Status and Transition (CFPST). The objective of those talks was to obtain agreement on the definition of the status of free association being negotiated. To this end, the United States presented eight principles that incorporated major changes in long-held U.S. positions. The major points were:

- Micronesia would be internally self-governing.
- Micronesians would have full responsibility for their own foreign affairs except in areas deemed by the United States to involve U.S. defense or security responsibilities in the area.
- Micronesia would have the right to unilaterally terminate the relationship with the United States at any time.
- The United States would have full responsibility

1. J5124 HistSum Jan 78 (U).
2. J5124 HistSum Apr 78 (U).
for defense and security matters in Micronesia for 15 years, even if the agreement were unilaterally terminated. U.S. land, harbor, and operating rights were also provided for.

(U) Palau, the Marshalls, and the United States delegations signed the principles without reservation. The CFPST signed "ad referendum." 1

(U) A letter from the full CFPST removing the reservation was immediately forthcoming.

(N) A United Nations-observed referendum on the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia (CRFM) was conducted on 12 July. The fragmentation of Micronesia was confirmed. Yap, Truk, Kosrae, and Ponape adopted the CRFM, while Palau and the Marshalls voted to go their separate ways. As a result, the Congress of Micronesia, which thus represented only the central four districts, asked for a delay in the negotiations until they had had time to fully consider the U.S. proposal. During July Ambassador Rosenblatt visited all six districts and he had found them gearing up for hard bargaining on economic issues. He feared that their opening bid would be substantially more costly to the United States than he was authorized to agree to, or that Congress would ever approve. 2

(U) A 10-day session of the second round of renewed status negotiations, the 10th round since 1969, convened 23 September in Saipan. The talks quickly bogged down on two major issues: foreign affairs and dispute resolution. 3

(N) Earlier, in Hilo in April, the United States had redefined "free association" to include total foreign affairs responsibility for Micronesians except where U.S. security interests were involved. This was perceived by the Micronesians as carte blanche "veto" power for the United States. Further, they pointed out that they must be signatories to treaties in order to be "fully responsible for their foreign affairs." The U.S. position was that as a less than independent entity, they could not sign treaties. It was believed the United States could ill afford to recognize the precedent because this country would not want other less than independent entities (such as the Palestine Liberation Organization) signing international treaties. 4

(N) Micronesian fears about what the United States might undertake in Micronesian waters and atolls in the name of "security" had caused them to

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 222230Z Jul 78 (N), GDS-84.
3. J5124 HistSum Oct 78 (N), GDS-84.
4. Ibid.
seek a dispute resolution mechanism that would have some third party, such as
U.S. Federal Courts, arbitrate any disputes, including security, that might
result from the Compact of Free Association. The Department of Defense would
not accept arbitration in security-related issues.1

New talks were expected to resume in Hawaii in January 1979. In
preparation for those talks, a new draft compact was prepared and was circula-
ted to CINCPAC for comment. The draft provided for U.S. activities in Mic-
ronesia to be subject to applicable U.S. laws (as though the activities were
conducted on U.S. soil), allowed Micronesian access to U.S. courts to insure
U.S. compliance with said laws, and placed U.S. defense activities in Mic-
ronesia under a CINCPAC-chaired joint committee for dispute resolution. On 12
December CINCPAC substantially concurred with the draft and provided some
technical change recommendations.2

Land Surveys and Usage

(U) While these negotiations continued, other ongoing actions were in
progress with the Marshalls, Palau, and the Northern Marianas. On 13 February
CINCPAC's Plans Directorate had hosted a working session with the Land Survey
Task Force from the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations enroute to
Kwajalein and the Marshall Islands. Representatives from the CINCPAC staff
and Service agencies involved in military land use agreements attended. The
task force was composed of representatives from the State, Defense, and Interior
Departments, the JCS, and the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations. Its
charter was to investigate, on location, the status and conditions of all
existing U.S. military land use agreements, in the Marshalls and Kwajalein
Atoll in particular. The task force spent the week of 14-20 February in the
islands and returned to Washington to draft a proposed single-document land
settlement for use in conjunction with on-going status negotiations.3

CINCPAC repeatedly stated the military land requirements on Palau
in 1978, as he had earlier. He considered Palau second in importance in this
regard only to the Northern Marianas. He outlined specific needs on 13 April
to the JCS and elaborated on them in April and May. In September the Admiral
again reiterated the increasing importance of Palau requirements, expressed
his concern regarding the status of required actions, and requested speedy
resolution of the financial aspects of the problem. He favored leases over
land options, "because we can get them cheaper now than later, and they will
provide us a much stronger position in the long run." He noted that in Palau,

1. Ibid.
2. J5124 HistSum Dec 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 120343Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. J5124 HistSum Feb 78 (U).
particularly, the United States might have trouble with the proposed economic package because of the high Palauan expectations.1

(U) The Northern Mariana and the United States had signed a covenant in 1975 to form the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana at such time as the Trusteeship Agreement for Micronesia between the United States and the United Nations was terminated (with a target of 1981). The covenant provided for creation of a constitution and administrative separation for the Northern Marianas. On 9 January 1978 that constitution had become effective and a new governor (Carlos Comacho) and legislature had been inaugurated.2

(U) The covenant provided the United States with two-thirds of Tinian Island, a small land area plus harbor rights at Saipan, and all of Farallon de Medinilla Island, for military use. Such rights were to be secured by a 50-year lease (extendable an additional 50 years at no cost) upon payment by the United States of approximately $20 million. There was, in 1978, approximately $23 million in the USAF Military Construction Program of FY 80 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for approval for this purpose.

(U) The covenant also provided that all U.S. land use and occupancy agreements in the Marianas became void on 9 January 1978. Prior to that date the U.S. Navy had used Farallon de Medinilla as a bombing and gunnery range and Tinian for U.S. Marine Corps amphibious exercises. To provide for continued use of Farallon and Tinian, the U.S. Navy concluded an interim (no cost) use agreement, effective 9 January 1978. The agreement was consummated between the Navy and Governor Comacho without referring the issue to either the Marianas legislature or the land board. The interim agreement provided for continued land use until budget action was completed in the U.S. Congress for the $23 million.3

(U) In September 1978 the Marianas land board and legislature found out about the interim agreement following an announcement of a B-52 bombing exercise on Farallon that appeared in the Pacific Daily News. The board and legislature objected to not having been consulted, and the newspaper described the subsequent debate in the legislature as an "uproar," but they later made it clear they had no intention of interfering with U.S. operations. To smooth the waters, the Navy negotiated a second interim agreement with the legislature, the land board, and the governor all party. Under the agreement the Navy would

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/ERD), Vol. I, p. 77; CINCPAC 13003OZ Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; ADMIN CINCPAC 150657Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; J5121 HistSum Sep 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 260413Z Sep 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J5124 HistSum Oct 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. Ibid.
pay the Northern Marianas Government $25,000 annually for rights on Tinian and Farallon.1

Military Civic Action Teams

(U) The Trust Territory Military Civic Action Team (CAT) program provided small (9 to 13 men) engineering teams to districts of the TTPI for vertical and horizontal construction tasks, such as road building or improvements, small building construction, etc. The program was funded jointly by the TTPI Government and the Defense Department, with Defense paying all military salaries, CONUS support, new team site facilities, and a portion of equipment depreciation. The purposes of the program included accomplishment of engineering tasks that normally could not be accomplished with the resources available to district public works departments or within district budgets; provision of on-the-job training in construction and heavy equipment skills to district citizens; provision of some medical assistance and training; and the fostering of good will between the citizens of the TTPI and the U.S. military.2

(U) In 1978 there were three teams deployed. A nine-man U.S. Air Force team moved early in the year from Fefan Island to Tol Island, both in the Truk Lagoon. A new 13-man Navy team was introduced to the Yap District in January, and a second Navy team, this with 13 men also, had been deployed early in 1978 to Babolthuap Island in Palau (from Kosrae). All were involved in road building in 1978.3

(U) Each year CINCPAC was required to provide a program analysis and recommendations for the following fiscal year. This review required a recommendation to continue the exemption to a Defense Department regulation that would otherwise not permit the Services to pay the cost of CAT member salaries. In 1978 the JCS asked for an expanded report on secondary tasks that the CATs could accomplish. CINCPAC's Representative to Guam and the TTPI furnished the requested information on 17 August.4

(U) Earlier, on 28 July, CINCPAC had recommended a one-man increase in the size of the team on Truk. The move to Tol Island had resulted in a long, overwater haul for all logistic, administrative, and morale/health support.

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC REP GUAM 190110Z Sep 78 (U), GDS-84; CINCPAC 042222Z Oct 78 (U), GDS-84.
2. J5124 HistSum Aug 78 (U).
4. J5124 HistSum Aug 78 (U); CINCPACREP GUAM 170430Z Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 250217Z Aug 78 (U).
CINCPAC supported the requirement for an extra man to maintain and operate a small boat to provide better logistic support.  

1. CINCPAC 280239Z Jul 78 (U); CINCPAC 250217Z Aug 78 (U).
CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

SECTION I--IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The Soviet Threat

(U) The thrust of newspaper and magazine articles, speeches, and congressional testimony regarding the threat to the United States invariably concerned the Soviet threat and, during 1978, these public discussions continued to address the relative strengths of the two nations. Most of this public discussion concerned either the global threat or the Soviet threat to the West. The West was usually defined as the NATO countries and the North American continent. There were some exceptions to the emphasis given to the NATO threat and, as in past years, the chief proponent of the view that the Soviet threat was a global threat was CINCPAC, Admiral M. F. Weisner. In a mid-1978 Strategic Review magazine article, Admiral Weisner discussed the vastness of the Asia-Pacific area and the imperative that the vital national interests of the United States in continued access to the foreign commerce and strategic raw materials in that part of the world be protected. The Admiral conceded that the Soviet Union probably continued to assign priority to Europe in its military planning; however, an objective observer in the Pacific could see a relentless expansion in Soviet military programs in the Far East. Almost one-third of all Soviet Forces were deployed to the Soviet Far East. The Soviet Pacific Navy had shown a marked improvement in mobility, range, and armament and routinely deployed ships to the East and South China Seas, the Philippine Sea, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters adjacent to the U.S. West Coast. In the Indian Ocean there had been a steady buildup in the number of Soviet ships. This buildup had continued against the background of Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and South Yemen. When the U.S.-Soviet negotiations for naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean began in June 1977, Russia had only 14 ships in the Indian Ocean. Since that time, the daily level had risen to as many as 30 ships, including 12 combatants.1

(U) In this article, Admiral Weisner acknowledged that the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) were regional Pacific powers, rather than global. However, he noted that the forward basing posture of U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific area was

at its lowest ebb since 1941, numbering only 140,000 U.S. military personnel stationed west of Hawaii. The Admiral noted that any evaluation of the threat in Asia and the Pacific was complicated by the fact that the threat took many forms. In addition to the nuclear (strategic) threat, there was a possibility of a worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, perhaps flaring from an outbreak of war in Europe. In that situation, there would be a struggle for control of the vital lines of communication (LOC) throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. In light of the steady growth in Soviet naval forces in the Pacific Command area, and the corresponding minimum levels of U.S. forward deployed forces, it was Admiral Weisner's opinion that the United States would find it difficult to protect those important LOC--there would be only an even chance of keeping them open in the initial period of conflict. "There were," stated Admiral Weisner, "some deficiencies in the U.S. force structure to be rectified if the U.S. Forces mission in the Asia-Pacific theater was to be preserved." The United States needed more air and naval forces to cope with growing Soviet capabilities. Also needed were improved anti-submarine warfare systems; better strategic airlift; improved long-haul, secure command and control systems; and rapidly deployable light ground and airborne strike forces. Referring to his "even chance" opinion, Admiral Weisner stated that, "...like any commander, I would like a better-than-even chance of defeating the opposition...."

(U) As he had in previous years, CINCPAC stressed in the foregoing article that the credibility of U.S. strength and resolve was dependent in large measure upon the forward basing posture of U.S. Forces. If U.S. Forces were to function properly as a deterrent, much depended upon the perception, by friend and foe alike, of U.S. strengths and resolve. It was perhaps significant that Admiral Weisner's article in the Strategic Review was quoted and commented upon by Japanese newspapers. They noted his statement that U.S. Forces were at their lowest level since 1941 and his recommendations as to the strengthening of air and naval forces to cope with Soviet military force. It was also noteworthy that the Admiral's "even chance" opinion regarding the security of LOC in the Pacific area became, in the Japanese commentary, "a difficult job."2

(U) Although the above article was not published until mid-1978, there was ample evidence throughout the year of growing concern regarding the relative strengths of the United States and Russia in newspapers, wire service reports, and periodicals. Early in January, a military affairs writer discussed problems in the U.S. Navy ship building program and noted that the Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet because the latter had been given

1. Ibid.
2. COMUS Japan 180605Z Aug 78 (U).
priority for the NATO commitment. The Atlantic Fleet Commander was quoted that the Atlantic Fleet and allied navies at their present sizes would get "an awful bloody nose" in keeping the sea lanes open and moving troops and cargo to Europe. Postulating that the Pacific Fleet was the Atlantic Fleet's prospect for reinforcement, the writer cited the Pacific Fleet Commander's argument that the European war would be global, with Soviet Pacific naval forces in action. The Pacific Fleet Commander (Admiral Hayward) stated that the Soviet threat in the Pacific was centered around an estimated 100 Soviet submarines and various anti-ship missiles on ships and bombers. At the same time, the Atlantic Fleet Commander stated that the Soviet Atlantic Navy had more than 100 submarines, also supported by surface ships and aircraft. Admiral Hayward was quoted as saying, "the number (of ships) is heading down to 464 in the entire Navy, and it has yet to turn around." Admiral Weisner was quoted as saying, "it was once said that the fleet which had 976 ships in 1968 would 'bottom out' at 500, but based on the continuous downward revisions I've stopped saying what the real figure will be."

(U) It was also in January that a national wire service cited a government study which not only conceded that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would win a nuclear war, but indicated that America and its allies would have trouble winning a conventional weapons war in Western Europe or the Far East. The government study was alleged to represent a comprehensive study of the military threats facing the United States and the adequacy of the Armed Forces in dealing with them. In the Far East, according to the article, the report stated that Soviet naval power might be able to cut economic and re-supply lines to Japan in case of a conventional war. The study also, according to the article, voiced concern over the ability of the Soviet Union to threaten Western oil supplies by stopping tankers at sea or by directly attacking the producing nations in the Persian Gulf. Late in January, several news articles discussed a "secret master plan" and a "thick document" which Secretary of Defense Harold Brown allegedly forwarded to the Service Chiefs which directed them to structure their forces to stop a Soviet blitzkrieg in Europe and put out a brushfire war in a place like the Persian Gulf. One article stated that Brown's guidance labeled a Soviet thrust against NATO as a full-war, and a flare-up in the Persian Gulf as a half-war. Another article alleged that the document submitted by Brown revealed that defense planners were uncertain whether U.S. military forces could deal effectively with a crisis in the oil-producing Persian Gulf region.²

1. Baltimore Sun, 14 Jan 78, "Number of Navy Ships Continues to Decline," by Charles Cordry, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 88/041931Z Jan 78 (U).
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(U) Early in February, news dispatches began the discussion of the presentation by Secretary Brown to the Congress of the annual report on U.S. military posture. Basic to these news articles was the citing of alleged testimony by various military and civilian officials. In one of these articles, Brown supposedly had voiced concern to Congress about the readiness of U.S. Forces to fight a short, intense war in Europe. The posture report allegedly disclosed that the Soviet Union was expected to begin flight testing two new types of intercontinental missiles and to unveil the prototype of a new intercontinental-range bomber.1

(U) Shortly thereafter, the weekly newsgram from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) discussed Secretary Brown's posture statement, which highlighted the need for improvements in anti-submarine warfare forces, anti-air warfare effectiveness, and anti-surface warfare capability as major objectives for U.S. naval forces during FY 79 through FY 83. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General George S. Brown, was quoted as stating, "while the U.S. Navy's capability to project and sustain sea-based power and the quality of its attack submarine force are superior to the Soviet Union's, current U.S. capability to control the essential sea lanes, versus the Soviet Navy's capability to deny the use of these lanes, is more difficult to assess...." One week later, the CNO weekly newsgram quoted from the testimony of Navy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr., and CNO James L. Holloway, III. Secretary Claytor stated that, "today, my professional naval advisers tell me that we and our allies are probably able to contest successfully for all sea lanes and areas vital to our interests, but only with severe losses, and, in some areas, with less promptness in engaging than we would like."

Admiral Holloway stated that, "...today the Navy is capable of carrying out its mission and tasks within the national strategy. However, the United States Fleet currently possesses this capability with only a slim margin of superiority over the Soviets in some scenarios involving the most vital national interests of the United States. Furthermore, this risk evaluation refers only to the present. If current trends are allowed to continue, the balance of maritime superiority could tip substantially in favor of the Soviets in ten years...."2

(U) In mid-February a wire service dispatch quoted from Admiral Weisner's speech to the Southern Center for International Studies that "Soviet force levels and capability trends are disturbing...and if we do not substantially increase our Navy ship building programs, the balance will tip in their favor in the next decade. We must therefore begin now to build the forces necessary to retain our current, though marginal superiority." On 10 May 1978, when

1. UPI Dispatch, 2 Feb 78, dateline Washington, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 214/021914Z Feb 78 (U).
2. CNO 041154Z Feb 78 and 111038Z Feb 78 (both U).
Admiral Hayward relinquished command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (to become CNO) he defined the term "marginal" during a speech aboard the carrier USS KITTY HAWK. He said, "...today in the Pacific, the principal margin of difference between the capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and your Pacific Fleet resides in the powers and capability of our carrier battle groups...."[1]

(U) Later in May Secretary of the Navy Claytor defined the "margin" somewhat differently. Speaking in Washington D.C. to a National Security Industrial Association group, he reportedly stated that the U.S. Navy was superior to the Soviet Navy in anti-submarine warfare capabilities despite the numerical advantage in attack submarines enjoyed by the Soviet Union. Stating that the submarine posed the single most dangerous threat to U.S. lifelines at sea, with the power to cripple those lifelines quicker and more effectively than any other threat, the Secretary stated, "...our ability to defend against enemy submarines thus takes on a level of national and international importance to all of us in the free world."[2]

(U) In a June 1978 speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Defense Secretary Brown reiterated the Administration's support for a strong defense establishment and rejected reports that the Administration was, "...allergic to defense in general and to the U.S. Navy in particular...." In the context of the FY 79 budget, Secretary Brown enumerated the specific missions to be accomplished by the U.S. Navy and listed the existing and planned Navy capabilities during the next five years. These capabilities, stated Brown, "...believe statements that we are neglecting the U.S. Navy or conceding some ill-defined superiority to the Soviet Navy." Nevertheless, Brown stated, "...all of us recognize at the same time that if inflation is to be curbed, federal spending must be controlled." He favored the construction of another carrier but felt that the Navy would be better served with a conventional carrier and the five additional frigates which the extra money could buy, rather than a nuclear carrier only. In response to the continuing buildup of Soviet forces, the Secretary stated that the U.S. option was to outdo them in efficiency. He stated, "...the Soviet military sector not only enjoys a growing income; it has become an increasingly sophisticated and discriminating consumer. We in Defense could use more of those qualities ourselves."[3]

1. UPI Dispatch, 10 May 78, dateline USS KITTY HAWK, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 19/101830Z May 78 (U); UPI Dispatch, 16 Feb 78, dateline Atlanta, Georgia, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 31/160206Z Feb 78 (U).
2. CNO 271539Z May 78 (U).
3. CNO 101534Z Jun 78 (U).
(U) In an October interview with the U.S. News and World Report, the new Chairman of the JCS, General David C. Jones, was reported to have said that the military advantages once enjoyed by the United States could shift to the Soviet Union by the 1980's. He noted that, a number of years ago, U.S. military spokesmen had noted that the trends were adverse in relation to the advantages enjoyed over the Soviets. "...now, the advantages are disappearing." In answer to a question regarding the military trend, General Jones stated that, at this point, we have a balance in general, but adverse trends continued in the strategic field and in much of the general-purpose field. He stated that there was a clear danger that the United States would become number two behind the Soviet Union in the 1980's, and noted that the Soviets were spending substantially more than the United States on defense. Jones stated that the United States had generally underestimated what the Soviets were going to do, and they had moved faster than expected, not only in numbers but also in quality. Noting that the Soviets were spending about 11 percent to 13 percent of their gross national product on defense, Jones said that if the Soviets were to be convinced that a continued buildup was counterproductive, the United States must increase its defense budget.

(U) According to a news article on 20 October 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the new CNO, told interviewers that he and his staff were trying to reassess, "the global nature of the Soviet naval threat, and the global requirements of our Navy, in order to influence those who have a responsibility for looking at national security in its totality--to appreciate the role that the Navy ought to play in that totality." Hayward stated, "from the standpoint of acceptability of risk...I think our Navy should be stronger than it is today." It was also in October that General Alexander M. Haig, Supreme Commander of NATO, stated in an address that the Soviet threat had shifted from being continental and Eurasian to global in scope; at the same time the Soviet Union had increased its defense spending about 4-5 percent per year, or approximately 15 percent of its gross national product. During a press conference General Haig was quoted as saying that, "we have entered a period in which we are no longer worried about force balances in NATO Europe, but more about peripheral areas such as the Third World." On the same day Major General John K. Singlaub (retired) alleged that for the past fifteen years the United States had engaged in "gradual unilateral disarmament carried out behind a diplomatic disguise labeled detente." Discussing the question of military equality or parity General Singlaub stated that, "...the fact is that parity or equality was reached at least five to eight years ago...." Singlaub also reportedly stated, "...the result of our policy of gradual unilateral disarmament in

1. Chicago Sun-Times, 23 Oct 78, "Fear Soviet Military Advantage by '80's," dateline Washington (UPI); U.S. News and World Report, 30 Oct 78, "America's Military Edge Over Russia is Disappearing" (both U).
ment is that we are now in a position of military inferiority. The degree or extent of that inferiority is subject to honest differences of opinion, but not the fact itself.1

(U) Shortly after his retirement as Chief of the Naval Reserve, Vice Admiral Pierre E. Charbonnet, Jr., stated that one of the biggest mistakes made by the U.S. Defense Department planners was trying to guess Russian intentions rather than their capabilities. He said, "...I'm sick of this worrying about intentions because we've never correctly guessed intentions of anybody I've ever known. That goes from Hitler to Castro. We're never right!" He maintained that planners were ignoring the fact that there was a Pacific Ocean and that the United States would be fighting Russians or an Iron Curtain in the Pacific. He stated that any war would be a worldwide engagement because the Russians had access to all oceans and an excellent, expanding Navy. Another retired officer, former chief of Air Force Intelligence Major General George Keegan, accused the Central Intelligence Agency of being intellectually corrupt and of allowing a pro-detente bias to blind Americans to a massive military buildup in the Soviet Union. Keegan reportedly stated that most Americans were unaware of the military inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union, which country, he claimed, had used detente to launch an advanced arms buildup.2

(U) In December during a demonstration of Army, Navy, and Air Force Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Secretary Brown reportedly stated that, "we are not second to anyone in military capability, but as long as Soviet military expenditures continue to increase at a rate of four-five percent a year, it is necessary to take advantage of PGM technology." Brown said, "we are outnumbered by our adversaries in tanks and artillery...and even in aircraft, we have the balance somewhat against us...the technology gap has narrowed and closed, and in some cases even reversed...." It was also in December that retired Air Force Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, in an article regarding President Carter's purported displeasure with the political intelligence he had received, concluded the article with the apparent non-sequitur that, "...today we are in diplomatic retreat around the world because of our declining military power. Tomorrow

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our survival will be in jeopardy for the same reason."¹

(U) The foregoing random selection of opinions regarding the Soviet threat revealed differences in the relative position of U.S. Forces, such as "inferior" and "second to none." However, U.S. officials and active and retired military were not alone in the discussion. One civilian writer, in a piece which added a third element of economics to the political and military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, stated that the Soviet Union was, "...a super power able to intervene worldwide at times and places of the politburo's choosing." The author based his thesis on a statement that the West faced three congruent dangers. The first was the inexorable Soviet military buildup which continued in all areas. The expensive foreign policy ambitions of the Soviet Union...were supported by the conventional and strategic military resources of a global power. The second danger postulated by the author was the geopolitical insecurity of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean "energy lifelines" of Japan and the West, lifelines which could be cut by the Soviet Navy, disrupted by a Cuban Foreign Legion, or imperiled by coup d'état and insurgency. The third danger enumerated by the author was the prospect that the NATO citadel could be weakened from within by subversion, propaganda, and popular front coalitions which could tilt toward Moscow on foreign policy, economic and security issues.²

(U) Another opinion, but with a certain parallel to the retired military officers' opinions, was that expressed by two former Defense Department officials. Their article in Orbis, a journal of international affairs, was described in a December 1978 news release. According to the news article, the two former officials warned that the nuclear balance of terror was no longer in balance but seriously lopsided—so much so that in a confrontation with the Soviet Union the United States would seek an escape hatch as the Russians did in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This alarming picture of the thermal nuclear balance reflected the former officials' views of the military implications of the second United States-Soviet treaty to limit strategic arms (SALT II).³

(U) There was a proliferation during the year of public media articles and papers concerning the merits of the SALT II negotiations, both pro and con,

as well as the increasing Soviet military strength and its meaning relative to
the United States. For example, no less than nine of the twelve monthly issues
of the Reader's Digest during 1978 contained articles of warning against the
SALT II terms and the Soviet military threat in its various aspects. One
example of an opinion differing considerably with all of those expressed
above was that of the Boston Study Group, a Harvard-Massachusetts Institute
of Technology organization, which claimed that the U.S. defense budget could
be cut by $47 billion by the 1980's without endangering security. This group
published a paper which estimated that the typical four-person family could
save one-third of its federal income tax if the defense budget were reduced
to $73 billion instead of the FY 78 $120 billion. This could be done by the
elimination of manned strategic bombers and land-based missiles. U.S. defense
would then consist almost entirely of missiles from nuclear submarines for
deterrence.1

(U) Against the backdrop of SALT II comments and on again-off again U.S.
weapon programs such as the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, the cruise missile,
the neutron bomb, the TRIDENT submarine-launched missile, and the nuclear
powered aircraft carrier, there was considerable evidence in the public domain
that the Soviet Union was not standing still in weapons development. At the
end of July a national wire service credited Washington "intelligence sources"
for a statement that the first Soviet sea-based missile with multiple war heads
was operational, thus tripling the number of targets the newest type of Soviet
submarines could attack with nuclear weapons. Again crediting the "sources,"
the wire service report stated that the SS-N-18 missile, with a range of more
than 4,900 miles, was being deployed on new Soviet submarines as these vessels
entered the Soviet Fleet. Five such submarines had been counted in the fleet
of 62 nuclear-powered missile submarines allowed the Soviets under existing
SALT agreements.2

(U) A 1 September 1978 article in a Honolulu newspaper, without source
accreditation, stated that the Soviet Navy was building a massive mobile sea
fortress—the first of a completely new class of large amphibious war ships
with the ability to land a complete armored battalion using the ship's own
helicopters and landing craft over open beaches. This was followed toward
the end of the month by a Baltimore newspaper article alleging that the Soviet
Union continued to install new intercontinental missiles at a rate of about 150
per year. After discussing the strengthening of Soviet forces on the Chinese
border, the article concluded that the Russians had also built up their naval,
marine, and air units in the Far East with the aim of influencing Japanese

2. UPI Dispatch, 30 Jul 78, dateline Washington, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA
86/301900Z Jul 78 (U).
policy. The Russians were conducting amphibious operations in the Sea of Japan.¹

(U) A newspaper article in late October stated that Soviet MIG-25 jets had shot down mock cruise missiles, and that the Russians were installing anti-aircraft rockets on ships to defend against American cruise missiles. The article also stated that the Soviets had built a plant to expand production of BACKFIRE jet bombers, which had been excluded from weapon limits in the SALT II Treaty. According to this article, high-level Pentagon sources said that the reports, based on information from U.S. spy satellites and other intelligence, were "essentially correct" although they disputed details and conclusions drawn from them. The basis of this newspaper article was a report published by Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, which linked Soviet SALT concessions to intensive administration efforts to "sell" the agreements in the United States. The Aviation Week report allegedly stated that the destruction of the cruise missile by a MIG flying within 200 feet of the ground had occurred about one week before Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, waving his hand at U.S. arms negotiators in a SALT meeting, had said, "you can fly your cruise missiles around the world if you like." The Soviets had previously demanded that U.S. cruise missiles launched from bombers be limited to a 1,500-mile range in the SALT II Treaty. The report in Aviation Week prompted a spate of other newspaper articles discussing the alleged anti-cruise missile capability of the Soviets. A Defense Department spokesman said that the Administration was confident that the U.S. cruise missile then being built could penetrate existing Soviet air defenses, and this spokesman, as well as a spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, declined to comment on intelligence discoveries relating to reported Soviet weapon initiatives. The Defense Department spokesman denied the accuracy of the Aviation Week story, although conceding that the Soviets had probably tested their capability to intercept a cruise missile.²

1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1 Sep 78, dateline London (no attribution), cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 54/012141Z Sep 78 (U); Baltimore Sun, 28 Sep 78, dateline Washington (no attribution), cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 35/282006Z Sep 78 (U).

(U) In a November 1978 Air Force magazine article, the senior editor asserted that, at a time when the United States had no strategic bombers in production or on the horizon, the Soviet Union was manufacturing the controversial BACKFIRE and developing a second bomber which could be even more deadly against targets in the continental United States. In the same issue of Air Force magazine, another writer referred to the previously mentioned Soviet tests of the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, and noted that the SS-18 had a throw-weight at least seven times greater than MINUTEMAN III's. By November of 1978 the Soviets had tested the SS-N-18 sixteen times and the SS-20 two-stage medium-range mobile missile seven times.

(U) Referring to an October disclosure by Secretary of the Navy Claytor that a "new and very capable" Soviet amphibious ship had been sighted in the Baltic Sea, a November article noted the parallel development of a rapidly growing number of high speed, roll-on/roll-off combination vehicle-and-container ships capable of transporting and landing large military cargoes by the Russians. These ships were characterized as "floating garages" which could load and unload either commercial or military cargo without the need of quay and dock facilities. Regarding the giant amphibious landing ship, the article noted that this ship was fitted with bow doors and a stern gate which could accommodate helicopter operations as well as landing craft operating on air cushions. No Western navy had a similar capability. Another article referred to a giant floating dock which had given the Soviet Pacific Fleet a new capacity to service an aircraft carrier. The dock--1,082 feet long and 276 feet wide--had been delivered from Japanese shipyards to Vladivostok, the main Soviet Pacific naval base. In the same article it was noted that the Russians had completed a third ship of their KUITE-class aircraft carrier series but, in response to query, Soviet naval sources in Tokyo discounted the idea of moving one of these aircraft carriers to the Far East. They insisted that the floating dock purchased from Japan was for the use of the large and growing Soviet Merchant Marine.

(U) In mid-November, in response to repeated requests by reporters for an update on cruise missile tests, the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William J. Perry, said that a just-concluded test series showed that U.S. cruise missiles could penetrate the full range of Russian defenses. Perry reportedly stated that the $100 billion Soviet air defense

network was totally useless against the U.S. cruise missile. These statements were picked up by several newspapers and wire services. Over one month later, Perry was reported to have stated that the Russians had successfully tested a new "look-down, shoot-down" radar and missile system which could seriously threaten low-flying United States bombers and fighter planes. He estimated that the Russians would be able to have an operational system in the early 1980's which would have significant implications for U.S. bombers and fighter planes, but that the Russians were nearly a decade away from developing a system that could defend against an attack by U.S. cruise missiles.¹

(U) And finally, the Soviet Union was reported to be building two new submarine bases on the Eastern Coast of Siberia which were expected to be used as home ports for the Soviet Navy's new classes of ballistic missile submarines. This report, crediting "Western intelligence sources" said the submarines, launching missiles from just outside their bases, would be able to hit targets in the United States as far away as the East Coast.²

Korean Peninsula

(U) In October 1978 the United Nations Command (UNC) announced the discovery of a third North Korean tunnel through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into South Korea. All ROK newspapers on 27 and 28 October gave unusually prominent front page and inside page coverage (including photos) and carried editorials on the UNC announcement. The articles reported at length the dimensions of the tunnel (including charts showing its location), compared it with the two previously discovered tunnels, recapitulated past efforts by the UNC and the ROK Government to uncover other tunnels, and quoted extensively from remarks by the senior UNC military representative during a Military Armistice Commission meeting. According to the editorials, this newly discovered tunnel and the history of the other tunnels indicated the true intentions of North Korea, compared with its often repeated desire for peace. Noting the proximity of the third tunnel to Seoul, the editorials contended that the tunnel discovery disproved the contention of those whose said tensions on the Korean Peninsula were low. Most newspapers published 27 October remarks by a "Pentagon spokes-

man" who had denounced the tunnel as a, "serious and flagrant violation of the Armistice agreement."1

(U) The ROK newspapers also carried front page coverage of remarks attributed to Washington D.C. newspapers which viewed the tunnel as a sign of North Korean intentions to wage a southward invasion by secretly infiltrating its combat troops through the tunnel. It was also in October, in the context of the announced U.S. ground force withdrawals from South Korea, that ROK newspapers gave prominent play to a speech by U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski had reportedly stated that the United States would strengthen its strike force to secure America's national interest not only in the ROK but in Persian Gulf countries as well.2

(U) On 6 November 1978 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrived in Seoul to take part in the activation of the Combined Forces Command (q.v.) in South Korea. Several newspaper articles covered the Brown visit to South Korea and discussions regarding the threat to South Korea by North Korea. One article, for example, stated that the existence of the third tunnel, about a mile long and extending into South Korea, was first suspected in mid-1978 but not officially confirmed until 17 October. Ever since the discovery, according to this article, massive demonstrations had been held throughout South Korea in a display of national anger at the North. There was speculation, according to this article, that the South Korean Government would offer the tunnel as proof that North Korean aggression continued and that the U.S. force reduction should be reconsidered.3

(U) On 16 November a spokesman for Admiral Weisner was quoted in a newspaper article which compared his remarks to those of retired Major General Singlaub, who had publicly claimed that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from South Korea could invite war. According to this article, the spokesman stated that any withdrawal of U.S. Forces from forward bases in the Far East, "would be perceived as a lack of commitment on the part of the United States." He stressed that, "massive North Korean forces" were poised within 50 miles of the DMZ and within 75 miles of the capital city of Seoul. "That's seven or eight minutes flying time for North Korean bombers." In an interview following his prepared talk, the spokesman conceded, according to this newspaper article, that many military leaders, "including Singlaub," opposed the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea.4

1. AMEMB Seoul 9731/300812Z Oct 78 (U); ICA Seoul 300800Z Oct 78 (U).
2. Ibid. (U).
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(U) Another newspaper story about the threat to South Korea by North Korea in late November discussed the "foreboding" among U.S. and South Korean generals that the planned withdrawal of U.S. infantrymen from Korea would bring Communist legions down across, "...this most heavily fortified border in the world." According to this article, the continuing military buildup by North Korea had widened the Communist lead in tanks, artillery, and overall fire power. This, added to North Korea's extensive defense industry, could enable Kim Il Sung to invade without the permission of either Moscow or Peking, stated the article. After discussing the possible outcome of an invasion by North Korea, the article claimed that highly publicized substitutes for the presence of the Second Infantry Division were scoffed at by South Korean generals. Although twelve additional F-4 jet fighters had been deployed to Korea (during Brown's visit), a senior Korean general was quoted as stating that, "it is ridiculous--exchanging twelve jets for an infantry division." The article concluded that, although there had been relatively few border incidents for the past eighteen months, there had been increased Communist troop concentrations on the DMZ and obvious preparations for invasion. The U.S. journalist authors stated that they had walked through the third underground invasion tunnel, and asserted that U.S. Army experts believed that there were at least ten more tunnels.1

The View From Japan

(U) Early in the year (January), a wire service dispatch reported that sources close to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) had stated that the Soviet Union was beefing up its naval forces in the Far East at an unexpectedly rapid pace. The unidentified sources stated that two of the Soviet's most modern missile-carrying warships had been spotted in the East China Sea on 11 January by patrol planes of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. This same dispatch referred to a Soviet purchase order for Japan's heavy industry to build a floating dock with an 80,000-ton capacity. Although this type of equipment was usually used to repair super-tankers, Japan reportedly was studying the possibility that the floating dock would be used for Russian aircraft carrier maintenance.2

(U) Early in May, Japanese press translations provided by the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan) carried stories regarding the credibility of support to Japan from the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the event of hostilities. A JDA source stated that Japan could hardly expect support from the U.S. Seventh


UNCLASSIFIED

90
Fleet in an emergency, even for defense, nor could support be expected for offense, depending upon the NATO situation. This was the result of an analysis by JDA experts of the JCS Chairman's posture statement to the U.S. Congress indicating the possibility that U.S. naval forces would be moved from the Pacific to the Atlantic in an emergency. Another Japanese newspaper article concerned an interview with a visiting former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Nixon-Ford Administration. This former official, billed as a U.S. strategic expert on Japanese defense, allegedly stated that the U.S. Navy had no capability to guard Japanese merchant ships in an emergency and recommended that Japan increase its food and oil stockpiles and arm its merchant ships.1

(U) On 7 May two Japanese newspapers carried reports from their Washington correspondents based on visits to American strategic positions on the U.S. mainland and in Hawaii. According to these reports, the increased Russian military strength and its menace to Western Europe were stressed by the American authorities. In the Pacific Command, the increasing strength of the Russian Pacific Fleet was emphasized. Citing "a U.S. Marine Corps officer in Hawaii" as the source, the reporters stated that a marine aircraft squadron stationed at Iwakuni in Japan could be dispatched anywhere in the world. The American military authorities repeatedly mentioned, however, the need for prior consultation. One newspaper concluded that Japan would be the most important base for American military operations and supplies in case of an emergency in the Korean Peninsula or Northeast Asia.2

(U) Ignoring a Japanese protest, the Soviet Union launched maneuvers off Northern Japan with an estimated 2,000 air, ground, and sea troops taking part, according to a JDA report on 6 June. The agency said naval ships and aircraft, including transport planes and tank landing ships, were participating in the war game, which had begun late in May. The exercise had begun after Moscow had set up a "danger zone" around Etorofu Island, one of four Northern Pacific islands claimed by both the Soviet Union and Japan. The exercise was expected to continue for an additional three weeks. About one month later, the JDA published a "white paper" which expressed concern over the growing military strength of the Soviet Union and especially the buildup of naval power in the Far East. Among the assertions in the white paper was that the Soviet Union had reached a nuclear balance with the United States, and that recent reinforcement of Soviet naval forces in the Far East had intensified the confrontation between the United States and Russia. According to the white paper, the Soviet Union Pacific Fleet comprised 755 ships totaling 1.33 million gross tons. The U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, according to the white paper, had 55 ships totaling 600,000 gross tons. Of the 125 Soviet

1. COMUS Japan 090655Z May 78 (U).
2. COMUS Japan 090001Z May 78 (U).
submarines in the Pacific, according to this paper, 50 were nuclear powered, while the United States had only five submarines in the Western Pacific. The paper also associated the withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea with Japan's national interest. This paper was the most open Japanese criticism to date of the decision by the Carter Administration to withdraw 30,000 ground troops from South Korea.¹

(U) After Secretary Brown's visit to South Korea in early November 1978, he also visited Japan. During his visit, extensive press coverage was generated. Brown reportedly stated, during his visit, that the Soviet Union was bolstering its Pacific Fleet and carrying out major increases in the strength of its air and ground forces in the Far East. In naval power, the augmentation of Soviet cruiser and destroyer forces and the anticipated basing of long-range naval aircraft in the eastern part of the Soviet Union would give them the capability to project more military power into the Pacific. However, Brown maintained that the United States continued to be the dominant naval power in the Western Pacific and that Soviet Forces were no match for U.S. naval and air forces in the area.²

(U) About a week after Secretary Brown's trip to Korea and Japan, a newspaper article reported the "grave concern" expressed by a California Congressman in Tokyo that the U.S. Navy might no longer be capable of protecting Japan's trade routes. The Congressman focused his remarks on what he described as a need for Japan to bolster its defense spending. He reportedly wanted to hear Japanese opinions on the U.S. Navy's capability to, "provide the umbrella and the protection Japan has relied on...to protect the sea lanes that deliver its energy and raw materials."³

(U) The foregoing discussion regarding the threat in Northeast Asia seemed to range from viewing with alarm to equanimity. However, the discussion would

1. UPI Dispatch, 7 Jun 78, dateline Tokyo, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALPHA 40/071830Z Jun 78 and UPI Dispatch, 29 Jul 78, dateline Tokyo, cited in CINCPAC ALPHA 72/290052Z Jul 78 (both U).

UNCLASSIFIED

92
be incomplete without the view of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as expressed in a news dispatch in mid-December 1978. In a paper prepared for the Senate Budget and Foreign Relations committees, the CBO was reported to have stated that the Navy could serve peacetime aims better by shifting one aircraft carrier from the Southwest Pacific to the Northwest Pacific. The budget office reportedly stated that, in light of the growing Soviet naval strength in the Northwest Pacific, such a deployment of carriers could assure American allies and China of its military protection. Citing the foreign policy aim of reassurance to Japan, South Korea, and mainland China about U.S. intentions to counter Soviet expansion in the region, the report was quoted as stating:

* * * * *

It is unclear that the deployment of a single carrier task force in the face of a large and growing Soviet air, surface, and submarine capability is sufficient to provide such assurance.

On the other hand, U.S. aims of maintaining regional stability in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean and of insuring the free flow of Middle East oil to East Asia might be met with lower-value forces less capable than the carrier task force....

SECTION II--SOVIET UNION

The CINCPAC Assessment

As in the classified CINCPAC assessment of the threat for the previous two years, it differed little in 1978 from the theme that the Soviet Union was the only world power with the potential to threaten the United States. After reviewing the strategic nuclear threat and the strength of Soviet general purpose forces, CINCPAC noted the fundamental change in the balance of naval forces in the Pacific/Indian Ocean areas. The Soviets had steadily upgraded their sea control forces in both areas, and the Soviet Pacific Fleet was the largest of all Soviet fleets. Additionally, it was expected that the new vertical short takeoff and landing/anti-submarine warfare carrier and BACKFIRE bombers would join the Soviet Pacific Fleet at the beginning of 1980, significantly improving Soviet war fighting capabilities in the Pacific. In a conventional worldwide war with the Soviets, the swing strategy, wherein significant portions of the PACOM war fighting capability would be called upon to support NATO, would reduce Pacific Command forces to a level which provided no alternative other than U.S. accommodation to the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union in the Pacific and increased Soviet options for:

- Attacking U.S. Forces and bases the Pacific and the United States.
- Providing forces or logistic support to a North Korean attack into the Republic of Korea.
- Dominating Western Pacific-Indian Oceans.
- Isolating both Japan and the PRC from the United States.
- Redeploying forces to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and NATO.
- Denying U.S./allied access to Mideast oil.

The IPAC View

In his overall assessment, CINCPAC acknowledged that it was unlikely that PACOM military forces would engage Soviet ground forces on the Asian land mass. In specific assessments of Soviet forces in the Pacific by the Intelli-

1. CINCPAC 062330Z Oct 76 (S/NOFORN), GDS-86.
gence Center of the Pacific (IPAC), the Soviet ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border were estimated to have reached 45 combat divisions (39 motorized rifle and six tank) with an estimated total strength of 440,000. Soviet air force strength in the Far East was estimated to include more than 2,000 combat aircraft, including about 350 medium and long range bombers. Nearly 1,000 attack aircraft were in the region; of these, 45 percent were MIG-23/FLOGGER and SU-17/FITTER. Soviet air defense forces in the Far East totaled approximately 550 aircraft, 60 percent of which were third generation FLOGGERS, FLAGONS, and FOXBATS. Long range aviation squadrons in the area had steadily increased the numbers of BADGER G (air-to-surface missile carriers); it was estimated that there were 98 BADGER G's in the Far East, including those assigned to Soviet naval aviation. For the past three years, the total number of Soviet naval aircraft had remained at about 230. IPAC anticipated that the BACKFIRE bomber would be delivered to Soviet naval aviation in the Pacific Fleet prior to 1980. The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) fleet in the Pacific was estimated to be some 32 submarines, including 12 YANKEE class and at least nine DELTA class submarines. In October 1978 IPAC estimated the order of battle for the Soviet Pacific Fleet to include 71 major surface combatants (down through frigates) and 112 submarines (51 were nuclear-powered).

The loss in 1977 of Soviet access to port facilities and airfields in Somalia had complicated Soviet Indian Ocean operations, but had not precluded them from maintaining their previous level of presence in the Indian Ocean. They were capable of maintaining a significant naval presence by basing their logistic and repair ships at anchorage in international waters. When the Soviets were expelled from Berbera in Somalia (November 1977), they moved their floating drydock to Aden in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and had also acquired access to airfields in South Yemen in return for

1. Ibid.; IPAC Point Paper (S), 23 May 78, Subj: Overview of Soviet Forces in the Pacific (U), REVW 23 May 98; IPAC Point Paper (S), 5 Oct 78, Subj: Soviet Maritime Activity in the PACOM Region (U), GDS-86.
Soviet arms and economic assistance. In mid-1978 the floating drydock was again moved from Aden to Dehalak Island, Ethiopia.1

One IPAC paper regarding the naval balance in the Pacific between the United States and the Soviet Union illustrated the difficulty in estimating relative strength strictly on numbers. IPAC noted that the Soviet Navy was a sea denial navy, while the U.S. Navy was a sea control navy. The orders of battle and the weapon systems of the two fleets in the Pacific reflected these different missions. The concept of naval balance assumed that the United States Navy and the Soviet Navy could be compared by counting ships/weapon systems. IPAC postulated that a more useful way to evaluate the two navies was the premise that, in a non-nuclear scenario, the United States must keep open its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to its allies and to potential battlefields. Conversely, the Soviet Union, as a land power with most of its potential battlefields on the Eurasian land mass, did not need to keep essential SLOC open, but only needed to deny or attrite the U.S. SLOC. From that premise, the relative numbers of carriers or submarines were irrelevant. Having stressed the different missions of the two navies, IPAC provided a side-by-side order of battle comparison in which the footnotes were perhaps more instructive than the figures themselves (see following two pages).2

Southeast Asia

One facet of the Soviet threat in the Pacific which was not entirely resolved during 1978 involved Southeast Asia, specifically the question of Soviet use of the Cam Ranh Bay air and naval base in Southern Vietnam. A wire service dispatch from Tokyo on 7 June 1978 cited an article published by a Chinese-American employee of Yale University which alleged that the Soviet Union had moved into the naval base built by the United States at Cam Ranh Bay. His statement was published by the Asahi Newspaper in Tokyo, and was purportedly based on information obtained from prominent Chinese expelled from Vietnam.3

In November 1978 an interview by a "State Department Soviet specialist" was published in a Honolulu newspaper. The State Department official reportedly did not foresee Cam Ranh Bay becoming a staging area for the Soviet Pacific Fleet.4

1. Ibid.
2. IPAC Point Paper (S), 28 Feb 78, Subj: U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance In The Pacific (U), REVW 28 Feb 98.
3. UPI Dispatch, 7 Jun 78, dateline Tokyo, cited in ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 40/071830Z Jun 78 (U).
### Order of Battle Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>SOVPACFLT</th>
<th>USPACFLT</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAG</td>
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Total: 112<sup>a</sup> 43

### Surface Ships

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<th>USPACFLT</th>
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<td>Carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers/Frigates</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Types</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Types</td>
<td>81&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Types</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Auxiliaries</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Auxiliaries</td>
<td>91&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Total: 464 167

### Naval Air Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
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<th>USPACFLT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Maritime (Patrol/ASW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Range (Patrol/ASW)</td>
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<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short Range (Patrol/ASW)</td>
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<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Range (Bomber/ Missile)</td>
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<td>Tanker aircraft</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 313 1,053

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SECRET

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SECRET
a. U.S. Navy submarines, while fewer in numbers, are technologically superior in most areas (quietness, weapons, sensors) to Soviet Subs.

b. In abstract U.S. carriers have a decisive advantage over Soviet major combatants in the Pacific, in that the carrier's primary battery (air wing) outranges a Soviet cruiser's primary battery (anti-ship missiles). However, this abstract advantage diminishes when the carrier's freedom of movement is restricted by geography or directed operations. In an environment where Soviet anti-ship missiles can be brought within range, the critical factors become ELINT/ECM/ECCM.

c. U.S. Navy Amphibs are larger and more sophisticated than Soviet Amphibs.

d. Because of the geography of the Sea of Japan, the Soviets have: (1) the option of mining straits to deny enemy access to their local waters, or (2) the problem of clearing enemy mines from such straits to get their ships out into the open Pacific. Consequently, mine warfare types constitute a major portion of their Fleet in the Pacific. Many of these are brown water (riverine) units rather than blue water (deep sea) mine warfare craft.

e. Coastal defense units are small-range limited types not capable of sustained operations at sea. They are positioned for close-in defense of important bases. They are also effective in geographic "bottlenecks" that force major enemy units to come within range of their weapons. The straits into the Sea of Japan are an optimum environment for such coastal defense types.

f. Fleet Auxiliaries are those units designed to provide logistics/support to naval combatants at sea. U.S. Navy Fleet Auxiliaries are larger than and technologically superior to Soviet Fleet Auxiliaries. Also the availability of overseas bases (such as Subic Bay, Okinawa, Yokosuka, Guam) minimizes the number of Fleet Auxiliaries required to sustain the U.S. Pacific Fleet at sea.

g. Other Auxiliaries are those that are not designed for direct support of the Fleet at sea, such as buoy tenders, and salvage and rescue ships. In order to have true comparability between SOVPACFLT and USPACFLT, some Soviet Naval Auxiliaries (such as survey ships, oceanographic ships) were not counted, since similar functions in the U.S. Navy are performed under civilian contract, or by Department of the Navy ships with civilian crews.

h. Because the Soviet Navy lacks overseas bases, having long range TU-95s is essential to them. For the U.S. Navy, with overseas bases for their medium-range patrol/ASW aircraft and aircraft carriers for their short-range patrol/ASW aircraft, the absence of a long-range aircraft is not significant.

i. Generally the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Force is limited because it lacks aircraft carriers and overseas bases. It is powerful in the northwestern Pacific and especially the Sea of Japan, but is largely ineffective in all other areas of the PACOM (especially since their eviction from Somalia in 1977).
Hanoi is not about to become a puppet. Vietnam will not be a vacuum for anyone. The Russians will use Vietnamese ports if there is an opportunity but they are cautious about building naval bases because of the expense involved and because of what happened in Egypt where a lot of money and effort went down the drain.

(C/NOFORN) In December 1978, after the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and cooperation treaty had been signed (q.v.), the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported that PRC diplomats had intimated that among the benefits obtained by Moscow from the recently-concluded friendship treaty was a secret agreement on Soviet usage of Cam Ranh Bay. The Embassy noted that it was not clear how well informed the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was on the state of Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations. However, a Chinese diplomat had mentioned that the Chief of General Staff of the SRV had stayed behind in Moscow after other officials had left for follow-on military planning talks. The Chinese diplomat implied that Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay figured heavily in the talks. Although the Embassy advised that some of the information obtained through the Chinese appeared to be incorrect, some sources agreed that secret military agreements had been signed in Moscow dealing with the Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay. This use was not expected to entail the stationing of Soviet troops at Cam Ranh Bay, but the Chinese diplomat was reported to have commented caustically that there were several arrangements under which foreign military bases could be used. The Embassy speculated that the Chinese diplomat had implied that Cam Ranh would remain a Vietnamese base, but would be used by the Soviets under the alleged secret agreement.

1. AH/EMB Moscow 29791/051652Z Dec 78 (C/NE) XGDS-1, REVW 5 Dec 08.
SECTION III--NORTH KOREA

Overview

(U) In October 1978 a Directorate for Plans paper noted that the balance of peace on the Korean Peninsula was a delicate matter which required constant evaluation. North Korea had concentrated development efforts on heavy industry with emphasis on military construction. This included domestically produced tanks, armored vehicles, long-range artillery, and a wide range of ships and submarines.\(^1\)

(S/NOPORN) Complicating any U.S. actions/objectives in Northeast Asia to demonstrate continued support to the Republic of Korea (ROK), in the face of the announced withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces, was the potential Soviet reaction to increased U.S. naval activity in the Sea of Japan and Pacific waters contiguous to the Soviet Union. Increased U.S. activity would be met, not only by strong defensive actions and a harsh propaganda campaign from North Korea, but by increased surveillance and the presence of Russian combatants within weapons range of U.S. forces. Most U.S. Navy operations in Pacific waters adjacent to the Soviet Union had met with some degree of simulated strike activity by Soviet Navy aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. The Soviets continued to deploy significant weapons platforms in reaction to carrier operations in the Sea of Japan, and U.S. peacetime aerial reconnaissance aircraft were frequently (one-third of missions) intercepted and paced by Soviet fighters.\(^2\)

(S/NOPORN) Early in January the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (COMUS Korea) stressed that the North Korean threat was real and the military capabilities of the North were expanding. He also noted that the Korean Peninsula was strategically important because of its pivotal role in the regional balance, and that its position on the globe, rather than just the ROK-North Korea equation in isolation, was the important factor.\(^3\)

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2. IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 16 Feb 78, Subj: What Reaction Could We Expect If We Increased Our Activity In SOJ? Can We Not Significantly Step Up Naval Activity In/Around Korea? What Are The Problems? (U), REVW 16 Feb 98.
3. General Vessey to Admiral Weisner 152/131122Z Jan 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-85; IPAC Point Paper (S/NF), 28 Nov 78, Subj: Military Developments In North Korea (U), GDS-86.
(S/NOFORN) The first tunnel had been discovered in November 1974 in the Western sector of the DMZ at approximately 0.5 to 2.5 meters below the surface of the earth. The second tunnel had been discovered in March 1975 in the Eastern section of the DMZ at a depth of 52 meters. This tunnel was about two meters in diameter and construction had been through bedrock. After the discovery of the two tunnels, ROK-U.S. detection efforts centralized around the development of tunnel neutralization teams. Seven suspected tunnel sites were identified and the ROK developed and employed approximately 230 seismic detectors along the 151-mile DMZ. Approximately 600 personnel manned these detectors 24 hours per day. Augmenting the ROK units were U.S. non-manned seismic sensors, along with drilling programs, the use of cross-borehole radar, and photography. IPAC considered that the possible uses of such tunnels included the ingress of North Korean Forces into ROK rear areas.2

Let shortly after the end of the year, CINCUNC informed the Secretary of Defense that, despite the location of the third North Korean tunnel, the threat from tunnels under the DMZ was as great as ever. Based upon seismic detection, it appeared that a branch of the recently intercepted tunnel was being dug and evidence indicated that the new branch was much farther into South Korea than the branch already intercepted. CINCUNC noted that the state of the art in tunnel detection continued to be in the experimental stage, and that locating North Korean tunnels was a time-consuming and laborious procedure. He acknowledged that the people working on the project had done a good job, but

1. CINCUNC Seoul Korea 260800Z Jun 78 (S/RF), GDS-86; Acting COMUSKOREA 170930Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. IPAC Point Paper (S/RF), 3 Oct 78, Subj: North Korean Tunneling (U), XGDS-2, REVT 31 Dec 08.
The Infiltration Threat

(6) Another aspect of the threat from North Korea was the extent of surface infiltration into South Korea. One example of such infiltration occurred late on the night of 27 April 1978. A North Korean agent reported to the ROK Government authorities that he had been landed approximately one hour earlier by a North Korean infiltration boat. In response to this information, aircraft of the ROK Air Force were scrambled to search for the agent boat. In addition, two ROK Navy vessels were sent to the area. The agent boat was sighted by the ROK Navy vessels and determined to be a North Korean vessel. An exchange of fire resulted in the sinking of the agent boat with no survivors. The ROK Navy reported that the agent boat was a high speed craft and had nine crewmen aboard. Two bodies were found, along with a quantity of clothing and unidentified type rockets.2

(6) About one month later the ROK Navy salvaged the North Korean infiltration boat which had been sunk on 28 April off the south coast of Korea. The agent boat had been recovered from 125 feet of water in remarkable intact condition. The wreckage consisted of a ten-meter hull approximately 3.5 meters wide at the beam. The boat had been powered by three Belgium-made 125 horsepower engines and armed with two rocket launchers mounted with movable brackets which allowed them to be either concealed inside the gunwales or hung over the side for firing. Other weapons found included one AK-47 with North Korean markings and a pistol with several rounds of ammunition. Additional items included field radios, field rations, common field gear including both cold and warm weather clothing, navigational charts with North Korean printer's marks, a variety of common marine hardware, and a 500mm telescopic camera lens. Subsequent to this recovery, the UNC Armistice Affairs Division called for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at which charges of Armistice violation would be repeated. The fact of the boat's recovery, backed by a display of salvaged artifacts, would be presented to substantiate the claim that the intruder was, without question, a North Korean infiltration boat. As usual, the North Korean representatives to the Military Armistice Commission

2. Osan CCP Osan Air Base Korea 280034Z Apr 78 (U); COMUS Korea 280845Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
were expected to evade the issue and deny the charges.\footnote{(5NUFORD)} Other incidents of penetration into ROK waters by North Korean vessels were reported on 19 May, 27 June, and 7 November. The latter infiltration attempt, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), occurred along the western coast of South Korea approximately 70 miles southwest of Seoul. According to reports received by the DIA, two South Korean civilians were killed by possible infiltrators on 7 November. The deaths were reported by a Korean woman sometime later and the bodies were found. Because of the discovery of clothing and supplies associated with infiltration attempts, the South Korean Army Reserve forces in the area were mobilized on the next morning and a higher security posture was declared for military and civilian forces in the area. This incident appeared to have been a sea infiltration effort because of its location. The last sea-related infiltration incident had occurred off the southern coast of Korea on 28 April 1978 when the South Korean Navy sank a suspected infiltration boat. The DIA noted that many of the incidents reported to represent North Korean infiltration activity had in fact involved confrontation between the ROK and the North Korean Navies after North Korean fishing boats had strayed into South Korean waters. Nevertheless, the DIA concluded that while overland infiltrators were expected to decrease in number when winter ground cover became sparse, seaborne infiltration efforts were expected to continue throughout the winter months.\footnote{(5NUFORD)
\footnote{(5NUFORD)}}

\footnote{(5NUFORD)} CINCPAC noted that the infiltration season reached its peak during the summer months and usually involved small groups of personnel, perhaps four to six people. It usually occurred on an annual basis in mid-year and took place overland across the DMZ and by sea. The sinking in April 1978 of the North Korean agent boat discussed in the above DIA report was cited as an example of the problem. Agent infiltration did not involve large groups of personnel nor assume major proportions.\footnote{(5NUFORD)
\footnote{(5NUFORD)}}

\footnote{(5NUFORD)} Assessment of North Korean GOB

\footnote{(5NUFORD)} During the eleventh ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1978, the threat briefing acknowledged the fact that, since the previous SCM,

1. AMEMB Seoul 4142/170558Z May 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}), GDS-86.
2. COMUS Korea 190545Z May 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}); COMUS Korea 271600Z Jun 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}), REVW 27 Jun 98; AMEMB Seoul 5588/280905Z Jun 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}), GDS-86; DIA 1518/081101Z Nov 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 080321Z Jul 78 (\footnote{(5NUFORD)}) (BOM), XGDS-2, REVW 8 Jul 98.

\footnote{(5NUFORD)} NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
the assessed personnel strength of the North Korean army had increased by at least 20,000. The briefing stated that, during the past six years, a marked North Korean military buildup had occurred and that there had been a shift from defense to a clear priority to offensive capability. Other increases in personnel and equipment, as well as qualitative improvements, were highlighted during the briefing, which also addressed hardened underground facilities for both personnel and weapons, the North Korean military production capability, superiority in Air Force and Navy inventories, and the massing of forces which enhanced the capability of North Korea to attack with little or no warning.¹

(\. \) The increase in the North Korean ground order of battle (GOB) cited in the aforementioned briefing was only a partial indication of the concern expressed earlier in the year regarding North Korean Army strength. In January 1978 COMUS Korea advised the DIA of his belief that assessments of the North Korean GOB were overly conservative and that the time had come for a complete and detailed audit of North Korean Army strength. COMUS Korea acknowledged the inherent difficulties in estimating North Korean strength because of the impact of its closed society and stringent security, and suggested that this could be compensated for by making use of modeling and extrapolation techniques to arrive at a reasonably realistic estimate. After detailing the specific areas which needed attention, COMUS Korea solicited the support of the DIA in correcting what he considered to be a long-standing deficiency.²

(\(S/NOFORN\)) In February the DIA proposed a division of labor among the Defense intelligence community to systematically address the concerns expressed by COMUS Korea. By March COMUS Korea noted considerable progress on the multilateral study effort, and considered such studies, both completed and in-progress, as likely to close some of the principal analytical gaps on the North Korean GOB.³

(\(S/\) Early in July (but before the eleventh SHM meeting) the State Depart-
ment informed the U.S. Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo and CINCUNC that the full refinement of data and detailed assessments of the North Korean GOB would probably not be completed before October. Nonetheless, the work to date suggested that previous North Korea GOB holdings might be incomplete. Accordingly, State advised that upward adjustments in U.S. estimates could be re-
quired. State emphasized that there were no indications that such adjustments would represent a very recent change in the North Korean force posture. Rather, the changes appeared to be due primarily to better analysis and information rather than a sudden increase in the North's forces. In view of the potential

₁. COMUS Korea 070600Z Jul 78 (S), XGDS-2, REVW 7 Jul 98.
₂. SSO Korea 99/100845Z Jan 78 (S) (BOM), XGDS-2, REVW 10 Jan 98.
₃. SSO Korea 918/250118Z Mar 78 (S/NF) (BOM), XGDS-2, REVW 25 Mar 98.

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

105
Implications of the reassessment in relation to the military force balance on the Peninsula, State thought it advisable to inform the ROK Government, the Government of Japan, and the U.S. Congress in a general, low-key manner, of the possible upward revisions in the GOB estimates for North Korea. On 10 July CINCUNC informed the Secretary of Defense that he had reminded the ROK Minister of National Defense of the ongoing North Korean GOB study and had briefed him as previously agreed during his visit in Washington.1

As transmitted to CINCPAC by the Department of Defense, the talking points made by CINCUNC to the ROK Government included the fact that no formal intelligence findings had yet been made and that the study would not be complete until the Fall. Stressing the tentative nature of the information, CINCUNC had been authorized to say that there was some evidence that the North Koreans could have a somewhat higher number of divisions or brigades than previously estimated, and a correspondingly higher number of people and greater combat capability. CINCUNC was also to stress the confidential nature of the information and U.S. concern that such preliminary analysis be misunderstood, distorted, or leaked.2

By December of 1978 COMUS Korea/CINCUNC was expressing concern that leaks about the results of the North Korean GOB reassessment could occur. He recommended that he be allowed to approach President Park Chung Hee and/or Minister of Defense Ro with some indications of the direction that the reassessment of the North Korean GOB had taken. He suggested that an early, fairly detailed briefing be given to President Park which could include the best available data on the reassessment and that he be authorized to brief both ROK officials at an early date.3

The DIA advised that plans for who tells what, to whom, and when were being formulated on an interagency basis. Findings were at different stages of completion; all elements of the intelligence community had agreed, however, that the retrospective analysis of the North Korean threat showed it to have been larger in 1977 than had been perceived. The Director of Central Intelligence had briefed the President, the Secretary of State, and other officials to that effect. The substance of this briefing had also been given to the principals of the Korea Review Group in Washington, and a series of private, face-to-face briefings for the leadership and leading members and staffers of key congressional committees by the Director of Central Intelli-

1. SECSTATE 172835/081906Z Jul 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-2&3, REVW 8 Jul 98; CINCUNC 100830Z Jul 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
2. OSD 081756Z Jul 78 (BOM), GDS-88.
3. SSO Korea 4704/220814Z Dec 78 (SF/WM) (BOM), DECL 19 Dec 84.
gence, his representatives, or by the State Department was scheduled.¹

The State-Defense message stressed that the revised estimates represented a recording of a steady increase in North Korean ground strength over a number of years and that it was premature to attempt to relate the revised estimates to broader regional security questions such as the program for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea.³

The State-Defense message advised that efforts to resolve these differences would continue but that complete resolution was not anticipated in the near term. In spite of the disagreement within the intelligence community on the precise figures, they agreed that the North Koreans were substantially stronger than they had estimated earlier.⁴

The Japanese officials receiving the briefing expressed appreciation for the prompt notification but, according to the U.S.

1. SSO DIA 292130Z Dec 78 (SYME) (BOM), REVW 29 Dec 98.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 327067/300000Z Dec 78 (§) (EX), GDS 29 Dec 84.
4. Ibid.
Embassy message, did not appear unduly concerned. The Commander U.S. Forces Japan (COMUS Japan) informed CINCPAC that the briefing had been presented on 4 January by COMUS Japan to the Chairman of the Joint Staff and assembled principals. The Chairman also expressed appreciation for the promptness of the notification as well as for the information itself. The reaction was non-committal and as low-key as the briefing, stated COMUS Japan. A reaction was expected to be slow-forming and deliberate and heavily influenced by the degree of concern expressed in Seoul and in the Washington media. However, there also would be recognition that the United States was the key factor in assessing the balance in Korea—not the relative strengths of the North and South.  

In Korea, the holiday delay apparently had provided time for the development feared most by CINCUNG—a leak. COMUS Korea advised CINCPAC that, by the time he had arrived at the Ministry of National Defense to brief Minister Ro on 4 January, the news of the leak by the Army Times had already been broadcast on Korean radio. Moreover, the revised GOB figures had been passed through another Korean agency to the Minister. Minister Ro had two reactions to the discussion. The first was one of shock and disappointment at the Army Times leak. The second was a sensible reaction to the study results. He said that, whatever the range of estimates, it was clear that the North Korean ground forces were stronger than had earlier been estimated. He observed that the new intelligence suggested that war plans should be reviewed, the ROK force improvement plan be reassessed, and that Korean defense plans and policies of the U.S. Government also be reviewed. It was vital, he stated, that defense plans and budgetary support be based on the most accurate estimates available of the enemy’s strength, because it was necessary to be absolutely certain that Korea could be defended successfully.

Meanwhile, even before the ROK and Japanese officials had been briefed, the JCS had requested CINCPAC to provide his views as to how the revised GOB figures would affect the perception of the military balance on the Peninsula, and how this would relate to the planned U.S. ground force withdrawals. CINCPAC passed the JCS request to COMUS Korea for his assessment. He replied that the situation was markedly different from the one before the reassessment.

1. SECSTATE 2028/041731Z Jan 79 (S) (EX), which transmitted AMEMB Tokyo 113 of 4 Jan 79 (S) (EX), GDS 4 Jan 85; COMUS Japan 050306Z Jan 79 (S), REVW 5 Jan 85.
2. COMUS Korea 050303Z Jan 79 (S) (EX), DECL 31 Dec 84.
What seemed even clearer was that deterrence played an even greater role in the "balance," and that the planned withdrawal of the Second Division should be canceled until the balance was redressed or until other political moves toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question were made.

External Threat to ROK

(TS/NOFORN) In August 1978 CINCPAC requested IPAC to prepare an analysis regarding the threats posed by the Soviet Union and the PRC to the Republic of Korea during the FY 81-88 timeframe. The IPAC analysis was that the threat from Russia was not forecast to be appreciably different in that timeframe than in 1978. Soviet air, ground, and naval forces were the most powerful forces in the Western Pacific, but would not normally be deployed for action against the ROK. The more realistic scenario foreseen by IPAC was one of Soviet "assistance" to North Korea in the form of advisors, technological support, weapon systems deliveries, air defense services, and stepped up deliveries of such things as surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, patrol boats, and new generation fighter aircraft. IPAC did not consider it probable that the Soviet Union would become committed on the ground or in the air with its own personnel.  

1. JCS 3089/022344Z Jan 79 (S/NF) (EX), DECL 2 Jan 85; COMUS Korea 080710Z Jan 79 (S) (EX), DECL 8 Jan 85, which cited CINCPAC 042030Z Jan 79.
2. COMIPAC 090016Z Aug 78 (S/NF), XGDS-2, REVW 9 Aug 98.
In summary, IPAC considered the threat of unilateral action by either the PRC or the Soviet Union against the ROK in the 1981-1988 time period as substantial but highly improbable. More probable was the threat posed by either Soviet or Chinese assistance to North Korea. The likelihood of such assistance would depend on the perceptions by the two powers regarding their resulting strategic positions if they withheld assistance during North Korea's attempt at forceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.2

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
SECTION IV--THE THREAT TO JAPAN

(TS) As part of a message from Admiral Weisner to Major General Wolff, Commander of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, the Admiral advised that IPAC was updating the threat to Japan. However, the CINCPAC assessment as of March 1978 was that the most probable threat to Japan was offensive action by the Soviet Union in the context of a U.S.-Soviet Union worldwide conflict.

(S) Initial reports of a Soviet force buildup in the Kuril Islands were received in May of 1978 which indicated that four Soviet amphibious assault ships were operating between the Soviet mainland and the southern Kurils. Subsequent reports from the DIA noted that, after a lapse of 17 years, the Soviets were redeploying ground forces to the Kuril Islands. A movement of this type, presumably of men and equipment, suggested an amphibious lift as opposed to an assault training operation. Additionally, Soviet transports reportedly conducted flights to Etorofu Island during the same period.\(^2\)

(S) Information obtained during June 1978 indicated the reestablishment of Soviet ground forces on the two southernmost islands in the Kuril chain. On Kunashiri Island, tents which could accommodate 1,500 personnel as well as sufficient combat material for a Soviet motorized rifle company, a tank company, and an artillery battery were reported. Numerous coast watch stations were located on this island and other watch stations and electronic monitoring sites were expected to be located on other islands in the Kuril chain. On Etorofu, tents for approximately 1,000 personnel, presumed to be engaged in construction activity, had been reported. No combat units or material had been recently reported at that location. A Soviet fighter regiment was deployed on Etorofu and numerous operational air fields were reported on the other islands; however, there was no significant air order of battle.\(^3\)

(S) The DIA assessment was that the Soviet ground, air, and naval forces deployed on the Kuril Islands could be described as token assets and were essentially defensive in nature. Nevertheless, and despite the relative scarcity of Soviet forces and installations in the Kurils, the Soviet Union

2. AMEMB Tokyo 10941/150907Z Jun 78 (S), GDS 15 Jun 84.
3. Ibid.
attached strategic, political, and economic importance to the islands. They served as a defensive barrier to maritime approaches to the Soviet Far East and insured naval access from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific. The islands were particularly important to Russia because the Sea of Japan would become an enclosed lake if the La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits were closed. From an economic standpoint, the Kurils provided one of the world's major fisheries.¹

¹ DIA 1790/137222 Oct 78 XGDS-2, REVW 13 Oct 98.
SECTION V--THE THREAT TO TAIWAN

The PRC Position

As in 1977 there was little difference in the overall threat posed by the PRC against Taiwan during 1978. During 1977 the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China (ROC), the Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), and CINCPAC were all concerned over the possibility of incidents arising from the extension of the PRC military presence into the Taiwan Strait. During 1977 there had been many instances of PRC air force intrusion into the air space of the ROC. The Ambassador had expressed to the ROC Foreign Minister the concern of the United States with the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the strong desire of the United States to avoid any incident there. In August 1977 the U.S. Embassy in Taipei had advised the State Department that ROC concern over the increased PRC military activity in the Strait, together with the belief in Taipei that normalization of U.S.-PRC relations might encourage the PRC to apply military pressure against the ROC, had prompted the ROC to increase the state of readiness of its forces on the off-shore islands.

This concern extended into 1978, as was shown, interalia, by a letter received from Admiral Soong, the ROC Chief of General Staff by COMUSTDC in April 1978. In this letter, Admiral Soong again expressed deep concern over the PRC air activity opposite Taiwan. The letter stated that, on 13 April 1978, two flights of four PRC fighter aircraft had left the Chinese mainland and proceeded to at least the mid-point of the Taiwan Strait. On the following day, eight PRC fighter aircraft in two flights had approached a ROC routine patrol mission as close as 15 nautical miles from the ROC aircraft. According to the Soong letter, engagement was avoided by the exercise of strict self-restraint on the part of the ROC pilots. The PRC air force flights were labeled deliberate, provocative acts which constituted a direct threat to the security of the Taiwan Strait. The letter emphasized that if such incidents continued to persist, they could lead to unexpected hostilities.

CINCPAC advised the JCS that the over-water flights cited in Admiral Soong's letter had not been corroborated by the U.S. military, but noted that the possibility of spontaneous incidents increased so long as the PRC continued to assert its right to fly over the Taiwan Strait.

2. CINCPAC 0505402 May 78 (S), GDS-86.
Other Threat Indicators

(U) In August 1977 the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Hua Kuo-feng, stated the PRC position on Taiwan. Hua stipulated that the conditions for normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC were that the United States must sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraw all its Armed Forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and abrogate the MDT. During this same policy statement, Hua stated that the PRC was determined to liberate Taiwan, and that when and how that was accomplished was entirely China's internal affair, which brooked no foreign interference.


About one year later, in August 1978, the ROC Chief of General Staff, Admiral Soong, visited CINCPAC. During this visit, Admiral Weisner took the opportunity to reiterate the great sensitivity of the United States toward the possibility of an incident during routine air operations in the Taiwan Strait. Soong acknowledged the awareness of ROC officials of that sensitivity and stated that he had instructed the ROC Air Force repeatedly in that regard.

2. CINCPAC 021850Z Sep 78 (EX), GDS-86; further discussions in Ch. VII, LOROP Cameras.
SECTION VI -- SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV)

(U) The fighting along the Vietnam-Cambodia border which had begun in 1977 continued and intensified during 1978. In May of 1977 the SRV had extended its economic zone waters to 200 miles off-shore. The SRV also claimed a 12-mile "contiguous zone" in addition to the 12-mile territorial zone. There had been several instances of attacks by Vietnamese gun boats on foreign flag vessels.¹

(²) Two such incidents, involving the same vessel, occurred early in 1978. On 2 January the SS GATEWAY CITY reported that it had been fired upon by an unidentified small boat at a position about 44 miles from the Vietnamese Island of Hon Khoai. The unknown vessel was approximately 44 feet long and was believed to have been firing small caliber automatic weapons. When the GATEWAY CITY took evasive action, the unknown vessel pursued for approximately ten minutes. The GATEWAY CITY received no hits. CINCPAC noted that, although the nationality of the vessel which had fired on the GATEWAY CITY was unknown, the location would indicate that it probably was Vietnamese. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the State Department be requested to take appropriate diplomatic action with the SRV to inquire into and protest these continuing incidents. CINCPAC also requested that the Master of the GATEWAY CITY be thoroughly debriefed in order to obtain any information which might be useful in the analysis of such incidents.²

(U) On 15 January Embassy officials from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok discussed the attack by fire on the SS GATEWAY CITY with the ship's officers. They indicated that no photographs had been taken of the attacking boat, that the total number of shots fired was approximately 15-20, and that the weapon appeared to be a Browning Automatic Rifle as opposed to a fixed-deck gun. The second mate of the GATEWAY CITY believed that, given the configuration of the attacking boat and the proximity to Vietnam, it was a Vietnamese vessel. The officers said they saw no fishing gear aboard the vessel which, at its closest point, came to within three-fourths mile to the GATEWAY CITY.³

(³) That information was passed by the State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France to be brought to the attention of Vietnamese authorities. An Embassy liaison officer in Paris was directed to state that this was a matter for the attention of the SRV in the hope of avoiding any possible future problems. An appropriate Notice to Mariners, previously issued in 1975, had been reiterated advising vessels to remain at least 20 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam, including the off-shore islands. The State Department directed

2. SS GATEWAY CITY 021050Z Jan 78 (U); CINCPAC 050051Z Jan 78 (SC), GDS-84.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 1649/170916Z Jan 78 (U).
that the SRV be told that a warning would be reissued which advised the American merchant ships to stay 30 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast. However, this did not imply acceptance of the SRV stated ocean boundaries because the United States recognized only a three-mile territorial limit and a nine-mile contiguous zone. This position on territorial waters contrasted with the claim of the SRV to twelve-mile territorial waters and an additional twelve-mile contiguous zone claimed by the SRV as a "zone of control."

By what seemed to be a remarkable coincidence, shortly before midnight on 31 January the same Sealand Incorporated ship, the SS GATEWAY CITY, reported having been fired upon at a position some 65 miles south of the SRV. The Sealand agent in Hong Kong informed the U.S. Defense Liaison Office (USDLO) in Hong Kong that the Master had observed tracer rounds from a small boat firing at a distance of approximately two and one-half nautical miles from the GATEWAY CITY. After this incident, the Sealand company ordered all of its ships to remain a minimum of 35 nautical miles from the SRV. However, the Master of the SS GATEWAY CITY ordered his crew to maintain a minimum distance of 60 nautical miles from the SRV; further, the Master ordered the closest point of approach for small craft to his vessel be kept at two nautical miles as a result of discussions with the USDLO regarding possible fishing boats with trailing nets. The USDLO noted that both this incident and the previous incident involving the GATEWAY CITY had occurred in the same general area and requested amplifying information which might reflect a high degree of sensitivity on the part of SRV nationals or craft regarding this area.

In response to the request for information, CINCPACFLT advised that amplifying information was limited. The SRV claimed twelve nautical mile territorial waters and enforced an unrecognized additional twelve nautical miles as a "search and seizure zone." CINCPACFLT noted that the U.S. yacht BRILLIG, seized on 12 October 1977, had apparently been within 24 nautical miles of SRV territory. The BRILLIG was seized by SRV fishing boats with armed civilians aboard. These personnel could represent an informal civilian maritime militia. Such armed fishing craft were believed to augment the SRV Navy in its coastal patrol functions, but were primarily bonafide fishing boats. However, the distance of the GATEWAY CITY from the SRV coast suggested another possibility. CINCPACFLT noted that firing incidents such as those encountered by the GATEWAY CITY had been reported previously in the Gulf of Thailand. It was possible that the merchant ships involved unknowingly disrupted fishing operations and irate fishermen retaliated with small arms fire. There was no evidence to suggest that the GATEWAY CITY incidents involved SRV Navy patrol craft.

1. SECSTATE 19610/250153Z Jan 78 (S), XGDS-3, REVW 25 Jan 98.
2. USDLO Hong Kong 010808Z Feb 78 (S) and 060700Z Feb 78 (S), both GDS-84.
3. CINCPACFLT 140300Z Feb 78 (U).
SECRET

On 2 March CINCPAC expressed concern to the JCS regarding the GATEWAY CITY incidents and their implications regarding the Law of the Sea negotiations. The JCS advised that the State Department had been made aware of CINCPAC's concerns and recommendations and that coordination procedures were anticipated to insure that the Law of the Sea implications were fully considered. On 21 March the State Department acknowledged the concern expressed by CINCPAC but stated that the Department had no reason to believe that the SRV was under any misapprehension regarding the U.S. position on coastal state jurisdiction. With respect to the preparation and clearance of Notices to Mariners and related maritime matters, wherein claims of off-shore jurisdiction or the recognition of such claims were germane, the State Department advised that both the Office of the Legal Advisor and the Office of the Law of the Sea negotiations would be involved in the clearance process.1

Another element was added to the SRV threat when, in early November 1978, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the Soviet Union and the SRV. This, as stated earlier in this chapter, prompted speculation regarding the future use of Cam Ranh Bay by the Soviet Union. The treaty followed a steady expansion of Russian support for Vietnam. Moscow had not only supplied Vietnam with arms for its war with Cambodia, but had also accused the Chinese of "aggression" in North Vietnam.2

Pertinent to the above was a 5 December 1978 DIA report that Vietnam had received its first major naval delivery from the Soviet Union. Two PETYA I-class small frigates, each towed by a merchant tug, had arrived off Da Nang. A Japanese sighting on 22 November indicated that the two vessels were equipped with only three anti-submarine warfare torpedo tubes vice the normal bank of five on Soviet naval vessels of the same class. If the frigates remained in Vietnam, reported the DIA, they would be the largest warships in Hanoi's inventory, and their acquisition substantially improved the capability of the SRV to patrol its long coastline and to enforce claims to its territorial waters.3

It wasn't until 14 December that the substance of the DIA report was published in a Tokyo newspaper quoting Japanese government sources. The Tokyo paper stated that the Soviet Union had supplied two 1,000-ton escort ships to its new Asian ally as an integral part of their military alliance. The newspaper stated that the turnover of the two PETYA-class escort vessels was the

1. JCS 5237/1101222Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited CINCPAC 022211Z Mar 78; SECSTATE 72077/2114222Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. DIA 2657/050526Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 4 Dec 98.
first indication of bilateral cooperation in naval operations. Citing "Japanese defense planners," the newspaper speculated that this could eventually lead to the development of the former coastal base at Cam Ranh Bay by the Soviets as their key naval station in Southeast Asia. The newspaper quoted "Japanese government sources" as stating that American military experts believed that construction of a refueling depot was underway at Cam Ranh Bay.¹

¹. CINCPAC 162326Z Dec 78 ( ), DECL 16 Dec 86.
SECRET

SECTION VII--THE ANZUS-INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Neither Australia nor New Zealand faced any immediate threat to national security from external or internal sources. However, both nations were concerned that the Soviet Navy could threaten vital SLOC from the Persian Gulf. Whether this concern by the ANZUS Treaty partners of the United States was justified depended to some extent on whether the ANZUS nations considered France to be an ally. A May 1978 IPAC paper on the Indian Ocean naval presence revealed that France maintained 11 combatant ships in the Indian Ocean, the United States maintained three, and Indonesia two. In contrast, the average number of combatant ships maintained in the Indian Ocean by the Soviet Union was ten. Obviously, if France were not considered to be an ally of the ANZUS countries, and considering the limited capability of the two Indonesian vessels, the Soviet threat of ten combatants against the three of the United States was a threat to the SLOC. Australia occasionally deployed submarines to the Indian Ocean, and there were also periodic deployments to the Indian Ocean by elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.1

As previously discussed in this chapter, after the expulsion of Soviet military forces from Somalia in November 1977, the floating drydock at Berbera was moved to Aden in South Yemen and subsequently to Dehalak Island, Ethiopia. In addition to the port facilities in Ethiopia, the Soviet Navy also used ports in Iraq and South Yemen. Shipyard facilities were available for the repair of Soviet auxiliaries at Singapore, bunkering rights were available at Port Louis in Mauritius and anchorage and buoy areas were used in Socotra, Guardafui, the Chagos Archipelago, Coetivy, the Arab Shoals, and South Yemen.2

1. IPAC Point Paper, 22 May 78 (C), Subj: Threat Assessment to ANZUS (U), XGDS-2, REVW 22 May 98; IPAC Point Paper, 22 May 78 (C/NOFORN), Subj: Indian Ocean Naval Presence and Force Levels (U), GDS-84.
2. IPAC Point Paper, 11 Oct 78 (S), Subj: Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean (U), GDS-84.
# COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

## USSR

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</table>

### PERSONNEL: 540,000**

* Includes Transcaucasian and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.

** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PA) and coastal defense forces; (b) ground forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground forces and support elements of the air force; (d) Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (32,250 and 4,750).

## NORTH KOREA

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<td>Infantry Regiments (Reinforced)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher Regiments</td>
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<td>Armor Regiments</td>
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<td>Artillery Regiments</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290mm Howitzers</td>
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</table>

### PERSONNEL (Army): 3,682,000**

* 21 infantry divisions and 1 motorized infantry division are being mechanized. Ongoing mechanization of North Korean Ground Forces is expected to result in a substantial increase of strength.

## NORTH KOREA — PERSONNEL

### CURRENT ESTIMATED STRENGTH

| MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES | 460,000 |
| PERMANENT MILITARY FORCES | 380,000 |

## CHINA

### INFANTRY DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>115</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/artillery</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank</td>
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<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
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<td>Armored Division</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne/Division</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne/Parachute Division</td>
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<td>Border Defense/Division</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garrison Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Division</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railway Engineer Division</td>
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### PERSONNEL (Army): 3,682,000**

* Includes two divisions used for non-military economic activities.

## VIETNAM

### REGULAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>28</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Regiments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Infantry Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Regiments</td>
<td>13</td>
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</table>

### MILITIA

Class I — Full-time militia members armed with semi-automatic weapons and medium caliber artillery weapons.

### SECURITY FORCES

Armed Public Security Forces: 16,500

### PERSONNEL

Regular Army: 850,000-900,000

Militia — estimated to consist of 18 million people's militia, self-defense forces and three million reserve forces.

### VIETNAM

* Includes two divisions used for non-military economic activities.

** Includes two independent regiments in Laos.

*** Includes two engineer regiments in Laos.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 53.

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>LONG RANGE ATTACK</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>306</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>31,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>1,575</td>
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</table>

**NOTE:** Figures in parentheses indicate additional units in reserve.

a. Many Vietnamese units believed to be immeasurable.
b. Included in Auxiliary Craft.
c. Includes about 16,000 LT.
d. Includes personnel in Naval Aviation, Naval Industry, and Coastal Defense.
e. Does not include 30,000 personnel of Naval Air Force.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 55.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
## SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
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<td>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighters (All Weather)</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,326</td>
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<td>Jet Fighters (Mg Weather)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Fighters (Frontline)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Light Bomber (Medium Range)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Jet Medium Bomber (Upper Range)</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Medium Bomber</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>126</td>
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<td>Jet Heavy Bomber (Long Range)</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Jet Transport</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utility Miscellaneous</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,277</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>502</td>
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</table>

**SUPPORT AIRCRAFT**

|          | 76 | 2 | 117 | 14 | 218 | 187 | 856 |
| Jet Transport | 3 | 2 | 20 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Jet Transport | 11 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Jet Transport | 11 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Jet Transport | 11 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Jet Transport | 11 | 2 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Helicopter: Admmis Transport | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Utility Miscellaneous | 30 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Helicopter | 10 | 2 | 144 | 22 | 27 | 192 |
| TOTAL | 1,186 | 56 | 2,311 | 218 | 175 | 1,558 | 5,000 |

TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT: 2,277 + 3,345 = 5,622

TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT: 1,261 + 2,061 = 3,322

TOTAL GRAND TOTAL: 5,622 + 3,322 = 8,944

**PERSONNEL STRENGTHS**

- USAF: 140,000
- USA: 25,000
- USAF: 192,000
- USA: 10,000
- USAF: 34,000
- USA: 10,000
- USAF: 22,000
- USA: 10,000

**NOTES:**

1. Includes all combat and support aircraft in the Far East, Transalpin, and Central Asian Military Districts which are a threat to PAVN forces.
2. Includes all anti-aircraft and fighter aircraft, which are used in fighter, ground attack, and air defense roles. Coordinating center for the combat aircraft in the Pacific Theatres of Operations.
3. Combat Support Aircraft - All other aircraft assigned to operational units or support units. Includes all types of direct fire and support to PAVN forces.
4. Includes 88% of all fighter aircraft, and 90% of all support aircraft.
5. Includes 21% of all anti-aircraft aircraft, and 22% of all fighter aircraft.
6. Includes 80% of all combat aircraft, and 90% of all support aircraft.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 76, p. 58.

Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
### SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<th>LAUNCHERS</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRBM: 4</td>
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<td>MRBM: 0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>TOTAL: 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>239</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR**</td>
<td>SA-2: 50</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-3: 65</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SA-5: 18</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IRBM: 1</td>
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<td>50 - 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
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<td>MRBM: 10</td>
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<td>38 - 51</td>
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<td>UNK/VARIOUS 解读 Defensive</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
<td>SA-2: 129</td>
<td></td>
<td>510</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
<td>SA-2: 117</td>
<td></td>
<td>43 OCC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-3: 0</td>
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<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>SURFACE TO AIR</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-3: 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* East of 100°E (formerly listed as separate sites).
** Occupied sites East of 100°E.

1. SA-3 complexes may consist of 1 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.
2. Eight SA-3 complexes, 3 to 5 SA-2 sites may consist of 6 launchers.
3. Bunkers move between prepared sites, none of which is known to be outside the Haiphong, Phuoc Yen Triangle.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 60.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
CHAPTER III
PLANNING

SECTION I--NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 80 Posture Statement

Since 1973 the Chairman of the JCS had annually asked CINCPAC to provide input for his annual posture statement. On 15 September CINCPAC was advised that work had started for the FY 80 military statement for presentation to the Congress early in 1979. CINCPAC and the CINCs of all of the unified and specified commands were asked for their contributions to the development of "this very important document." CINCPAC was asked for the most current information and assessment related to the PACOM in areas of U.S. national security objectives supported, an assessment of challenges to U.S. security objectives in the PACOM, U.S. force capabilities to counter the challenges to U.S. security "today and for the near future," an assessment of present and near term risks, and other relevant subjects or considerations appropriate for inclusion in the Chairman's statement.

Contributions were requested and received from CINCPAC's component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. CINCPAC provided his response on 6 October, followed by a supplemental message on 13 October that addressed PACOM readiness capabilities and requirements, and on 14 October by a message that responded to a JCS request for the Admiral's personal views. These three messages are addressed in some detail in the material that follows.

In his message of 6 October, CINCPAC addressed the specific requests of the JCS. First, regarding U.S. national security objectives supported, CINCPAC noted that achievement of national security objectives required not only maintenance of the power balance in the Asia-Pacific area, but also maintenance of a world-wide power relationship favorable to the United States. Political and economic power must be used in concert with military posture to insure attainment of these objectives, and the will to use military power, when necessary, was the decisive factor.

With the forces presently assigned and the existing forward base structure, the PACOM could support the national security objectives of security

1. JCS 7225/152015Z Sep 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J5324 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 062330Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.

SECRETS

125
of the United States, deterrence of aggression, security of sea and air lines of communication, and protection of U.S. citizens, property, and interests abroad. "Force reductions beyond those already planned would significantly impair our capability to support those objectives, and would cause significant adverse political reactions in the Asia-Pacific area." To assure the physical security of the United States and maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific area, the PACOM maintained modern, ready, and well-positioned forces in the area. "However, continuous erosion of force levels has progressively degraded overall PACOM capabilities. PACOM is becoming increasingly dependent upon rapid augmentation to support in-theater units and assets." The key to the forward deployment strategy, CINCPAC continued, was maintenance of essential bases in the area. "Forward basing places PACOM forces in position to react quickly to potential military or political emergencies and thereby reduces likelihood of such emergencies. Forward basing also serves as buffer for Alaska, Hawaii, and CONUS and U.S. territories in event of conventional conflict." CINCPAC believed that the existing basing posture was the minimum threshold for supporting this security objective and sustaining forward deployment strategy. CINCPAC continued, "To deter aggression requires a clear and evident warfighting capability, and resolve to fight at any level of conflict. PACOM can support this objective only by maintaining a strong, credible, and visible military capability" in the Western Pacific. In peacetime, forward deployed PACOM forces signaled significant U.S. interest in the area, demonstrated U.S. resolve to honor its commitments, and permitted timely and flexible U.S. actions in periods of increased tension. Should deterrence fail, those forces provided an initial combat capability in the area and an increased number of options for early application of U.S. military power.

CINCPAC next provided an assessment of challenges to U.S. security objectives in the PACOM. These challenges are addressed in the chapter of this history concerned with "The Threat."

In the matter of PACOM force capabilities to counter challenges to U.S. security, CINCPAC commented on the "Swing Strategy." This subject is addressed in considerable detail elsewhere in this history.
CINCPAC noted that another example of a fundamental change was the balance of naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Soviets had steadily upgraded their sea control forces in both areas, and the Soviet Pacific Fleet was by this time the largest of all Soviet fleets. Additionally, it was likely that their new vertical/short take-off-and-land/antisubmarine warfare carrier and BACKFIRE bomber would join the Pacific Fleet beginning in 1980, significantly improving Soviet warfighting capabilities in the Pacific. In conventional NATO war, the Soviets could be expected to initiate action in the PACOM and provide the United States with a two-front problem. In the face of this growing Soviet threat, however, PACOM force levels had declined markedly.
CINCPAC next provided his assessment of present and near-term risks. He noted that existing military strategy guidance was almost exclusively defensive in nature, and limited offensive guidance was given for PACOM forces in case of a conventional worldwide war with the USSR and its allies. The guidance did not provide an assessment of Soviet vulnerabilities along the extensive sea and land frontiers that the Soviet forces would have to protect in a global conflict with the United States. As a result, CINCPAC said, "it fails to identify worldwide pressure points which could be exploited by U.S. forces outside the NATO area to complicate Soviet defensive planning, reduce the threat to NATO by fixing Soviet forces, compel inefficient utilization of Soviet resources, and gain strategic advantage for the United States. Of specific concern to the PACOM, CINCPAC said, was the failure to recognize the advantages that offensive action against the Soviet forces in the Western Pacific and East Asia could produce in a global conflict with the USSR. Additionally, U.S. control of the Western Pacific and early offensive action to impose major attrition on Soviet naval and air capabilities in the Far East would significantly affect the perceptions of Chinese and Japanese leaders."

Regarding a two-ocean capability, CINCPAC noted that the United States required a capability to operate in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to execute the strategy in a conventional worldwide war with the USSR and its allies. In such a war, existing U.S. forces could control the North Atlantic sea lines of communication to Europe, but only after serious initial losses to U.S. and allied shipping. An added risk of such a war was that U.S. naval forces in the Pacific would be insufficient to defend the minimum flow of essential shipping in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf oil lines of communication, as well as provide protection for Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. bases in the Pacific.

In the matter of concurrent aggression, the lack of Sino-Soviet reconciliation did not mean that the possibility of simultaneous armed conflict with both countries should be ignored in force planning. "Either one might take advantage of preoccupation of the U.S. in war with the other." U.S. forces were so structured that such an occurrence could result in serious military risks involved with redeployment of some PACOM forces to Europe. Accordingly, the capability of U.S. forces to respond to concurrent aggression without strong dependence on the use of nuclear weapons "must continue to be assessed and associated risks identified."
Regarding resource competition, CINCPAC said that military strategy guidance was also the legacy of the period of strictly ideological confrontation between East and West. "Both sides have resisted numerous temptations to go to war over purely ideological differences and likelihood they will abandon this restraint is small." Conversely, the opposing sides had never had to deal with competition between themselves for a critical resource, such as oil. There was a real possibility that the United States (together with its industrial allies) and the Soviet Union might enter such a competition. Given the flexibility inherent in its capitalistic system, the United States, and its allies, would have an advantage over the USSR. The unwieldy Soviet system might not adapt to international competition, making recourse to military aggression or active subversion in oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf an attractive alternative.

CINCPAC believed that reliance on Atlantic Ocean lines of communication to move forces needed in the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war constituted a risk. He noted that the availability of immediate naval reinforcements from the Pacific essential to protection of those lines jeopardized the successful execution of U.S. military strategy. He believed that efforts must be made to improve the security of those lines of communication, reduce their vulnerability, and reduce reliance on them during the initial stages of a war in Europe. He further believed that increased emphasis should be given to the forward deployment of additional forces in peacetime, increasing the pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets and pre-positioning war reserve stocks, and improving the defense of lines of communication to and over Europe.

CINCPAC addressed Asian perceptions of U.S. activities. He said that maintenance of U.S. control of the Western Pacific and early offensive action to impose major attrition on Soviet naval and air capabilities in the Far East would significantly affect perceptions of the leadership of the People's Republic of China and Japan.
force levels would increase adverse political reactions in Asia, since, from the Asian perspective, the United States would be "abandoning Asia."

CINCPAC commented on Soviet naval growth, noting that the continued growth of strength indicated both the desire and capability to project military power abroad and compete, if not dominate, on a global scale. This growth constituted a new dimension of the threat to U.S. and allied interests that were at the time not being countered by the growth of U.S. forces. CINCPAC believed that the unanswered expansion of Soviet naval forces constituted a risk.

The last in the series of subjects the JCS had requested coverage on concerned other relevant considerations for the Chairman's posture statement. Addressing the strategic importance of the PACOM area, CINCPAC noted that sheer size and population gave the Asia-Pacific area a vital place in the political, economic, and military affairs of the world, and in the future well-being of the United States. Events of the preceding year had not upset the post-Vietnam equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific area, but the balance was dynamic and challenges to it arose. Among these were the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, spreading rifts among Communist states in Southeast Asia, Communist wooing of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Mauritius, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

CINCPAC noted that, unlike Western Europe, the Asia-Pacific region presented little semblance of homogeneity. Great disparities in national wealth and industrial development, ancient and unsettled disputes over land and sea boundaries, religious animosities, and communal frictions threatened to upset existing regional equilibrium through domestic uprisings or through local warfare. In either form, such conflict stood a strong chance of engaging rival interests of outside major powers.

Next, CINCPAC described the existing situation, both by country and by region. In Northeast Asia he noted that China had dashed any Soviet hopes for better relations after Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death and the stifling of the "Gang of Four."
An anti-Soviet tone also marked the Sino-Japanese treaty. The Soviets reacted in the only way readily available to them: military shows of force to the north of Japan. Despite strong objections from China and North Korea, Japan and the Republic of Korea ratified an agreement on exploiting continental shelf areas to which all four lay claim. Tension over offshore rights in Northeast Asia fitted the regionwide pattern of potential conflict over this issue.

In Southeast Asia the oil issue was latent in the South China Sea, but it might eventually embroil the Philippines, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Taiwan, as well as China. At this time, however, the falling out among the Communist states dominated the Southeast Asian scene.

In the Southwest Pacific, Australia and New Zealand continued to contribute to Southeast Asian security through their defense arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore. Within the ANZUS alliance they had placed added stress on the value not only of training exchanges and interoperability, but also on contingency cooperation in the field of logistics. Their support for new and essentially defenseless Pacific Island states had helped keep the feared Soviet and Chinese penetration of the area at the level of small-scale economic projects.

Among all of the Asia-Pacific regions, South Asia appeared to be the least stable. Measured steps toward full diplomatic relations and possible border talks between India and China were more than offset by the shakiness of the martial law regime in Pakistan and the still-unpredictable effects of the pro-Soviet coup d'état in Afghanistan. New Afghan leaders faced religious and tribal opposition, and their own hold on power was uncertain. To seat themselves more firmly, they might attempt to export such unrest to Pakistan, and possibly Iran.

In Northeast Asia, which for the purposes of the regional appraisal consisted of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, a political-military realignment could significantly alter the global power balance. Local and external powers competed in the area for political, economic, and military influence. The USSR supported North Korea to further Soviet influence and to preclude Chinese gains. China sought greater regional influence at Soviet expense and considered a North Korea-China alliance essential. U.S. force withdrawals from Taiwan and planned withdrawals of ground combat forces from Korea had placed the responsibility for ground defense of those two coun-
tries, while the United States provided the required air, naval, and logistic support.

CINCPAC then expanded on this regional appraisal with specific information about the countries of that region, a practice he followed throughout this part of his message to the Chairman.

Next he discussed the Southeast Asia region, which, for the purposes of this message, consisted of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos. He noted that the People's Republic of China was attempting to counter Soviet moves in the region as both countries continued to vie for influence in the area. Countries of that region were important to U.S. security interests because of their proximity to vital sea lines of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and because they had abundant natural resources. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, he continued, had emerged as an important regional organization whose corporate success had become a major factor in the foreign policies of member nations.

The region of Oceania consisted of Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji, Western Samoa, and other South Pacific islands. CINCPAC believed that increased efforts by Australia to guide and assist nations in Asia and the Southwest Pacific should be encouraged. Australia offered alternatives for forward U.S. bases, communications, and training areas. New Zealand, it was believed, should also be encouraged to continue to play an active role in the Southwest Pacific.

The South Asia-Indian Ocean region consisted of India, Pakistan, and Diego Garcia. South Asia was important to the United States because of its common borders with China, its proximity to the volatile and oil-rich Middle East, its important natural resources, and its facilities that could support forces used to control adjacent Indian Ocean lines of communication. The Indian Ocean's strategic importance stemmed from the lines of communication that transited the area and the several littoral and small island states that could support U.S. military operations in the region. Access to or denial of the lines of communication in this area also impacted directly on the vitaly important Atlantic-Mediterranean lines of communication to the Mid-East.
Lastly, CINCPAC provided his projection for the near future. He said:

Likelihood of conflicts involving US security interests, as well as form and outcome of such conflicts, will depend in large measure upon degree to which the US and its allies maintain credible military capability and clear national determination to apply that capability throughout spectrum of potential conflicts.

...One critical factor in stability of Asia-Pacific region is perception of US military power and resolve. Throughout region, it is perceived security interest and commitment of the US that is absolutely necessary for continued atmosphere of security. Our presence is perceived as stabilizing influence and necessary balance to Soviet Union. That perception of balance may give Chinese option of deferring achievement of capability to project their military power over great distances. Without this balance it is also possible that PRC would be forced to consider less hostile stance or even rapprochement with Soviets. We will continue to strive for peaceful evolution and stability in region. These objectives can be attained if the US maintains balanced political, economic, and military position of strength and resolve.

...For the future, Pacific-Asian area will continue to be aware of dynamic change and unpredictable events to which the US economic, political and security interests will remain inextricably tied to events in this vast region. In view of increasing Soviet threat in PACOM and expanded role of our air and naval force in underwriting US commitments to defense of our allies, demands on PACOM forces will increase. Our ability to decisively and confidently meet future challenges in PACOM will depend, in large measure, on maintenance of combat ready, forward deployed US forces throughout the area.

PACOM Readiness Capabilities and Requirements

(U) In a supplemental message of 13 October CINCPAC provided information on PACOM readiness capabilities and requirements, this also for use in the

1. Ibid.
JCS Chairman's FY 80 posture statement.

(8) CINCPAC's overview was as follows:¹

...While individual unit readiness has gradually improved since 1975, continuous erosion of force levels has progressively degraded overall PACOM capabilities. At this time, when potential adversaries are strengthening their theater forces, PACOM has become increasingly dependent upon rapid augmentation of CONUS-based combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. Consider it essential to maintain force levels and mix in PACOM sufficient to execute national military strategy in conventional worldwide war with Soviets and to rapidly react to less intense crises and contingencies in theater.

(8) CINCPAC outlined the readiness of Army forces and then listed significant actions he thought would improve the PACOM Army force posture. These included reestablishing the Army component command to CINCPAC, increasing the strength of the 25th Infantry Division to three active brigades and reorienting it with a mission to be prepared to reinforce in Korea, developing new and improved electronic warfare capabilities, and upgrading communications systems in Korea.

(8) CINCPAC then listed significant actions to improve the PACOM Air Force posture. These included increasing numbers of aircraft to meet expanding mission requirements and accelerating development and procurement of more advanced weapons and munitions.

(8) CINCPAC noted that overall fleet capabilities had continued to improve over the previous year. Improvements were attributed to the steady introduction of new weapons, sensors, and platforms, the soundness of innovative tactical

¹. CINCPAC 130644Z Oct 78 (8), GDS-86.
concepts, and the high state of readiness of deployed amphibious forces, among other things. His list of other needed improvements included additional conventional munitions stockpiles to support war plans, retention of experienced personnel possessing scarce technical expertise, and various improvements in ships and capabilities. He noted that the PACOM naval force capability to counter the Soviet naval threat was constrained by equipment age and inadequate parts support; funding for ship overhauls, new construction, rework and procurement of aviation components; and qualitative and quantitative weapon deficiencies.

(S/NOFORN) Several of CINCPAC's comments in the field of logistics concerned pre-positioned war reserve stocks. He cited other problems with port capability and transfer authority of U.S. stocks to the ROK. He listed communications requirements.

(C) CINCPAC said that military personnel remained the key element in fulfilling assigned missions and tasks, and that the quality, ability, motivation, and dedication of PACOM personnel continued to increase. "Our main concern centers on retention of our highly qualified technicians and leaders through complete Service careers. Existing shortages of supervisory enlisted personnel adversely affect our capabilities in areas of maintenance, training and operations, thus degrading readiness. Herculean task of significantly increasing retention requires full support and command attention at all echelons commencing with our Congressional leaders."

(S) Exercises continued to play a key role in U.S. involvement throughout the PACOM. They provided an essential vehicle of demonstration of our political intentions and military capabilities.

(S/NOFORN) In the matter of mobility of PACOM forces, the shortage of amphibious shipping continued, and the shortage of airlift forces "reduces our capability to respond quickly to contingencies in the PACOM."1

Personal Views

(U) The JCS had also requested Admiral Weisner's personal views for consideration in preparation of the Chairman's FY 80 posture statement. These were provided on 14 October.2

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 140019Z Oct 78 (EX) (S), GDS-86; J5324 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
In an opening general statement, the Admiral noted that while addressing the international environment and U.S. military strategy, he believed that it was most important that the posture statement emphasize the global dimension of the Soviet challenge to U.S. security. He elaborated that he meant global in the sense of both peacetime competition for international influence, and wartime application of military power.

In the matter of force posture, he believed that efforts to counter the growing Soviet threat in the PACOM deserved the highest consideration by national leadership. He said that it was critical that the PACOM maintain its forward deployed forces at no less than the existing level and retain the capability to rapidly augment those forces. He further stated that any increase in the force level would be viewed as a positive commitment by the United States and would go a long way toward bolstering the declining confidence of U.S. Asian allies.

Regarding PACOM base posture, CINCPAC said that the PACOM ability to support U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and successfully carry out the many and varied tasks assigned, depended, to a large extent, on the maintenance of a viable U.S. forward-basing structure in the Pacific.

In discussing pre-positioned war reserve stocks, CINCPAC said that sufficient in-place war materials represented an essential part of the PACOM equation for protection of U.S. security interests in the Pacific. "As you know," he told the Chairman, "we are currently faced with certain shortages which could seriously affect our ability to generate and employ our forces in response to a contingency." He then highlighted certain of those shortages.

Regarding logistics readiness, CINCPAC advised that a recent down trend in PACAF tactical forces had resulted from increased and new authorizations to the war reserve spares kits and base level spares support listing. Trends for other type forces were generally steady at acceptable levels, but the data on which the trends were based did not fully consider the chronic shortages in pre-positioned war reserve materiel.

Admiral Weisner, once again, provided his thoughts on the "Swing Strategy," which was addressed both in his basic contribution to the posture statement and in considerable detail elsewhere in this history. Here he noted that the importance of early offensive action by the United States in the Pacific following the outbreak of war with the USSR "cannot be overemphasized."

Increasing competition for the world's energy resources was of particular importance to the United States in view of the Free World's dependence
on the continued flow of Mid-East oil, and Soviet moves to expand their influence in Africa and the Middle East, moves that could directly challenge U.S. access to this vital resource. The Admiral provided several actions that the United States might pursue to assist in offsetting this Soviet influence.

(U) CINCPAC's closing remarks are quoted:

In nearly every area of military strength there has been relative decline over the years in relation to Soviet Union. This is not to suggest that there have been no improvements in PACOM's forces and capabilities. Indeed, programs JCS has supported in past, and moneys provided have strengthened our military capabilities. Modest increases in combat forces and in readiness, development of several major weapon systems and other improvements all contribute to our military power. However, in light of extensive growth in military capabilities of Soviet Union, it is questionable whether what has been done is enough to assure security and well-being of our country in coming years. Without adequate security, other necessary and desirable programs to meet national needs cannot be successfully conducted.

(S) CINCPAC's philosophy as expressed in his contributions to the Chairman's posture statement received support through State Department channels in November. The U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo advised the Department in Washington that he hoped that those involved in preparation of the statements of the Chairman and also of the Secretary of Defense, and other public statements to the Congress on U.S. military posture and plans, would "keep in mind the importance of presenting such information in manner which will enhance confidence of US reliability and staying power in this part of the world." He reminded of the interpretation by the Japanese of the previous year's posture statement that the Pacific was of vastly lower military importance than NATO to the United States.

1. Ibid.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 21089/300310Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84.
The Ambassador in Manila endorsed the concerns of the Ambassador in Tokyo. He advised that President Marcos sought clarification of U.S. intentions in the region during the visit of a U.S. congressional delegation in November. He strongly recommended that appropriate reference be made to the Philippines in the various major policy reports, such as the Chairman's posture statement. He noted that it had been surprising, because of the major U.S. military facilities in the Philippines, that that country had not been mentioned once in the Secretary of Defense's 375-page annual report released in January 1978.1

The Chairman's posture statement was expected to be released in 1979.

Consolidated Guidance

Consolidated Guidance was the name of a new planning document designed to replace the former Defense Guidance, Planning and Programming Guidance, and Fiscal Guidance. The 1978 Consolidated Guidance was to serve as a guide to the Services and Defense Department agencies in preparation of the FY 80-84 Program Objective Memorandums. It served as an authoritative statement of the fundamental issues and rationale underlying the defense program, and encouraged debate and dialogue on critical national security issues. The new document was designed to permit earlier Presidential involvement and enhance the leadership of the Secretary of Defense by providing earlier detailed fiscal and programming guidance. On 18 January 1978 the JCS requested PACOM comments on the draft Consolidated Guidance FY 80-84, indicating that PACOM comments would be used in the preparation of the JCS response to the Secretary of Defense. The response was to be considered by the Secretary in revising the Consolidated Guidance before submitting it to the President. The PACOM views were forwarded to the JCS on 1 February and CINCPAC provided his personal views a few days later.2

The PACOM reply of 1 February noted that the Consolidated Guidance was a major departure from the previous approach to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. In the past the Defense Guidance had provided a relatively straightforward compilation of fundamental U.S. security policy, defense strategy, and related planning guidance. It represented an important element in shaping not only programming guidance but also contingency planning tasks. It also provided a meaningful defense policy baseline to measure the risk level associated with resource-constrained forces and programs. Those fundamental defense objectives and strategy were less clearly defined in the

1. AMEMB Manila 21577/060432Z Dec 78 (S), ADS 12/4/83.
2. J5324 HistSums Jan, Feb 78 (S), GDS-88.
new draft and in some cases seemed to be secondary to programming and fiscal objectives. "Such an approach, over time, could result in fundamental U.S. defense policy being shaped by budgetary objectives rather than basic U.S. security interests and defense imperatives."1

CINCPAC noted that there should have been concise discussions concerning the international environment, regional analyses, and assessment of the threat to the U.S. security interests worldwide, and regional objectives and policies. Security assistance, an element of U.S. foreign policy and Defense programs, was not mentioned. On the other hand, some information on the Services was too specific, encroaching upon Service responsibilities and prerogatives.

The entire document was NATO oriented with little recognition of U.S. worldwide requirements. With its narrow focus on the Central Front, it was unduly restrictive in its definition of U.S. interests and objectives in what would, in fact, be a worldwide war with the Soviet Union.

The Guidance did not provide a description of the desired outcome of a global war with the Soviet Union or the totality of military objectives in such a war.

The PACOM noted that throughout the Guidance the emphasis was placed on what could be done with programmed forces without reference to the prior question of whether those forces were adequate for the protection of vital national interests, and capable of coping with the totality of Soviet military power.

The Swing Strategy was addressed in some detail and the PACOM recommended that it be reviewed closely.2

1. CINCPAC 010311Z Feb 78 (N), GDS-86.
2. Ibid. The Swing Strategy is discussed in considerable detail elsewhere in this History.
On 10 February the Admiral forwarded his personal views on the draft
Consolidated Guidance. He noted first that he supported the comments that had
been prepared and forwarded by his staff. He said that the Guidance did not
provide an adequate basis for the development of a defense program. His funda-
mental concerns were that in an effort to replace three documents with one,
there was too much under one cover, and it lacked the quality of the three
documents to be replaced. He said that dollars dictated strategy and force
structure without adequate attention to requirements, and the Guidance was too
heavily oriented toward Europe. He recognized that the goals of Consolidated
Guidance included earlier Presidential involvement and enhancement of the
Secretary of Defense's leadership, but the draft as a means to achieve those
ends might embody serious risks.

The Guidance emphasized what could be done with programmed forces
without reference to whether those forces were adequate to protect vital U.S.
security interests or to cope with Soviet military capabilities. It tended to
postulate a passive or defensive role for U.S. forces. This could result in
structuring of the General Purpose Forces in a manner that would impede offen-
sive employment of U.S. forces and cede the initiative to the USSR.

The Guidance assumed that Soviet actions would focus essentially on
Central Europe. The Admiral said that it was highly unlikely, however, that
other vital U.S. worldwide interests would not be targeted.

He noted that earlier involvement by the President and Secretary of
Defense in defense issues logically would lead to earlier top-level guidance.
The corollary, however, was that those officials might make detailed program
decisions before key defense issues were thoroughly examined by the Services
and without a "good fix" on what the impact might be. The planning process,
he said, had been reversed. "Key inputs are generated from the top rather
than from the working level, which virtually guarantees that decisions will be
made without benefit of best available information."

1. J5324 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 100427Z Feb 78 (EX) (S), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
...Our Consolidated Guidance, above all, should be reassuring to our allies and disconcerting to our potential adversaries, not the other way around. Most important, it should be based on the best information and professional expertise available, and should provide clear guidance that will lead ultimately to a defense posture that will protect our security interests everywhere.

1. J5327 HstSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85.
2. CINCPAC 2304052 Dec 78 (S)(EX), DECL 20 DEC 84.
3. Ibid.
SECRET

Defense Policy Guidance

(U) In August the Secretary of Defense tasked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (a newly-created position) to draft defense policy guidance that would initiate and guide the FY 81 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System/Consolidated Guidance cycle. The JCS advised CINCPAC that a small team from the Under Secretary's office and the Joint Staff would visit the PACOM to get CINCPAC's views on military strategies required to achieve the PACOM's assigned objectives, and CINCPAC's assessment of how PACOM operational capabilities, on hand and programmed, supported those strategies.

(U) The items discussed during the 28-29 August visit included the purpose of defense planning guidance, strategic realities, military strategies and operational requirements, priorities, policy guidance for planning and programming, and validation-verification requirements.

(U) During that visit the team provided CINCPAC with a copy of the outline on Defense Policy Guidance under preparation and requested his comments. CINCPAC welcomed the opportunity, indicating that the outline was a good starter in translating national security goals and objectives into policy and strategy to guide the development of programs in the Consolidated Guidance. CINCPAC said that although it addressed NATO conflict, it failed to recognize the fact that NATO war was global war. He said, "It is unlikely that maritime aspects of NATO war would be confined to Atlantic/Mediterranean areas. Soviets would probably initiate actions in PACOM to provide the U.S. with a two-front problem. Recent trends in Soviet conventional capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S. suggest that they may have a better capability to initiate and sustain a two-front operation than the U.S."

(U) Just as he had for the outline, the Secretary tasked the Under Secretary of Policy to develop the Draft Defense Policy Guidance (DDPG), the major report that would initiate and guide the FY 81 cycle. Many of CINCPAC's comments on the DDPG, which were provided on 27 November, were similar to those he had provided earlier regarding the draft Consolidated Guidance. 4

1. J5324 HistSum Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 7535/251716Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. J5324 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 131823Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. J5324 HistSum Nov 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86, Extended by CINCPAC 272054Z Nov 78 for reason 2-301c(6); CINCPAC 272054Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
CINCPAC said that the DDPG did not yet provide a basis for translating broad national goals and objectives into policy and strategy statements sufficiently specific to guide the initiation and development of Consolidated Guidance. The first serious shortcoming was the absence of a reasoned and comprehensive description of defense policy and military strategy as a basis for planning or for evaluating and selecting program alternatives that would shape future defense posture. The result was that policy and strategy tended to become secondary to fiscal considerations. The revised Draft Consolidated Guidance had provided a relatively straightforward compilation of fundamental U.S. security objectives, defense strategy, and related planning guidance. Those fundamental objectives were less clearly defined in the DDPG.

The PACOM believed that national objectives and policy deserved more explicit coverage. For example, other enduring national security objectives were to protect U.S. citizens, property, and interests abroad; to maintain U.S. access to world markets and resources; to promote stability in the international environment; to maintain the United States and its friends and allies free from coercion; and to achieve U.S. objectives peacefully, if possible.

He noted that the DDPG was almost exclusively NATO oriented, with little recognition of U.S. worldwide requirements. It was unduly restrictive in its definition of U.S. security interests and objectives in meeting the Soviet threat in the PACOM. The focus on the outcome of a single theater risked distorting planning and provided no basis for assurance that the overall strategic balance would be favorable to U.S. security interests.

CINCPAC said that the DDPG was interspersed with inconsistencies that detracted from its stated purpose of providing positive guidance for development of the Consolidated Guidance. He provided some examples.

The DDPG had implicitly altered or obscured existing military strategy without providing an explicit statement identifying changes for high-level consideration. In order to maintain a favorable worldwide power relationship, the United States needed adequate military strength to use in conjunction with its allies, to prevent coercion, and to deter aggression at all levels of conflict.

The DDPG was almost exclusively defensive in nature and failed to follow through on the idea of the global nature of the Soviet threat; it did not provide an adequate description of the desired outcome of global war with the USSR. Emphasis was on what could be done with programmed forces without reference to whether those forces were adequate for protection of U.S. security objectives, and capable of coping with the totality of Soviet military power.
Of specific concern was the failure to recognize the advantages that offensive action against Soviet forces in the Western Pacific and East Asia could produce in a global war with the Soviets. The importance of the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Pacific sea lines of communication had been underplayed.

The DDPG stated that although U.S. programming actions for short and mid-terms would attempt to introduce most advanced technologies to give the United States qualitative improvements, where possible, significant changes in overall force levels should not be assumed. This suggested that the Soviet threat, which was steadily growing quantitatively as well as improving qualitatively, would only be met with qualitative improvements on the U.S. side. This established a severe constraint on U.S. force planning that was likely to prevent development of adequate defense within the bounds of acceptable risk, and conflicted with the basic U.S. objective of maintaining the balance that was stated in the DDPG.

In discussing maritime superiority, the DDPG did not convey clearly defined policy, but rather addressed various options for consideration. It stated, "We need to examine our views on maritime policy with overall objective of maintaining margin of maritime superiority over Soviet Union." The DDPG, it was believed, should give specific recognition that the principle of maritime superiority must include retention and improvement of offensive capabilities of U.S. naval forces because those capabilities provided a most effective contribution to deterrence.

The discussion of General Purpose Forces for simultaneous major and minor contingencies established the importance of not being forced to abandon a minor non-NATO contingency should NATO war occur. It was equally important, CINCPAC believed, that, if NATO-Warsaw Pact war commenced first, forces identified for non-NATO contingencies not be deployed to NATO.

In summary, the DDPG was a "starter" dealing with complex defense issues with potentially far-reaching implications. As such, the document, as well as specific defense policy guidance therein, required considerable and continuing review and adjustment.

Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis

(U) There were a number of changes in the titles of documents in the Joint Program for Planning in 1978. The former Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,

1. Ibid.
Volumes I and II, was to be replaced by a Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). This continued to be the JCS mid-range planning vehicle and a major document in military planning. It was planned to publish the JSPD 60 days prior to publication of the draft Consolidated Guidance. (Consolidated Guidance was the new name for the national-level paper that replaced the former Defense Guidance and Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum.) The JSPD was to provide JCS advice on military strategy; a summary of the JCS planning force levels that could successfully execute, with reasonable assurance, the approved strategy; and JCS views on the attainability of those forces. The planning forces would be used as a baseline against which to assess the capabilities and associated risks of the programmed force to execute the national military strategy. This assessment would provide the foundation for recommendations on force planning guidance and changes to the Consolidated Guidance.  

(U) The JSPD was derived from a two-part Supporting Analysis, which was an internal Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) document. Part I of the Supporting Analysis was reviewed annually and published biennially by 15 March, taking into consideration the most recently published Consolidated Guidance. It provided the Services and the CINCs with the guidance necessary for the development of force requirements, thus replacing JSOP II guidelines. Part II of the Supporting Analysis, with annexes, developed force and support levels for strategic, general purpose, allied and friendly, and support forces, and was published biennially, concurrently with the JSPD. In odd years both parts of the supporting analysis were reviewed and updated as necessary.

(U) These schedules were not always met. Prolonged development of Consolidated Guidance and modification of both the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the Joint Strategic Planning System had caused changes in the schedule for producing the JSPD for the period FY 81-88.  

(S) On 28 July 1978 the JCS informed CINCPAC that Part I of the JSPD Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) for FY 81-88 was approved on 5 July. They provided advance guidance to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands and the Service Chiefs for them to provide their recommendations. The CINCs would be asked to provide input on strategy. First, recommended changes to the national military strategy in terms of scope, geographic region, or additional considerations. Rationale was to include statements of risk where the strategy set forth in the draft Consolidated Guidance (then under study; see a detailed discussion regarding Consolidated Guidance elsewhere in this chapter) was deemed

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1. JCS 4929/220027Z Apr 78 (U). In early planning, the JSOP replacement was called the Joint Strategic Assessment Memorandum (JSAM), but this term was not adopted; the JSOP became the JSPD.
inadequate, unnecessarily specific, or representing a danger to the protection of U.S. interests worldwide. Secondly, they asked for major revisions or proposed alternate strategies to the stated national military strategy; these were to identify the implications of their adoption.¹

(U) CINCPAC considered the inputs from his component commanders and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group in the preparation of his reply, which was forwarded to the JCS on 21 August.²

CINCPAC first addressed global strategy, noting that the guidance was a legacy from a period in which nearly all Soviet forces had faced NATO. It ignored the fact that since the Sino-Soviet split [1963], the Soviets had perceived China as a threat and had massed 25 percent of their total forces along the Sino-Soviet border. By continuing to emphasize NATO's defense in Europe (against only those Soviet forces customarily located in Europe), the guidance did not consider the danger of NATO being confronted by the massive addition of fresh Soviet forces from the Far East. The rapid relocation of forces was becoming feasible because of improvements in the Soviet rail lines. The Soviets lacked only a political accommodation with China to be able to effect this critical force relocation. CINCPAC believed that U.S. strategy must influence China, especially in times of U.S.-Soviet crisis, to reject such Soviet demands for accommodation.

CINCPAC noted that the guidance was almost exclusively defensive in nature. Only limited offensive guidance was given for PACOM forces in the case of a conventional worldwide war with the USSR and its allies. Because it did not provide an assessment of Soviet vulnerabilities along the extensive sea and land frontiers that Soviet forces would have to protect in a a global conflict, the guidance failed to identify worldwide pressure points that could be exploited by U.S. forces outside the NATO area to complicate Soviet defensive planning, reduce the threat to NATO by fixing Soviet forces, compel inefficient utilization of Soviet resources, and gain strategic advantage for the United States.

The guidance did not fully recognize the desirability of the United States initiating offensive action against the USSR in the Pacific, in the event of a war starting only in Europe, forcing the Soviets into a two-front war.

In the matter of conventional worldwide conflict with the USSR and its allies, CINCPAC advised that he strongly concurred that sea lines of

1. JCS 5619/280244Z Jul 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 212020Z Aug 78 (S), XGDS-3; J5324 HistSum Aug 78 (S). GDS-86.
communication to Alaska and Hawaii should be afforded the same high priority of effort as the defense of North America, the NATO area, and sea lines of communication across the Atlantic. He noted that in previous editions of the JSOP the security of lines of communication to Alaska and Hawaii had not been given the same degree of priority as NATO and the sea lines of the Atlantic. CINCPAC believed that the United States required a two-ocean capability—in both the Atlantic and Pacific—to execute strategy in a war with the USSR. He also discussed support of NATO and the "Swing Strategy."

CINCPAC suggested that the capability of U.S. forces to respond to concurrent aggression, without the use of nuclear weapons, must continue to be assessed and associated risks identified.

CINCPAC also pointed out the danger of U.S.-Soviet competition for resources (such as oil) and suggested that the guidance should emphasize preparations to deter this type of conflict. CINCPAC then included a number of specific comments and recommendations in corrigendum format.1

Allied and Friendly Forces

In the old JSOP, Volume II, Book III had dealt with allied and friendly forces. The JSPDSA continued to address this subject. In the material that follows is a recapitulation of the PACOM experience in formulating input for this subject in recent years.2

In the period since October 1975 there had been a modification of CINCPAC responsibility in regard to Allied and Friendly Forces. The end result was that CINCPAC had been excused from responsibility for developing "Projected" forces. This became an exclusive function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. CINCPAC, however, was required to reinstate lists of Allied and Friendly Forces that could be considered in total force planning. In April 1978 CINCPAC had been further excused from reporting "In-Being" forces—the order of battle forces. These decisions had been made following controversies among the Services, the unified commanders, and the DIA in finalizing order of battle figures. The decision that DIA figures would prevail resulted in that agency alone being responsible for their development.3

1. Ibid.
2. J5314 HistSum Sep 78 (G), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.; See the chapter of this history devoted to The Threat for a further discussion of disagreements between the DIA and one of the Services concerning North Korea order of battle.
On 31 March the JCS outlined specific procedures to be followed. (Unified command input was required not later than 15 May.) The DIA was to task Defense Attache Offices for in-being and projected force structure data as part of a submission for the Joint Intelligence Estimate. Those DAOs were to provide a copy of their submissions to the DIA to the appropriate unified commander. For those countries requiring a recommended mid-range objective force level, unified commanders needed only to submit information on force structure and recommended mid-range objective forces. The terminology used by CINCPAC in the force structure input was to be the same as that in the DAO submission to the extent possible. During staffing of the FY 81-88 Allied and Friendly Forces planning document by the Services, the Defense agencies, and the Joint Staff, unified command representatives would have the opportunity to review and recommend changes to the "in-being" and "projected" force data in Washington, D.C.¹

With the cycle changes in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, an accelerated JSOP cycle (later JSPD) was required; actually the 1978 cycle was over three months earlier than previous cycles. An 8 February message from the JCS advised of the 15 May deadline and CINCPAC had to generate new development milestones and notify the Country Teams to begin JSOP preparation to meet the accelerated timetable. There was no time to wait for new guidelines from Washington, which were then projected for March. The CINCPAC Plans Directorate independently developed new guidelines based on those of the previous year. The JCS confirmed this approach a few days later.²

In part because of this short suspense and the long lead-time necessary for mailing the Secret JSOP extracts to the Country Teams, CINCPAC staff officers made quick trips to six selected PACOM countries to provide guidance clarification and JSOP preparation help, among other duties. Despite the short suspenses involved, all CINCPAC milestones were met and fully-coordinated CINCPAC input was forwarded to the JCS in advance of the suspense.³

Guidance from the JCS on the new JSPDSA at this time was piecemeal with considerable slippage. Because CINCPAC had accelerated to meet the 15 May suspense, most of the guidance was too late to be assimilated. For example, JCS guidance for the JSPDSA Part I was not received until August, three months later than it had been expected, and "In-Being" forces data had already been

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1. JCS 3731/317533Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; DIA 2525/131511Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. JCS 3787/080045Z Feb 78 (U) and 5217/110107Z Mar 78 (U); J5314 HistSum Sep 78.

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forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS when instructions were received to exclude them. All of this, of course, reflected the massive difficulties experienced in adapting the new JSPDSA to the accelerated PPBS cycle. It was anticipated that these difficulties would be largely resolved in future cycles.¹

(U) In late July a CINCPAC staff officer attended an action officers meeting at the JCS to review the initial draft of Part II, Book III of the JSPDSA for FY 81-88, following a review of the draft earlier by PACOM headquarters. All PACOM-recommended changes had been accepted by the JCS, the DIA, and the Service representatives, and were incorporated in a revised draft.

(Sha) The primary changes to CINCPAC's draft were the result of implementing new guidelines that had been developed subsequent to the PACOM submission. The Security Assistance Projection and almost all references to Security Assistance were deleted. Close editing had resulted in a more readable document specifically tailored to force planning and development. In that editorial process, some new terminology had been introduced, such as replacing the term Recommended Mid-Range Objectives with "Desired Force Levels (DFL)."

(Sha) In the matter of General Strategic Sensings, Malaysia had been moved from "Of Interest" to "Important Interest," in accordance with a CINCPAC request. Also, the Republic of China and Indonesia and Contiguous Waters had been raised from "Important Interest" to "Significant Interest." Afghanistan appeared for the first time in the "Of Interest" category.²

(U) On 16 August CINCPAC advised the JCS of areas of the JSPDSA Part I for FY 81-88 that required further clarification.³

(Sha) Also, informal exchanges between members of the CINCPAC staff and the Plans people in the JCS indicated that there would be substantive changes to Part I for the next planning cycle. CINCPAC, therefore, should not develop guidelines prior to receipt of this guidance. Informal coordination was expected to continue. In one matter, however, it had been decided that the projected force levels in the next cycle would be for 1989 instead of 1985, so that direct comparisons could be made between projected and desired force levels.⁴

1. J5314 HistSum Sep 78 (C), GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC 162235Z Aug 78 (Sha), GDS-84.
4. J5314 Memorandum for Record (Sha), GDS-86, 17 Aug 78, Subj: JSPDSA FY 82-89; J5314 HistSum Sep 78 (U).
On 14 October CINCPAC provided his views on the force planning guidance portion of the JSPDSA, Part I, for consideration in preparation of the following year's volume. He noted that the overall force guidance in Part I was basically sound, but he hoped the PPBS cycle would be sufficiently refined in future years to insure that Part I was published in advance of CINC suspenses. CINCPAC discussed the potential difficulty posed by the planning guidance for the development of allied forces. He noted that while the DIA would provide allied "in-being" and "projected" force levels, the unified commanders would develop the "desired" force levels. Information from the DIA would have to be provided in a more timely fashion by that agency than had been the case in recent years, however, if the CINCs were to have the necessary planning data to meet JCS suspenses. Also, it appeared that the CINCs would need to expand allied force planning to insure that logistics requirements were also considered as well as the host nation's support capabilities.\(^1\)

CINCPAC noted that the JSPDSA had expanded the scope of logistics assessments required by the unified commands related to "minimum risk" force planning. This logistics assessment, CINCPAC said, must also focus on requirements rather than be constrained to existing capabilities as derived from existing OPLANS. "Therefore, a whole new body of planning will have to be instituted by CINCs and component commands. The quality of this planning will be directly related to timeliness and thoroughness of tasking."

He noted that Part I for FY 81-88 had tasked several new excursions not previously considered. He thought that tasking to assess a direct Soviet combat involvement in a Korean conflict was questionable, and believed a more realistic scenario was one of Soviet logistics support to North Korea. In addition, that scenario was not addressed in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; he believed either the JSCP tasking should be changed or the scenario should be deleted from the JSPDSA.

He also noted that force planning guidance did not fully recognize the Soviet threat to Europe and the Pacific. "Significant improvements in Soviet internal lines of communication, particularly enhancement of Trans-Siberian and Baikal to Amur River rail lines, and qualitative and quantitative increase in Soviet commercial air fleet provide Soviets capability to rapidly redeploy large forces between Asia-Pacific and European theaters." Also, the Soviets had been steadily increasing their forces in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

With parity in strategic forces, maintaining superiority in conventional forces and control of strategic territory and bases became crucial during

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1. CINCPAC 140705Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
a conventional conflict. Existing force planning guidance did not address the strategic importance of the Aleutians and the contributions Aleutian bases made to potential surface, subsurface, and air operations against the Soviets in Northeast Asia. Seizure or destruction of U.S. Aleutian bases by the USSR would severely impact on the U.S. capability to counter Soviet naval and air operations in the Northern Pacific.

CINCPAC noted that the existing arrangement of the JSPDSA, Part I, incorporated force planning guidance for the JCS, the unified and specified commands, and the Services in one section. Also, force planning guidance for the development of "minimum risk forces" and "planning forces" (prudent risk) was interwoven throughout the guidance. CINCPAC recommended that the guidance section be restructured to separate "minimum risk" force planning guidance from "planning forces."

CINCPAC also made a number of specific comments regarding JSPDSA for FY 81-88. As of 31 December, however, the JCS had not yet approved that document.

**Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the near-term document in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System. It addressed the application of in-being forces and capabilities to tasks and contingencies. The JSCP constituted the annual JCS tasking of CINCPAC for certain plans and activities.

The annual review of the JSCP for FY 80 (Volumes I and II and Annexes B, C, and J) was completed and comments were forwarded to the JCS on 2 September. The comments had been requested by the JCS for consideration in their preparation of this document.

The major issue CINCPAC addressed was the "Swing Strategy." (This subject is discussed in much detail elsewhere in this chapter.) In accordance with Defense Guidance, the JSCP directed CINCPAC to prepare a complete plan for "Pacific Area Operations Countering USSR Aggression Worldwide." It also directed preparation of a Concept Plan to provide for PACOM defense and conduct of naval and air offensive operations in the Western Pacific to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities using only PACOM-assigned forces and assuming no requirement to redeploy forces in support of the Atlantic and European Commands. CINCPAC "strongly" believed the PACOM should

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1. Ibid.; J5311 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. J5222 HistSum Aug 78 (TS), XGDS-3; CINCPAC O221242Z Sep 78 (TS), XGDS-3.
be directed to develop a complete plan for "Pacific Area Operations Countering USSR Aggression Worldwide" under the assumption of no redeployment of major PACOM forces to the other two commands. The plan should include provisions for early offensive naval and air operations against Soviet Far East forces and bases. CINCPAC said his reasons included, first, that redeployment of PACOM forces to NATO would cause deployment forces to be lost to both theaters during transit, expose forces to transit losses, degrade PACOM capability to execute PACOM strategy, further jeopardize the capability to fulfill defense arrangements with U.S. allies, and contribute relatively little to either the European or Atlantic Command effort in the initial stages of a campaign in Europe compared to the contributions they could make in the PACOM area. Secondly, CINCPAC said that the USSR had a global military capability and could probably accept the risk of a two-front war and initiate engagement of PACOM forces. It was more than likely that the Soviets would encourage and support a North Korean attack against the Republic of Korea in an attempt to isolate Japan from its allies, and gain control of the Chinese seaward flanks. Deployment of PACOM forces to NATO would cede the Western Pacific to the Soviets and result in a post-war balance favorable to the USSR. CINCPAC continued that, in any event, U.S. actions in the PACOM should attempt to influence China to deny accommodation with the USSR during worldwide war, tying down Soviet forces along the border. Soviet Far East forces redeployed to the NATO area would decisively alter the area balance and would negate the impact of PACOM forces swinging there.

CINCPAC also proposed that the JSCP include specific tasking for the defense of the Aleutian Islands. He proposed that the JSCP state, "The defense of Hawaii, the approaches to Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands, and the LOC's connecting Hawaii and Alaska to the Continental United States will have first priority in PACOM." This proposal was to eliminate any potential confusion; Alaska, less the Aleutians, was outside the PACOM area. The CINC of the Aerospace Defense Command was tasked for the air defense of Alaska including the Aleutians. The CINC of the Readiness Command was tasked to provide joint contingency planning for the defense of Alaska other than aerospace defense. 1

Consolidated Guidance Study 8 and the Swing Strategy

At every opportunity for a number of years the CINCPACs in turn had pleaded with the Washington community to change the "Swing Strategy," a plan to redeploy significant numbers of PACOM forces, ships, and aircraft to

1. Ibid.
reinforce the European and Atlantic Commands in the event of a NATO war. This was perhaps the single most important subject addressed by CINCPAC in 1978, and it was addressed repeatedly and emphatically. One vehicle that brought it to special attention was a study by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs entitled, "Consolidated Guidance Study Number 8: Asia During a Worldwide Conventional War."

By way of background, the strategy had come into being in the immediate post-World War II environment, in which the United States and its European allies had become concerned with Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. The concept to deploy forces from the Pacific came into being in mid-1947, gained momentum in the 1950's, and in the 1960's resulted in JCS tasking in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for the PACOM to develop plans to support NATO requirements. At the end of World War II the leading trading partner of the United States was Western Europe, there was no energy crisis, China was the primary U.S. adversary in Asia, nearly all Soviet land and air forces faced NATO, and the U.S. Navy, which had 15 carriers in the Pacific, was virtually unchallenged. It was not illogical to develop a strategy to redeploy selected forces from the PACOM to support NATO requirements.¹

By 1978, however, the fundamental geopolitical, economic, and military situations had changed in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan was the leading U.S. overseas trading partner and trade with Korea had grown by 400 percent in the previous five years; there was similar growth in other PACOM countries. The region was the source of many critical raw materials imported by the United States (9 out of 11). The 1978 energy crisis had pointed out the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the Western industrialized nations and the potential vulnerability of oil sea lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to Soviet sea control forces. The USSR challenged U.S. security objectives worldwide. The split between the USSR and China had been a major contributor to the maintenance of a U.S.-USSR balance; by 1978 the Soviets were devoting from 25 to 33 percent of their military establishment to China. In conventional worldwide war, Soviet uncertainties over Chinese activities could inhibit the transfer of Soviet Far East forces and assets to the west. The balance of naval forces in the PACOM had changed markedly. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was the primary threat to PACOM forces and by 1978 it was the largest of the Soviet fleets; PACOM naval strength was down to six carriers.²

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2. Ibid.
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Availability of the Panama Canal was an important consideration, and would have significant impact on the arrival of PACOM forces to the Atlantic and Europe. The "Swing" would cause congestion problems with large numbers of merchant ships congregating at both ends of the canal, which caused problems of ship security and the delay of important cargo. Security of the canal for transit had become a major problem. If the canal was open, the transit time from the West Coast (at 15 knots) was 15 days to the Atlantic and 21 days to Europe. If the canal was closed, transit time at the same speed via Cape Horn would take 37 days to Europe. Via the Indian Ocean, the time was 54 days. From Hawaii, transit by the canal to Europe was 26 days; via Cape Horn it was 38 days. It took 8 hours for one ship to transit the canal; the daily capacity was approximately 30 ships.¹

In June 1978, in response to a JCS request, CINCPAC had commented on the importance of the canal and Latin America, which he described as of great importance to the United States. He considered a stable, friendly Latin America essential to the security of North America. The canal was of singular strategic significance to both the execution of PACOM contingency plans and for any plans supporting CINCLANT and CINCEUR.²

Back in October 1967 CINCPAC had commented to the JCS that while he had followed JCS guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that directed him to redeploy or plan for redeployment, he strongly recommended that permanently assigned PACOM forces remain in the theater to be available for all contingency situations and that the JSCP should be revised accordingly. He repeated this position frequently. The term "Swing Strategy" first surfaced in 1970 in a study forwarded by the JCS to CINCPAC for comment.

¹ Ibid.
² CINCPAC 190503Z Jul 78 [TS], GDS-86.
In July 1978 the Chairman of the JCS received a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense concerning the U.S. response to the 1978 NATO Defense Planning Review Questionnaire (DPQ). The Secretary said he considered the 1978 proposed response a particularly good effort, and with one exception he had approved it for formal coordination with the State Department and submission to the White House. The "one exception" was that he could not agree with the proposed redesignation of PACOM and Mid-East Force units from "assigned" to "earmarked." He said that the matter of the Swing Strategy was under study, but to announce such a change in the absence of such a decision could provoke a political reaction by European allies that could be highly damaging in light of NATO's sensitivity to the question of U.S. Navy force posture and planning. If the United States was intent on making such a change, "we should ensure as best we can that the rationale is understood by our Allies before they are presented with a decision. This need for such an approach to the question is reinforced by the fact that no such decision has been taken."2

Throughout 1978, however, CINCPAC continued to advise that the strategy was no longer viable for the United States during a conventional worldwide war with the Soviet Union. He said so in his inputs to the FY 80 Posture Statement of the Chairman of the JCS, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Strategic Planning Document, Consolidated Guidance, Defense Policy Guidance, the Quarterly Report of Major Issues and Activities, the November conference of the CINCs of the unified and specified commands, and at other appropriate times.3

In the development of Consolidated Guidance FY 81-85, the Secretary of Defense directed completion of a series of studies on germane issues.

3. J5324 Point Paper (S), 10 Nov 78, Subj: Swing Strategy (U), GDS-86.
Study Number 8 concerned Asia during a worldwide conventional war. The study, prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was initiated on 14 July, and CINCPAC received a first draft for review on 28 August.  

CINCPAC's reply of 9 September focused on his primary areas of concern. He found the study team's treatment of the Swing Strategy "encouraging" as the subject needed to be fully discussed in defense planning guidance. He believed that the discussion was long overdue in light of the growing Soviet threat in the PACOM and related strategy and force posture imperatives that had evolved therefrom. CINCPAC recognized the NATO priority, but he said that the swing had major weaknesses that were detrimental to U.S. security objectives. It failed to recognize NATO war as global war. It was unlikely that the maritime aspects of a NATO war would be confined to the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. With two-thirds of the world's population in the PACOM, along with vital sea lines of communication to critical resources, the Soviet Union would certainly attempt to dominate the Western Pacific area. Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East posed the closest direct threat to the United States.  

Other subjects CINCPAC commented about in Study Number 8 were concerned with U.S. objectives and options in Asia, Asian perceptions, U.S. options and force analysis, and the role of China and Japan in a conventional worldwide war between the United States and the USSR. "While it is probably useful to assess the implications of PRC support in a war with the Soviets, believe it imprudent to count on that support in mid-range strategy planning."

1. J5324 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.  
2. CINCPAC 090032Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
While Sino-Soviet split and U.S. normalization actions have changed relationships of major powers, do not believe PRC is now in Western camp.  

CINCPAC said more definitive guidance was needed on Korea. A more precise statement of U.S. goals was necessary to translate general guidance into specific military plans. Some discussion was required to establish how the defense of Korea tied in with U.S. global strategy for general war.  

The First Integrated Draft of Study 8 was forwarded to CINCPAC for review and he provided his comments on 28 October. CINCPAC found it a well-reasoned assessment of U.S. interests in Asia and a "significant improvement" over the earlier first draft. He said the study remained seriously deficient, however, in its treatment of the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas in relation to the worldwide power balance, and the importance to the United States and NATO of confronting the Soviets from a position of strength in the Pacific. Further the study did not give adequate consideration to the destabilizing consequences in Asia that would ensue from an announced U.S. policy of planned force withdrawals in the Pacific.  

Regarding the Swing Strategy, however, he was concerned that the major conclusion of the first integrated draft had been altered from the first draft, which had stated that "political and military implications of the Swing Strategy are such that steps should be taken to eliminate it." The later draft changed "eliminate" to "modify," and the study continued to recommend some level of force realignment from the Pacific to the Atlantic and Europe.  

CINCPAC noted that it appeared that the alteration of the Swing conclusion was accomplished to substantiate the 1978 Defense Planning Questionnaire decision by the Secretary of Defense, described above. He recognized the prudence of the Secretary's decision not to change the NATO force commitment to the surprise of our European allies. Japan and China, however, had recognized that Soviet military capabilities had to be countered on a global basis; CINCPAC believed that the European allies also recognized that it was no longer possible to keep the Soviets in check with a

1. Ibid.  
2. CINCPAC 282237Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
coalition of forces constrained to Europe. He said that if the United States
were to begin "now" to alert our European allies to the options that would
accrue to the Soviets as a result of the redeployment, they would recognize
that PACOM forces could make a greater contribution in the PACOM than in the
hazardous transit to Europe and the Atlantic.

 Rowe. The study's recommendation that the Swing Strategy be discussed with
Asian allies, however, was strongly opposed. The destabilizing impact of
informing our Asian allies and friends that we intend to redeploy major PACOM
forces in the event of global war with the USSR "cannot be overstated." A
viable course would be a careful, well-reasoned approach to NATO that empha-
sized the necessity to counter the Soviet threat on a global scale, coupled
with a sound military explanation of how PACOM forces could be most effectively
employed in a NATO war by taking prompt offensive action in the Pacific. A
convincing case could be made that a change in strategy was not a change in
commitment.

 Rowe. The study appeared to underplay the importance of Persian Gulf-Indian
Ocean lines of communication for oil. An uninterrupted flow to NATO was criti-
cal to a successful offense. Japan was dependent on such oil for its day-to-
day existence. The swing of forces would give the Soviet interdiction forces
essentially free rein in the Indian Ocean, a situation neither Western Europe
or Japan could endure.

 Rowe. Following a U.S. swing, the USSR could readily redeploy long-range
aviation, naval aviation, attack submarines, and surface combatants to strate-
gic areas where they could be more profitably employed. A major U.S. presence
in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific threatening their bases and forces and
their commercial shipping would deter such relocations.1

 Rowe. Regarding the orientation of the First Integrated Draft, CINCPAC
agreed that the United States must plan for and take actions that would retain
the confidence of our Asian allies and friends in peacetime, and gain their
assistance during conventional war with the USSR. The Integrated First Draft,
however, basically reaffirmed a "Europe first" strategy, and was unduly restric-
tive in its definition of U.S. interests and objectives in war with the Soviets.
The principal U.S. objective in such a war would be its early termination on
terms advantageous to U.S. interests.

 Rowe. The study suggested that the United States would seek to convince
friendly Asian nations of our resolve in the Far East as an inducement to

1. Ibid.
cooperate in the war effort, and CINCPAC concurred. CINCPAC summarized by saying that the integrated draft was a better treatment of U.S. interests in Asia, but it remained deficient in its analysis of the optimum contribution that PACOM forces could make in a global war. Finally, the report was seriously in error in its failure to assess adequately the impact of the Swing Strategy, or discussion of it, upon Asian allies and friends.¹

On 2 December the JCS provided the CINCs of the Pacific, European, and Atlantic Commands, and the Service Chiefs, the conclusions in the Executive Summary of the ISA Study Number 8. The study noted that there was no simple solution that would enable all military demands to be met or satisfy all of our allies. ISA said:²

...The findings of this study indicate that during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict the Swing forces (particularly the naval units) would make the greatest military contribution in the NATO theater. This conclusion is supported by the finding that the Soviets would probably avoid initiating simultaneous hostilities in Europe and Asia, by the conclusion that naval air attacks on Soviet territory would have little or no effect on Soviet ground and tactical air deployments and would not be the most cost-effective way to neutralize the Soviet naval threat, and by the strong possibility

The component of the Swing force with the greatest military value for NATO is the carrier battle groups. Unfortunately, the carriers also would take the longest time to transit, and the NATO commanders could make the best use of additional carriers if they were available when the war began. This study recommends that the US consider adjusting its carrier swing force from three battle groups to two. This would allow the US to reinforce WESTPAC at the same time it was swinging two battle groups to NATO. Since the US would be reinforcing in both theaters, it would be politically

1. Ibid.
2. JCS 1844/021543Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 1 Dec 84.
easier to start the Swing before the war actually started; thus, minimizing the impact of the transit time to NATO.

In the final accounting, however, the utility of the Swing concept will be determined by events....

In the DPQ, the U.S. makes a commitment to place specific forces under NATO command at a set point in the NATO alert procedures. Given the advantages of flexibility and the importance of situational factors, this study recommends that the Swing forces be downgraded from the "assigned" to the "earmarked" category in the DPQ....

...The Japanese have never been told officially about the Swing concept nor have they been promised that a given number of carriers would be deployed in Asia during a worldwide war. They are, however, undoubtedly aware of the Swing concept from informal sources....Conceivably, the Japanese have already factored the possibility of a Swing into their defense calculations. In any event, the Swing issue may have to be faced squarely in the future...

Admiral Weisner sent a personal message to the Chairman of the JCS on 22 December in which he said that despite previous inputs the conclusions of the study remained essentially unchanged, that the Swing Strategy, with some
modifications, remained a viable strategy for the United States. He said that 
at the November CINCs conference, Secretary Brown had been in general agreement 
with the CINCPAC position. While the Secretary's revised views may have not 
been expressed in time to affect the Third Draft, CINCPAC was disappointed with 
ISA's findings and conclusions. "It appears to me that we are continuing to 
move on two diverging tracks with regard to Swing Strategy. I strongly solicit 
your support in turning around major conclusions in CG Study Nr. 8 so that they 
are in consonance with the CINCPAC position."1

(U) CINCPAC sought similar assistance from the Chief of Naval Operations.2

(S) The CINC of the Atlantic Command provided his comments on the CG 
Study 8 Executive Summary on 22 December. He said the LANTCOM conclusions 
based on the study contained two points that should be made clear before he 
commented in detail on the findings in the Executive Summary. He said first 
that the United States should not reduce the assigned forces that were reported 
in the DPQ. The total of NATO forces already fell short of the capability 
that the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic had determined to be the minimum 
required. He thought we needed to strive to attain a position to be even more 
responsive to NATO wartime needs.3

(S) The second point CINCLANT made was that the Swing concept was not 
realistic. He said that to base NATO-area plans on augmentation from the 
Pacific was to delude ourselves as to our total force posture vis-a-vis the 
Soviets. The threat was global and the Swing, though needed, was not likely 
to occur. He concluded that despite the cost the United States should purchase 
additional forces to make a swing of forces unnecessary.4

(S) The CINC of the U.S. European Command found the Swing Strategy con- 
cclusions in the Executive Summary "unacceptable, for the most part, because 
they are inconsistent with stated US national priorities and would do severe 
damage to the NATO alliance." He described those national priorities as a 
"Europe-first commitment," and said that he believed changing the DPQ designa- 
ation of the "assigned" forces to "earmarked" would prevent their consideration 
in US CINCEUR and NATO planning, because their availability and timing would 
not be known. This action, he believed, would also be perceived by our NATO 
allies as a major change in U.S. maritime priorities and a decrease in our 
commitment to the alliance. He concluded that he could not support any recom- 
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to the problem was the same as that concluded in many other studies: additional assets were required to do the job properly. If the United States was to counter the ever-increasing Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, "we must continue to work toward acquiring and maintaining necessary force levels."  

At the end of the year CINCPAC received a message from the Joint Staff, advising that while CINCPAC's initial inputs had not been wholly accepted by the ISA, the views of all of the CINC and Services were being consolidated and reevaluated, and would be resubmitted to ISA, as appropriate. The Joint Staff was separately reevaluating the Swing Strategy implications in development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 80. CG Study Number 8 was not the last word on the Swing concept. The Joint Staff was still working the problem.  

1. USCINCEUR SHAPE 261235Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-86.  
2. JCS 1986/300049Z Dec 78 (EX) (S), DECL 26 Dec 84.
The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the requirements for planning for many contingencies and operations. Most numbered CINCPAC Operation Plans were the responsibility of the Plans Directorate, although other staff elements contributed directly with specialized input, particularly for detailed functional annexes to plans. Some plans were prepared or revised by the Operations Directorate, in which case they were usually promulgated by letter or message. The following list identifies CINCPAC contingency plans and their status as of 31 December 1978.

The following definitions pertain: An OPLAN was an operation plan for the conduct of military operations that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. Complete plans included deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in concept format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD prior to implementation. An OPORD was a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND (Pacific)

(U) Under the provisions of the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. 686) the
U.S. Postal Service may request and the Department of Defense may provide assist-
ance to the USPS in the event union employees initiated a work stoppage to
emphasize their contract demands.¹

(U) In view of a possible walkout by postal workers, on 18 July CINCPAC
tasked the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group to prepare a plan, designate a local
task force commander, and coordinate activities of all Service components.
CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT were tasked to provide support as required.²

(U) The Commander, USACSG submitted the plan on 19 July. It provided for
assistance to the Honolulu District, Western Region, on a phased basis to

2. CINCPAC 180331Z Jul 78 (U).
reestablish and maintain essential postal services. CINCPAC approved the plan on 20 July, but it was not necessary to execute it in 1978.1

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 1437 (U), 20 Jul 78, Subj: Approval of OPLAN GRAPHIC HAND (Pacific), which cited CDRUSCG ltr S-21 July 1978 (U).
SECTION III--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Planning

1. CINCPAC 190117Z Sep 78
2. JCS 1693/012324Z Aug 77 (S), GDS-85.
(N) On 15 March 1978 CINCPAC provided a revised force list as amended by comments from his Service component commands and COMUS Korea and requested those same commands' concurrence. CINCPACAF replied on 17 March, concurring with the data and reiterating his concern for expeditious JCS approval and release to the Koreans. He considered the JCS guidance a major breakthrough on this long-standing issue and provided the basis for PACAF's ROK upgrade proposals. "The ability to coordinate ROKAF/USAF efforts and planning, and the expected willingness of the ROK to upgrade their facilities for our augmentation forces, will greatly enhance overall combat readiness in Korea," CINCPACAF concluded.2

(3) On 1 April CINCPAC advised the JCS of the concurrence of his Air Force and Navy component commanders and COMUS Korea on the revised notional force list and population increase at destination bases proposed for release, and requested authority from the JCS to release it to the ROK Ministry of National Defense and appropriate military headquarters through COMUS Korea and CINCUNC. The JCS concurred with minor exceptions on 26 April. CINCPAC advised all concerned on 28 April and asked COMUS Korea to take release action through CINCUNC to the Koreans.3

(3) The notional force list included all combat, combat support, and logistic support forces planned to be in Korea in the first 35 days of ROK defense. It also included naval forces committed in support of in-country operations. It did not include forces planned for arrival after the first 35 days nor forces operating from bases outside of Korea.

1. COMUS Korea 220850Z Aug 77 (S), GDS-85.
2. HQ PACAF 172130Z Mar 78 (S), XGDS-3(06), which cited CINCPAC 150037Z Mar 78.
3. CINCPAC 010115Z Apr 78 (S), XGDS-3; JCS 1667/261317Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 280201Z Apr 78 (S), XGDS-3.
In that same message the JCS advised that discussions between CINCPAC and the Joint Staff had resulted in certain proposed guidance to more closely integrate CINCUNIC and CINCPAC plans. The general planning approach was to be as follows:2

...CINCPAC will respond to JSCP tasking and CINCUNIC will respond to JCS (other than JSCP) tasking for development of plans for defense of the ROK.

...CINCUNIC will develop the concept of operations for defense of the ROK in coordination with CINCPAC and will be guided by notional force and support data provided by CINCPAC. Close interface between the respective planning staffs will be required.

...CINCPAC and CINCUNIC will strive to have compatibility of OPLANS to include the concept of operations, command relationships, and support planning factors. Given this harmonization, there should be few questions as to feasibility of the OPLANS.

...The JCS review process for the CINCPAC and CINCUNIC OPLANS will focus on compatibility of OPLANS for the defense of the ROK.

For CINCPAC’s unilateral planning, the JCS tasked him to develop and submit a plan in accordance with JSCP tasking and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) format, release notional force data to the UNC as outlined by the JCS, and release logistic support data to the UNC as required.

1. JCS 3795/080056Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited CINCUNIC 051000Z Dec 77 and CINCPAC 090225Z Dec 77.
2. Ibid.
CINCUNC continued that there was clearly a need for CINCPAC review of the bilateral plan. He said that his concept visualized this as a continuous process in the U.S. channel of communication involving COMUS Korea, CINCPAC, and the JCS. He said the process should be clarified so the CINCUNC/CINCCFC would provide copies of the bilateral plan to CINCPAC for information and then the JCS could task CINCPAC for review and comments, essentially the same procedures that had been being used for CINCUNC plans. He said that procedures for U.S. and ROK JCS review and approval of the bilateral plan would formalize and improve future planning.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCUNC 180145Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. JCS 5757/272108Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84.
SACLANT-CINCPAC Agreement for the Protection of Shipping in the Indian Ocean

(U) On 14 March NATO approved Outline Plan 112/212 prepared by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and entitled "Protection of Shipping in South Atlantic, Cape and Indian Ocean Areas in Contingency and War Situations." In a message on 28 March the JCS authorized SACLANT to conduct direct liaison with CINCPAC to effect mutually beneficial arrangements for protection of shipping in the Indian Ocean.

(U) On 30 March members of CINCPAC's Plans Directorate participated in discussions regarding these command arrangements with members of the CINCLANT and SACLANT staffs in Norfolk, Virginia. Discussions centered around the general content and format of an agreement that would be acceptable to both commands. SACLANT assumed the lead in developing a "strawman," and their proposal was reviewed by the CINCPAC staff and component commanders. On 5 August CINCPAC provided his recommended changes.

(U) On 26 September the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, signed the agreement; Admiral Kelso signed on 12 October.

(U) The agreement provided guidance for the planning of operations for the protection of shipping in the Indian Ocean in circumstances in which SACLANT and CINCPAC might be required to conduct mutually supporting operations. The agreement covered arrangements for command and control of forces, command and mission relationships, force levels, exchanges of information, communications, logistics, and naval control of shipping.

1. Ibid.
2. J563 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84; JCS 7505/2822382 Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 032059Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. SACLANT ltr C-831/5711 Ser N-1168, 26 Sep 78, Subj: SACLANT/CINCPAC Agreement for Operations in the Indian Ocean in Support of SACLANT OPLAN 112/212-78, as cited in J563 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 84.
In October 1977 the Chief of Naval Operations had asked CINCPACFLT to comment on the feasibility and desirability of basing a Marine Amphibious Brigade in the United Kingdom. The requirement for a Navy analysis had originated from a report from Ambassador Komer to the Secretary of Defense on ways to improve the capabilities of NATO. The Defense Secretary had asked the Navy for a report, and the interim report had been provided in mid-November. The final report had been completed in March 1978 and submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 May. On 14 July the Secretary had requested the views of the Chairman of the JCS and appropriate CINCs on which to base his decision.  

CINCPAC had previously monitored the progress of the proposal since the CINCPACFLT involvement in 1977. People on the staff of the CNO had believed that the proposal would die because of a lack of enthusiasm by the Marine Corps and the lengthy period of time that the proposal had remained at the Secretary of Defense level.

2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 290145Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. Ibid.
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On 27 November the JCS advised that no decision would be immediately forthcoming from the Secretary of Defense and requested information for an expanded study. The entire spectrum of strategic requirements of Marine Forces in Europe was to be assessed. They requested CINCPAC's comments on the expanded study to include PACOM requirements, threat assessments, political considerations, and priorities of USMC employment.1

CINCPACFLT provided his comments to CINCPAC on 16 December. He recommended the use of all existing PACOM Marine Corps assets for Aleutian defense and major offensive operations in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. He further argued for the study to focus on the worldwide effective use of unique Marine Corps assets.2

CINCPAC provided his comments to the JCS on 17 December. He said that his earlier expressed views were germane. The perspective from the PACOM remained that NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict was in fact a global conflict with the USSR. Accordingly, any expanded study that intended to support national military planning and policy should address the strategic use of Marine Corps assets on a worldwide basis. It was necessary, therefore, to determine which of the possible worldwide employment options provided the most advantage in conflict with the USSR. He noted that fragmentation and separation of Marine forces from their amphibious lift assets reduced the potential impact of the existing U.S. advantage in amphibious power projection. Also, Marine forces were best employed as a striking force in an environment conducive to tactical success and strategic impact. Secondly, they provided a quick reaction force that could defend allied assets not otherwise protected, or gain necessary support bases for allied initiatives.3

CINCPAC said that the cost-benefit analyses should include comparisons of procurement of additional lift capability versus the pre-positioning of Marines. Those cost-benefit analyses should include increases in Army or Air Force strength versus use of Marines to achieve specific objectives.

Possible employment options in response to PACOM area threats were prioritized and summarized. First was defense of the Aleutians, early in a worldwide conflict. Next was early offensive operations in the Northwest Pacific. There was a requirement to support the Republic of Korea in the event

1. J5325 HistSum Dec 78 (TS), DECL 9 Jan 85; JCS 5045/272024Z Nov 78 (TS), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACFLT 161725Z Dec 78 (TS), DECL 7 Dec 88/DG/S 7 Dec 80; J5325 HistSum Dec 78 (TS), DECL 9 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 172312Z Dec 78 (TS), DECL 11 Dec 84.
of either unilateral North Korean aggression or a North Korean aggression concurrent with a worldwide conflict. Amphibious operations might also be required for re-entry of forces into Korea. Use of Marines in countering a Soviet sea lines of communication interdiction campaign might be required. Lastly, with threats other than worldwide conflict, an effective and flexible U.S. amphibious capability had been historically vital to influencing the outcome of crises short of all-out conflict. The Pacific theater provided ideal maneuvering room and objective areas for influencing the world's perceptions of U.S. intentions, resolve, and capabilities.

CINC PAC believed that maintenance of an effective and responsive Pacific Marine force was "at this time and for the foreseeable future vital to maintaining a perceived force balance with USSR in face of recent U.S. force drawdowns in the Pacific."

CINC PAC said that he provided this position not to diminish the importance of the NATO theater, but to provide a background for his recommendations regarding the expanded study of the subject. He recommended that the study seek to maximize the advantage of amphibious strike against suitable targets. He recommended that the positive support of NATO, achieved through amphibious operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, be compared in the study to NATO in-theater use of Marine Corps assets. Such study "could conceivably demonstrate that employment in the Pacific theater would be more supporting of NATO than employment in NATO."

CINC PAC concluded that if the aim of the study remained only the enhancement of NATO, the nearly certain conclusion was that at some cost, a highly trained and effective USMC could contribute.

During Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, a JCS-sponsored biennial Command Post Exercise held in October 1978 (discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this History), a Marine Amphibious Brigade was deployed early to Iceland and a second subsequently to the Azores.

1. Ibid.
The scenario used in the exercise typified the need for some type of defensive elements to be in the Aleutians prior to hostilities, as well as highlighting the difficulty of getting forces there.

Perceptions of U.S. Staying Power and Strength in the PACOM

For many years the CINC's had believed in the extreme importance of foreign perceptions of U.S. staying power in the Pacific and our military strength. In a number of the CINC's Quarterly Reports to the Secretary of Defense the lead item had been the same: Asian perceptions of U.S. staying power in the Pacific. After a series of such recommendations, the Secretary asked, "Aside from changing Korea withdrawal terms, what actions would have the best effect?" CINCPAC followed Washington discussions on the subject with amplifying information to the UNC on 8 May. 2

Cited the briefings his staff had developed on PACOM strategic interests, regular press tours and visits, and visits to PACOM countries by flag and general officers. These countries included the smaller, less-developed "third world" nations, and CINCPAC and key members of his staff had made many personal contacts throughout the command.

Ship visits, a traditional means of showing the flag, should be broadened, CINCPAC believed, to their full potential. On-going initiatives included a cruise to the South Pacific area, similar to the "Unitas" cruise in South America; participation by USN ships and the Commander SEVENTH FLEET in the Coral Sea celebration in Australia; and continued engagement in naval passing exercises with allied and friendly navies at every opportunity.

In addition to naval visits, there was a potential for more "show the flag" type visits for training by Air Force or Army elements. This was being studied by the CINCPAC staff.

1. J5325 Point Paper (S), 3 Nov 78, Subj: Basing MAB in the UK (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 08001Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
CINCPAC continued to support combined exercises and combined planning and cited a number of examples. He concluded that those initiatives were by no means all-inclusive and the command continued to search for new ones. "Obviously there also are initiatives which we would like to see undertaken by other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government." He cited greater visibility and higher priority to Security Assistance in Asia (although the trend seemed to be in the other direction), continued visits by senior officials and key Congressional leaders, and participation of U.S. agencies in regional seminars, trade fairs, and other such forums.  

In that same message CINCPAC had outlined certain options to counter Asian perceptions of a relative increase in Soviet military strength by providing the news media with information about the planned deployment of the USS NIMITZ (and accelerate its deployment time schedule), and the first deployment of the Fleet's newest amphibious ship, USS TARAWA (LHA-1), planned for March 1979.  

An overall evaluation of the views on the military balance between the East and the West held by foreign military leadership was the subject of a study under way in the Defense Department in September. The JCS asked CINCPAC's Director for Plans for comments on the perceptions held by the military elite of principal PACOM countries concerning the regional and global East-West military balance; identification and assessment of U.S. activities

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 120425Z Aug 78 (TS), GDS-88.
3. Ibid.
The component and subordinate unified commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and appropriate members of the CINCPAC staff were consulted.

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Quarterly Report of Major Issues and Activities

(U) In June 1977 the JCS had advised that the Secretary of Defense had required that each of the commanders of unified and specified commands provide him with quarterly reports on the strategy and activities of his command. The Secretary wanted short reports (two or three pages), and CINCPAC welcomed the opportunity. Three reports had been prepared in 1977.4

1. J531 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 3225/212210Z Sep 78 (EX) (S), GDS-86.
2. J531 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 230256Z Sep 78 (EX) (S), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
Four reports were prepared in 1978. Although CINCPAC sought to make each report unique, not just an update of previous reports, some subjects surfaced more than once throughout the year. Each of the topics addressed is covered in some detail elsewhere in this history.\(^1\)

The issues addressed in the quarterly reports in 1978, in random order, included the foreign perception of U.S. staying power in the Pacific and Asia, in which CINCPAC had seen improvement; increased Soviet and Cuban influence in the Horn of Africa area and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; Indian Ocean arms control negotiations; and, as the year ended, concern regarding Middle East and Persian Gulf strategy, with concern mounting about denial of Persian Gulf oil and concern about the security of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Concerning Japan, the positive change in attitude toward defense issues was noted; the declining value of the dollar against the yen was having considerable impact on the PACOM; but the Japanese Diet approved a budget permitting implementation of the labor cost-sharing agreement signed by the United States and Japan in 1977, with hope for proposed cost sharing on facilities construction and maintenance. Also regarding Japan, approval of the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation by the Seventeenth Security Consultative Committee opened the way to bilateral planning with Japan. Both the U.S. Ambassador and the Japan Foreign Minister had endorsed the guidelines and had proposed studies by the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces concerning the defense of Japan. Further Japanese Government actions later in the year finally cleared the way for the Self-Defense Forces to officially engage in bilateral planning with the United States.

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1. CINCPAC 070203Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 052240Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 060122Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 062340Z Jan 79 (S), Decl 2 Jan 85.
CINCPAC reiterated his requirement for a readily available, highly mobile communication capability in support of Joint Task Force/Remote Task Force commanders deployed in possible contingency situations.

In his third report in 1978 CINCPAC reiterated his strong feelings about the "Swing Strategy."

CINCPAC addressed the desirability of close working and personal relationships between U.S. and allied middle and junior grade officers, a condition that greatly enhanced military cooperation and influenced allied and friendly national attitudes toward the United States. He believed it was essential to keep those relationships viable, and was taking steps in the PACOM to improve contact, with emphasis on combined exercises at the small-unit level.

CINCPAC, discussing the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, said that the Presidential announcement had generated a wide range of Defense Department-related activities concerning Taiwan. CINCPAC hoped to ensure an orderly and proper transition of PACOM actions that supported normalization, but at the same time minimize adverse impacts on PACOM readiness and the welfare of our people on Taiwan.1

Orientation of the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions

On 11 September the JCS advised CINCPAC of an Army-proposed revised contingency orientation of the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Army

1. Ibid.
proposed that the 25th Division in Hawaii be designated as the primary Army force for Asian contingencies, and to provide a reinforcement capability as the 2nd Division was withdrawn from Korea. The Army had indicated a requirement for a heavy division as part of a non-NATO contingency force.\footnote{1}

\footnote{(S)} Army plans provided for the mechanization of the 2nd Division upon its withdrawal from Korea, which would make it capable of satisfying this requirement. Under those plans the 2nd Division, following its mechanization, would be available for deployment to Korea as well as other non-NATO contingency areas as part of a unilateral corps. Additionally, it could be committed to NATO, depending on its availability. Elements of the 2nd Division, however, would suffer a readiness degradation during the period of reorganization and reequipping. The 25th Division was already assigned to the PACOM for contingency planning for all situations except a full-mobilization NATO conflict. After withdrawal of the 2nd from Korea, the 25th would be the only Army combat unit in the Pacific, so these proposed modifications to U.S. commitments would result in a more logical and responsive posture for Army forces, the Army proposal noted.

\footnote{(S)} The realignments would result in a light division for Pacific contingencies and a heavy division for rapid redeployment to Asia, other non-NATO contingencies as part of the unilateral corps, or for use in a NATO conflict. It would provide a commitment, real and perceived, to allay security concerns of Asian allies, provide a rapid reaction capability, and be both a deterrent force and an initial reinforcement capability for Korea. The Army also advised that it was examining the feasibility of adding a third active component brigade to the 25th Division. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on these proposals.\footnote{2}

\footnote{(S)} CINCPAC considered the views of the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group when he provided his reply on 22 September. CINCPAC said:\footnote{3}

\ldots Concur in DA proposal to reorient 25th ID as primary Army force for Asian contingencies. However, if this does not occur until after 2d ID has been withdrawn, reequipped, and retrained, CINCPAC will have no Army forces in PACOM for Pacific contingencies during that period. Therefore, recommend reorientation not be delayed until completion of 2d ID withdrawal. 25th ID commitment to NATO must be terminated

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1} JCS 4349/12123Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
\footnote{2} Ibid.
\footnote{3} CINCPAC 220355Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
\end{footnotes}
as soon as politically feasible to reassure our Pacific allies and conform to DOD consolidated guidance to retain capability to reenter Korea.

CINCPAC also recommended that Army assets on the West Coast be earmarked to augment the 25th during 2nd Division withdrawal and prior to bringing the 25th to full strength. He further suggested that action be initiated to insure adequate war reserve materials were prepositioned in the PACOM for the 25th. CINCPAC said that the Army's proposal implied that the 25th Division was an equivalent force although its configuration at that time, only two active infantry brigades, provided less than a light division for Asian contingencies. Therefore, he strongly supported creation of a third active brigade for the 25th Division to maximize the advantages of realignment.¹

COMMANDO NEST Program Declassification

The Air Force had programmed deployment of three F-15 squadrons to Kadena Air Base, Japan (Okinawa Prefecture) beginning in FY 79 to replace three F-4 squadrons.²

In December 1977 CINCPAC had requested COMUS Japan to inform appropriate Japanese officials through the Embassy that the program would be declassified on 1 April 1978. The Japan National Defense Council approved the F-15 as the aircraft for Japan to replace their aging F-104s, this also in December 1977.²

On 29 March 1978 COMUS Japan advised that the Japan Defense Budget for JFY 78 would be approved by 5 April 1978 and requested that the declassification announcement be deferred until at least 15 April. CINCPAC concurred.

On 4 April COMUS Japan again requested that the announcement be delayed until 29 April because of a local election in Okinawa City (in which a good portion of Kadena Air Base was located), which was to be held on 23 April. CINCPAC, however, was scheduled to appear before the Washington, D.C. press corps, which would provide a good opportunity to make the F-15 conversion announcement and not interfere with the Okinawa City mayoral elections. COMUS

1. Ibid.
3. COMUS Japan 2901292Z Mar 78 (C), ADS 8 May 78; CINCPAC 310034Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
Japan and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo concurred with the idea and Admiral Weisner announced the F-15 conversion program to the press corps on 26 April.\(^1\)

(U) The Japanese press reaction was more adverse than had been anticipated. The Kyodo Wire Service reported from Washington regarding a 25 April General Accounting Office report which the wire service alleged concerned major defects in the engines used in the F-15 and a high accident rate. The Kyodo story stated that the F100 engine used in the F-16 had major defects that had caused in-flight accidents at a rate three times higher than USAF standards even after improvements had been made, and that a similar engine was used in the F-15, resulting in similar major problems. The American Consul General in Naha met with the leading anti-base coalition group, and reported that while those reformists would draw on the the GAO report to press the theme that the F-15 was a "defective" aircraft, there would be no problems with other allegations concerning increased noise, nuclear weaponry, or the "strengthening" of Kadena accompanying the F-15 deployment.\(^2\)

(U) The F-15 announcement also sparked Japanese political debate over defense policy and what was a defensive weapon compared to what was an offensive weapon, as the F-15s the Japanese had ordered were to come equipped with bombsights and a mid-air refueling capability.\(^3\)

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1. J5323 HistSum Dec 78 (\&), DECL 8 Jan 85; COMUS Japan 040525Z Apr 78 (\&), ADS 8 May 78; CINCPAC 080224Z Apr 78 (\&), GDS-84; COMUS Japan 100455Z Apr 78 (\&), GDS-84.
2. AMCONSUL Naha 280800Z Apr 78 (U); AMCONSUL Naha 020330Z May 78 (U).
4. ADMIN CINCPAC 160150Z Feb 78 (TS/ERD), XGDS-2.
1. J322 HistSum Jul 78 (C/FRD); JCS 2363/082212Z Mar 78 (S/FRD), XGDS-2.
2. CINCPAC 290412Z Jun 78 (TS/FRD), XGDS-2; COMUS Korea 100350Z Jul 78 (EX) (TS/FRD), XGDS-2; JCS 6951/311329Z Jul 78 (TS/FRD), XGDS-2; CINCUNC 130230Z Sep 78 (TS/FRD), XGDS-2; ADMIN CINCPAC 290054Z Sep 78 (TS/FRD), XGDS-2; JCS 1058/071959Z Nov 78 (TS/FRD), XGDS-3.
3. COMUS Korea 310645Z Jul 78 (TS), GDS-84.
(S) In response to a further request to develop a minimum U.S. military presence in the region, CINCPAC again stated that the existing presence was at a minimum to meet existing policy objectives. In order to comply with the tasking, he presented illustrative reduction options, but he said they were not to be construed as recommendations.  

1. CINCPAC 210120Z Oct 78 (S), XGDS-2.  
2. JCS 6851/112251Z Dec 78 (S), ERD-1, REVW 7 Dec 98 Reas 2.  
3. J5132 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-87; CINCPAC TDY MANILA 100112Z Jan 78 (TS), GDS-89.  
4. J5132 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 14231Z Mar (BOM) (S), GDS-86.
CHAPTER IV

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Readiness of U.S. Forces in the PACOM

(U) CINCPAC provided semiannual reports on the readiness of forces in the PACOM as required by the JCS. The October 1978 report is summarized in the paragraphs that follow.1

(5) CINCPAC said that while individual unit readiness had gradually improved since 1975, the continuous erosion of force levels had progressively degraded overall PACOM capabilities. At a time when potential enemies were strengthening their theater forces, the PACOM had become increasingly dependent upon rapid augmentation by CONUS-based combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. He considered it "essential to maintain the proper force levels and mix sufficient to execute national strategy in a general war and to rapidly react to less intense crises and contingencies."

(TS/FRD) CINCPAC next assessed the capability of his component commands to support CINCPAC OPLANs. PACAF units were capable of supporting the missions assigned by CINCPAC OPLANs. The prepositioning of war reserve materiel and the ability of the logistics infrastructure to meet the demands of intense tactical operations continued to improve steadily.

(5) CINCPACFLT's overall readiness to meet contingency plans continued to improve. Systematic analysis of the compatibility of forces with expected missions had brought command attention to a number of correctable problems. Major fleet exercises had been proving the soundness of innovative tactical

1. CINCPAC 140238Z Oct 78 (TS), GDS-88. The earlier report on this subject in 1978 was CINCPAC 161149Z Apr 78 (TS), GDS-88.
concepts such as the Composite Warfare Coordinator and submarine support of the CVBG (SSN)(DS). The CINCPACFLT war game, well into development, showed promise of supplementing at-sea exercises for testing concepts and fleet battle plans. The steady introduction of new weapons, sensors, and platforms had sharpened the fleet's aggressive edge and heightened the confidence of commanders at all levels. After listing CINCPACFLT's capabilities in regard to the four OPLANS listed above, he listed in priority the readiness-degrading issues facing the fleet. These were inadequate force levels, anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and anti-surface warfare.

(TS) For Army forces, the in-theater conventional combat forces were capable of performing wartime missions using existing assets and resources. The capability to logistically support OPLANS, however, remained marginal because of the drawdown of combat service support forces in the PACOM and continued shortages in war reserve stocks and operational projects stocks.

(U) CINCPAC next provided more detailed information on the state of readiness by addressing the specific subjects of personnel, intelligence, operations and training, communications-electronics, and logistics.

Indian Ocean Operations

(S) Three routine task groups deployed to the Indian Ocean in 1978 as they had in previous years, one composed of nuclear-powered ships. At the end of the year a fourth task group was preparing to deploy as a result of the deteriorating situation in Iran.

(S) The first deployment in 1978 was Task Group 75.1, which consisted of USS FOX (CG-33) with Commander Task Force 75 embarked, USS STEIN (FF-1065), USS OUELLET (FF-1077), and USS HASSAYAMPA (AO-145). The task group entered the Indian Ocean on 20 February. FOX, OUELLET, and HASSAYAMPA entered via the Sunda Strait enroute to Australian port visits. STEIN entered independently via the Malacca Strait enroute to a port visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka. The ships called at various ports during the deployment, as follows: FOX visited Fremantle, Australia and Port Louis in Mauritius; OUELLET visited Fremantle, Port Louis, Mombasa, Bandar Abbas, and Karachi. HASSAYAMPA visited Fremantle, Port Louis, Mombasa, Bahrain, and Karachi. Exercises included participation in MERCUB, with Singapore, just prior to the deployment, and passing exercises with Royal Australian Air Force Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft on 2 March and the French frigate COMMANDANT BOURDAIS on 16 March.

1. Ibid.
2. J313 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-84.
On 13 March Commander Task Force 75 shifted his flag to STEIN, and FOX departed for special operations (RUBY SURVEY) with the Mid-East Force, commencing 19 March, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. FOX chopper to Commander Mid-East Force at 190001Z Mar 78.

On 18 April the task group exited the Indian Ocean by the Malacca Strait. OUELLET detached on 18 April and proceeded independently to Subic Bay, while HASSAYAMPA and STEIN proceeded to Singapore for a port visit 19 to 22 April.

CINCPACFLT proposed sending a nuclear-powered task group to the Indian Ocean in the July-August time frame in place of the surface combatant task group that was scheduled. CINCPAC asked for amplifying information, which CINCPACFLT provided on 11 January. He said that future Indian Ocean deployments could be accommodated on either a calendar or fiscal year basis, but he considered it advantageous to schedule a nuclear task group during the fourth quarter of FY 78 so it would then provide the basis for one carrier task group deployment into the area each calendar year. Without this change, there would be no carrier deployment into the Indian Ocean during calendar year 1978. CINCPAC agreed, and advised the JCS of the proposed change.

Thus, the second deployment in 1978 was Task Group 77.6, which consisted of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) with Commander, Task Force 77 embarked, USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), and USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35). The group deployed during the period 13 July to 16 August. USS ROANOKE (AOR-7), operating independently, provided Mobile Logistic Support Force support. The task group entered the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait.

The objectives of this task group were outlined by CINCPACFLT in an April message. The task group was to project the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean in support of national interests, to conduct a significant bilateral exercise with Singapore forces, maximize readiness through optimum training and readiness, provide the opportunity to conduct passing exercises with the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force, and evaluate logistics support during sustained blue water operations in the Indian Ocean, including the contribution by rapid, long-range COD aircraft (US-3A).

TRUXTUN visited Colombo, Sri Lanka, and Cockburn Sound, Australia. ENTERPRISE and LONG BEACH visited Fremantle, Australia while TRUXTUN was at

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACFLT 110208Z Jan 78 ($), GDS-86; CINCPAC 142322Z Jan 78 ($), GDS-86.
3. J313 HistSum Aug 78 ($), GDS-86.
4. CINCPACFLT 290318Z Apr 78 ($), GDS-86.
Cockburn Sound, and the entire task group visited Singapore at the conclusion of the deployment. The task group participated in Exercise BEACON SOUTH with the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force prior to and following those port visits, and in Exercise MERLION with Singapore prior to their port visit there. The group exited the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait.\(^1\)

\([\$]\) The third deployment began on 15 November, entering the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait. It consisted of USS STERETT (CG-31), USS WADDELL (DDG-24), USS BRADLEY (FF-1041), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (TAO-107). The task group proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan, and conducted Exercise MIDLINK 78 with Pakistan, Iran, United Kingdom, and Turkish naval forces from 23 November to 7 December.

\([\$]\) Upon completion of MIDLINK 78, the JCS directed the task group (TG 75.1) to remain in the Arabian Sea and conduct routine operations until further advised. This tasking was in response to the uncertainties in the Persian Gulf brought about by the political problems in Iran. Accordingly, passing exercises with the United Kingdom, Kenya, and Australia were cancelled, as were port visits to Mombasa, Port Louis, and Mogadishu in Somalia. The task group was scheduled to depart the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait on 7 January 1979, but the ships were to remain in the vicinity of the Arabian Sea until further notice.\(^2\)

\([\$]\) On 28 December the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC a deployment preparation order by direction of the Secretary of Defense. Because of the internal situation in Iran and vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region, a continuing augmented U.S. naval presence could be required. CINCPAC was directed to position a carrier task force in the vicinity of Singapore at the earliest feasible time, to be prepared for a possible Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea deployment. TG 77.7 consisted of USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64), USS LEAHY (CG-16), USS KINKAID (DDG-955) with Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVEN embarked, USS DECATUR (DDG-31), USS SOMERS (DDG-34), and USNS MISPLILLION (TAO-105). The estimated time of departure from Subic was 30 December with arrival in the vicinity of Singapore on 2 January.\(^3\)

**RUBY SURVEY**

\([\$]\) On 28 January the CINC of the U.S. European Command was directed by the JCS to increase surveillance activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to monitor Soviet and Cuban activity in the Horn of Africa and the south Arabian

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1. J313 HistSum Aug 78 ([\$]), GDS-86.
2. J313 HistSum Dec 78; JCS 142248Z Dec 78 (EX) ([\$]), DECL 14 Dec 86; CINCPAC 150220Z Dec 78 ([\$]), DECL 14 Dec 86.
3. JCS 7684/280134Z Dec 78 ([\$]), DECL 20 Dec 84; ADMIN CINCPAC 290223Z Dec 78 ([\$]), DECL 28 Dec 84.

**SECRET**

196
Peninsula. USCINCEUR was directed to augment the Mid-East Force with one surface combatant (of the DD/FF class) equipped with Direct Support Equipment. RUBY SURVEY was the nickname authorized by CINCUSNAVEUR to cover the surveillance operations.

(U) USS TRUETT (FF-1095), a unit of the Sixth Fleet, was the first ship assigned to augment existing Mid-East Force units. USS LA SALLE (AGF-3), the flagship of the Mid-East Force commander, was in Naples, Italy, in a state of Restricted Availability and was not scheduled to return to its normal area of operations before 15 April. TRUETT chopper to COMIDEASTFOR on 2 February. This provided two ships to cover the area of interest.1

(U) On 13 February the JCS directed CINCPAC to relieve TRUETT with USS FOX (CG-33) on 19 March in the vicinity of the Gulf of Aden. FOX, a Seventh Fleet unit, was on a routine Indian Ocean deployment in the western Indian Ocean at the time (Task Group 75.1). Accordingly, FOX relieved TRUETT and chopper to COMIDEASTFOR on 19 March, as directed. With the return of LA SALLE on 15 April, Operational Command of FOX reverted to CINCPAC and FOX conducted port visits in Colombo, Singapore, and Pattaya in Thailand enroute to normal Seventh Fleet operations.2

(U) USCINCEUR advised that FOX had provided timely, accurate, and often unique intelligence information, not available from any other source. An example of a FOX "first" was its reporting of the movement of a floating drydock, the first indication of possible Soviet intent to establish a support facility of that kind in Ethiopia.3

B-52 Surveillance

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1. J3 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.; JCS 2641/132320Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 310451Z Mar 78 (S), ADS 30 May 78.
3. USCINCEUR 141202Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. J5132 HistSum Jul 78 (S), XGDS 2005; SAC 191855Z Jul 78 (BOM) (S), XGDS 2005; CINCPAC 250402Z Jul 78 (BOM) (S), GDS-86; SAC 080005Z Aug 78 (BOM) (S), XGDS 2008.

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Sea of Okhotsk Operations

Operations were conducted in the Sea of Okhotsk from 18 to 24 June by Task Group 75.2. The excursion provided continued support for the position that the Sea of Okhotsk was an international body of water with continuing right of high seas navigation and overflight. Secondary objectives were to evaluate national intelligence systems in support of naval forces operating in the Soviet Pacific maritime area, gain familiarity with the Sea of Okhotsk, and enhance task group readiness and training of personnel in operations involving possible Soviet reaction forces.¹

The task group was composed of USS FOX (CG-33) with Commander Task Force 75 embarked, USS STEIN (FF-1065), and USS HASSAYAMPA (AO-145), supported by VP (Patrol Squadron), VQ (Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron), and HSL (Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron) aircraft. The group departed Yokosuka, Japan on 15 June, entered the Sea of Okhotsk via the Prolov Bussol Strait on 18 June, operated as far north as 54°54'N/154°33'E, and departed the Sea of Okhotsk via La Perouse Strait on 24 June.²

The task group did not approach Soviet territory closer than 25 nautical miles, except that when transiting through an international strait the restriction was reduced to not-closer-than 12 nautical miles.

The operation was principally characterized by poor visibility (fog 69 percent of the time) and intense surveillance and reconnaissance by Soviet air and surface forces (13 sorties of 26 aircraft and 1 to 5 surface "tattletales"). Possible harassment by a Soviet surface unit was noted on one occasion on 23 June when KRIVAK 602, which had been maintaining a "tattletale" position on STEIN's starboard side, increased speed, maneuvered close aboard, and ultimately crossed STEIN's bow at 200 yards. The ships maneuvered carefully on two occasions to avoid collision. Neither ship sounded whistle signals for rudder movement. No collision occurred.³

Nuclear Powered and Other Ship Visits to Foreign Ports

U.S. warships, both conventionally and nuclear powered, continued to visit PACOM ports. For many years CINCPAC had sought to have the visits of nuclear powered ships treated as any other ship visit, but the visits had become "routine" only in certain areas. In other areas political considerations

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1. CINCPAC 062017Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 131918Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; J313 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J313 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.; CTG 75.2 240326Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.

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continued to hamper or deny such visits, sometimes based on the emotional response of the residents of those countries. For the first time, nuclear powered U.S. ships called at ports in Tonga and Sri Lanka in 1978. Certain ship visits are discussed in the material that follows, by country.

Australia

Nuclear powered ship visits to Australia had resumed in 1976 for the first time since 1971. Visits by USS SNOOK (SSN-592), USS TRUXTON (CGN-35), USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), and USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) were conducted that year; these visits were considered eminently successful and conducted without noteworthy adverse incident. No visits were made in 1977.

On 8 February 1978 the Defense Attache stated that the consensus in the Embassy was that Australia had moved a long way toward acceptance of such visits as innocuous and, if not quite routine, at least safe. A proposed visit by USS QUEENFISH (SSN-651) was expected to be no different. There might be a few demonstrators and perhaps a wharfside vigil, "but Australia has moved a good bit further than New Zealand in these matters, and we do not expect anything approaching the magnitude or determination of those who 'greeted' USS PINTADO in Auckland harbor last month." On the contrary, they expected a warm welcome and a hospitable reception.

QUEENFISH visited Melbourne from 5 to 10 March. The visit saw only two very limited and completely non-disruptive anti-visit demonstrations. The American Consul in Melbourne said he believed the visit marked the beginning of an era in which visits by such warships would be considered to be relatively routine occurrences. The first of the demonstrations had been held as the ship arrived. The day before its departure approximately 60 protesters appeared at the pier in an apparent last-chance bid to demonstrate their strength. In some scuffleles with a more than adequate number of policemen, paint was thrown and six were arrested. Departure was uneventful.

The Commander, Seventh Fleet visited Brisbane during Australian-American Week in May. The celebration was known more generally as Coral Sea Week, commemorating the World War II battle. The American Consul in Brisbane described the American presence as the most impressive in many years. Actually OKLAHOMA CITY, the Seventh Fleet commander's flagship, bypassed Brisbane, but

2. AMCONSUL Melbourne 4325/140626Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
called at Sydney, Melbourne, and Fremantle.) "Chip" Carter and his wife Caron were there and the Seventh Fleet's ceremonial/show band, called the "Far East Edition," performed in concert and at a dinner meeting of the Australian-American Association. COMSEVENTHFLT and Mrs. Baldwin arrived on 12 May for an active two and a half days. The Consul in Brisbane said it was the fervent hope that the next time COMSEVENTHFLT came he would sail up the river aboard his flagship. "In the meantime, more frequent visits by other Seventh Fleet vessels would be both welcome and fruitful from the standpoint of preserving and furthering goodwill."¹

A visit by USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25) to Townsville, Queensland, was proposed. When it became known that tug services might not be available, other ports were proposed. The Defense Attache in Canberra advised that the Communist-influenced Seamen's Union protested the visit of a nuclear-powered warship visit to any Queensland port, so the situation would be the same for Townsville, Gladstone, or Brisbane. The Minister for Defence agreed in principle to the proposed visit, provided BAINBRIDGE anchor seaward of the approach channel to Townsville Harbour (about eight miles from the port). The Commander, Seventh Fleet said that such an exposed anchorage was marginal at best for a recreational/goodwill port visit because of the constraints and inconveniences. "The markedly different treatment given an NPW from that of a conventionally powered warship is inconsistent with policy of overt equal treatment of ships regardless of propulsion mode." To acquiesce without exceptional comment on those conditions had undesirable precedential implications, he believed. BAINBRIDGE finally visited Darwin, which was not in Queensland. Following the visit the mayor of Darwin said that BAINBRIDGE would always receive a warm welcome any time she chose to return.²

The Embassy in Canberra, on 6 June, received an urgent query from Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser through the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister was visiting in New York and wanted to be able to announce publicly visits to Western Australia ports of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35), and USS ROANOKE (AOR-7) in August. The Australians knew U.S. policy was not to announce ship visits more than six or eight weeks in advance, but asked that the United States "bend the rules" a bit in this instance in view of the Prime Minister's personal interest in announcing the visit while he was in the United States. The State Department's reply on 16 June regretted that the authorized statement could not be agreed

¹ AMCONSUL Brisbane 0186/1803302 May 78 (U).
² CTF SEVEN FIVE 030539Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; USDAO Canberra 854/060735Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; COMSEVENTHFLT 160558Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Canberra 4812/200546Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; NOCNA 120824Z Jul 78 (U).
on in time before the Prime Minister's departure from New York for London, but it had been agreed that he could make a general announcement that did not mention specific ships or dates, such as "I am pleased to announce that units of the United States Pacific Fleet will be visiting ports in Western Australia in August. Further details will be provided later." The task force did visit Western Australia in August and the Ambassador said they performed with "great credit to our country."1

Fiji

Nuclear powered warships were not yet welcome in Fiji. During discussions of the possibility of such visits in 1976, the Fiji government had expressed concern overall safety and indemnity in the event of an accident. The Navy wanted to arrange for a visit to Suva in April 1978 and the matter was addressed by the State Department with Ambassador (designate) Condon in Washington in February. The proposed visit involved a strategic missile launching submarine.2

Former Ambassador to Fiji Selden, assigned as Ambassador to New Zealand, offered his thoughts. He said that while the United States had been successful in opening up New Zealand to nuclear submarine visits, the selection of an SSBN for Fiji would appear to be "setting for ourselves the most difficult case in our initial efforts." He appreciated the Navy's scheduling problems, but advised we "get our foot in the door" with a potentially less contentious ship visit, either a surface ship or an SSN. He also noted that the timing of the visit, just a few days before Ambassador Condon's arrival, may not be "optimum." The State Department, with "great reluctance," asked the Navy to withdraw its request for the April visit.3

Ambassador Selden also noted that on several occasions he had discussed the matter with Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, and he had never reacted negatively, saying that he had no personal objection to such visits and was more concerned about nuclear testing in the Pacific. The Prime Minister was in China on 14 June when Ambassador Condon broached the subject with his deputy, Acting Prime Minister Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, who reacted favorably when told that the customary diplomatic paper requesting official clearance had been sent to the Foreign Office and was shown a copy. He said that he would see to it that

1. AMEMB Canberra 4308/060220Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-B6; SECSTATE 7731/161900Z Jun 78 (U); AMEMB Canberra 6410/150453Z Aug 78 (U).
2. SECSTATE 060833/091903Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-B6.
3. AMEMB Wellington 5145/130337Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-B6; SECSTATE 074119/222058Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-B6; CINCPACFLT 222247Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-B6.
the clearance would be issued promptly. The Ambassador was concerned about the alacrity, fearing that the Acting Prime Minister might not have grasped the significance of the request, so he found ways to repeat several times that this was a nuclear powered ship. The next day the Embassy received official clearance from the Foreign Office for USS BAINBIDGE (CGN-25), a situation the Ambassador found almost too good to believe.1

(6) In mid-August the Fiji Times published an article entitled, "N-Ship Will be Allowed to Visit Fiji," which quoted Department of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Jioji Kotobalavu as saying Fiji would eventually lift the ban on visits. The next day the paper reported that church and youth groups had reacted negatively to the announcement. In Fiji the Ambassador believed that this limited public opposition could not even begin to mount the sort of demonstrations experienced in New Zealand. However, it would ultimately have to be Prime Minister Mara who would decide whether the "psychological" climate was right for Fiji to receive nuclear powered warships.3

New Zealand

1. AMEM Wellington 01508/240441Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-86; AMEM Suva 1003/130430Z Jun 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEM Suva 1025/152000Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. AMEM Suva 7558/272000Z Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. AMEM Suva 2268/160410Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEM Suva 1501/212000Z Aug 78 (U); SECSTATE 215865/242121Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEM Suva 8400/132000Z Dec 78 (C), GDS 12-13-84.
Following those resolutions, the U.S. Ambassador asked for a visit by a nuclear powered surface ship. In December 1977 CINCPAC had advised the Ambassador that the limited number of such craft in the PACOM did not permit one to be available then for a visit. He said that he understood that a surface ship was preferred, but proposed that a nuclear powered submarine visit in mid-January 1978. On 23 December 1977 Prime Minister Muldoon announced the impending visit to Auckland of USS PINTADO (SSN-672).  

The visiting ships in 1976 had been greeted by "peace squadrons" opposed to the visits. Almost immediately following the Prime Minister's announcement a "peace squadron" spokesman called the proposed visit a "grotesque Christmas present," and declared that their small craft would be out in force to meet the submarine. He said, however, that squadron members were not opposed to the people of the United States or to the members of the submarine's crew. 

A U.S. Navy Communications Unit operated an installation at Christchurch for the National Science Foundation under the U.S.-New Zealand Antarctic Treaty, for Project DEEPFREEZE. In the early hours of 10 January the guy wire supporting the antenna tower was cut, causing the tower to topple and bring down the entire antenna array. An anonymous caller to Radio New Zealand claimed the attack was a protest to PINTADO's visit. A similar incident had occurred in 1976. At that time the Government of New Zealand had paid about $44,000 for the repair of the facility. New Zealand Defense Forces and police began providing increased protection for U.S. facilities in Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland for the period preceding and during the PINTADO visit. 

While New Zealand's Opposition Leader sent a telegram of protest to the President of the United States and anti-visit rallies were held, citizens also wrote to newspapers favoring the visits and one man sent the U.S. Ambassa-

1. CINCPAC 062145Z Dec 77 (S), GDS-85.
2. AMEMB Wellington 05910/230120Z Dec 77 (S), XGDS-3.
3. AMEMB Wellington 00115/100524Z Jan 78 (U); SECSTATE 007924/112301Z Jan 78 (C), E.O. 11652: N/A; AMEMB Wellington 00146/110524Z Jan 78 (U).
The Naval Investigative Service described PINTADO's arrival:

The "Battle of Rangitoto Channel" was over in less than ten minutes with PINTADO, later mooring uneventfully precisely on schedule, emerging the clear victor from the marine melee with the peace squadron.

...There were 78 boats, including the infamous trimaran "Phoenix" which tried to ram PINTADO, some other smaller boats managed to penetrate screen and approach PINTADO close aboard. One small demasted sail boat with a man, woman with babe in arms, and dog aboard came alongside PINTADO's bow and passed down starboard side, while simultaneously a swimmer from an overturned kayak thrashed about aft of PINTADO's propeller. PINTADO was forced to turn and back momentarily in a real test of seamanship, but quickly resumed her track. Significantly, although the protesters are claiming foul over the New Zealand Police and Royal New Zealand Force helos, the protesters have not claimed a victory for the peace squadron. They are reportedly frustrated and depressed.

Following a successful six-day visit (16 to 22 January), the Ambassador urged a further nuclear powered warship visit within the following 90 days to consolidate the gains achieved and demonstrate that future visits would indeed be routine. CINCPACFLT understood and supported the idea, but regretted that no ship was available within that timeframe without causing adverse impact on operational schedules or requiring excessive deployment length extensions.

No subsequent visit was made in 1978. In May the Ambassador requested that no visits be scheduled until after national elections held late in November. The ship visits were a campaign issue, with the opposition leader stating that...
if the Labor Party were elected, "We will again close New Zealand ports to nuclear military vessels." On 25 November the National Party was returned to office, but with a greatly reduced majority. On 19 December Prime Minister Muldoon announced the visit of USS HADD (SSN-604), which was scheduled for the period 19 to 24 January 1979.  

Seychelles

No nuclear powered warships visited the Seychelles in 1978, but the June visit of a ship from the Mid-East Fleet was warmly welcomed. In March the President of the Seychelles had advised that the USSR had requested permission to send a "large Soviet warship" to the Seychelles at the time of the 5 June celebration of the first anniversary of the 1977 coup d'etat in that country. President Rene asked if it would be possible for the United States to send a ship at the same time, advising that he would also be approaching France and the United Kingdom and possibly Australia and India regarding visits from their ships.

There were no Seventh Fleet assets available for the visit and the Mid-East Force had operational commitments. CINCPAC advised the Embassy in Victoria that if the operational commitments of the Mid-East Force were changed, consideration would be given to sending such a ship. The Embassy requested that CINCPAC continue the effort and where possible modify deployment schedules so that the United States would be among the countries with representation.

USS BARNEY (DDG-6) of the Mid-East Fleet represented the United States. Following the "Liberation Day" celebration, the Charge d'Affaires described the event. The United Kingdom, France, the USSR, India, and the United States sent a total of eight ships. Australia provided a P-3 aircraft which performed a low-level flyover. Both India and the USSR had flag officers embarked. From the outset, the Charge reported, the Soviets appeared to do their utmost to wear out their welcome. They inconvenienced officials, irritated port officials, furnished fireworks which would make small town July 4 display in U.S. seem like a Cecil B. DeMille production," and upset wreath-laying plans. As with past visits, he continued, the "highly individualistic Seychellois were incredulous at sight of regimentated Soviet crew members being led about town by

1. AMEMB Wellington 02309/050312Z May 78 ( ), XGDS-3; CINCPAC 060011Z May 78 ( ), GDS-86; USDAO Wellington 06203/140411Z Nov 78 ( ) ADS 30 Nov 78; USDAO Wellington 06945/190439Z Dec 78 (U).
2. AMEMB Victoria 0195/031001Z Mar 78 ( ), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 220219Z Mar 78 ( ), GDS-84; AMEMB Victoria 0273/300800Z Mar 78 ( ).

GSGDS.
officers and NCO's."1

(5) He continued that the BARNEY provided sharp contrast. A rock band from BARNEY, in a stadium concert, played before 4,000 to 5,000 enthusiastic Seychellois, crew members gave a record blood donation, and a sports program served to establish a good relationship with the young people. He said that absence of the unit on this occasion would have been "very unfortunate."2

Solomon Islands

(U) On 7 July the Solomon Islands, a British Protectorate, became an independent nation. The U.S. delegation was headed by Senator and Mrs. John Glenn. The British delegation was headed by the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester. Two conventionally powered U.S. ships, USS HOLT (FF-1074) and USS WHIPPLE (FF-1062), conducted a port visit to the capital, Honiara, from 5 to 10 July in conjunction with the Independence Day ceremony. The ships provided administrative and communication support as well as billeting space for some of the delegates. The ships also hosted an official reception and awards ceremony, conducted ship visits for the local citizens, and participated actively not only in formal independence ceremonies but also in sports and other related events. The U.S. Ambassador said:3

...In an emotion-filled period, I believe Americans present at the July 7 independence ceremony will most remember the moment the men of the HOLT and WHIPPLE marched onto the field with the Stars and Stripes. The only massive and spontaneous ovation of the several days of ceremonies greeted them and the effect on all of us was electrifying. It was apparent that the Solomon Islanders have a special place in their hearts for Americans. That place may have been won by previous generations but the officers and men of USS HOLT and USS WHIPPLE certainly helped to ensure that it will remain for a long time to come.

(U) CINCPAC's Operations and Logistics Directorates coordinated air transportation requirements for the U.S. delegation. Transportation consisted of a MAC C-135 flight from CONUS to Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, via Honolulu. A USAF C-130 provided transportation from Port Moresby to Honiara, and then on

1. AMEMB Victoria 0954/120630Z Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Port Moresby 1058/110545Z Jul 78 (U); J313 HistSum Jul 78 (U). AMEMB Port Moresby 3277/180005Z May 78 (C), E.O. 11652 N/A.
to Nandi in Fiji for a return flight to CONUS, again by a MAC C-135. The load-bearing capacity of Henderson Field at Honiara had precluded use of heavier aircraft.1

Sri Lanka

USS TRUXTUN (CGN-35) was the first U.S. nuclear powered warship to visit Sri Lanka. The visit to Colombo occurred 19 to 21 July, in conjunction with the deployment of an Indian Ocean Task Group. There had been a long-standing Sri Lankan government policy against such visits, and there were two factors that weighed in the government's consideration of the visit. It was believed that domestic political parties would charge that the ruling United National Party was being too cooperative with the United States. Secondly, that Government was chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, and carefully weighed actions that could cause its devotion to the principles of that organization to be questioned by critics at home or abroad.2

In 1972 the Prime Minister had specifically invited ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) to visit, but operational requirements would not permit the visit. Also, a British nuclear powered submarine had called in 1975. The precedents may have assisted in the negotiations that resulted in clearance for USS TRUXTUN to visit. The ship did not anchor in the harbor, however. Sea conditions prevalent during the monsoon season militated strongly against use of the anchorage and the ship remained outside the breakwater. The visit was described as successful.3

In the note granting diplomatic clearance for the visit, there had appeared a proviso not previously discussed: "provided the ship does not carry nuclear weapons." A subsequent informal explanation from Sri Lanka indicated that the reference was included by a low-level drafting clerk and sent in haste directly without proper clearance from higher up. The proviso had not been discussed in connection with TRUXTUN's visit. In subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was agreed that the United States would continue its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on any of its ships. The Government of Sri Lanka would not embarrass the United States by trying to find out if there were such weapons.4

1. J313 HistSum Jul 78 (U); HQ MAC 172200Z May 78 (U).
2. AMEMB Colombo 2879/231002Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Colombo 2920/261045Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; J313 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. SECSTATE 164299/281709Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Colombo 170600/062052 Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; COMSEVENTHFLT 150354Z (S), GDS-86.
4. AMEMB Colombo 3539/040630Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Colombo 4793/171117Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.

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207
In December, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, while visiting the Sri Lankan Secretary for Defense, had expressed appreciation for the hospitality our ships had received in Colombo. The Secretary suggested that the U.S. Navy ships also consider visiting Trincomalee. The Deputy Secretary said it was the U.S. understanding that Sri Lanka did not desire to open that port to foreign warships, but the Secretary for Defense encouraged the Navy to consider visiting Trincomalee and estimated "no serious objection."  

**Taiwan**

In anticipation of a visit by a U.S. Navy officer to Taiwan, in August the State Department advised the Embassy in Taipei that the Department did not wish to resume nuclear powered warship visits to Taiwan at that time. Such port visits, as well as nuclear submarine participation in SHARK HUNT exercises, would run counter to the U.S. Government policy of lowering our military profile on Taiwan. According to State Department records, the last nuclear powered warship visit had occurred in 1972.  

**Tonga**

On 11 May the U.S. Ambassador to Wellington, New Zealand, advised the State Department that during a recent visit to Tonga he had discussed the matter of nuclear powered warship visits to Tonga and that King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV had readily agreed, "just so they don't discharge any nuclear wastes into our harbor." CINCPAC proposed to send USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25) in July. BAINBRIDGE was on a South Pacific cruise, and visited Nukalofa in Tonga from 21 to 24 July. The visit was considered very successful and notably advanced U.S. efforts to open Pacific Island ports to nuclear powered ship visits. The visit also served to forestall an expected effort by New Zealand's Labor Party, should it have been successful in the November election, to close the ports of the South Pacific to such ships and to resurrect the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal. Tonga became the 48th on the global list of countries or territories that welcomed the visits of U.S. nuclear powered warships.  

**Tuvalu**

Nine small islands 2,600 miles southwest of Hawaii became the independent...
dent nation of Tuvalu on 1 October. USS BENJAMIN STODDERT (DDG-22) was on hand to fire a 21-gun salute. Mrs. Elizabeth G. Stevens, a personal representative of the President, headed the U.S. delegation. The British delegation was headed by Princess Margaret. (Tuvalu was a former British protectorate known as the Ellice Islands). While the United States studied the request for a U.S. ship to visit for the ceremony, the Secretary of State had added his personal support to the Ambassador's request. He said, "I repeated my support for ship visits in the South Pacific stressing the political value of such visits in my July 31 testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee...We are preparing for negotiations in September with Tuvalu concerning the four islands in the Tuvalu chain to which the United States has a claim. It could help the atmosphere of these negotiations considerably if we are able to be forthcoming to Tuvalu's request for a U.S. ship visit."  

(S) The JCS also advised CINC PAC of the September negotiations. The Defense Department goals in exchange for renunciation of claims of sovereignty were general assurances of denial of Tuvalu territory for military purposes to powers unfriendly to the United States and sympathetic consideration by the Government of Tuvalu to requests by the United States to introduce military forces into Tuvalu during times of crisis.  

(C) There was some concern about hazards to ships in the Ta-Ava-Fumata (channel) and the commander of the Maritime Squadron within the Royal Fijian Military Forces volunteered to pilot the ship as it approached Tuvalu.  

(U) STODDERT provided administrative and communications support as well as berthing space for some of the delegates. The ship also hosted a luncheon and barbecue, conducted ship tours for the local citizens, and participated not only in the formal independence ceremonies but also in sports and other related events. Ships from Australia, New Zealand, France, and Fiji also attended. A flag of the Republic of Tuvalu, hand-sewn by the wife of one of STODDERT's officers, was raised aboard the ship on Independence Day and then presented to the Tuvalu Prime Minister, Toalifi Lauti.  

(U) STODDERT's commanding officer, Captain McDonald, advised CINC PACFLT,

1. CNO 071533Z Oct 78 (U); SECSTATE 021441Z Aug 78 (S), E.O. 11652 N/A; J313 HistSum Oct '78 (U).
2. JCS 6573/091243Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. USDAO Canberra 1411/250432Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Suva 1545/242000Z Aug 78 (C), E.O. 11652 N/A; USDAO Wellington 809/250432Z (S), ADS 31 Dec 78; CINC PACFLT 282250Z Aug 78 (S), ADS 31 Dec 78.
4. J313 HistSum Oct 78 (U); CNO 071533Z Oct 78 (U).
"Found Funafuti, feted same. Forging on to Fiji."¹

Western Samoa

(§) When USS BAINBRIDGE (CGN-25) was on her South Pacific cruise in the summer, CINCPAC had proposed that the ship call at Fiji, Tonga, and Apia in Western Samoa. As discussed elsewhere in this section, the call at Tonga was completed and successful. The calls at Fiji and Western Samoa were not authorized by the host governments. When the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand was in Samoa he found the proposal to call more tentative than he had in Tonga. Prime Minister Tupuola Efi's first reaction had been that there would be no objection, but then he drew back and said he would have to give the matter more thought. He later said the visit would present domestic political problems. The Ambassador in Wellington felt confident that Prime Minister Efi would consent to such a visit after a national election to be held in February 1979.²

1. USS BENJAMIN STODDERT 012330Z Oct 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 202043Z May 78 (§), GDS-86; AMEMB Wellington 02504/110444Z May 78, XGDS-3; AMEMB Suva 1085/260005Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-84; AMEMB Wellington 5831/030438Z Jul 78 (§), XGDS-2; AMEMB Wellington 03856/250501Z Jul 78 (§), GDS-84.

-Secret-

210
ARNOLD's deployment was thus extended on station by the JCS for three successive one-week periods. ARNOLD departed the Bering Sea Test Support Position on 22 July for Adak, and returned to Pearl Harbor on 31 July.

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 042109Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 180123Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J313 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 292122Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. DIA 302138Z Jun 78 (S), XGDS-2.
4. J313 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 142355Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
Because of the possibility of more testing, PONY EXPRESS assets remained on alert until the operation was terminated on 23 October.²

1. J313 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
3. J313 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85.
1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 199-200; CINCPAC 230250 Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 220340Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. DIA 5168/2900432 Apr 78 (S), XGDS, DECL upon notification by the originato
4. CINCPAC 070220Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
Earlier, on 30 October, the U.S. Ambassador in Suva had described an encounter he had with the Chinese Ambassador at a reception aboard a French patrol boat visiting the Fiji Islands. The Chinese Ambassador was "very relaxed if not pleased" that the United States had taken notice of the HYH-5 in the area. When asked what kind of research the ship was conducting he replied meteorological, adding that it was being carried out in coordination with the World Meteorological Organization. The U.S. Ambassador decided to go further in the conversation and suggested that "some people here in Fiji" would be speculating that the HYH-5 might be investigating the area as a possible missile impact zone. The Chinese Ambassador "certainly thought that this was funny" and "just in case I had any doubts he seriously dismissed the very idea of such a thing accompanying his words with dismissing gestures with his hands for greater emphasis." While the U.S. Ambassador did not wish to underestimate the Chinese talent for dissimulation, he noted that the Chinese Ambassador preferred to use other techniques than dissimulation when he did not want to share information.²

P-3 Operations

Singapore

(3) In the 1977 CINCPAC Command History it was reported that CINCPAC had advised CINCPACFLT that negotiations for the use of Singapore as a P-3 staging base showed little chance of increasing U.S. aircraft presence in that country "in the near future."³

(3) Things moved much more quickly than had been expected, and the first P-3s staged through Singapore in April 1978. During a visit of Prime Minister

1. CINCPAC 262012Z Aug 78 (3), GDS-86; CINCPAC 162315Z Dec 78 (3), DECL 16 Dec 84.
Lee Kuan Yew to Washington in October 1977 the two governments had agreed in principle to the staging of P-3 Orion flights through Singapore, primarily to improve surveillance of Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Lee had noted that his agreement was contingent on advance consultation with the Chairmen of Congressional Foreign Affairs Committees. He wanted a letter from an appropriate U.S. official stating that such consultations had been carried out to protect himself in the event that the existing situation changed and U.S. opinion once again became critical of the U.S. military role in Asia and of those countries that had provided support.

On 13 February the Secretary of State advised the Embassy in Singapore that the Congressional consultations (which also included the House and Senate Armed Services Committees) had been completed and the Ambassador was to inform the Prime Minister of the U.S. intention to conclude the agreement. The State Department text continued that the Defense Department planned an initial effort of about four Maritime Air Patrol flights per month through Singapore enroute to the Indian Ocean and envisioned that the frequency might be expanded at a later date to 8 to 12 flights per month. They would include an overnight crew rest and a need for support by contract services. Also, some minor assistance might be requested from the Royal Australian Air Force. "The United States Government has no plans to station U.S. military personnel in Singapore in connection with these flights."

Subsequent diplomatic exchanges resulted in agreement between the two governments to these conditions by 16 March.

In a completely unrelated incident, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63) was conducting flight operations on 12 March when she experienced main propulsion problems while speeding up to recover aircraft that were aloft. Twelve aircraft were diverted to Singapore International Airport (Paya Lebar) on an emergency basis (5 F-14s, 2 A-6s, 1 HA-7, 2 S-3s, 1 EA-3, and 1 E-2). They subsequently returned to KITTY HAWK without other problems.

On 21 March the U.S. Embassy in Singapore advised of a BBC broadcast (possibly triggered in part by the KITTY HAWK incident) that stated that the United States had asked Singapore for the use of International Airport as a

1. AMEMB Singapore 0111/100545Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 037664/132206Z Feb 78 (G), XGDS-2.
3. AMEMB Singapore 0992/020945Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-86; AMEMB Singapore 1241/16091C Mar 78 (G), GDS-86.
4. CINCPAC 121915Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-86; CTG 77.5 121532Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-84; USDAO Singapore 130220Z Mar 78 (U).

SECRET

215
staging base for military aircraft covering the Indian Ocean, and alleging that Singapore was "now taking the bulk" of such U.S. military traffic, rather than Thailand. Prime Minister Lee, on being shown the transcript, was completely unconcerned, noting that such reports were bound to happen, it was impossible to keep the Soviets from learning of the flights once they began, and his advice was simply to "ride it out."¹

Negotiations had been on-going with the Australians; it was hoped they would provide logistics assistance from the Australian detachment at Tengah Royal Singapore Air Force Base. When the American Charge briefed the Australian High Commissioner on the status of the project on 4 April, the Commissioner had asked that the U.S. State or Defense Department in Washington contact the Australian Embassy to explain the project and confirm Australian logistic assistance. On 19 April the Embassy in Canberra received a note from the Department of Foreign Affairs confirming Australia's support for the U.S. P-3 operations. The note said:²

I can confirm that Australian support to the extent of the present capabilities of the RAAF support unit at Tengah can be provided. It is our understanding that the assistance sought to the RAAF support unit at Tengah is limited to refueling, general ground handling, crew weather briefing and customs clearance. Please note, however, that the RAAF support unit does not have the capability at Tengah to provide crew weather briefing. The RSAF provides this service. The other assistance detailed above applies to U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft transiting Singapore on flights to and from the Indian Ocean area at an initial frequency of no more than four per month. It is also confirmed that the Australian support required by the United States may be arranged through Service-to-Service channels.

On 31 March CINCPAC sent the execute message for the first P-3 flight. He provided public affairs guidance in a separate message, which stated, in response to query only, "For many years U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft have been making regular flights to areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea. Some of them stop briefly in (country name) for fuel and crew rest. Clearance for these flights is always requested in advance from the Government of (country) which has interposed no objection to them." The first P-3 flight through Singapore occurred on 24 April, and was considered by

1. AMEMB Singapore 1306/210745Z Mar 78 (contains GDS-84); AMEMB Singapore 1314/220325Z Mar 78 (contains GDS-84).
2. AMEMB Canberra 2954/190652Z Apr 78 (contains GDS-84).

SECRET

216
the Defense Attache "a smooth operation."

Kenya

As reported in the 1977 Command History, there had been discussion regarding the length of stay of the crews of P-3 aircraft in Kenya. CINCPAC had sought a two-day period of crew rest. To optimize P-3 surveillance time the flights took place during daylight and therefore landed about sunset. Because of the elevation of the airfield, temperatures, and take-off weight, an early morning takeoff was considered prudent from a safety standpoint. This combination of factors left too little time for rest in a single day.

On 6 January 1978 the U.S. Ambassador in Nairobi had advised that the question had been reviewed and that such aircraft could remain up to but not longer than two days (two overnights) without adverse political effect.

First AWACS Deployment to the PACOM

Two E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft deployed to the PACOM in September, the first such deployment. A wire service described the aircraft as modified 707 jetliners with a radar "flying saucer" astride their backs. Its sophisticated radar and computer systems made it the most expensive plane in the operational Air Force fleet. A single AWACS, the wire service said, was able to watch everything that moved in the air in an area extending from New York City to North Carolina and dispatch fighter planes to intercept enemy aircraft throughout that big a zone. The Air Force planned to start using the planes on U.S. air defense missions on 1 January 1979, the wire service report continued, and hoped eventually to persuade Congress to buy 31 of them at a total cost of $3.8 billion.

On 28 April PACOM headquarters had strongly supported CINCPACAF's request for the deployment, noting that this initial deployment was "essential to refine operational concepts, tactics and procedures."

1. CINCPAC 310407Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 010110Z Apr 78 (S); GDS-86 or upon release of contingency statement and Q's and A's; USDAO Singapore 0760/270535Z Apr 78 (S), GDS 31 Dec 86.
3. CINCPAC 040110Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-85; AMEMB Nairobi 0274/061320Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
5. CINCPAC 282306Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
(U) The two AWACS aircraft were in the PACOM in September to participate in Exercises COPE JADE CHARLIE and COPE THUNDER. COPE JADE CHARLIE was a combined U.S.-Republic of Korea air defense exercise. The purpose of the deployment was to develop and test employment procedures and to demonstrate AWACS capabilities to U.S. and allied officials. The deployment to Korea directly supported U.S. Government exercise and deployment commitments made at the 10th and 11th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Committee meetings.1

(S) The aircraft also participated in COPE THUNDER, a U.S. tactical air exercise in the Philippines, but the aircraft did not land in the Philippines and that country was not notified of the deployment. The U.S. Ambassador believed that the sensitivity of ongoing base negotiations and the precedent setting practice of notifying the Philippine government each time an aircraft deployed to the Philippines precluded such notification. The orbit of the AWACS would be in international airspace, but afforded radar coverage of land and ocean areas covering a wide radius.2

(6) The aircraft deployed from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma (552nd AWACS Wing) and arrived at Kadena in Okinawa on 6 September. All practice and exercise missions were flown from Kadena from 9 through 14 September. The E-3As did not land in Korea or the Philippines during this period.3

(U) Prior to their redeployment to the CONUS, E-3A static displays were conducted at Osan Air Base in Korea, Kadena, and Yokota in Japan, and Hickam in Hawaii. This was to provide maximum visibility of the aircraft to the media and host country officials. President Park of Korea was among those to visit the aircraft in Korea.

(U) Electronic interference with host country systems was not a problem.

(U) The major significance of the introduction of the AWACS into the PACOM was the added command and control and air defense radar coverage it provided in the Korean scenario.4

(U) It was possible that introduction of the AWACS might be delayed following the discovery of a potential fuel booster pump failure problem discovered in November. The Air Force was working with the manufacturer to resolve the problem, the Defense Department announced on 2 December.5

1. J311 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.; J6 BWEB 14-27 Aug 78 (S); REVW 28 Aug 98.
3. J311 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. Ibid.
5. SECDEF 0201022 Dec 78 (U).
Six-Month Marine Temporary Additional Duty Deployments

In mid-January 1978 the Commandant of the Marine Corps proposed a Western Pacific U.S. Marine Corps deployment plan to enhance combat readiness by providing the personnel required to man assigned WESTPAC air and ground combat units (battalions and squadrons) through six-month temporary additional duty deployments of those tactical units from CONUS and Hawaii homebases. The six-phase evolution was designed to be effected with one increment each fiscal year. The plan provided an alternative means of meeting personnel requirements in WESTPAC (from permanent change of station) while improving overall U.S. Marine Corps readiness. The deployment cycles in each phase were in addition to the continuous deployment cycles that began in each preceding phase.

The six phases were to be as follows:

- Phase One (FY 78) involved the deployment of one Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and an F-4 (VMFA) squadron from Hawaii and the subsequent relocation of a like-sized force from WESTPAC to CONUS and Hawaii homebases.

- Phase Two (FY 79) was to begin with the deployment of one infantry battalion, one F-4 (VMFA) squadron, one CH-46 (HMM) squadron, and one CH-53 (HMH) squadron from CONUS to WESTPAC and subsequent relocations of like units from WESTPAC to CONUS homebases.

- Phase Three (FY 80) was to begin with the deployment of one infantry battalion, one A-6 (VMA(AW)) squadron, one A-4 (VMA) squadron, and one HUH-1 (HML) squadron detachment (reduction of UH-1 aircraft had been previously approved) from CONUS to WESTPAC and subsequent relocations of like units from WESTPAC to CONUS homebases.

- Phase Four (FY 81) was to begin with the deployment of one infantry battalion from CONUS to WESTPAC and subsequent relocation of a like unit from WESTPAC to a CONUS homebase.

- Phase Five (FY 82) was to begin with the deployment of one infantry battalion from CONUS to WESTPAC and the subsequent relocation of a like unit from WESTPAC to a CONUS homebase.

- Phase Six (FY 83) was to begin with the deployment of one infantry battalion from CONUS to WESTPAC and the subsequent relocation of a like unit from WESTPAC to a CONUS homebase.

1. JCS 22232227 Feb 78 (S). GDS-86. The Marine proposal was in CMC 1-78 of 18 Jan 78.
2. Ibid.
(S) The new plan required the Marines to be stabilized in tactical units that were homebased in CONUS and Hawaii. This stabilization was expected to enhance the continuity of training and leadership in combatant units, improve family stability and ameliorate the impact of repetitive 12-month family separations, and have a salutary effect on morale, attrition, discipline rates, and skill levels, thereby achieving improved uniform readiness throughout the Marine Corps.

(S) See the Plans chapter of this history for a discussion of CINCPAC's objections to redeploying U.S. Marine Corps assets from the PACOM to Europe to support NATO.

Operational Tests

Final analysis of such tests was conducted by Johns Hopkins University, with the results usually available

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 100431Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 3550/091200Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUS Japan 190105Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
in about two months.  

**USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN**

(U) The nuclear powered submarine USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (SSBN-602) became the first fleet ballistic missile submarine to complete 50 patrols when she returned to port at Apra Harbor in Guam early in March. Since commissioning 17 years ago, the submarine had spent more than eight and a half years submerged (74,571 hours) and steamed a distance equivalent to circumnavigating the globe almost 17 times. The submarine throughout her lifetime had met every operational commitment and passed every readiness inspection, according to the CNO's public affairs office.

**Exercise Scheduling**

(C) Early in February the JCS provided information on the proposed five-year JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise schedules, and provided preliminary guidance on funding for exercises in FY 80 and 81. The deadline for CINCPAC's submission was 15 March. For planning purposes only USAF airlift exercise funding figures furnished for CINCPAC were $15,705,000 for FY 80 and FY 81. Additionally, a figure of $28,600,000 was provided, for planning purposes, to support exercises as a portion of the Korean withdrawal offset program for FY 80. The JCS also announced the annual Worldwide exercise scheduling conference held in July 1978.

(C) Prior to the 1978 conference, CINCPAC reminded the JCS that during the 1977 conference PACOM representatives had stated that KANGAROO III, a joint combined exercise sponsored by Australia, and the Korean exercise withdrawal offset package had both been unfunded. JCS-allocated airlift dollars did not provide sufficient funds for those requirements. CINCPAC noted the concern that had been expressed over ANZUS exercises, reflecting U.S. support of Australia as a key member of ANZUS. CINCPAC believed that airlift support for KANGAROO III was essential in demonstrating that resolve. He also considered support of the Korea offset exercises "essential."

(C) The JCS replied that there was no indication that additional exercise airlift funds would be made available other than those that had already been funded.

1. J821 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CNO 1118242 Mar 78 (U).
3. JCS 8813/0118202 Feb 78 (C), GDS-84.
4. CINCPAC 3005572 Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.
5. JCS 5115/2213082 Jul 78 (C), GDS-84, which cited JCS 231415Z May 78.
Another facet of exercise planning continued to be of importance in 1978 as it had in previous years. This was the perception of others, both allied and potential enemy, created by the significant military exercise program. The JCS Director for Operations, therefore, urged that unified commanders take the greatest care to insure a comprehensive evaluation of both allied and potential enemy perceptions for each planned exercise.¹

Selected exercises that took place in the PACOM or in which the PACOM participated in 1978 are discussed in the material that follows.

1. JCS 5525/1914412 Oct 78 (S), (EX), GDS-84.
3. J3321 HistSum Jan 78 (TS), XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 05.

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1. [Note: The number 1 is used here, possibly indicating a reference or citation, but the number is not followed by the actual reference text.]
CINC PAC's Director for Operations provided his personal assessment of the exercise to his counterpart in the JCS on 29 April. He considered certain aspects of the scenario that pertained to the PACOM as unrealistic and proposed that scenarios for future exercises consider real-world capabilities and probabilities and be designed within those parameters. He noted some confusion regarding procedures for transfer of War Reserve Stocks for Allies and recommended specific guidance. He also noted certain inadequacies involving the COMUS Korea response cell in Hawaii when part of the exercise concerned Korea. For future exercises he recommended a scenario that was releasable to the Republic of Korea, which would result in real-world training for actual contingencies as well as satisfy JCS exercise objectives. During later stages of the exercise PACOM naval forces had been ordered to deploy to the European and Atlantic

1. ADMIN CINC PAC (ALFA 128) 2821517 Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J3 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.

SECRET

223
SECRET

Commands. He reiterated CINCPAC's opposition to the "Swing Strategy." Communications security procedures had been greatly improved, but still more secure voice equipment was required. He concluded that the exercise was very beneficial to the PACOM.1

NIFTY NUGGET

NIFTY NUGGET was a JCS-sponsored and conducted biennial Command Post Exercise held from 10 through 30 October 1978. The exercise scenario portrayed a situation characterized by worldwide escalating tensions. Because of those rising tensions the USSR reinforced Central Europe causing the United States to shift to a national mobilization posture. Tensions then led to an outbreak of conventional hostilities in Europe and a worldwide war at sea.

The broad objectives of NIFTY NUGGET were to exercise and evaluate logistic plans and procedures under mobilization conditions, to evaluate the effectiveness of the automated data processing system in support of mobilization and deployment, to exercise and evaluate the command and control system, and to determine limitations and shortfalls in manpower and logistics in support of a conventional NATO conflict. PACOM participants besides the CINCPAC staff were the Air Force and Navy components, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, and the subordinate unified commands in Japan and Taiwan. COMUS Korea did not participate.2

In a "Well Done" message to PACOM participants, CINCPAC noted that the training received was invaluable. He said that the success of the exercise would come after the problem identification, exercise analysis, and after-action process that "must take advantage of the valuable training and lessons learned."3

In his annual report to the Congress, Defense Secretary Harold Brown (according to the Washington Star) said that "severe shortcomings" had been discovered in the nation's readiness to respond to an attack on NATO forces in Europe during a simulated full mobilization alert. The exercise was described as the largest test of U.S. wartime alert capabilities in recent years, testing the full system of logistics needed for rapid reinforcement of Western Europe—everything short of a call-up of troops—and it "apparently resulted in a sizeable strategic snafu."4

1. CINCPAC 292142Z Apr 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
2. J3515 HistSum Oct 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 072127Z Nov 78 (U).
The CINC of the European Command in his initial assessment told the JCS that the most significant issues highlighted were the lack of sufficient forces and strategic airlift to accommodate simulated execution of CINCs' OPLANs. "This familiar dilemma surfaced early as JCS grappled with the problem of trying to satisfy legitimate but competing military requirements of the CINCs." 1

CINCPAC's assessment addressed the "Swing Strategy," protection of sea lines of communication, strategic airlift, defense of the Aleutians, and the Panama Canal. He also noted that neither U.S. Ambassadors nor the Combined Forces Command in Korea had been included. See the Plans chapter of this history for a more detailed account of CINCPAC's position on the "Swing Strategy." The logistics support of NIFTY NUGGET in the PACOM is discussed in more detail in the Logistics chapter of this history. 2

STEADFAST 78

Exercise STEADFAST 78 was conducted from 30 January to 3 February. It was an exercise of staff procedures to implement and coordinate a variety of Naval countermeasures against Warsaw Pact merchant and naval vessels in retaliation for interference with Allied ground and air access to Berlin. CINCPAC was the director of the Naval Coordination Center, Pacific, which was designated FREE FLOW. The FREE FLOW organization was normally comprised of naval officers from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as the United States. During Exercise STEADFAST 78 two foreign officers participated at CINCPAC, one French and the other Australian. Around-the-clock watches were manned at the coordination center (a CINCPAC staff conference room) for the duration of the exercise. At a conference critique held later in February in Norfolk, Virginia, a CINCPAC Operations Directorate officer recommended that CINCPAC participate in the exercise every other year. 3

Telephone Notification Exercise

A CINCPAC staff telephone notification exercise was initiated by the CINCPAC Command Center at 1915 hours (local time) on 19 January, a Thursday. (CINCPAC and his Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff were exempt.) The last staff directorate was notified at 1929 hours, and other staff elements had all been notified by 1942. All reported their internal notification completion times to the Command Center. The last notification completion time was at 2058. 4

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1. USCINCEUR 050852Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 3 Dec 86.
2. CINCPAC 280206Z Nov 78 (S) (EX), REVW 28 Nov 98.
3. J313 HistSum Feb 78 (SNAF), GDS-86.
4. J3321 HistSum Jan 78 (U).

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

225
PORT ARMS

Exercises in the PORT ARMS series also continued during 1978. These were JCS-conducted readiness increase exercises. They were intended to insure that personnel were familiar with the publications, procedures, and actions necessary to attain a higher Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON). The JCS directed review of the DEFCON change procedures by initiation of a PORT ARMS exercise on 9 June at 0959 (local). The Chief of Staff directed staff participation in reviewing requirements and alternatives. The exercise was considered to have gone well.1

FORCE LIST 78

FORCE LIST 78 was a procedural Command Post Exercise conducted from 3 to 10 May. The purpose was to evaluate the effectiveness of a new force deployment planning and reporting system designed to replace the Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP) during time-sensitive and relatively large crisis operations involving the potential deployment of substantial CONUS-based augmentation forces.2

Procedures to be followed were as outlined in JCS SM 100-77, which was concerned with operational planning and reporting procedures to support the Crisis Action System. FORCE LIST 78 was the first large-scale evaluation, and the exercise had highlighted several areas in which procedural changes would be required to improve procedures prior to their scheduled implementation later in 1978. At the completion of the first phase of the exercise CINCPAC had noted that the SM-100 instructions implied a requirement for more data than was actually required during the Crisis Action evaluation process.3

As a result of the exercise, the following requirements were recommend-
ed to the JCS:4

- If time permitted, supported unified commanders should have the opportunity to review the Preliminary Closure Estimate at the earliest possible time. Procedures should also be developed to expedite the production of the Preliminary Closure Estimate by the Transportation Operating Authorities.

2. J419 HistSum Jun 78 (U).
3. CINCPAC 060053Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CINCPAC Ltr Ser 1058 of 31 May 78, Subj: Exercise FORCE LIST 78 Lessons Learned (U); J419 HistSum Jun 78 (U).
- More definitive guidance was needed on the information required to support the preparation of the Preliminary Closure Estimate. This was the Crisis Action System Force Deployment Data.

- Guidance for the development of Warning Orders should be modified to provide transportation planning guidance for the Transportation Feasibility Estimator.

- Additional automated procedures were required to assist in the management of the large volume of crisis action data associated with large force lists.

(U) SM 100-77 was superseded by SM 725-78, Time Sensitive Operational Planning Procedures to Support the Crisis Action System, on 8 September. Formal implementation procedures occurred on 10 October when Change 7 to JCS Publication 6, Volume II, Part 2, Chapters 3 to 10 was published. A revision of JOPS Volume IV was expected in the early part of 1979.1

TEAM SPIRIT 78

TEAM SPIRIT 78 was, as TEAM SPIRIT 77 had been the year before, the largest exercise ever conducted in the PACOM. It was conducted in Korea and contiguous waters from 7 to 17 March 1978. Its purpose was to test deployment, reception, and employment of Korean and U.S. forces responding to likely contingencies in the Korean theater with fully integrated joint and combined operations. It involved some 107,000 Korean and U.S. personnel.2

(U) U.S. participation included a LANCE Battery (+) from Fort Sill, Oklahoma (LANCE was a long-range missile system either conventional or nuclear capable, but only in the conventional role); an infantry battalion task force from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; an EB-57 detachment from Burlington, Vermont; National Guard Special Forces elements from Utah; plus other forces from CONUS. There were also Marine amphibious elements and a carrier task group from the PACOM, in addition to Eighth U.S. Army elements, and Air and Naval Forces, Korea. Deployment of most forces was administratively scheduled prior to the start of the exercise to minimize costs.

(U) The exercise was conducted in three phases, the first of which was a 36-hour indications and warning phase during which the staffs responded with Defense Readiness Condition changes in preparation for a full-scale attack from the North. Phase II was a 3½-day defensive operation designed to test...

1. J334 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. J3512 HistSum Apr 78 (U), GDS-84.
CONFIDENTIAL

country forces augmented with deploying forces in containing a North Korean invasion by land, sea, and air. Phase III was a 6-day counteroffensive operation. It commenced with an amphibious operation and simultaneous attacks along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area supported by air and naval operations. Phase III followed a simulated 18-day additional defensive period during which containment of the enemy attack had been successful. Administrative redeployment of out-of-country forces followed termination of the exercise.

TEAM SPIRIT 78, unlike previous exercises in the series, received widespread publicity through public affairs announcements. A number of Korean newspaper and television reporters had traveled to Hawaii to deploy with the 25th Infantry Division task force from Schofield Barracks on Oahu. Comments made to International Communications Agency members in Korea made it clear that favorable press comment accurately reflected Korean popular reaction to the exercise. It had provided a definite boost to Korean confidence in the U.S. commitment. Several journalists had confided that the ROK Government had asked the press to tone down coverage to avoid raising public confidence so high that self-defense efforts would slacken.

CINCPAC provided a number of details on the exercise to the JCS early in May; the information had been requested in connection with an upcoming JCS Congressional briefing on the exercise. The information that follows was provided in that May message.

Deployment and reception of forces was addressed first. Air augmentation forces consisting of 4,000 personnel and 163 aircraft, and ground augmentation forces with 1,100 personnel, including Special Forces and a LANCE unit from CONUS and an infantry battalion task force from Hawaii, arrived on schedule and were ready for employment at the start of the exercise. The Military Airlift Command and receiving bases did an excellent job of managing the flow of traffic to prevent facility saturation. The Air Forces from the Western Pacific and CONUS operated from eight locations in the ROK (Kwang Ju, Taegu, Osan, Kimhae, Kunsan, Sachon, Yechon, and Pohang) with no major support problems. The capacity to receive and support deployed augmentation forces had improved since the 1977 exercise.

Ground operations were discussed. At the beginning of the exercise all headquarters elements of regiments or brigades and above, in the forward defense areas of the ROK, were deployed to their operating locations. This

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; COMUS Korea 230551Z Feb 78 (U); AMEMB Seoul 3345/220203Z Apr 78 (C), REVW 22 Apr 08.
3. CINCPAC 020303Z May 78 (C), GDS-84.
was primarily a mobility exercise and provided excellent training in establishing field command posts and setting up communications. Between 8 and 12 March the ground forces conducted tactical training in a generally defensive posture. I Corps Group (ROK-U.S.) and the First ROK Army provided and controlled aggressor forces to oppose the defending units, which initially withdrew under aggressor pressure and then conducted counterattacks to restore lost ground. The LANCE missile unit was employed very effectively in support of those operations and conducted simulated conventional fire missions.

(6) From 13 March to the end of the exercise ground units practiced offensive tactics against the aggressor. Other ground units, which included some mobilized ROK reserves, were employed during this phase. One highlight of the exercise was the maneuver of a composite mechanized division made up of a brigade from the U.S. 2nd Division and a brigade from the ROK Capital Mechanized Division. This composite ROK-U.S. unit was commanded by a ROK general officer.

(6) That phase of the exercise was considered very successful. It had involved air drops of equipment and personnel, close air support provided by USAF, USN, USMC, and ROK Air Force aircraft, and ground maneuver units working in close coordination with this support.

(9) The U.S. infantry battalion from the 25th Division was put under Operational Control of a ROK division in the First ROK Army area for the entire exercise. The unit received excellent training while working with the Koreans, and identified several areas that needed improvement in their training areas to better prepare them for the climate and terrain encountered in Korea. The continuing need for language training, especially military terms, was also pointed out.

(6) The air operations effort was increased significantly over the previous year's exercise. There were more different types of aircraft involved and many were equipped with high technology systems that enhanced overall operations. Weapons systems that were especially impressive were the A-6 and F-111 with their inherent all-weather attack capabilities, the C-130 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, and Navy E-2Cs that played a major role in maintaining direction and control over the many ongoing air events. A-6 and EB-57 electronic warfare systems and AC-130 gunships performed a variety of missions to include close air support and air base and installation defense. The total number of sorties exceeded the 1977 effort and was accomplished in fewer flying days, with a per day sortie rate of approximately 680 versus 530. The ability of the units to maintain high aircraft operationally-ready rates was impressive, especially for the ROK Air Force, which averaged over 90 percent even during high sortie surge periods.
The air campaign to achieve air superiority went well. Air Forces Korea (the 314th Air Division) was able to integrate effectively air resources from the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps into this effort. Part of this success was due to a much improved command and control interface with elements of the Navy and Marine Corps. A large part of the air effort, approximately 2,300 sorties, went into providing close air support to the ground maneuver elements. Not only was good training provided, but techniques and procedures improved, especially the use of all-weather systems, such as F-111s, A-6s, and B-52s.

Training in delivering live ordnance was also provided to the aircrews. Three different range complexes in the ROK were used for this purpose and live munitions, including high technology weapons such as MAVERICKs and laser-guided bombs, were employed using tactical deliveries.

During the initial phases of Navy and Marine operations, U.S. and ROK naval units conducted a combined antisubmarine operation in the Korea Straits and a mine-laying and mine-countermeasures exercise in Chinhae harbor. Live naval gunfire was also employed on ranges located in the southern part of the ROK.

As the exercise progressed, the carrier task group with the USS MIDWAY (CV-41) moved into position off Pohang to support an amphibious landing of approximately 3,000 ROK and U.S. Marines at Tok Sok Ri on 12 March. After a successful landing these forces were joined by 4,000 pre-deployed U.S. Marines and conducted five days of offensive operations against U.S. and ROK Marine aggressors. This effort was supported by U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft from MIDWAY and bases in the ROK. In addition, U.S. Air Force and ROK Air Force sorties were employed in support of Marine forces to gain operating experience in a different command and control environment. During the latter stages of the Marine ground offensive, the combined operation was placed under the command of a ROK Marine Corps general officer. This provided a valuable training experience.

For unconventional warfare operations, Special Forces units from the ROK and U.S. ground, air, and naval unconventional warfare forces were placed under the operational control of the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force. This unit was commanded by a ROK general officer who reported directly to CINCUNC. The CINCAPAC Special Operations Cadre was provided as a U.S. contingent. Over 1,650 Special Warfare personnel participated. Ground actions centered in the I Corps and First ROK Army areas, and were prosecuted from a Combined Special Forces Operating Base at Taegu, an Air Force Special Operations Base

1. Ibid.

CONFIDENTIAL

230
at K-2 Air Base (Taegu), and a unilateral ROK Special Forces operating base a Kimpo. Maritime operations were conducted in the Northwest Islands, Cheju Island, and the coast from bases at Chinhae and Inchon. Extensive joint and combined operations were conducted against headquarters, lines of communication, assembly areas, port facilities, and government and military installations. The forces received very realistic training and gave internal security forces and procedures a good test during those events.1

(Г) In the CINCPAC summary message to the JCS on 2 May the overall assessment was that TEAM SPIRIT 78 had been one of the most productive exercises conducted in Korea. The view was shared by both the ROK military and ROK government, including President Park. The major objective, to provide combined and joint training for ROK and U.S. forces, was achieved. The operation of the U.S.-ROK combined battle staff was considered noteworthy. "It was evident that they are becoming more capable of planning, directing and controlling complex operations. This capability will increase as they evolve into the Combined Forces Command structure where the combined staff will be in continuous operation. TEAM SPIRIT provided an opportunity to show our constant readiness and ability and willingness to deploy forces rapidly if necessary to assist in the defense of the Republic of Korea."2

(Я) Prior to the exercise, in February, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials instructed their Embassy in Washington to make several points to the U.S. State or Defense Departments regarding TEAM SPIRIT 78. The Japanese appreciated the demonstration of U.S. determination to live up to commitments as exemplified by such exercises, but believed that due care should be taken to prevent misunderstandings that would give rise to doubts among the Japanese people and weaken their faith in arrangements under the U.S.-Japan security system.

(U) One observer of TEAM SPIRIT 78 was U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan who told a press conference in Seoul that he was "extremely

1. Ibid., J363 HistSum Mar 78 (S), REWV 18 Apr 98.
2. CINCPAC 020303Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCUNC 220650Z Mar 78 (S) (EX), GDS-8
3. AMEMB Tokyo 2999/240412Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; SECSTATE 048826/242216Z Feb 7 (S), GDS-84

-SECRET-

231
impressed" with the readiness and defensive capabilities of both the U.S. and Korean forces. He was "confident that together we can deal with any North Korea aggression."  

(U) The ROK Minister of National Defense, Ro Jae-hyun, in a message to the American troops, noted that the two countries not only gained the benefit of testing and evaluating joint reaction capabilities on land, sea, and in the air, but also were "provided an opportunity and illustrative means of demonstrating our constant mutual commitment to peace and our joint resolve to abide thereby, especially in a land where the threat to peace remains real and undiminished."  

(4) As had been the case the year before, planning for TEAM SPIRIT 79 began almost as soon as TEAM SPIRIT 78 had been completed.  

ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 78  

(5) For the third consecutive year the Republic of Korea's mobilization exercise ULCHI, a large-scale command post exercise with limited field training exercise play, was combined with the United Nations Command joint/combined command post exercise called FOCUS LENS. The exercise was conducted in Korea from 23 to 28 June. The primary objective of the 1978 exercise was to exercise, evaluate, and improve the proficiency and organization of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command staff, which was scheduled to be officially formed on 1 October.  

(6) The scenario was based on a coordinated land, sea, and air attack by North Korea, supported by unconventional forces. The exercise was conducted in three phases, and involved ROK forces and U.S. forces from all Services including selected CONUS elements and theater assets.

1. USIS Seoul 140950Z Mar 78 (U).  
2. CINCUNC 160145Z Mar 78 (U).  
As mentioned above, unconventional warfare forces were part of the exercise. The CINCPAC Special Operations Cadre augmented the ROK Special Warfare staff to form a Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force headquarters which was located at Seongnam. Cooperation and exchange of ideas among ROK and U.S. members of the staff was one of the strong points of the exercise. Interface with the Combined Forces Command staff was good except for periodic difficulties with communications.  

During the defense phase of the exercise, unconventional warfare operations consisted of providing defense against infiltration of North Korean personnel. In addition, unconventional warfare forces provided information on enemy activities in areas north of the Demilitarized Zone. In the offensive phase, unconventional warfare forces were employed in North Korea to conduct direct action missions until linkup with friendly forces. Infiltration plans were developed for land, sea, and air operations.  

A number of unconventional warfare objectives were established for the exercise and successfully completed. These included to improve combined command and staff capabilities in the employment and controlling of large-scale unconventional warfare forces; to improve target acquisition techniques; to improve and evaluate unconventional warfare infiltration techniques (air, land, and sea) and the support systems of deployed unconventional warfare forces; to test functionally and improve the Combined Unconventional Warfare Policy and Planning Guide, to include report formats and reporting systems; and to improve procedures and the command relationship between the task force and the Combined Forces Command.  

At CINCPAC headquarters the Logistics Readiness Center was activated on 22 June to monitor logistics actions. The Logistics-Security Assistance Support Force:  

1. Ibid.; J362 HistSum Jun 78 (GDS-84); ADMIN CINCPAC 280307Z Jun 78 (GDS-86).  
3. Ibid.
Directorate contributed comments on the following matters to CINCUNC/Combined Forces Command, the Deputy Director of the CFC said that both he and General Vessey believed that the exercise had been successful in every way. He said, "We have learned important lessons that will serve us well in the future. Most importantly, we have, for the first time, fully exercised the Combined Forces Command organization and have proven the concept a success." He noted that while there was much work ahead to analyze and build on the lessons learned, there could be confidence that the CFC would provide the unity of effort necessary to insure success and provide the foundation for the mutual defense of the ROK.²

Those lessons continued to be studied. Prior to the exercise the JCS had requested that the effectiveness of the ROK-U.S. combined command be monitored during the exercise and that a general assessment be provided to include CINCPAC's views and recommendations.³

On 10 July COMUS Korea provided his comments. He said that preliminary indications concerning the adequacy of the Terms of Reference, command relationships, and other aspects of the command following the exercise were adequate. Specifically he listed the following. The flow of information to subordinate commands was smooth and efficient. Non-SI communications were adequate;

1. J419 HistSum Jun 78 (S), REVW 30 Jun 98.
2. CINCUNC/CFC MAIN CP TANGO 280504Z Jun 78 (U).
3. ADMIN CINCPAC 080406Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
CINCPAC concurred in the report and agreed that it would be helpful to have a U.S. general officer (07) on the intelligence staff. He noted that the report should be considered an interim evaluation, but subsequent messages later in the year did not make substantive changes to the conclusions.  

Exercises in Taiwan

1. COMUSK 100600Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 150117Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; the other messages were CINCPAC 070315Z Nov 78 and COMUSK 130811Z Nov 78.
4. Ibid.
5. AMEMB Taipei 6284/140930Z Oct 77 (S), GDS-85; JCS 2520/121251Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-84.
1. SECSTATE 107888/272051Z Apr 78 (6) (EX), XGDS-84.
2. J3523 Point Paper (6), 9 Jun 78, Subj: "J35 History Notes May 78 (6), GDS-84; CINCPAC 070645Z May 78 (6) (EX), GDS-84.
3. SECSTATE 122734/132326Z May 78 (6) (EX), GDS-84; ADMIN CINCPAC 180220Z May 78 (6), GDS-86; SECSTATE 127416/190006Z May 78 (6), GDS-86, which cited STATE 125042/180444Z May 78.
4. COMUSTDC 300045Z May 78 (6), GDS-84.
1. AMEMB Taipei 07063/190347Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; SECSTATE 278401/020132Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSTDC 270020Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
2. CINCPAC 030117Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 2320/082141Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. AMEMB Taipei 08523/200132Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 20 Dec 84; AMEMB Taipei 00022/030722Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85.
Combined Exercises Near the Philippines

(5) A Navy Special Warfare Exercise conducted in the Philippines in 1977 had been altered at the last minute when participation by Australian and New Zealand detachments had been "precluded by non-availability of diplomatic clearance from the Philippines."2

(5) The same kind of problem occurred in February 1978. The CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines advised that although he had conducted extensive personal liaison with the British Ambassador and the U.S. Embassy, the Philippines had refused permission for the British, Australian, and Thai navies to conduct SEA SIAM VII and FRIENDSHIP I exercises in Philippine operating areas. He forwarded the text of a 17 February note from the Department of Foreign Affairs, which discussed the 1977 matter, noting that while the Philippines had been invited to participate in the Special Warfare Exercise, they only later came to know of proposed participation by Australia and New Zealand. The Philippines then denied participation because of a lack of "prior understanding" on the manner. "It is suggested that in similar future exercises, the prior approval of the Philippine Government be secured before invitations are extended to other countries to send naval ships to the Philippines. This procedure will promote coordination between the Philippines and the United States and preclude embarrassments to the other countries concerned."3

(5) Denial of clearance for the British and Australian navies to use Subic Bay sea operating areas necessitated cancellation of FRIENDSHIP I.4

1. CINCPAC 060431Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 007199/111553Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. CINCPACREP PHIL 221010Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CINCPACFLT 230723Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
the Commander, Seventh Fleet had requested exercise approval from the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand only. The Embassy subsequently learned that part of the exercise was to involve the use of naval firing ranges on the coast north of Subic Bay and that the United Kingdom and Australia had also been invited to participate, but the Philippines had not. The U.S. Navy informed the Naval Attachés of Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Australia in Manila that prior diplomatic clearance from the Philippines would be required and those countries submitted their notes on 23 January, 27 January, and 13 February. The Philippine note of 17 February from the DFA followed. The Embassy recommended that Subic discuss with the Armed Forces of the Philippines at the earliest planning stages, following Country Team approval, all combined naval exercises that would take place within Philippine territorial waters; if the AFP agreed that participation by those third countries was desirable, and that if the Philippines wished to issue the invitations, that Government would be the party to do so.1

CINPACFLT provided some guidance to the Commander, Seventh Fleet and COMUSNAVPHL, noting, among other things, the disparity to the territorial sea limit recognized by the nations involved: three nautical miles for the United Kingdom and Australia, 12 nautical miles for Thailand and New Zealand. He commented on the "delicate nuances" of different recognized and claimed territorial sea limits of the parties involved and recommended a careful, methodical approach, as there was no urgency involved.2

CINPAC agreed with CINPACFLT's approach, but advised that the guideline regarding courtesy notification for U.S.-only exercises between 3 and 12 nautical miles of the Philippines could adversely impact on Law of the Sea negotiations. He noted that this was a highly sensitive subject and of interest not only to CINPAC but to higher headquarters.3

CINPAC concluded that to insure that a U.S. cooperative attitude with the Philippines was evident during the development of procedures relative to combined exercise coordination, combined maritime exercises involving third country forces should be conducted outside the limits outlined by CINPACFLT (three nautical miles for Australia and the United Kingdom, 12 for Thailand and New Zealand).4

CINPACFLT submitted his proposed procedures to CINPAC on 3 April. CINPAC concurred with implementation of the revised procedures, which included

1. AMEMB Manila 3195/270945Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. CINPACFLT 180000Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINPAC 250325Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. Ibid.
informing the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Mutual Defense Board Plans Committee of combined exercises when third countries would be using land or close-to-land areas and scheduling combined exercises outside the 12 nautical mile limit when possible to avoid diplomatic clearance problems. CINCPAC provided the reminder that coordination with Country Teams was also required.¹

On 13 April the JCS forwarded the text of a note from the British Embassy to the U.S. Government regarding the exercises, outlining their view of exercises carried out on the high seas and requesting information from the U.S. State Department on Philippine maritime limits the United States recognized, more details about U.S.-Philippine agreements, and whether the Department had considered Law of the Sea negotiations prior to notification of exercises. The JCS were asked to provide further background on the two exercises that had been scheduled early in 1978.²

CINCPAC’s reply of 19 April noted that there were two distinct exercises involved, SEA SIAM VII, scheduled for 24 to 26 February, and FRIENDSHIP I, scheduled for 22 to 26 February. SEA SIAM, an antisubmarine warfare exercise, was conducted entirely on the high seas and involved only Thai and U.S. Navy units; no clearance from the Philippine Government was necessary except for Thai ship port visits. FRIENDSHIP I was a biennial naval warfare exercise and was to include participation by the British and Australian navies as well as limited Thai naval participation. Part of FRIENDSHIP I was to involve the use of Leon Creek Target Area, on Philippine soil, for naval gunfire support; thus the British properly sought required Philippine clearance. The British note cited above, CINCPAC said, appeared to view the FRIENDSHIP exercise as totally a "high seas" exercise, and did not mention shore bombardment. Earlier efforts by the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the Philippines to resolve clearance problems through the Philippine Navy headquarters had been unsuccessful. Following Philippine refusal for FRIENDSHIP I, Thai and U.S. Navy units went ahead with SEA SIAM VII. The United Kingdom was offered the opportunity to conduct FRIENDSHIP I on the high seas, but declined because of the requirement to cancel the naval gunfire support portion of the exercise. CINCPAC again outlined revised procedures initiated as a result of these problems. He also commented on some of the Law of the Sea implications of exercises and emphasized that the United States recognized only a three nautical mile Philippine territorial sea.³

1. CINCPACFLT 031928Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 151955Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-84, J5123 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. JCS 4234/132144Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 192213Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
Combined Exercises with Australia and New Zealand

U.S. Forces exercised with the forces of various other PACOM countries, and combined exercises with the forces of Australia and New Zealand were conducted many times throughout the year. Certain of those exercises are addressed elsewhere in this chapter. Some exercise planning was in response to an Australian concern over the U.S. Indian Ocean presence and the need to back up policy statements with innovative, highly visible programs. The JCS had recommended inclusion of land-based strike air in a combined maritime exercise with Australia, and CINCPACAF deployed aircraft for various exercises, as noted below. CINCPAC cautioned CINCPACAF, however, regarding the JCS restriction on not deploying land-based strike forces greater than those deployed on previous ANZUS exercises.1

GRAND LEGEND

CINCPAC's Representative in Canberra forwarded a letter from the Australian Department of Defense inviting U.S. Air Force participation in an air defense exercise conducted 21 August to 1 September. This was the major air defense exercise for 1978 and involved Australian Army and Navy units supplementing the Royal Australian Air Force. PACAF provided four F-5E aircraft for participation in the exercise.2

BEACON SOUTH

BEACON SOUTH was a combined exercise of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force and Navy conducted off the West Coast of Australia in the Indian Ocean from 5 to 7 August and again on 12 and 13 August, with a port visit between those dates for the nuclear powered task group. It was a war at sea and maritime air superiority exercise and was conducted as participating U.S. Navy ships returned from a routine Indian Ocean deployment. U.S. participants were USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65), USS TRUXTON (CGN-35), USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9), and USS ROANOKE (AOR-7). An Australian Navy frigate, HMAS STUART, and Australian Air Force F-111s participated. The first exercise period was inbound to Fremantle, a major Western Australian port city, and the second involved sea maneuvers north from Fremantle. The key objective of the exercise was to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to South Pacific regional security by not limiting, or appearing to limit, our freedom to exercise in Australian and associated waters.3

1. CINCPAC 252313Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 040029Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. Ibid., USAFLO/CINCPACREP Canberra 110657Z May 78 (U).
3. J3522 HistSum Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
CAPTIVE LIGHTNING V

(U) CAPTIVE LIGHTNING V was a combined air mobility, cold-weather Field Training Exercise sponsored by the U.S. Army, the Army's CINCPAC Support Group, and the New Zealand Defence Staff. It was conducted in the Tekapo Training Area/Burnham Camp on South Island, New Zealand from 1 to 16 September. The exercise had been scheduled to be held from 25 June to 23 July and an advance party from the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, had been deployed at that time. The whole battalion did not deploy as planned, however, because of an outbreak of hepatitis among battalion personnel. When 36 men had been afflicted the New Zealand Field Force Commander was notified of the delay, and the advance party returned to Hawaii. When the exercise was conducted in September U.S. participation was reduced to 150 men, a rifle company, because New Zealand was not able to support the exercise in September at the same level as had been originally scheduled. The U.S. Air Force supported the exercise with four F-4Es and four KC-135s. The exercise was considered successful in its demonstration of air mobility and cold-weather capabilities.1

(U) When the exercise had been scheduled for June and July, it had been planned to deploy eight F-111s from Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, in conjunction with follow-on commitments in Korea. The deployment, called CORONET ROBIN, took place as scheduled, from 5 to 20 July.2

SAND GROPER

(S) As mentioned above, the JCS had noted Australian concern regarding exercises in the Eastern Indian Ocean and Western Australia areas. As exercises involving land-based strike air and ships were without precedent in this region, there was concern over their probable exclusion in a final Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement. CINCPAC shared those concerns expressed by Australia and supported the concept of not limiting, or appearing to limit, U.S. freedom to exercise in the Western Australian and associated waters. While he was in Canberra, U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale had stated that the United States was totally committed to the ANZUS Treaty and announced that a sizable naval exercise would take place in October involving land-based strike air flying out of Western Australian bases.3

1. J3522 HistSum Sep 78 (U); CDR25THINFDIV SCHOFIELD BKS HI 230200Z Jun 78 (U); CDR25THINFDIV SCHOFIELD BKS HI 270031Z Jun 78 (U); ADMIN CINCPAC (ALFA 009) 280307Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. ADMIN CINCPAC (ALFA 014) 281729Z Jun 78 (U).

SECRET

242
The exercise, SAND GROPER, was a multi-threat maritime exercise conducted 22 October to 1 November off Western Australia in the Indian Ocean. Australia had proposed the specific exercise on 14 March. CINCPAC had regretted it was not feasible to deploy a carrier task group in that time frame without adverse impact on scheduled carrier task group commitments. CINCPACFLT would be able to support the exercise with a surface combatant task group, however, and with patrol aircraft, provided that exercise dates accommodated their timely departure for Exercise MIDLINK, which was scheduled from 23 November to 7 December.

Prior to the U.S.-Australian scheduling conference 17-20 April the JCS advised CINCPAC that he was free to discuss and plan for any type or size of exercise that we had conducted before, such as passing exercises, COMPASS 77. The United States, however, should not initiate discussion of larger-scale exercises, such as KANGAROO III or follow-on major exercises in the Yampi area, or in substantial change in the composition of forces involved, such as an amphibious task group or U.S. land-based strike aircraft. If the subject was raised by the Australians, CINCPAC was to indicate that large-scale exercises must be fully coordinated with the U.S. worldwide exercise program and in this specific case might require high-level approval.

In June, when CINCPAC was advised that New Zealand desired to participate in SAND GROPER, he advised the JCS and he welcomed such participation. He said that the addition of New Zealand forces would make the exercise an ANZUS event demonstrating the solidarity and cooperation that characterized that partnership.

The following forces took part in SAND GROPER. For the United States the USS KIRK (FF-1087), USS KNOX (FF-1052), USS LOCKWOOD (FF-1064), and USS ASHTABULA (AO-51), plus three P-3 ORION aircraft. U.S. Air Force forces included eight F-4E PHANTOMS, providing a land-based strike air capability, accompanied by KC-135 tankers, plus back-up support from C-130 HERCULES transports. The Australian participants included HMAS SUPPLY, STALWART, TORRENS, VENDETTA, and SWAN and two OVERON-class submarines, OVENS and ONSLOW. The Fleet air arm provided eight A-4 SKYHAWK aircraft. In addition, the Royal Australian Air Force provided four F-111s and three P-3s, plus a substantial back-up with C-130 support aircraft. New Zealand provided one surface ship, HMNZS CANTERBURY, a frigate, and one P-3. One of the features of SAND GROPER was the use of RAAF Base Pearce. Normally a training base, Pearce was converted into an operational base for this exercise, during which more than 50 operational air-

1. JCS 1338/202231Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 252205Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. JCS 5649/142303Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC 122215Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84.

SECRET

243
USN P-3 Aircraft Ditching

(U) On 26 October a Navy P-3 assigned to Patrol Squadron NINE, based at Moffet Naval Air Station, California, and operating out of Adak, Alaska, made a controlled ditching in the waters of the Northern Pacific while on a routine reconnaissance mission. Of the 15-man crew, there were ten survivors. The ditching was the result of massive electrical and hydraulic failure.2

[S] The aircraft was on a Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) mission, BEGGAR HERITAGE 50V3JB. There were 13 regular U.S. Navy crew from the squadron and two regular U.S. Navy crew members from the Tactical Support Center at Adak. The weather in the area of the ditching (52°44'N, 167°31'E) had a ceiling of 1,000 feet, three to four mile visibility, waves 12 to 15 feet, winds SSW at 35 to 40 knots, and a water temperature of 44°F.3

(U) Active airborne and seaborne search and rescue operations were immediately initiated for the crew and an initial report of survivors was relayed from the scene by a U.S. aircraft based at Adak. An additional aircraft and the Coast Guard Cutter JARVIS were dispatched to the scene. A subsequent report indicated that at least three life rafts and eight survivors had been sighted.4

(U) The HC-130 aircraft contacted the Soviet fishing vessel MYS SINYAVINA and directed it to the ditching scene. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow was notified of the ongoing rescue operations as SINYAVINA was the closest surface vessel capable of effecting the rescue. During the early morning hours on 27 October SINYAVINA eventually located and recovered ten survivors. Search efforts had been hampered by the low overcast skies, strong winds, rain showers and fog, and high seas. Three additional bodies were subsequently recovered. It was determined from the survivors that one crewman was lost with the aircraft and one remained lost at sea.5

(U) Although the Soviet trawler was requested to remain on the scene until the arrival of JARVIS, word was received from the Embassy in Moscow that the ship was proceeding to Petropavlovsk with the survivors. Subsequent aerial

1. DEFNAV Canberra 030931Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J311 HistSum Nov 78 (U).
3. CINCPAC 271042Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; CTG 32.3 271635Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
5. Ibid.; CTG 32.3 271635Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
UNCLASSIFIED

observation of the Soviet trawler was discontinued a few hours later, but the search for the missing crewmen continued.

(U) While the trawler was enroute to Petropavlovsk, arrangements were being made through Military Airlift Command and State Department channels for a C-141 to proceed to Petropavlovsk to pick up the survivors. A request for flight clearance into that city was not approved by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however.

(U) To expedite and coordinate medevac operations, a coordination center was established in the 5th Air Force Command Center, manned by representatives of the 5th Air Force, the 316th Tactical Airlift Wing, and U.S. Navy Forces Japan. The U.S. Air Attache to Moscow was present.

(U) All search efforts were suspended as of 300340Z October, and the JCS were requested to insure that the USSR was notified of the termination. A C-141 was placed on one-hour alert at Yokota in anticipation of bringing the survivors back from Petropavlovsk. Yokota was to be the primary medical facility and debriefing location. The condition of all survivors was by this time reported as satisfactory.

(U) The U.S. Embassy in Moscow advised that the USSR was planning to fly the survivors to Khabarovsk on the evening of 31 October, so the P-3 Recovery Coordinating Unit at Yokota made plans for the anticipated flight. Included in the plans were preparations for an initial arrival ceremony, medical check-ups, debriefing procedures, and onward transportation to the United States.

(U) The U.S. Embassy in Moscow, however, was advised by the Soviets that the USSR government would like arrangements made by American Embassy officials arriving in Khabarovsk to take the crew members (including the deceased) by the closest air flight to Japan as soon as possible. They further explained that this meant a regularly scheduled commercial flight.

(U) A check of schedules indicated that Japan Air Lines had the most appropriate flight to accomplish the pickup, departing Niigata for Khabarovsk and returning. The Embassy officials arrived in Khabarovsk and reported that the survivors were in good shape and that the remains had been identified and placed in appropriate containers. Reservations were made on the Japan Air Lines flight in anticipation of the medevac C-9 request being denied. The status of the survivors was passed to their next of kin. Because of problems in transferring the remains from the Japan Air Lines flight to a C-9, a C-141

1. 5AF Command Center Yokota 290220Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J311 HistSum Nov 78 (U); AMEMB Moscow 26503/311735Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84.

UNCLASSIFIED

245
was substituted, returning to Yokota from Niigata with both survivors and caskets on 1 November. Arrival and welcoming ceremonies were conducted as appropriate. After two days of rest and debriefing, all departed for Moffet Field, arriving on 4 November. Again, appropriate ceremonies were conducted in an outstanding manner.1

C-117 Ditching Near Guam

(U) On 14 August a C-117D based at the Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam, lost its starboard engine after takeoff and had turned back to Guam. It ditched about 16 miles west of Guam. Two of the 30 passengers were missing and presumed dead. (They were Navy enlisted men who did not get out.) The survivors included James Joseph, Under Secretary of the Interior and three other civilians, including the High Commissioner of the TTPI; RADM David S. Cruden, USN, the CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI; and a number of other Navy officers and enlisted men.2

Search and Rescue Agreements

(U) On 28 April the JCS requested a list of countries with which Search and Rescue (SAR) agreements were desired. CINCPAC's list was provided on 8 May. It included Australia, Burma, Fiji, French Polynesia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.3

(U) CINCPAC noted that Detachment 3 of the Headquarters, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron had copies of five SAR agreements in effect, and he provided the status of each. Those with Singapore and Hong Kong were current. Those with Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan were being held in abeyance or under negotiation.

(U) CINCPAC said that he realized that obtaining approval of the entire list would be a time-consuming endeavor. He requested, however, that the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide approval on a country-by-country basis so that CINCPACAF, as the CINCPAC-delegated subordinate, could initiate negotiations and conclude agreements with corresponding foreign SAR authorities on operational and technical matters.4

1. J311 HistSum Nov 78 (U).
2. COMNAVMIANAS GUAM 140820Z Aug 78 (U); COMNAVMIANAS GUAM 150145Z Aug 78 (U), which carried a list of survivors.
3. CINCPAC 082154Z May 78 (U).
4. Ibid.

UNCLASSIFIED

246
A meeting was held at Point Mugu on 10 February, attended by representatives of the National Security Agency, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the Naval Security Group, the Pacific Missile Test Center, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPAC.

The first deployment to the PACOM of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in September was the subject of attention by an OPSEC team. CONSEC monitoring was also conducted. A report of those surveys, with recommendations to improve the security of future AWACS deployments in the PACOM, was prepared.

Tropical Cyclones

In the broad, diverse PACOM area, weather, especially tropical cyclones:

1. J316 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J316 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. J316 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. J316 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
and other severe weather, was a constant concern. During 1978 tropical weather activity within the PACOM area was above normal. Eighty-one tropical cyclones occurred during the year. Fifty-six of those occurred during the period June through November. Two tropical cyclones were particularly destructive while several others caused only moderate damage. Early warning in each case prevented even worse destruction. In October, Typhoon RITA (the Philippine name was Kading) passed through the Philippines, and according to preliminary GOP reports, left 246 persons dead, 93 missing and 1.4 million displaced, and caused $500 million pesos in damage. Damage to U.S. bases was light. In November, Tropical Cyclone 21-78 swept Sri Lanka and caused many deaths and injuries, and extensive property damage. CINCPAC's Disaster Area Survey Team was deployed to provide assistance; that deployment is discussed in detail below.1

(4) The 20th annual Tropical Cyclone Conference was held 6 to 10 February 1978 at the U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Fifty-nine delegates representing 41 military commands and U.S. Government agencies attended the conference. The conference was sponsored by the Environmental Group Pacific Command (EGPACOM) and was chaired by the CINCPAC staff meteorologist who was also the Chairman EGPACOM. The comprehensive conference report included the text of significant presentations and summaries of committee reports.2

Disaster Relief

(U) A major cyclone disaster in Sri Lanka in November became the first test of the CINCPAC Disaster Area Survey Team (DAST) concept that had been implemented in 1976.3

(U) Responsibility for coordinating and providing U.S. disaster relief to foreign countries was vested in the U.S. Agency for International Development, an agency of the Department of State. The Secretary of Defense provided assistance as requested by the Secretary of State. CINCPAC was responsible for conducting foreign disaster relief operations in his area as directed by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. CINCPAC staff responsibility for this function was transferred within the Operations Directorate in April 1978 from the Special Operations Division to the Current Operations Division. CINCPAC maintained a DAST to assist in relief operations; the team was led by

1. J37 HistSums Jan - Dec 78 (U).
2. J37 HistSum Apr 78 (U), which enclosed Tropical Cyclone Conference Proceedings Report, Environmental Group Pacific Command, 6-10 Feb 78 (U).
an officer appointed by CINCPACFLT. The primary mission of a team was to assist the U.S. Chief of Diplomatic Mission in obtaining an estimate of the disaster situation and a reasonable assessment of needs.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{(U)} A message from the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, Sri Lanka, advised that a tropical cyclone had come ashore the night of 23 November and proceeded west across the country. This initial report contained no inkling of the major disaster that had occurred. As the magnitude of the situation became more apparent, the Secretary of State on 27 November requested that a DAST of not more than 20 persons be deployed. The team was tasked to advise the Embassy in Colombo on communications needs and other disaster relief requirements, but the team was specifically not authorized to commit additional U.S. resources. Later that same day the JCS directed that CINCPAC respond to the State Department request and deploy a self-sustaining team for a period of from 7 to 14 days. CINCHMAC was directed to provide transportation.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{(U)} CINCPAC had already alerted the DAST that consisted of 20 persons (a five-man quick reaction element, a nine-man tactical communications team, and a six-man disaster area communications survey team). CINCPACFLT provided the officer in charge of the team, CDR David B. Miller, CEC, USN, and the preventive medicine officer, both part of the quick reaction element. CINCPACAF provided an airlift control element team chief for the quick reaction element and the disaster area communications survey team. Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group provided a civil affairs officer and a tactical communications officer to round out the quick reaction element and personnel for the tactical communications team. MAC transportation was immediately available and the entire DAST deployed on the morning of 28 November, departing by C-5A only 17 hours after the JCS had directed the deployment. The aircraft arrived at Clark Air Base in the Philippines on 29 November, where the team and its equipment were transferred to two waiting MAC C-141s for further movement to Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{(U)} Shortly after arrival in Sri Lanka the team chief met with U.S. Embassy personnel and high-ranking Sri Lankan officials to form a basis for the team's operations. The next day, on 1 December, the DAST officer in charge conducted a helicopter survey of the stricken area to determine the extent of the damage. That same day half of the tactical communications team was deployed to Batticaloa, the largest city in the affected area, to establish communications between the area of operations and the Embassy in Colombo. On 2 December a DAST forward command post was established in beleaguered Batticaloa. The DAST

\textsuperscript{1} J312 HistSums Apr, Nov 78 (U); CINCPAC 142136Z Apr 78 (U).
\textsuperscript{2} SECSTATE 300362/272334Z Nov 78 (U); JCS 5322/280430Z Nov 78 (U).
\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC 280425Z Nov 78 (U).
conducted field surveys and provided assessments in such matters as food supplies, transportation, medicine, sanitation, airport facilities, electricity, and communications.1

(U) On 8 December all DAST field work was completed and recommendations were submitted to the Embassy. Having fulfilled its purpose, the forward command post was closed on 9 December and the forward-deployed communications team returned to Colombo on 10 December. The Embassy reported that the DAST would be ready for redeployment on 12 December, and the JCS and CINCPAC directed such redeployment. Two MAC C-141 aircraft were routed from Sri Lanka through Clark to Hickam AFB; the redeployment was completed on 13 December.2

(U) On 13 December the Embassy in Colombo, in a message to the State Department, the JCS, and CINCPAC, among others, commended the DAST for very professional and extraordinary service to the Embassy, the donor community, and the Government of Sri Lanka. It was noted that the personal thanks of Sri Lankan President Jayewardene had been forwarded by General Attygalle, a special assistant to the President who was formerly commander of the Army. "Because of their appreciation for the demonstrated competence and professionalism of the DAST, Commander Miller was requested to suggest to GSL [the Government of Sri Lanka] steps which could be taken to mitigate future disasters." The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization's coordinator expressed his admiration for the group and his appreciation of their activities in providing on-the-spot assessments and sound advice as to real and pressing needs. The Embassy found the team's services "invaluable" in evaluating needs and recommending remedies that could best be provided by the U.S. Government, and the Embassy's recommendation, based on the DAST assessment, had been approved by the Agency for International Development.3

(U) The Chairman of the JCS also offered congratulations to the DAST (and MAC) for the professionalism and dedication exhibited by all concerned, to allow timely relief from human suffering and achieve good will for the United States and the Military Services.4

(U) No official summary of the effects of the cyclone is available, and any statistics are estimated. The wind that struck, for example, was estimated to be from 70 to 80 miles per hour, up to 100 at times. The number of dead from the storm and its aftermath was estimated to exceed 500 and the number left homeless in excess of 800,000. As reported by a Sri Lankan jour-

1. J312 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. Ibid.; AMEMB Colombo 5672/070650Z Dec 78 (U).
3. AMEMB Colombo 5783/130640Z Dec 78 (U).
4. JCS 3706/032323Z Jan 79 (U).
nalist, "The town of Batticaloa, several hundred years old, does not exist any more. In its place is a landscape of ruin and rubble, reminiscent of the bombed-out German cities at the end of World War II...I failed to find a single building which stood intact." Drinking water supplies were contaminated, roads were completely washed away, and major problems of distribution of food and drinking water were encountered by the Sri Lankans.\textsuperscript{1}

(U) As this was the first CINCPAC DAST deployment, the lessons learned and any DAST recommendations will be addressed in some detail in the material that follows. The team found, however, that existing instructions had proved to be both flexible and suitable to accomplish the task. The information that follows was taken from the CINCPAC staff after action report published in April 1979.\textsuperscript{2}

(U) Sixteen specific subjects were discussed under lessons learned; as each was identified a discussion was provided and recommended follow-up action was outlined. The subjects will be addressed here in the same sequence used in the report.

(U) First was support for the medical officer, who was hampered in his analysis by the non-availability of a hospital corpsman to provide laboratory support. The medical officer had to ship specimens across the country for analysis which precluded timely decision making. It was noted that adding a corpsman to future quick reaction elements would facilitate the activities of the medical officer.

(U) Upon being alerted, the medical officer discovered that the recommended medical equipment had not been formed into a kit. He hastily threw together a kit, but it proved to be insufficient. It was recommended that a kit be pre-packaged to save time, and inspected just prior to deployment to tailor it to the assignment.

(U) The title "Civil Affairs Officer" seemed to have connotations that the officer intended to assume the role of government in the affected area. The title was to be changed to "Civil Liaison Officer."

(U) In the matter of organic transportation for the DAST, in Sri Lanka the team had relied on the host country for air and ground transportation.

1. Ceylon Daily Mirror (U), 27 Nov 78, extract in After Action Report, Sri Lanka (U), Nov-Dec 78, Officer in Charge CINCPAC Disaster Area Survey Team.
2. CINCPAC Ser 1038 (U), 26 Apr 78, Subj: Disaster Area Survey Team--Sri Lanka, which was bound as Hq PACOM Disaster Area Survey Team--Sri Lanka--After Action Report, Nov-Dec 78.

UNCLASSIFIED

253
"The use of locally available air transportation deprived the host country of a critical means of ferrying food supplies to the disaster area." The lesson learned was to examine fully the air and ground transportation requirements and availability in-country.

(U) The DAST communications team located at the Batticoloa airport had not been provided any security for the first few days; nor were the survey teams and convoys operating in the disaster area. As the convoys carried large amounts of water and rations for DAST use, and other equipment, a dangerous situation might have developed if members of the local population, who were without food and water, had been more aggressive. A positive commitment was desired from the host country government regarding security of personnel, equipment, and supplies to insure early and continuous physical security.

(U) There were problems with personal hygiene and sanitation. There were no latrines or showers and there was exposure to obvious contagious diseases. Although shots had been given prior to departure, there were cases of intestinal disorders, fungus, leeches, and insect bites. Snake bite was also a real consideration. Recommendations for the future concerned capabilities to boil eating utensils, cook hot meals, and clean clothing.

(U) DAST members whose normal duties were in staff positions were not prepared for field living. Field gear had not been stored for them for short-notice deployment. A proposed gear list was prepared for the components to equip their personnel accordingly.

(U) Upon the team's arrival the Embassy had provided some cash to defray costs incurred. Some team members, however, had to use some personal funds to acquire goods, services, or necessary repair parts. They had trouble getting reimbursed, so it was proposed to designate a DAST member as a temporary, limited procurement officer.

(U) It was noted that while the quick reaction element was to be prepared to deploy within six hours of notification, deployment would depend on the availability of airlift. If MAC crews had to deploy from CONUS, requirements for crew rest could delay departure up to 24 hours.

(U) The quick reaction element had included an Airfield Management Officer, whose skills duplicated those of the Airlift Control Element Team Chief. When such a team chief was included in the quick reaction element, there would be no need for an Airfield Management Officer.

(U) During the Sri Lanka operation the only voice communication between the Embassy in Colombo and CINCPAC headquarters was by means of commercial
circuit. CINCPAC-owned small satellite terminals were considered a better solution. They were requested in a 5 June 1978 letter to the JCS, and it was expected that a capability would be available by mid-1979.

(U) The team encountered two major intra-team communications problems. One was frequency interference and interruption, which was corrected by selection of a better frequency. The second was that the radios deployed proved unreliable for distances exceeding two miles; radios with greater range were to be substituted. It was recommended that a frequency survey be conducted to determine the most usable frequencies for day and night operations, eliminating the hit-and-miss selection procedures used in the early days in Sri Lanka.

(U) In another communications matter, the team noted that record copy traffic between the base command post and the forward operating location was useful but not essential. The teletype vans and trailers had taken up considerable airlift space in comparison with benefits gained. It was recommended that jeep-mounted, voice-only equipment be used in the future.

(U) The DAST took with it sufficient water and C-rations, assembled from the tasked unit's own assets. There was no local food or water. There were problems of C-ration accountability, as the rations were consumed also by local government officials, drivers, and interpreters accompanying the team. For accountability purposes, all rations should be turned over to the Embassy on arrival and used by the DAST as needed, with any remainder left for local Mission use; the bulk transfer process would be more simple. If the team had not carried its own water, the need would have been a major problem. Future teams, it was recommended, should carry water treatment products and equipment. (The Sri Lanka team carried 40 water containers of 20 gallons each, supplied by the 13th Air Force at Clark.)

(U) DAST readiness was recommended, should be periodically exercised, to assist in standardizing individual equipment, insure that proper consideration was given to team equipment, and exercise procedures for DAST alerting and deployment preparation.

(U) The last lesson concerned audio-visual support. The deployment had been accompanied by a three-man team from MAC (DAST strength had been limited to 20). The audio-visual team had not been considered part of the DAST and costs associated with them were not defrayed by the Agency for International Development. The team shot motion pictures plus both color and black and white still photography. Review of the film coverage revealed that there was insufficient good motion picture film, the black and white and color slides contained different sequences, and the material arrived too late for good news releases. It was planned to include an audio-visual team in any future DAST deployment.
deployments, to use commercial carriers to provide the most expeditious shipment to Washington to insure timeliness, and, wherever possible, motion and still film sequences should be consistent.

Research and Development Objectives

(U) Beginning in 1977, with the discontinuation of the annual Joint Research and Development Objectives Document, a document in the JCS Joint Strategic Planning System, the Secretary of Defense had asked for an annual letter providing the Admiral's personal view of how the research and development community could best help in CINCPAC's area of responsibility.

CINCPAC's 1978 statement of objectives was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS on 24 July. He noted that the PACOM had to be prepared to address a wide spectrum of contingencies ranging from conflict with the Soviet Union to smaller but still significant incidents in areas remote to existing military forces. The capability to fulfill this responsibility was made more complex by the size of the command. He requested emphasis on research and development programs that addressed the following objectives.

First, CINCPAC said, our surveillance and early warning capability required improvement so as to provide better warning indications, classification, and targeting information.

CINCPAC said that it was necessary that, in an electronic countermeasures environment, we provide secure command, control, and communications among command centers, ships, aircraft, and ground units of PACOM forces and our allies.

CINCPAC said he also strongly endorsed the continued development of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC Ltr Ser S294 of 24 Jul 78, Subj: Research and Development (R&D) Objectives (U), GDS-86.
architecture to improve strategic command, control, and communications.

(U) CINCPAC also provided a specific list of operations deficiencies in a format that had been suggested by the JCS.\(^1\)

**Casualty Resolution**

(U) Attempts to resolve the status of Americans who were missing in action and recover, if possible, the bodies of the dead still in Southeast Asia were the tasks of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). In 1978 that work continued, but the JCRC also received an unprecedented visit by a team from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.\(^2\)

(U) During the Fourth Session of Negotiations between the United States and the SRV in Paris in December 1977, the SRV had received an invitation from the Department of State to visit the facilities of the JCRC and its Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) in Hawaii. The SRV accepted this invitation. The visit had originally been scheduled for late March or early April, but in February the United States had uncovered espionage activities that involved the SRV Ambassador to the United Nations, and relations between the SRV and the United States were strained for a time.

1. Ibid.
2. JCRC HistSum (J3) Jul 78 (U).
(U) While originally it had been thought that the whole visit to Hawaii might be cancelled, the SRV Liaison Officer in Paris stated on 14 February that it might be possible to reschedule the event.

(U) On 20 June the U.S. Embassy in Paris was informed by the SRV that if the invitation for a team of MIA experts from the SRV was still valid, they would like to send a team to Honolulu from 5 to 10 July. The United States advised that the invitation was still valid, but proposed a later time frame. On 26 June the 10 to 14 July visit was agreed to by both sides.

(U) CINCPAC was tasked by the State Department through the JCS to provide a JCRC/CIL tour and briefing; food, transportation, and lodging; appropriate security for visitors while on military facilities; and other assistance that might be required.

(U) Hickam Air Force Base was selected as the billeting site and the Hickam Officers Club was tasked to provide semi-private dining accommodations. Commercial car rentals were arranged. A CINCPAC control center was established in the building where the visitors were billeted.

(U) The U.S. State and Defense Department party had arrived by 9 July, led by Dr. Frank Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The SRV team arrived in Honolulu in the morning of 11 July. The six-man team was led by Mr. Vu Hoang, Representative of the SRV Office in Charge of Seeking Information About Personnel Missing in the War in Vietnam, part of the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(U) The team held a brief press conference upon arrival at the airport. Official activities began the next day with tours of the facilities in Hawaii devoted to casualty resolution, the JCRC and CIL.1

(U) In 1978 the remains of 15 U.S. Servicemen were returned from Southeast Asia. On 26 August the SRV returned the remains of 11 MIAs to U.S. custody at Noi Bai Airport in Hanoi to a delegation headed by Congressman G.V. Montgomery of Mississippi. Just prior to the SRV turnover, Laos had returned the remains of four MIAs to U.S. custody at Vientiane Airport in Laos. The remains were moved to Clark Air Base in the Philippines and prepared for movement on to the United States.2

(U) A joint honor guard ceremony honoring the 15 was conducted at Hickam Air Force Base on 27 August. Following the brief ceremony the remains were

1. Ibid.
2. J361 HistSum Aug 78 (U).
moved to the CIL for identification processing. Once positive identification was made the remains were to be transported to Travis Air Force Base, California.¹

(U) The 11 from the SRV were honored at a ceremony at Hickam on 12 September when they were returned to Travis. All branches of Service were represented at the ceremony. Only one of the remains from Laos was positively identified in 1978. On 10 October the remains of Major Wallace L. Wiggins, USAF, were also returned to Travis, with a planeside ceremony conducted at Hickam on 10 October.²

Hanoi, August 1978

1. Ibid.
2. J36T HistSum Sep 78 (U); J365(A) HistSum Oct 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

259

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II
1978

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1979
CHAPTER V -- LOGISTICS

SECTION I -- PLANS/POLICY
Joint Operations Planning System
Revision of CINC/PAC OPLAN 5001
CONUS/Surface Movement Under
Logistics Support for Exercises
Exercise ELITE TROOPER 78
Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78

SECTION II -- RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Interservice Support
Sixth Annual PACOM DRIS Conference
FY 78-80 Plan
DOD DRIS Manual
PACOM DRIS Facts and Figures
PACOM DRIS Study Digest
PACOM Calibration Consolidations
GAO Survey of Interservice Support

Fuels and Energy
Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices
PACOM POL Storage Facilities
POL Consumption versus Throughput
AVGAS in PACOM
POL Storage at Diego Garcia
Wake
Hawaii
Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System

Supply and Services
PACOM War Reserve Assets
War Reserve Stocks for Allies
Wartime Logistics Support to ROK Forces
War Reserve Materiel on Taiwan
Programmed Depot Maintenance on Taiwan

Munitions
AIM-7E Missile Allocation
PACOM Munitions Summary
West Coast Ammunition Port Capability
Excess U.S. Government Property Disposal
Philippines
Thailand
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTION III--MOBILITY OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Routes in the Pacific</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Air Division Structure in the Pacific</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Space Available Travel to Thailand</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Flights to Diego Garcia</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Airlift Management Office Users Conference</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Flag Shipping</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Surface Shipping Conference</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Watercraft Study</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM/JCS Joint Transportation Board Meeting</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eniwetok Cleanup</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam Land Use Plan</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities in Korea</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force Facilities</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC TACAIR Beddown</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities in Japan</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanno Hotel</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Storage</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Housing in Japan</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Integrated Relocation/Consolidation Programs</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI--COMMUNICATIONS-DATA PROCESSING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION I--OPERATIONS AND PLANS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Center Relocation</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project APACHE</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMTSS Plan</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Satellites</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Satellites</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABNCP/MEECN Satellite Capability</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIS Contingency Communications</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM TSC-54 Deployments</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activation of H. E. Holt Satellite Terminal</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM AUTODIN Reconfiguration</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deactivation of Fort Buckner ASC</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC Closure Simulations</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanto Plain Reconfiguration</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan-Korea Bulk Encryption 340
COMMANDO LION 342
Korea Communications 345
MITS Okinawa 347
Submarine Cable Disruption 348
Communications in the Philippines 349
Lubang TACAN 349
Air Defense 349
Spacetrack Radar Relocation 351
Briefing for GOP 353
Communications on Taiwan 354
TROPO System Deactivation 354
Project FORMER TAIHO 354
Taiwan Communications Drawdown 355

SECTION II--COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROGRAMS 357
Secure Voice and Record Conferencing 357
Tactical Secure Voice Requirements 357
WWMCCS ROC FOURTEEN 359
Command Center Secure Voice Switch 359
CMS at CINCPAC 359
Communications Security Requirements-Korea 360
Classified Message Routing-Korea 361

SECTION III--AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING 365
PACWRAC 365
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) 367
Cruise Missiles Systems 367
Message File Retention 368
PLAD Review 368
MINIMIZE in PACOM-1978 369
Tsunami Warning Communications 369
ADP Training 370
WWMCCS Graphics Terminals 370
Military Message Experiment (MME) 371
ADP for Tactical Air Operations-Korea 372
WWMCCS ADP Support-Japan 372

CHAPTER VII--SECURITY ASSISTANCE 375

SECTION I--GENERAL 375
Security Assistance Roles 375
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar 377
PACOM Security Assistance Conference 378
Security Assistance Reporting Requirements
PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop
Training of Security Assistance Personnel
Excess Ship Transfers
Missiles for Australia and Japan

SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS
Afghanistan
Australia
Bangladesh
  Program Management
  Assistance to Bangladesh Navy
Burma
  Military Training
  Request for Recoilless Rifles
Republic of China
  Overview
  F-5E/F Coproduction Program
  Request for Submarines
  MK-46 MOD-2 Torpedoes
  Self-propelled 8-inch Howitzers
  Mobile Radar System
  LOROP Cameras
  Improved CHAPARRAL
  M-48A1 Tanks
  Request for AIM-9J Missiles
  Ship Transfer
  SAR Helicopter Request
India
  Overview
  TOW Anti-tank Missile
  HARPOON and AIM-9L
Indonesia
  F-5 Aircraft
  M-16 Coproduction
  UH-34D Helicopters
  MK-44 Torpedoes
  A-4C Aircraft
Japan
  Overview of Fiscal Posture
  F-15 Program
  P-3C ORION
  Airborne Early Warning (AEW)
  BADGE-Japan
Overview
Aircraft Procurement Actions
Ammunition in Thailand
Incendiary Munitions
Thailand FAD

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
CINCPAC Headquarters
Performance Ratings for Civilian Personnel
Federal Day 1978 Awards Program
Upward Mobility Program
Activity Training Plan for FY 79
Employment of the Handicapped and Disabled
Pay and Allowances
PACOM Country Activities
General Accounting Office Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans
GAO Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans and Benefits--Japan
Army Realignment Personnel Actions--Japan
Labor Cost Sharing--Japan
Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees--Korea
U.S. Forces Local National Employee Severance Pay (NAF Activities)--Korea
Revised Wage Schedules and Benefits for U.S. Forces LN Employees--Philippines
Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees--Taiwan
Pay Rates for Non-U.S. Citizens Employed in Foreign Areas
PACOM Third Country National Employment

SECTION II--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES
Military Awards--CINCPAC Staff
Military Customs Program
Department of Defense Dependent Schools
FY 79 Combined Federal Campaign--Pacific
CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS

SECTION I--PLANS/POLICY

Joint Operations Planning System

1. CINCPAC Command History 1976 (TS/FRD), Vol. I, pp. 136, 137; the 1976 plan was approved on 18 May 77 by the JCS.
1. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 250315Z Jul 78 5, GDS-86.
1. Ibid.
2. J416 HistSum Dec 78 (S), REVW 11 Jan 89; CINCPAC 012122Z Sep 78 (S), XGDS-
which cited MAC 102025Z Aug 78.
3. JCS 1553/210845Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CINCPAC 250230Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
CONUS/Surface Movement Under OPLAN 8027N

(U) One of the objectives of a 1977 throughput study to analyze CONUS/surface movement under CINC PAC OPLAN 8027N was to shorten the planning cycle through the early involvement of Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs). The proposed procedure encompassed three phases:

Phase I - Conducted at the PACOM to develop requirements and create the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). Computer tape sent to the Military Traffic Management Center (MTMC).

Phase II - Conducted at the MTMC. Using MTMC transportation simulator Mobility Analysis and Planning System (MAPS), tested and evaluated the CONUS movement segment. First, MAC selected aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and prepared movement tables which reflected the schedule of air deployment. Next, MTMC prepared movement tables from CONUS origins to the APOEs provided in the MAC movement tables. Then, using MAPS, the CONUS sea POEs for sea deployments originating within CONUS were designated and the related CONUS movements were scheduled. Shortfalls or "flag" movements which could not be moved were identified and origin data were examined.

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 252356Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86; MAC 182130Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
UNCLASSIFIED

Phase III - Conducted at the Military Sealift Command (MSC). This portion of the study took the requirements and movement data from MTMC and, using the MSC simulator Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System (SEACOPS), scheduled the sea movements. The system took the supported commander's sealift requirements and, using predetermined MSC ship data bases, port characteristics, and planning assumptions, determined the feasibility of supporting the sealift portion of the supported commander's OPLAN. The end product was the number and types of ships required by MSC to accomplish the assigned sealift tasks based on various assumptions and planning factors.

(U) During a TOA working group meeting at PACOM in the latter part of 1977, three Deployment Data tapes for CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N TPFDD were developed. MAC then structured the Integrated Military Airlift Planning System and prepared initial airlift scheduling reports. On 23-30 January 1978 the 5027N Airlift Planning Conference (under the auspices of the CINCPAC J43-chaired TOA Working Group) was held at MAC. Participants included representatives of the three TOAs (MAC, MSC, and MTMC), PACAF, Pacific Airlift Center, USAF, and CINCPAC Directorate for Plans (J5). The main conference goal was to produce realistic airlift delivery schedules for the first 30 days under OPLAN 5027N FY 77 using the MAC Military Airlift Capability Estimator. Schedules produced by this group were sometimes as much as 20 days later than closures attained at PACOM using the GFE, which further confirmed that the airlift available would not support the plan. Updates of aerial port onload and offload capabilities and MAC en route support were also accomplished by the working group. Results of the conference enabled MTMC and MSC to prepare movement schedules which were used as a basis to update the FY 78 CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N.

(U) At a CINCPAC J4-sponsored meeting in Washington D.C. on 25 April-2 May, representatives from MAC, MTMC, and MSC finalized intra-CONUS movement schedules, inter-theater sealift schedules, and TOA involvement in Change 2 to OPLAN 5027N for FY 77. MTMC and MSC flow plans and movement schedules were reviewed for accuracy and to develop guidance and planning factors for update of future OPLANS. The accomplishment of these actions, utilizing the concept developed by CINCPAC J43 during the 1977 study, marked the completion of the planning cycle for CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N for FY 78. The new methodology, which involved the TOAs at an earlier stage for use in formulation of future (J4 input to) major CINCPAC OPLANS, was presented as a recommendation to the JCS JOPS User's Group for inclusion in JOPS during a worldwide conference on 8 July 1978.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. J437 HistSums Dec 77, Jan 78; BWEBs 2-15 Jan, 16-29 Jan, 30 Jan-12 Feb, and 27 Mar-9 Apr 78; Interview with G.N. Bech, J437, 20 Feb 79; all (U).
2. J437 HistSum May 78; BWEBs 27 Mar-9 Apr and 8-21 May 78; all (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

265
SECRET

Logistics Support for Exercises

Exercise ELITE TROOPER 78

During ELITE TROOPER 78, a JCS worldwide procedural command post exercise held on 3-8 April 1978, the J4 Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) was activated to react to changes in Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCONs) and to resolve logistics problems connected with the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which was the exercise focal point in the PACOM. The participants gained experience in crisis action procedures in a contingency scenario, and several significant logistics problems which surfaced were referred to the JCS for consideration:

- Because the release of War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) was vested in different agencies based on type/category and method of origin/acquisition, approval authority had not been clearly defined, nor had procedures been formalized with the ROK. Subsequently, it was learned that the subject had not even been addressed in pre-exercise coordination. Thus, when requests for the release of various kinds of WRSA to the ROK Armed Forces were generated in exercise play, the requirement could not be resolved within the context of the exercise plan. Since this problem had surfaced in previous exercises involving Korea, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that, until WRSA turnover procedures have been formalized with the ROK, play of this subject should be limited to U.S.-only exercises.

- Pre-exercise data did not clearly identify specific CONUS logistical/support elements participating in the exercise.

- Exercise tanker schedules...were not updated. Consequently, CINCPAC fuels personnel were not current on fuel movements.

- Supporting commands and TOAs often failed to include the supported CINC and other interested supporting commands as addressees on transportation-related traffic. As a result, it was impossible to verify the total mix of TPFDD and other movements.

1. J419 HistSum Apr 78 (4), DECL 4 May 84; CINCPAC 030120Z May 78 (Exercise Critique) (4), REVW 3 May 98.
SECRET

Because all commands did not use the same OPLAN database, it was not possible to reconcile the deployment of augmentation forces with the information provided to the CINCPAC LRC via message traffic.

Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78

NIFTY NUGGET 78 was a JCS-sponsored procedural command post exercise which was conducted during the period 10-30 October 1978 from 1200Z to 2400Z daily (see Chapter IV). The primary purpose of the exercise was to evaluate mobilization and initial deployment plans and procedures of participating Services, DOD and civil agencies, and the JCS in support of unified and specified commanders. The exercise was to be conducted in an atmosphere of deteriorating political-military relationships which ultimately resulted in general war in Central Europe with worldwide implications. This was to be the most significant mobilization exercise since World War II with heavy involvement of civil agencies by interfacing with Exercise REX-78, a parallel civil exercise.

The object of the subsequent planning conference held in Washington during 11-14 July was to finalize the exercise Control Staff Instruction including approval of the Master Scenario Event List. The exercise objectives selected for PACOM logistic participation were to monitor and coordinate PACOM logistic activities; assess the feasibility of current logistic support planning for WestPac/Indian Ocean operations; and to determine the adequacy of existing logistic plans, systems, and procedures in support of full mobilization and initial deployment.

In May the JCS accepted the exercise planning conference recommendation to permit free play of the three competing OPLANS. After the exercise, CINCPAC

1. J411 HistSum Apr 78 (S), REVW 4 May 98; J411 HistSum Oct 78 (S), REVW 8 Nov
3. J411 HistSum Apr 78 (S), REVW 4 May 98; J411 HistSum Jul 78 (S), REVW 1 Aug

SECRET

267
noted 13 significant logistics discrepancies, of which three were designated by the JCS for remedial action projects:

- Clear-cut delineation of TOA-to-user responsibilities was needed.

- MSC plans should include all support force movement requirements including Force Requirement Numbers (FRNs).

- One standard format was needed to request airlift transportation to establish continuity and priority. Further, compatibility with MSC/MTMC information requirements was needed to enable rapid shift in mode of transportation should airlift not be available.

1. JCS 3018/082345Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 160209Z Dec 78 (S), REVW 16 Dec 98; JCS Initial Report on Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 Critique Items, Encl: 1.
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SECTION II--RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Interservice Support

Sixth Annual PACOM DRIS Conference

(U) The sixth annual PACOM Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) conference was held at CINCPAC on 29-30 March 1978 with 34 military and civilian attendees representing 21 agencies. Formal presentations were given on the new DRIS Manual, the FY 78-80 Plan for defining DRIS geographical areas, the interface between support agreements and force realignments, the calibration consolidation program, and a General Accounting Office (GAO) survey relating to support function consolidations. The following were of special interest.¹

FY 78-80 Plan

(U) The FY 78-80 Plan was presented by the DRIS Program Manager for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The major benchmarks of the plan were:²

* * * * * *

· Designation of installations in CONUS and overseas to participate in the program. Generally, the DRIS areas will be grouped based on the presence of two or more military services/defense agencies operating within a 50-mile radius.

· Development of a DRIS management tool created by merging Commercial and Industrial Activities (CITA) information with DRIS data to facilitate the identification of functions with interservicing potential.

· Emphasis on DRIS Catalog of Support Services through incorporation of CITA information to broaden the visibility of support services potential.

· Reorganization of the DRIS program worldwide and redesignation of DRIS organizational elements.

¹ J421 HistSum Mar 78 (U).
² CINCPAC Ltr Ser 819, 2 May 78, Subj: Minutes of 6th Annual PACOM DRIS Conference (U).
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- At certain milestones, meetings will be held in geographical regions to update plans and provide status of actions.

DOD DRIS Manual

(U) A major revision to the DRIS Manual (DOD 4000.19-M) was published 1 September. The DRIS Manual was the only DOD directive which was applicable to all levels of command. In addition to clarifying numerous procedural instructions, the DRIS chain of command, and methods of resolving disputes, this change established Joint Interservice Resource Study Groups (formerly known as Sub-Zone Groups) in CONUS as well as in overseas theaters.¹

PACOM DRIS Facts and Figures

(U) Statistics depicting volume of Interservice Support throughout the PACOM area were published in a PACOM DRIS Facts and Figures Booklet issued as of 30 September 1978. The accompanying tables portray Interservice Support Agreements (ISA) for the period September 1976-September 1978. The PACOM Regional ISA Summary showed overall dollar value with a net growth of $10.1 million for the six-month period March-September 1978. The Service ISA Summary reflected the effect of force realignments on Service dollar values--decreasing Army totals and increasing the Air Force and Marine Corps totals.²

PACOM DRIS Study Digest

(U) The second PACOM DRIS Study Digest, published in December 1978, listed results or status of 87 studies conducted in the PACOM between 1 April 1976 and 30 June 1978. The cover letter of the Digest highlighted the downward trend in study actions from a high in 1974 of 66 to a low of eight in 1978 and pointed out further potential consolidations.³

PACOM Calibration Consolidations

(U) During the DRIS conference discussed above, the status of calibration consolidation studies in Korea, Japan, and Guam was reviewed. In mid-1977, the Korea Sub-Zone Group had requested assistance from the Joint Technical Coordinating Group Metrology and Calibration (JTGMETCAL) in developing a

1. J421 HistSum Jul 78 (U); Interview with LCOL R.C. Pastor, USAF, J421, 8 Mar 79.
2. J4212 HistSum Nov 78 (U); PACOM DRIS Facts and Figures Booklet, 31 Mar-30 Sep 78 (U).
3. J4212 HistSum Dec 78 (U); CINCPAC Ltr Ser 2452 of 5 Dec 78, Encl: PACOM DRIS Study Digest (extracts) (U).

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270
## UNCLASSIFIED

### PACOM Regional ISA Summary 30 Sep 76 Through 30 Sep 78
(In millions of dollars providing support)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Sep 76</th>
<th>Mar 77</th>
<th>Sep 77</th>
<th>Mar 78</th>
<th>Sep 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>27.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (Okinawa Prefecture)</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other locations</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Less Okinawa
**Figures not available

### PACOM Service ISA Summary 30 Sep 76 Through 30 Sep 78
(In millions of dollars providing support)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Sep 76</th>
<th>Mar 77</th>
<th>Sep 77</th>
<th>Mar 78</th>
<th>Sep 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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271
joint study. Later, however, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) had advised that changes in the U.S. Forces' withdrawal schedule had precluded the development of a stable data base for the study. In Japan and Guam initial studies had been completed, but both were being restudied because of Army force structure/workload changes in Japan and the lack of Air Staff concurrence with the Guam study. During the conference, the Japan, Korea, and Guam representatives agreed that on-site consolidation surveys should be conducted by a JTCG-METCAL team.¹

(U) In response to CINCPAC's May 1978 query regarding a JTCG-METCAL study visit, the U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ) advised that, although the Army workload could be absorbed by other Services through consolidation, USARJ desired to maintain a nucleus of capability for contingency situations and "uncertainties concerning Army Pacific realignment." The Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan) supported the USARJ position that the progress of the restudy nullified the need for JTCG-METCAL assistance. The Commander EUSA in Korea requested a complete independent JTCG-METCAL study rather than an assistance survey. The CINCPAC Representative in Guam confirmed interest in the survey. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested a JTCG-METCAL team to visit Korea and Guam.²

(U) In November 1978, following completion of the Korea study and Guam survey, the JTCG-METCAL team debriefed the CINCPAC J4 staff. The team tentatively concluded that full-scale interservice consolidation in Korea was not feasible. However, the team intended to recommend consolidation of the calibration activities of the U.S. Army Communications Command at Camp Humphreys into those at Camp Carroll. They would also recommend increased interservice support between the Army and Air Force for assets shipped out of Korea for calibration. During the Guam survey, the team found "significant" potential for interservice calibration consolidation between the Navy and Air Force and that a full study was needed.³

(U) In Japan, consolidation of calibration facilities within geographic areas of Honshu had been considered under DRIS (Japan Sub-Zone Group) auspices since 1975. A study completed in February 1976 indicated the possibility of a one-time saving of $608,036 and annual savings of $101,590. In August 1977 an implementation plan was issued by the Naval Air Systems Command, but the USARJ advised that portions of the plan involving the Army had been overtaken by Army realignments which had taken place prior to its issuance.⁴

1. CDR USAEIGHT 060023Z Jul 77 (U); CINCPAC 060344Z May 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 122149Z Aug 78 (U), which cites COMUSJAPAN 090656Z May 78, CINCPACREP Guam 092304Z May 78, CDR USAEIGHT 242323Z Jul 78 and CDRUSARJ 260250Z Jul 78.

UNCLASSIFIED

272
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Partial consolidation took place late in 1978, which resulted in manpower, equipment, and transportation savings. Major actions included the transfer of support responsibility for Air Force communications sites and an Army ammunition depot to nearby Army and Navy facilities. Savings included the planned deletion of two manpower spaces, $1,970 for transportation of equipment, and $18,648 in temporary duty per diem costs. Also, a transportable field calibration unit valued at $49,650 was declared excess.1

GAO Survey of Interservice Support

(U) On 26 August 1975 the General Accounting Office (GAO) submitted a report to Congress entitled "Millions Could Be Saved Annually and Productivity Increased if Military Support Functions in the Pacific Were Consolidated." This report was based on visits to Hawaii, Japan/Okinawa, Korea, and Taiwan from January through June 1974, and recommended consolidation of these selected interservice functions:2

- Procurement offices.
- Maintenance of real property in Hawaii and Okinawa.
- Civilian personnel offices.
- General cargo ports in Japan.
- Equipment calibration.
- Administrative aircraft support in Japan.
- AUTODIN terminals in Hawaii.
- Industrial gas production in Okinawa.
- On-base housing and household furnishings management in Okinawa.

(U) From August 1977 through February 1978, a three-man GAO team conducted a follow-up survey on the nine interservice functional areas recommended for consolidation in the 1975 report. Additionally, the team was charged to

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1. BWEB 31 Dec 78-13 Jan 79 (U); Interview with LCOL R.C. Pastor, USAF, J421 of 8 Mar 79.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
examine DRIS program management and three new functional areas—disbursing, supply, and administrative vehicle maintenance. During an exit interview with the CINCPAC staff, the team chief acknowledged that the PACOM DRIS program was active and had shown considerable improvement since the 1975 report to Congress. He discussed each of the nine interservice functional areas listed in 1975, noting that some were successfully consolidated, some were studied with a decision not to consolidate, and some were not comprehensively studied. The three most successful consolidations involved on-base housing and furniture management on Okinawa, with 85 personnel spaces and $1.4 million saved annually; industrial gas production on Okinawa, with $324,000 savings annually; and AUTODIN facilities in Hawaii, with annual savings of $380,000. The final GAO report, however, was expected to contain the following recommendations:

- Unified commands should be given the authority to direct consolidations over the objections of Service components.

- The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services need to provide greater uniformity of policies and standardization of procedures in areas such as real property maintenance, civilian personnel, supply, and disbursing to allow for increased interservicing.

- Disinterested study teams, rather than subzone group substudy teams, should be used to perform certain studies where the potential for parochialism and protectionism is greatest.

- Anticipate repeat recommendations in the areas of consolidating real property maintenance management, administrative aircraft support, family housing and furniture management, and civilian personnel offices.

Fuels and Energy

Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices

(U)  On 1 October 1978 the Defense Fuels Supply Center (DFSC) adjusted standard bulk petroleum prices and PACOM user activities were alerted to fill

1. J421 HistSum Mar 78 (U); J42/Memo/30-78 (U) of 14 Mar 78, Subj: Exit Interview with GAO Team on Survey and Follow-up of Military Support Functions Consolidations (U); CINCPAC Ltr 421 Ser 819 of 2 May 78, Subj: Minutes of 6th Annual PACOM DRIS Conference (U).
BULK POL DATA, PACOM

- AVGAS: 0.44, 0.29, 5.05, 10.30, 2.44, 5.95, 3.44, 0.93, 0.34, .04
- JP-4: 5.96
- JP-5: 3.62
- MOGAS: 9.65
- DIESEL: 1.71
- NSFO: 1.52

RECEIPTS DURING LAST 180 DAYS
TOTAL... 12.01

MILITARY STORAGE AVAILABLE
TOTAL... 28.8

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 39.
tanks prior to that date. The adjustments covered changes in procurement and delivery costs which would insure that the Services adequately replenished the DFSC revolving stock fund. Comparison of prices per gallon for previous two years is shown below:\footnote{1}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78 (1 Oct 77)</th>
<th>FY 79 (1 Oct 78)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP-5</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFM</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGAS</td>
<td>.316</td>
<td>.543</td>
<td>.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td>.437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PACOM POL Storage Facilities

\footnote{2} The long-standing shortage of PACOM POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) storage facilities was again addressed by CINCPAC in 1978. In January the JCS passed to CINCPAC for comment an October 1977 DLA study entitled "Coordinated Plan for Satisfying PACOM PWRMR Bulk Petroleum Storage Deficiencies FY 78-81." The plan identified the need for six million barrels of additional storage capacity in the PACOM and requested authority to meet the shortage through short-term, multi-year leases of commercial tanks.

\footnotesize{1. \textbf{CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD)}, Vol. II, p. 243; J422 HistSum Sep 78 (U); J4 BWEB 25 Sep-8 Oct 78 (U).}
\footnotesize{2. J422 Histsum May 78 (S), which cites JCS (J4)DM-48-78 of 30 Jan 78, REVW 6 Jun 98.}
\footnotesize{3. \textbf{Ibid.}; J422 Point Paper, 9 May 78 (S), Subj: PACOM POL PWRMR (U), REVW 9 May 98.}
Measures to overcome this potential deficit had been initiated by the Services in the PACOM, including repairs of existing tanks and new construction. Also, an appraisal of lease opportunities had been made by the Defense Fuel Region Pacific (DFRPAC) in November 1977 which indicated the existence of a small amount of commercial tankage available. Contract awards for leased storage were scheduled for 1980, with product storage to begin in 1981.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>435 (Diego Garcia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repairs</td>
<td>372 (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,350 (Hawaii - Red Hill)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>570 (four different locations in Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500 (Guam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Repairs</td>
<td>33 (Okinawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40 (Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKG (USMC/USAF)</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>480 (150 each at Pohang and Yecheon; 20 at Kimhae; 40 each at Chongju and Suwon; and 80 at Sachon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOJ Cost-Sharing</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>515 (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>Construction/Lease</td>
<td>500 (Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction/Repair</td>
<td>250 (Wake)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.; Hq PACAF 282300Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-85, which cited DFRPAC 030302Z Nov 77.
2. J422 HistSum Nov 78 (S), REVW 5 Dec 98; J422 Point Paper (S), 21 Nov 78, Subj: Review of PACOM POL PWRMR (U), REVW 21 Nov 98.
(U) In 1978 the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office noted the need to clarify the figures in the accompanying chart. The "consumption" nomenclature used in previous histories was initiated during the Vietnam era when there was a close correlation between product receipts and issues—and it was assumed that receipts equaled consumption. In peacetime, the statistics reflected more accurately the product "issues" from the various terminals, some of which involved the emptying of tanks for maintenance and repair (e.g., Red Hill in Hawaii, Sasebo in Japan), and the relocation to a different storage area. Thus, the accompanying chart is labeled POL Issues rather than "Consumption" or even "Throughput."^1

**AVGAS in PACOM**

(S) In an effort to reduce the overall PACOM Prepositioned War Reserve Requirements (PWRR) deficit and to convert AVGAS tankage to other POL products, during the past several years CINCPAC J4 had worked to draw down AVGAS use in the PACOM. One phase of this effort involved U.S. aircraft requirements. By the end of FY 78, AVGAS requirements for C-123K and EC-121 aircraft were eliminated at the Kimhae, South Korea, and Yokota, Japan bases of operations and also from en route refueling areas at Elmendorf, Adak, Hickam, Midway, Wake, and Andersen.2

(U) Another phase involved the ROKG requirement. The ROKG had been self-sufficient in all grades of bulk petroleum products, with the exception of AVGAS, for several years and the U.S. Government had been providing AVGAS support through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. Because the U.S. Air Force requirement for AVGAS in Korea had been reduced (see above) and commercial sources were available in the PACOM, the USAF asked relief from the FMS case for CY 79. CINCPAC supported the Air Force position and, through the efforts of DFSC and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea (JUSMAGK), the ROKG obtained a contract with the Chinese Petroleum Corporation for 100/130 AVGAS with first scheduled delivery to commence in February or March 1979.3

(TS) However, there still was a minor peacetime AVGAS requirement in Korea for a U.S. Navy aircraft used by Commander, Naval Forces, Korea (COMNAVFORKOREA) at Yongsan, and a USAF contingency requirement for an O-2 aircraft operating with these planes.4

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2. J4226 Point Paper, 9 May 78 (S), Subj: PACOM POL PWRM (U), REVW 9 May 98; J4 WWEB 24 Apr-7 May 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86.
3. J4 HistSum Sep 78 (U); Hq USAF 282050Z Apr 78 (U); CINCPAC 040336Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; CJUSMAG-K 270732Z Jul 78 and 180435Z Aug 78 (U).
### 1978 POL Issues

(in thousands of barrels)

#### By Product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>AVGAS</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>JP-4</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>855</td>
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<td>721</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>813</td>
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<td>828</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>919</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>622</td>
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<td>388</td>
<td>314</td>
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<tr>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,116</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,534</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,309</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,362</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,957</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,859</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,395</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,035</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,799</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,425</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,294</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,318</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,403</strong></td>
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#### By Area

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
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<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
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<th>Jul</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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<td>Hawaii</td>
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<td>817</td>
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<td>830</td>
<td>466</td>
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<td>409</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>660</td>
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<td>Guam</td>
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<td>225</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,116</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,534</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2,294</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,318</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,403</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: J422
UNCLASSIFIED

PACOM POL ISSUES
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)

* Naval Distillate phased out in 1974.

UNCLASSIFIED
280
from Hoengsun AB. COMUS Korea and the ROK Ministry of National Defense discussed two proposals for fulfilling these needs: the first was to have the ROKAF store and issue USAF fuel to U.S. peacetime or contingency users; the second was to have the ROKAF issue their AVGAS to support the U.S. (Navy) requirement in exchange for a dollar equivalent amount of USAF-owned JP-4. It appeared, however, that the latter proposal might be in contravention of provisions of Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which, as amended in 1967, repealed authority to exchange U.S. military property or services for foreign military services or property. As the year closed, alternative proposals were being investigated which would allow the accomplishment of the desired legitimate objectives without creating the appearance of circumventing foreign assistance procedures.

In late 1977, at CINCPAC's request, the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) had reviewed the positioning of AVGAS 115/145 and recommended the phaseout of AVGAS bulk storage at the Naval Supply Depot (NSD) Guam. After CINCPAC concurrence, action was taken to terminate AVGAS storage at the NSD. Included in this movement was the reallocation of the former NSD AVGAS tank to storage of JP-6 and the movement of the Navy Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel Requirement (PWRMR) to the Naval Air Station at Agana with a base level of 1,000 barrels. Phaseout of AVGAS on Guam was scheduled in 1984.

**POL Storage at Diego Garcia**

At the beginning of 1978 a permanent POL storage capacity of 83,000 barrels had been constructed at Diego Garcia, consisting of two 30-MBBL tanks, two 10-MBBL tanks, and one 3-MBBL tank. Eight 80-MBBL tanks were under construction—six funded by the U.S. Navy and two by the U.S. Air Force. Originally, a mix of Marine Diesel Fuel (DFM), JP-4, and JP-5 fuel was planned. In December 1977 the Air Force agreed that all storage capacity could be converted to JP-5. By the end of 1978, construction of the eight 80-MBBL tanks had been completed, and auxiliary pipes and pump house completion was scheduled for April 1980.

1. J4226 HistSum Oct 78 (S), REVW 9 Nov 90; HQ PACAF 240135Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSK 131927Z Sep 78 and 050728Z Oct 78 (U); CINCPAC 220122Z Sep 78 and 260401Z Oct 78 (U).
2. J4226 HistSum Jan 78 (S), REVW 4 Feb 98; CINCPACFLT 300644Z Dec 77 (S), GDS-83; CINCPACFLT 190045Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 051921Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
In early February 1978 the possible positioning of SR-71 fuel (JP-7) at Diego Garcia was suggested by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This suggestion was prompted by the possible need, on a contingency basis, for manned photo reconnaissance of the Horn of Africa which would entail the fewest political and diplomatic liabilities. Secretary Brown noted that such operations would be significantly simplified by operating an SR-71 and supporting tanker aircraft directly from Diego Garcia. In order so to operate, it was necessary to position JP-7 fuel and a small amount of support equipment there. Based on the recommendation of the Chairman, JCS, the Secretary advised that he would initiate action to establish minimum contingency operating capability for the SR-71 at Diego Garcia, acknowledging, at the same time, the need for higher authority and United Kingdom concurrence before an actual SR-71 deployment and reconnaissance operation could be made.

The JCS replied that the establishment of permanent facilities for SR-71 contingency operations had not yet been directed by higher authority. Moreover, the language of Congressional Military Construction (MILCON) authorizations for Diego Garcia mandated interagency staffing and Congressional approval of the addition of permanent installations and/or personnel.

However, early in June, USAF headquarters informed SAC (with info to CINCPAC) that the Air Staff was coordinating a CSAF memorandum seeking to obtain JCS and Defense approval to establish permanent JP-7 storage facilities on Diego Garcia. The Air Force proposed to convert an existing U.S. Navy 30-MBBL storage tank, along with provisions for a dedicated ocean vessel receipt line and a truck fill system. If approved, the conversion would parallel then on-going JP-5 expansion efforts, with final conversion of the 30-MBBL tank to take place after Navy storage requirements were met. Since the Air Force had

1. JCS (J3) 1291/061731Z Feb 78 (S) (DOM), XGDS-2. Note: Message downgraded from Top Secret to Secret by JCS 5806/121917Z Jun 78 (S), XGDS-2.
2. CINCSAC 010001Z Mar 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-2; JCS 2385/092240Z Mar 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-2, which cited CINCPAC 280350Z Feb 78.
3. Ibid.
agreed to permit the substitution of JP-5 in the Air Force-funded 80-MBBL JP-4 storage tanks, the Air Staff considered that the JP-7 capability could be provided with a minor conversion effort. SAC was requested to provide a budgetary estimate.¹

(§) SAC requested CINCPAC's assistance, and CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to provide the cost estimate. Based on contract construction, CINCPACFLT estimated that the 30-MBBL tank conversion, and associated components to accommodate JP-7 fuel, would cost $1.385 million. CINCPACFLT pointed out the sensitivity of Diego Garcia construction vis-a-vis the Congress, suggesting that permanent storage of JP-7 represented an addition to the Diego Garcia mission.²

(§) CINCPAC relayed these and other concerns to the JCS noting that, although the JCS had advised that no requirement for permanent storage existed, the subject was, nevertheless, apparently being considered. CINCPAC suggested that, if serious consideration were being given to permanent JP-7 storage facilities on Diego Garcia, planning should proceed through the designated executive agent (Secretary of the Navy) for DOD development of the island. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS initiate action to insure proper coordination and planning. The JCS assured CINCPAC that the proposal for permanent JP-7 storage facilities was being coordinated with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, USAF, and the Navy.³

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1. J422 HistSum Jun 78 (§), REVW 7 Jul 98; Hq USAF 021650Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-86.  
2. Hq SAC 131345Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPAC 150322Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 290404Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-86.  
3. CINCPAC 201910Z Jul 78 (TS) GDS-88; JCS 5906/281336Z Jul 78 (TS), GDS-88.  
Meanwhile on 30 September the ownership of all bulk fuel inventories on Diego Garcia was transferred from the U.S. Navy to the DFSC under the DLA.

Wake

A memo of 20 March from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (ASD MRA&L) authorized the DLA to budget in the FY 80 MILCON program for 250,000 barrels of tankage on Wake Island. Authority included mooring, discharge, and loading capabilities as required. The type of fuel to be stored would be JP-5 vice JP-4. Since any new POL tank construction on Wake required a tie-in with existing in-service/repairable tankage to facilitate the storage of one grade of jet fuel, CINCPAC agreed that Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) should submit Project Data Sheet and Supporting Data to the DFSC for inclusion in the FY 80 MILCON program. Estimated cost was $10.5 million.

Hawaii

In January 1978 the Governor of Hawaii requested assistance and information that the Services might provide as to the availability of unused petroleum storage capacity on Oahu. Under the Federal Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program, the Department of Energy (DOE) was considering storage of 2.2 million barrels of petroleum in Hawaii, but the State wanted a 10-million-barrel reserve. Areas under consideration by the State were located at DOD-controlled property at Barber's Point, Lualualei, and Camp Malakole. In mid-year, at the request of the DOE, the State reevaluated storage options to determine cost data on proposed tank locations. CINCPACFLT was tasked to assist the State Energy Office.

1. SECSTATE 273659/271820Z Oct 78 (TS), GDS-88; AMEMB London 20006/061646Z Dec 78 (TS), XDS-1, REVW 5 Dec 08.
2. J4 BWEB 11-24 Sep 78 (U).
3. J422 HistSums Jun, Jul 78; CINCPAC 062319Z Jul 78 and 252325Z Jul 78; Hq PACAF 312111Z May 78 and 290210Z Jul 78; Hq USAF 291515Z Jun 78; DFSC 211502Z Jun 78; all (U).
4. J4 BWEBs of 16-29 Jan 78, 13-26 Feb 78, and 19 Jun-2 Jul 78; all (U).
(U) According to a local newspaper article, the State of Hawaii received word on 19 January 1979 that the DOE had not included funds for regional oil storage in Hawaii or the U.S. Northeast in its proposed budget for 1980. A U.S. Representative from Hawaii stated that members of the Hawaii Congressional delegation would continue to push for regional oil storage in Hawaii and federal funding of alternate energy resources in the State.¹

Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System

¹ Because of the 1975 and subsequent reductions of U.S. Army presence in the Pacific, the Army proposed to transfer operation and control of the Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS) to the Air Force, which was the predominant user; however, a December 1976 Deputy Secretary of Defense decision, relayed to the Commander, U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ) on January 1977, tasked the Army to retain petroleum logistics responsibility on Okinawa. Under existing host-tenant relationships, the U.S. Air Force base host was to provide support for the Army's petroleum elements.²

² By the end of 1977, predominant user and host-tenant support questions were again surfacing. The Army, with one percent use of the system, but overall responsibility, was dissatisfied with Air Force (73 percent use) support. An Interservice Support Agreement (ISA) between the two was being negotiated at year's end in conjunction with Department-level discussions reviewing operation and maintenance responsibilities for the OPDS.³

³ In January 1978 staff members of the Department of the Army Energy Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics resumed discussions on operation and management of the OPDS. The Army Staff maintained that the system should be operated by a single Service and that it should be the Air Force. The Air Force agreed to the single manager concept, but disagreed that it was an Air Force mission. In March the Defense Department decided that the Army would retain operation and maintenance responsibility for OPDS.⁴

Supply and Services

PACOM War Reserve Assets

¹ Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 20 Jan 79, "State Insists Oil Reserve is Necessary" (U)  
³ Ibid.  
⁴ J4 BWEBs 30 Jan-12 Feb 78 (C), REVW 12 Feb 98 and 13-26 Mar 78 (U).
1. CINC PAC 250541Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 6645/101935Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
   Note: "Fenced" equates to compartmented or restricted.
2. J461 Point Paper (C), 28 Feb 78, Subj: Transfer of WRSA to ROM BM wartime
   (U), REVW 28 Feb 98, CHJUSMAGK 100135Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; SSO Korea 120742Z
   Oct 78 (U) (BOM); Interview with LCOL D.J. Phillips, USA, J4233, 22 Mar 79.
1. J4233-Point Paper (S), 21 Apr 78, Subj: WRSA Program (U), REVW 21 Apr 98; J4 Briefing Chart (S), n.d., Subj: WRSA Program (U), REVW Dec 98; J4 Point Paper (S), 21 Apr 78, Subj: Wartime Logistic Support to NUK Forces (U), REVW 21 Apr 98; J4/Memo/T59-79 (U) of 30 May 79, Subj: 1978 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft (U).

2. Ibid.; CINCUNC 1403352 Jan 78 (S), (EX), GDS 31 Dec 84.
War Reserve Materiel on Taiwan

War Reserve Materiel (WRM) on Taiwan consisted of conventional munitions, POL products, and miscellaneous combat support items at three bases jointly operated by the U.S. Air Force and the Chinese Air Force. In November 1977 CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to submit a plan by 1 March 1978 addressing the relocation of theater-related WRM (on Taiwan) within three months after notification to relocate. Questions were raised concerning WRM during a visit by the Secretary of Defense to CINCPAC in February 1978 which dealt with the possible sale of WRM to the Republic of China (ROC), the significance of WRM to the defense of Taiwan, and storage site value. CINCPAC's position was that the sale of WRM to the ROC would be neither feasible nor desirable. Not all stocks were compatible with ROC equipment, some might be cost-prohibitive, and some were not authorized for sale to the ROC. More importantly, WRM was required not only to support Taiwan defense under OPLAN 5025, but also for the defense of Korea and other CINCPAC plans. Finally, POL storage facilities on Taiwan were sorely needed because facilities in Japan and Hawaii were undergoing repairs, and facilities in Korea, Diego Garcia, and Okinawa were programmed for repairs.

As the planned reduction of U.S. military personnel on Taiwan progressed during the year, WRM came under even closer scrutiny. Concurrently with the decision to relocate the PDM facility from Taiwan (q.v.), in September CINCPAC was also informed by the JCS that action would be taken to relocate WRM items on Taiwan which were not essential for the defense of Taiwan against air attack or naval blockade but were needed to meet other requirements.

As the October CINCPAC response stated that WRM was required on Taiwan to ensure air superiority, if removed, a completely new concept for the defense of Taiwan would be required. All WRM items on Taiwan were to be relocated except those considered essential for the defense of Taiwan against air attack or naval blockade and not needed to meet other requirements.

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1. JCS 6575/1523422: Nov 77 (5), GDS-85; J423 Talking Paper, 15 Feb 78 (5), Subj: SECDEF Questions-Taiwan (para 1,3.5) (U), REVN 15 Feb 98.
On the following day, 21 December, CINCPAC withdrew that request and the JCS stopped action to retain the vessel. However, the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's deferral of the 116 short tons withdrawal because of political considerations and possible future decisions affecting the disposition of WRM stocks on Taiwan. As of 15 November 1978, WRM stored on Taiwan was as depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WRM Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>7,407 short tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Munition Items</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAP (Tanks, Racks, Adaptors, Pylons)</td>
<td>87 short tons</td>
<td>Ching Chuan Kang (CCK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaff</td>
<td>245 short tons</td>
<td>CCK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Barrels</td>
<td>1 short ton</td>
<td>CCK</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
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<td>Aviation Fuels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Oils</td>
<td>14 short tons</td>
<td>Pipeline</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. J423 Point Paper (S), 15 Nov 78, Subj: WRM Storage in Taiwan (U), REVW 15 Nov 98, which cited CINCPAC 042026Z Oct 78; CINCPAC 200222Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 19 Dec 84, which cited Hq USAF 131530Z Dec 78 and CINCPAC 192120Z Dec 78.
2. J423 Point Paper (S), 15 Nov 78, Subj: WRM Storage in Taiwan (U), REVW 15 Nov 98; JCS 6283/230055Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 22 Dec 84.
Combat Support Items

- Housekeeping Kits: 1,409 short tons, CCK
- Field Equipment: 317 short tons, CCK
- Matting and Tools: 80 short tons, CCK
- Vehicles and AGE: 52 each, CCK

Programmed Depot Maintenance on Taiwan

SECRET

In FY 77 Air Asia had performed depot-level maintenance on 110 U.S. and ROKAF military aircraft (and depot services on 58 other U.S. aircraft). Corrosion control, modification, and component rework was also accomplished. Programmed inputs for FY 78 were 48 USAF F-4s, 6 ROKAF F-4s, and 29 Navy/Marine Corps aircraft, plus an additional non-scheduled 15 USMC aircraft. Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) F-4 workload estimates for FY 79 were 109 USAF, and 39 USN/USMC, plus drop-in maintenance.

Throughout the years since the Shanghai Communique of 1972, CINCPAC had studied many options for the withdrawal of U.S. facilities and forces from Taiwan, including the PDM facility. A November 1977 JCS message requested a plan by 15 December 1977 from CINCPAC for reduction of U.S. DOD personnel on Taiwan to a ceiling of 500 by 1 August 1978. The same message stated a requirement for a plan by 1 March 1978 addressing "relocation of USAF aircraft contract maintenance center within six months after notification to relocate." CINCPAC continued to urge retention of the PDM facility in a February message to the JCS by pointing out the adverse effects relocation of the PDM facility would have on PACOM readiness. For example, ferry time, plus additional overhaul flow time, would extend pipeline time from 75 days for Air Asia to 100-120 days for Ogden, Utah. (PACAF had 6.5 percent of its F-4s in the

1. J4232 Point Paper (S), 3 Feb 78, Subj: PDM Facility, Taiwan, Taiwan (U), REVW 3 Feb 98; ltr from John W. Dixon, President Air Asia Ltd., to President Carter of 18 Dec 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 132240Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; Op. Cit. J4232 Point Paper (S), 3 Feb 78; J4232 Point Paper (S), 26 Dec 78, Subj: PDM (U), REVW 26 Dec 98.

SECRET

290
pipeline and if PDM location were changed to Ogden it would go to 12 percent). Costs for FY 79 would increase $20 million for the Air Force and a similar amount for the Navy. The Air Asia facility was privately owned—not a U.S. military facility. It was comprised of 70 buildings, covering 43.7 acres, and had a skilled local workforce of 2,000.1

In exploring other possible PACOM locations, CINCPAC found Japan had aircraft repair services available but they would require expansion, wage rates were much higher, and, due to political sensitivities, use problems could be anticipated should contingency situations occur. Although the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) was developing an F-4 depot capability at Taegu under an FMS case called PEACE DEPOT, capability was minimal. Expansion of a skill base, tooling and equipment, and facilities construction would take up to two years (FY 80-81) to accommodate USAF PDM requirements, with an even later date forecast for the Navy and Marine Corps. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS or DOD initiate a study of the depot level maintenance and corrosion control requirements for all forces stationed in WESTPAC and estimate overall manhour and facility requirements.2

In April the Secretary of Defense signed a memo to the National Security Council recommending that steps be taken to have the ROK develop a capability to handle the workload currently being performed by Air Asia. At the same time, he directed the Air Staff to prepare a plan for a PDM facility in Korea to support PACOM forces with a desired operational date within 18-24 months after NSC approval. In a 3 August memo, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski directed the Secretary of Defense "over the next 18 months [to] develop PDM facilities in Korea similar to those on Taiwan and to have transferred all of the workload now done on Taiwan to the Korean and possibly other facilities by March 1, 1980." Further, the USAF and USN contracts with E-Systems were to be extended for a period not to exceed the relocation schedule, and DOD was also to transfer corrosion control work done by China Air Lines in Taipei to an off-island contractor as soon as practical. The JCS confirmed to CINCPAC that the USAF would take the lead in implementing these directives.3

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/EBD), Vol. I, pp. 67 and 72; JCS 6575/152342Z Nov 77 (TS) (EX), GDS-85; CINCPAC 132240Z Feb 78 (TS), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
3. J4232 Point Paper (S), 19 Apr 78, Subj: Pacific PDM Facility (U), REVW 19 Apr 98; Z. Brzezinski Memo (S), 3 Aug 78, Subj: U.S. Programmed Depot Maintenance Facilities and War Reserve Materials on Taiwan (U), GDS-86, which cites 6 Apr 78 SECDEF Memo; SECSTATE 216384/250102Z Aug 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-3; JCS 2943/012206Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
(S) A PACER DOT conference was held at Wright-Patterson AFB (Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)) on 14-15 November to refine plans for PDM relocation to Taegu (ROKAF) or Kimhae (site of a Korean Airlines maintenance facility). The establishment of a MAC channel, if the Kimhae site were chosen, and provisions for sufficient civilian and military manning were also discussed. Announcement of the selection of Kimhae as the site for the new PDM facility was made on 30 November in a message from ROK Minister of National Defense Ro Jae-Hyun to General Bryce Poe, Commander of the AFLC. As the year closed USAF/ROK/KAL were developing the ROK F-4 PDM facility at Kimhae to accommodate both USAF and USN/USMC airframes. Workload estimates for FY 80 were 25 USAF and 5 USN/USMC, plus unscheduled maintenance. The first USAF F-4 was scheduled into the Korean depot in October 1979.2

Munitions

AIM-7E Missile Allocation

(S) The PACAF semiannual Situation Report submitted to CINCPAC on 30 March 1978 stated that an existing AIM-7E shortfall had been aggravated by a USAF-directed reallocation of assets from PACAF to Europe. Since this was CINCPAC's first notification of the planned transfer of already reduced air-to-air missile assets out of the PACOM, PACAF was requested to advise details and status of intended transfer actions and the effect on PACAF's ability to support existing CINCPAC OPLANs.3

1. J4232 Point Paper (S), 15 Nov 78, Subj: PACOM PDM (U), REVW 26 Dec 98; SECSTATE 216384/250102Z Aug 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-3; Hq USAF 081435Z Sep 78 (S), GDS 31 Dec 86.
2. J42/Memo/S25-78 (S) of 24 Nov 78, Subj: PACER DOT Conference (Wright-Patterson AFB 14-15 Nov 78) (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; SSO Korea 3009432 Nov 78 (BOM), GDS-84; J4232 Point Paper (S) 26 Dec 78, Subj: PDM (U), REVW 26 Dec 98.
3. PACAF Command History 1977 (TS/EBD), pp. 351-353; Hq PACAF 250230Z Apr 78 (S), XGDS-3(07); CINCPAC 040419Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; J4236 Point Paper (S), 19 Apr 78, Subj: AIM-7E Reallocation (U), REVW 19 Apr 98.

SECRET

292
(S) Further, PACAF stated that the allocation for FY 79 was even less (507 AIM-7Es, and if available, 100 AIM-7Fs), and that the situation was not expected to improve until FY 80 when production and supply of AIM-7Fs would permit attainment of minimum levels of AIM-7s.  

(S) The AIM-7E shortfall was the result of a critical worldwide shortage of AIM-7 missiles caused by earlier decisions not to reopen the AIM-7E production line, but rather to initiate production of the AIM-7F. The problem was further exacerbated by substantial production delays. In an effort to insure a continuous supply of AIM-7s for Korean/PACOM contingencies, PACAF obtained Air Staff approval for tactical ferry of AIMs by CONUS augmentation forces (at the option of the area commander) and that AIMs, earmarked under Tactical Air Missile Program for USAF in Europe and the Aerospace Defense Command, also be designated as available for PACAF contingency planning. By year's end, these alternatives had been incorporated.

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1. Hq PACAF 250230Z Apr 78 (S), XGDS-3 (07); Interview with SMSgt C.S. Goodwin, USAF, J4236, 13 Mar 79.
2. Hq PACAF 072300Z Jun 78 (S), XGDS-3 (07).
3. Ibid.; Hq PACAF 250230Z Apr 78 (S), XGDS-3 (07); Op. Cit., Interview with SMSgt C.S. Goodwin.
PACOM Munitions Summary

The following is a comparison in short tons of the PACOM munitions inventory status at the beginning and end of 1978:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 December 1977</th>
<th>31 December 1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>On Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>551,139</td>
<td>381,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>37,176b</td>
<td>95,910c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>64,671b</td>
<td>76,736c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>754,862</td>
<td>661,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. As reported in CINCPAC Command History 1977.

b. Storage objectives and on-hand assets for the Navy/Marine Corps are based on OPNAVNOTE C8000, calling for three carrier task groups.

c. On-hand asset totals include approximately 43,000 short tons of training (27,500 short tons) and excess/obsolete (15,500 short tons) ammunition. This ammunition was not included in CINCPAC OPLAN support.

West Coast Ammunition Port Capability

An October 1977 JCS Logistics Directors' Conference had identified the limited West Coast ammunition onload capability at Concord, California, as a matter of grave concern. The PACOM need for increased West Coast onload capability had been highlighted constantly by CINCPAC contingency planners during each review of the

1. Figures (S) provided by LCOL N.T. Kobayashi, USA, J4234, 27 Mar 78, REVW Dec 98.
2. CINCPAC 070336Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
Ammunition Movement Planning Factors

I. Order, place, load, and move ammunition to West/East Coast ports (U.S. Army Armament Command) 18

II. Load ammunition break bulk ship (MTMC input) 7

III. Transit times (MSC input)

- Concord, CA to Pusan:
  - 16 knots 13.5
  - 20 knots 10.5

- Sunny Point, NC to Pusan:
  - 16 knots 27
  - 20 knots 21

- Transit Panama Canal 1

IV. Discharge ship (MTMC input) 5

V. In country transit time (2d Trans Gp, Korea input) 0.5

VI. Total:

- West Coast to Ammunition Supply Point Korea 41 - 44
- East Coast to Ammunition Supply Point Korea 52.5 - 58.5

VII. Impact of Canal closures:

- Panama Canal closed - Suez open Add 6-8
- Panama and Suez Canal closed Add 10-13
In April CINCPAC solicited JCS assistance to assure inclusion of the upgrade in FY 80 Navy MILCON funding. The JCS response indicated full support would be given "until fruition" and noted the problem was receiving priority attention within the Joint Staff, the Navy Department, and MTMC. This was confirmed through informal discussion with the Undersecretary of the Navy in June. However, as of the end of the year, the matter was still in the DOD under review.3

Excess U.S. Government Property Disposal

Philippines

Local Philippine Customs officials had interpreted President Marcos' 1 January 1978 verbal ban on the private sales of tax-exempt merchandise to

1. J431 Point Paper (S), 2 Mar 78, Subj: West Coast Ammunition Port Capabilities Shortfall (S), REVW 2 Mar 98.
2. CINCPAC 070336Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; J431 Point Paper (S), 2 Mar 78, Subj: West Coast Ammunition Port Capabilities Shortfall (S), REVW 2 Mar 98.
3. Ibid.; JCS 4342/132325Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
non-tax-exempt individuals to include sales by the U.S. Government of excess materiel. (Primary intent of the ban was to stop the flow of U.S. Base Exchange (BX) items into the civilian community). Consequently, sales of excess materiel (except garbage and scrap) were suspended from January through the end of 1978. Storage became a problem and turn-ins were stopped. Early informal discussions between American and Philippine officials had been to no avail. However, at a 29 June meeting with Ambassador Murphy, President Marcos had directed General Espino, Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff, to solve the problem by segregating "BX-type" items from the remainder—the remainder could then be sold through competitive bidding. Further delays in resolving the matter were encountered because some Philippine officials wished the subject to be discussed as part of base negotiations or by the Mutual Defense Board (MDB). In an attempt to resolve the issue, the Co-Chairmen of the MDB sent a letter to the Minister of National Defense in early January 1979 requesting that non-BX sales be authorized and excluded from the ban on sales of tax exempt property. This letter was forwarded to President Marcos, who, on 15 February 1979, ordered the Philippine Commissioner of Customs to exempt sales of excess U.S. Government materiel from taxes.¹

Thailand

The U.S. Defense Property Disposal Office in Thailand closed in July 1976 in conjunction with the major United States withdrawal. At that time, the General Services Officer at the American Embassy had agreed to handle disposal requirements for JUSMAGTHAI. However, when the volume of MAP-disposable property exceeded expectations the Embassy declined to perform the processing. As a result, an extensive backlog accumulated. In November 1977 CINCPAC forwarded to JUSMAGTHAI a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering the sale of Foreign Excess Personal Property which provided for the establishment of a Defense Property Disposal Regional Office-Pacific (DPDO-PAC) branch in Thailand. It was not until October 1978, however, that the MOU was signed by JUSMAGTHAI and Thai officials. The Thailand office conducted its first sale in March 1979 with proceeds of $29,246.13 from 134 items.²

² J4232 Point Paper ☺, 28 Aug 78, Subj: Property Disposal Problems—Philippines, Thailand, and Japan (U), REVW 13 Jul 98; CHJUSMAGTHAI 110823Z Oct 78 (U); DPDO-Thailand 211024Z Mar 79 (U)
India

(U) The Indian Cooperation Commission and the Central Public Works Department declared as excess approximately 50 items of heavy road equipment which had been provided by the U.S. Government under Grant Aid for construction of the East-West Highway through Nepal. Due to the deteriorated condition of the equipment, its remote location, and lack of qualified maintenance personnel, disposal by means of sale seemed unlikely and consideration was given to donating the equipment to His Majesty's Government of Nepal. However, DPDR-PAC awarded a contract for sale and removal of the equipment to Hawaii Steel and Supply Company for approximately $50,000. Removal of all but nine items was completed by the end of 1978.1

Indonesia

(U) In early 1978 the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) Indonesia requested CINCPAC assistance in negotiating an agreement with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense (HANKAM) covering disposal of excess MAP property. CINCPAC, in coordination with DPDR-PAC, furnished a draft MOU for use in discussions with HANKAM and later sent a DPDR representative to assist USDLG with technical matters and review of material intended for disposal. The final draft MOU, which provided for DPD sales in Indonesia, was approved by CINCPAC and DPDR-PAC staffs in August. Signature by Indonesian and USDLG officials was anticipated in early 1979. Initial sales would follow shortly thereafter in Indonesia, conducted under the auspices of the DPDR-PAC Detachment Subic.2

2. J4233 Point Paper (U), 14 Sep 78, Subj: Property Disposal in Indonesia (U); Interview with LCOL J.W. Burt, USAF, J4232, 27 Mar 79.
MAC Routes in the Pacific

(U) In April CINCMAC informed PACAF and the Alaskan Air Command that on 1 April 1978, 30 MAC channel missions per month would be shifted from Mid-Pacific to North-Pacific routes (Elmendorf and Yokota vice Hickam and Guam) on a 90-day trial basis. The mission shifted was the daily MAC C-141 Forward Supply System mission 807/808 which moved spare parts from CONUS depots to MAC stations in PACOM and returned reparable parts to CONUS depots. Because of the daily frequency, this mission also moved high priority cargo and passengers for other PACOM users. The former Mid-Pacific routing was: Norton-Travis-Hickam-Andersen-Yokota-Kadena-Clark-Andersen-Hickam-Travis-Norton. The new North-Pacific route was: Norton-Travis-Elmendorf-Yokota-Kadena-Clark-Andersen-Yokota-Travis-Norton. The MAC-stated advantages were decreased flying times (39:45 on new route vs. 43:10 on former) and fuel consumption; reduced aircrew per diem costs; and fewer landings at Hickam (17 percent) and Andersen (36 percent), which would permit manpower reductions, although some increases would accrue at Elmendorf and Yokota.¹

(U) In response to CINCPAC's request for an evaluation of the impact of the mission change, the Pacific Airlift Management Office (PAMO) reported that a canvas of PACOM components and CINCPACREP's revealed adverse effects on high-priority passenger and cargo movement from WESTPAC to Hawaii and the West Coast. Hardest hit under the new routing was the Clark-Hickam-West Coast leg where, prior to 1 April, the number of temporary duty and emergency leave passengers had averaged 107 per month. Under the new route, this number was reduced to a trickle because the 807 mission changed to 808 at Guam. Under MAC rules, the passengers and cargo on 807 were "re-originated" at Guam in competition with Guam-originated traffic of equal priority. PACAF reported that the cargo pipeline time of aircraft parts shipments from Kadena/Guam to Hickam in support of a Force/Activity Designator-1 unit increased from two to five days since rerouting. Navy air cargo shipments on this same leg experienced longer hold times at Clark, as depicted below:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin- Destination</th>
<th>Transportation Priority</th>
<th>Old Port Hold Time (Days)</th>
<th>New Port Hold Time (Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clark-Hickam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Under 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Under 2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark-Travis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Under 1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Under 2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ J436 HistSum Apr 78 (U); CINCMAC 131700Z Apr 78 (U); J434 Point Paper (U), 22 Jul 78, Subj: Reroute of MAC 807/808 mission (U).
² Ibid.; CINCPAC 280207Z Apr 78 (U); J434 HistSum, Dec 78 (U); PACAF 010025Z Jul 78 (U).
(U) In July, CINCPAC reported the impact of the PAMO findings to MAC, asked whether MAC data corroborated the CINCPAC-PAMO analysis, and requested that final action be withheld until the matter was fully reviewed. CINCMAC's response to the CINCPAC-PAMO report of effects of rerouting indicated MAC data generally supported the CINCPAC-PAMO points and advised that, although the rerouted missions would remain on their new itineraries, MAC would provide sufficient Mid-Pacific capability to ease the impact reported by CINCPAC.1

MAC Air Division Structure in the Pacific

(U) In September PACAF advised that the USAF had approved the CINCMAC proposal for "implementation" of the 834th Air Division (MAC) at Hickam AFB on or about 8 October. This reorganization was to consolidate management of airlift operations in the Pacific under an intermediate headquarters which would provide CINCPAC and CINCPACAF with face-to-face senior representation on theater airlift matters. Attendant to the creation of the 834th AD in Hawaii was the establishment in Japan of a tactical airlift group (TAG), the 316th TAG at Yokota AB, which included the 345th TASS and 610th MASS in Japan and the 611th MASS at Osan in Korea. The 316th TAG reported to the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at Clark, which in turn reported to the 834th AD.2

MAC Space Available Travel to Thailand

(U) A ban on space available travel between Clark and Bangkok had been imposed by the American Ambassador to Thailand at the request of CINCPACAF at the time of the Thailand withdrawal in 1976. In conjunction with the establishment of MAC channel service to Thailand in March 1977, CINCPAC sought to have the ban lifted. CHJUSMAGTHAI wished to limit space available travel to personnel stationed in Thailand and emergency cases from out of the country. The rationale cited was limited manpower to process passengers and Thai political sensitivities to U.S. military personnel coming into Thailand—a view in which the American Ambassador concurred.

(U) CINCPAC, however, pointed out that such a restriction would be discriminatory and was contrary to space available policy elsewhere. PACAF supported the CINCPAC position because of the potential favorable impact on morale. Discussions between Admiral Weisner and Ambassador Whitehouse at the January 1978 Chiefs of Mission conference were fruitful and a decision was made to initiate a limited (maximum 10 passengers per flight) space available

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1. CINCPAC 26O1042 Jul 78 (U); CINCMAC 242300Z Aug 78 (U).
2. Hq PACAF 02O332Z Sep 78 (U); the organization and activation of the 834th AD and 316th TAG was executed through MAC Programmed Action Directive 78-20 of 29 Sep 78.
program into Bangkok effective 15 February 1978. The Embassy was assured that CINCPAC would monitor the program closely for compliance and effectiveness.¹

MAC Flights to Diego Garcia

In January the Twenty Second Air Force (22nd AF) in California advised that an alternate route for MAC flights between Clark and Diego Garcia had been developed. The purpose of the new route was to allow contingency operations or short-notice flights without obtaining special Thai overflight clearance. The new route required only Singapore diplomatic clearance, flew up the Strait of Malacca from Singapore (international airspace), and joined the normal routing just north of Sumatra (see map). The exact route was coordinated and approved among the attaché offices of the three countries involved (Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia), MAC, and USAF. MAC approved the operation of missions to Diego Garcia via the Strait of Malacca effective 25 April 1978. The alternate route reduced flying time by 1.5 hours per roundtrip mission.²

2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 254, 255; J436 HistSum Apr 78 (S), REVW 9 May 98; 22 AF 120040Z Jan 78 (S), XGDS-3; Hq MAC 192335Z Apr 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

301
Pacific Airlift Management Office Users Conference

(U) Problems concerning airlift management in support of the JCS exercise program had recurred during exercises in 1977-78 which indicated the need for more experience and understanding of the guidelines and procedures. With a view towards bridging this gap between users and managers, CINCPAC, PACAF, and MAC presented a series of briefings to 40 mid-level transportation managers from all Services in PACOM at the semiannual PAMO Users Conference held at Clark AB 29-31 August. Subjects concerned short-range forecasting, the JCS priority system, PACOM's role in airlift planning, MAC's airlift enhancement and operations restrictions, the Korean Logistics Concept, and the revision of PACAFR 76-4.¹

(U) In the brief on the new JCS single priority system, the CINCPAC representative pointed out that other unscheduled competitors, such as the Presidentially-directed airlift to Africa and the Middle East, had the net effect of reducing capability for U.S. military requirements. In the exercise airlift overview, the CINCPAC representative emphasized the increasing role of exercises and explained the complicated scheduling and funding procedures which tied the five-year exercise schedule to the budget cycle. Because, in the PACOM, 75-85 percent of exercise costs were for airlift, operations decision-making had become increasingly predicated on early involvement by transportation planners.²

Korean Flag Shipping (b)(5)

(S) In the July 1978 review of JSCP FY 79 Annex J, CINCPAC transportation planners noted that logistics ships available for CINCPAC support planning had decreased from 325 in FY 78 to 308 for FY 79. Of particular concern was the paucity of U.S. shipping available in WESTPAC in the D to D+10 time frame, when only three ships would be available for the movement of PWRM from Japan to Korea and the supply of POL to Korea.

(S) COMUS Korea and JCS shared this concern and, as a result, a working level conference to develop a concept of operations for the use of Korean flag shipping during a contingency was held from 6 to 8 November in Korea. The conference was attended by representatives from CINCPAC J4, COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, USARJ, MSC, the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), the ROK Ministry of National Defense, the ROK Ministry of Transport, and the Combined Forces Command. Major items of discussion included U.S. shipping availability, U.S.-ROK logistic requirements, Korean shipping availability and suitability.

¹ J435 HistSum Sep 78 (U); PAMO Users Conference Report, 30 Nov 78 (U).
² Ibid.
command and control of Korean shipping, potential third country problems, and POL resupply to Kunsan. A program of actions and milestones was developed with the concurrence of all attendees. At the end of 1978 the CINCPAC analysis of shipping shortfalls to support was under review by the MSC. Upon completion, a summary of shipping shortfalls was to be presented to the Korean Ministry of National Defense, whose response was anticipated to be a listing of Korean shipping available to alleviate the shortfall. Final action was scheduled for 1 June 1979 with the signing of an MOU between the U.S. and ROK Governments. Inclusion of the nominated ROK shipping in the JSCP Annex J was the ultimate goal after signing of the MOU.1

PACOM Surface Shipping Conference

(U) The second annual PACOM Surface Shipping Conference was held at the Sanno Hotel, Tokyo, during the period 21-23 February under the sponsorship of COMUS Japan. Attendees included 69 DOD representatives from PACOM components, subordinate commands and elements, and Transportation Operating Authorities, plus representatives from five commercial steamship carriers which supported DOD activities in the PACOM.2

(U) The Conference allowed CINCPAC an opportunity to consolidate conference-generated issues for presentation at other joint forums such as the Joint Sealift Movement Board, MAC Users Conference, and the Joint Strategic Mobility Conference, all of which normally met during the May-June time period. Some of the problems identified for remedial action included:2

- Small lot shipments of ammunition to off-line points.
- Specialized training in hazardous cargo documentation and handling procedures.
- Responsibility for DOD cargo shipped on MSC-chartered vessels.
- Privately-owned vehicle (POV) shipments into Japan.
- Utilization of MILVANs to ship POVs from PACOM to CONUS.

1. CINCPAC 281051Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 250457Z Aug 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-86; COMUSK 140515Z Sep 78 (S), GDS 31 Dec 86; JCS 5965/192250Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; J437 HistSum Nov 78 (U); J433 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
2. J432 HistSum Feb 78 (U); Minutes of PACOM Surface Shipping Conference, Hotel Sanno, Tokyo, Japan, 21-23 Feb 78 (U).
SECRET

- Insufficient copies of ocean manifests aboard ships.
- Direct Supply Support cargo destined for two or more locations or countries in the PACOM shipped in the same container(s).
- Potential for terrorist activities at U.S. military port facilities.
- Shrinking O&M budgets, which made it difficult for some activities to afford to work cargo on MSC-controlled ships.
- Chinhae ammunition port net explosive weight restriction.
- Army and Air Force Exchange Service use of Transportation Priority-4, space available air cargo.
- Late arrival of cargo stowage plans at ports.

PACOM Watercraft Study

(U) In January 1978 CINCPAC voiced concern to the JCS regarding the potential loss of PACOM watercraft assets and requested that no disposal action be taken by the Army until a CINCPAC study could validate requirements. After collection of relevant data both at CINCPAC and in Korea, a PACOM Watercraft Study Group convened at CINCPAC from 13 February to 10 March with representation from CINCPAC, Department of the Army (USARJ/USACSG), COMUS Korea, CINCPACFLT, Military Traffic Management Command-Field Office Pacific, Military Sealift Command Office Honolulu, and PACAF. The group assessed the requirements for watercraft support and related logistic throughput requirements for CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N, as well as the PACOM-wide requirements during contingency operations. The study group provided a detailed analysis of vessel flow and discharge requirements under OPLAN 5027N and related problems impacting on mission capabilities, both in the PACOM theater and within CONUS, which would require modifications of existing OPLANS.

Study conclusions and recommendations were sent by message to the JCS on 27 March, and the completed study was distributed to the JCS, DA, CNO and

SECRET
other commands concerned by CINCPAC letter on 19 April. The recommendations were:

- That the JCS request the Department of the Army to activate and relocate one barge derrick, BD-89T, from Okinawa to Pusan for use by COMUS Korea for contingency heavy lift requirements. This would place two BD-89Ts in Korea for this mission.

- That the JCS request that DA direct EUSA to retain the eight dry cargo barges until completion of withdrawal actions.

- That the JCS request the Military Sealift Command to accept and activate the Army "Y" tanker located in Okinawa for JP-4 support of Kunsan AB during contingencies or provide similar assets from other sources.

- That the JCS request DA to transfer two liquid barges to EUSA for use by COMUS Korea for contingency support of Kunsan AB. That COMUS Korea add these barges to two then on hand and provide a concept of operation for use of the four for JP-4 contingency support to Kunsan AB. All barges were to be operational to include auxiliary pumps if required.

- CINCPACFLT was requested to consider early arrival of appropriate antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasure elements to assure access to Republic of Korea surface ports.

- That COMUS Korea review planning alternatives for use of ports other than Pusan for container offload, in the event Pusan containerization facilities were lost.

- That the JCS request MTMC to review onload capability for East and West Coast ammunition ports to determine the most realistic data upon which to develop far shore reception capability.

1. CINCPAC 271900Z Mar 78 (N), GDS-86; CINCPAC Ltr Ser S162 (SANE) of 19 Apr 78, Subj: PACOM Watercraft Study (U), XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 06, w/Encl (1) (N), Subj: PACOM Watercraft Study (U), XGDS-3.
SECRET

- That COMUS Japan initiate planning for a container transfer point at North Dock, Yokohama, for purposes of inclusion in 5027N to accommodate from 60,000 to 150,000 measurement tons at one time.

- That COMUS Japan initiate planning for a container-breakbulk air transshipment point in the vicinity of Atsugi-Yokota-Sagami for purposes of inclusion in 5027N to accommodate up to 60,000 measurement tons of breakbulk at one time and up to 500 short tons of airlift-oriented cargo daily.

- That COMUS Korea plan for container reception facilities, both in and outside Pusan, and advise the status of ROK planning and estimated completion date of work. Earmarking of specific cranes and forklifts by the port was considered essential.

- That COMUS Korea determine the anticipated availability of Korean flag shallow-draft and deep-draft shipping, categorized by container, both self-sustaining and nonself-sustaining, roll on-roll off, breakbulk, and powered lighters for contingency use.

As a fall-out from the study, and at the request of CINCPAC, the JCS determined that Marine Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) logistics support was a U.S. Navy responsibility. The JCS also approved the disposal by the Army of all watercraft not required to support OPLAN 5027.1

PACOM/JCS Joint Transportation Board Meeting

(U) The PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) met in joint session with the JCS JTB on 1 June 1978. This was the first joint session ever held. The initiative came from the JCS JTB because they wanted to be briefed on PACOM wartime operational concepts and transportation constraints or shortfalls in support of major PACOM OPLANS. The JCS JTB had previously met with CINCLANT, CINCEUR, and CINMAC to receive similar briefings. The mission of the JCS JTB was to allocate and prioritize strategic lift resources among the theaters during wartime. The CINCPAC-provided agenda included the following topics:2

- Prioritization of lift requirements during general war.

1. CINCPAC 271935Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; J4 BWEB, 10-23 Apr 78 (S), REVW 23 Apr 98.
2. J432 HistSum Jun 78 (U); CINCPAC 121851Z May 78 (U).
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- Airlift in exercises.
- Airlift shortfall in defense of Korea.
- Air drop/air delivery capability in theater.
- Transportation operations in Korea after the phasedown.
- Kimhae Logistic Concept.
- Ammunition onload capability on West Coast.
- MSC ability to furnish breakbulk ships in support of OPLANs.
- Container capability in PACOM ports.
- PACOM watercraft study.
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SECTION IV--FACILITIES ENGINEERING

Enewetak Cleanup

(U) Decontamination and cleanup of Enewetak continued in 1978. Work was interrupted again on 9 January by Tropical Storm NADINE (Typhoon MARY had caused evacuation to Guam from 26 to 29 December 1977). The Director, Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA); the Director Field Command, DNA; and a CINCPAC representative conducted an inspection 17 to 19 January to review the progress of the cleanup and to ascertain damage caused by the two tropical storms. In addition to late delivery of construction materials and insufficient intra-atoll transportation, encrypting of increased quantities of contaminated soil in Cactus Crater on Runit Island caused the project to fall behind schedule temporarily. The latter resulted from a Department of Energy (DOE) and DNA decision in January that transuranic (higher numbered isotopes), as well as suburanic elements, would be included in calculating soil contamination levels. At a conference of concerned agency representatives held on 3-4 May at DNA, several significant results emerged:

- Acceptance of new Environmental Protection Agency standards for allowable levels of radionuclides in the soil would significantly alter the project.

- DNA would impose constraints of staying within the $20 million Congressional appropriation, meeting the April 1980 completion date, and minimizing changes in Service/DOE manpower and equipment resources. These two restrictions meant that some of the islands (probably Runit, Enjebi, and Lujor) would not be decontaminated to the level necessary to permit the desired land usage.

- DNA planned to issue a supplement to the Environmental Impact Statement since the cleanup would no longer conform to the original statement.

(U) As the year ended, the project was slightly ahead of schedule and a Demobilization Annex to FCDNA OPLAN 600-77 was published in January 1979.


UNCLASSIFIED

309
SECRET

Guam Land Use Plan

(U) In December 1974 the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force conduct a joint study to develop a mid-range land use plan for Guam. The study was completed in September 1977 and the Secretary of Defense announced approval on 24 March 1978. The purposes of the study were three-fold: to determine landholdings to support mid-range (eight years) DOD presence on Guam; to examine joint use of land and facility consolidation to promote efficient use of land; and to determine landholdings for release. Major recommendations and findings showed needs for: construction of a new ammunition port facility at Orote Peninsula; consolidation and collocation of military communication facilities; acquisition of 900 acres as Quantity Distance safety arcs and 1,285 acres for noise hazard zones. The study further disclosed the availability of 2,625 acres for immediate release and 2,555 acres which could be released when replacement facilities became available. At the close of 1978 funding for replacement areas by the Government of Guam had not yet taken place.

Facilities in Korea

As Japan and Germany assumed larger portions of their defense costs, there was increasing Washington-level interest in having other allies do the same. The Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) fell into this category and had provided significant financial support for facility projects, not only for their own forces, but for U.S. Forces in Korea as well.

U.S. Air Force Facilities

On 29 March 1978 the Defense Department approved a $178 million facilities package developed by the Air Force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force forwarded the package through COMUS Korea to the ROKAF Chief of Staff for negotiations toward funding and construction by the ROKG.

J442 Point Paper (U), 3 Aug 78, Subj: Guam Land Use Plan (U); J442 Point Paper (S), 21 Dec 77, Subj: Mid-Range Plans for Guam (U), REVW 21 Dec 97; J442 HistSum Mar 78 (U); CNO 241236Z Mar 78 (U); Interview with MAJ E.T. Applegate, USAF, J443, 9 Apr 79.

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In May CINCPACAF discussed the facilities package with the ROKAF Chief of Staff, who advised that the ROKAF staff considered the requirements to be valid and that construction could be done for $105.6 million. The ROKAF intended to address the funding aspects through the ROK Ministry of National Defense. Negotiations continued as the year ended, with indications that 38 of the original 60 projects would be funded during the CY 81-85 timeframe. Although an official reply had not been received, the ROKAF informally indicated willingness to build nearly all of the projects shown below except those at Osan and Kunsan, which were considered to be a USAF responsibility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kimhae</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$ 340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunsan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13,130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-Y (Cheongju)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8,010,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23,320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td><strong>$105,600,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USMC TACAIR Beddown

A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) covering joint use of these two airfields was signed on 23 April 1978 by ROK and USFK officials. The ROKG agreed to construct the necessary facilities and the U.S. Government would fund and preposition ammunition and petroleum upon completion of construction. In June an engineering team from Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific Division, completed a site survey and criteria package for

1. J443 HistSum Apr 78 (S), REVW 1 May 98; J443 HistSum May 78 (S), REVW 6 Jun 98; CSAF personal ltr (S) to General Choo of 29 Mar 78 (n.s.), DECL 31 Dec 86; J443 Point Paper (S), 19 Apr 78, Subj: Installation Aspects of Korea Drawdown (U), REVW 19 Apr 98.

2. J443 HistSum May 78 (S), REVW 6 Jun 98; J443 HistSum Dec 78 (S), REVW 17 Jan 99; J443 Point Paper (S), 16 Oct 78, Subj: ROK Government Funding to Support U.S. Forces (U), REVW 16 Oct 98.

SECRET

311
construction at both locations. The project included 354,600 barrels of POL storage, 100 ammunition storage igloos, two munitions maintenance buildings, 123,350 square yards of reveted aircraft parking, and two 4-point rapid refueling systems. The package was forwarded to the ROKG with an estimated cost of $20 million. At year's end, the ROKG Ministry of Defense was in the process of package design and allocating funds to acquire the necessary real estate for construction of the fuel and ammunitions storage areas.¹

Family Housing

(U) COMUS Korea negotiated an agreement with the Korean National Housing Corporation to construct 200 family housing units at Osan AB and 700 at Niblo Barracks (adjacent to Yongsan) in Seoul. The Osan units would improve effectiveness and permit continuity by increasing the number of Air Force personnel on two-year stabilized tours. Likewise, the Seoul units would encourage key USFK personnel to serve a longer tour by providing them affordable housing.²

Facilities in Japan

Sanno Hotel

(U) The U.S. Services continued to fund the operation of the Sanno Hotel on a pro-rated basis: Navy, 45 percent; Army, 24 percent; Air Force, 24 percent; and COMUS Japan, 7 percent throughout 1978. Emphasis was placed on negotiations with the Government of Japan (GOJ) for a replacement facility in order to return the present site to its original Japanese owners by late 1980. A special working group, composed of representatives from the U.S. Services and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (Japan), developed design criteria for a seven-story, 150-room structure at a site near the French Embassy. By year's end a revised schematic plan had been submitted and, while progress appeared slow, the only problems remaining were kitchen design and concurrence of approximately 45 property owners and consensus of 130 neighbors at the new site. A construction contract award was scheduled for April 1979, with a projected closing of the old Sanno by December 1980.³

1. J443 HistSum May 78 (); REVW 6 Jun 98; J443 HistSum Dec 78 (); REVW 17 Jun 99; J443 Point Paper (S), 26 Oct 78, Subj: USMC TACAIR Beddown (U); GDS-86; J443 Point Paper (S), 16 Oct Subj: ROK Government Funding to Support U.S. Forces (U), GDS-86.
2. J443 HistSum Apr 78 (); REVW 1 May 98; J443 HistSum Dec 78 (); REVW 17 Jan 99.
3. COMUS Japan 142239z Jun 78 (U); J441 HistSums Jul and Oct 78 (U); J44 MFR of 14 and 22 Nov 78 (U), Subj: Sanno Hotel (U).

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312
(U) A projection of the utilization data for the Sanno Hotel in 1976 made a strong case for a replacement transient billeting and conference facility in downtown Tokyo:

Per diem rates:

Civilian hotel - $57
Sanno Hotel - $24 - Army (which considered the Sanno equivalent to an open mess).
- $34 - Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force

Apparent per diem savings during 1976:

Army - 3,048 users x $33 = $100,584
Navy - 2,347 users x $23 = 53,981
Marines - 1,063 users x $23 = 24,449
Air Force - 1,768 users x $23 = 40,664
Total $219,678

1. J441 Point Paper (U), 19 Apr 78; Subj: Utilization of Sanno (U).
Family Housing in Japan

(U) The family housing situation (as well as BEQ and BOQ) in Japan had been historically unsatisfactory for many years. Attempts to improve the housing picture were inhibited by a DOD Directive, which limited the programming level for on-base housing in overseas areas to 80 percent of effect housing requirements. This required 20 percent of the eligibles (plus non-eligibles) to reside off-base to avoid a potentially harmful impact on local housing markets. However, in Japan, with its high-density population, civil housing in most areas had always been in extremely short supply and highly competitive. The general high rate of inflation and the rapid appreciation the yen in recent years had diminished, both in quality and in quantity, the number of adequate off-base units affordable or available to U.S. personnel. Relocation and consolidation activities since the reversion of Okinawa in 19 had also complicated the housing situation, and efforts to alleviate the problems had been the subject of numerous studies and reports, as well as a matter of serious concern at all levels.2

In early January 1978, after consummation of the first labor cost-

1. CINCPAC 080740Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; COMNAVFORJAPAN 290700Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 302307Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 22 Feb 86.
2. COMUSJ 160420Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. Ibid., CINCPAC 290430Z Nov 77 (S), GDS-83.
Later in January CINCPAC outlined to COMUS Japan a course of action which would be appropriate in seeking GOJ assistance for an equitable solution to housing problems for all Service components: determine housing requirements for all Services; develop a prioritized program suitable for submission to the GOJ; submit the program to the JCS and the OSD via CINCPAC for approval, including rationale for relief from any construction constraints, such as the 80 percent programming limit, and incorporating priorities of other construction programs for the cost-sharing proposal to the GOJ; and, after approval by the JCS and the OSD, submission to the GOJ. CINCPAC also asked to be kept informed of ongoing actions and the status of informal discussions with the GOJ.2

By mid-April COMUS Japan reported that efforts were proceeding in the spirit of the CINCPAC January tasking. The DFAA had set up a Housing Task Group and had been furnished preliminary results of a recent housing survey which showed a gross housing deficit of approximately 7,500 units for all Services. The Deputy Director General had stated at a 4 April meeting that the DFAA "positively" wanted to provide assistance, and if housing were to be provided for in the JFY 79 budget, DFAA had to request funding by the end of June 1978. Japanese interest in cost-sharing was evidenced in a Japanese newspaper article of 19 April which related an exchange of views between JDS Director General Shin Kanemaru and Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda. Kanemaru reportedly stated the GOJ need for an established cooperative posture on the question of U.S. Forces cost-sharing and Sonoda was said to have asked the Director General to draft a cost-sharing plan via the DFAA. Further, the

1. AMEMB Tokyo 4160/091854Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84. The 1973 Ohira View limited the GOJ to providing new facilities to U.S. Forces only on an explicit quid pro quo basis (like facilities on a square foot for square foot basis).
2. CINCPAC 270102Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84.
DFAA was studying the feasibility of construction of 5,000-7,000 off-base NCO housing units under a three-year project costing about ¥20 billion.

CINCPAC, in a 7 June message to the JCS, summarized construction programs in Japan through FY 85 and pointed out that, while $500 million had been formally submitted by the Services in MILCON projects for Japan, requirements for an additional $1.5 billion worth of construction had been identified,

1. COMUSJ 11035Z Apr 78 (U); COMUSJ 200515Z Apr 78 (U).
2. COMUSJ 080905Z May 78 (T), GDS-84.
but not yet included, with potential for the cost-sharing concept. Family housing and troop billets, for example, accounted for $1.093 billion based on the need to raise the level of adequacy to 80 percent for all Services (including eligible U.S. civilians currently excluded by local policies) and improved housing for single and unaccompanied personnel at Marine installations. CINCPAC intended to authorize COMUS Japan to furnish this data to the GOJ (DFAA) by 15 June for inclusion in the JFY 79 budget.1

(U) About the same time, 6 June, at a meeting of the Lower House Cabinet Committee, DFAA Director General Watari said the GOJ should do what it could in the context of the Mutual Security Treaty (MST), SOFA, and Ohira View to assist U.S. Forces. Specifically, in relation to the Ohira View he stated that it "pertained only to relocation or substitute construction of existing U.S. facilities and did not preclude offers of new facilities at GOJ initiative..."MOFA DirGen Nakajima provided official SOFA interpretation that Ohira View was not to be taken as general interpretation of provisions of para 2, Art 24, but rather applied to only above two specific categories of facility provision..."2

(?) By way of keeping CINCPAC informed on the status of informal discussions with the GOJ, COMUS Japan reported on 28 July that a DFAA "preview" of the JFY 79 cost-sharing program gave top priority for construction of 210 military family housing units at both Yokota and Atsugi. Also included in the program were reconstruction of some bachelor quarters at Iwakuni, Yokota, and Misawa, and two environmental projects. Total package cost was $120 million with approximately $75 million scheduled for JFY 79 and the remainder in JFY 80. Presentation of these items to the Finance Minister was anticipated not later than 1 September with submission to the Diet by the end of March 1979. The CINCPAC response acknowledged COMUS Japan efforts and enjoined pursuit, at COMUS Japan and Embassy discretion, of relief from the Johnson-Ohira Agreement and the Ohira View so that additional housing requirements (especially Navy) could be included in the JFY 80 cost-sharing program.3

(?) Parenthetically, under the Johnson-Ohira Agreement of November 1972, the U.S. Government waived its right to request facilities to support U.S. Forces stationed in Japan under SOFA in exchange for GOJ approval for homeporting the MIDWAY/Air Wing at Yokusuka under the Overseas Family Residence Program. The agreement was politically driven to facilitate timely approval

1. CINCPAC 070155Z Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. COMUSJ 070653Z Jun 78 (U).
3. COMUSJ 280439Z Jul 78 (C), GDS-78; COMUSJ 150840Z Aug 78 (C/NE) (BOM), GDS-84; J441 Point Paper (U), 5 Dec 78, Subj: Government of Japan Facilities Cost-Sharing (U).
of homeporting of the MIDWAY. By 1978 carrier/air wing families represented about 31 percent of the effective housing requirements for the Navy; however, strict interpretation of the Agreement was a constraint as far as other Navy housing requirements were concerned. Because the Agreement was known to only a small inner circle of the LDP, PACOM consensus was to defer to COMUS Japan, in coordination with the Embassy and COMNAVFOR Japan, to initiate probes on the issue at the appropriate time, place, and level with GOJ officials.1

(U) Early in August, the OSD requested CINCPAC to provide background and replies to four specific questions related to cost-sharing:2

- Percent of effective housing requirements available now on-base; off-base?
- Our recommended percentage of on-base housing goal and why?
- Should we seek a revision to the Johnson-Ohira Agreement to include MIDWAY's dependent housing needs in effective housing requirements?
- Have U.S. commands in Japan fully used mechanisms of per diem, travel, and transportation allowance committee? Were results satisfactory? If not, explain problems of inadequacy of housing allowance and cost-of-living allowance.

2. OASD/ISA 032207Z Aug 78 (U) (BOH); J441 Point Paper (G), 2 Oct 78, Subj: U.S. Housing in Japan (U), REVW 2 Oct 98.
3. Ibid.
Active Integrated Relocation/Consolidation Programs

(U) Various relocations and consolidations of facilities in Japan had resulted from negotiations with the GOJ based on the quid pro quo concept. A recapitulation by the CINCPAC Directorate for Logistics in September 1978 noted that, momentarily, about 50 percent of the approved projects had been completed. Of the $1.1 billion total, about $565 million had been expended since JFY 72. Projected through 1984, real estate adjustments as a result of major relocations/consolidations were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of U.S. Bases</th>
<th>15 May 72 (following Okinawa reversion)</th>
<th>December 1978</th>
<th>Projected in 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>106*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acreage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>December 1978</th>
<th>Projected in 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>71,230</td>
<td>56,245</td>
<td>55,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>71,557</td>
<td>65,072</td>
<td>58,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142,795</td>
<td>121,317</td>
<td>114,054*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents a 44 percent reduction in bases and a 20 percent reduction in acreage since Okinawa reversion.

(U) The status of the active relocation construction program was:

- **Grant Heights/Green Park and Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan:** These were Air Force programs which consolidated major USAF activities in the Kanto Plain into Yokota Air Base. Facilities consisting of 15 million square feet of building space on 5,800 acres had been returned to the GOJ in return for 3.7 million square feet of new construction, all at Yokota Air Base. The Air Force had estimated an annual

1. J441 Point Paper (U), 4 Dec 78, Subj: Status of Active Relocation Construction Programs in Japan (U).
2. Ibid.

UNCLASSIFIED

321
savings of $100 million in facility maintenance and personnel reductions. Construction was completed in September 1978 at a cost of $278 million.

- **Japan Facilities Adjustment Program:** A multi-service plan which involved movement of all U.S. air units from the Naha Air Base complex to Kadena Air Base. In return for this agreement, the GOJ agreed to undertake projects throughout Japan. Major bases involved included Kadena Air Base, Futema Air Station, Iwakuni Air Station, and Misawa Air Base. The move from Naha was made on 8 May 1975 and Naha Airfield was returned to the GOJ on 7 June 1975. One hundred eighteen projects were involved and the last were expected to be funded with JFY 80 funds. September 1978 value of this program was $265 million.

- **Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan:** Designed to further reduce the visibility of U.S. Forces in Okinawa, this program consisted of 47 facility actions throughout Okinawa, of which 30 had been completed. However, 27 of those 30 completed actions were under study by the GOJ and ten others were in progress. September 1978 value of this program was $350 million.

- **Yokohama Housing Relocation Program:** This program surfaced originally in 1968 and was endorsed in 1973. It involved the relocation of 778 units of dependent housing and related support facilities from Yokohama to Yokosuka and Negishi Dependent Housing Area. Some housing would be retained in Yokohama to support residual U.S. activities remaining in Yokohama. Construction of the first 347 units had been completed and 203 other units were under various stages of construction, with the remaining 228 units scheduled in JFY 79 and later. September 1978 value of this program was $125 million.

- **Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program:** The U.S. Army had a 100-bed facility at Sagami Ono which was to be released to the GOJ. A proposal to relocate this facility into Camp Zama and U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, was submitted to the GOJ and approved on 15 December 1977. The JFY 77 budget contained funds to construct all the medical and support facilities at Camp Zama and site survey and design work for the hospital at Yokosuka. The JFY 78 program in-
cluded partial funding to construct the replacement hospital, the BEQ, utilities, and a medical support building at U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. September 1978 value of this total program was $75 million.

- **Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities:** This program followed the Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan effort to consolidate and reduce facilities and areas in Okinawa Prefecture. Generally, the program called for four partial or total releases without relocation, and eight total or partial releases contingent upon relocation construction. By September 1978 two of the releases had occurred and the two governments were actively negotiating two of the items. The GOJ was studying the remaining eight items. The major relocation project was Ie Jima range which would span several years if undertaken. The JFY 77 budget included funds for construction of a facility for 16 dog kennels, which resulted in the release of 250 acres of real estate at Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield. Partial funding for additional CROF projects was also included in the JFY 78 program. September 1978 value of this program was $35 million.

- **Defense Communication System Relocation:** The objective of this program was to relocate the AUTODIN and AUTOVON switches from North Camp Asaka and Fuchu AS to Camp Zama. A memorandum proposing the release of North Camp Asaka and Fuchu AS for replacement facilities, including a communications building, commercial communications access, and 120 units of family housing (using Makiminato Housing Area, an Okinawa quid pro quo) was passed to the GOJ on 26 April 1977. This plan had been proposed for the JFY 78 and JFY 79 programs, but revision might be required because the GOJ found it extremely difficult to justify the construction of housing on Mainland Japan for housing units from the Okinawa quid pro quo. September 1978 value of this program was $17 million.

(U) On 17 April COMUS Japan submitted the U.S.-developed JFY 79 Proposed Integrated Relocation Construction Program (PIRCP) for review by CINCPAC and approval by the Secretary of Defense prior to submission to the GOJ. The purpose of the PIRCP, based on the GOJ-requested budget for JFY 78, was to maintain the credibility of an annual U.S. Government integrated program and continue high-level funding in the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program and Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan on Okinawa, and the Yokohama Housing
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Relocation and Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Programs on Mainland Japan. The integrated program emphasized the need for replacement housing, bachelor quarters, and POL facilities. It was in alignment with known GOJ political objectives, and was a continuation of projects that had been initiated in prior years. COMUS Japan had also noted that the cost-sharing approach then under consideration could impact on the PIRCP, with a possibility of combining relocation and non-relocation type projects.1

(U) The Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC concurred in the proposed PIRCP, which summarized the program as follows:2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan Facilities Adjustment Program</td>
<td>$34,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan</td>
<td>72,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama Housing Relocation Program</td>
<td>19,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation and Reduction of Okinawa Facilities</td>
<td>11,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa Facilities Consolidation Program</td>
<td>12,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Communication System Reconfiguration</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanno Hotel</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187,032</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. J441 HistSum Apr 78 (U); COMUSJ 170009Z Apr 78 (U).
2. Ibid. J441 HistSum May 78 (U); SECDEF 6250/111904Z May 78 (U); CINCPAC 130506Z May 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

324
CHAPTER VI
COMMUNICATIONS-DATA PROCESSING

SECTION I—OPERATIONS AND PLANS

Command Center Relocation

In March 1978 a communications working group was organized to insure a coordinated effort in support of military construction project P002, CINCPAC Command Center Modernization Project. On 28 October 1978 CINCPAC announced that the emergency actions element of the CINCPAC Command Center would relocate to the CINCPAC alternate command post effective 2 November. Continuous operations would be conducted from the alternate command post until approximately July 1980. The activation of the alternate command post, which had been relocated from Kunia, Hawaii to Hickam Air Force Base on the island of Oahu in January 1977, was necessary because of extensive renovation to the CINCPAC Command Center. All primary command and control circuits were available at the alternate command post. The improved emergency automated transmission system (IEMATS) was deactivated, relocated, and reactivated during the period from 2 October to 2 November.1

On 21 December the CINCPAC Command Center was moved to an interim location in Room 375, Building 80, immediately adjacent to its former location. The command center watch team, less the emergency action element, was scheduled to operate continuously from the interim location until completion of construction of the new command center, estimated to be July 1980.2

Project APACHE
The most visible portion of Project APACHE was the test conducted at the Naval Communications Area Master Station, Eastern Pacific (NAVCAMS EASTPAC) near Wahiawa, Hawaii which began in April 1978. In order to conduct simulated EMP tests with high level pulsing, a transportable electromagnetic pulse simulator (TEMPS) had been developed which generated up to 50,000 volts. The simulator and associated instrumentation vans were collocated next to the NAVCAMAS EASTPAC and were visible to motorists from a highway close by. Prior to site preparation, Hawaii's congressional delegation, state and local officials were notified. However, the pulse generated by TEMPS testing did not cause any significant interference with commercial power systems or residential electrical appliances near the test site. Testing using TEMPS or similar simulators had been conducted repeatedly during the prior ten years at several U.S. sites with no record of ill effects to any personnel. Exhaustive medical research had been conducted on workers previously exposed to EMP tests, and no adverse health effects from such exposure had been disclosed. An environmental impact assessment prepared for APACHE testing had reviewed all health hazard data with no adverse findings.2

The APACHE NAVCAMAS EASTPAC testing program provided the first simulated EMP high-level exposure of an element of the PACOM command, control, communications and computer (C3) system. In addition to the TEMPS, which simulated high altitude EMP, tests were also conducted using low level continuous wave (CW) generators, inductively-coupled current sources, and repetitive pulse generators (RPG). Plans for the tests were under the supervision of the Project APACHE test working group, chaired by a CINCPAC representative. In addition, the group had members from DNA, CINCPACFLT, Naval Security Group, NAVCAMAS EASTPAC, the 1957th Communications Group (Hickam Air Force Base), the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific (DCA PAC), and the Boeing company. The purpose of the group was to ensure that all aspects of testing at NAVCAMAS EASTPAC were evaluated to determine the impact on the operations of commands receiving service from, or through, the systems supported at that facility. Test command control was

2. J620 Point Paper (U), Subj: Project APACHE-Transportable Electromagnetic Pulse Simulator (TEMPS); Hq DNA 181822Z Mar 78 (U).
provided by the executive management group with members from CINCPAC, CNO, DCA and the National Security Agency (NSA). The test was conducted through the Project APACHE test management team, chaired by the NAVCAMS EASTPAC representative with members from CINCPAC, DCA PAC, NSA, and DNA.¹

**JMTSS Plan**

In 1975 the JCS provided guidance to expedite planning for a joint multi-channel trunking and switching system (JMTSS) to support major operation plans (OPLAN). The purpose of the JMTSS was to provide the joint force commander in an area of operations with a responsive communications system composed of mobile and transportable Service resources. Shortfalls in equipment were to be reported to the JCS for validation and Service programming. Analysis of CINCPAC OPLANs 5027N, 5025, and 5001 started in 1977. Subsequently, OPLAN 5047 was included in the tasking from the JCS. By the end of 1978, three of the JMTSS plans had been completed and forwarded to the JCS. The remaining JMTSS plan (for OPLAN 5001) was undergoing coordination at the end of 1978.³

1. J620 HistSum Aug 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J6 BWEB's (G), 5-18 Jun 78, 19 Jun-2 Jul 78, 17-30 Jul 78, 31 Jul-13 Aug 78, 14-27 Aug 78, and 11-24 Sep 78, all GDS-84; SS0 Mt View 1547/240005Z Aug 78 (U) (BOM).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 281; J621 HistSums Jun 78 (CS), DECL 31 Dec 84 and Dec 78 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 012105Z Oct 77 (U); CINCPAC (621) Ltr Ser S229 of 9 Jun 78 (S), Subj: Joint Multi-Channel Trunking and Switching System for CINCPAC OPLAN 5027N (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; CINCPAC (621) Ltr Ser S341 of 29 Aug 78 (U) and Ltr Ser S423 of 16 Nov 78 (U), Subj: JMTSS for OPLANs 5025 and 5047 resp. (U).

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327
(U) After an abortive effort in March of 1978, a dual launch of two new satellites was successfully completed by the DSCS on 14 December 1978. One of the satellites (9441) was placed at the operational Eastern Pacific location to replace the NATO IIIB. The other (9442) was placed at the operational Western Pacific location to replace DSCS satellite 9438. The latter satellite was moved to replace the Indian Ocean satellite, which was, in turn, moved to a Western Pacific location as the first on-orbit spare in the DSCS program.³

(U) With this dual replenishment launch, and subject to the availability of satellite terminals, communications satellite coverage (both ultra-high frequency (UHF) and super high frequency (SHF)) in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas provided the capability to project command and control communications into virtually any location in the PACOM. The two additional

2. Ibid.
3. J612 HistSum Mar 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U); DCA 1398/131243Z Sep 78 (U) and 8849/22170123 Dec 78 (U); J6 BWEB's 13-26 Mar 78 and 1-14 Jan 79 (both U).
satellites increased the survivability of SHF coverage, but that segment of the space program remained considerably ahead of the transportable terminals available to take maximum advantage of this enhanced command and control potential.  

ABNCP/MEECN Satellite Capability.

(U) In July 1976 the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy agreed that one channel of the 500 kilohertz (KHZ) bands on the Atlantic and Pacific satellites be reserved for use by the Airborne Command Posts (ABNCP). This capability provided more reliable communications with the Navy airborne very low frequency radio broadcasting aircraft (TACAMO) within the bounds of the Pacific GAPSAT footprint. By March 1977 a 100 word-per-minute secure teletype could be dispatched from the CINCPAC ABNCP to any PACOM location within the Pacific GAPSAT footprint via the teletype ground entry point at Hickam Air Force Base and the tactical satellite communications terminal at Wahiawa.  

1. CINCPAC 130644Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.  
3. Ibid.; p. 274.
1. Ibid.; p. 274, 275.
2. J622 HistSum Apr and May 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4376/111514Z Oct 77 (S), GDS-85; J6 BWEB 24 Apr-7 May 78 (S), GDS-86 and 25 Sep-8 Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
PACOM TSC-54 Deployments

(S) Late in 1977 the JCS-controlled TSC-54 contingency satellite terminal based in Hawaii was loaned to support a Presidential mission in Europe. Although the original need for the TSC-54 expired early in January 1978, the Department of the Army requested the JCS to allow the PACOM TSC-54 to remain in Europe. CINCPAC did not agree and requested the immediate return of the terminal upon the completion of the Presidential support mission, stressing the continuing CINCPAC requirement for an in-theater deployable contingency terminal. On 24 April the TSC-54 was returned from Landstuhl, Germany to Helemano, Hawaii.²

1. J6 BWEB's 3-16 Jul 78, 28 Aug-10 Sep 78, 23 Oct-5 Nov 78, and 6-19 Nov 78, all (S), all GDS-86.
2. J6 BWEB 30 Jan-12 Feb 78 (C), DECL 31 Dec 84; J612 HistSum Apr 78 (U).
3. J623 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; Defence Canberra 2556/180800Z Aug 78 (S), XGDS-2; HQ ADCOM 182330Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
Activation of H. E. Holt Satellite Terminal

Within the Australian government, a very real political sensitivity existed pertaining to information regarding any type of change or alteration to U.S. military facilities. This sensitivity was evident in connection with the activation of an AN/TSC-64 satellite terminal at the U.S. Naval Communications Station HAROLD E. HOLT. H. E. Holt was located in Western Australia, 850

1. DCADC 232005Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; Hq ADCOM 232310Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 6761/241741Z Aug 78 (S/NF), GDS-86.
2. SECSTATE 217707/260018Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Canberra 6815/260127Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; USAFLO/CINCPACREP Canberra 260231Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Canberra 6817/270341Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. J6 BWEB 28 Aug-10 Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 1257/270450Z Aug 78 (S), XGDS-3; AMEMB Canberra 6907/290742Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 2280/292042Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
miles north of Perth, on the Northwest Cape peninsula. Its primary mission was to operate a high power, VLF transmitter to provide broadcast service to U.S. and Australian/United Kingdom submarines on a non-interfering basis. H. E. Holt also operated and maintained Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities as assigned. The station maintained HF links with Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the Navy Communications Stations in Guam and Diego Garcia, and the Royal Australian Navy Communications Station in Canberra. Other communications capabilities included INTELSAT links with Guam and Hawaii, the reception and rebroadcast of U.S. Navy Indian and Pacific Ocean area communications transmissions, U.S. Navy tactical circuits terminating with ships in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, and VLF broadcasts to submarines and aircraft carriers. The station was considered to be a vital link in U.S. and Australian military communications systems.¹

(U) In the early 1970's, an AN/TSC-54 DSCS satellite terminal was installed at H. E. Holt. It was removed in 1974 to fill a higher priority requirement at Diego Garcia and, in mid-1977, the United States initiated plans to install a replacement AN/TSC-54 satellite terminal. However, during a visit to H. E. Holt in August 1977, the Australian director general of joint communications expressed concern that official notification had not been received regarding U.S. plans to install the replacement satellite. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) noted that the reintroduction of the AN/TSC-54 satellite terminal had not been viewed as a new satellite requirement which required notification to the Australian Defence Department. Nevertheless, the CNO directed the Naval Telecommunications Command to hold the terminal reinstallation in abeyance until the political aspects were clarified. On 13 October 1977 the CNO rescinded the hold order based on agreement by the Australian Defence Staff that the AN/TSC-54 could be installed.²

(SECRET) Installation of the replacement AN/TSC-54 terminal began in November 1977. However, it wasn't until 24 October 1978 that the AN/TSC-54 was accepted as operational by DCA PAC. The terminal provided six channels to the Western Pacific AN/MSC-46 terminal at Clark Air Base in the Philippines through the DSCS II satellite over the Indian Ocean.³

(FOUO) The political sensitivity of the reinstallation of the AN/TSC-54 satellite terminal was laid to rest when Australian officials were assured that the terminal only replaced a similar one from years ago. However, when the

1. J621 Point Paper (C), 11 Jul 78, Subj: U.S. Naval Communications Station (NCS) HAROLD E. HOLT Australia (U), GDS-84.
2. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (C), GDS-84; COMNAVTELCOM 022309Z Aug 77 (U); CNO 251716Z Aug 77 (U), 162234Z Sep 77 (U), and 131824Z Oct 77 (U).
3. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (C), GDS-84; DCA PAC 240206Z Oct 78 (U).
DCA, in concert with the U.S. Navy, sought Congressional approval for a new system which would replace the AN/TSC-54 units in U.S. defense installations worldwide, the presentation to the Congress raised another political storm in Australia. A newspaper columnist published a story intimating that a new ground station was being built in Australia, as part of a new DSCS system, but that neither the Australian Parliament nor the public had been informed. The matter was raised to the level of the Australian Parliament, and opposition politicians called into question the basic "good faith" of the United States in its relations with the GOA. The Australian Defence Minister was questioned about the programmed new terminal at H. E. Holt, and the United States was accused of not consulting with the GOA regarding a proposed new military system. In fact, the GOA Defence Minister was quoted as stating that the U.S. Government had acted in a discourteous way by not informing the GOA of plans to upgrade the site at the Northwest Cape. Upon hearing of the political storm raging in Australia, the director of the DCA informed the defense attache that the subject concerned the routine replacement of the obsolete AN/TSC-54 earth terminal in early 1982 with the next generation (AN/MSC-61) earth terminal. The new terminal would provide improved communications capability, but there would be no significant functional changes in the communications associated with the replacement. In his discussions with GOA officials, the U.S. Ambassador likened this "tempest in a teapot" to a change from a manual typewriter to an electric typewriter—merely the improvement of existing equipment. Since Congress had not yet funded the proposed worldwide upgrade of earth terminals, the question of actual installation in Australia was not resolved during 1978.

One other matter which spun off from the reinstallation of the AN/TSC-54 in Australia was the continued need for the HF communications trunk between H. E. Holt and Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The Air Force had proposed to deactivate the HF trunk after the satellite terminal was activated; however, the DCA PAC noted that the trunk line was considered to be a CINCPAC asset. CINCPAC requested comments and/or concurrence on the planned deactivation from CINCPACFLT and DCA PAC. Both agreed that the HF trunk should be retained between Australia and the Philippines as a contingency backup communication into the Indian Ocean, but both also agreed that the trunk could be placed in on-call status. CINCPAC reviewed the plan which called for the activation of an interim Clark Air Base to H. E. Holt DSCS link via the Indian Ocean satellite to alleviate power overloading on the WESTPAC satellite. However, the ultimate DSCS configuration called for a link between H. E. Holt and Guam by 1982. To facilitate the restoration of minimum communications to Diego Garcia in the event of satellite failure, the availability of the Phi-

1. DCA 122015Z May 78 (U); AMEMB Canberra 3694/130248Z May 78 (U); AMEMB Canberra 3730/150816Z May 78 (C) and 3731/150817Z May 78 (C), both GDS-84; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 123/151830Z May 78 (U).
The Philippines to Australia HF trunk was considered essential. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested PACAF to hold the deactivation of the HF trunk in abeyance until the Guam to H. E. Holt DSCS link was established, at which time the Philippines to Australia HF trunk could be deactivated. Meanwhile, CINCPAC agreed that the HF trunk could be relegated to on-call status.¹

PACOM AUTODIN Reconfiguration

(U) The Pacific Defense Communications System (DCS) automated digital network (AUTODIN) provided the Pacific Command with reliable digital communications capable of meeting ever-changing record and data communications requirements. In 1974 the JCS directed the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to conduct a study entitled "Reconfiguration of the Pacific AUTODIN." The study originally addressed the closure of the Camp Drake AUTODIN Switching Center (ASC) and was later expanded to include consideration of the operational effect on communications of the closure of a combination of ASCs in the PACOM. At the beginning of 1978 the AUTODIN system was built around six strategically located ASC's. In January 1978 that number was reduced to five when the ASC at Fort Buckner in Okinawa was deactivated.²

Deactivation of Fort Buckner ASC

(U) As part of a DCS reconfiguration in the Kanto Plains in Japan discussed below, the JCS initiated action to close the Fort Buckner ASC. As a result of DCA closure simulation studies, in September 1977 CINCPAC recommended the expeditious closure of Fort Buckner ASC, and CINCPAC so ordered in October 1977. The Fort Buckner ASC closure plan was to be promulgated by the DCA Pacific.³

(U) The Fort Buckner ASC was deactivated and placed in caretaker status on 13 January 1978. It was to remain in caretaker status pending future installation at Camp Zama, Japan in conjunction with the DCS reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain.⁴

References:
1. DCA PAC 170234Z Mar 78 (U) and 262110Z Apr 78 (U); Hq PACAF 252202Z Mar 78 (U) and 102200Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPACFLT 272340Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 122359Z Apr 78 (C) and 172043Z May 78 (C), both GDS-84.
ASC Closure Simulations

In July 1977 a total system review of the Western Pacific DCS AUTODIN requirements was considered necessary by the JCS. This review was needed because of the planned troop withdrawal from Korea, proposed U.S. forces reductions in Taiwan, the closure of the Fort Buckner ASC, planning for the consolidation of DCS facilities in Japan at Camp Zama, and a U.S. Air Force proposal in July 1977 to close the ASC at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Accordingly, the JCS tasked CINCPAC to provide an operational evaluation of ASC requirements in the Western Pacific. In addition, the DCA was requested to update simulations for the closure of Clark, Taegu, and the Fort Buckner AUTODIN switches.¹

In reply, CINCPAC provided an operational evaluation of ASC requirements in the Western Pacific. In summary, and when considering the PACOM backbone communications transmission and switching systems, CINCPAC considered the ASCs at Guam, the Philippines, and Japan to be the minimum necessary in the foreseeable future to insure adequate operational flexibility throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans. CINCPAC validated the plan to close the Fort Buckner ASC and advised that the requirement for the Taegu ASC in Korea would be examined further as the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea progressed.²

In order to assist the DCA in conducting the closure simulation studies, CINCPAC hosted a reconfiguration planning conference in November 1977. After CINCPAC had collected data from the various military Services and cognizant government agencies, the data was used by the DCA Pacific to conduct closure simulation studies.³

1. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (S), DECL 5 Dec 86; JCS 3829/261654Z Jul 77 (S), GDS-85.
2. CINCPAC 022322Z Sep 77 (S), GDS-85.
Kanto Plain Reconfiguration

The DCS reconfiguration in the Kanto Plain also had its origin in the 1974 JCS-directed DCA study entitled "Reconfiguration of the Pacific AUTODIN." Subsequently, the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan (COMUS Japan) recommended the consolidation of the Camp Drake ASC and the automated voice network (AUTOVON) and the technical control function at Fuchu Air Base at one location (Camp Zama) and the release of both Fuchu and Drake to the Government of Japan (GOJ). In return for the release of Fuchu and Drake, COMUS Japan also proposed the development of a quid pro quo (QPQ) package to be supplied by the GOJ. In March 1976 a revised DCA study recommended the consolidation of the Drake and Fuchu communications functions at Camp Zama, the total release of Fuchu and Drake, and the presentation of the QPQ package to the GOJ. The JCS tasked the U.S. Army to develop an architectural and engineering plan for the new facility at Zama. The U.S. Air Force was tasked to determine the cost required to relocate the Fuchu communications functions to Zama. As a result of these taskings and additional coordination, COMUS Japan presented the QPQ package to the GOJ on 22 April 1977. The QPQ specified that the GOJ would build a communications building, completely equipped, install commercial terminal facilities, and build 120 units of family housing at Zama, identified by the U.S. Army as a requirement. This requirement was linked to the total release of the Makiminato housing area in Okinawa to the GOJ. Replacement construction was to be accomplished by the GOJ at no cost to the U.S. government.

1. DCA Memorandum 531 of 6 Jun 78 (S), Subj: DCS AUTODIN Reconfiguration (U), GDS-86; CINCPAC 260212Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4816/2715542 Nov 78 (U); JCS-4816/2715542 Nov 78 (U).
2. J623 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; Hq USFJ Memorandum of 22 Apr 77 (U), Subj: Total Release of North Camp Asaka, FAC 3048, and Fuchu Air Station, FAC 3016 (U).
(U) As directed by CINCPAC, a meeting was held at COMUS Japan in February 1978 to develop a consolidated position regarding the details of the communications support facility to be established at Zama. During the meeting it was concluded that complete development of the communications design criteria for the Zama facility depended upon the availability and lead time of the AUTOVON switch to be installed in the new communications facility. The DCA was requested by CINCPAC to assemble the necessary data.\(^1\)

(U) After several exchanges between the DCA and the military agencies in the field regarding the construction design criteria, the DCA forwarded the desired information to Fifth Air Force in Japan on 30 May 1978. The DCA also proposed that the original concept of a modified AUTOVON switch, an AN/TTC-39 voice switch, transmission equipment, and a technical control in the Zama building be expanded to include the collocation of an AN/MSC-61 satellite earth terminal. The DCA also proposed that the building be constructed underground because of advantages to be gained in environmental impact, energy conservation, typhoon protection, TEMPEST reduction, and electromagnetic pulse emission protection (See Project APACHE).\(^2\)

(C) The subject was discussed with JCS representatives during a visit to CINCPAC in August 1978. The JCS representatives expressed concern over the delay in official response from the GOJ to the QPQ proposal. The JCS representatives advised that, in the event the QPQ proposal was not accepted by the GOJ, the entire project had been submitted for inclusion in the DCS five-year plan (FYP-81) for funding by the U.S. Government. However, the balance of trade deficit with the GOJ, combined with the devaluation of the dollar in Japan, made it doubtful that Congress would approve the funding of any construction in Japan. Therefore, the maintenance of the status quo for the Kanto Plain DCS appeared to be the most feasible fallback position if the GOJ did not accept the QPQ. The JCS had under consideration the modification of the QPQ to make it more acceptable to the GOJ or canceling the proposal in its entirety. CINCPAC was requested to do nothing pending JCS action. Shortly thereafter, the CINCPAC J6 decided to take the initiative in developing alternative courses of action in the event that the GOJ did not accept the QPQ proposal. With JCS concurrence, the CINCPAC J6 tasked COMUS Japan to conduct a review of the Kanto Plain DCS reconfiguration. Accordingly, COMUS Japan submitted four possible courses of action for consideration. The most viable of the four options appeared to be the withdrawal of the QPQ and the maintenance

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1. COMUS Japan 300511Z Nov 77 (U), 180557Z Jan 78 (U), and 130645Z Feb 78 (U); CINCPAC 170001Z Feb 78 (U).
2. DCA 241533Z Feb 78 (U) and 121927Z May 78 (U); CINCPAC 071900Z Mar 78 (U); 5AF 170542Z Mar 78 (U); DCA PAC 262102Z Apr 78 (U); DCA Ltr 410 of 30 May 78 (U), Subj: DCS Reconfiguration in the Kanto Plains (U).
of the status quo in the Kanto Plain DCS or the modification of the proposal by deleting the 120-unit housing requirement and changing the location of the DCS facility to Yokota Air Base. CINCPAC requested the component commanders and DCA Pacific to comment on the courses of action suggested by COMUS Japan.¹

CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and DCA Pacific concurred that a cost analysis of the status quo and the Yokota alternative should be conducted; however, the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG) expressed strong opposition to the deletion of the housing requirement and recommended that nothing be done until an official response had been received from the GOJ regarding the QPQ.²

Considering the previous extensive discussions pertaining to the Kanto Plain reconfiguration and the consolidation of communication facilities at Zama, COMUS Japan's response to the USACSG position appeared to be somewhat of a non-sequitur. On 18 October COMUS Japan stated that the mission effectiveness, survivability of DCS communications, command and control functions, the management of DCS facilities, and the conservation of critical manpower resources would be greatly enhanced by the relocation of the DCS facilities from Drake and Fuchu to Yokota. These same advantages, stated COMUS Japan, could not be achieved by relocating the DCS facilities to Camp Zama. At the same time, COMUS Japan advised CINCPAC that, at a meeting of the Joint Facilities Subcommittee, the COMUS Japan staff formally queried the GOJ for a response to the QPQ proposal. The GOJ responded that the 120 housing units could not be justified. The relocation of DCS facilities was not discussed in that reply. This response was confirmed in a 26 October 1978 message from COMUS Japan to CINCPAC which provided the "official" position of the GOJ on the subject. The GOJ could not agree to the relocation of 120 units of family housing from Okinawa because it could not find proper justification. The relocation of Camp Drake and Fuchu Air Station was desirable but, because it would require a considerable amount of money, execution of the work in the immediate future was not anticipated. Design work was expected to begin in Japanese FY 80 at the earliest, and actual work during and after Japanese FY 81. The GOJ representatives reiterated that the relocation of family housing from Okinawa to Mainland Japan was the only restraint to the proposed project.³

The USACSG challenged the apparent non-sequitur of COMUS Japan that Yokota was preferable to Zama for the DCS reconfiguration in detail and reiterated its position that any consideration to modify the QPQ should be held in abeyance until a formal written response to the original proposal had been

1. COMUS Japan 230020Z Sep 78 (ţi), GDS-84; CINCPAC 300406Z Sep 78 (ţ6), GDS-84.
2. J623 HistSum Dec 78 (ţi), DECL 5 Jan 85; CDRUSACSG 132345Z Oct 78 (ţ6), GDS-84.
3. COMUS Japan 180003Z Oct 78 (ţi), GDS-84 and 260541Z Oct 78 (ţ6).
received from the GOJ. CINCPAC, however, pointed out to the JCS that the GOJ response transmitted from COMUS Japan was apparently a formal response to the QPQ which eliminated any consideration of the relocation of 120 family housing units from Okinawa to Mainland Japan. In view of this response, CINCPAC suggested that alternatives to the QPQ should be evaluated. The only feasible alternatives, stated CINCPAC, were to revise the original proposal to delete the requirement for 120 units of family housing at Camp Zama, to construct the DCS facility at Yokota Air Base, or to withdraw the QPQ proposal and maintain the status quo of the Kanto Plain DCS.³

(U) On 11 December 1978 the USACSG acknowledged that, since the Japanese Defense Facilities Agency had cited the relocation of family housing as the only restraint to the proposed communications reconfiguration, the U.S. Army withdrew the requirement for 120 units of family housing. This would allow the GOJ to begin the design of AUTODIN and AUTOVON facilities at Zama in Japan FY 80 and start construction in Japan FY 81 as previously stated. The USACSG recommended that the original QPQ package be revised by deleting the housing unit requirement, with the balance of the package to remain valid. Accordingly, CINCPAC requested PACAF to include this option in the cost analysis of the subject. As the year ended, PACAF and the DCA were exchanging information regarding the costs of various options for providing the AUTOVON switch in the proposed new DCS facility at Zama.³

Japan-Korea Bulk Encryption

1. CDRUSACSG 311915Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 182012Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. CDRUSACSG 112345Z Dec 78 (U); CINCPAC 160112Z Dec 78 (U); Hq PACAF 230300Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84; DCA PAC 142109Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 13 Dec 84.
At a meeting held on 30 January-3 February 1978 at Yokota Air Base in Japan among representatives of the NSA, USAF, DCA, CINCPAC, and the Nippon Electric Company (contractor of the microwave system), major interface problems between the Japanese-provided radio equipment and the U.S.-provided bulk encryption equipment were discovered. At a subsequent meeting, it was determined that an interface device could be developed to circumvent this problem. The NSA agreed to study the matter but warned that it was not possible to provide valid milestones for the development of an interface device and that the original target date for an interface availability of October 1978 appeared unlikely.2

CINCPAC reviewed the situation in early March 1978 and expressed continued commitment to the earliest possible implementation of bulk encryption on the Tsushima Strait (Japan to Korea) microwave system. CINCPAC expressed concern with the potential schedule impact if a technologically risky interface and installation scheme were pursued. The JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's concern about delays in securing the Japan-Korea microwave system and advised that actions were underway to expedite an evaluation of alternative solutions and that the U.S. Air Force would develop a course of action to satisfy the CINCPAC requirement. In May 1978 the NSA outlined four alternative options for securing the microwave system and recommended one of the four options as the least cost and the most timely solution. All concerned subsequently concurred, and the JCS directed the U.S. Air Force to expedite the implementation of the selected option and to initiate the necessary actions to acquire the four encryption units apportioned for the Japan-Korea microwave upgrade.3

2. PCA Hickam 040115Z Jan 78 (U) and 082100Z Feb 78 (U), XGDS-2; 1956 CG Yokot 030307Z Feb 78 (U), XGDS-2; DIRNSA 171904Z Feb 78 (U), XGDS-2.
3. CINCPAC 061730Z Mar 78 (U), GDS-84; DIRNSA 200241Z May 78 (U), XGDS-2; DCA 221931Z May 78 (U); HQ AFCS 301240Z May 78 (U); JCS 5040/070125Z Jun 78 (U), XGDS-2; HQ USAF 091500Z Jun 78 (U).
(U) By September the new digital microwave system between Changsan and Seburiyama was completed. By November all circuits had been cut over from the 60-channel tropospheric scatter and 36-channel VHF systems between the two to a newly installed 96-channel digital microwave system. The activation of the digital system completed Phase I of the management engineering plan. Phase II would provide transmission security for the link through the addition of bulk encryption equipment. This phase was tentatively scheduled to be completed in March 1979.

**COMMANDO LION**

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1. J6 WWEB 19 Jun-2 Jul 78 (U) and 6-19 Nov 78 (U).
3. Ibid.; J622 Point Paper (S), 7 Mar 78, Subj: COMMANDO LION (U), DECL 31 Dec 86.
1. J622 Point Paper (£), 2 May 78, Subj: COMMANDO LION (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; J6 BWEB 16-29 Jan 78 (£), DECL 31 Dec 86.

2. CCGD FOURTEEN 220059Z Apr 78 (£), GDS-86; J622 Point Paper (£), 2 May 78, Subj: COMMANDO LION (U), DECL 31 Dec 86; J6 BWEBs 24 Apr-7 May 78 (£) and 8-21 May 78 (£), both DECL 31 Dec 86.
1. CINCPACAF 100518Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-85.
2. CINCPACAF 092001Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-85; J6 BWEB 14-27 Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
1. CSAF 292010Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; J6 BWEB 18-31 Dec 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J612 Point Paper (U), 2 May 78, Subj: Korea Defense Communications System (DCS) Limitations (U), DECL 31 Dec 84.
3. J6 BWEB 24 Apr-7 May 78 (U); SSO Korea 3379/210726Z Jul 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-86.
1. J612 HistSum Sep 78 (3), DECL 31 Dec 86, which cited the COMUS Korea and CINCPAC messages and the U.S. Forces Korea and CINCPAC J6 Ltrs.

2. J612 HistSum Sep 78 (3), DECL 31 Dec 84; CINCPAC 190123Z Sep 78 (2), GDS-84; J612 Point Paper (3), 26 Oct 78, Subj: Korean C3 Requirements (U), DECL 31 Dec 86.
MITS Okinawa

(U) As a result of facility adjustments under the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program and the Okinawa base consolidation program, changes to the disposition of U.S. Forces in Korea, and the return of land to the GOJ, a recon-

1. J612 HistSum Nov 78 (SYNOFORM), XGDS-2; Hq USFK (SJ) Ltr, 27 Oct 78, n.s. (U) CINCPAC (612) Ltr Ser S441 of 8 Dec 78 (SYNOFORM), Subj: Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK) (U), REVW 31 Oct 98.
3. J612 Point Paper (SYNOFORM), 29 Nov 78, Subj: C3 Improvements-Korea (U), DECL 31 Dec 86.

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347
Configuration of the Military Integrated Telephone System (MITS) on Okinawa was initiated. This reconfiguration included the transmission systems over which the telephone circuits were routed. In mid-1977, COMUS Japan requested the Army and Air Force to outline the problem and that CINCPAC direct a joint engineering effort to reconfigure the MITS through 1985. The study would serve as a basis for an engineering plan to be used to reconfigure the system. CINCPAC tasked the DCA Pacific to develop a time-phased plan of approach for the system engineering effort.

(U) The DCA Pacific submitted the time-phased plan for the MITS reconfiguration in August 1977 and, after supporting data had been provided by component commands, the DCA Pacific provided a draft engineering study to all concerned commands and subordinate organizations for review and comment. After incorporating the changes recommended by the concerned principal, the system engineering study for the MITS on Okinawa and the supporting facilities was published by the DCA Pacific.

(U) After concurrences were received from the component commands on the revised engineering study, CINCPAC approved the study on 27 December 1978 and authorized the necessary action to implement the reconfiguration as specified in the DCA Pacific study. The study was underway as of the end of 1978.

(U) The objectives of the study were to reconfigure the MITS to meet the revised user requirements, to rearrange the DCS transmission media to permit the release of unnecessary U.S. Government-controlled land to the GOJ, to transfer circuits assigned on underground cables to microwave facilities, and finally, to develop and maintain future communications requirements for both near and long-term planning and system engineering efforts.

Submarine Cable Disruption

(U) On 12 September 1978 the Okinawa-to-Taiwan U.S. Air Force-owned submarine cable failed for the first time since April 1977. Restoral plans were initiated and re-routing of communications was completed on 14 September. As

1. J623 HistSum Dec 78 (U); COMUS Japan 280720Z Jun 77 (U); CINCPAC 091739Z Jul 77 (U).
2. DCA PAC 170202Z Aug 77 (U) and 292114Z Dec 77 (U); COMUS Japan 310553Z Mar 78 (U); DCA PAC Ltr Ser P441 of 9 Jun 78 (U), Subj: DCS Reconfiguration Okinawa and DCA PAC Ltr Ser 441 of 8 Sep 78 (U), Subj: System Engineering Study for the MITS Okinawa and Supporting Facilities (U).
3. CINCPAC 262104Z Sep 78 (U) and 270201Z Dec 78 (U).
noted later in this chapter, the disruption caused one of the two MINIMIZE impositions during 1978. The commercial cable repair ship C.S. RECORDER was dispatched to the site of the cable break and the repair of the cable was completed on 5 October 1978. The cable was turned over for testing on 7 October, but final testing was delayed because of microwave link problems. The cable link was finally returned to service on 9 October 1978. The cable was out of service for 26 days, 16 hours, and 56 minutes and affected a total of 48 circuits.¹

Communications in the Philippines

Lubang TACAN

Subjects related to communications in the Philippines during 1978 ranged from the proposed deactivation of a tactical air navigation (TACAN) station to the full disclosure of U.S. communications operations in the Philippines in connection with the ongoing negotiations regarding the Military Bases Agreement (MBA). Early in January 1978 PACAF proposed the deactivation of the TACAN on Lubang Island, located off the west coasts of the Islands of Luzon and Mindoro. When asked by CINCPAC to comment on the Air Force proposal, CINCPACFLT advised that the Lubang TACAN was the only unobstructed TACAN navigational aid which could be used during operations in the southern/southwestern portions of the Subic off-shore operating area. Further, the majority of Navy tactical aircraft were classified as TACAN only. During carrier operations throughout the South China Sea, the Lubang TACAN was frequently used to remain clear of numerous airways in that area. The deactivation of the Lubang TACAN could pose a hazard to the safety of those flight operations. Based on the Fleet comments, CINCPAC informed the Air Force of nonconcurrency with the proposed deactivation. However, because the Navy operations could be the only ones impacted by the proposed deactivation, CINCPAC recommended that CINCPACFLT and PACAF seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the matter.²

Air Defense

The Philippine air defense system came under scrutiny when, in November 1977, an Air Force radar quality control team found severe deterioration in the Philippine air defense radar equipment. The U.S. Air Force maintained one

¹. J623 HistSum Oct 78 (U); 1961 COMM GP 122010Z Sep 78 (U) and 130045Z Sep 78 (U); CINCPAC 140146Z Sep 78 (U); DCA PAC 130209Z Sep 78 (U); DCA PAC 150100Z Sep 78 (🙋), 270310Z Sep 78 (♂), 060900Z Oct 78 (♀), 071240Z Oct 78 (♂), and 090620Z Oct 78 (♂), all GDS-84.
². CINCPACFLT 250051Z Jan 78 (U), which cites Hq PACAF 120300Z Jan 78; CINCPAC 280101Z Jan 78 (U).
radar station at Wallace Air Station and the Philippine Air Force maintained
stations at Parades Air Base, Paramal Air Station, and on Lubang Island at
Gozar Air Station. In February 1978 a U.S. Defense Department equipment
survey team visited the Philippines to review requests for equipment. Among
their recommendations regarding the radar system was that it needed to be up-
dated and restored to operationally ready status. It was also recommended that
six additional radars be provided for coverage in the Southern Philippines.
In March the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in Manila, citing the
substandard operation of the Philippine air defense system, proposed to up-
grade the capability by assigning Philippine Air Force maintenance and quality
control personnel to work side-by-side with U.S. personnel at Wallace Air
Station. The JUSMAG also proposed the establishment of a joint JUSMAG/13th
Air Force/Philippine Air Force quality assurance team. CINCPAC concurred with
that proposal and tasked PACAF and JUSMAG Philippines to pursue an agreement
with the Philippine Air Force. Additionally, the JUSMAG informed CINCPAC in
August that the Armed Forces of the Philippines intended to reprogram FY 79
military assistance funds amounting to approximately $1 million to overhaul
all of the Philippine air defense radars. 1

Meanwhile, the question of improvements in the air defense radar
coverage in the Philippines had become involved in the MBA discussions. The
GOP had been negotiating with the International Technical Products Corporation
(ITPC) for four years to purchase four ITT-320 Series air defense radars to
add to the three already in operation. Early in 1978 the ITPC advised the
U.S. Embassy and the State Department that negotiations on the purchase of the
four radars was being delayed because of an alleged CINCPAC statement to Mrs.
Marcos that the radars would be provided by the U.S. Government. After meeting
with high officials in the Philippine Government, the ITPC stated that it
was very clear that President Marcos intended to hold the contract with the
ITPC in abeyance pending an offer from the U.S. Government. After clarifica-
tion by CINCPAC of the alleged statement to Mrs. Marcos, the JCS advised CINCPAC
that informal information indicated that the GOP was holding other commercial
contracts pending the development of a U.S. compensation package in connection
with the base negotiations. In February 1978 the Defense Department equipment
survey team held discussions with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to deter-
mine the types and priorities of equipment which might be included in a U.S.
compensation package. At that time, the Armed Forces of the Philippines con-
sidered the radar systems to be their number one priority. In March the U.S.
Ambassador presented the base compensation offer and comments on the military
equipment requirements list to the Philippine President, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Minister of Defense. Concurrently, the equipment package de-

DECL 31 Dec 84; J6 BWEB 14-27 Aug 78 (\&), GDS-84.
veloped by the U.S. Defense Department equipment survey team was presented to the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces. This list specified six mobile air defense radars as the number two priority after the repair of the existing radar system. On 15 July 1978 President Marcos signed and released the ITPC contract for four ITT Series 320 radars.¹

Spacetrack Radar Relocation

(§) Another subject under discussion involved the location of a spacetrack radar site in the Philippines. In order to fill the spacetrack mission gap caused by the deactivation of the radar at Ko Kha in Thailand in 1976, the Aerospace Defense Command had proposed the relocation of the radar to the Philippines. In July 1976 a formal site survey of San Miguel Naval Communications Station, John Hay Air Base, and Wallace Air Station was conducted. San Miguel was tentatively selected as the best site for the radar relocation but, because of the sensitive on-going U.S.-Philippines base negotiations, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had not been advised of the proposed relocation. Early in January 1978 the State Department reviewed the situation in a message to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The U.S. Air Force had an important requirement for a radar site to cover the mid-Pacific, Western Pacific, and areas of the Southern Hemisphere. The site was planned as a major sensor in support of the spacetrack mission of the Aerospace Defense Command. When established, it would be one of three radars in the Pacific surveillance barrier which monitored foreign space launches and space activities outside of existing U.S. sensor capabilities.²

(§) The mission of the radar would be classified no higher than Secret, as would the information concerning unannounced launches of space vehicles. The raw data produced by the site would be immediately available to the host country military communities and would be transmitted to the computational facility in the United States by satellite to be combined with other spacetrack data for analysis and refinement. The refined data would be used to predict positions of objects in space, estimate the place and time of decay of re-entering space objects and provide support to all manned space missions. The spacetrack radar site would require approximately 140 personnel (12 officers, 43 enlisted, and 85 contractors). Positive aspects of the site installation from the GOP point of view were that the U.S. Air Force would share the data gathered with the

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1. AMEMB Manila 955/190351Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84 and 1132/230558Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84; JCS 4056/272336Z Jan 78 (TS) (EX), GDS-86; SECSTATE 30605/040859Z Feb 78 (TS), GDS-84; J475 Point Paper (TS), 27 Jul 78, Subj: Philippine Equipment Compensation List (U), GDS-86.

2. SECSTATE 310408/051400Z Jan 78 (TS), which transmitted the same message dtd 30 Dec 77 (TS), GDS-86.
Philippine Air Force, joint manning and operation with the Philippine Air Force would be encouraged, and Philippine labor and materials (approximately $2.25 million) would be used to the maximum extent possible in site activation.1

Preliminary assessments of the siting proposal by the U.S. Navy (which operated the San Miguel site) indicated that the spacetrack radar would cause frequency interference with existing military and civilian electronic equipment. Consequently, the Navy requested the Air Force to conduct an engineering analysis of the impact of the spacetrack radar on the electromagnetic environment. The Air Force, in turn, tasked the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) to conduct the study.2

In May 1978 the State Department advised the U.S. Embassy that the continued delay in installation of the Pacific surveillance barrier radar at San Miguel Naval Communications Station had caused a severe impact on the spacetrack mission of the U.S. Air Force. Among the concerns expressed by the Air Force was the possible deterioration of the equipment which had been stored at Clark Air Base since its removal from Thailand two years before. The Embassy was also advised that the preliminary ECAC analysis indicated that the radar would present no problems at San Miguel, which was, of course, contrary to the earlier Navy findings. Nevertheless, State recommended that the U.S. Ambassador approach the GOP to inform them of plans to install the radar at San Miguel.3

Referring to the State Department instructions to the Ambassador, the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines noted in a message to CINCPAC that State appeared to be relying heavily on the ECAC preliminary assessment of electromagnetic compatibility at San Miguel. CINCPAC was informed that an Air Force survey in 1976 had stated that a spacetrack radar could be expected to cause television interference and that there were five commercial television stations and one military station originating from Manila. The CINCPAC Representative also noted that the survey had indicated that tape recorders on-base and in local communities would be unusable. There were approximately 5,000 television sets in the local area and strong objections could be expected from the GOP if the spacetrack radar installation caused TV interference. Therefore, the CINCPAC Representative recommended that notification to the GOP of a proposed installation be deferred pending the results of the formal on-site electromagnetic compatibility survey to be conducted by ECAC. An approach to the GOP was not believed, at that time, to be in the best interests of the

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPACFLT 150325Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; J611 Point Paper (U), 9 Mar 78, Subj: Spacetrack Radar GPS-10 Relocation (U).
3. SECSTATE 130676/231707Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
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imminent military-to-military bases discussions.¹

(⁸) The ECAC team conducted the survey in August 1978 and advised the CINCPAC J6 Staff of a tentative finding that the San Miguel site was feasible. Coordination would be required between the U.S. Embassy and the GOP regarding land use, airspace restrictions, and frequency allocation. Such coordination, however, was deferred pending the final ECAC report and until recommended by the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines. His timing depended upon the status of the base negotiations.²

Briefing for GOP

(⁸) Related to the on-going MBA discussions, but not specifically to the spacetrack radar installation, was an OASD/ISA proposal that the President of the Philippines be briefed on the total U.S. communications capability in the Philippines. CINCPAC reviewed the information proposed for release to the GOP and took strong exception to the scope and detail of some of the information. CINCPAC noted that the subject of communications-electronics facilities had been interjected by the GOP into the 1976 base negotiations in an attempt to learn the missions, details of installations, and the possibilities for joint use of U.S. communications facilities in the Philippines. CINCPAC foresaw similar political problems if the information were provided to President Marcos at that time (August 1978). It could possibly prompt the GOP to examine the data, dredge up old issues, and slow down the on-going base negotiations.³

(⁸) Responding to CINCPAC's objections, the DASD/ISA provided CINCPAC with the background which had led to consideration of full disclosure to President Marcos. A GOP position had been stated during the MBA discussions that the State Department Regional Relay Facility at Clark Air Base would be the subject of a separate exchange of notes and that reciprocal rights in the United States would be demanded by the GOP. The Department of Foreign Affairs had also asked the U.S. Embassy whether electronic eavesdropping operations were being conducted against government agencies and private entities in the Philippines. Lastly, conversations between officials of the United States and the GOP revealed confusion and suspicion in the Philippines regarding the various communications and radar facilities at the military bases, the presence of which was known but the functions of which were not known. GOP officials were also aware that they had not been consulted or informed about the installation and purpose of much of the equipment.⁴

1. CINCPAC REP Philippines 300820Z May 78 (⁸), GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC 250341Z Aug 78 (⁸), GDS-86.
4. OSD (OASD/ISA 103-78) 142004Z Sep 78 (⁸) (BOM), GDS-86.
SECRET

The DASD/ISA believed it would be useful for the U.S. Ambassador to have a complete list of the major military communications facilities in the Philippines, but agreed that the subject should be kept out of the base talks if possible. Therefore, a private Demarche to Marcos was proposed in which he would be offered a thorough review of the facilities, including an opportunity to visit them. Such an approach to Marcos, stated the DASD/ISA, would provide a tangible expression of the commitment by the United States to Philippine sovereignty, show Marcos that he had the confidence of the United States, and quell high level doubts and suspicions about what the communications-electronics facilities actually accomplished. CINCPAC was advised that the question of timing was important and that the most propitious moment for such a presentation would be decided by CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador together.1

Communications on Taiwan

TROPO System Deactivation

(U) In 1977 the DCA Pacific had recommended the deactivation of the DCS Philippines-to-Taiwan tropospheric scatter link after the Philippines-to-Japan DSCS link was established. CINCPAC and the JCS approved the deactivation following successful operation of the DSCS link and, on 4 April 1978, the TROPO System was deactivated after 16 years of continuous operation. Because of its age and design limitations, the system could no longer support high quality data and voice circuits, and logistics supportability had also become more expensive and difficult. After the deactivation of the TROPO System, communications requirements in support of the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) were met by commercial leases and DCS links between Taiwan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan.2

Project FORMER TAIHO

(U) FORMER TAIHO was the unclassified code name for a DCA Pacific project to reconfigure and resize the DCS on Taiwan. The plan was developed in accordance with CINCPAC tasking to reduce U.S. military communications systems on Taiwan in consonance with U.S. Force reductions underway in 1977. The plan was approved by the JCS in July 1977, but implementation was held in abeyance pending decisions on additional Taiwan force reductions. After the announcement by President Carter on 15 December 1978 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) would be recognized by the United States on 1 January 1979, and that all U.S. military forces would be withdrawn from Taiwan within four months, the

1. Ibid.
2. J623 HistSum Apr 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 83; JCS 3711/032143Z Aug 77 (S), GDS-83; CDRUSACC Taiwan 040857Z Apr 78 (U); J6 BWEB 27 Mar-9 Apr 78 (U).
implementation of Project FORMER TAIHO was overtaken by events.1

Taiwan Communications Drawdown

After the Presidential announcement, the USTDC developed a plan for the orderly and systematic drawdown and withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Taiwan. The plan included a Communications Annex which provided for the withdrawal of all military owned and operated communications systems on Taiwan. On 22 December 1978 CINCPAC invited the attention of the JCS and other concerned agencies to the fact that a successful and orderly withdrawal was partly dependent upon the provision of adequate and continuous communications support to the residual forces. Moreover, the U.S. Government was committed to support the Mutual Defense Treaty through 1979. CINCPAC reviewed the condition of the DCS backbone system in Taiwan, which was relatively old, in conjunction with the need to lease commercial circuits or introduce mobile assets if the backbone system were withdrawn. CINCPAC noted that the Republic of China (Taiwan) could be willing, and had limited capability, to operate and maintain the DCS backbone system after U.S. troops had been withdrawn. Further, if the communications-electronics equipment were dismantled, additional personnel and communications support equipment would be needed, with an accompanying affect on available airlift and sealift assets. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended that the existing DCS backbone system and the integrated joint communications system submarine cable between Okinawa and Taiwan be left intact and turned over to the ROC for operation and maintenance with a proviso that the United States Forces reserved the right to use the equipment if reentry were required under the Mutual Defense Treaty commitment. As exceptions to the foregoing, CINCPAC listed all automatic secure voice communications assets, other COMSEC equipment, the WWMCCS automated data processing terminal and equipment, and some selected post, camp, and station communications equipment. A decision had not yet been made by the end of the year.2

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 281, 282; J621 Point Paper (S), 29 Sep 78, Subj: Taiwan Communications Drawdown (U), DECL 31 Dec 78; J6 BWEB 1-14 Jan 79 (U).
2. J621 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 16 Dec 84; CINCPAC 220210Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 20 Dec 84.
SECTION II--COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PROGRAMS

Secure Voice and Record Conferencing

(U) The requirement for a CINCPAC secure voice and secure record conferencing capability to a remote task force anywhere in the PACOM had been established by ROCs 4 and 9, respectively. They were submitted in January 1975 as part of the CINCPAC command and control master plan, validated by the JCS in August 1976, and discussed during meetings in 1977. By November 1977 a digital conferencing unit (DCU) had been installed at Pearl Harbor. The DCU multiplexed nine narrow band secure voice circuits, expanding the previous conferencing capability from five wideband and one narrow band to five wideband and nine narrow band circuits.¹

(U) During the 1977 meetings, it was decided that the secure record conference requirement could be met by the use of the automated digital network (AUTODIN) query/response capability. This allowed real-time exchange of information without a dedicated network. The first incremental installation, using MOD 40 telemetry terminals, was completed in December 1978. It included the National Military Command Center, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMUS Korea and the USS BLUE RIDGE. Plans were underway to extend the secure record conferencing capability to nine other locations by the end of 1979.²

Tactical Secure Voice Requirements

(U) CINCPAC had repeatedly expressed concern regarding the limited ability within the PACOM to provide timely secure communications to a crisis scene. Many political, geographic, economic, and cultural factors made the Pacific theater particularly vulnerable to a crisis. Recent examples included such contingency operations as PAUL BUNYAN, MAYAGUEZ, EAGLE PULL, and PUEBLO. These and future crises reinforced the need for rapidly deployable secure voice and record communications capabilities in order to react in the early stages of the crisis and hopefully contain it at the lowest possible level.³

(U) The communications requirements to support joint task force (JTF) or remote task force (RTF) operations in the PACOM were defined as:⁴

2. Ibid.; J612 HistSum Oct 78 (U); DCA CAT III Certification, 26 Sep 78 (U); J341 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 23 Jan 81.
3. J612 Point Paper (U), 26 Oct 78, Subj: Crisis Communications Requirement (U), GDS-84; CINCPAC 130644Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. J622 Point Paper (S), 23 Aug 78, Subj: Responsiveness of Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) to CINCPAC in JTF Operations (U), DECL 31 Dec 84.

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- Two secure voice satellite circuits from the objective area to both the remote marshalling base and the CINCPAC Command Center.

- One secure, photocapable, facsimile circuit from the REMAB to Headquarters PACOM.

- Airborne command and control capability: joint airborne communications center/command post or airborne battle-field command and control center.

- Two quick reaction element teams to provide secure HF/UHF/VHF links from the objective area to the airborne platform.

On 5 June 1978 CINCPAC requested JCS approval to procure a highly transportable secure voice capability for crisis management in the PACOM. The capability requested consisted of a small UHF satellite terminal (WSC-3) with a secure voice processor. In his request, CINCPAC noted that the need for flexible and responsive command and control communications (C3) had previously been stated by the submission of ROCS. However, the satisfaction of C3 needs often resulted in long-term solutions which did not satisfy critical near-term needs. A readily available, highly mobile secure voice capability to exercise command and control responsibilities was essential for the effective management of contingencies, non-combatant emergency evacuation operations, and the many bilateral/multilateral conferences and negotiations conducted throughout the PACOM. Secure voice communications existed only at well-established bases within the PACOM and could not readily be extended throughout the theater.1

The JCS validated the CINCPAC requirement in August 1978 and tasked the Navy to coordinate with CINCPAC. The Navy response to the JCS tasking proposed alternative equipments to satisfy the CINCPAC requirement and, on 10 October 1978, CINCPAC concurred in the Navy recommendation to use the WSC-3/CV-3333 as the contingency package. The package was expected to be delivered in May 1979.2

1. J612 HistSum Nov 78 (U); CINCPAC (612) Ltr Ser C110 of 5 Jun 78 (S), Subj: CINCPAC Secure Voice Requirement (U), GDS-84.
2. JCSM 720-78 of 31 Aug 78, cited in J612 HistSum Nov 78 (U); CNO Ltr Ser 941/C602527 of 21 Sep 78 (S), Subj: CINCPAC Secure Voice Requirement (U), DECL 31 Dec 84; Naval Electronic Systems Command Ltr Ser 139-51021 of 21 Sep 78 (U), Subj: CINCPAC Mobile Secure Voice Terminals (U); CINCPAC 102105Z Oct 78 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

WWMCCS ROC FOURTEEN

(U) In May 1978 staff members from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Engineering Organization (WSEO) visited PACOM headquarters to discuss CINCPAC's requirements for a responsive, highly mobile command and control capability. The WSEO had been directed to identify requirements and develop a consolidated deployable C3 program to be used as a basis for the FY 80 budget. As a result of the discussion between the WSEO members and the CINCPAC staff, it became evident that the WWMCCS programs had not addressed previously stated requirements for information needs at the lower end of the crisis spectrum. During working discussions, the CINCPAC staff identified three distinct levels of capability needed in the PACOM to enable CINCPAC to meet his obligations in crisis management. After coordination with the CINCPAC components, subordinate unified commands, and the CINCPAC staff, PACOM ROC 14 was forwarded to the JCS in early December 1978. The three graduated levels of communications capability identified in ROC 14 were a light-weight forward-based deployable C3 package with single channel secure voice; a forward-based deployable C3 package with two secure voice and one secure facsimile channels connectivity from a JTF to PACOM headquarters; and an Airborne Command Center facsimile.¹

Command Center Secure Voice Switch

(U) In mid-June 1978 CINCPAC requested the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command to provide a secure intercommunications system for the CINCPAC Command Center capable of interfacing with the worldwide automated secure voice communications network. On 10 January 1979 CINCPAC requested information on a procurement package for the lease of the secure internal telephone system, known as the CINCPAC Command Center secure voice switch.²

CMS at CINCPAC

(U) The communications security material system (CMS) at CINCPAC provided service to the CINCPAC staff, the Naval Communications Area Master Station (NAVCAMS), Naval Telecommunications Center detachment, the Naval Security Group, the Navy Automated Data Facility, and the Intelligence Center Pacific. Regularly superseded material was issued monthly, and monthly superseded material was turned in or destroyed monthly. Irregularly superseded material was issued as requested and reserve material was received monthly as well. Reserve material

¹. J341 HistSums Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 ( ), DECL 23 Jan 81; PACOM ROC 14 ( ), undated, Subj: WWMCCS Required Operational Capability for Extension of CINCPAC's Crisis Response Communications System (U), DECL 31 Dec 84.
². J6 BWEBs 17-30 Jul 78 (U) and 1-14 Jan 79 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

359
was received from the Communications Security Material Issuing Office (CMIO) San Diego; the Communications Security Material Sub-issuing Office (CMSIO) Honolulu; Air Force Cryptological Depot (AFCD) San Antonio and the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) Washington, D.C. Transactions were also sent from CINCPAC to the above mentioned agencies to report transfers or destructions. In 1978 282 transactions were completed. Because of the designation of CMIO San Diego as the central issuing office for the Pacific Command, the 1978 figure represented a decrease of 25 transactions from 1977.1

There were two security violations, both involving the Naval Telecommunications Center (NTCC) at Camp H.M. Smith, the local holder of CINCPAC CMS account 267012. The first violation, in August 1978, was investigated by the Naval Security Group Detachment, Wahiawa. CINCPAC reported the findings of the investigation to the CNO and outlined measures taken to preclude recurrence. All disciplinary action was taken by NAVCAMs Eastern Pacific. The second violation was in December 1978. NAVCAMs Eastern Pacific requested the Naval Investigative Service to conduct further inquiry which was ongoing at the end of the year.2

Communications Security Requirements-Korea

In December 1975 the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) approved the release of 254 units of secure record equipment and 38 units of secure voice equipment for use by the ROK forces. A U.S.-ROK Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in February 1977. With the establishment of the CFC and the eventual drawdown of U.S. Forces from Korea it was inevitable that increased responsibility for secure C3 would shift to ROK elements of the CFC structure. Although it was difficult to project exact numbers and types of equipment needed, COMUS Korea increased the requirement previously approved to 335 secure record units and 78 secure voice units in August 1978. At the end of the year, action was pending at the JCS on this increased requirement.3

Meanwhile, a new wideband secure voice circuit from the Pentagon to Seoul in South Korea became operational on 3 April 1978. The new circuit provided an alternate wideband secure voice capability to Korea via the Pentagon secure voice switch.4

1. J613 HistSum Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
4. J623 HistSum Apr 78 (U); DCA 7958/052037Z Apr 78 (U).
In August 1978 COMUS Korea addressed the problem of classified message handling and releasability for U.S.-originated classified message traffic in connection with the scheduled 8 November 1978 establishment of the CFC. On the assumption that U.S.-originated messages could in fact be addressed to UNC CFC, and to insure that inadvertent Noform information was not passed to the UNC/CFC combined staff section, COMUS Korea recommended that U.S.-originated messages addressed to UNC/CFC be received at the Seoul Automated Multi-Media Exchange (AMME), which was operated and maintained by U.S. personnel. He also recommended that the Secretary of the Combined Staff of UNC/CFC provide proper cleared U.S. personnel to screen traffic for inadvertent Noform information and to query the originators of messages which did not include releasability markings (REL/ROK). He requested that CINCPAC pass this proposal to the JCS and solicit approval of this course of action. He also requested CINCPAC to support a promulgation of procedures worldwide for addressing UNC/CFC messages. CINCPAC concurred with COMUS Korea's proposed procedures pending the availability of means to provide fully automated message processing capability.1

On 25 October the JCS informed CINCPAC that the MCEB had indicated that it was inappropriate to include releasability statements/special instruc-

1. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (U); COMUS Korea 010210Z Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 160011Z Aug 78 (U).
2. JCS 3139/161738Z Oct 78 (C); GDS-84; COMUS Korea 200745Z Oct 78 (C); XGDS-1, REVW 20 Oct 2008.
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tions in the ACP. The JCS also reiterated its proposal for two separate PLAs, one for U.S. Forces only and one for the new CFC. CINCPAC verified informally that COMUS Korea considered the use of two distinct PLAs as unacceptable because of the implication that there were two separate entities within the CFC, one U.S. and one Korean, which was contrary to the single combined nature of the CFC organization. COMUS Korea's position was passed to the JCS by CINCPAC, along with additional rationale for the inclusion of specific U.S. classified message handling procedures in the ACP. In view of the activation of the CFC on 7 November 1978, CINCPAC proposed a message for promulgation by the JCS to all military activities to insure the widest possible dissemination of the message handling procedures.¹

(U) Based on a phone conversation between COMUS Korea and CINCPAC on 20 October 1978, it was determined that the activation of the CFC, message processing procedures, and related information was unclassified. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended that all further messages on that subject be unclassified, but did not address the downgrading of previous message traffic.²

(U) In November the JCS requested the MCEB to make the changes to the ACPs requested by COMUS Korea. On 7 November, the same day that the CFC was activated, the JCS dispatched a message to all military activities implementing the special procedures to be used when addressing messages to the CFC in Korea. The final procedures, as agreed to by COMUS Korea and CINCPAC, were:³

- U.S.-originated classified messages addressed to the CFC must be releasable to Republic of Korea (ROK) and contain "Releasable to ROK" following message classification.

- Command control messages: address to both CINCUNC/CFC CP Seoul Korea and CINCUNC/CFC CP/TANGO Korea.

- All other message traffic: address to CINCUNC/CFC Seoul Korea.

- Messages not completely releasable to CFC but containing portions which are intended for and releasable to CFC should be addressed to CINCUNC Seoul Korea or CINCUNC CP's (i.e., CINCUNC CP Seoul Korea and CINCUNC CP TANGO Korea), as appropriate. To help insure releasable portions intended

1. JCS 6924/252124Z Oct 78 (SC), GDS-84; CINCPAC 020115Z Nov 78 (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (U); JCS 7483/070117Z Nov 78 (U).
for CFC are passed to CFC, appropriate passing instructions such as "pass paragraphs releasable to ROK to CFC" should be included in message texts.

- If doubt exists as to applicability or releasability of a U.S. classified message to CFC Korea, address the message to CINCUNC Seoul Korea for disposition.
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION III--AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING

PACWRAC

(U) In 1975 the PACOM regional Automated Data Processing (ADP) facility planning group conducted a feasibility study for the consolidation of all WWMCCS ADP H-6000 computer systems on Oahu (Navy and Air Force). The report identified savings in manpower and material for two possible sites, one at Hickam Air Force Base and the other at Kunia, which at that time was the CINCF Alternate Command Post. The feasibility study contained PACAF's minority report, which disagreed with the proposed cost savings and therefore did not concur with the consolidation recommendation. In 1976 a CINCPAC letter transmitted a System Development Notification (SDN) as the plan to consolidate three computer systems, two from CINCPAC and one from CINCPACFLT, into the Fleet Intelligence Pacific (FICPAC) Building 352 at Makalapa on Oahu. Facilit construction was underway in 1977 and scheduled for completion in 1978. Acceptance testing of the Honeywell Informations Systems (HIS) H-735G Remote Terminal System (RTS) mini-computer to link data communications between the WWMCCS ADP terminals at Camp Smith and Makalapa began in November 1977.¹

(U) In February 1978 the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC) concept of operations was published. This was the relocation plan for the three computer systems. A first phase called for the relocation of the CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT general service (GENSER) function in support of command and control and Phase 2 involved the assessment and relocation of the CINCPAC Strategic Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) computer system into the PACWRAC. However, the PACWRAC concept as published provided for a reevaluation of the relocation of the SIOP function to the PACWRAC facility with respect to both economical and operational issues. In July the CNO noted that not moving the SIOP function was contrary to Congressional guidance. This guidance had been published in 1975 and stated in part, "...at the Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the Fleet Command Center deleted by the House was restored in full scope with the proviso that the Navy inform the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives if it is not planned to centralize Army, Navy, and Air Force automatic data processing and worldwide military command and control functions into this facility."²

(U) Shortly thereafter, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan was approved in concept, but noted that a statement in the plan regarding consolidation of Navy WWMCCS computers central pro-

2. Ibid.
cessing units (CPU) excluded the SIOP CPU. The JCS requested CINCPAC to revise the previously submitted SDN if it were not planned to relocate all CPUs into the PACWRAC. CINCPAC replied in September 1978 emphasizing the efforts in the PACOM to comply with the spirit and intent of Congressional guidance—to consolidate in order to conserve resources—but also stated that before commitment to arrangements which could impede or adversely impact on the responsiveness of the WWMCCS to existing and future operational needs, all limitations of such arrangements required examination. Toward that end, CINCPAC intended to plan for the integration of the cruise missile mission planning system with the SIOP system and then to assess the cost of trade-offs for optimum site location. Also, CINCPAC intended to update the 1975 PACOM Regional ADP Report regarding the utilization of resources at the Makalapa facility, to revise the PACWRAC manpower requirements to assure adequate support in all areas, to examine the possibility of relocating additional equipment to the PACWRAC facility, and to assist PACAF in a feasibility investigation of consolidation with PACWRAC. CINCPAC noted that a recent Defense Audit Agency report concurred with the Congressional guidance that the PACAF WWMCCS ADP be relocated to the PACWRAC facility.¹

(U) Meanwhile, the installation of communications equipment on the fourth floor of Makalapa Building 352 had begun in December 1977 and the installation of ADP equipment had begun in mid-April 1978. In May the CNO approved the relocation of the FICPAC H6000 Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) from the first floor to the fifth floor within Building 352 at Makalapa. The OSIS computer would be used as the CINCPAC GENSER system in an H6000 trade and would ease the transition to a consolidated PACWRAC. On 12 May 1978 the CINCPAC Director of the ADP System Support Group took part in a ribbon-cutting ceremony to celebrate the opening of the PACWRAC at Makalapa.²

(U) By October it had become apparent that the target implementation date for the PACWRAC of November would not be met. Difficulties had been encountered in the establishment of reliable circuitry between Camp Smith and the PACWRAC facility. Late in November the circuit was scheduled for a complete system test of the entire microwave link complex by NAVCAMS Eastern Pacific. Necessary repairs were to be accomplished and alignment assured in order to meet DCA acceptance standards. A new PACWRAC implementation date would depend upon the completion of the NAVCAMS Eastern Pacific system test.³

¹ Ibid.
² J631 HistSums Jan 78 (U), Apr 78 (U), and May 78 (U).
³ J631 HistSums Oct 78 (U) and Nov 78 (U); J6 BWEs 23 Oct-5 Nov 78 (U), 20 Nov-3 Dec 78 (U) and 1-14 Jan 79 (U).
The WIN is a communications network to allow WWMCCS computer interconnecting to support routine and crisis C2 information processing. The prototype of the WIN was approved for development in December 1974 and, subsequent to the successful test of the prototype, the JCS validated and approved the WIN. In January 1978 the JCS published the approved WIN implementation plan and, in March 1978, the Defense Department approved the plan up to a configuration which could be achieved by 30 December 1979. The WIN was expected to evolve over a period of years and would consist of a number of WWMCCS host computers interconnected to accommodate both local and remote terminal users. The network was to be used in support of JCS-approved exercises and would exchange information between the WWMCCS and the logistics, intelligence and tactical command and control information systems. WIN also would support the national military command system, the service headquarters, unified commands, selected specified commands, selected component commands, the transportation operating agencies and selected Defense Department agencies. Achievement of a WIN capability in the PACOM depended upon the installation of an interface message processor (IMP), a mini-computer to be installed in the PACWRAC to interface with PACOM hosts to the WIN network. The capabilities of the WIN included teleconference, remote access, file transfer, workload sharing, and a mail function. By the end of 1978 an approved WESTPAC WIN system configuration had not yet been agreed upon by the CNO, the JCS, and CINCPAC. The approved portion of the management engineering plan covered only expansion to Hawaii. COMUS Korea was originally scheduled to enter the system in December 1979; however, the JCS had rescheduled the entry of COMUS Korea into the system to coincide with the scheduled 1980 operational date for AUTODIN II. A final WESTPAC system configuration for COMUS Japan and COMUS Korea was still under development.

Cruise Missiles Systems

During 1978, CINCPAC was involved in the development and acquisition of the theater Cruise Missile Mission Planning System (CMMPS). The purpose of the system was to plan the routes of sea launched (SLCM) and ground launched (GLCM) cruise missiles by means of a complex computer system. Once the path of the missile was planned, the CMMPS would convert the final route plan into a set of formatted instructions to be directly loaded into the missile's on-board guidance computer.

1. J635 HistSum Dec 78 (U); the JCS WIN Implementation Plan, Jan 78 (U); J635 Point Paper (U), 22 Aug 78, Subj: WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) (U).
2. J63 HistSums 78 (U).
(U) In addition to participating in the development of CMMPS, J6 personnel took active roles in the PACOM Cruise Missile Working Group, CMMPS Source Selection Evaluation Board, CMMPS Source Advisory Council, Test and Evaluation Group and the System Design Source Selection Advisory Board. Technical assistance was rendered to PACAF during meetings of the Air Force's GLCM Computer Resources Working Group. Valuable inputs to the CINCPAC Cruise Missile Concept of Operations were made by J6 Staff.

(U) The contract for the CMMPS was awarded to McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Corporation in September 1978. The target date for installation of the CMMPS at Camp Smith was October 1980.

Message File Retention

(U) In 1977 the Camp Smith Telecommunications Center (TCC) microfilmed one copy of each narrative incoming and outgoing message manually and retained these copies for three years. After a CNO survey team review of each Navy TCC on the island of Oahu, it was noted that the retention and retrieval of messages in excess of 90 days was an administrative function and not a function of the TCC. The CINCPAC J6 initiated action through the CINCPAC Joint Secretary to the Deputy Chief of Staff to transfer the responsibility for this function from the TCC to CINCPAC. The J6 tasked the Navy Regional Data Automation Center (NARDAC) to investigate the automation of the microfilming process, specifically to investigate the utilization of existing microfiche capability. As a result of the NARDAC investigation, the CINCPAC J6 informed the Deputy Chief of Staff that a totally automated procedure had been developed. The WWMCCS computer was used to transcribe the TCC magnetic tapes into a new date-time group (DTG) sequence tape. The microfiche processing then was done at the Data Processing center, Pearl Harbor. It was then proposed that the microfiche file be maintained by a designated CINCPAC staff element to provide retrieval of messages over 90 days old. The new system was implemented and the function for retention and retrieval of messages in excess of 90 days old was transferred from the Camp Smith TCC to the Classified Records Branch, Administration Division, Joint Secretariat (J0422) on 1 October 1978.1

PLAD Review

(U) In June 1977 the U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB) announced the distribution of a joint Department of Defense (JODD) plain lan-

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1. J622 HistSum Oct 78 (U); J6/Memo/1007 of 5 Dec 77 (U), Subj: Message File Retention (U); J6/Memo/0544 of 14 Jun 78 (U), Subj: Message File Retention (U); CINCPACNOTE 2300 of 27 Oct 78 (U), Subj: Requests for Messages Over 90 Days Old (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

368
CONFIDENTIAL

guage address directory (PLAD) containing the commonly used joint/DOD activities, federal agencies, non-military departments, and a limited number of widely used service PLAs. The JODD PLAD became effective on 1 July 1977 and, in conjunction with existing PLADs, provided the authorized PLAs to be used on all narrative and data pattern traffic originated by DOD components. The MCEB also directed a six month evaluation of Services and JODD PLADs. In December 1977 the sus-pense date for PLAD evaluation comments was extended to 31 May 1978. CINCPAC submitted an extensive and comprehensive review of JODD and Service PLADs on 27 May. In summary, CINCPAC recommended that a single combined PLAD in the form of an Allied Communications Publication or similar document with Service, joint DOD, State, and allied supplements be adopted rather than the existing Service/JODD PLADs. CINCPAC stated that standardization of PLAs, PLAD format, change entries, and accountability procedures was necessary in order to mini-mize PLA inconsistencies, decrease message processing delays, and improve command and control record communications.¹

MINIMIZE in PACOM-1978

(U) In December 1977 CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC to impose MINIMIZE world-wide for record traffic destined to, through, and within the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility (Western Pacific Communications Area), less the Indian Ocean, for all Navy afloat and ashore activities located therein during exercise READEX 1-78, which was conducted from 12-17 February 1978. CINCPAC concurred and, as requested, the JCS imposed MINIMIZE effective 12-17 February 1978.²

(U) The only other imposition of MINIMIZE during 1978 occurred on 13 Sep-tember when CINCPAC imposed MINIMIZE PACOM-wide on all AUTOVON traffic destined for Taiwan because of the failure of the submarine cable between Taiwan and Okinawa. CINCPAC requested the JCS to impose AUTOVON MINIMIZE on originators worldwide. The JCS complied on 13 September and MINIMIZE was in effect for AUTOVON destined for Taiwan until canceled by CINCPAC on 9 October for PACOM and by the JCS on 11 October worldwide.³

Tsunami Warning Communications

(U) In November 1977 CINCPAC requested the Defense Communications Agency

1. J623 HistSum Nov 78 (U); USMCEB 011601Z Jun 77 (U) and 030137Z Dec 77 (U); CINCPAC 270056Z May 78 (U).
2. J623 HistSum Dec 78 (U); CINCPACFLT 241904Z Dec 77 (G), GDS-83; CINCPAC 051920Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84; JCS 1598/120319Z Feb 78 (U) and 1611/120419Z Feb 78 (G), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 130153Z Sep 78 (U); JCS 5340/130457Z Sep 78 (U); CINCPAC 091325Z Oct 78 (U); JCS 7162/111303Z Oct 78 (U).

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

to assign a collective routing indicator (CRI) to be used by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in order to minimize message delays in the promulgation of flash precedence tsunami watches, warnings, supplementary reports/advisories, cancellation reports, all-clear messages, and tsunami test messages. The DCA approved CINCPAC's request and assigned a CRI for tsunami warning. On 20 January 1978 CINCPAC promulgated a collective address designator (CAD) entitled "Tsunami Warning Pacific" to be used in conjunction with the assigned CRI. CINCPAC advised that the PTWC in Honolulu and CINCPAC were the authorized originators of messages addressed to the Tsunami Warning Pacific CRI/CAD. Under normal circumstances, messages would be originated by the PTWC; however, CINCPAC was an authorized originator for the purpose of managing/maintaining the CRI/CAD and for use in the event that the PTWC was unable to transmit tsunami watches/warnings directly via AUTODIN because of communications difficulties. As reported by the J6 Operations Division, the use of the CRI/CAD had significantly reduced tsunami-related message transmission time, thereby decreasing the delays previously experienced with such messages.1

ADP Training

(U) Classroom courses in automated data processing (ADP) at Headquarters PACOM were provided by a mobile training team from Keesler Air Force Base Technical Training Center and by a team from the Department of Defense Computer Institute (DODCI). In 1978 29 separate ADP courses were conducted by the Keesler team for a total of 331 students. Ten courses were conducted by the mobile training team from the DODCI, which graduated a total of 348 students. In addition, 16 students attended DODCI courses in Washington, D.C., and three students attended a course at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.2

WWMCCS Graphics Terminals

(U) A CINCPAC requirement for a technologically advanced information display terminal was acknowledged as early as 1975. The CINCPAC Display and Information System (CINDIS) requirements report noted the influx of terminal types into the CINCPAC Command Center and underlined problems of terminal proliferation. Maintainability, interchangeability, and flexibility to access multiple ADP systems were issues that prompted consideration of implementing and employing a single, all-purpose terminal, or a family of compatible terminals in the Command Center and supporting centers. In February 1978 the Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) published a technical memorandum

1. J623 HistSums Jul 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U); CINCPAC 202109Z Jan 78 (U), 111833Z Apr 78 (U), and 222100Z Jul 78 (U).
2. J631 HistSums Jan-Dec 78 (U), with 65 attached supporting documents (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

370
entitled "Graphic Terminal Upgrade Study" which documented the efforts expended to establish a strategy for the selection of a more capable graphics terminal. Since specific capability definitions were lacking, the CCTC leased graphics display equipment to develop a prototype graphic display system. However, the leased equipment satisfied only the basic requirements necessary to define additional needed capabilities. In addition to basic graphic functions and hard copy capability, it was determined that WWMCCS graphics requirements included a local processing capability to off-load some graphics computation and displays from the host; multi-colored displays; local image processing capabilities; television compatibility without the use of expensive image converters; the selective erasure or addition to any portion of the display; and, an auxiliary input/output and storage device. At the end of the year, a WWMCCS request for proposal for a standard graphics terminal was being coordinated by the CCTC.¹

**Military Message Experiment (MME)**

(U) By formal agreement among CINCPAC, the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) a two year MME was planned at Camp Smith. The U.S. Navy and DARPA had provided approximately $6.5 million for the test. The objective of the experiment was to determine the utility of an automated message service in an operational environment and to provide improved message handling in the Command Center. By the beginning of 1978 the computer room had been reconfigured, computers had been installed and tested, software had been selected and some training of CINCPAC operators had been accomplished. However, software problems revealed during initial testing had been serious enough to delay the start of the experiment until mid-July 1978.²

(U) Limited experimental use (LEU) began on 27 July 1978. In October 1978 the MME system underwent an extensive hardware upgrade. In addition to increasing the main memory to a capacity of one million words, the Central Processing Unit was replaced by a more powerful processor. The LEU permitted increased use in training within the participating Directorate for Operations staff elements to develop procedures and gain experience in the use of the MME. Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DARPA, the Naval Telecommunications Command, the Naval Electronics Systems Command, and CINCPAC, the MME was destined for additional testing in 1979.³

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¹ J635 HistSum Dec 78 (U); DCA (CCTC) Graphic Terminal Upgrade Study, 21 Feb 78 (U).
³ J631 HistSum Jul 78 (U), Oct 78 (U), and Dec 78 (U); J341 HistSum Oct 78 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

ADP for Tactical Air Operations-Korea

(U) The Commander of Air Forces Korea (Commander 314th Air Division) issued operations and fragmentary orders (FRAGs) through the 603rd Tactical Air Control Center at Osan, Korea to commit forces in tactical air operations within the area of operations of COMUS Korea/CINCUNC. Automated support for the preparation and dissemination (FRAG PREP) was provided by the WWMCCS computer at Taegu, Korea. The FRAG PREP system transmitted orders through AUTODIN, directing aircraft for tactical air control. The Tactical Air Control Center received FRAG PREP support from the WWMCCS computer system via a remote terminal. That system was not responsive during peak operating periods and exercises because of competing requirements for ADP resources. Secondly, the communications link between Taegu and Osan remained vulnerable to interrupted service and extended outages. In May 1978 COMUS Korea submitted an SDN to procure a mini-computer system to improve ADP FRAG PREP support. The SDN was coordinated with the 314th Air Division, CINC PACAF, and CINCPAC before the final version was forwarded to the CNO by CINCPAC in July 1978. Because of vendor equipment and system software non-availability, and additional coordination needed between the Air Force agencies involved, it was not until December 1978 that the CNO forwarded the updated version of the FRAG PREP SDN to the JCS for approval. When implemented, the Honeywell Level 6 computer system (equipment and system software) would be leased, installed, and operated at PACAF Headquarters. PACAF would develop the FRAG PREP software system for Korea and, subsequent to the software development, the Level 6 system at PACAF would be deployed to Osan, Korea to support FRAG PREP.1

WWMCCS ADP Support-Japan

(U) The installation of WWMCCS data processing and data communications equipment for ADP support of COMUS Japan began in February 1978. The COMUS Japan data processing system was linked to the COMUS Korea WWMCCS standard H6060 computer in Korea via a dedicated DCA circuit. A second, similar link was scheduled to the CINCPAC H6060 when that computer became operational in the PACWRAC at Makalapa. A Remote Terminal System (RTS) was installed at Yokota Air Base in Japan in February and the first increment of computer programs to support COMUS Japan was installed in the COMUS Korea main computer. In March the H735G RTS was accepted from the Honeywell Information Systems (HIS) Corporation, and in July the second increment of computer programs was installed in the COMUS Korea main computer. In November the final increment of computer programs was installed in Korea and, by the end of the year, work was in progress to establish a WWMCCS ADP terminal at the U.S. Army, Japan, Headquarters, Camp Zama. This computer would be connected via remote communi-

1. J635 HistSum Dec 78 (U); J6 BWEB 17-30 Jul 78 (U).
cations link to the RTS at Yokota. A study was also underway to establish an RTS at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to support the CFC Command Post in Korea.¹

¹ J631 HistSums Jan 78 (U), Feb 78 (U), Mar 78 (U), Apr 78 (U), Jul 78 (U), and Dec 78 (U); J6 BWEB 2-15 Jan 78 (U), 30 Jan-12 Feb 78 (U).
CHAPTER VII
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SECTION I--GENERAL

Security Assistance Roles

(U) The International Security Assistance Act of 1976 established guidelines for the eventual termination of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) grant aid worldwide, the reduction of personnel assigned to security assistance worldwide, and continued gradual reductions of security assistance monetary levels. "The Act specified that the primary functions of Armed Forces personnel assigned security assistance duties were logistics management, transportation, fiscal management, and contract administration. Further, the Act stipulated that training and advisory functions should primarily be performed by personnel detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks.

In February 1978, the JCS forwarded for CINCPAC review and comment a draft joint State-Defense message which updated previous guidance pertaining to the roles and activities of military personnel assigned to security assistance billets. The message was based on the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (PL 95-92 of 4 August 1977), which amended the FAA of 1961 and the Arms Control Export Act of 1976. Three basic provisions for the management of the security assistance program were specified in the FAA:

- Section 515(B) authorized the President to assign U.S. military personnel as members of military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) or similar organizations to perform necessary functions with respect to foreign military sales (FMS), FMS financing, MAP and IMET to 15 specific countries. Of these, only four--Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea--were in the Pacific Command (PACOM).

2. J452 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 2854/030012Z Feb 78 (S) (EX), GDS-84.
CONFIDENTIAL

- Section 515(C) authorized the President to assign not to exceed six members of the U.S. military to any country not specified in Section 515(B) to perform accounting and other management functions with respect to international security assistance programs.

- Section 515(F) authorized Defense Attaches to perform overseas management functions related to security assistance programs, but only if the President determined that their performance of such functions was the most economic and efficient.

(C) CINCPAC welcomed the spelling out of ground rules pertaining to MAAG-type organizations and recommended few substantive changes. Chief among these was the stipulation that unified commanders would be addressees on all communications related to security assistance within their theaters of responsibility, regardless of the communication channel involved. In that connection, a unified commander would also have a reasonable time, e.g. five days, in which to comment if desired.¹

(6) The final State Department guidance, passed to CINCPAC by the JCS, contained one paragraph not in the draft. It quoted Section 515(E) of the FAA as it pertained to 515(B) and 515(C) that members assigned to a foreign country would serve under the direction and supervision of the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in that country. As already noted, Section 515(F) pertained to defense attaches, who by definition were "under the direction and supervision" of the chief diplomatic officer. Therefore, all personnel designated to perform security assistance functions were covered.²

(6) Related to the Section 515(E) provision regarding direction and supervision was the paragraph addressed by CINCPAC in the draft and labeled "Communications" by the State Department. The final guidance concerning communication referred entirely to telegraphic channels and made no specific reference to written communication. Organizations under 515(B) and 515(C) were directed to use State telegraphic channels to transmit major program changes, new initiatives or recommended new programs with State, Defense, unified commands, etc. as addressees. Routine message traffic could be transmitted directly from the security assistance organization to the Defense

1. CINCPAC 100650Z Feb 78 (6) (EX), GDS-84.
2. JCS 241926Z Feb 78, which transmitted SECSTATE 47743/240237Z Feb 78 (6), GDS-84.
Department (using Defense facilities if available). The State guidance concluded that, "Unified commanders should be addressees on all messages relating to security assistance in their assigned areas of responsibility." ¹

Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar²

(U) The eighth Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) was held in Honolulu from 17 to 20 October 1978 and was hosted by CINCPAC with representatives from nine PACOM countries (Australia, Republic of China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand). In his opening remarks to this tri-Service, multi-national seminar, Admiral Weisner commented on the common challenge facing all nations—-the management of scarce resources in an environment of competing national priorities with ever-increasing constraints. He stated that since logistics is the glue that binds the security framework together, new and innovative methods must be sought, such as the transfer of experience between nations.

(U) The keynote address by Mr. Donald S. Cuffe, Director of International Logistics, OASD, emphasized the major effects on the security assistance program of the closer control exercised by the (Carter) administration and the Congress. This necessitated the exercise of restraint and a careful policy evaluation before U.S. defense articles were provided to other nations. There had been a reduction in U.S. presence in nations throughout the world and increased attention to recovery of all costs through reporting mechanisms. The address also urged expansion of the general PASOLS theme of regional logistics cooperation into specific efforts which would produce tangible results. A step in such development would be for all member nations to approve the proposed PASOLS terms of reference which called for the establishment of a formal PASOLS organizational structure consisting of a Logistics Review Board, a Project Development Group, and ad hoc Study Groups. Such a structure could provide, bearing in mind inherent national sensitivities, arrangements for a cooperative program whereby member nations would share data and information concerning logistics requirements and capabilities.

(U) Conference results included the adoption of a formal PASOLS organizational structure by the Executive Committee and the adoption for action by the Executive Committee of two regional cooperative logistics projects: the

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1. Ibid.; illustrative of CINCPAC's reason for concern about communication channels was that, although European Command and Southern Command were addressees on the State msg, CINCPAC was not.
2. Summary of Proceedings (U), Eighth Pacific Area Senior Logistics Seminar, 20 Oct 78.
CONFIDENTIAL

development of a consolidated reference list of regional assets and logistics capabilities; and, the development of a consolidated reference list of available training facilities and capabilities. Procedures for the effective distribution of these lists within the Pacific region were also to be formulated.

(U) Other conclusions of the conference were that member nations should consider coordinated bi-national or multi-national procurement actions to achieve the significant economic benefits of common logistics requirements and that U.S. Government FMS procedures required continual review and clarification.

PACOM Security Assistance Conference

(U) The annual PACOM Security Assistance Conference was held on 14-16 November 1978 at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. It was attended by representatives from the CINCPAC staff, component commands, PACOM security assistance offices, and the Departments of State, Defense, and Military Departments in Washington, D.C. The conference agenda, coordinated by the CINCPAC Directorate for Logistics and Security Assistance (J4), included security assistance policy, program budgeting, program management, classified data exchange, technology transfer and training issues.

[U] The fundamental theme of the conference—"Security Assistance: Its Directions in the Future"—encouraged discussion of the major national policy trends over which the PACOM conferees exercised no direct control. These were the dollar ceilings and allocations, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the policy of the President and Congress concerning human rights, and the strongly-stated Presidential thrust toward reductions in arms exports and against the use of arms transfers for foreign policy objectives. For example, in a statement on conventional arms transfer policy in 1977, the President had directed that, "U.S. Embassies and military elements will not promote or assist in the promotion of arms sales without specific authorization."2

(U) The State Department iteration of information to be provided by U.S. diplomatic missions in order to evaluate properly host country requests for defense articles and services complemented guidance already issued by the JCS through military channels. During the conference, both State and Defense representatives emphasized the need for complete justification if host country requests were to be approved. In that regard, CINCPAC J4 presented the conferees a comparison of the two primary sets of guidance for evaluating requests

1. J454 HistSum Nov 78 [U], GDS 84.
2. Ibid.; SECSTATE 207984/310241Z Aug 77 [U], GDS-83.

CONFIDENTIAL

378
for defense articles and services discussed above. The comparison revealed
that neither source covered all factors which should be addressed. CINCPAC J4
proposed a single format for use by the Country Team in developing the neces-
sary analysis and justification to evaluate host country requests. The CINCPAC
format combined data requirements from the "National Policy and Procedures for
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and Inter-
national Organizations (NDP-1)," Section 36 of the AECA and the two sources
previously mentioned. The essential items of information and specific related
questions in the CINCPAC format aligned the data-gathering process with guid-
ance contained in the Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM).\(^1\)

(U) After the conference, CINCPAC forwarded the proposal for review by
the JCS with the recommendation that it be considered as a joint State-Defense
format; however, no reply had been received by the end of the year.\(^2\)

(\(\_\_\_\_\) The conferees also noted conflicting data as to whether increased
costs for training under IMET and FMS had an adverse effect on host country
training. It was agreed that CINCPAC would solicit data from PACOM countries
to define and quantify the impact, if any. After receipt and consolidation,
the data would be forwarded to the JCS.\(^3\)

**Security Assistance Reporting Requirements**

(\(\_\_\_\_\) On 1 July the State Department advised that security assistance
reporting requirements were to be reduced to eliminate redundancies and over-
lap in reports from elements of diplomatic missions. Previously four reports
were required: Military Security Assistance Projection, Security Assistance
portion of the JSOP, Security Assistance Program Development (ZBB), and State
Department Security Assistance Budget Data Request. Beginning in 1979 only
two reports would be required: an annual Integrated Assessment of Security
Assistance and a Consolidated Data Report with annual due dates of 1 June and
15 December. The latter would be used in preparation of the Congressional
Presentation Document (CPD). Reports were to be submitted to the Secretary
of State with information copies to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development,
and unified commanders.\(^4\)

\(^1\) JCSM 431-76 of 12 Jan 77, cited in J454 HistSum Nov 78 \(\_\_\_\_\), GDS-84;
CINCPAC 050455Z Dec 78 (U).
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) CINCPAC 060441Z Dec 78 \(\_\_\_\_\), DECL 30 Nov 84; CINCPAC 060443Z Dec 78 \(\_\_\_\_\),
DECL 3 Dec 84.
\(^4\) J452 HistSum Jul 78 \(\_\_\_\_\), GDS-84; SECSTATE 167901/010215Z Jul 78 \(\_\_\_\_\), GDS-84.
CONFIDENTIAL

PACOM Tri-Service Training Workshop

(U) The 1978 PACOM tri-Service training workshop was held during 13-17 March at the Naval Reserve Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, with participation by 62 representatives from the Defense Department, the Military Departments, Service training commands, CINCPAC, CINCPAC components, MAAGs, and DAOs. The conferees reviewed each training line in all 17 PACOM countries' International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for FY 79. Also addressed was the first outyear (FY 80) requirement for FMS and IMETP training. The workshop concept served as a forum through which the DOD and the Military Departments were able to standardize reports and procedures pertaining to training received under the security assistance program.

Training of Security Assistance Personnel

(U) A four-man CINCPAC mobile training team conducted Phase IV training sessions during the period from 16 November to 21 December 1978 in Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo for 54 personnel from 15 different MAAGs/DAOs. The program consisted of two parallel courses conducted over a period of three days. One was designed for students primarily engaged in planning and programming training requirements. The other was for FMS and MAP programmers. A representative from the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, attended the Jakarta and Bangkok sessions in order to update the DISAM course of instruction for new MAAG/DAO personnel. Phase IV training was required under DOD Directive 2000.1D, which provided field personnel with updated information on legislative, IMET, and CINCPAC policy changes. This was expected to continue as a mandatory requirement for the foreseeable future.

Excess Ship Transfers

(C) As early as 1975, the Philippine Government (GOP) had accepted 31 ships declared excess to the needs of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and available as MAP-redistributable assets. By the end of 1976, the number of ships awaiting transfer from Japan to the Philippines had risen to 54, including two destroyer escorts (DEs) which had been loaned to the JMSDF. It was not until September 1977 that the GOP signed a contract for repair and rehabilitation in Japanese shipyards of the 54 Ex-U.S. Navy/JMSDF ships and craft.

2. J452 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
In May and October 1977, the GOP requested approval by the Government of Japan (GOJ) of a license for the repair and export of the vessels. Approval was withheld because of GOJ policy against the repair and export of combatant ships and arms, complicated by disagreement among Japanese officials as to whether the repair and export license should be issued. In January 1978, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo reviewed the situation and requested permission to raise the question to diplomatic government level in order to solve the problem. CINCPAC noted that legal title to all 54 ships—42 ex-MAP, 10 Military Sealift Command (MSC) tank landing ships (LSTs), and 2 loaned DESs—had passed to the GOP. However, the absence of GOJ approval of the GOP requests for the repair and export license indicated the need for formal discussion by the U.S. Government with the GOJ to resolve the problem. Therefore, CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense of concurrence with the Embassy recommendation.1

The Secretary of Defense replied to CINCPAC (and by implication also to the U.S. Embassy) that State agreed with Defense that the issue was primarily one between the GOP and GOJ. Raising the issue to higher levels was not desirable. The Secretary of Defense also advised that a proposed schedule for repair and movement of the vessels had been submitted by the GOP to the GOJ (navy-to-navy).2

On 31 March 1978, the U.S. Military Defense Assistance Office (MDO) in Japan informed CINCPAC that the GOJ had formally responded (in February) to the GOP diplomatic notes which requested approval of GOP ship repair and export plans. The GOJ response directed the GOP to forward their plan to the GOJ Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for review, since that agency was the export license authority. That was done, and, by the end of March, the logjam appeared to be breaking up. However, the disposition of the two DESs had not been broached by the GOP because of Japan's avowed policy of non-export of lethal weapons. The MDO informed CINCPAC that GOJ approval of repairs was unlikely, but that, if no repairs could be accomplished in Japanese ports, removal of the DESs elsewhere presented no problems. If that were not possible, the MDO suggested that consideration be given to withdrawal of the DESs from the Philippines package and selling them for scrap. CINCPAC replied that the scrap proposal was considered to be premature and that the DE issue was still a legitimate and solvable one between the GOP and the GOJ.3

1. AMEMB Tokyo 831/180822Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 310122Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J465 HistSum Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; SECDEF 4279/170011Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. J466 HistSum Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; CMDO 38/311206Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 102314Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; U.S. Embassy (MDO), ltr Ser 055 of 15 Apr 78 (C). Subj: MDO-Japan Quarterly Activity Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Mar 78 (U), DECL 15 Apr 84.
CONFIDENTIAL

In mid-1978, the Philippine Navy proposed that the two DEs be towed to a port in South Korea for repair and subsequent transfer to the Philippines. The Republic of Korea interposed no objection to this proposal, and the GOP accepted the U.S. estimate of cost for towing preparation, towing costs, and hull repair of $115,000. After lengthy coordination among various agencies in the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and the United States, the USNS UTE towed the two DEs (ex-AMICK and ex-AHERTON) to Pusan in South Korea. The tow began on 16 December and was completed on 22 December 1978.1

By the end of the year, only eight vessels remained in Japan ports. The Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (CHJUSMAg), Philippines had recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that four of the craft (LSSLS) be withdrawn from the Major Items Excess (MIMEX) offers because of Philippine Navy funding problems. Three utility landing craft and one barge remained to be transferred as well.2

Missiles for Australia and Japan

In late December 1977 the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on the releasability of the AIM-9L air-to-air missile to Australia and Japan when F-15 production aircraft became available. Officials of both governments had asked that the AIM-9L be made available concurrently with the delivery of new U.S. fighter aircraft to their respective defense forces. The JCS noted that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) had already announced initial funding for the F-15 in the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1978 budget, and that negotiations had begun on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the GOJ.3

The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo responded to CINCPAC's request for comment by noting that the JDA selection of the F-15 as the follow-on fighter was based upon the capabilities of the total weapon system including the AIM-9L missile. Further, and to be consistent with U.S. encouragement toward Japan air defense complementarity with U.S. weapon systems, phased release of the AIM-9L was strongly recommended by the Embassy.4

1. J4 BWEBs 17-30 Jul 78 (C), GDS-84; 9-22 Oct 78 (U); 17-30 Dec 78 (U); U.S. Embassy (MDO) ltr Ser 0170 of 16 Oct 78 (C), Subj: MDO Quarterly Activity Rpt (U), DECL 31 Dec 84; U.S. Embassy (MDO) ltr Ser 18 of 16 Jan 79 (C), Subj: MDO Quarterly Rpt (U), DECL 15 Jan 85; J4/Mem/SL23-79 (U) of 7 Sep 79, Subj: 1978 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J465 HistSum Jan 78 (C), GDS-84; JCS 1894/291613Z Dec 77 (C), GDS-83.
4. AMEMB Tokyo 2/050611Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-84, which cited CINCPAC 310351Z Dec 77.

CONFIDENTIAL

382
In reply to the JCS, CINCPAC noted his previous opposition to the automatic release of the AIM-9L missile to Australia and Japan. The basis for this opposition had been concern for proliferation and compromise of AIM-9L technology. Subsequently, the U.S. Government had approved an MOU with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) allowing the FRG to co-produce the AIM-9L missile for the European Consortium. Moreover, a roughly equivalent technology (the Improved CHAPARRAL export model) had been released to several western nations and to Korea. Thus, the issue was no longer proliferation, but rather the validity of military requirements and guarantees against compromise. Therefore, based on the U.S. announcement that Australia, New Zealand, and Japan were considered by the United States to have status equivalent to NATO, CINCPAC recommended release of the AIM-9L to both countries to coincide with purchases of advanced U.S. fighter aircraft. Licensed production, in the case of Japan, was not included in the CINCPAC recommendation, but could be addressed at a later date.¹

In February the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) informed CINCPAC that the AIM-9L release to the JDA had been approved concurrent with acquisition of the F-15. The ASD/ISA also advised that, if Australia selected a U.S. fighter for its Tactical Fighter Force (TFF), the AIM-9L would be releasable concurrently with aircraft acquisition. Neither authorization, however, included a commitment for coproduction or licensed production.²

In August the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on the release of the AIM-9L to Australia for use on the French MIRAGE or other non-U.S. aircraft. CINCPAC replied that, regardless of the aircraft source, the AIM-9L would enhance the Australian air defense capability and contribute to commonality of equipment between allies. CINCPAC restated his recommendation for release regardless of the eventual decision by Australia regarding the source of the TFF aircraft.³

On 24 October the Australian Defense Minister announced that thecontending aircraft for TFF purchase were the F-18A, F-18L, F-16, and the French MIRAGE. The U.S. Chief of FMS in Australia believed that the F-15 had been dropped for consideration because of cost and uncertain future production availability. Meanwhile, the question of licensed production of the AIM-9L

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1. CINCPAC TANGO 50/112103Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J465 HistSum, Feb 78 (S); GDS-Dec 87; SECDEF 7965/212325Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-87.
3. J465 HistSum Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 7798/012147Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 052120Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
(and the AIM-7F) by Japan was addressed by CINCPAC in an October message to the JCS. CINCPAC referred to the elevation of disclosure level (q.v. Ch. IX) of classified information to Japan and postulated that there existed no logical reason to deny licensed production authority. Since Japan had NATO comparability, and since the United States had already agreed to provide the AIM-9L to Japan under FMS procedures, and since licensed production of the AIM-9L was allowed by the FRG and Norway, CINCPAC recommended the same approval for Japan.\footnote{J465 HistSum Nov 78 (U); CHFMS Australia 070257Z Nov 78 (U); CINCPAC 152237Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.}
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>CINCPAC MAE FUNDED</th>
<th>FOREIGN ASST ADMIN SERVICES</th>
<th>MILITARY DEPT SUPPORT</th>
<th>TOTAL U.S. COSTS</th>
<th>HOST COUNTRY COSTS</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM HQ &amp; DAOs</td>
<td>$ 410.4</td>
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<td>$ 1,351.0</td>
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<td>1,064.0*</td>
<td>174.1</td>
<td>(611.3)*</td>
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<td>3,353.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>4,016.6</td>
<td>7,406.5*</td>
<td>510.2</td>
<td>(1,894.5)*</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 6,367.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 682.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 9,026.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 16,076.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 3,522.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ (2,505.8)</strong></td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 30.
*Contributed currency is paid directly to the U.S. Government to offset U.S. costs and, therefore, is a non-add item.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FMS Credit</th>
<th>MAP (Grant Material)</th>
<th>IMETP (Grant Training)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expended FY 78</td>
<td>Allocated FY 79</td>
<td>Proposed FY 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>427&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>50,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>403,000</td>
<td>310,100</td>
<td>342,000</td>
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</table>

a. Supply operations only.
b. Raised from 15,000 by SECSTATE 002518/0423192 Jan 79.
c. For supply operations for delivery of previously-funded materiel in pipeline.

NOTE: Source for FY 78 and FY 80 figures is FY 80 Congressional Presentation Document; source for FY 79 figures is SECSTATE 321218/01/211846/2 Dec 78.
SECTION II--COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Afghanistan

Security assistance to Afghanistan was limited to the IMETP, the objective of which was to preserve Afghan independence, promote economic and social development, and increase understanding between the United States and Afghanistan. On a visit to Kabul from 3-5 February, Admiral Weisner (the first high-ranking U.S. military figure to visit Afghanistan since World War II) held discussions with President Daoud and Foreign Minister Abdullah concerning a recent exchange of notes governing the IMETP in Afghanistan and the importance that IMETP provided in "balancing" the Soviet military assistance program. In a separate meeting, the Chief of the General Staff Aziz noted that 316 Afghan students (some repeaters) had studied in the United States since 1957 and that 24 were currently enrolled. He also addressed the dearth of middle-grade English-speaking officers who could qualify for training in the United States.1

However, the coup d'etat of 27 April resulted in a socialist government which leaned even more heavily toward the USSR. Despite the lessened U.S. Government influence, the new government (initially) indicated a willingness to continue use of IMET funds if they were provided. However, while publicly "non-aligned," the new government gradually reduced the availability of IMET candidates; consequently, $256,377 of the $525,000 FY 78 IMET funds available for Afghanistan were not used. From 13 September through December no Afghan students were sent to the United States and by year's end, no candidates for first or second quarters of FY 79 IMET (allocation for the year of $250,000) had been proposed and the program was at a standstill.2

Australia

Security assistance to Australia consisted entirely of FMS cash sales. Australia ranked first among PACOM countries with more than $1.9 billion of FMS from 1950 to 1977. During FY 78, Australia's FMS cash sales totaled $337.3 million, with purchases estimated to reach $130 million in FY 79.3

Major items of equipment purchased by Australia from the United States

1. USDA0 Kabul 43/220345Z Jan 78 (C) and 1070/0611422 Feb 78 (C), both GDS-84.
3. DOD Pamphlet, "Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts," Dec 78 (U); J465 Point Paper (S), 6 Oct 78, Subj: FMS in Australia (U), GDS-86.
AFGHANISTAN

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA 647,500 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION 10,166,000
ANNUAL GROWTH 2.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE 11 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY 40 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 1.52 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT $2.25 Billion
PER CAPITA $11,100
DEFENSE BUDGET 8.6 Billion
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET 32 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT Commendent Dictatorship

PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER Mohammad TARAKI
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Haftar AHMAD
MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARMY
COMMANDER Haftar AHMAD (In de facto MOD
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF (VACANT)
COMMANDER ARMY COL. Musafar BAKHI
COMMANDER AIR FORCE COL. Nazar MOHAMMAD

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVE

TO CONTINUE TO OFFER THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT MILITARY TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. ADOLF DUBS
U.S. AIR DIRECTOR Vincent W. BROWN
ATTY COL. James S. W. EDGAR, USA

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY
3 Corps, 10 Infantry Divisions, 3 Armored Divisions, 2 Mountain Brigades, 1 Artillery Brigade, 1 Guard Regiment, 5 Artillery Regiments, 2 Commando Battalions, 1 Airborne Battalion
Strength: 102,000

incapable of resisting outside aggression. Can maintain internal security jointly with para military forces. Marginal logistic reliant on USSR for material.

AIR FORCE
2 Fighter Wings, 1 Light Bomber Wing, 1 Transport Wing, 1 Training Wing
Strength: 10,500 men and 250 aircraft

incapable of defending the nation's airspace. Can provide limited support in internal security operations. Poor logistic, complete dependence on USSR for material support.

NAVY

None

NOTE: On 27 April 1979 a Marxist, pro-Russia regime seized control of the Afghan Government. This regime has clearly aligned itself with the USSR and U.S. influence has deteriorated significantly.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 61. Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
AUSTRALIA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA 7,692,200 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 8 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION 14,074,000
ANNUAL GROWTH 1.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE 96.5 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY 74 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 8.4 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT $92.6 Billion
PER CAPITA $5,600
DEFENSE BUDGET $5.7 Billion
DEFENSE BUDGET 60.6 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT Federal State within Commonwealth recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as Sovereign or Head of State

GOVERNOR GENERAL SIR Zelman COWEN
PRIME MINISTER John Malcolm FRASER
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER John D. ANTHONY
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Andrew B. PEACOCK
MINISTER OF DEFENSE Denis James KILLEN
CHIEF OF DEFENSE FORCE STAFF GEN Arthur L. MACDONALD
ARMY, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF LGEN D. R. DUNSTAN
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF ADM Anthony M. SYNNOT
CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF AM James A. ROWLAND

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. Philip R. ALSTON, JR.
COUNCILOR COL. Warwick H. GLASGOW, USAF
CINCPACFEFP AUSTRALIA COL. Jack T. DETOUR, USAF

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY
6 Infantry Battalions, 1 Special Air Service Regiment, 2 Artillery Regiments, 1 Armored Regiment, 1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 1 Cavalry Regiment, 74 Non-Combat Aircraft in Army Division

NAVY
1 Carrier, 12 Destroyers/Frigates, 6 Submarines, 12 Coastal types
5 Amphibious types, 3 Mine Warfare types, 3 Auxiliary types, 47 Service Craft, and 78 Naval aircraft

AIR FORCE
404 Aircraft, of which 228 are jets.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 62.
Not Releaseable To Foreign Nationals
SECRET

included destroyers, guided missile frigates, C-130 transport aircraft, F-111C fighters, A-4 attack aircraft, P-2 and P-3 patrol aircraft, S-2 anti-submarine warfare aircraft and numerous helicopters and ground vehicles. Major prospective sales for FY 78-82 included replacement aircraft for French MIRAGEs, helicopters, howitzers, an amphibious assault ship, and various types of missiles.¹

Bangladesh

Program Management

Although Bangladesh was not eligible to make FMS purchases under the Arms Export Control Act, an IMET Program began in 1977 and expenditures in FY 78 amounted to $209,000 for 23 students. Programmed IMET funding was $220,000 for 19 students in FY 79 and $140,000 for ten students in FY 80. The program was designed to foster a western-oriented military, increase professionalism, modernize the training base, and contribute to regional and internal stability through an effective military establishment. Although the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 authorized DAOs on station prior to December 31, 1977 to perform security assistance functions, a Presidential determination to that effect was required by Section 515(F) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The Embassy political-military section continued to administer the IMET Program in Bangladesh. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, after receiving the endorsement of Ambassador Schneider and CINCPAC, initiated the request to the Secretary of State in October 1978, but at year's end, approval was still pending.²

Assistance to Bangladesh Navy

The Bangladesh Navy (BDN) was formed in 1972 and in 1978 consisted of approximately 200 officers, 2,300 enlisted personnel, two frigates, four patrol craft, five armed river patrol boats and one auxiliary craft. During CINCPAC’s visit to Bangladesh in January 1978, RADM Mosharoff Hossain Khan, Chief of the Naval Staff, solicited Admiral Weisner's help in obtaining training assistance for the fledgling BDN. In February the American Embassy in Dacca forwarded a list of specific requests from the Bangladesh Government (BDG) Ministry of Defense. In July CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that, through the efforts and cooperation of various U.S. Navy agencies and personnel, a limited quantity of excess training aids equipment was obtained for shipment to Bangladesh. Thirteen cartons containing manuals, slides, and small training devices were sent

¹ Ibid.
² J474 Point Paper (S), 14 May 79, Subj: Bangladesh Security Assistance Program (U), GDS-87; AMEMB Dacca 6180/110945Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; SECDEF 1881/140710Z Oct 78 (U).
BANGLADESH

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA .................................................... 142,500 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ..................... 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE .............................. 200 Nautical Miles
POPULATION .............................................. 78,750,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ........................................ 2.8 Percent
LITERACY RATE .......................................... 25 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ....................................... 65 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ............................... 2 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT $ 12,218 Billion
PER CAPITA ($76) .......................................... $130
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 77) $ 146 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ....................... 8.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT .................................... Independent Republic
under Martial Law

PRESIDENT, CHIEF MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR, MINISTER OF DEFENSE ...................... MGON Saeed RAZA
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF .................................... MGON Hakim ERSHAD
DEPUTY CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF ...................... (VACANT)
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF ................................ RADN Mostarif KHAN
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF .................................... AIR COMMODORE B.P. SADRUDDIN

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ....................................... HON. David T. SCHNEIDER
DATT ....................................................... LCOL James R. CORCORAN, USA

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

Army
5 Infantry Divisions
Strength: 65,000

NAVY
8 Gunboats, 2 Frigates
Strength: 3,500

AIR FORCE
2 Fighter Squadrons (7 MIG-21, 8 MIG-19), 1 Transport Squadron, 3 Helicopter Squadrons, 1 Flight Instructor School. Total aircraft approximately 63.

Strength: 2,200

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 63.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
by mail to the USDAO Singapore for delivery to the Bangladesh Trade Commission in Singapore in October. These were followed by a number of larger items which were shipped to Singapore as Project HANDCLASP material. They ranged from technical, engineering, and naval manuals to diesel engines, cargo rigging trainers and pumps. Ambassador Schneider acknowledged arrival of the material in Bangladesh in a 21 December letter stating that the CINCPAC Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate and others involved were deserving of high praise for their efforts in providing the training aids to the BDN.1

During 1978 the BDN also sought assistance in obtaining U.S. excess defense articles and services such as surplus landing craft, a hydrographic survey vessel, an oceangoing tug and additional training authorizations. Because Bangladesh was not eligible for FMS sales, CINCPAC solicited the support of the Country Team for a coordinated request for a Presidential determination that FMS to Bangladesh was justified. CINCPAC noted that the items sought by the BDN were non-lethal, would be helpful in maintaining internal stability, and could be used for emergency disaster relief.2

The Charge in Dacca initially interposed no objection to CINCPAC's proposal to seek a Presidential determination, but the 2 March reply to CINCPAC's 1 March message was not received by CINCPAC until 3 May. Meanwhile, CINCPAC had followed up on the initial recommendation and received a reply on 26 April that the new Ambassador suggested the matter be allowed to lie dormant until, "...circumstances are better." In mid-May, CINCPAC again suggested to the Embassy that FMS to Bangladesh made sense considering the non-lethal nature of the requested articles and the fact that Bangladesh was the only friendly country on the South Asia mainland not authorized FMS.3

In a July message to the State Department, the Ambassador replied that he could not agree with CINCPAC's view, stating that, "...while we may at some time wish to make available non-lethal military material to Bangladesh, I believe we should stay generally out of military sales."4

1. J474 Point Paper (S), 22 May 79, Subj: Training Assistance for the Bangladesh Navy (U), GDS-85; AMEMB Dacca 4876/080930Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 59630/082118Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 012347Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Dacca 1304 of 2 Mar 78, transmitted to CINCPAC by SECSTATE 112344/030617Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. Ibid.; AMEMB Dacca 2579/260946Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC Airborne 1423232 May 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. J474 Point Paper (S), 14 May 79, Subj: Bangladesh Security Assistance Program (U), GDS-87, which cites AMEMB Dacca 051026Z Jul 78.
Burma

1. J471 HistSum Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 020030Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; USDAO Rangoon 91/130410Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84, which cited AMEMR Rangoon 516/100950 Feb 78; CINCPAC 170516Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; SECOSTATE 103133/260745Z Apr 78 (S), REVW 27 Apr 98.

2. AMEMR Bangkok 32512/040633 Z Nov 78 (S), for Admiral Weisner from Dick Holbrooke, GDS-86.

**BURMA**

### BASIC INFORMATION

| Land Area | 652,000 sq. km |
| Limits of Territorial Waters | 12 nautical miles |
| Limits of Economic Zone | 200 nautical miles |
| Population | 43,500,000 |
| Annual Growth | 1.8% |
| Literacy Rate | 70% |
| Life Expectancy | 63 years |
| Arable Land Per Capita | 1.5 acres |
| GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT | $2.2 billion |
| Per Capita | $917 |
| Defense Budget | $114.5 billion |
| Of Total Government Budget | 8.2% |

### MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

**ARMY**
- 1 infantry division with 10 battalions each 24 infantry battalions assigned to 3 arm commands, 4 artillery battalions, 1 armored car battalion, 1 tank battalion, 2 light AAA batteries
- Strength: 150,000
- Paramilitary Personnel: 72,000
- People's Police Force: 30,000
- People's Militia: 30,000

Only capable of containing insurgency at existing levels of intensity.

**NAVY**
- 7 coastal patrol ships / craft, 25 river / border patrol craft
- 1 minelayer / mine warship, 1 amphibious warfare craft, 3 auxiliary, 14 service craft
- Strength: 2,700

Capable of effective river and coastal counter-sabotage / counter-insurgency support operations within limited areas.

**AIR FORCE**
- 1 combat squadron, 8 transport squadrons, 2 training units, total direct personnel: 117
- Strength: 800

Capable of supporting the Army's counter-insurgency and narcotics suppression operations.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 67

Not Releaseable To Foreign Nationals
Republic of China

Overview

At the end of 1978, the mechanics of continuing to provide security assistance to what was, by that time, labeled the Government on Taiwan (GONT) had not yet been solved. The United States had previously provided the Republic of China (ROC) with approximately $2.6 billion of equipment under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Although this equipment remained in the hands of the ROC military forces, the United States had residual rights to it and the ROC could not dispose of it nor transfer it to another country without the consent of the United States. In addition, the law under which it was provided required the ROC to allow the United States to monitor the utilization and disposition of MAP equipment. However, the law did not require that the monitoring be accomplished by personnel stationed in Taiwan itself.

Regarding arms sales, it was planned to allow the ROC to purchase items for which approved LOAs had been executed. In addition, items for which Executive Branch approval had been conveyed to the ROC in writing prior to 1 January 1979 would be allowed. Also planned was follow-on support for defense articles and services—including materiel, technical training, technical assistance, other services and Technical Data Packages—needed to support U.S. systems or items previously furnished or for which commitments existed.

Other steps planned to ease the transition as U.S. forces were withdrawn included the preservation of the highly automated logistic system of the ROC Armed Forces and continuation of technical and professional training.

1. J47 HistSums Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr 78 (all C), all GDS-84, with 26 attached messages; J471 Point Paper (S), 17 Oct 78, Subj: Security Assistance to Burma (U), GDS-84.
2. Memo, ASD/ISA to Chairman, SCC Ad Hoc Group on China (S), 9 Jan 79, Subj: DOD Implementing Steps (U), DECL 5 Jan 85.
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (TAIWAN)

LAND AREA  12,000 Sq Kms
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS  8 Nautical Miles
FISHING ZONE  12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE  No Claims
POPULATION  17,000,000
ANNUAL GROWTH  15 Percent
LITERACY RATE  90 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY  70 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA  1 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1978)  $18.6 Billion
PER CAPITA  $1,079
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY ending 30 Jun 78)  $1,841 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET  45.9 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT  Republic, One Party Presidential Regime
PRESIDENT  CHIANG Ching-kuo
VICE PRESIDENT  HSIEH Tung-chieh
PREMIER  SUN Yen-hsun
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  KAO Kai-yuan
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  Y.S. TIANG
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF  ADM SONG Ching-chih
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ARMY  GEN HAO Pei-tsun
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, NAVY  ADM TSOU Chien-chih
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, AIR FORCE  GEN WU Tsao-chi
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE  GEN WANG Ta-sien
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS  LGEN LO Chung

KEY U.S. PERSONNEL
COMMUNIC  ADM James R. Linder, USN
CHIEF MAAG  COL. Sidney Thompson, USAR

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

SUPPORT MODERNIZATION OF TAIWAN FORCES ESSENTIAL TO INITIAL DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND THE PENDACORAS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT.
ENSURE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. FORCES.
ENCOURAGE PURSUIT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY
2 Field Army Headquarters, 6 Corps Headquarters, 12 Heavy and 8 Light Infantry Divisions, 2 Armored Brigades, 1 Armored Brigade, 2 Airborne Infantry Brigades, 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments, 1 Special Warfare Command (Airborne), 25 Artillery Battalions, 1 Aviation Battalion, 1 Air Defense Group (Missile)
Strength: 512,000
Maintain internal security to conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, the Penghu, and offshore islands against small-scale attack if provided outside air, naval, and logistic support. Well organized and combat ready.

NAVY
23 Destroyer types, 9 Frigates, 2 Submarines, 23 Coastal Patrol types, 21 Mine Warfare types, 29 Amphibious types, 26 Auxiliary types, 2 Missile Divisions, 1 Landing Vehicle Tank Regiment
Strength: 61,200 (includes 21,000 Marines)
The overall ability of the Chinese Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese Marines are considered capable of conducting division-size amphibious operations, provided the required air and naval support, including amphibious shipping, is available.

AIRCRAFT
14 Tactical Fighter Squadrons, 1 Reconnaissance Squadron, 2 All-weather Squadrons, 1 Search and Rescue Squadron, 6 Transport Squadrons, 1 Anti-submarine Warfare Squadron, 1 Tactical Support Squadron
Strength: 67,200
Force is combat ready. The Air Force has demonstrated its ability to perform its primary function, air defense of Taiwan under day visual flight rules conditions. The limited all-weather defense capability is improving with the introduction of new F-16 fighters. Capable of providing fighter cover for naval operations in the area and tactical support for Army corps.
approved before 1 January 1979.1

The military equipment for which LOAs had not been signed, but Executive Branch approval for which had been conveyed to the ROC in writing before 1 January 1979, included:2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Estimated Value (in $ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>F-5E/F Aircraft (Coproduction)</td>
<td>$144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>MAVERICK Missiles</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Laser Target Designators w/AF Spt.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>8-inch Howitzers (Self-propelled)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F-5E/F Coproduction Program

(U) In 1975 coproduction of 100 F-5E aircraft had been authorized for sale to the ROC under FMS case PEACE TIGER I, and an additional 20 were authorized later. In late December 1975 the American Embassy in Taipei requested State Department approval for the ROC to coproduce 80 additional F-5Es, which CINCPAC indorsed, for a total of 200. In July 1976 approval was given to coproduce 60 of the 80 with an option for the other 20, which became PEACE TIGER III and IV respectively. Planned configurations of the 20 under PEACE TIGER IV were 11 as F-5Es and 9 as F-5Fs.3

(C) At the beginning of 1978 the Republic of China Air Forces (ROCAF) tactical fighter forces consisted of:4

4.5 Squadrons of F-5E
1 Squadron of F-5A/B
3 Squadrons of F-104 A/B/G (understrength)
5 Squadrons of F-100 A/F (understrength)

(C) Throughout 1978 CINCPAC, Chief MAAG China, and the Embassy indorsed continuing attempts by the ROC to update their aging combat fighter forces with suitable replacement aircraft. The effort was two-fold. One element was to obtain replacements in the near term for the three squadrons of F-104s and

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

SECRET
five squadrons of F-100s which were to be phased out beginning in 1980 due to airframe fatigue and which by 1982 would exceed service life and not be combat ready. In the search for replacement of F-104 aircraft, the U.S. Government declined to act as a procurement agent; however, if the ROC was able to locate suitable 104s, the United States agreed to assist in the transfer procedures. Attempts to locate 104s from early 1977 through mid-1978 had been fruitless, and the State Department considered rumors of availability during 1978 to be simply "will-o-the-wisps." Also, during the early part of 1978, the ROC had explored the acquisition of Israeli KFIR interceptor/ground attack aircraft as replacements for the F-104Gs. The KFIR would be in lieu of the preferred U.S. F-4s and would require U.S. approval since it contained a U.S.-manufactured J-79 engine. Even though the United States was agreeable to the sale, in March the ROC decided against the KFIR, and it was speculated that the ROC was awaiting the U.S. decision on sale of the F-4s and **[redacted]**.

(U) The second element of the ROC aircraft requirements was securing a follow-on all-weather interceptor by the mid-1980s to replace five squadrons of F-5 aircraft. The ROC desires for replacements in order of preference were the F-5G, F-16, F-18L or the F-4E.²

(U) During a visit to CINCPAC in late August, Admiral Soong, Chief of the ROC General Staff, iterated the various ROC requirements for U.S. aircraft and weapons systems. He stated the ROC was concentrating on air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and with regard to new fighters, he emphasized that the type was not important so long as they were high performance aircraft.³

(U) In September the U.S. Embassy in Taipei forwarded an August request from Soong for approval to coproduce an additional 48 F-5E/F (42 Es and 6 Fs) with an option to later coproduce 50 advanced F-5 aircraft. In recommending approval, the Embassy cited the ROC need to cover current F-5 attrition and to insure full combat capability to maintain nine squadrons of 16 F-5Es and 3 F-5Fs per squadron for a total of 171 aircraft. The 50 advanced F-5s were to begin filling the ROCAF's requirement for six squadrons (120 aircraft) of highly advanced fighters by the early 1980s. Acquisition of the latter was supported in the FY 81-88 JSOP. The Embassy further urged an early decision in order for the ROC to retain coproduction skilled labor and proficiency, specifically, in order to prevent a production break, coproduction of the 48

1. J463 HistSum Sep 78 ☑ (S); REVW 10 Oct 98; AMEMB Taipei 1439/090740Z Mar 78 ☑ (S); XGDS-2; SECSTATE 160079/230206Z Jun 78 ☑ (S), GDS-84.
2. CINCPAC 140413Z Oct 78 ☑ (EX); GDS-86; AMEMB Taipei 7085/191234Z Oct 78 ☑ (EX), XGDS-1.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 38/010250Z Sep 78 ☑ (EX), GDS-86.
SECRET

F-5s would have to begin by July 1981. CINCPAC concurred with the Embassy, stressing that air defense was Taiwan's most immediately pressing problem with almost one-third of its fighter force due to end service life in 1980. Replacement aircraft, including an all-weather interceptor to replace aging 104s, were valid defensive military requirements.1

According to a 16 September message, the JCS supported sale of the F-4E and F-5G. It appeared that the F-5G might be offered to the ROC as a replacement for its F-104s and, because of anticipated lag in development of the F-5G, additional F-5Es might be offered as gap-fillers. Coproduction of both was a possibility. The JCS emphasized no decision had yet been made because certain issues, such as long-range implications of post-normalization coproduction, had not been resolved.2

Finally in early November the State Department notified the Embassy in Taipei that, after careful analysis of the military situation in the Taiwan Strait and implications of competing weapons systems, decisions on certain long-standing ROC requests had been made at the highest level of the U.S. Government. The Ambassador was charged to relay to President Chiang that the U.S. Government:4

- Could not authorize purchase of either the F-16 or F18-L aircraft because it would introduce new and highly sophisticated technology into the Taiwan Strait area and would be contrary to the U.S. Arms Transfer Policy.
- Could not authorize purchase of the F-4E fighter-

1. AMEMB Taipei 6007/071053Z Sep 78 ($) GDS-86; CINCPAC 112021Z Sep 78 ($) GDS-86.
2. JCS 7840/161614Z Sep 78 ($) GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC 140413Z Oct 78 ($) (EX) GDS-86.
4. SECSTATE 278289/020019Z Nov 78 ($) (EX) XGDS-3; CMAAG Taipei 090600Z Nov 78 ($) GDS-84.
SECRET

bomber since it would introduce a new and higher level of combat capability which was not justified.

- Had not reached a decision on the production of the follow-on aircraft to the F-5s.

- Would agree to extend the present arrangement for coproduction of another 48 F-5Es as well as accompanying armaments previously requested /500 LGB kits, 29 laser target designators, 500 MAVERICKS, 100 launchers, and 48 aircraft modification kits/.

(U) On 13 November the Secretary of Defense directed the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to prepare LOAs for the latter items and it was anticipated that they would be issued in March-April 1979.1

(U) ROC reaction to the decisions was indicated by comments made by the Defense Ministry's spokesman on 8 November which expressed regret over the American Government's decisions disallowing the ROC requests for buying more powerful planes and hope that the American Government would reconsider its decision in the future.2

(U) In view of the recent guidance, American Embassy Taipei on 16 November asked the status of the eight RF-4E aircraft which were needed by the ROCAF to carry the recently approved LOROP cameras (see below) and noted that none of the current F-5s or F-104s could be remodeled to accommodate the LOROP. The State Department replied on 22 November that the recent Presidential decision excluded sale of any F-4s to the ROC and, based on recent consultations with U.S. contractors, avowed the LOROP could be mounted on the F-5s and F-104s.3

Whether or not the LOROP could be mounted on aircraft other than the RF-4 appeared to be academic since no F-4s were available to the ROC. More than academic, however, was the information conveyed to the Embassy in Taipei by the State Department on 16 December—the day following the Presidential announcement that the PRC would be accorded diplomatic recognition. State advised that there would be no FMS financing available to the ROC in FY 80, and,

1. J465 HistSum Nov 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 4284/132250Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Taipei 7572/080919Z Nov 78 (U).
3. AMEMB Taipei 7722/160537Z Nov 78 (S), (EX), XGDS-3; SECSTATE 295181/220106Z Nov 78 (S), (EX), XGDS-3.

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400
...probably very little for FY 79."

Request for Submarines

By diplomatic note the ROC had asked to purchase two diesel submarines. To assist in formulating a recommendation, the JCS requested CINCPAC views on whether or not the submarines should be sold. In a 10 February response, CINCPAC stated that the two diesel-powered submarines sold to the ROC in 1973 were adequate for ROC ASW purposes and opposed any increase. CINCPAC's rationale was that, not only were additional submarines not in the JSOP, but that expansion of the ROC submarine forces could only complicate the already complex coordination problem for U.S. submarine and ASW forces.

MK-46 MOD-2 Torpedoes

In November 1977, the Secretary of Defense directed the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to provide price and availability (P&A) data to the ROC for 150 MK-46 MOD-2 torpedoes. An LOA for $27.2 million was made in June 1978 and signed by the ROC on 31 July 1978.

Self-propelled 8-inch Howitzers

On 13 September 1977 the Secretary of Defense requested the Chief of Staff of the Army to provide price and budgeting data and performance data to the ROC for 100 8-inch self-propelled howitzers to allow them to make an acquisition decision.

A National Security Council (NSC) memorandum for the Departments of State and Defense dated 10 March 1978 conveyed a decision that the 100 howitzer request should begin clearance process in the Spring with an assessment of when howitzer sales could be accommodated within the arms sales ceiling. The ROC was informed on 5 April that the LOAs were being prepared; however, on 24 April the ROC advised DSAA that it was deferring purchase of all 100 howitzers and on 17 May requested an LOA for only 25. In October another LOA was requested by the ROC for the other 75 howitzers. On 9 November SECDEF advised CHMAAG China that DA was to prepare an LOA for the 75, plus 45,000 rounds of ammunition,

1. SECSTATE 317313/1615442 Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J465 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4592/081813Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 100340Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/ERD), Vol. II, p. 311; J464 HistSum Jun 78 (U); J4 BWEB 19 Jun-2 Jul 78 (U); Interview with LCOL R. Wright, USMC, J465, 29 May 79.
and that since the value of this FMS case would exceed $7 million, Congressional notification would be necessary. As of 26 December DSAA had transmitted advance Congressional notification to the State Department, and it was anticipated that the LOA would not be issued to the ROC until March 1979.1

Mobile Radar System

In his 1977 end of tour report, a former Chief of the MAAG, Taiwan had listed a mobile radar system as a long-standing ROC Armed Forces requirement to back up fixed long-range search radars when the fixed sites were damaged by typhoons or earthquakes. A step in that direction occurred in April 1978, when the ROC formally requested P&A data for four AN/TPS-43F mobile radar systems. This radar system was a light weight, air transportable, land-based radar designed for use with manned aircraft or surface-to-air missiles. It provided solid three-dimensional cover up to 240nm and incorporated extensive clutter rejection and electronic counter-countermeasures. The cost of the four systems was estimated at $8 million plus support equipment. The U.S. Embassy recommended approval, but, at the end of the year, an LOA had not been signed.2

LOROP Cameras

Long Range Oblique Photography (LOROP) cameras had been among the requirements (since 1976) which had not been filled due to the uncertainties surrounding U.S.-PRC normalization. In the fall of 1977 CINCPAC had requested the JCS to reopen the matter with the State and Defense Departments and was advised that the National Security Council (NSC), through the State Department, had called for a consolidated listing of all outstanding ROC requirements.3

1. ASD/ISA Memo for the Chairman, SCC Ad Hoc Group on China (S), 9 Jan 79, Annex A, DECL 5 Jan 85; J465 HistSum Nov 78 (U); SECDEF 2486/091259Z Nov 78 (S), GDS 31 Dec 84; J4 BWB 4-18 Nov 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TSXERD), Vol. II, p. 303; J465 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Taipei 2814/051056Z May 78 (S), REVW 5 May 98; Interview with LCOL R.R. Wright, USMC, J465, 29 May 79.
Because the ROC aerial reconnaissance tracks were of long standing and recognized by the PRC as being defensive in nature, CINCPAC recommended and approval of the LOROP camera sale. The JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's views, which would be incorporated in a reclama to the NSC regarding the 30nm standoff proposal.¹

By July 1978, State and other Washington agencies had apparently decided to compromise. The Embassy was instructed to inform the ROC that the sale of up to six LOROP cameras would be authorized if written assurance was received that the ROC would observe the specific reference was made in the letter to PRC-held islands, the Embassy advised State and CINCPAC that the State stipulations concerning the LOROP camera sale had been met. In September the American Embassy advised that the ROC was deliberating over purchase of the cameras from four U.S. companies and requested the State Department to advise which ones had export licenses so the exact model could be selected.³

Improve CHAPARRAL

The improved CHAPARRAL air defense missile had also been among the long-standing requests of the ROC.

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1. J465 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 100005Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 5674/171605Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. SECSTATE 167924/011626Z Jul 78 (S), XGDS-3.
3. AMEMB Taipei 5264/310210Z Aug 78 (S), XGDS-2; AMEMB Taipei 06098/110920Z Sep 78 (S), XGDS-2.
M-48A1 Tanks

(U) FMS Case XMQ for the sale of 100 M-48A1 tanks to the ROC was approved early in 1978. This sale stipulated that the ROC return, on a one-for-one basis, either an M-24 light tank or an M-18 gun carriage. In March 1978 the ROC requested 150 additional M-48A1s at approximately $70,000 each. The Embassy had supported the first request, even though the tanks were not considered to be a top priority ROC requirement, with the hope that the tanks would encourage the substitution of firepower for manpower. Because there had been little discernible reduction in ROC military manpower, the Embassy recommended disapproval of the second request. In lieu of a flat negative response, however, the Embassy suggested deletion of the one-for-one provision in the case for the first 100 tanks.2

(C) MAAG China did not agree with the Embassy, on the grounds that the tanks were an effective mobile defense against amphibious or airborne assault and, equally important, a psychological manifestation of the ROC Army ability to defend the island against such attacks. Also, since the Case XMQ tanks had not yet been delivered, their usefulness as a means of encouraging ROC reductions in active force manning had not yet been tested. Further, the requested tank force level was legitimized in the JSOP. CINCPAC supported the MAAG rationale for approval of the second request for tanks, and also agreed with the Embassy suggestion that the one-for-one requirement be waived, not only for the XMQ case, but for the second request as well.3

(U) The JCS informed CINCPAC on 25 March 1978 that the sale of 150 additional tanks had been approved in principle and that the ROC Mission in Washington had been so informed. Still unresolved was the question as to availability of M-48A1s. There was no intent to require the one-for-one turn in of other equipment in connection with the 150-tank request and the possibility of removing that requirement from the previous sale of 100 was still under consideration. In April the State Department advised the Embassy in Taipei that State, Defense, and the National Security Council had approved the sale of the additional 150 tanks; however, the Embassy was enjoined not to broach the subject to

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 304-305; J465 HistSum Jan 78 (C), GDS-86; JCS 7551/2315392 Jan 78 (C), GDS-86; CINCPAC 282236Z Jan 78 (C), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 312; J4 BWEB 13-26 Feb 78 (U); J465 HistSum Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEMB Taipei 1456/091000Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 1723492 Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
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ROC officials because Defense was not sure the entire number was available. The LOA, when issued, would not include the turn-in provision. State would receive favorably a ROC request either to buy the residual rights to the M-18 gun carriages and M-24 light tanks or to amend the LOA to delete the provision.1

(U) The last word in 1978 regarding the 150 tank sale came in October when DSAA informed CINCPAC that the U.S. Government had approved the sale to the ROC. However, only 26 tanks could be made available at that time because of possible adverse impact on U.S. Army capability and readiness. The 26 tanks would be part of FMS Case XRS and count against the total of 150 tanks approved for sale.2

Request for AIM-9J Missiles

(U) In November 1977 the Secretary of Defense directed the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to prepare an LOA for 600 AIM-9J1 SIDEWINDER missiles for sale to the ROC. The cost of the package was estimated to be $15.8 million, which required Congressional notification. Congress was notified in March 1978. The offer was made in April and accepted by the ROC in May 1978. Delivery began that month.3

Ship Transfer

(U) On 13 April the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the required congressional notification for the proposed transfer of the USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114) to the ROC had been initiated. The LOA for the "as-is, where-is" sale of this ship was prepared and forwarded to the Chinese Naval Attaché in Washington D.C. upon successful completion of the Congressional notification in mid-May. ATF-114 was decommissioned and stricken from the naval vessel register on 1 June and transferred to the Republic of China Navy on 11 July 1978.4

SAR Helicopter Request

(U) In October 1978 the Embassy in Taipei advised the State Department that the ROC desired to purchase ten S-61D search and rescue helicopters from

1. JCS 4583/2500522 Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; SECSTATE 85891/0401552 Apr 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. SECDEF 6750/251713Z Oct 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. J465 HistSum Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; SECSTATE 82848/310229Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; DSAA Quarterly Rpt, Foreign Military Sales, Jan-Mar 79 (U).
4. J465 HistSum Apr 78 (U); CNO 130039Z Apr 78 (U); DSAA Quarterly Rpt, Foreign Military Sales, Jan-Mar 79 (U).

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405
Sikorsky Aircraft. Estimated cost, including accessories, supporting equipment, spare parts, training, etc. was $65.65 million. CINCPAC supported the request and the JCS expected little opposition because of the non-contentious nature of the helicopters. As previously discussed, one element of the normalization agreement with the PRC was that only equipment already in the pipeline as of 1 January 1979 would be delivered. Consequently, the S-61D helicopter request was deferred until the sale of selected military equipment to Taiwan was resumed.1

India

Overview

India received support under the IMETP and was eligible for FMS, which amounted to about $3 million annually. The FMS was mostly for spare parts to support previously-acquired U.S. transport aircraft, an air defense radar system (STAR SAPPHIRE), and an air defense communications network (PEACE INDIGO). IMET expenditures in FY 78 were $306,037 for 24 students; projection for FY 79 was for $450,000 (25 students) and for FY 80, $500,000 (32 students).2

The government-to-government (and therefore security assistance) relationship between the United States and India was marred by the "tilt toward Pakistan" publicity during the India-Pakistan war in 1965. As late as January 1978, the Indian Defense Minister recalled during a meeting with a U.S. Senatorial delegation that the United States had cut off critical military supplies at a critical time during that war. As noted, had placed no orders for U.S. military supplies since. When one Senator observed that the United States had also cut off arms supplies to Pakistan, the Defense Minister retorted that the U.S. Seventh Fleet had been sent to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the thrust of the discussion with the U.S. Senators was India's complaint that the United States discriminated against India in its arms supply policy.3

As postulated by the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, the U.S. interest in India militarily was to assure that India continued to be a source of regional stability. This was particularly true by the end of 1978, when unrest and violence were dominant in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Embassy noted

1. J465 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Taipei 7052/181029Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 232233Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 1345/271410Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84; SECDEF Brown Testimony to Senate FRC, 5 Feb 79 (U).
2. J471 Point Paper (S), 4 Oct 78, Subj: Security Assistance Program, India (U), REW 4 Oct 98; J471 Point Paper (S), 4 Oct 78, Subj: IMET History and Projections for India (U), GDS-84.
3. AMEMB New Delhi 528/101240Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
IN\(D\)A

BASIC INFORMATION

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<tr>
<th>Land Area</th>
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<td>Limits of Economic Zone</td>
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<td>Annual Growth</td>
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<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>Of Total Government Budget</td>
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President: Neelam S. REDDY
Prime Minister: Morarji DESAI
Minister of Defense: Jagmohan RAM
Chief of Army Staff: GEN Tukaram Maro RAINA
Chief of Naval Staff: ADM RE PERERA
Chief of Air Staff: ACM Ramanath MOOLGAVKAR

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. Ambassador: DRL Robert F. GOOHER
CIA: COL. Charles H. BREMER, USA
Air Attache: COL. Chester Y. WILLIAMS, USAF

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

Consistent with the regional restraints of U.S. Global and regional transfer policies and India's current political relationship with the U.S., remains open to India's interest in diversifying its sources of military supplies, including limited direct sales by the U.S.

REDUCE SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE THROUGH CONTINUATION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR INDIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AT U.S. SERVICE SCHOOLS AND THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

7 Corps, 17 Infantry Divisions, 28 Mountain Divisions, 2 Armored Divisions.

Strength: 964,000

(Paramilitary Strenght: 192,000)

Excellent capability to maintain internal security and good capability to resist external aggression. Limited airborne capability.

Dependent on Foreign sources for some sophisticated weaponry.

NAVY

1 Aircraft Carrier, 1 Light Cruiser, 22 Frigates, 5 Submarines, 10 Patrol Craft (Guided Missle), 11 Coastal Patrol Ships/Craft, 9 Mine Warfare Ships, 6 Amphibious Warfare Ships

Strength: 44,000

Moderate capability to defend coastline. Limited long-range (offensive), anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, transport, and amphibious capabilities.

AIR FORCE

2 Light Bomber Squadrons, 10 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons, 18 Fighter Squadrons, 1 Reconnaissance Squadron, 16 Transport Squadrons, 16 Helicopter Units

Strength: 113,000

Moderate intercepter and close air support capabilities. Limited air-mobile capability.
that, with the advent of the Desai government in India, India had begun a diversification of sources of military supply, with diminishing dependence on the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Embassy believed that the United States should be among the Western nations providing India with limited amounts of military equipment. Within the context of military training and commercial sales of selected military equipment, the Embassy recommended a carefully orchestrated and highly selective program of sales in addition to the existing IMETP.

In addition, either FMS or commercial purchases were possible for the TOW and SIDEWINDER missiles, the negotiations for which are discussed below.¹

TOW Anti-tank Missile

(SYNOPSIS) In late May 1978, the USDAO in New Delhi advised that India intended to make a formal request to acquire the TOW anti-tank missile from the United States. In the same message, the Embassy suggested that the subject could be raised by Prime Minister Desai during President Carter's visit to India in June. This, according to the Embassy, was additional evidence of India's objective to diversify its sources of military equipment. Consequently, the Embassy strongly recommended that the United States be as responsive as possible to India's interest in obtaining the TOW missile.²

During President Carter's visit, the military subject which drew the most notice was the deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSA), according to a New Delhi newspaper on 15 June 1978. President Carter was reported to have expressed the hope to the Indian Prime Minister that India would not acquire a DPSA because it would escalate the arms race in South Asia. When, on 6 October, India announced the decision to acquire the British JAGUAR as the DPSA, the issue of component technology was brought into focus. Earlier in the year, India had expressed interest in acquiring U.S. components (inertial navigation system, radios, ejection seats) for the DPSA.

¹ AMEMB New Delhi 19293/151157Z Dec 78 (NS), GDS 14 Dec 84; The TOW anti-tank missile is a tube launched, optically tracked, wire commanded, link guided missile.
² USDAO New Delhi 241216Z May 78 (SAF), XGDS-2.
³ J474 Point Paper (NS), 21 May 79, Subj: British JAGUAR Sale to India (U), REVW 21 May 99, with 1 Encl (S): Chronology of Significant Events Pertinent to JAGUAR Sale (U), REVW 21 May 99.
Meanwhile, CINCPAC was asked by the JCS, in September, to comment on an exception to policy for the release of TOW information to India via a contractor's briefing. CINCPAC noted first that the Country Team in India had not objected to a proposed contractor briefing. CINCPAC acknowledged that the release of vendor technical information via the proposed briefing would not necessarily indicate a formal commitment to a subsequent sale. It could, however, be construed as an indicator of U.S. Government approval for release which, if later denied, could damage U.S.-Indian relations. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he viewed the proposed TOW briefing and possible sale of the TOW system to India as a major policy, rather than a military requirement, issue. CINCPAC therefore recommended that the contractor briefing be held in abeyance until all aspects of the issue had been analyzed.1

The Embassy in New Delhi immediately addressed CINCPAC's position, acknowledged the validity of CINCPAC's comments, and stated that the contractor briefing should be held in abeyance.2

CINCPAC acknowledged the difficulty confronting the Embassy relative to furthering U.S. goals and objectives and interposed no objection to the TOW briefing, provided that the analysis and evaluation of the issue was accomplished in accordance with established State Department guidance regarding the arms transfer policy. Pending such analysis, CINCPAC once again stated his position that the contractor briefing should be held in abeyance.3

On 13 October 1978, the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), granted a State Department policy request for an exception to policy for India. The NDPC recognized the "argument made by CINCPAC, and supported by JCS and Navy," but stated that disclosure was authorized for SECRET, Category 2 (military materiel and munitions) information, but the

1. CINCPAC 09213OZ Sep 78 (S/SAFE), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB New Delhi 13894/130600Z Sep 78 (S), XGDS-2.
3. CINCPAC 162235Z Sep 78 (S/SAFE), GDS-86.
approval was subject to certain limitations: briefing and sale of ground version TOW only; no discussion of possible coproduction; until commitment to purchase, release was limited to unclassified information; and tests prior to sale would be conducted under U.S. Government control. At the end of 1978, the briefing had not yet been scheduled.1

HARPOON and AIM-9L

A situation comparable to the TOW anti-tank missile request arose while the TOW issue was under discussion. In August India requested information on the releasability of the sea-launched HARPOON missile and the SIDEWINDER AIM-9L air-to-air missile system (AAMS) for use in conjunction with its anticipated acquisition of the British SEA HARRIER aircraft. Before responding to the JCS request for comment, CINCPAC asked the Country Team in New Delhi for an assessment of the Indian request. The Embassy Country Team

As with the TOW missile, the Embassy stated that, "...release of these two systems to India is consistent with U.S. arms transfer policy in this region and would further U.S. policy objectives both within the region and in our bilateral relations with India...."2

Responding to a JCS request for comment, CINCPAC acknowledged the Country Team position.

The JCS agreed that

However, in a draft JCS recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and sent to CINCPAC for comment, the JCS recognized the potential political gain if

Such a model would not exceed the technology level possessed by India nor qualitatively

2. J474 Point Paper (S), 26 Apr 79, Subj: Release of HARPOON and AIM-9L to India (U), REVW 26 Apr 99; AMEMB New Delhi 16680/271336Z Oct 78 (C), GDS-84, which cited CINCPAC 212333Z Oct 78.
3. J474 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 10 Jan 86; CINCPAC 080617Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
alter the India-Pakistan missile balance. Therefore, the JCS intended to interpose no objection to the release of the AIM-9E missile to India.  

Before commenting on the JCS draft recommendation, CINCPAC (J4) convened a Technology Review Board to consider the ramifications of the AIM-9E release. Following a detailed review, the Board concluded that the

In spite of explicit reservations, CINCPAC advised that no objection would be interposed to the release of a limited number of AIM-9Es to India for the avowed purpose of arming the SEA HARRIER.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated 27 December 1978, the JCS transmitted essentially the same draft on which CINCPAC had commented. The JCS recommended but, subject to NDPC approval, interposed no objection to the release of a limited number of AIM-9Es for use on the SEA HARRIER. The matter of possible coproduction was not addressed.

Indonesia

F-5 Aircraft

In February 1977 the American Embassy Jakarta received a request from the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) to investigate the availability, through FMS credit, of a squadron of 12 F-5E aircraft at an estimated cost of $80 million. By May 1977 the GOI request for an LOA had received U.S. Presidential approval. However, the possibility of a delay in U.S. Congressional action caused the GOI to vacillate on the F-5 and consider the French MIRAGE. In January 1978 the GOI once again decided in favor of the F-5 and was desirous of expeditious Congressional action on the LOA to avoid cost escalation and delivery slippage. Congress was provided the 30-day unclassified certification on 15 February for 12 F-5Es, four F-5Fs, and related spares and support items with a package value of $125 million. Indonesian officials sign an LOA for eight F-5Es and four F-5Fs under FMS case PEACE KOMODO I on 30 March

1. JCS 7911/131502Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 12 Dec 84.
2. J474 HistSum Dec 78 (S), DECL 10 Jan 87; CINCPAC 180612Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 15 Dec 84; JCS/Memo/366-78 of 27 Dec 78 (S), REVW 27 Dec 98.
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<th>MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Infantry Brigades, 2 Airborne Brigades, 1 Paratroop/Commando Regiment, 1 Cavalry Brigade, 6 Field Artillery Regiments, 4 Air/Army Artillery Regiments, 83 Infantry Battalions (Separate), 6 Cavalry Battalions (Separate), 5 Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Combat Engineer Battalions, 4 Airborne Infantry Battalions, 1 Airborne Artillery Battalion (Separate), 5 Field Artillery Battalions, 1 Airborne Artillery Battalion (Separate), 3 Signal Battalions, 1 Air Defense Radar Battalion, 2 Hammerhead Battalion, 6 Transportation Battalions, 2 Military Police Battalions</td>
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<tr>
<th>U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES</th>
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<tr>
<td>MAINTAIN A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT INDONESIA FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE UNITED STATES</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPORT THE GO IN DEVELOPING A CREDIBLE MILITARY ENABLING FOR SELF-DEFENSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENHANCE U.S. FORWARD DEFENSE POSTURE AND U.S./ALLIED ABILITY TO DEFEND OR PROTECT AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO INFRINGE ON ITS INTERESTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROMOTE AFRICAN SECURITY AND STABILITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND REGIONALLY, WHERE AND WHEN APPROPRIATE</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY FOR INTER-SERVICE TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS/SUPPORT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS AS WELL AS TROOP LIFT, AND MAINTAIN AND REDUCE OPERATING COSTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROVIDE TANGIBLE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT DEFINED INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MILITARY PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENHANCE THE U.S. IMAGE AND MAINTAIN PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. AMBASSADOR:</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOV. Edward H. Masters</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. AID REPRESENTATIVE:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR. Thomas C. Miroldo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSLIG:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL. William W. Tombough, USA</td>
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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 67.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
however, they rejected an LOA for an additional four F-5Es under PEACE KOMODO II.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} The chronic budgetary limitations faced by the GOI were addressed by Ambassador Masters in a February message to the State Department after a conversation with General Panggabean, the Indonesian Minister of Defense and Security. According to the Ambassador, an additional problem existed in U.S.-Indonesian relations with regard to the role of military assistance. The Ambassador noted "...when Indonesians look at the record, they...

...many of the GOI leaders...attach very real importance to the U.S. response to requests for military assistance...." In addition to making recommendations on specific major equipment items being requested by the GOI, the message offered a number of options developed by the Country Team to assist the GOI with its financing problems and urged consideration of ways to advance U.S. goals:\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{2} The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State were responsive to the near-term requests on F-5s by twice extending the LOA expiration dates without change in P&A data for PEACE KOMODO II and by advising how FMS credit payment schedules could be lengthened, if prior approval were obtained. Subsequently, the GOI signed the LOA on PEACE KOMODO II for the four additional F-5Es on 28 July and a separate LOA was requested for FMS training of instructor

\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 317; J473 HistSum Jan 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-84; AMEMB Jakarta 408/100910Z Jan 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-84; J473 HistSum Feb 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-86; AMEMB Jakarta 1807/100920Z Feb 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-86; SECSTATE 40604/160005Z Feb 78 (U); J473 HistSum Mar 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-84; AMEMB Jakarta 4067/300731Z Mar 78 (U).

\textsuperscript{2} AMEMB Jakarta 6731/100920Z Feb 78 (\textsuperscript{5}), GDS-86.
pilots, support personnel and for mobile training teams.1

M-16 Coproduction

(1) In 1977 the GOI sought to convert the Indonesian Army Military Industries small arms factory in Bandung to coproduction of M-16A1 rifles. As 1977 ended, the DSAA was acting on a request from Colt Industries for an export license and awaiting contract information to prepare a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Secretary of State and Congressional approval.2

(1) By early February 1978 the munitions control license application for M-16 coproduction had been approved and it was anticipated that the FMS case, with approved export license and completed MOU, could go to Congress for the required 30-day notification as early as 1 April 1978. Meanwhile, financial arrangements were being worked out between the State and Defense Departments based on a proposed FY 78 GOI FMS credit allocation of $40 million, of which $22 million was for the M-16 project. However, the Secretary of Defense advised that it should be made clear to the GOI that the United States was not prepared to enter into a multi-year FMS financing commitment for the M-16 coproduction project. Attempts to provide additional FMS credit during FY 79 and FY 80 would be contingent upon the continuation of relevant legislation and appropriations.3

(1) Later in the year, during discussions with the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the American Ambassador reported that even though Indonesia still hoped ultimately to obtain an M-16 coproduction plant, the GOI was unable to pursue that project because of limited funds. Meanwhile, according to the official, the GOI intended to purchase 30,000 M-16s from Colt to meet immediate requirements.4

UH-34D Helicopters

(1) Efforts to assist the GOI in the acquisition of UH-34D helicopters and to modify them to a twin-pack configuration in Indonesia with the assistance

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1. J473 HistSum Apr 78 (U); SECSTATE 103385/220354Z Apr 78 (U); J473 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; SECDEF 9246/292326Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; J473 HistSum Jul 78 (U); CHUSDLG 280446Z Jul 78 (U); J473 HistSum Nov 78 (U); Hq USAF 131902Z Nov 78 (U).
3. J473 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 28979/030237Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; J473 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 8715/230341Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. J473 HistSum Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; AMENB Jakarta 13747/100904Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
of a commercial technical representative began in 1977. Although the twin-pack was not a U.S. Navy-approved modification, GOI financial constraints ultimately led the Secretary of Defense to approve the use of FY 77 Indonesian MAP funds for procurement of three twin-pack modification (TPM) kits. By December 1977 the Indonesian request for modification kits had increased to four.1

(U) Negotiations continued between the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (CHUSDLG), the CNO, DSAA, and the GOI during 1978 to obtain UH-34 airframes, main rotor and tail rotor blades, engines, main gear boxes, and repairs and modifications thereto, as well as to arrange transportation and financing. Since the UH-34 was no longer a U.S. Navy-supported item, all rework and support items had to be procured from commercial contractors. By the end of 1978, three UH-34 airframes had been shipped from Davis-Monthan AFB. MAP funds had been approved and obligated for four sets of S-58T engines at a cost of $1,102,064, 12 sets of main and tail rotor blades, and seven U.S. Navy surplus gear boxes. Three of the four TPM kits had been received and the first modification had been completed except for the avionics. Nine pilots and three crew chiefs had completed ground training.2

MK-44 Torpedoes

(Dec) MK-44 torpedoes were used by the Indonesian Navy on four ex-CLAUDE JONES-class DEs which had been obtained previously from the U.S. Government. The GOI initially procured 24 MK-44s but had no rework capability, and on at least two occasions (November 1976 and June 1977) had exchanged torpedoes needing rework with the U.S. Navy. In March 1977 PACFLT notified the USDLG that no further MK-44 exchanges would be possible since the MK-44 was being withdrawn from the U.S. fleet service except for exercise purposes. Since an exchange program would not be available in the future, the GOI obtained P&A data under FMS for six warshots, four exercise torpedoes, and support and test equipment in August 1977. During the same month CNO notified the DLG that the MK-44 Mod 1 would be declared obsolete on 1 October and that the U.S. Navy would dispose of all MK-44s in storage and all nonexercise MK-44 fleet assets thereafter. CNO requested that immediate and out-year requirements for a last-time logistic support buy be provided no later than 1 October. In November, USDLG notified CNO that the GOI wished to obtain the MK-44s and support equipment with MAP funds, vice FMS, and requested P&A revision accordingly.3

2. J473 HistSums Jan-Jun 78 (all U), with 19 encl (all U); J473 HistSum Oct 78 (Dec), GDS-84; CHUSDLG 310830Z Oct 78 (Dec), GDS-84.
The CNO provided the revised P&A in February 1978, and CHUSDLG advised CNO and DSAA that the GOI had decided to obtain all items cited in the P&A list, including the associated supporting equipments and shore-based repair parts. However, in May 1978, the CNO informed the USDLG that the U.S. Navy had been authorized to continue exercise firings of the MK-44 through September. Consequently, there had been a substantial drawdown of MK-44 torpedoes and supporting materiel. Logistic support had been reduced to the point where the filling of non-U.S. Navy requirements was doubtful. Pending a complete inventory, therefore, all P&B, P&A, LOAs, and grant aid cases relating to MK-44 material were suspended.  

Based on informal information from CNO that the inventory completion date could be delayed, CINCPAC advised the USDLG to begin preliminary planning to reprogram the funds set aside for the MK-44 MAP case in the event that neither torpedoes nor supporting equipment were available. Almost one month later, on 20 June, CINCPAC reviewed the MK-44 torpedo program in a message to the CNO and noted the approaching deadline for reprogramming action to reach the DSAA. Since about $793,540 in MAP funds were involved, CINCPAC requested CNO to advise of the anticipated date that a decision on availability would be made. The reply from CNO set 10 July as a target date.

In July the U.S. Ambassador expressed concern to the State Department that the MK-44 torpedo/spares/workshop equipment package might be curtailed. He noted that it had been the number one priority in the Indonesian Navy security assistance program for FY 78 because the MK-44 was the major anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapon system on the ex-U.S. Navy DEs. Further, the MK-44s had been planned for use on three new corvettes. MK-32 surface vessel torpedo tubes were purchased from the United States through FMS specifically in order to standardize the Indonesian Navy ASW system, a major goal of the U.S. security assistance program. The Ambassador cautioned that failure to provide the package for which P&A had been accepted by the GOI would result in a serious loss of U.S. credibility.

On 9 August, the CNO conveyed the result of the U.S. Navy inventory. Ten warshot-configured MK-44 torpedoes were available to the GOI. However, the exercise configuration, spare parts support, workshop equipment, expendable material for test firing, test equipment, and documentation were not available.

1. J473 HistSums Feb, Apr, May 78 (all U); CNO 232157Z Feb 78 (U); CHUSDLG 110755Z Apr 78 (U); CNO 222234Z May 78 (U).
2. J473 HistSum Jun 78 (U); CINCPAC 252329Z May 78 and 200330Z Jun 78 (both U); CNO 231525Z Jun 78 (U).
3. J473 HistSum Jul 78 (U); AMEMB Jakarta 8855/050730Z Jul 78 (U).
Also unavailable through U.S. Navy stocks were propulsion batteries for the warshot configuration. As expected, the GOI authorities expressed deep disappointment. Based on the non-availability of the associated backup material, the Indonesian Navy decided not to obtain the ten MK-44s offered by the U.S. Navy.1

\[\text{(U)}\] In mid-August, the Chief, USDLG recommended to the CNO that the possibility of exchange/rework of the 24 MK-44s on board the Indonesian DEs be considered. A short time later, the USDLG informed CINCPAC that the repair of the ex-Claude Jones-class DEs was a continuing topic of discussion at various levels of the Indonesian Navy hierarchy. The repair work was expected to be done at the ship repair facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines, since two of the DEs had previously been repaired there in 1977 through grant aid. The scheduled termination of grant aid to Indonesia as of 30 September, however, would preclude such funding in the future. The repair of the DEs was also expected to be linked to the possible exchange of MK-44s for re-worked torpedoes at Subic. CINCPAC suggested to CINCPACFLT that the capability and feasibility of not only DE repair but also MK-44 torpedo exchange at Subic be investigated.2

\[\text{(U)}\] The CNO replied to the USDLG that, because the MK-44 spare parts inventory was not being repurposed, the U.S. Navy maintenance capability had been reduced to organizational deck and systems checks and that spare/repair parts had been depleted by continued fleet use. Therefore, the U.S. Navy was no longer able to perform any rework or repair on MK-44s. The CNO recommended that the possibility of rework/repair by third countries such as the Republic of China, Japan, and Korea be explored by the GOI. Even if this approach bore fruit, prior U.S. Government approval would be required in accordance with the AECA.3

A-4C Aircraft

\[\text{(U)}\] In April 1978 the GOI requested P&B data on 28 excess A-4C aircraft stored at the Military Aircraft Surplus and Disposal Command, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The U.S. Embassy informed the State Department that the GOI intended to have the aircraft modified and supported by a U.S. contractor. The A-4Cs would be used primarily in an air-to-ground role in support of the Indonesian Army, and could reach most parts of the archipelago. No other

1. J473 HistSum Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; CNO 092330Z Aug 78 (U); CHUSDLG 140750Z Aug 78 (U).
2. J473 HistSum Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; CHUSDLG 140750Z Aug 78 (U); CHUSDLG 210820Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 250531Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. J473 HistSum Sep 78 (U); CNO 282009Z Sep 78 (U).
aerial aircraft then available in the Indonesian Air Force inventory had that capability. The GOI request for P&B data was supported by the Embassy.

(C) CINCPAC informed the JCS that the A-4C request was in consonance with the FY 81-88 Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, and that the A-4C, in conjunction with the acquisition of F-5s, would provide a reasonable and cost-effective mix of aircraft. However, CINCPAC stipulated that release of the P&B data should be contingent upon the recognition that other countries, such as Malaysia and possibly the Philippines, could be competing for the A-4Cs.

(U) Vice President Mondale, during a visit to Indonesia in May, announced that the Carter Administration was open to the idea of selling 16 reconditioned A-4Cs to Indonesia. Shortly thereafter, the CNO informed the USDLG that tasking from the State Department could be expected to provide an LOA to the GOI for 28 A-4Cs. The CNO requested the USDLG to determine the anticipated commercial overhaul facility, since the A-4C was no longer in use by the U.S. military and was not supportable by the U.S. Navy. The USDLG replied that preliminary discussions regarding A-4C overhaul had been held by the GOI with both Douglas and Lockheed, but that no contract had been signed.

(U) As predicted, the DSAA asked the CNO to prepare an LOA for the sale to the GOI of the maximum number of A-4C aircraft and related support equipment which could be accommodated within the $9.226 million available under the U.S. Navy FY 78 allocation for excess defense articles (EDA). The remainder of the 28 A-4Cs requested by the GOI would be offered under a separate LOA when additional EDA transfer authority became available to the U.S. Navy. The aircraft were offered on an "as is-where is" basis, with overhaul to be contracted by the GOI. Terms were FMS credit. The proposed sale did not require Congressional notification because the value of the major defense equipment included in both LOAs did not exceed $7 million and the total value of the items offered for sale would be less than $25 million.

(U) Acting on the DSAA request, the CNO queried the USDLG for the LOA information, and was advised that 16 A-4Cs were needed in operational attack configuration, four as operational trainers, and eight for logistic support. Subsequently, the CNO noted that it was U.S. Government policy to encourage MAP recipient countries to acquire U.S. defense articles (including EDA)

1. J473 HistSum Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEMB Jakarta 4322/040920Z Apr 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 1420362 Apr 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. Honolulu Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, 7 May 78, "Mondale Lauds Release of Indonesia Prisoners," dateLine Jakarta (AP); J473 HistSums May, Jun 78 (U); CNO 302320Z May 78 (U); CHUSDLG 020642Z Jun 78 (U).
4. SECDEF 4046/032018Z Jun 78 (U).
through FMS rather than grant aid. Also militating against GOI use of MAP was the fact that the A-4Cs did not meet the material condition standards for transfer under MAP; moreover, a MAP transfer required deviation from the funded portion of the GOI's FY 78 MAP programmed for other requirements. Finally, and as previously discussed, the Indonesian MAP would terminate as of 30 September. Both State and the DSAA had agreed that MAP could not be used to finance the A-4C acquisition.1

(U) In September, the CNO advised the USDLG that planning for the A-4C sale to the GOI had reserved a significant portion of the U.S. Navy EDA ceiling for FY 78. This had required the deferral of EDA sales to other countries until FY 79. Consequently, no assurance could be given that sufficient EDA ceiling would be available to the GOI for an LOA in FY 79, and the prudent move by the GOI was to sign the LOA by 30 September. The U.S. Embassy advised that the LOA would not be signed by 30 September, probably because of GOI fund limitations, and invoked Vice President Mondale's affirmation to request that the time limitations for purchase of the original 28 airframes be adjusted to protect GOI interests pending a possible FY 79 request. On 26 September, the DSAA informed the USDLG that, based on the Embassy request, the LOA would be withdrawn and a new LOA for 28 A-4C's issued after 1 October 1978. At the same time, the DSAA requested the CNO to place 28 of the A-4Cs then in storage on hold for Indonesia.2

(U) The DSAA informed the USDLG that the U.S. Navy had prepared a new LOA for 28 A-4C aircraft and that it would be issued to the GOI Defense Attaché in Washington during November. However, the GOI formally advised that, because of budgetary constraints, the new LOA could not be considered until April-June 1979. The U.S. Embassy recommended that the LOA be held in abeyance until early 1979 and issued with an expiration date of not earlier than 30 June 1979.3

Overview of Fiscal Posture

(U) The Japanese Diet approved the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) FY 78 Budget on 4 April 1978 (JFY cycle is from April to March). Precedent-setting policy

1. CNO 091526Z Jun 78 (U); CHUSDLG 120548Z Jun 78 (U); CNO 222318Z Jun 78 (U).
2. J473 HistSum Sep 78 (U); CNO 082034Z Sep 78 (U); AMEMB Jakarta 12382/130516Z Sep 78 (U); SECDEF 5458/260001Z Sep 78 (U).
3. J473 HistSum Oct 78 (S); GDS-86; SECDEF 3933/171728Z Oct 78 (U); AMEMB Jakarta 14181/180822Z Oct 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

419
**JAPAN**

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>377,700 sq. km</th>
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<tr>
<td>Limits of Territorial Waters</td>
<td>12 Nautical Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits of Economic Zone</td>
<td>200 Nautical Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>114,200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>1.0 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>98.6 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>73 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
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<td>Gross National Product (est.)</td>
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<td>Per Capita</td>
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<td>Of Total Government Budget</td>
<td>$15.6 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type Government</td>
<td>Constitutional Parliamentary Monarchy</td>
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### U.S. Security Assistance Objectives

- Encourage qualitative improvement in Japan's efforts, particularly in antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and logistics.
- Encourage standardization, compatibility, and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese defense equipment.
- Encourage an increased dialogue in defense planning for expanded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

### Major Country Forces and Combat Capability

#### Army

**Ground Self-Defense Force**

- Organized into 3 Army headquarters, 12 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, 1 combined brigade, 1 tank brigade, 1 airborne brigade, 1 antiaircraft artillery brigade, 2 HAWK missile groups (126 launchers and 1,200 missiles), and 1 helicopter brigade. Total aviation inventory includes 84 fixed wing aircraft and 258 helicopters.
- Strength: 154,000

#### Navy

**Maritime Self-Defense**

- 241 aircraft, and 281 ships and craft. Major naval units include 2 guided missile destroyers, 2 AW/SH helicopter destroyers, 57 destroyers, 15 frigates, 14 submarines, 12 large submarine chasers, 5 motor torpedo boats, 38 mine warfare ships/craft, 8 tank landing ships, 6 auxiliary craft, and 544 service craft. Naval air has 212 fixed wing aircraft (P-2, P-3, P-3C, P-3E, P-3F, P-3G, P-3H), and 99 helicopters.
- Strength: 48,000

#### Air Force

**All Self-Defense**

- 261 aircraft, including: 10 fighter interceptor squadrons, 3 fighter bomber squadron, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 1 transport wing, 1 air reserve wing, 5 training wings, and 5 training groups.
- Strength: 42,000

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 68. Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
decisions included the simultaneous initiation of two major acquisition pro-
grams from the United States (F-15 and P-3C aircraft) along with the commitment
to a quantity buy for a 10-11 year period. Significant factors of the budget
are reflected in the comparison below: 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JFY 77</th>
<th>JFY 78</th>
<th>JFY 79 (proposed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Budget ($ billion)</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td>National budget (%)</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross National Product (%)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90 (Est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment purchase (%)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) On 1 May Defense Minister Kanemaru issued the Japanese Defense Planning
Directive for JFY 79 which called for, inter alia: 2

- Establishment of one AEW squadron commencing with
  procurement in JFY 79 of three E-2C aircraft.
- Organization of a new tank division on Hokkaido by
  consolidation of the 7th Mechanized Division and Tank Bri-
  gade.
- Establishment of a central command center.
- Addition of ammunition reserves.
- Construction of additional ships.
- Joint U.S.-Japan training.
- Joint studies on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

F-15 Program

(U) After two years of study, the Government of Japan (GOJ) selected the
McDonnell-Douglas F-15 as the next generation of fighter aircraft to replace
the aging F-104s of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) in 1976. In 1977
the Japan National Defense Council (NDC) approved the procurement, over a ten-
year period, of 100 F-15s, as well as 48 P-3C Lockheed ORIONs. In February
1978 the JASDF submitted a request, through diplomatic channels, for Price

1. J466 HistSum Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; J466 Point Paper (C), 18 Oct 78, Subj:
   Analysis of Japanese FY 78/79 Defense Budget (U), GDS-84.
2. J466 HistSum May 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

421
and Availability (P&A) data on two F-15s and six F-15 trainers (TF-15s). Delivery of this first increment was scheduled to begin in 1980.1

(U) On 4 April 1978 the Japanese Diet approved the purchase of 100 F-15 aircraft and 45 P-3Cs, and, shortly thereafter, MOUs were initialed by representatives of the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDO) and the JDA on the purchase of the F-15s and the P-3Cs discussed below. The F-15 purchase consisted of 88 F-15s and 12 TF-15s, with 23 funded in the JFY 78 budget--two complete F-15s and six complete TF-15s; eight knockdown aircraft; and materials for the licensed production of seven additional aircraft. The complete aircraft would be procured via FMS, and the remainder through licensed production.2

(U) During a visit to Washington by Japan Minister of State for Defense Kanemaru in June, he and Secretary of Defense Brown witnessed the formal signing of the MOU for the F-15 purchase by JDA and DSAA representatives. At the same time, the MOU for the P-3C purchase discussed below was also signed.3

P-3C ORION

(U) In 1977 the JDA announced the selection of the P-3C ORION as the next generation of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. As already noted, the NDC formally approved the selection in December 1977 and the Japanese Diet gave its stamp of approval in April 1978. The MOU was initialed simultaneously with that of the F-15 and formally signed in Washington in June.4

(U) The number of P-3Cs to be purchased was 45 over an eleven-year period, with initial delivery scheduled for June 1981. Those funded in the JFY 78 budget included three by FMS, four knockdown, and materials for one under licensed production. All of the balance were to be license-produced.5

Airborne Early Warning (AEW)

(U) Japanese concern for shortcomings in air defense, particularly in the

2. J466 HistSum Apr 78 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 5980/0805012 Apr 78 (U).
3. CMO 7928/0208422 May 78 (U), GDS-84; SECDEF 1859/282257Z Aug 78 (U); J466 Point Paper (U), 18 Oct 78, Subj: F-15 Program-Japan (U), GDS-84.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 320; J466 HistSum Apr 78 (U); AMEMB Tokyo 5980/0805012 Apr 78 (U); SECDEF 1859/282257Z Aug 78 (U).
5. J466 HistSum Apr 78 (U).
detection of unfriendly intruders, was heightened as a result of the 1976 Soviet MIG defection. In 1977 the JDA had requested P&B estimates on E-2C aircraft, but the AEW program was dropped from the FY 78 budget request. Interest in AEW and air defense remained high, however, and in 1977 and 1978 information-gathering teams from the JDA visited numerous U.S. Navy activities and contractors in the United States. The request for P&B data for six E-2C AEW aircraft was renewed, and the FY 79 budget included a request for the E-2Cs.1

Although the E-2Cs were being procured by the JASDF, it was expected that the early warning radar aircraft would ultimately be linked to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) air defense role. Further, the E-2C interface with U.S. naval forces and the Japan BADGE would enhance the AEW capability.2

BADGE-Japan

The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system in Japan was a semi-automated radar information processing system for air defense. It had been in operational use since 1968 and, in 1976, the JASDF established a study group to modernize or replace the system to cope with changes in tactical and strategic technology. The goals were to enhance command and control by integrating with other information systems, to automate the Okinawa Air Defense Sector and Air Operations Control Center, and to design the BADGE to synchronize with the capabilities of the AEW E-2Cs and air defense F-15s.3

In 1977 and early 1978, the JASDF study team visited the United States to acquire up-dated AEW and air defense data. In March 1978, the JASDF requested sole source (MITRE Corporation) technical representatives to assist in the BADGE up-date study under FMS. MITRE was requested because it was a non-profit organization which would provide unbiased advice. In May the JDA requested P&B data for a joint U.S.-Japan six-month update study beginning in January 1979.4

The U.S. Air Force authorized the sole source FMS case with MITRE in July and provided the P&B estimate in August for system engineering technical support manpower. The Commander, Fifth Air Force was designated by U.S. Air Force to take the lead in up-date discussions because 5AF was responsible.

2. Ibid.
3. J466 Point Paper (S), 17 Jun 78, Subj: BADGE-Japan (U), GDS-84.
4. Ibid.; J466 HistSum May 78 (U).
with JASDF and Korean assistance, for air defense within the WESTPAC North Air Defense Region.¹

During a visit to CINCPAC in October 1978, the JASDF Chief of Staff reviewed the purpose of the BADGE study with CINCPAC. He told Admiral Weisner that the new system should be interoperable with U.S. Forces which might be deployed to Japan in case of emergency. Mutual understanding and agreement would be sought with the U.S. military, particularly those in Japan, from the outset. It was for that reason that the technical assistance of the U.S. military was needed. CINCPAC's support was solicited during the scheduled close coordination which would ensue between the JASDF, the MDO, and U.S. Forces, Japan (5AF) headquarters.²

Republic of Korea

Overview

(U) Throughout 1978 the dialogue between Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. military and diplomatic officials was focused on the Security Assistance Program as a vehicle to compensate for the announced withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea. The first increment of 6,000 troops was initially scheduled for redeployment in 1978. However, in April President Carter announced that this phase of the withdrawal would be extended to occur during 1978 and 1979, rather than entirely in 1978. By the end of 1978, 3,400 men had been withdrawn, including 850 from the Second Infantry Division. The remaining 2,600 men involved in the first phase were scheduled to leave Korea during 1979. The President's decision to stretch out the first phase withdrawal recognized the importance of Congressional approval to transfer equipment and weapons from the withdrawing U.S. units to counterpart units of the ROK Armed Forces. At the time of the President's announcement, Congress had not yet approved the transfer package.³

(U) Based on a confidential report from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Secretary of State Vance, on behalf of the President, transmitted an unclassified annual summary of Korean security assistance to key congressional leaders on 15 January 1979. The report stated that new orders placed by the ROK for major equipment items under FMS for 1978 amounted to approximately $390 million. This included such items as missiles, tank upgrade kits, precision guided

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1. J465 Point Paper (C), 18 Oct 78, Subj: BADGE Update-Japan (U), GDS-84.
2. CMDO 110/1209362 Oct 78 (C), GDS-84.
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA
96,400 Sq Km

LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
12 Nautical Miles

LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE
200 Nautical Miles

POPULATION
20,000,000

ANNUAL GROWTH
1.7 Percent

LITERACY RATE
90 Percent

LIFE EXPECTANCY
70.4 Years

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA
0.22 Acre

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1978 Est)
$46.8 Billion

PER CAPITA
$1,119

DEFENSE BUDGET (1977)
$2.6 Billion

PERCENT OF GDP
0.6 Percent

PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGET
26.4 Percent

TYPE GOVERNMENT
Republic with President

Government in a Strong Executive

* Under Consideration

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. Wm. H. GLEITZEN, JR.

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. WILLIAM E. PAUP

COMUS KOREA
GEN John W. VINES, JR., USA

CHIEF, USMACF-E
MOEN Henry A. GRIFFITH, USA

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

17 Infantry Divisions, 1 Mechanized Infantry Division, 2 Full- strength
Regimental Combat Teams, 9 Armored Brigades, 5 Infantry Brigades,
25 Infantry Regiments, 7 Aviation Regiments, 7 Special Forces Brigades,
7 Mobile Battalions, 205 Field Artillery Battalions, 7 Separate
Tank Battalions, 10 Air Defense Artillery Battalions, 34 Air Defense
Artillery Batteries

Strength: 529,000*

Maintain internal security and effectively repel a unilateral North
Korean attack assuming adequate logistic, air and naval support is
provided from outside sources.

NAVY

111 Ships including 10 Destroyers, 7 Frigates, 6 Patrol Ships, 15 Missile
Attack Boats, 31 Patrol Craft, 9 Mine Warfare Craft, 23 Amphibious
Ships, and 10 Auxiliary Craft.

Strength: 40,000, which includes 23,000 Marines*

Adequate capability to patrol coastal waters. Limited antiaircraft
warfare and amphibious capabilities. Limited mine sweeping
capability.

AIR FORCE

18 Tactical Fighter Squadrons, 4 Transport Squadrons, 2 Tactical Air
Support Squadrons, 7 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Helicopter
Squadron, 1 Electronic Warfare Squadrone,

Strength: 32,800*

Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations,
and conduct VFR air and limited all weather defense missions.

* Strengths as of 4 January 1973

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

TO SECURE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND
POLITICAL INTERESTS IN NORTH KOREA THROUGH
THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE
KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE PRESERVATION OF A NON-
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
TO INSURE THE ABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO
DEFEND ITSELF WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE, AGAINST EXTER-
NAL AGGRESSION,

TO REDUCE NORTH KOREAN DEPENDENCE ON U.S. COMBAT FORCES BY
SUPPORTING MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF
NORTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES

TO SUPPORT THE U.S. FORWARD STRATEGY IN THE REGION
BY SUPPORTING THOSE PROGRAMS WHICH CONTRIBUTE
TO OBTAINING THE NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS
AND FACILITIES ARRANGEMENTS.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 69.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
munitions, command and control communications equipment, and spare parts and
maintenance packages. Major items delivered under FMS for 1978 included anti-
tank, ship-to-ship, air-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles, helicopters,
fighter aircraft, and a destroyer. Particular attention had been given to
support of the ROK program of self-help, such as tank upgrade and indigenous
tank manufacture. FMS credits for 1978 totaled $275 million. The IMETP grant
was for $1.5 million.¹

Equipment Transfer Authority

¹ As part of the planning for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea,
an interagency task force was established in June 1977 to develop detailed
programs and recommendations. Among the measures recommended by the task force
to preserve the existing combat capability of the ROK Armed Forces was the
cost-free transfer of selected weapons and equipment from the withdrawing U.S.
units to the ROK. The value of the items recommended for transfer by the task
force was approximately $800 million. This figure was not intended to be a
program ceiling, nor was it a commitment to the ROK. Rather, it was an order
of magnitude kind of estimate for those items needed to preserve the firepower
and mobility in Korea represented by the U.S. units scheduled for withdrawal.³

³ Legislation which would authorize the transfer was developed and for-
warded by the President to the Congress in October 1977. The proposed legisla-

1. Ibid.; AMEMB Seoul 8714/3000982 Sep 78 (TS), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 32121/2118462 Dec 78 (TS), GDS-N/A and 328029/3015452 Dec 78 (TS),
   GDS-84; COMUSKOREA 1023002 Jan 79 (TS), DEC 31 Dec 85; CINCPAC 140024Z
   Jan 79 (TS), DECL 11 Jan 85.
   222/2009902Z Jan 78 (TS) (BOM), XGDS-2, (Personal from Mr. Flint to Mr.
   Abramowitz).
tion was subsequently incorporated in Section 23 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, which became law on 26 September 1978. This section of the Act amended the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Assistance Act of 1954 to provide Presidential authority for the "cost-free" transfer of equipment, but did not contain a monetary figure as to the estimated value of that equipment. In an October 1978 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense authorized discussion with the ROK of the capability, type, and quantities of material to be transferred, but cautioned that the monetary value placed on the equipment by U.S. personnel was for internal U.S. Government use only.

The above initiatives were conveyed to the ROK Defense Minister, who expressed appreciation. In May the ADD president visited Washington.

1. Extract, Public Law 95-384, ISAA of 1978, 26 Sep 78 (U); SECDEF 4551/012106Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 042055Z Feb 78 (S/NE), GDS-86; J462 Point Paper (S), 28 Apr 78, Subj: U.S. Support to ROK Industry (U), GDS-86; SECSTATE 122534/130109Z May 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-3.
During the visit in Washington the status of U.S.-ROK defense research and production cooperation was discussed and the ADD president appeared to have gained a greater comprehension of the complexity of the U.S. technology transfer decision-making process.1

[5] In mid-June the U.S. Ambassador provided a summation of the results to date which, in essence, concluded that the U.S. policy [redacted] had paid dividends and gave much of the credit to Defense and other officials in Washington. He cited a change in the ROK perception of U.S. assistance and intentions and the evolving openness and candor in discussions of the real-world ROK military requirements. Among these subjects was the announced ROK intention to procure submarines, which was, "...another good illustration of this new phenomenon."2

Korea Study Group

[7] Although progress in the area of assistance to ROK industry and research capability seemed evident, in the area of the arms transfer package some hitches had developed. The authorizing legislation for the compensatory equipment transfer program provided for the substitution of equipment from outside Korea in cases of unserviceable in-country equipment.3

Korean Review Committee, expected to be established by the Defense Department shortly, would address such matters.3

1. AMEMB Seoul 4083/160309Z May 78 (S), GDS-86; J464 HistSum May 78 (U); AMEMB Seoul 3887/100117Z May 78 (S), XGDS-3; SECSTATE 131962/241633Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Seoul 5064/150214Z Jun 78 (S), XGDS-3.
3. CDR USA Eight Seoul 250130Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; DA 021420Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
SECRET

In September, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (DASD/ISA) proposed the establishment of an in-house Republic of Korea Review Committee (ROKRC) to consider a wide range of policy issues and solicited comments or recommendations from CINCPAC and COMUS Korea on an informal basis. Both would be represented on the proposed committee, as well as JUSMAG Korea. At the same time, the DASD/ISA tasked the JCS and DA to address the issues raised by the Commander, Eighth Army.

On 14 November, the Secretary of Defense established the Korea Review Group (vice the ROKRC). Members were the Service Secretaries; the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; the Chairman, JCS; three assistant Defense Secretaries; and the Director of DSAA. All were requested to designate a flag officer or senior civilian as their representative. Equivalent representatives of other departments, agencies, and offices would be invited to participate when items of interest to them were on the agenda. Specific mention was made of CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, and Chief, JUSMAG Korea, whose representatives would be invited "when appropriate." Initial working level and flag level meetings were held in November and December 1978; the CINCPAC Deputy Director for Plans attended the latter meeting as the CINCPAC representative.

Joint Study Proposals

The above title is an unclassified euphemism for the discussion during 1978 as to the extent of participation by Washington agencies in joint in-country studies proposed by COMUS Korea. The discussion centered around a proposed joint missile requirements study, with a proposed joint submarine requirements study as a peripheral consideration. During the eighth SCM in August 1975, a proposal for a team of U.S. experts to visit Korea to determine missile requirements was approved in Washington and communicated to the ROK.

1. J463 HistSum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; OSD/ISA 106-78, 121750Z Sep 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-86; CINCPAC (J00) 142204Z Sep 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-84; SS0 Korea 3993/150852Z Sep 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-86.
2. J461 HistSum Nov 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 4688/141639Z Nov 78 (U) and 2652/221642Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
As a first step, the Country Team proposed that General Vessey send a letter to Minister Ro requesting his approval and support. CINCPAC approval was solicited.

(5) In the May message from State to the U.S. Embassy and COMUS Korea which reported on initiatives toward ROK industry support, also previously discussed, State addressed the proposed joint missile study. On the other hand, State was concerned that a broad-gauged joint missile study could result in a misleading impression that the United States would support a requirement for a surface-to-surface missile capable of reaching Pyongyang. The key question, according to State, was whether a missile study was needed, and, if so, whether it should be joint or unilateral. Embassy and COMUS Korea views and suggestions were invited. CINCPAC, who was not an addressee, received the message by retransmittal from the JCS.

(5/NOFORN) In mid-June, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC and the Chief, JUSMAG Korea that a unilateral U.S. study of ROK missile requirements would be undertaken by a Strike Study Group (SSG) and invited addressee participation. In July, during the eleventh SCM, Secretary Brown and Minister Ro agreed on a joint examination of the ROK military need. The ROK Minister also requested that the United States consider the sale of two submarines to the ROK Navy. Secretary Brown suggested that this requirement also be studied in conjunction with COMUS Korea. Both

1. CINCPAC Command History 1975 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, pp. 422, 423; COMUSK 030730Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; J464 HistSum May 78 (U); AMEMB Seoul 3887/100117Z May 78 (S), XGDS-3.
2. SECSTATE 122534/130109Z May 78 (S) (EX), XGDS-3.
of these subjects had been raised by ranking ROK officials as early as January 1978.1

It wasn't until 24 August that the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC that a draft study entitled "Surface-to-Surface Missiles and ROK Security" (S) had been completed by the SSG and routed to each participant and relevant interagency staffs for comment.2

The SSG study conclusions, according to Defense, raised the questions whether a joint study was still necessary and, if so, how the SSG study could be used to best U.S. advantage in influencing the conclusions of a joint study. CINCPAC's views were requested.2

In response to CINCPAC's request for comment from the Chief, JUSJAG Korea, COMUS Korea answered (in a joint COMUS Korea-Embassy message) that there was no longer an option as to whether a joint study would be undertaken in Korea because of the agreement between Minister Ro and Secretary Brown to examine jointly the military requirements. Since such a study could not be undertaken in isolation, an examination of the total tactical surface-to-surface missile requirements and alternatives was needed.3

CINCPAC acknowledged the joint COMUS Korea-Embassy message in his comment to the Defense Department, but added that informally he had learned

1. CINCUNC 100850Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; SSO Korea, General Vessey to Admiral Weisner, 156/140229Z Jan 78 (S), XGDS-2008; J4 BWEB 17-30 Jul 78 (S), GDS-86; J463 Hist Sum Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 9493/240109Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSK 090610Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86 and 140730Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. SECDEF 9493/240109Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. CINCPAC 310052Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; COMUSK 090610Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
members of the joint study group with the best possible advice on how to pro-
ceed.

Both CINCPAC and the DASS/ISA asked COMUS Korea for an explanation
of the purpose, scope, composition, and terms of reference of the submarine
study group. The DASS/ISA further expressed concern about the timing and
procedure of the letter to Ro on missiles.

In accordance with the DASS/ISA request, COMUS Korea forwarded the
texts of two letters to Minister Ro, both dated 7 September and both referring
to the Secretary-to-Minister-level discussions regarding the feasibility of
joint studies on missiles and submarines.

After review within Defense, it would be
necessary to staff the terms of reference with other responsible agencies in
order to clear them for use by the joint U.S.-ROK group. This, according to
Defense, could take some time. Meanwhile, CINCPAC's views regarding the parti-
cipation of Washington and CINCPAC representatives were solicited. Also,
CINCPAC's view of the desirability of inviting the SSG study director (GS-76
Olson) to present the SSG report to the joint group in Korea was solicited. 3

1. CINCPAC 120345Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 120432Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; OSD/ISA 107-78/121452Z Sep 78 (S) (BOM).
   GDS-84.
3. COMUSK 140730Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 7858/161713Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.

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On 21 September Minister of National Defense Ro replied in one letter accepting the study proposals in both letters from General Vessey and providing the names of the senior ROK military contacts. After discussions among Admiral Wiehner, General Vessey and the DASD/ISA (Mr. Armacost) during a visit to Korea, it was agreed that the letters from General Vessey to Minister Ro, while not formal terms of reference, described the parameters for the study groups sufficiently. It was also agreed that one representative from OASD/ISA would be sent to Korea during the latter stages of the study efforts, as would a CINCPAC representative.

The JCS advised CINCPAC that, based on subsequent Washington discussions, the ground rules for the missile and submarine studies were mutually agreed.

New Weapon System for ROK

In May the JCS informed CINCPAC of a contractor request for permission to release technical data on a night CHAPARRAL air defense system to the ROKG and requested evaluation of ROK military requirements and recommendations on release and future sale to the ROK. JCS advised that a preliminary review indicated the night CHAPARRAL could...

1. COMUSK 220245Z Sep 78 (6), GDS-84; SSO Korea 3503/231242Z Sep 78 (S) (BOM), REVW 23 Sep 98.

2. COMUSK 280216Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 072010Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 4660/181559Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.

3. JCS 4766/180115Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
The CINCPAC response of 27 June noted the Improved CHAPARRAL (Export Model) had been approved for release to the ROK in August 1977 and was a strong contender in the on-going ROK evaluation of its requirements for a short-range air defense (SHORAD) system. Moreover, ROK officials were aware of U.S. Army demonstrations of the night capability system. Even if the Army did not take advantage of the IC growth potential, CINCPAC felt it would behoove any country contemplating purchase of the IC to examine the night capability which could be obtained by adding a forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensor. This would provide compatibility with U.S. Army IC, night IC components, and fire unit launching station components.

As part of an air defense system for the ROK Navy combatant ships, in January the ROK requested an LOA for the NATO SEA SPARROW missile system, which was the ship-mounted version of the AIM-7E air-to-air missile. The AIM-7Es would be installed on seven destroyers as well as the first Korean-produced frigate and would permit performance of "blue-water" combat activities. American Embassy Seoul pointed out that the U.S. Navy had been performing depot maintenance on older AIM-7Es for the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) but that the Navy planned to discontinue the AIM-7E in 1981. Although the ROKAF had been exploring development of a maintenance facility with the Raytheon Corporation, plans were as yet too vague and uncertain to forecast completion with any degree of assurance. Therefore, the Embassy and CINCUNC favored granting an LOA if it could be premised on development of a suitable maintenance capability. CINCPAC supported the Country Team recommendation as caveated. The JCS directed the Chief of Naval Operations to prepare an LOA for sale of 112 NATO SEA SPARROWS and seven ship sets of launcher control equipment to the ROK and advised CINCPAC that, since the FMS case would exceed $7 million, the 30-day Congressional notification procedure would apply. CINCPAC was also advised to encourage the ROK to request and fund a depot maintenance capability/operation.

1. J463 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 270025Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84. Interview with CDR I. Larguiere, USN, J464, 29 Jun 79.
SITE SURVEY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE JCS ADDED THAT CURRENT U.S. NAVY PLANNING INDICATED THE -7Es WOULD BE SUPPORTED THROUGH 1985, VICE 1981. CINCPAC SO INFORMED CHIEF, JUSMAG.1

In March the American Embassy notified the State Department that the ROK Ministry of National Defense was intent upon building a missile repair facility and had let some bids for equipment to...

SIDEWINDER

On 6 November the ROK Embassy in Washington requested P&B data on AIM-7F and AIM-9L missiles and authority to co-assemble the AIM-9J-I-R. The JCS subsequently requested CINCPAC's evaluation of the proposal including, but not limited to, the impact on regional stability. Based on recommendations from his component commanders and the Country Team, CINCPAC considered the co-assemble of 333 AIM-9J-I-Rs as a key element in the achievement of increased self-sufficiency by the ROK in weapons production and recommended approval of the request.

HARPOON

During 1978 the HARPOON (RGM-84) weapons system was installed on four of twelve patrol motor gunboats and destroyers, and as of 1 September the ROK Navy had received 14 of the 120 HARPOON missiles purchased through FMS from the United States. Phase III training for the system was completed by 24 November; however, test firing was postponed until April 1979.4

1. J463 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Seoul 117/060848Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 190030Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 9633/261413Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 282004Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Seoul 1845/070817Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; Interview with CDR I. Larguier, USN, J464, 29 Jun 79.
3. JCS 2129/220017Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86; J464 HistSum Dec 78 (U), GDS-84; CINCPAC 212240Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. J464 HistSum Nov 78 (U); J4 BWEB 28 Aug-10 Sep 78 (U); J4 BWEB 3-16 Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.

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435
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Request for Destroyers

In January the ROK resubmitted an earlier LOA request to purchase two GEARING or SUNNER-class destroyers (DDs) from the U.S. Navy, which had denied the original request. Both the United Nations Command and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul recommended approval provided the U.S. Navy was willing to release them.

After canvassing the availability of DDs for transfer, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) informed the Chief, JUSMAG Korea that staffing had been completed for the sale of the WILLIAM R. RUSH (DD-714) to the ROK on an "as is, where-is" basis. Final transfer, however, did not take place until 1 July after the 30-day Congressional notification period. Transfer of the second destroyer to the ROK Navy was scheduled for October 1979.2

Modernization of ROK Tank Force

Early in 1976, JUSMAG Korea and the ROK JCS agreed that a program was needed to modernize and upgrade the existing tank force of M-47s and early model M-48s. The M-47s were becoming logistically unsupportable and the early M-48s were no longer combat effective against the continually upgraded tanks and anti-tank capability of North Korea. It was agreed that the M-47 tanks would be replaced by M-48A1s, and that the entire force of M-48s in the ROK tank inventory would be converted to late model M-48A3s and M-48A5s. At the ninth SCM in 1976, the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved a ROK request to purchase 421 M-48A1s to replace their M-47s.3

The first phase of the tank upgrade program was to convert the newly acquired M-48A1s. In January 1977, the ROK decided to upgrade the first 40 of these to M-48A5 configuration, which involved installing diesel engines, improved fire control, and a larger (105mm) gun. The M-48A3 conversion included

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/FRD), Vol. II, p. 330; AMEMB Seoul 54/050740Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 140034Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. JCS 6028/202230Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; J467 HistSum Mar 78 (C), GDS-84; CNO 302128Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; Interview with CDR I. Larguier, USN, J464, 29 Jun 79.

SECRET

436
the diesel and fire control improvement, but retained the 90mm gun of the basic M-48.1

In May 1978, the ROK requested P&B data to upgrade 140 M-48 tanks and 280 M-48A2Cs to the higher level A5 configuration, rather than the A3. The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command quoted a total cost of $49 million for M-48 conversion kits and $89 million for M-48A2C kits. By the end of 1978, the ROK had converted 40 M-48A1s to M-48A5s and had converted about that many to M-48A3s. The programmed conversion schedule was:

**Phase I (1977-1980)**

381 M-48A1s to M-48A3s.
40 M-48A1s to M-48A5s.

**Phase II (1981-1984)**

140 M-48A1s to M-48A5s.
280 M-48A2Cs to M-48A5s.

**Phase III (1984-1986)**

In-country manufacture of 120 tanks.

**ROK Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) Program**

Phase III of the ROK tank improvement program shown above was the development of an indigenous tank production capability. During the tenth SCM in 1977, this program (ROKIT) was raised and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed that the United States would assist the ROK in program development. In August 1977 a specific request for assistance was received from the ROK Minister of Defense to which the U.S. Secretary responded in October with a proposed MOU.

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2. J464 HistSum May 78 (U); CHJUSMAGK Seoul 120801Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; CDR USASAC 061345Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; J464 HistSums Sep and Oct 78 (both S), both GDS-86, which cited USDAO Seoul 190355Z Sep 78, 190356Z Sep 78 and 020005Z Oct 78 (all S), all GDS-86.
In March 1978, the ROK submitted a revised MOU on the ROKIT program which spelled out in detail the kinds of assistance which would be provided by the United States. After one more exchange of drafts, the MOU was signed by Secretary of Defense Brown in June and countersigned by Minister of Defense Ro in July 1978.2

By the end of July, the ROK had selected bids from two U.S. firms—Teledyne Division of Continental Motors and ADI Corporation of Baltimore—to build wood mock-ups of their own design. These were expected to be equivalent to the M-60 tank in armament reliability and maintainability, but lighter and with a lower silhouette. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. had been designated the prime contractor and was to be assisted by the Ministry of National Defense and the Korean Agency for Defense Development. The target date for completion of the mock-ups was January 1979.3

F-5E Aircraft

In March 1978 the U.S. Embassy informed the State and Defense Departments that a request for P&B data on 40 and 60 F-5E aircraft had been forwarded through ROK channels to the ROK Embassy in Washington. The U.S. Embassy provided rationale in support of the request, and, when received by the DSAA, the Chief, JUSMAG Korea was requested to comment. The JUSMAG endorsed the Embassy rationale, as did CINCPAC.4

2. Ibid.; SECDEF 4964/071616Z Apr 78 (S) and 5344/241426Z Jun 78 (S), both GDS-84; CHJUSMAGK 100432Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. AMEMB Seoul 1929/090807Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; SECDEF 5752/171713Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; CHJUSMAGK 220004Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 271936Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.
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In May the U.S. Air Force provided P&B data with total estimated cost of $284.9 million for 40 aircraft and $435.5 million for 60. In June, the Air Force also forwarded costs of $84 million, including support, for eight RF-5Es. However, the ROK had not requested an LOA by the end of the year.²

F-16 Aircraft

A formal ROKG request for an LOA covering 60 F-16 aircraft had been pending since early 1977. At the 10th SCM in July 1977, Secretary of Defense Brown had indicated to ROK Defense Minister Suh that the U.S. Government agreed in principle to make the F-16 available, but made no timing commitment. As the formal processing of the LOA request began in September 1977, and after a full inter-agency review of various options, in June 1978 a decision was rendered to decline to process the LOA at the time, but to reaffirm the agreement in principle. Further, future timing of the LOA would depend on congressional attitudes.

(U) In mid-November, according to a Washington Post news service article, President Carter rejected the Defense Department plan for the early sale of F-16s to South Korea. The decision was based, according to this reporter, on Carter's rule against the introduction of higher levels of technology into regional disputes and to forestall the Soviet Union's supplying a new generation of aircraft to North Korea. The article also referred to South Korea's request for "coproduction" of the F-16 which was "...unlikely to be approved even if

1. SECSTATE 83000/310329Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 4286/312303Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J463 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; Hq USAF 061405Z May 78 (S) and 161750Z Jun 78 (S) both GDS-84.
3. SECSTATE 15184/150044Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Seoul 5492/260806Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.

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439
the sales proposal is given the green light."\(^1\)

**JUSMAG Korea Manning**

(U) Sandwished between a General Accounting Office (GAO) manpower survey in early 1978 and a Defense Department survey late in the year was the effort by the JCS, CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, and the Chief, JUSMAG to maintain the authorized JUSMAG strength at the FY 78 level of 218--130 military, 38 U.S. civilians, and 50 local nationals.\(^2\)

(U) The GAO survey report alleged that some 60 of the assigned personnel (both military and civilian) were involved in "advisory" assistance to the ROK; of these, at least 50 were devoting more than 50 percent of their time to advisory duties. This, stated the report, equated to some 43 full time positions engaged in activity prohibited by Section 515(B)(2) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Public Law 95-92 of 4 August 1977. This section of the Act stated the sense of the Congress that advisory and training assistance in countries where MAAGs were authorized would be provided primarily by personnel not assigned to the MAAGs, but detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks. The GAO report acknowledged the JUSMAG position that the security assistance role in Korea was unique and also that the law did not clearly define the advisory functions meant by Congress to have been terminated under the law. There was no criterion to distinguish between "advice" and "assistance."\(^3\)

(S) The "broader" interpretation of advisory duties applied by the GAO report was vigorously contested by COMUS Korea on the grounds that the functions being performed were in fact inseparable from the statutory duties of logistics management, transportation, fiscal management and contract administration.

3. COMUSK 271200Z Jan 78 (U).
(U) Meanwhile, the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) for FY 79 had been forwarded to the Congress. In addition to the reduction of 18 military spaces for JUSMAG Korea which had been planned prior to the withdrawal decision the CPD for FY 79 reduced the U.S. civilian spaces from 38 to 25 and the local national spaces from 50 to 35. As noted in a March 1978 CINCPAC paper and message to the JCS, manpower reduction decisions regarding security assistance had been made in Washington without input from the field implementing agencies regarding regional or specific country considerations.²

(C) CINCPAC immediately suggested to the JCS that a review of the JUSMAG personnel situation was in order. CINCPAC noted that the withdrawal announcement, the proposed equipment transfer, and additional commitments during the August 1977 SCM all were subsequent to the previously planned total of 200 spaces in the MAG. The JCS replied that, in spite of Defense Department and

1. CINCPAC 010052Z Feb 78 (U); AMEMB Seoul 971/040248Z Feb 78 (S); GDS-84; COMUSK 080735Z Feb 78 (S); GDS-84.
3. COMUSK 060415Z Apr 78 (S); GDS-84.
CONFIDENTIAL

JCS support for the previously planned MAG FY 79 manning; zero based budgeting, State Department recommendations and administrative decisions had resulted in the civilian space reductions. Any reclama for relief would require detailed justification; moreover, because of trade-offs involved worldwide, any increase in military spaces for JUSMAG Korea was unlikely. Proposals for civilian increases would be considered based on justification for each position if approved by the Chief of Diplomatic Mission.¹

² CINCPAC's request that COMUS Korea provide detailed justification for each required personnel space above the CPD-authorized 112 military, 25 U.S. civilians and 35 local nationals was answered by Chief, JUSMAG Korea on 17 May. Military spaces were not addressed, but the Chief of Mission (Ambassador) had concurred in the need for 31 U.S. civilians (+6 FY 79) and 44 local nationals (+9 FY 79).

³ On 23 June CINCPAC dispatched two messages to the JCS--one personal to the Chairman, and another which supported the Embassy-approved reinstatement of six U.S. civilians and nine local nationals pending additional study by the CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group team then in Korea. In his personal message to General Jones, Admiral Wessner advised that he shared General Vessey's (COMUS Korea) deep concern over the proposed reduction of JUSMAG manning levels.

1. J467 HistSum Apr 78 (β), GDS-84; CINCPAC 150220Z Apr 78 (γ), GDS-84; JCS 3960/051647Z May 78 (ε), GDS-84.
2. CINCPAC 091947Z May 78 (α), GDS-84; CHJUSMAGK 170434Z May 78 (β), GDS-84 and 090447Z Jun 78 (γ), GDS-84.

CONFIDENTIAL

442
By early August, the JCS informed CINCPAC that, because of the workload impact of the SCM commitments and transfer action on both military and civilian resources of JUSMAG Korea, the JCS was inclined to support restoration of the total proposed FY 79 reduction, including the 18 military personnel. With a two-day, short-fuse suspense for reply to the JCS, the Chief, JUSMAG submitted justification to restore the 18 military spaces to CINCPAC on 10 August. CINCPAC passed that message, and a supportive separate message, to the JCS the same day.

He strongly recommended that every effort be made to maintain the JUSMAG manning level at the FY 78 authorization of 130 military, 38 U.S. civilian and 50 local nationals. 3

Late in August, the Secretary of Defense responded to a JCS memorandum supporting the retention of the JUSMAG manning level. Defense recognized the need to maintain sufficient personnel for effective security assistance management, especially during the period in which defense responsibilities were being transferred to the ROK. Nevertheless, because the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Korea did not agree with the increase in personnel authorizations supported by the military agencies in the field, Defense informed the JCS that an on-site survey would be conducted of JUSMAG Korea functions and staffing. Pending resolution of the issue, Defense authorized the retention of JUSMAG personnel authorizations at the FY 78 level. 4

The manpower survey was conducted during the period 23 October-2 November. On 15 November, Acting DSAA Director Von Marbod forwarded the survey team report to Admiral Moreau, CINCPAC J4, requesting comment by 15 December.

1. J463 HistSum Jun 78 (U), GDS-84; CINCPAC 230315Z Jun 78 (U), GDS-84 and 230411Z Jun 78 (U), GDS-84; JCS 9268/292349Z Jun 78 (U), GDS-84; AMEMB Seoul 5496/260855Z Jun 78 (U), GDS-84.
2. J462 HistSum Aug 78 (U); JCS 4360/081823Z Aug 78 (U); CHJUSMAGK 100140Z Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 100522Z Aug 78 (U); AMEMB Seoul 7012/100312Z Aug 78 (U), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 120632Z Aug 78 (U), GDS-84.
4. J463 HistSum Oct 78 (U); JCS 3386/082229Z Sep 78 (U), which cited JCSM-277-78 of 30 Aug 78.
comparison of the survey team recommendations with other authorized and proposed manning showed no support for restoration of the 18 military spaces:

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(U) The report reviewed the opinions of the U.S. Embassy, COMUS Korea and the Chief, JUSMAG that the MAG role in Korea was unique because of the integral nature of the CINCUNC command of Korean forces and the direct impact of the MAG operation on the readiness of those forces. Also acknowledged was the enactment of Public Law 95-384, which was the authority for the compensatory equipment transfer in conjunction with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces (q.v.). A major conclusion of the report was that the majority of the functions being performed by the JUSMAG Assistant Chief of Staff for Development and Acquisition were not in consonance with the functions specified in Section 515(B)(1) of the FAA as amended. Therefore, the report recommended that this JUSMAG agency and its personnel be transferred to another organization. Complicating that suggestion, however, was the fact that some U.S. Congressmen supported the provision of both advice and assistance by JUSMAG Korea in such areas as management and defense industry quality control. The report offered four alternatives to resolve this problem:

- Develop a ROK defense industrial base and associated technical data exchange by direct contract between the ROK Government and a private commercial contractor.
- Establish an Industrial Management Assistance Team and an Engineering and Technical Services Team.
- Seek to amend Section 515 of the FAA to permit MAG personnel to perform advisory and training functions, including defense industry development, as primary functions.

1. DSAA Ltr I-10435/78 of 17 Nov 78 to RADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr. (U), with 1 attch, Survey Team Rpt (U).
2. Ibid.
CONFIDENTIAL

- Notify Congress that local requirements in Korea did not permit proper implementation of Section 515 of the FAA.

(U) The report also asserted that some 15 military and three local national JUSMAG positions in three field logistics centers were no longer required. Consequently, there was not sufficient justification to support the retention of the FY 78 manning level. However, there was sufficient justification to warrant an increase over the proposed FY 79 levels. Thus, as shown in the preceding table, the report recommended an increase of 11 spaces over the FY 79 authorization.1

(U) The CINCPAC and JUSMAG comments on the Defense manpower survey focused on the basic difference of opinion between the team's position and that held by CINCPAC and the agencies in Korea. This difference included the narrow interpretation of the law relating to advisory and training assistance and the actual workload increase generated by the U.S. commitments in connection with the U.S. withdrawal. CINCPAC also discussed the alternative actions propounded in the report, giving cogent reasons why the first two were neither practical nor in the interests of the United States. CINCPAC agreed that the third alternative--amending the FAA--was acceptable if it were determined that the JUSMAG method of operation violated the law. However, CINCPAC considered the fourth alternative--notification to Congress that the law was inappropriate for Korea--to be the most appropriate solution.2

(6) Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and JUSMAG Korea jointly submitted data and information to the State and Defense Departments to be used in compiling the CPD for FY 80. After a detailed description of the security assistance task facing the JUSMAG, the joint message recommended that the FY 78 manning level for JUSMAG of 130 military, 38 U.S. civilians, and 50 local nationals be retained through FY 80. Neither the definition of nor justification for JUSMAG personnel performance of advisory and training functions had been resolved by the end of 1978. In a 23 December message to the JCS, CINCPAC noted that the issue continued to be raised, not only in the Defense manpower survey but in GAO and other reports, and suggested that clarifying legislation be sought.3

1. Ibid.
2. CHJUSMAGK 110300Z Dec 78 (U); CINCPAC 200159Z Dec 78 (U).
3. AMEMB Seoul 11370/150919Z Dec 78 (S); AGDS-1 Dec 79; CINCPAC 232340Z Dec 78 (U).
Overview

Malaysia continued to have no immediate external threat, but was faced with internal communist terrorist activity, particularly along the Thai-Malaysia border. Until 1978, security assistance to Malaysia centered around State Department approval of a list of equipment generated during the June 1975 Crowe-Shackley (DOD-CIA) interdepartmental team visit. In January 1978, high Malaysian officials evinced renewed interest in the purchase of military equipment by means of FMS cash or credit. This was borne out by a Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) request in November 1977 for P&B data on 15 A-4C SKYHAWK fighters and 15 T-34A trainers. CINCPAC supported the request, noting that a mix of A-4s with the F-5s already possessed by the RMAF would provide greater versatility in the counterinsurgency role.

A-4 Aircraft

Upon receiving the P&B data for the 15 A-4Cs from the CNO in February 1978, the RMAF informed the U.S. Defense Attache Office (DAO) and U.S. Embassy that approval had been received to procure two squadrons of A-4s. The Embassy was requested to ask for P&B on 54 A-4Es. If A-4Es were not available, however, A-4Cs would be satisfactory. The 54 aircraft represented two squadrons of 18 aircraft, ten for spare parts, and eight to be converted into four two-seat trainers.

In May the State Department advised the Embassy that A-4Es were not available and that P&B data for the A-4Cs would be provided. After coordination through Defense and Navy channels, the CNO transmitted the data to the DAO in Kuala Lumpur in August.

Shortly thereafter, however, the DAO informed State that a U.S. aircraft sales representative had intimated to Malaysian officials that A-4Es could be obtained from Israel. The representative implied that arrangements had been made for the United States to reacquire the aircraft from Israel and subsequently to sell them to Malaysia. The DAO asked State whether such

2. J472 HistSum Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; CNO 180039Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 1711/010651Z Mar 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. J472 HistSums May 78 (C), GDS-84 and Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; SECSTATE 129392/221504Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; SECDEF 4629/260315Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; CNO 312026Z May 78 (U) and 102254Z Aug 78 (U).
MALAYSIA

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA: 322,566 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: None
POPULATION: 12,644,000
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.7 Percent
LITERACY RATE: 55.5 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 60 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 0.6 Acres
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: $124 Billion
PER CAPITA: $8,892
DEFENSE BUDGET: $685 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: 18.4 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT: Constitutional Monarchy headed by Paramount Ruler (King); Bicameral Parliament
PARAMOUNT RULER: Ya'ha Salurudin
PRIME MINISTER: Hussein ibn Sa'ud
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Ahmad Alhuzaif
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS: Mohammed Ghalib ibn Shafiq
CHIEF OF THE ARMY: Gen. Ahmad Alhuzaif
FORCES STAFF: LGEN. Ghalib ibn Shafiq
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF: RADM. Mohamad Zain ibn Sulaiman
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF: AVM. Mahomed ibn Sulaiman

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR: Hon. Robert A. Miller
DATT: COL. Franklin Collins, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

Provide tangible evidence of support for a stable, moderate and democratic non-communist Malaysian government.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

3 Divisions, 9 Brigades, 32 Infantry Battalions
Strength: 54,000

Essentially an infantry force trained and experienced in jungle operations. Fairly effective in internal security and counter-insurgency missions up to battalion level. Very slight capability at brigade level and incapable of fending off a significant external attack or engaging in operations outside Malaysia without considerable outside assistance.

NAVY

2 Frigates, 31 Coastal Patrol craft, 6 Mine Warfare craft, 31 Amphibious Warfare ships, 19 Landing Craft
Strength: 9,000

Offshore patrol, defense of sea lines of communication and territorial waters, as well as support of internal security operations. Limited by small size, maintenance problems, long coastline and geographic separation of the country into two portions.

AIR FORCE

20 Jet, 6 Turboprop, 41 Propeller Aircraft, 62 Helicopters
Strength: 6,000

Can provide relatively effective transport support to Army, Navy, and Police for internal security missions. Modest ground support capability with CL-41G and P-6K aircraft.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 70.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
arrangements had been made but, by year's end, the question remained unresolved.1

T-28 Aircraft

(ณ) At the same time that the RMAF requested P&B data on A-4C/E aircraft, the Embassy was also asked about the P&B data for the T-34s requested in 1977. Upon being advised that T-34s were unavailable, the RMAF asked for P&B data for 25 T-28s.2

(ณ) State approved that request concurrently with the A-4C request in May 1978 which was forwarded to the Defense Department and the CNO, in turn. However, it was not until 10 March 1979 that the CNO provided the P&B data on the T-28s.3

F-5 Aircraft

(ณ) In June the U.S. Air Force responded to a P&B data request for one F-5E to replace an aircraft lost by the RMAF during a training mission. In August the DAO requested P&B information for four F-5Fs, to be used as trainers for the F-5Es, vice the F-5Bs possessed by the RMAF. In October the Malaysian Ministry of Defense formally requested an LOA for one F-5E and 4 F-5Fs and, in November, State informed the Embassy that Defense would prepare separate LOAs. The LOA for the four F-5Fs, after Congressional notification, would be forwarded in FY 3/79.4

A-10 Aircraft

(ณ) In May 1978 the DAO asked the Defense Department whether P&B data for 18 A-10 aircraft could be provided to the RMAF, which had specified that the information would be used "for study purposes only." Defense replied that the provision of P&B data on A-10 aircraft required high-level inter-agency review and that, in any case, policy was not to provide P&B data unless approval of

1. USDAO Kuala Lumpur 591/180708Z Aug 78 (ณ), GDS-84; J472 Point Paper (ณ), 18 Dec 78, Subj: Malaysian Request for Aircraft (U), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 1711/010651Z Mar 78 (ณ), GDS-84.
3. J472 HistSum May 78 (ณ), GDS-84; SECSTATE 129392/221504Z May 78 (ณ), GDS-84; SECDEF 4629/260315Z May 78 (ณ), GDS-84; CNO 312026Z May 78 (U); J4/Memo/ SI23-79 (U) of 7 Sep 79, Subj: 1978 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft (U).
4. J472 HistSums Oct 78 (U) and Nov 78 (ณ), GDS-84; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 591/180708Z Aug 78 (ณ), GDS-84 and 733/070300Z Oct 78 (U); SECSTATE 288829/141937Z Nov 78 (ณ), GDS-84.
sale was considered to be likely.¹

CINCPAC recommended in a June message to the JCS that P&B data on the A-10 not be provided to Malaysia because such release would imply U.S. Government approval for system acquisition. CINCPAC noted that the principal threat to Malaysia was a communist insurgency which was neither organized nor equipped at a level which required the antiarmor capability of the A-10. The request for P&B data on A-4s, stated CINCPAC, was a far more realistic response to the internal threat.²

Pakistan

Overview

After the decade-long U.S. embargo on exports of military equipment to Pakistan was lifted in 1975, equipment was sold on a case-by-case, cash-only basis. In 1977 the U.S. policy of even-handedness toward Pakistan and India regarding the sale of military supplies and equipment was complicated by Pakistan's effort to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. This prompted discussions between State and Defense to develop a military sales package which would serve as an inducement to Pakistan to forgo acquisition of a nuclear capability but maintain the balance of military power between Pakistan and India.³

Late in 1978, the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) advised CINCPAC that the nuclear reprocessing issue had apparently subsided. The U.S. Ambassador had returned to Pakistan from Washington with the information that the U.S. Government was receptive to the resumption of economic aid and military assistance to Pakistan within residual Congressional restraints. France had apparently refused to sell the plant to Pakistan without a major objection being voiced by the Government of Pakistan (GOP).⁴

Subsequent to the Ambassador's return, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology Lucy W. Benson visited Islamabad for discussions with Pakistan officials on security assistance matters. In an informal but frank exchange of views, and after presenting the same informa-

1. J472 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-84; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 307/0803432 May 78 (S), GDS-84; SECDEF 4629/260315Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J472 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 070134Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84.
4. ODRP Islamabad 121100Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-82.
PAKISTAN

BASIC INFORMATION

- LAND AREA: 803,000 Sq Km
- LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: 12 Nautical Miles
- LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE: 200 Nautical Miles
- POPULATION: 77,780,000
- ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.5 Percent
- LITERACY RATE: 14 Percent
- LIFE EXPECTANCY: About 40 Years
- ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 1.1 Acre
- CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA: $14.5 Billion
- DEFENSE BUDGET: $9.87 Billion
- OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: 29.4 Percent
- TYPE GOVERNMENT: Islamic Federal Republic

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

- PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE AREA BY ASSISTING PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES TO ASSURE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE TO OUTSIDE AGRÉSSION.
- ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES.
- ASSIST IN IMPROVING PAKISTANI CAPABILITY TO DEFEND CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS & SEA/AIR ROUTES.
- DEVELOP CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER ALLIES/FRIENDLY NATIONS ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COOPERATION.
- STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN'S WILL AND ABILITY TO RESIST AND DETER EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN.
- ENCOURAGE PAKISTAN'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ZEITO AND STRENGTH MILITARY FORCES TO ASSURE ITS VITALITY.
- CONTINUE A RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AIMED AT HELPING PAKISTAN MAINTAIN A CHECKMATED PERIODIC PERSPECTIVE, SIMULTANEOUSLY, THIS ASSISTANCE, SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH FAVOUR REGIONAL ARMS RACE OR THREATEN TO MAKE PAKISTAN A PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

- 6 Corps Headquarters, 16 Infantry Division, 2 Armored Divisions
- Strength: 408,000
- (Para-military Strength: 232,000)

- Capable of maintaining internal security and limited capability to resist external aggression. Dependent on foreign sources of supply for most war materiel.

NAVY

- 1 Anti-aircraft Cruiser, 1 Destroyer, 1 Frigate, 2 Large Submarine Chasers, 4 Submarines, 13 Motor Gunboats, 4 Hydrofoils, 6 Torpedo Boats, 7 Mine Warfare, 3 Auxiliaries
- Strength: 10,000

- Marginally capable of defending coastline and has very limited anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare capability. No transport or amphibious capability.

AIR FORCE

- 1 Light Bomber Squadron (B-26), 5 Fighter/Fighter-Bomber Squadrons (MIRAGE III, MIRAGE II, F-86, MIG-15), 1 Reconnaissance Squadron (MIRAGE III), 2 Transport Squadrons (C-130E/6, F-87, Mystere 20),
- Strength: 17,000

- Moderate Interceptor and limited close air support capability.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 73.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
tion to President Zia on 4 November, Benson discussed three general categories of military equipment: items which the United States was prepared to make available for sale; items which would not be available; and items on previous Pakistan lists, going back to 1974, on which Pakistan sought information on the possibility of availability and/or sale. Items in the first category included howitzers, destroyers, a destroyer tender, F-5E aircraft, CHAPARRAL or towed VULCAN missiles, light aircraft and helicopters, night vision devices and an IMET program at then current levels. Items not available included F-18, F-16, and A-7 aircraft and tanks. Items on previous lists, which would be considere individually as presented, included Improved HAWK and man-portable missiles, mine countermeasures ships, a hydrographic survey ship, anti-tank missiles, ammunition fuses and a production capability for the 106mm recoilless rifle. Secretary Benson also informed the Pakistani officials that no credit financing was likely, at least in the short term.¹

(§) During Secretary Benson's visit, she and the Ambassador were asked two direct questions regarding military equipment. The first was whether a helicopter-borne TOW system was available; the second was the number of F-5Es available for purchase by Pakistan. In December, after her return to Washington, the State Department advised the Embassy that the U.S. Government was willing to sell a helicopter-borne TOW system and that up to 76 F-5Es could be made available for purchase.²

Support for Pakistan Navy

(§) In mid-1975 the Pakistan Navy (PN) requested two GEARING-class 710 destroyers (DDs), one destroyer tender (AD), and 100 MK-46-1 torpedoes. Two U.S. Navy DDs (716, 719) were transferred to the PN in April 1977. with separate FMS Cases for ship checks, overhaul and training. They underwent overhaul in the United States and, in September 1978, were recommissioned in the PN as the TARIQ and TAIMUR.³

(§) In July 1977 the PN submitted a formal request for an LOA on one destroyer tender. That was followed by a November LOA request for four additional GEARING-class DDs. This request was supported by CINCPAC. In February 1978 the PN expressed interest in the acquisition of a fleet oiler to replace

1. ANMEM Islamabad 10928/070810Z Nov 78 (§), GDS-86.
2. SECSTATE 313603/130128Z Dec 78 (§), ADS 31 Dec 79.
an aging former U.S. Navy oiler. 1

As discussed in the Overview, the entire question of U.S.-Pakistan military assistance relationships was undergoing inter-agency review. After the Ambassador's return to Pakistan from Washington in October, but before Under Secretary Benson's visit, the ODRP informed CINCPAC that the PN still desired four DDs, a destroyer tender, and an oiler. Although the Ambassador had told President Zia of U.S. willingness to resume normal relationships, no specific requests for assistance were forthcoming. The ODRP suggested to CINCPAC that, prior to pursuing the various PN requests, an attempt be made to determine specific ship availability dates. However, it wasn't until Benson's visit that Pakistan was informed that the DDs were available—two of them possibly by 1980.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy had reviewed the PN request for MK-46 torpedoes. In 1975 the Navy had reluctantly agreed with a State Department initiative to sell the MK-46 torpedo to Pakistan. Noting that the significant capability and sensitive technology of the MK-46 was common to all models, the Navy amended the FMS case for MK-46 Model 1 torpedoes to permit the substitution of Model 2s because the Model 1s were no longer adequately supportable by the U.S. Navy. Prior to amending the FMS case, the Navy had sought and received approval for the substitution as an exception to National Disclosure Policy. The FMS case called for 100 MK-46-2 torpedoes at a cost of about $17.7 million. In November the CNO informed the ODRP that an FMS case for an additional 40 MK-46 Model 2s was in process at an estimated cost of $7.340 million. Delivery was estimated in mid-1982. 3

**Fighter Aircraft**

Early in 1976 a four-man Pakistan Air Force (PAF) team visited the United States to evaluate the A-4, F-5, and A-7 as possible follow-on aircraft for the PAF. Their evaluation resulted in a formal request on 19 May 1976 to purchase 110 A-7s and a complete (except for nuclear weapons) array of weapon systems, munitions, electronic countermeasure equipment and target acquisition.

1. J471 Point Paper (2), 13 Jan 78, Subj: Pakistan Naval Expansion Plans (U), GDS-86; ODRP Islamabad 121100Z Oct 78 (2), GDS-82, which cited CINCPAC 230130Z Nov 77; ODRP Islamabad 090931Z Feb 78 (2), GDS-84.
2. ODRP Islamabad 121100Z Oct 78 (2), GDS-82; AMEMB Islamabad 10928/070810Z Nov 78 (2), GDS-86; CNO 301926Z Nov 78 (2), GDS-84.
capabilities. The JCS requested CINCPAC's views to incorporate in their response to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC convened the newly-formed PACOM Release Review Group to consider the PAF request, based on the external threat and technology involved in the requested systems and munitions. As a result of this review, CINCPAC recommended sale of only 59 A-7s in conjunction with replacement of aging F-86s as recognized in the JSOP FY 78-85. Furthermore, CINCPAC recommended not including offensive capabilities such as inflight refueling, and not releasing certain systems based on technological grounds.1

(CYNOEORNE) By February 1978, the ODRP had received informal information (that Pakistani funds earmarked for the A-7 purchase had been spent elsewhere, but that PAF interest in the purchase of F-5Es was growing.)

($) As previously noted, the U.S. Ambassador provided State with assessments of the political and military ramifications of U.S.-Pakistan relations upon his return to Pakistan from Washington in October 1978. One assessment concerned the question of aircraft for the PAF. This subject had been complicated by the early October decision of India to procure some 200 high performance "deep penetration strike" JAGUAR aircraft. These were a generation of fighters superior to F-5Es. Nevertheless, after a detailed analysis of the balance of power probabilities in South Asia vis-a-vis U.S. interests, the Ambassador recommended that Pakistan be offered between 70 and 80 F-5Es. However, he recommended against the sale of more potent aircraft, such as the A-7, F-16, or F-18. Also previously noted was the transmittal by Under Secretary Benson of U.S. Government willingness to provide F-5Es, but not the more advanced aircraft.3

($) The Ambassador's comments regarding aircraft were strongly endorsed by a November CINCPAC message which noted that relations between the United States and Pakistan were at an important, if not critical, stage. Provision of the F-5E would not only meet a valid air defense requirement, but would also reflect U.S. recognition of the important role a healthy, strong, and independent

2. AMEMB Islamabad 1455/091155Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 100857Z Feb 78 (C/XAF) (EX), GDS-84.
3. AMEMB Islamabad 10423/241043Z Oct 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86 and 10928/070810Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
Pakistan would play in South Asia and the Middle East.¹

(SYNFORM) On 20 December the PAF Chief of Staff indicated a desire to the American Ambassador to purchase 40 F-5Es; however, he stated there were no funds available and cited the competing needs of runway repair, a new air defense system, replacements for MIRAGE aircraft, as well as maintaining the current force. In his reporting to the State Department the Ambassador referred to the U.S. offers to influence financing from Middle East countries during Secretary Benson's visit and requested State's advice on how to proceed.²

Philippines

(U) All phases of the security assistance program in the Philippines were tempered during 1978 by negotiations on the Military Bases Agreement. The Government of the Philippines (GOP) wished to include a large monetary compensation package as part of the Agreement, however, the United States preferred to steer clear of establishing such a precedent. The negotiations, which had started in 1969, moved forward in 1978 and a new Agreement was signed on 7 January 1979. (See Chapter X, Political-Military Relationships.)

Department of Defense Equipment Survey Team

(U) The United States had been responsive to requests for accelerated deliveries of materiel and equipment in 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1977 within the limitations imposed by Congress, the Vietnam conflict, and program levels. Although the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had occasionally expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. responsiveness, it had generally acknowledged these efforts gratefully. In late 1977 and throughout 1978 the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continued to press for accelerated deliveries and the United States was even more responsive.

(U) On 22 December 1977 the GOP Ministry of National Defense (MND) submitted an extensive military equipment requirements list (MERL) to Chief JUSMAG Philippines which was forwarded the same day to CINCPAC. The JSOP-supported items alone were estimated at $1.7 billion, exclusive of training, concurrent spare parts, and support equipment. Approximately two-thirds of the entire list would cost $4.6 billion while the remaining one-third consisted of industrial projects. On 7 January 1978 the JCS advised CINCPAC of the formation of

1. CINCPAC 140425Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Islamabad 12854/280714Z Dec 78 (S), XGDS-1.
PHILIPPINES

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA ........................................ 300,440 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ................. 6,300 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE ....................... 12 Nautical Miles
POPULATION ...................................... 49,283,000
ANNUAL GROWTH ................................... 2.5 Percent
LITERACY RATE .................................... 82 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY ................................ 69 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA ....................... 0.25 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (FY 77) ............... $ 36.7 Billion
PER CAPITA ....................................... $ 645
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 77) ........................ $ 763.4 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ............... 14.5 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT ................................ "Republic"

* Martial Law in effect since September 1972 and the constitution suspended.

PRESIDENT ...................................... Ferdinand E. MARCOS
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................. Carlos P. RAMOS
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ............... Juan P. ENRIQUEZ
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFF .............................. GEN Ramos ERPINO, Army
CG, ARMY ........................................ MGEND Portosael U. ARAYA
FORS Command .................................... RADM Ernesto N. OUSBAN
CG, AIR FORCE .................................... MGEND Samuel O. SABINETO
CHIEF Constabulary ................................ MGEND Piedad RAMOS

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR ................................. HRH, Richard W. MURPHY
U.S. AID DIRECTOR ............................... MR. Thomas C. NELSON
CHIEF JUSMAG ..................................... MGEND Eugenio S. KORPAL, USA

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

ASSIST IN ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS.

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED INTERNAL SECURITY AND ANTI-SMUGGLING CAPABILITIES AND PROMOTE THE SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES.
PROMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND REGIONALLY, TO ENHANCE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY, WHEN APPROPRIATE.
PROMOTE SELF-RELIANCE.

ENCOURAGE CONTINUED CONTRIBUTION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CIVIC ACTION.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY

4 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Brigade, 1 Artillery Regiment,
2 Engineer Brigades, 1 Home Defense Force Group (Airborne), 1 Signal
Group, 1 Light Armored Regiment
Strength: 76,000
Constabulary: 13 Regional Commands (Brigade), 11 Battalions,
1 Metrocom (Brigade), 1 Presidential Guard Battalion
Strength: 43,400

In conjunction with the Constabulary, the Army can maintain internal security and perform counter-insurgency and civic action missions. Not capable of resisting a major external attack without considerable outside assistance. Budget limitations, understrength combat units, and lack of operational experience and training above battalion level retard combat readiness.

NAVY

1 Frigate, 66 Coastal Patrol types, 2 Mine Warfare types, 20 Amphibious types, 18 River Patrol Craft, 20 Auxiliary types, 2 Marine Brigades
Strength: 20,200, which includes 7,140 Marines

Conduct limited offshore patrol and minor amphibious and anti-submarine warfare operations.

AIR FORCE

1 Interceptor-Attack Squadron (12 F-6A, 2 F-4B), 2 Attack Squadrons (36 T-33D, 18 SF-260MX), 1 Day Fighter Squadrons (F-86), 5 Transport Squadrons (17 C-47, 8 C-133C, 1 EC-47, 8 F-27, 3 C-180H, 12 N-22 MONAID, 1 Training Squadrons (25 SF-260 Marchetti Trainers, 11 T-35A, 1 RT-35A, ET-34A, 22 T-41D), 1 Air Commando Squadron (24 UH-1H), 2 Air Rescue Squadrons (2 MB-109, 5 HH-43D, 2 HH-45D), U.S.-provided F-15A aircraft started to arrive in the fall of 1978.
Strength: 16,000

Limited capability to assist the Army in maintaining internal security and contributing to the defense against external attack.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 74.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
a DOD equipment survey team, in conjunction with the Philippine base negotia-
tions, which would go to Manila in late January to review the MERL with GOP
officials. The team would be composed of a JCS general/flag officer as team
leader plus one member each from the Air Force, Army, Navy, CINCPAC, and DSAA.
This was followed by a Secretary of Defense message to JUSMAG Philippines re-
questing clarification and identification on many of the items in preparation
for the DOD survey team's arrival in country. The message also directed JUSMAG
to impress upon the GOP that the "extreme and unexpected length of the list,"
plus the fact that it was not prioritized, added considerably to the efforts
required in Washington and might cause delay of the team's arrival.1

(§) The team conducted a review and assessment of the MERL in Washington
from 16-28 January. On 31 January the Secretary of State provided terms of
reference which directed the team to discuss the list with GOP representatives
"with a view towards assisting final U.S. Government consideration of equip-
ment it might take into account in addressing Philippine needs in terms of
the MDT and MBA." The team was to listen to Philippine rationale, indicate
the limitations of U.S. financing, explain the difficulties of providing cer-
tain items, identify items that would be most effective, and convey to the
AFP that the team was not empowered to make any decisions or commitments re-
garding the scope or composition of the arms transfers.2

(§) En route the team stopped in Hawaii to meet with CINCPAC staff members
and component command representatives and arrived in Manila on 2 February.
After extensive consultations with JUSMAG and American Embassy personnel,
wherein the Ambassador recast the team direction to focus on air defense and
sea surveillance, the team commenced discussions with AFP officials on 6 Feb-
uary. The team reported that U.S. efforts to focus on priorities and reduce
AFP expectations as to the size and content of any equipment compensation
package were met with resistance. Each Philippine Service provided the team
with detailed priority listings of desired equipment, and upon completion of
the discussions, AFP representatives at the working level still had exaggerated
expectations as to the U.S. Government equipment package. The team returned
to Hawaii on 14 February and completed a draft report on 15 February prior to
departure for Washington.3

(§) CINCPAC comments to the JCS on the draft report supported the team's
overall prioritization efforts as being the best obtainable in view of the

1. J475 Point Paper (§), 19 Dec 78, Subj: Security Assistance to the Philip-
pines and Base Negotiations (U), GDS-86; JCS 1775/071623Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-
86; SECDEF 8148/120013Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-86.
2. J474 HistSum Feb 78 (§), GDS-86; SECSTATE 24967/310323Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84.
3. J474 HistSum Feb 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPACREP PHIL 040700Z Feb 78 (§), GDS-86.
political realities and attendant constraints. The 27 February message pointed out that the proposed compensating equipment would require a substantial increase in related training and recommended that the final equipment list include a $12.5 million five-year IMET package, a provision for engineer and baseline surveys, technical assistance, concurrent spare parts, support equipment and follow-on support requirements. The message also expressed certain reservations with regard to the radar equipment package and A-7 aircraft.1

The final team report was sent by the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador in Manila on 16 March for presentation to President Marcos (either with the U.S. compensation offer or separately as he deemed appropriate). The Ambassador was to advise President Marcos that the report was meant to provide an indication of what the United States believed possible and desirable, subject to further refinements. Decisions on the procurement of items and means of financing them rested with the GOP, and normal military procurement and financing procedures would apply. The United States would make its best efforts to satisfy the requests as expeditiously as possible subject to availability, Arms Transfer Policy constraints, and Congressional action where appropriate. The Ambassador presented the base compensation offer and comments on the equipment list to President Marcos, Minister of Foreign Affairs Romulo, and Minister of National Defense Enrile on 16 March. The report of the DOD team, calling for a five-year package totaling $400 million, was presented to the Chief of Staff AFP the same day. The basic package was as shown on the accompanying chart.2

On 28 March Defense Secretary Enrile informed the American Ambassador that the GOP counterproposal on compensation would be forwarded after the 7 April 1978 elections, but in the months following it was not received. During a visit to the Philippines in late October by Senator Inouye (D-HI), President Marcos was made aware of the positive aspects of submitting a base compensation package in time to be included in the FY 80 budget submission to the U.S. Congress in January 1979. President Marcos responded that he would resolve the issue by the end of the year. The compensation offer to the GOP at the end of 1978, which was independent of the itemized MERL, was as follows:3

1. CINCPAC 270745Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; for discussion of the radar package, see Ch. VI.

SECRET

457
**SECRET**

**DOD Survey Team Basic Equipment List**

<table>
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<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>IRAN Team for existing radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Air Defense Radar (ITT Series 320)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2G Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Line Communication Technical Survey Team</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VULCAN Gun</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery (105/155mm Howitzers)</td>
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<td>PSMM</td>
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<td>AFDL-10 (Dry Dock Overhaul)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* FY 78 MAP funds were used for IRAN survey in September 1978. FY 79 MAP ($1.1M) funds will be programmed for repair of one of three air defense radar sites.

** On 15 July 1978 PM Marcos signed and released the International Technical Products Corporation (ITPC) contract for four ITT series 320 radars. Contract price increase apparently delayed implementation; price of $29M was agreed upon in mid-October 1978. GOP was weighing alternatives of cancelling the contract in November/December 1978.
105mm Howitzer Ammunition

(W) In a February 1978 message to the Department of the Army, the Chief JUSMAG reviewed the status of FMS cases for 100,000 105mm cartridges and fuzes which had been initiated in June and October 1977 respectively. The message also requested that delivery of both items be expedited since the AFP faced total depletion of stocks in early May, based on current expenditure rates of 15,759 rounds per month. Chief JUSMAG noted

(W) CINCPAC supported the JUSMAG request and sought to ensure expedited delivery of at least a partial shipment of cartridges and fuzes. However, some delay ensued even after the AFP completed $10.1 million payment in advance for both cases. The delay was caused in part by paperwork, proposals for substitute fuzes, and lack of agreement as to sources for both items, and it was not until 27 August that the ammunition reached the Philippines. However, according to a CINCPAC staff paper the projected AFP stock depletion did not occur and it was subsequently learned that the actual inventory status of the AFP 105mm ammunition was unknown.2

Munitions Management Team Visit

(W) In a May message to the Department of the Army, CINCPAC presented a resume of recent problems in fulfilling Philippine requests for accelerated deliveries of FMS munitions and asked for comments on ways to streamline FMS processing procedures further. By August it was determined by concerned commands that a munitions management team from the Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command should be sent to the Philippines to discuss methods and guidelines for ammunitions pricing procedures. JUSMAG Philippines requested that the team also assist in providing methodology for developing consumption and logistics management data for ammunition.3

(U) The four-man team, accompanied by a CINCPAC Security Assistance representative, met with JUSMAG representatives and visited the AFP General Head-

1. J474 HistSum Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; CHUUSMAG PHIL 080845Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 180307Z Feb 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J474 HistSums Apr, May, Jun 78 (C), GDS-84; J474 HistSum Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 210506Z Apr 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 090742Z May 78 (C), GDS-86; CINCPAC 250112Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 072235Z Jun 78 (U); J474 Point Paper (S), 26 Aug 78, Subj: Accelerated Availability/Delivery of 100,000 each 105mm HE Howitzer Cartridges and Fuses (Feb-Jun 78) (U), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 252316Z May 78 (C), GDS-84; J475 HistSums Jul, Aug 78 (U).
quarters at Fort Bonifacio on 28-29 November. The meetings opened with a
summary presentation to 15 senior AFP personnel which covered FMS policies and
procedures, ammunition management and rates computation, and ammunition pricing
concepts and production schedules. Expanded presentations and discussions
with 32 junior logistics officers and NCOs followed which sought to provide
a realistic perspective of munitions management and price escalation problems.1

F-8 Aircraft

A Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) was signed on 17 October 1977
by Philippine officials for 35 F-8H fighter aircraft on an "as is-where is"
basis for $11.7 million. Ten air frames "spares" were to stay at Dallas for
potential long-term parts support. The other 25 were to be refurbished by
LTV (Ling-Temco-Vought) at a cost of $22.8 million. Projected delivery of the
initial aircraft was April and of the remainder, between September and December
1978; however, the first F-8H did not reach Basa AB, R.P. until 6 July.2

Numerous problems plagued the program throughout 1978 ranging from
delays in training, acquisition of spare parts, support equipment and ammunition
and faulty refurbishing procedures, to financial and computer problems.

The LTV contract called for training 18 pilots and 60 technicians in
Dallas starting in March 1978 and ending in January 1979. However, the only
two-seat F-8 in existence (which had been leased from NASA) crashed and alternate
arrangements had to be made for pilot training. The U.S. Navy had estimated
that $3.2 million worth of F-8H repair parts and aerospace ground equipment,
extcess to service requirements, would be available. However, due to
computer problems and improper requisition coding, availability was lower than
anticipated. As of December 1978, the Navy International Logistics Control
Office (NAVILCO) was still attempting to clear the backlog of approximately
1,000 requisitions.3

In mid-February the U.S. Embassy in Manila had forwarded a request
from the AFP to the State Department for 700,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition
under an FMS LOA. In a May message to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
CINCPAC pointed out that air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery training had

1. J475 HistSum Nov 78 (D), GDS-84.
2. J475 Point Paper (D), 19 Dec 78, Subj: Philippine F-8H Aircraft Acquisition
   (U), GDS-84; SECSTATE 30391/040745Z Feb 78 (U); J4 BWEBs 30 Jan-12 Feb,
   25 Sep-8 Oct 78 (D), GDS-84.
not been conducted by LTV as part of the initial CONUS contractor training package. Therefore, the PAF would have to conduct this training after the aircraft arrived in the Philippines and would need ammunition which the PAF would consider the United States should provide. CINCPAC also expressed concern as to the availability of the ammunition, because there were no ongoing procurement actions or stocks in theater, and suggested the possibility of providing an initial increment to meet PAF near-term requirements until production assets became available. The FMS case for 400,000 rounds from stocks assets and 300,000 rounds from production was for $16.3 million. While there was some thought that the PAF might reject the FMS case for production 20mm ammunition, CNO released the LOA for 400,000 rounds at $6.9 million on 31 October, and in mid-December the AFP requested a 30-day extension on the case to compensate for lost working time during the holidays and to carry the case into the new Philippine fiscal year.1

Other areas of concern were the inadequate support facilities at Basa Air Base. Hangar space was limited and plans to support aircraft on the ramp were not satisfactory. As of 10 November four F-8Hs were in-country and the PAF had requested permission to perform training operations at Clark Air Base since Basa lacked a barrier system. Due to the severe air traffic congestion at Clark, the U.S. Air Force sought an alternative and the optimum solution appeared to be the temporary installation of a U.S. Air Force-owned barrier at Basa. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drafted, signed by 13th Air Force and PAF officials on 28 November, and the barrier was installed by mid-December. Meanwhile, the LTV Hawaii representative advised that commercial purchase of items on approximately 300 unfilled F-8 requisitions would require about $5 million in additional funding by the Philippines. Thus, the American Embassy and CINCPAC believed that, while the initial acquisition price of the F-8H was low, the extremely tight Philippine funding restraints and the extensive refurbishing and support equipment costs for the F-8H aircraft might impact severely on the overall deployment of the Philippine logistics support posture.2

As a result of the above problems, overall program deliveries slipped approximately six months. By 19 December a total of 12 F-8Hs had arrived at Basa AB and ten participated in a "fly-by" on 21 December for Philippine Armed

1. CINCPAC 192146Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; J4 BWEBs 8-21 May 78 (U), 5-18 Jun 78 (U), 17-30 Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; J471 HistSum Dec 78 (S), GDS-84; CHJUSMAG PHIL 200520Z Dec 78 (U).
2. Op. Cit., J475 Point Paper, 19 Dec 78; J476 HistSum Nov 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Manila 13132/010019Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 071955Z Aug 78 (S), GDS-84.
Forces Day. The remaining 13 aircraft were due to arrive by March 1979.¹

As a follow-on to the above F-8H acquisition program, the AFP requested P&B data on 35 F-8J aircraft to form a second F-8 squadron. In forwarding the request to the State Department on 1 August, the American Embassy in Manila was concerned with the long-term program supportability and felt that funds to acquire these aircraft "...might be better directed to increasing the capabilities and support for existing systems."

CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS, echoed the Embassy's concern and emphasized efforts by JUSMAG Philippines to point out to the AFP the pitfalls which might be expected in logistic support requirements and which could impact adversely on operational readiness. While not wishing to dissuade the AFP in weighing the alternatives to a second F-8 squadron, CINCPAC felt it was essential to insure that the decision entail a comprehensive portrayal of all related requirements and recommended inclusion of specific provisions for an in-depth program review and a baseline survey to identify current and projected support requirements versus on-hand assets.²

On 12 December the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) provided the P&B data to the American Embassy which covered 11 complete F-8J aircraft, 24 F-8Js without engines, 24 J-S7-P420 engines, and appropriate support items. The P&B package cost was approximately $7 million and included an optional line for "Program Management Planning," (pre-site, site survey, and a technical logistics development plan) at a cost of $100,000. The package did not, however, include the CINCPAC recommended provision for an in-depth program review.

T-28 Rehabilitation Program

During 1975 the GOP accepted a total of 60 T-28 aircraft which were located in Thailand under MIMEX procedures. Late in 1975 the Secretary of Defense had granted an exception to policy to allow MAP funding for rehabilitation of the T-28s, which was to be done under contract with Philippine Airlines.⁴

In September 1977 JUSMAG Philippines initiated procedures for obtaining

1. J475 HistSum Dec 78 (G), GDS-84; J4 BWEB 22 Oct-4 Nov 78 (G), GDS-84; Interview with CDR W. Wallis, USN, J475, 26 Jul 79.
2. AMEMB Manila 13132/010019Z Aug 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 071955Z Aug 78 (G), GDS-84.
3. CNO 122356Z Dec 78 (U); J471 HistSum Dec 78 (G), GDS-84.
residual Government Furnished Material/Government Furnished Equipment (GFM/GFE) for use by the Philippine Air Force after completion of the T-28D rehabilitation and modification contract by Philippine Airlines (PAL). Through administrative error the items were removed from the PAL supply warehouse and transferred to the U.S. Defense Property Disposal Office (DPDO) at Clark AB.\(^1\)

(U) In March 1978 JUSMAG requested CINCPAC assistance to place a hold on all T-28D GFE/GFM items currently held at the DPDO Clark until a determination was made whether or not they could be provided to the PAF as excess defense articles under the FY 78 MAP. The Defense Property Disposal Region Pacific granted CINCPAC's request to freeze the items, which had a total (inventory) value of approximately $556,448. After negotiations between CINCPAC, the Navy, Air Force, OSAA, and DPDO, it was agreed that $95,000 worth of parts would be withdrawn for U.S. Navy use. In May 1978 a grant aid requisition line was established for the remaining T-28 GFM/GFE items excess to U.S. military requirements and JUSMAG was requested to remove them from the DPDO at Clark.\(^2\)

**Infrared Countermeasures**

(S) In March 1977 the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines had suggested assisting the GOP in developing T-28 aircraft infrared countermeasures to counter the possible SA-7 threat in the Southern Philippines. By May 1977 the most viable solution to the problem was confirmed by the USAF Tactical Air Command as the application of infrared paint and installation of heat shields.\(^3\)

(S) In December 1977 it was determined through a fabrication and flight safety test that heat shields would be structurally adequate for use on the T-28D aircraft. The infrared operational test and certification of shields was successfully conducted by a team from the 4950th Test Wing from Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, at Basa AB, R.P. on 27 January 1978.\(^4\)

**IMET Funding**

(S/NODENT) In March JUSMAG Philippines advised that the Philippine Government had assumed responsibility for round-trip surface travel of Philippine personnel.

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1. J475 HistSum Mar 78 (U).
2. J475 HistSums Mar 78 (U), Apr 78 (U), and May 78 (U); CHJUSMAG PHIL 060835Z Mar 78 (U); CINCPAC 080535Z Mar 78 (U); CDR DPDR PAC 132207Z Mar 78 (U); AFLC 191507Z May 78 (U).
4. J475 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; Dir Mat Mgt 031952Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-83; CHJUSMAG PHIL 121330Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; CHJUSMAG PHIL 270900Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
students attending CONUS training in lieu of payment from IMET funds. While it was hoped that freeing of approximately $78,000 in FY 78 would permit training of 15-20 percent more students under the IMET Program, it was found that the 22 percent increase in FY 79 tuition costs offset this savings. In October CINCPAC supported U.S. Embassy Manila proposals to expand IMET for the Philippines by including IMET as part of the base compensation package at an annual cost of $2 million plus per year. CINCPAC further recommended to the JCS that an increase of $150,000 be provided for Philippine training from residual worldwide IMET funds, if available, in late FY 79. The JCS response indicated support of both proposals but pointed out that prospects for FY 79 IMET funds were bleak since Congress had appropriated 12.3 percent less than authorized. Further, inclusion of IMET in the base compensation package would not be possible unless the Presidential Review Committee were reconvened.1

MAP Fund Support of JUSMAG Open Mess

(U) In March the Secretary of Defense directed CINCPAC to reduce MAP-funded support, estimated at $78,000 for FY 78, of the Navy Officers' Open Mess in Manila which a Defense Audit Service (DAS) report had found excessive. A CINCPAC tasking message to Chief JUSMAG Philippines quoted applicable portions of the DAS report, which stated that although DOD guidance did not address use of such facilities by foreign nationals, the ratio of patrons of approximately 14 Filipino nationals to one MAAG member was considered high. The DAS suggested that perhaps a surcharge might be imposed on Filipinos to increase revenues and to comply with DOD Directive 1330.2 requiring that resale facilities generally be self-sustaining. CINCPAC felt that $10,000-$15,000 would be a realistic annual funding level and suggested elimination of personnel paid with appropriated funds, substitution of local nationals for U.S. civilians, or increased aid-in-kind support from the host government as possible means to reduce outlays.2

(U) The Chief JUSMAG Philippines response pointed out that the appropriated fund support for the mess did not come from MAP funding but from the Military Assistance Executive Appropriation, and that the mess manager also managed the package store and the recreation fund. Since the Chief of Naval Operations had granted one civilian space to the mess, it should be the Chief JUSMAG's prerogative to hire either a Civil Service or non-appropriated fund mess manager. Moreover, the present manager's contract would not expire until November 1979.

1. J475 HistSum Mar 78 (U); CINCPAC 142110Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86; J475 Point Paper (S), 19 Dec 78, Subj: Philippines, IMETP (U), GDS-84; JCS 6293/161648Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. J475 HistSum Mar 78 (U); SECDEF 8154/220046Z Mar 78 (U); CINCPAC 310417Z Mar 78 (U).
Immediate conversion from a Civil Service billet would require RIF procedures and, in view of MAAG personnel reductions, the near-term status of the mess was uncertain. The Chief JUSMAG also advised that Navy personnel regulations did not address a surcharge and, in any event, imposition of such a charge would create an irritant which would defeat one of the club's objectives; i.e., the fostering of good relationships with host country personnel. Chief JUSMAG believed the required reductions could be accomplished by raising prices six to eight percent and by improving management practices. He therefore asked CINCPAC's approval of sufficient appropriated funds to cover the salary and expenses of the club manager so long as it was a Civil Service billet—otherwise funding for the position would not be required. CINCPAC supported the JUSMAG plan and advised the Secretary of Defense of compliance with the DAS report findings.1

Singapore

Overview

Basic U.S. Pacific strategy depended strongly on a friendly and cooperative relationship with Singapore as a counter balance against the possibility that the Soviet Union might develop additional positions athwart U.S. lines of communication. The United States looked to Singapore for Seventh Fleet base support, access to the Indian Ocean and support to the base at Diego Garcia. Security assistance was the major means of obtaining support for U.S. objectives. Since 1975 security assistance to Singapore, as with Malaysia, had centered around the Crowe-Shackley (DOD-CIA) interdepartmental team visit.2

Grenade Launcher Coproduction

In March 1977 the Government of Singapore (GOS) requested a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) on the technical data package (TDP) for the M-203 grenade launcher. The GOS proposed a joint production venture with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) amounting to an estimated 2,000-2,500 for the GOS and 5,500-6,000 for the RTG per year. The U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) in Singapore, CHJUSMAG Thailand and the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok enthusiastically endorsed the proposal. Action in Washington on the request for the TDP seemed to move slowly until October 1977, when President Carter personally assured the GOS Prime Minister that the sale of the TDP would be approved. The GOS

1. J475 HistSums Apr, May 78 (U); CHJUSMAG PHIL 2608252 Apr 78 (U); CINCPAC 0503562 May 78 (U).
SINGAPORE

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA
682 sq Km

LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS
2 Nautical Miles

LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE
300 Nautical Miles

POPULATION
5,289,000

ANNUAL GROWTH
1.5 Percent

LITERACY RATE
70 Percent

LIFE EXPECTANCY
70 Years

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA
91 Acre

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
$8.64 Billion

PER CAPITA
$1,560

DEFENSE BUDGET
$413.5 Million

OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET
18.5 Percent

TYPE GOVERNMENT
Republic within Commonwealth

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY
1 Division, 2 Infantry Brigade, 1 Artillery Brigade, 1 Armored Brigade, 1 Commando Battalion, 4 Engineer Brigade, 1 Signal Brigade

Strength: 22,000

NAVY
12 Coastal Patrol, 4 Amphibious Ships/Craft, 2 Mine Warfare, 2 Service type

Strength: 1,000

AIR FORCE
182 Jet, 8 Turboprop, 18 Prop, 19 Helicopters

Strength: 4,500

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PRESERVATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP UNDER WHICH U.S. ENJOYS CONTINUED ACCESS TO SINGAPORE'S NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES.

CONTINUATION OF SINGAPORE SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT IN AND OVER THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE.

CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF SINGAPORE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN SECURITY.

CONTINUATION OF MODERATE, NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENT NOT SUBJECT TO UNION PACIFIC OR SOVIET INFLUENCE.

IMPROVED SINGAPORE RELATIONS WITH ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL THEMES OF COOPERATION AND PEACE.

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 75.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals.
signed the LOA in February 1978.\footnote{1}

In April 1978 the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) informed the USDAO in Singapore that, because of the high-level interest in the M-203 joint production concept, the need for 30-day prior notification to Congress before the TDP could be transferred from Singapore to Thailand had been overlooked. After this oversight was remedied, assurances were still required from the RTG under the AECA that no grenade launchers would be made available to any third party without the express approval of the United States. The TDP was received by the GOS in May 1978, but it was not until August that the assurances were provided by the RTG.\footnote{2}

On 5 September the State Department authorized the Embassy in Singapore to convey to appropriate GOS authorities the consent of the U.S. Government to transfer technical data on the M-203 grenade launcher to Thailand. By the end of 1978, the GOS and RTG had expressed interest in coproduction of the ammunition (40mm) used with the M-203 in order to support the entire system in case it was phased out by the U.S. Army.\footnote{3}

**A-4 Aircraft**

At the end of September 1978 the U.S. Embassy in Singapore reported that the Government of Singapore (GOS) had requested the purchase of 20 used A-4C aircraft from U.S. Government stock. The aircraft were to serve as replacements for aircraft already lost through attrition plus anticipated future attrition. The Embassy recommended that the request be approved since the sale would have no effect on the regional balance of military forces and would be a positive response to offset the refusal in late 1977 by President Carter of a GOS request for the Improved HAWK Air Defense Missile. CINCPAC also endorsed the request and cited the proposed plan of Singapore and Indonesia to refurbish the aircraft in a joint venture as a contribution towards regional cooperation and security. It would also be a positive signal to reinforce Singapore's approval of C-141 resupply and P-3 Indian Ocean surveillance flights to stage through Tengah Air Base, as well as frequent port visits and access.

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1. J472 Point Paper (N), 18 Dec 78, GDS-84, Subj: M-203 Coproduction, Singapore and Thailand (U), GDS-84; J472 HistSum Apr 78 (N), GDS-84; AMEMB Singapore 1725/170210Z Apr 78 (N), GDS-84.
2. J472 HistSums Apr (N), GDS-84 and Aug 78 (N), GDS-86; SECDEF 7270/101647Z Apr 78 (N), GDS-84; J4/Memo/C55-78 (N), of 17 Apr 78, Subj: PTDP for M-203 Grenade Launcher (U), GDS-84; SECSTATE 104519/242312Z Apr 78 (N), GDS-84; AMEMB Bangkok 24330/231223Z Aug 78 (N), XGDS-1, REVW 23 Aug 08.
3. J472 HistSum Sep 78 (N), GDS-84; SECSTATE 224377/051616Z Sep 78 (N), GDS-84; J4 BWEB 31 Dec 78-13 Jan 79 (N), GDS-84; J472 HistSum Dec 78 (N), GDS-84.
to repair facilities by U.S. Navy vessels.¹

(chn) On 6 November the State Department informed the Embassy that the sale of 20 used A-4C aircraft to Singapore had been approved and that the Defense Department had been requested to process the case.²

Crew Chief Familiarization

(chn) In January 1978 the GOS proposed familiarization/orientation flights to Clark AB in the Philippines by members of the Royal Singapore Air Force (RSAF) to observe the U.S. Air Force crew chief system in operation. In response to query from CINCPAC, the U.S. Embassy in Manila acknowledged the value of providing RSAF access to the crew chief system at Clark, but noted that such flights could rekindle RSAF interest in a previous proposal for A-4 training at Clark. That proposal had been held in abeyance because of the sensitivity of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) negotiations between the Philippines and the United States. In view of the reservations expressed by the U.S. Embassy in Manila, CINCPAC recommended to PACAF that the Singapore crew chief familiarization project be delayed until such time as base negotiations progressed to a stage where the Singapore requests would not have a potential adverse political impact.³

(chn) The U.S. Embassy in Singapore addressed the Embassy Manila reservations, noting that there was no connection between the crew chief familiarization proposal and pending GOS plans for A-4 training in the Philippines. Rather, the objective of the crew chief project was a very short visit to Clark AB to watch U.S. Air Force crew chiefs in action. It would involve no more than a brief visit by RSAF personnel for informal discussions with maintenance personnel of Clark's Tactical Fighter Wing. Therefore, the Embassy in Singapore requested the Embassy in Manila to reconsider the GOS request. The Embassy in Manila again declined to support the request because of the potential impact on the base negotiations. Once again the Embassy in Singapore pressed the point, noting that the GOS had already been informed that there would be no movement on the A-4 training project until further progress had been made in the U.S.-Philippine negotiations. The GOS would take no action

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TSFED), Vol. II, pp. 347,348; J472 HistSums Sep 78 (chn), GDS-84 and Oct 78 (chn), GDS-84; AMEMB Singapore 4422/290930Z Sep 78 (chn), GDS-84; CINCPAC 060336Z Oct 78 (chn), GDS-84.
2. J472 HistSum Nov 78 (chn), GDS-84; SECSTATE 282168/061804Z Nov 78 (chn), GDS-84.
3. J472 HistSum Feb 78 (chn), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 2150/080807Z Feb 78 (chn), GDS-84, which cited CINCPAC 240239Z Jan 78 and 250443Z Jan 78; CINCPAC 180302Z Feb 78 (chn), GDS-86.
on that matter until a signal had been received. Since that subject had formally been laid to rest, the Embassy in Singapore found it difficult to understand how the crew chief familiarization visit could affect the negotiations.  

On 1 March CINCPAC informed the two Ambassadors of his agreement with the Embassy Manila reluctance to support the GOS request because of the sensitive nature of base negotiations. At the same time, CINCPAC expressed concern for the impact of unresponsiveness to GOS requests for assistance in light of its favorable accommodation of U.S. interest and activities in Singapore. CINCPAC offered optional proposals for consideration by the two Embassies. The immediate option recommended by CINCPAC, as a no-cost training option, was for PACAF personnel scheduled to visit Singapore during the first week in April to conduct discussions of mutual Air Force interest and to give a presentation on the U.S. Air Force crew chief system. Another option was to incorporate the crew chief familiarization into the RSAF C-130 flight training program to Clark AB, which had been underway for sometime. CINCPAC suggested that perhaps additional crew chiefs and maintenance officers could be carried on those flights. Although appropriate diplomatic clearances would be required for the RSAF personnel, this would be a minor modification to an existing program. This option—that small numbers of RSAF maintenance personnel transit Clark by means of the RSAF C-130 training flights—was endorsed by the Embassy in Singapore as meeting the needs of the program. The Embassy in Singapore also considered that a PACAF presentation on the U.S. Air Force crew chief concept would be a productive introduction to the subject. However, the Embassy in Manila still did not endorse the project.  

In a personal message to the Ambassador in Manila, CINCPAC acknowledged the delicate nature of the base negotiations and the impending visit to the Philippines by Vice President Mondale. He expressed hope that the crew chief familiarization project could be reconsidered after the visit by the Vice President. He noted the description of the training visits by the Defense Attache in Singapore as "low-key talks, opportunity to watch and ask questions," which CINCPAC considered to be more orientation visits than training. CINCPAC also recognized the need to notify the Philippines but believed that could be done in an equally low-key manner in conjunction with the established flight training program. The Ambassador responded with agreement that the C-130 training flights to Clark would seem to be a feasible way to provide the crew chief

1. AMEMB Singapore 802/220415Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86 and 913/272200Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 3016/231025Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.  
2. J472 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 012147Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Singapore 1009/030420Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 3538/030908Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86.
familiarization desired by the RSAF. Following the visit of the Vice President, the Ambassador suggested that the matter could be discussed further.\(^1\)

\(^1\) After the PACAF Team had provided the crew chief briefing in Singapore in April, CINCPAC queried the DAO in Singapore as to whether the RSAF still desired to observe and discuss the U.S. Air Force crew chief system at Clark Air Base. The DAO replied that the RSAF was still interested in the program, noting that the PACAF briefing of 4 April was of benefit to the RSAF and appreciated by both operations and engineering personnel. Nevertheless, direct discussion with U.S. Air Force personnel at Clark Air Base would be of additional assistance and the RSAF desired to send a small contingent (two-three) of maintenance personnel for informal discussions.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Accordingly, CINCPAC requested the concurrence of the Ambassador in Manila to proceed with the crew chief familiarization project, noting that he would not pursue this project if it were believed likely to impede base negotiations in any way. On 15 June the Embassy concurred in the concept of the RSAF carrying additional crew chiefs and maintenance officers on the C-130 training flights from Singapore to Clark. The GDS would be required to seek from the Philippine Government the appropriate diplomatic clearances for all such flights and to acknowledge that additional RSAF personnel would be aboard for crew chief familiarization while the aircraft was at Clark. The Embassy also suggested that the Armed Forces of the Philippines be notified through the Plans Committee of the Mutual Defense Board. Thereupon, CINCPAC reviewed the stipulations with the Embassy in Singapore and advised that the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines would present notification of the project to the MDB Plans Committee as soon as possible.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The Embassy in Singapore responded on 25 July that the guidelines for the conduct of the crew chief familiarization project as stipulated by the Embassy in Manila and CINCPAC were acceptable to the RSAF, which was prepared to send a three-man team on 9 August 1978 if convenient. The Embassy in Singapore also requested CINCPAC to provide appropriate notification to the MDB Plans Committee. CINCPAC requested his Representative in the Philippines to notify the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which was done on 31 July 1978. On 18 August PACAF informed CINCPAC that the first three-man visit of RSAF personnel had taken place on 9-12 August. They received informal briefings

1. CINCPAC 092209Z Mar 78 (\(_G\)\_), GDS-84; AMEMB Manila 3877/100733Z Mar 78 (\(_G\)\_), GDS-84.
2. J472 HistSum May 78 (\(_G\)\_), GDS-84; CINCPAC 112017Z May 78 (\(_G\)\_), GDS-84; USDAO Singapore 924/240800Z May 78 (\(_G\)\_), GDS-84.
on the U.S. Air Force crew chief system, as well as informal conversations with crew chiefs and other maintenance personnel. PACAF considered the visit to be successful from both the U.S. Air Force and RSAF standpoints. The low-level, informal nature of the visit allowed a maximum amount of fruitful interchange between the maintenance personnel of both Air Forces.¹

Sri Lanka

IMETP

Sri Lanka was designated a "CONUS-only" country for training under IMET. The U.S. Embassy and CINCPAC had consistently supported the retention of a small grant aid training program. In late 1977, the Embassy noted the deletion of Sri Lanka from the CPD for FY 79 and requested State to support the continuation of a modest IMETP as being in the best interest of the United States. CINCPAC also recommended that the JCS initiate action to establish Sri Lanka IMETP funds in the FY 79 security assistance budget and its inclusion in the CPD. The JCS agreed that the training program was supportive of U.S. objectives.²

In spite of careful scheduling and full utilization of FY 78 IMET funds, which amounted to $62,147, by the Embassy and CINCPAC, the JCS informed CINCPAC in March 1978 that no IMET funds were allocated for Sri Lanka in FY 79. Allocation depended on Congressional IMET funding and subsequent State review of priorities. The JCS acknowledged the concern again expressed by CINCPAC and the Embassy, stating that agencies in Washington, including State, were sympathetic with the Sri Lanka situation.³

In early November, the Ambassador expressed strong disagreement with the elimination of the FY 79 IMETP for Sri Lanka, which he termed "unacceptable." He noted that IMET for Sri Lanka had begun in the late 1960's at U.S. Government initiative. A number of Sri Lankan officers, including the current (1978) second highest ranking officers in the Sri Lankan Army and Air Force, had

1. J472 HistSum Jul 78 (Q), GDS-84 and Aug 78 (U), GDS-84; AMEMB Singapore 3321/250849Z Jul 78 (Q), GDS-84; CINCPAC 270229Z Jul 78 (Q), GDS-84 and 040502Z Aug 78 (Q), GDS-84; CINCPACREP 029130X Jul 78 (Q), GDS-84; USDAO Singapore 1416/030915Z Aug 78 (Q), GDS-84 and 1445/070711Z Aug 78 (U); Hq PACAF 180030Z Aug 78 (U).
3. JCS 1102/080007Z Mar 78 (Q), GDS-84, which cited USDAO Colombo 281010Z Feb 78 and CINCPAC 041850Z Mar 78.
### SRI LANKA

#### BASIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>65,500 Sq Km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limits of Territorial Waters</td>
<td>12 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of Economic Zone</td>
<td>200 Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>14,523,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth</td>
<td>1.6 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>92 Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy</td>
<td>62 Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arable Land Per Capita</td>
<td>3 Acre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
<td>$8.1 Billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>$24.7 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Total Government Budget</td>
<td>5.6 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type Government</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

**ARMY**

- 2 Infantry Battalions, 1 Artillery Regiment (Battalion), 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (Battalion).
- **Strength:** 5,000
- **Reserves (Volunteer Force):** 2,000

**NAVY**

- 6 Patrol Craft, 20 Patrol Boats (est. op.)
- **Strength:** 2,500

**AIR FORCE**

- 1 Tactical Squadron (MIG-17), 2 Transport Squadrons (DH-114, C-1), Convair 587, Convair 440, DC-2, Cessna 150, 1 Helicopter Squadron (OH-13DJ, Bell 204A, RA-566), 1 Training Squadron (T-6A, BHC-1, C-1)
- **Strength:** 2,500

#### U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

- **Provide a tangible reminder of U.S. interests in Sri Lanka to act as a counterweight to Soviet and presence.**
- **Maintain good working relationship with all political and military elements to influence development of a stable and non-aligned government of Sri Lanka friendly to United States.**
- **Assist the government of Sri Lanka in developing expertise for effective management of its defense establishment.**

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 76.

Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
attended courses in the United States. There had been a hiatus from 1970 to 1977 because of a strong Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) policy of nonalignment but, when a new GSL assumed power in 1977, enthusiastic participation in the IMET was resumed, also with U.S. Government encouragement. Sri Lankan participants in the program, stated the Ambassador, returned from the United States with an increased awareness and appreciation for U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean and overall U.S. goals. The Ambassador considered the program to be essential and requested State to restore the requested ($78,747) FY 79 IMETP for Sri Lanka. In April 1979 $30,000 was made available for the Sri Lankan FY 79 IMET Program.1

GSL Ship Request

(2) In October 1977 the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) inquired about the possibility of acquiring a destroyer/frigate-type ship as a replacement for the SLN flagship which had been scrapped. He was advised that the outlook for such ships was not optimistic. In January 1978 the GSL forwarded a request for a HAMILTON-class Coast Guard cutter either as a gift or at a nominal cost. The ship would be used primarily for training SLN personnel, with auxiliary fishing and petroleum research activities. However, the American Embassy in Colombo recommended against the request, the State Department agreed, and in February the GSL was advised that the U.S. Government was unable to fill the request. On 1 March CINCPAC asked JCS support to seek an alternative vessel (ATF) expected to be available shortly. CINCPAC also reviewed stated U.S. objectives in the Sri Lanka MSAP for FY 80-84 and State Department guidance "to encourage continued access of U.S. Navy ships to Sri Lanka and the preservation of existing VOA facilities." CINCPAC pointed out the potential rescue and salvage capability such a ship might afford and its potential contribution to GSL stability. However, the JCS, while acknowledging CINCPAC's rationale, advised that the particular ATF had been designated for another country and no others would be available until FY 83.2

Overview

(6) In an October 1978 assessment of U.S. military assistance in Thailand,

1. AMEMB Colombo 5104/031010Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-84; J4/Memo/S123-79 (U) of 7 Sep 79, Subj: 1978 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/ERD), Vol. II, p. 347-348; J471 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Colombo Airgram A-1 11 Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 038217/141243Z Feb 78 (S), XGDS-1; AMEMB Colombo 0947/011012Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 010349Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 1369/080350Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.

SECRET

473
THAILAND

BASIC INFORMATION

LAND AREA 512,820 Sq Km
LIMITS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS 12 Nautical Miles
LIMITS OF ECONOMIC ZONE None Claimed
POPULATION 46,850,000
ANNUAL GROWTH 2.6 Percent
LITERACY RATE 78 Percent
LIFE EXPECTANCY 61 Years
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA .7 Acre
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1977) $ 18.2 Billion
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA $ 406
DEFENSE BUDGET (FY 79) $ 961 Million
OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET 20.6 Percent
TYPE GOVERNMENT Constitutional Monarchy

KING PHUMIPHON Adunrat
PRIME MINISTER GEN KRIANGKRA Chansana
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GEN(Bk) BUNCHEI Bunsangkong
SUNTHORN Hongthongvan
NOMTHOP (Non-thong)
SUPERME CDR, ARMED FORCES GEN SOM Na Nakhoon
CINC ARMY GEN PREM Thammasan
CINC NAVY ADM KAWI Singha
CINC AIR FORCE ACM PHANJAN Chansat

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION
U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. Morton L. Abramowitz
U.S. CHARGE D'BUSINESS MR. Daniel Cohen
CHIEF OF MISSION COL. William R. Dean, USAF

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND AGAINST LIMITED EXTERNAL MILITARY THREATS AND PROTECT MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

ASSIST THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS INSURGENCY AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY.

ENHANCE DEFENSE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY.

PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR COST EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS THAT DEVELOP THAI MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES AND COMBAT CAPABILITY

ARMY
7 Infantry Divisions, 1 AAA Division, 1 Regimental Combat Team (Separate), 2 Special Forces Groups. Strength: 154,500

NAVY
2 Destroyer types, 48 Coastal Patrol types, 22 Riverine Patrol, 17 Mine Warfare types, 82 Amphibious types, 18 Auxiliary types, 1 Anti- Submarine Warfare Squadron, 1 Marine Infantry Battalion, 5 Marine Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Marine Artillery Battalion. Strength: 34,200, which includes 16,000 Marines

AIR FORCE
29 Jet, 67 Turboprop, 189 Prop, 50 Helicopters. Strength: 43,200
Limited airborne operations, close support of the Army and day air defense.

Source: Command-Digest, 15 Feb 79, p. 77.
Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals
the American Ambassador stressed that during 1978 Thailand had faced increasing uncertainties with insurgency problems and neighboring communist countries and wished to improve its defense capabilities. The Prime Minister, who placed great importance on U.S. assistance programs and the JUSMAG, sought to encourage Thai confidence by means of improving Thai military capabilities and thereby Thai economic development. The Ambassador opined further that, while increased private and domestic investment would best stimulate Thai confidence, he felt the psychological impact of a small increase in FMS credits on a temporary basis would "serve to demonstrate in a concrete fashion our interest in Thai security and our interest in deepening the psychological confidence in the region." 1

In a similar vein the October end-of-tour report of the departing Chief JUSMAG-THAI pointed out the drastic reductions in JUSMAG manning from the FY 77 authorization of 121 military personnel to 40 in FY 78, and to 35 at the beginning of FY 79. Reductions also were made in the Military Assistance Program (MAP) from $90 million in FY 72 to $30 million in FY 75, $17 million in both FY 76 and 77, $9 million in FY 78, to none for FY 79. The report recommended reestablishment of a modest MAP program (primarily to make U.S. technical assistance available to resolve maintenance problems on U.S. equipment), an increase in FMS credits and IMETP funding, and provision of all needed publications at U.S. expense. 2

Major program items for FY 78 MAP material were as shown below (in $ millions): 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical/support vehicles</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications equipment (all branches)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons (16 105mm howitzers)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (components-parts/ground equipment)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply operations (PCH&amp;T)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft Procurement Actions**

In 1976 the Royal Thai Government (RTG) signed an LOA to purchase 13 F-5E and three F-5F Tiger II fighter aircraft under FMS Case PEACE ETERNAL at a cost of approximately $75 million, which included support equipment and

1. AMEMB Bangkok 30822/210314Z Oct 78 (E), GDS-86.

SECRET
spares. The F-5s were to be employed primarily in the air superiority and air defense roles, with a secondary mission of ground support and interdiction.¹

(²) During the second half of 1977 the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) continued its quest for an air-to-ground capability to counter the perceived external armor threat in the mid-1980s and had submitted requests for P&B data on one squadron of A-10A aircraft, A-37s, and A-4Ms as possible replacements for their aging T-28s. CINCPAC supported the release of P&B data on the A-10 but, because of its advanced technology, chose to reserve judgment on actual procurement until the Thai response (to the P&B data) could be assessed. P&B data on the A-37 was provided by Headquarters USAF on 17 August 1977. CINCPAC also recommended approval to release P&B data on the A-4M.²

(³) On 8 March 1978 the American Embassy reported that the RTG had asked for P&B data for purchase of another 18 F-5Es with delivery not later than 1980 as partial replacement for two squadrons of T-28s. Since the Thai had one squadron of F-5A/Bs in service and the F-5E/F squadron ordered in 1976 was due to be activated in June 1978, procurement of 18 additional F-5Es was a logical step for improving air defense posture with a supporting air-to-ground attack role in the post-1980 timeframe. The CINCPAC endorsement of 17 March for the release of the F-5E/F P&B data made a distinction, however, between the roles required by replacements for the two T-28 squadrons. While acquisition of these additional F-5Es would fulfill JSOP requirements for a third air defense squadron in 1980, a separate requirement for a ground support (anti-armor) aircraft still remained.³

(⁴) On 16 March the RTG requested P&B information on 16 F-16A aircraft through FMS purchase via the American Embassy. Provisions for spares, support equipment, training, and delivery options were included in the request. Rationale for the purchase was the growing RTG need for a squadron of modern air support fighters to counter the MIG-21 aircraft operating in Laos and the potentially larger threat of the Vietnamese MIG force. The American Embassy believed the sale of the F-16s should be disapproved for the following reasons: the aircraft would represent a significant increase in technology beyond the Thai capability for maintenance and operation; the sale could be a destabilizing influence in the area; procurement and operating costs would be drain on the

1. CINCPAC Command History 1976 (TSYERD), Vol. II, p. 345; J476 Point Paper ( שי), 14 Jul 78, Subj: PEACE ETERNAL Program Thailand (F-5E/F) and Planned F-5 Acquisitions (U), GDS-84.
3. AMEHB Bangkok 7012/080145Z Mar 78 (שי), GDS-84; CINCPAC 170039Z Mar 78 (שי), GDS-86; J476 HistSum Mar 78 (שי), GDS-84.
Thai budget; and acquisition of such a small number would not significantly increase Thai combat capability. However, the Embassy did recommend, as an exception to policy, that the P&B data be furnished in the hope that the high price-tag would discourage Thai interest in the F-16 in the near term. CINCPAC did not support the request, even for the P&B data, because there was no justification for the actual sale.¹

A 21 April State Department message approved the second squadron of 18 F-5E/Fs, but disapproved the request for P&B on the F-16. The message also stated that these decisions were not to be released to the RTG, since Vice President Mondale would be conveying the F-5E decision to RTG officials during his visit to Thailand in early May. Shortly thereafter, Headquarters USAF provided the F-5 P&B data with three options. The first was for delivery in CY 80 at a cost of $108.3 million. The other two had later delivery and higher payment schedules.²

Later in May the RTG submitted yet another request for P&B data—this time for 16 F-8 Crusaders. The Crusaders would be used in an air defense role which would then free the F-5s for a greater ground attack role. Since the F-8 would not introduce new technology, would be within Thai capabilities to operate and maintain, would be cost effective and was readily available, the American Embassy recommended release of the data. CINCPAC perceived the request as a continuation of earlier Thai interest in the F-8 and believed it would be appropriate to review the request in broader terms—particularly as a gesture of U.S. steadfast interest. CINCPAC's position was that in view of the RTG determination to obtain a modern, low-cost fighter, procurement from U.S. sources would be preferable to third country acquisition. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the P&B information be provided because the threat to Thailand was greater than to other Southeast Asian nations already scheduled to receive equivalent aircraft. Further, the F-8s would be within the context of the Arms Transfer Policy, and the Thai had recently received high-level U.S. Government assurance for support of valid Thai military requirements.³

According to Chief JUSMAG Thailand, as of early June the RTG appeared to be leaning toward the purchase of 18 Italian Aeromacchi MB-326K (attack) and 18 MB-339 (trainer) aircraft as replacements for the two T-28 squadrons. Also in June the American Embassy in Bangkok forwarded an RTG request for four more F-5Es as an addition to the first squadron which the RTG hoped to expand.

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 7961/160412Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 232051Z Mar 78 (G), GDS-86; J476 HistSum Mar 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 101739/210155Z Apr 78 (G), GDS-86; J476 HistSum Apr 78 (G), GDS-84.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 14692/240730Z May 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 082253Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84; J476 HistSum May 78 (G), GDS-84.
ultimately to 24 aircraft. The request specified that cost was not to exceed $15 million and an LOA receipt date of not later than November 1978, with delivery as soon as possible after LOA approval. The Embassy strongly supported the request, noting that the increased size of the squadron would provide a more effective air defense and would avoid proliferation of new aircraft types. CINCPAC also recommended favorable action on the request and sought expeditious approval based on the fact that the proposed acquisition had been documented and approved in current planning guidance, met planned attrition/expansion requirements and would be another timely and important step toward assuring the RTG of continuing U.S. interest.1

During a luncheon on 21 June Prime Minister Kriangsak voiced the strong RTG desire to procure sophisticated military equipment, if not from the United States, then elsewhere, and he gave crucial importance to acquisition of at least three or four F-16s. In response, Embassy and JUSMAG Thailand officials tried to dissuade the Prime Minister by alluding to political considerations, technology sophistication, and high costs. While dismissing the cost issue and not challenging the other two points, the Prime Minister placed the F-16 subject in the context of basic military procurement relationships with the United States and subsequently, in conjunction with other RTAF officials, exerted increased pressure for U.S. reconsideration of the F-16 request. As a result the American Embassy suggested to the State Department, and CINCPAC concurred to the JCS, that the P&B data be provided with the caveat that present policy prohibited sales in the near future and that the earliest delivery would not be until the mid-1980s. Later in June, Chief JUSMAG Thailand reported the RTAF was reexamining its options, wavering in its decision to buy the Aeromacchi exclusively, and restudying the possible purchase of the A-37 to provide the much needed air-to-ground support.2

On 1 July the State Department issued approval of the P&B data for 16 F-8s, but on 17 July the American Embassy advised that the RTG was no longer interested in the F-8 because it would not fit into the future RTAF force structure. The same Embassy message referred to a high level assessment being conducted by the RTAF of its long-term force structure vis-a-vis the various procurement actions under consideration. By mid-July the RTAF was veering away from purchase of the MB-326K Aeromacchi which, as a new type of aircraft, might present logistical problems, and by mid-August an RTG request for P&B

1. J476 HistSum May 78 (G), GDS-84; CHJUSMAGTHAI 060726Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84; AMEMB 17335/160951Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 172050Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84; J476 HistSum Jun 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 18165/261058Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84; CINCPAC 301936Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-86; J476 HistSum Jun 78 (G), GDS-86; CHJUSMAGTHAI 230906Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84.
data on 36 A-37Bs was being staffed through the Country Team. CINCPAC supported this request since A-37s already in the Thai inventory had been operated and maintained effectively by the Thai. In addition, the A-37 was ideally suited to the counterinsurgency close air support role and would best meet the Thai near-term requirements.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} On 8 September the American Embassy advised the Secretary of State informally that a firepower demonstration on 18 August had renewed Thai interest in the second F-5E squadron. Prime Minister Kriangsak informed the Embassy on 25 September that he had made a definite decision to proceed with the purchase of the second F-5E squadron and requested expeditious approval in order to take advantage of the Option \footnote{1} price. By 7 October the State Department acknowledged receipt of the LOA request and advised that request would suffice to insure delivery in 1980 and Option \footnote{1} prices, but the State Department also cautioned that certain items had not been included in the P&B estimates.\footnote{2}

\footnote{2} However, a DIA report in late October viewed this F-5 decision in a different light. The report contended that the selection of the F-5E over the Aeromacchi MB-326K more likely was attributable to pressure by Thai officials than to a thorough study of alternatives. Reportedly, the initial decision to acquire the Aeromacchi aircraft had been led by Deputy Supreme Commander Kamron and a number of senior RTAF officers, and when Air Force officials opposed the decision the Prime Minister conveyed his decision on the following day to purchase the second F-5 squadron. The DIA report noted, however, that the second squadron would not alleviate the requirement for additional close ground support aircraft.\footnote{3}

\footnote{3} As of year's end the American Embassy advised CINCPAC that the F-16 issue seemed to be "dead" and recommended that the JCS stop work on the F-16 study. Delivery of the additional four F-5s was scheduled for July and August 1979, P&B information on the A-37s had been provided, and the RTAF indicated no further interest in the A-4M aircraft.\footnote{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1} AMEMB Bangkok 20331/170502Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; CHJUSMAGTHAI 161052Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 230440Z Aug 78 (C), GDS-84.
\item \footnote{2} AMEMB Bangkok 25976/080808Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 256057/071730Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84.
\item \footnote{3} DIA 2320/282133Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86.
\item \footnote{4} J476 Point Paper (S), 17 Dec 78, Subj: F-16 Aircraft for Thailand (U), GDS-86; Dir Int Log Kelly AFB 181630Z Aug 78 (U); Hq USAF LEFE 311300Z Aug 78 (U); CHJUSMAGTHAI 200802Z Mar 78 (U).
\end{itemize}
Ammunition in Thailand

When hostilities in Cambodia and Vietnam ended in 1975, U.S.-owned in-transit and excess ammunition remained in Thailand. In May 1975 the JCS directed that ammunition not required for mission requirements/contingency plans be retrograded on an accelerated basis. However, the American Embassy and Chief JUSMAGTHAI believed that precipitous retrograde of such materiel might be interpreted by the Thai as eventual U.S. intent to abandon Thailand. Therefore, 14,449 short tons valued at approximately $43 million remained in Thailand. In January 1977 a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the RTG which provided for storage, security, and maintenance by the RTG, accountability and quality surveillance by the United States, and Thai purchase of the ammunition in three increments. Payment of $20.8 million and transfer of the first two increments were completed by April 1978. Payment of $11.3 million for the third increment was made in November 1978, with transfer of balance scheduled prior to October 1979. Later a fourth increment was added to the package and President Carter announced on 7 February 1979 that subject to congressional approval, the United States would turn over the final increment of AIT (approximately $11.3 million) at no cost to the RTG.1

Incendiary Munitions

JUSMAGTHAI had submitted an RTG request for FMS purchase of white phosphorous and incendiary munitions in September 1977 for counterinsurgency use. The State Department disapproved the purchase the following month on the grounds that the RTG had not indicated any extraordinary circumstances associated with the need for the items. State further advised that, if there were an urgent need for these items, full justification and American Embassy endorsement were required. After receipt of a letter from the Royal Thai Supreme Command, the American Embassy on 1 March 1978 supported the release with the justification that these munitions would be used for marking targets, screening troops, jungle navigation, and destruction of captured materiel. It was not until December 1978, however, that the State Department approved the request with the stipulation that they be used for target marking purposes only.2

2. J476 HistSum Feb 78 (S), GDS-84; SECEDE 3734/210017Z Oct 77 (S), GDS-83, which cites JUSMAG 260320Z Sep 77; AMEMB Bangkok 6334/010510Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 312056/101753Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 7 Dec 84.
1. CINCPACINST S4900.1B of 24 May 76 (S), Subj: Implementation of the Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System-FADs for Foreign Country Forces (U), GDS-84.

2. CINCPAC 130456Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited CHJUSMAGTHAI 240508Z Aug 78, et. al.; AMEMB Bangkok 26422/121128Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.

3. JCS 3772/152231Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 9 Jan 85; J476 Point Paper (S), 20 Dec 78, Subj: FAD Assignment for Thailand (U), REVW 20 Dec 98.
UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

CINCPAC Headquarters

Performance Ratings for Civilian Personnel

(U) The following is a recapitulation of the awards granted for the rating period 1 April 1977 to 31 March 1978. The results included some Outstanding Performance Ratings; some of those were accompanied by Quality Step Increases or Sustained Superior Performance Awards:1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilians Assigned</th>
<th>OPRs Recommended</th>
<th>OPRs Approved</th>
<th>Cash Awards Recommended</th>
<th>Cash Awards Approved</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>49 (39.5%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federal Day 1978 Awards Program

(U) CINCPAC submitted nominees in two categories for the Federal Day awards competition. Nominated were DPC Robert R. Moser, USN, as "Serviceman of the Year," and Mrs. Francis Hackbarth as "Federal Employee of the Year." Both were members of the Communications-Data Processing Directorate. Nominees represented the many Federal agencies in Hawaii. At the annual awards luncheon on 10 May, DPC Moser was selected by the Federal Executive Board as "Serviceman of the Year" for the Honolulu-Pacific area.2

Upward Mobility Program

(U) In December 1976 the first CINCPAC position in the Upward Mobility Program (UMP) had been announced. The goal of this program was to provide an opportunity for advancement in another occupational field for employees with competitive Civil Service status and potential, whose other assignments had not so provided. The first position, that of a computer aide (typing), had been filled in 1977. Two more positions were filled under those procedures in 1978. One of the positions was for a historian; it was filled in June by a staff member who had been serving as secretary to the Chief of Staff. The

1. J144 HistSum May 78 (U).
2. J144 HistSum Mar 78 (U); J6315 HistSum May 78.
other position filled in 1978 was that of a communications technician; it was filled by an employee who had been working for a Navy agency.¹

Activity Training Plan for FY 79

(U) The Office of Civilian Personnel required each activity to submit an Activity Training Plan for its civilian employees that identified their training needs and established training objectives. Preparation of the plan also facilitated preparation of the agency's training budget. The CINCPAC Activity Training Plan for FY 79 was forwarded to the Office of Civilian Personnel at Pearl Harbor in August.²

Employment of the Handicapped and Disabled

(U) In January CINCPAC published an Affirmative Action Plan for Civilian Employment of Handicapped Individuals and Disabled Veterans. Also the CINCPAC Instruction for civilian employment of the handicapped was updated.³

Pay and Allowances

(U) The civilian Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) was paid in Hawaii when the cost of living was found to be higher than the cost of living in Washington, D.C. In March 1978 the annual survey was conducted. This included a questionnaire that each full-time, permanent, married male employee was requested to complete on his housing costs.⁴

(U) A brief recapitulation of COLA payments paid to CINCPAC staff personnel follows. On 5 December 1976 those staff members who were entitled to Post Exchange and Commissary privileges (Defense Department dependents or retirees) were to have COLA eliminated, in increments. On that day in December 1976 the COLA was cut from 12.5 percent to 10 percent; on 10 April 1977 it was cut to five percent; and on 9 April 1978 it was discontinued entirely. On 30 July 1978 it was restored to 15 percent when the President suspended temporarily that section of an Executive Order that called for the COLA to be reduced if lower living costs resulted from employees' access to Government subsidized facilities. Federal employees in Hawaii had filed civil suit over

¹ J144 HistSums Apr, Oct, Nov 78. (U)
² J144 HistSum Aug 78 (U).
³ J144 HistSum Jan 78 (U); CINCPACNOTE 12306 of 27 Jan 78 (U), Subj: Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) for Civilian Employment of Handicapped Individuals and Disabled Veterans (U).
⁴ J144 HistSum Mar 78 (U).
the deprivation of COLA; this was overtaken by the President's suspension of the Executive Order.¹

(U) At the same time COLA had been cut for those with PX privileges, it had been raised from 12.5 percent to 17.5 percent for other staff members. On 19 November 1978 it was cut from 17.5 percent to 15 percent. (The COLA varied from island to island in Hawaii. On Oahu, where CINCPAC's headquarters was located, COLA in January 1978 was retained at 17.5 percent, but for those on Maui it was up to 12.5 percent and Molokai to 15 percent.)²

PACOM Country Activities

General Accounting Office Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans

(U) As reported in the CINCPAC Command History for 1977 the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted surveys and issued reports on U.S. Forces foreign employee compensation practices in Korea and the Philippines. In 1978 they conducted such a study on Japan. (See subsequent entry in this section.) Similar surveys were also made in Germany and Italy in the European Command, because it was in those five countries that the Defense Department employed approximately 90 percent of its foreign national work force. Based on those five surveys, the GAO concluded its efforts by issuing a summary report on Defense Department foreign employee compensation practices. The report, entitled "Department of Defense is Overcompensating its Foreign Employees," was dated 2 August.³

(U) CINCPAC believed that the summary report presented a number of constructive observations that were of help to the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee in administering U.S. Forces foreign employee compensation in the PACOM, under Terms of Reference that had been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1972.

(U) Some of the GAO conclusions and recommendations had already been acted upon. On 1 September, however, CINCPAC identified to the Office of the Secretary of Defense a number of conclusions or recommendations the PACOM found to be inappropriate or incomplete assessments.⁴

1. CNO 101543Z Jun 78 (U).
2. ADMIN CINCPAC 280357Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CINCPAC 010411Z Sep 78 (S), GDS-84.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) A principal point of CINCPAC disagreement with the report concerned a recommendation that negotiations be initiated with host governments to revise existing labor agreements that contained provisions overly restrictive to the United States. The report noted, for example, that there might be host country sensitivities to changes. It failed, however, to give sufficient recognition to the formidable difficulties in effecting changes, the role played by the host government in bilateral decision making, and the types of demands that could be made by a host government before consenting to renegotiate. PACOM experience had shown that personnel cost-oriented gains from such renegotiations were marginal compared to more significant losses to U.S. Forces in terms of management control and other necessary operating prerogatives demanded by those host governments as trade-offs.

GAO Survey of Foreign National Compensation Plans and Benefits--Japan

(U) A General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of U.S. Government foreign national compensation costs and retirement benefits in Japan was conducted during February and March. This was part of a larger GAO review; see the preceding entry in this section.

(U) The U.S. Forces Japan were the dominant U.S. users of foreign national labor. As a consequence, the GAO effort concentrated heavily on U.S. Forces methods for setting compensation and severance pay.

(U) GAO survey team members met with representatives of the PACOM headquarters, the component commands, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group in preparing for the surveys. As a courtesy, they reported back and exchanged information prior to preparing their final report. The meetings were arranged in consideration of 1972 guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense that delegated authorities, through the Service headquarters, to the PACOM level for determining compensation and conditions of employment for non-U.S. citizens employed by the U.S. Forces in PACOM.

(U) The GAO's principal conclusion was that the Secretaries of State and Defense should strongly urge the Japanese Government to either eliminate or pay Japanese National employee labor costs that exceeded prevailing Japanese industrial pay practices. These included a 10 percent U.S. Forces pay differential, a language allowance, a generous premium pay formula, wage schedules based on a 44-hour work week, and employee separation pay entitlements.

1. Ibid.
2. JI21 HistSum May 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

486
CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Under an indirect hire system, the Japanese Government was the legal employer of the 22,000-person Japanese National work force, and would have to agree to any changes to wages and pay benefits. The GAO acknowledged Executive Branch accomplishments in getting Japan to share cost support. The survey also recommended that the Secretary of Defense explore ways of hiring more Americans instead of Japanese Nationals.¹

Army Realignment Personnel Actions--Japan

(U) Under the Defense Department-approved Pacific Support Realignment Plan (called WESTPAC III), the Army gave up most of its garrison functions in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. This resulted in the transfer of several support functions including 575 Japanese employees to the USAF and USMC by 30 September. Transfers for those employees were accomplished without major problems.²

(U) WESTPAC III also resulted in the Army's elimination or reduction of other functions, with over 600 Japanese employees faced with the loss of jobs by reduction-in-force (RIF). The prospective and actual RIFs caused considerable turmoil among affected employees, with the employees' union, and within the Japanese government.³

(U) U.S. Army Japan had originally requested authority to announce by 31 May 1978 the RIF of 800 Japanese employees in two stages: 400 on 31 August and 400 on 30 September. This was in line with the usual practice of U.S. Forces attempting to provide the Japanese with at least 90 days notification prior to a RIF. The Army had neither the funds nor manpower spaces to continue the employees beyond FY 78.⁴

(U) The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo advised the State Department of the Army's RIF plans and requested that they take action to delay the announcement beyond 15 June pending further consideration of the impact of the proposed large RIF on the Japanese political and unemployment scenes. A significant factor for the delay had been an informal Japanese indication to Embassy officials regarding substantial Japanese labor cost sharing and financial assistance to U.S. Forces. Such assistance, however, would require time to develop in Japanese political circles, and it was feared that the large-scale RIF and its timing would be a threat to the success of those efforts.

(U) Various alternatives to the RIF announcement timing and total numbers to be affected were proposed by different U.S. Government echelons.

1. Ibid.
2. J121 HistSum Oct 78 (CS), GDS-84.
3. Ibid.
The RIF issue became a significant point of discussion during Japan Defense Minister Kanemaru's visit with Secretary Brown in Washington during June. Follow-on discussions that included the Defense Minister and Defense Facilities Administration Agency Director Watari were held in Hawaii with CINCPAC staff members. Following those discussions, representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC went to Japan to present the conclusions that had been reached to COMUS Japan and Service component representatives on Mainland Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture.¹

In line with the scenario jointly developed in Washington and Hawaii, and subsequently coordinated with U.S. and Japanese officials in Japan, the first U.S. Forces press release was made on 31 July. It announced a RIF of over 800 Japanese employees to be effective 31 October. It also announced the transfer of the majority of other employees with their functions by 30 September. The union and civilian press reaction was severe. Union strikes of short duration were conducted in protest.²

On 18 September COMUS Japan issued a second press release and formally notified Japanese agencies to the effect that the earlier announced RIF of over 800 effective 31 October was reduced to 274, with the separation of the remaining, reduced number of excess employees to be phased (monthly) through mid-1979. All but 41 employees to be transferred with their functions had been transferred to Air Force or Marine activities.³

Employee union strikes that had been scheduled for 20 and 29 September were cancelled because of the favorable reaction by the union to the announcement that reflected U.S. and Japanese efforts to reduce the impact of the RIF.

Phased, incremental RIFs of no more than 49 employees per month were planned until the remainder of the 600 to be RIF'd was complete, or the employees were otherwise provided with alternate employment. (RIFs of 49 or fewer per month did not require public announcement.)⁴

Labor Cost Sharing--Japan

The first step toward cost sharing with Japan had been taken with an agreement in 1977 between the United States and Japan that the Japanese would begin to bear some of the cost of the U.S. Forces local national workforce. This agreement was reported in the 1977 Command History.⁵

1. J121 HistSum Oct 78 (b), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. COMUS Japan 140700Z Sep 78 (U)
4. J121 HistSum Oct 78, (b), GDS-84.

CONFIDENTIAL
On 1 April 1978 the Japanese government began absorbing some six percent of the U.S. Forces Japanese worker labor cost, which was over $25 million for the first year.

The matter of additional Japanese assumption of funding was pursued in diplomatic channels throughout 1978. It was hoped the Japanese would assume an additional seven percent (for a total of 13 percent). The subject was under study within the Japanese government. It was possible for it to be incorporated in the budget late in December, with Diet approval possible by March 1979 and activation by 1 April 1979.

Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees—Korea

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces local national employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by the PACOM Service component commands under authorities delegated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of 91 private sector firms in four Korean urban areas during April and May. Revised compensation benefits, effective 1 July, resulted in an average increase of 25.7 percent for some 22,000 employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds. Included in the increase was the raising of Payment in Kind Allowance from 36 to 48 won per hour, above base pay, to each employee and a reduction in the Consolidated Allowance Payment of from 7 to 6.9 percent above base pay. Also included in the increase was an additional half-month bonus, which raised bonus payments from 4.5 to 5 months' pay per year.

(U) A special wage survey of selected engineer and construction firms had been conducted in December 1977 and January 1978 to verify the need to pay special rates for professional engineers and architects required to use international engineering standards. That survey had resulted in adoption of occupational premiums of 15 percent at the GS-11 level and 20 percent at the GS-12 and 13 levels for those jobs, effective 14 February. A similar survey was made concurrently with the regular 1978 wage survey. As a result, higher occupational premiums for those jobs were found to be warranted and were raised to 20 percent at the GS-11 level and 25 percent for the GS-12 and 13 levels, effective 1 July.

1. J121 Point Paper (U), DECL 8 Nov 84, 8 Dec 78, Subj: Labor Cost Sharing—Japan (U).
2. Ibid.
3. J121 HistSum Jun 78 (U); COMUS Korea Ltr (U), to USACSG of 14 Jun 78, Subj: US Forces Wage Change and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations (U); CDRUSACSG 240210Z Jun 78 (U).
4. J121 HistSum 78 (U); USACSG Ltr (U), of 17 Mar 78, Subj: US Forces Special Engineer-Architect Wage Survey in Korea.

CONFIDENTIAL

489
U.S. Forces Local National Employee Severance Pay (NAF Activities)--Korea

(U) A uniform severance pay plan to apply to all Korean National employees of U.S. Forces non-appropriated fund (NAF) activities in Korea was approved on 10 March. This was in response to a request from COMUS Korea. The PACOM Service components and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group approved the pay plan under Office of the Secretary of Defense authority delegations as enunciated by a CINCPAC Instruction.¹

(U) The plan combined the features of arrangements established by the Army for most of its NAF Korean Nationals in 1968, the USAF in 1970, and the Korea Area Exchange in 1977. The revised plan covered for the first time several hundred U.S. Army morale support NAF employees and thereby completed, for all NAF employees, the conversion from a costly, escalating, employer-paid plan to one still paid for by the employer, but at a less costly, non-escalating rate.

(U) The new plan provided for an initial pay off of all accrued severance pay directly to employees. Severance pay accrued in the future was to be deposited directly into an employee account in a Korean bank on a quarterly basis. (Interest on Korean bank time deposits had been high in recent years.) Each deposit (the severance pay rate) amounted to one-fourth of one month's salary at the employee's rate of pay at that time. Employees would be permitted to withdraw the deposited severance pay at two-year intervals and in emergency situations. The two-year withdrawal feature did not become effective, however, until four years after the plan was converted and did not include severance pay accrued for the most recent two years. That latter might be withdrawn only in an emergency or upon separation of the employee.

(U) Full conversion to the new plan was completed in April, with authorizations for variation by employing activities in recognition that dates for time deposit cycles might vary. The new plan had received informal approval from the Foreign Organizations Employee Union, representing all U.S. Forces Korean National employees. The office of Labor Affairs of the ROK Government interposed no objection to it.²

Revised Wage Schedules and Benefits for U.S. Forces LN Employees--Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 21,000 U.S. Forces Local National employees in the Philippines were jointly approved and issued by the PACOM

1. J121 HistSum Mar 78 (U); COMUS Korea 210948Z Feb 78 (U); CDRUSACSG 100136Z Mar 78 (U)
2. J121 HistSum Mar 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

490
component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. The revisions were based on data obtained during a wage and fringe benefits survey of 29 private sector firms in the Greater Manila area during August. The new wage rates, which were effective 1 October, resulted in an increase in base pay of 15 percent for manual and 4.5 percent for non-manual employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds. A comprehensive survey was made of fringe benefit practices granted by private sector firms. This was done to compare local area prevailing practices to U.S. Forces practices, as warranted. Based on survey findings, the PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee determined that most U.S. Forces fringe benefit practices would be continued. Paid time off for military leave was increased from 14 to 30 calendar days per year.¹

One prevailing practice was for employers to subscribe to government sponsored Medicare (health and hospitalization) and Employee Compensation coverage (on-the-job accidents and injuries). U.S. Forces entry into the programs required intergovernmental arrangements. Action was initiated in the Philippines to recommend U.S. participation. This would require review and endorsement by the PACOM Service components before it could be forwarded by CINCPAC to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department for consideration.²

Revised Wage Schedules for U.S. Forces Local National Employees—Taiwan

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces Local National employees on Taiwan were approved jointly and issued by the PACOM component commanders and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. Revisions were based on data obtained during a full-scale wage survey of 48 private sector firms in the Taipei area in September and October. The new rates, effective 1 December, resulted in an average total compensation increase of 14.8 percent for some 1,300 general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds. As a part of the increase, a Combined Allowance (formerly called Payment-in-Kind) was raised from 5 to 7 New Taiwan Dollars per hour for each employee. That allowance represented an amount equivalent to benefits received by private sector employees in the form of cash allowances, employer-provided meals, uniforms, transportation, and other non-cash benefits.³

1. J121 HistSum Sep 78; CINCPACFLT 301740Z Sep 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. J121 HistSum Nov 78 (U); COMUSTDC Ltr Ser C-073 (C), GDS-84, of 6 Nov 78, Subj: 1978 Taiwan Wage and Fringe Benefit Survey (U); PACAF Ltr of 20 Nov 78 (U), Subj: Authorization of U.S. Forces Wage Schedules - Taiwan (U).
Pay Rates for Non-U.S. Citizens Employed in Foreign Areas

(U) A problem arose in Japan on what pay rates to use in employment by U.S. Forces of non-U.S. citizen dependents of U.S. Forces personnel and non-U.S. citizen off-duty enlisted personnel employed in a civilian capacity by non-appropriated fund activities. All Services in Japan had administratively extended U.S. pay rates to those employees. Then the Chief of Naval Personnel directed that those categories of employees in foreign areas would be paid non-U.S. citizen wages. CINCPACFLT authorized Navy activities in Japan to withhold implementation of this policy while the matter received higher level attention.1

(U) The PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee addressed the issue. CINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense that U.S. pay rates be authorized. The recommendation was based on the need to have a uniform pay practice among the Services, the need to grant uniform pay rates to employed dependents and military members whether U.S. or non-U.S. citizen, and the desire to preclude the necessity of applying either third country national pay policy or a separately developed pay plan similar to that used for Japanese employees. As an exception to U.S. pay rates, Japanese nationals already employed by the U.S. Forces, who later became dependents of U.S. personnel, would continue to be employed and paid under the Japanese indirect hire arrangement.2

(U) The Secretary of Defense replied that U.S. rates would be used to pay non-U.S. enlisted personnel in foreign areas when they were employed in a civilian capacity by a non-appropriated fund activity. The Department of the Navy had been so advised. Pay for non-U.S. citizen dependent employees in the PACOM was the delegated authority of the PACOM components through the Joint Labor Policy Committee.3

(U) CINCPAC notified COMUS Japan of this decision and also provided Joint Labor Policy Committee confirmation that non-U.S. citizen dependents of U.S. Forces personnel in Japan employed by non-appropriated fund activities would be paid the same compensation as U.S. civilians similarly employed, except, as noted above, for already-employed Japanese nationals who subsequently became U.S. dependents.4

1. J121 HistSum Oct 78 (U); COMUS Japan 160421Z Feb 78 (U).
2. CINCPAC 131941Z May 78 (U).
3. SECDEF 2436/171412Z Jul 78 (U).
4. CINCPAC 220226Z Jul 78 (U).
PACOM Third Country National Employment

(U) U.S. Forces direct-hire employment of Third Country Nationals (TCN) in the PACOM had steadily declined from a high of some 1,100 employed in numerous PACOM foreign areas in 1970 to a 31 December 1977 strength of only 25. Of those, 20 were serving in Okinawa Prefecture in Japan, 3 were in Korea, 1 was in the Philippines, and 1 in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. There were 22 Filipinos, 2 Chinese, and 1 Australian.

(U) In consideration of increased living costs abroad, the PACOM component commands and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group approved a policy change that increased the living quarters allowance for TCNs. Revised rates were those specified in Department of State standardized regulations for "without family" (an unaccompanied tour) in the area of assignment. Employing commands were to provide government quarters if they were available; if not, a living quarters allowance was authorized.1

1. J121 HistSum Jan 78 (U); CINCPACFLT 230354Z Dec 77 (U); CINCPACFLT 302111Z Dec 77 (U); CINCPACFLT 022034Z Feb 78 (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

493 (Reverse Blank p. 494)
SECTION II--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Military Awards--CINCPAC Staff

(U) In February the Defense Meritorious Service Medal was added to the joint Service awards for recognition while assigned to a joint staff or task force. Of the 300 recommendations for awards in various categories received in 1978, 287 were processed. There were 252 awards presented, as follows:1

- Distinguished Service Medal--4
- Defense Superior Service Medal--5
- Legion of Merit--17
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal--81
- Meritorious Service Medal--10
- Joint Service Commendation Medal--134
- Other--1

Military Customs Program

(U) The Military Customs Program in the PACOM was managed by CINCPAC at the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Besides staff officers at the unified and Service headquarters, there were three GS-14 U.S. Customs Service advisers (one each at the subordinate unified commands in Japan and Korea and a third assigned to CINCPACREP Philippines), and 1,135 full or part-time military customs inspectors.2

(U) At a January 1978 worldwide drug smuggling conference sponsored by the Air Force and the Military Airlift Command, PACOM's customs program was cited as the Defense Department's most effective drug suppression effort.3

(U) From 26 to 28 July the Personnel Directorate convened a conference of over 30 military customs coordinators, representing the component and subordinate unified commands, and officials of the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Agriculture. The conference coincided with the CINCPAC staff orientation for the newly assigned replacement Customs Service advisers mentioned above.4

1. J1 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
3. Ibid.
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(U) Briefings confirmed on-the-scene observations made earlier by the PACOM military customs staff that the program served as the primary deterrent to the transportation of illegal narcotics and contraband on Defense Department ships and aircraft in the Pacific. The conference permitted the opportunity to exchange ideas on military customs inspection techniques. Plans were made to hold annual meetings of a similar nature.¹

Department of Defense Dependent Schools

(U) Facilities and staffing for Defense Department Dependent Schools were based on the number of space-required students enrolled. For several years there had been a trend toward the number of space-required (command-sponsored dependents) decreasing, while the number of space available (non-command sponsored dependents) increased. The result was a progressively unproportionate student-teacher ratio, with fewer teachers available to teach more dependent children.²

(U) In July 1977 CINCPAC had requested that the DOD school program in Washington initiate action that would include the number of space-available students in the criteria used for establishing teacher staffing for schools in the Pacific. This change would allow better schooling for dependents and make better use of existing facilities and programs. CINCPAC's component commanders had agreed with this position. (When queried, the European Command had reported no problem with space-available students.)

(U) The subject was also an agenda item during the annual Dependents' Education Council meeting in Washington late in 1977. At that time the Director of the DOD Dependent Schools said he was still working on the matter.

(U) Marine Corps support for staffing for space-available students was withdrawn in early January 1978. It was believed inclusion of space-available students in criteria for such other matters as tour lengths, command-sponsored dependents, and exchange and commissary privileges might be considered directly involved by decision makers of some of the Services.

(U) On 9 February the DOD Dependent Schools agency in Washington notified CINCPAC that the request to the Defense Department Comptroller had been again denied. Based on that decision, the schools must continue to be staffed based on space-required students only.³

¹ Ibid.
² J114 HistSum Feb 78 (U).
³ Ibid., which cited DODDS 091330Z Feb 78 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In another matter, effective 15 June, upon completion of the school year, the George Cannon School on Midway Island was closed by Department of Defense Dependent Schools Pacific. The closing was the result of a Navy restriction of Midway as an authorized overseas dependent area on 31 August 1978.\(^1\)

FY 79 Combined Federal Campaign--Pacific

(U) PACOM contributions to the FY 79 Overseas Combined Federal Campaign totaled $2,023,405.25, the first time the campaign raised over $2 million. The milestone was achieved despite devaluation of the dollar. It was an increase of over $28,000 from the year before.\(^2\)

2. J113 HistSum Dec 78 (U).
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME III
1978

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861
1979

TOP SECRET
CHAPTER IX--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
PACOM Data Systems Center 499
PDSC Composition 499
PDSC Hardware 499
PDSC Software 500
Hughes Report Observations 502
Contract Negotiations 502
Funding the Contract 503
Hardware Delivery 504
GSA Contract Support 504
IPAC Relocation 505
IPAC Personnel Augmentation 505
Defense Analysis System (DAS) 506
PACOM IDHS/IDHSC Activities 507
Secure Facsimile Capability 507
Delegated Production Program 508

SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
Support to Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 511
Photo Reconnaissance and Processing 511
Contingency Operation 511
MPC Activation 513
Korea Photo Reconnaissance 514
ELINT Exploitation 515
OEE Processing 515
EWIR Improvement 515
Radar Fingerprint Support 516
Korea OEE 516

SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE
PACOM Target Management 519
Nuclear Targeting 519
LNO Planning 519
PACOM Defense Plan 520
OPLAN 5027N 521
PANWAS 523
NOMS 523
Cruise Missile Planning 524
NKTLT Refinements 525
CHAPTER IX
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

PACOM Data Systems Center

(U) In 1975 the Department of Defense approved a CINCPAC proposal to establish a PACOM Data Systems Center (PDSC), and in 1976 the required operational capabilities (ROCs) to establish the PDSC were validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). A contract for systems engineering/systems integration was awarded to the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, which produced a master automated data system (ADS) development plan as a basis for future budgetary actions regarding the PDSC. The CINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2) was designated as the PDSC Program Director, and the Intelligence Center of the Pacific (IPAC) was tasked with the responsibility for operation and management of the PDSC host complex along with specific subsystems supporting the PACOM Indications and Warning (I&W) and IPAC analysis functions. During 1977 Hughes continued the development of the PDSC system design documentation in coordination with CINCPAC J2 and the Rome Air Development Center (RADC). Specifications for the complete computer hardware configuration were developed in an automated data processing equipment (ADPE) plan, and the original ADS was changed to include the consolidation of software development and hardware integration efforts under a prime contractor. Also included in the ADS was a verification and validation (V&V) contractor to provide technical advice and assistance to the PACOM Systems Architectural Group (PSAG). In August 1977 the PDSC Installation and Engineering Plan was revised to provide for the centralization of all PDSC computers and the IBM 360/40 in Building 20 at Camp Smith on Oahu. The MITRE Corporation was selected as the V&V contractor and Bunker-Ramo Corporation was selected for hardware procurement.¹

PDSC Composition²

(U) As defined by the Hughes Aircraft Company in its Final Technical Report on the PDSC in mid-1978, the essential elements of the PDSC were:

- A sufficient number of on-line terminals in secure working spaces to provide an on-line environment for the analyst community.

---

Sufficient capacity and an appropriate architecture to provide interactive performance in support of most intelligence tasks.

- A centralized on-line intelligence data base (all-source and collateral versions).

- A capable, modern data based management software system including user-oriented on-line query/update and report generation capability.

- An automated message processing and distribution capability for I&W support and rapid dissemination of current intelligence.

- Specialized software for required types of data base extractions (e.g., geographic search), data base loading/maintenance/update validation, graphics, and application support.

- Software support for interactive, on-line application programs invoked by either analyst action, received data, or elapsed time.

- Intelligence Communications Netting through the Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Net (IDHSC) to allow external access to PDSC Data bases and PACOM access to national level systems.

(U) The PDSC would interface with off-island systems via incoming messages received over all-source and collateral lines, and via the IDHSC-II node for external data base access and/or bulk data transfer. Under DIA delegated production the PDSC would be a designated host computer with data bases on-line to external users via the IDHSC-II.

PDSC Hardware

(U) The major computers of the system constituted a homogeneous functionally-partitioned network of thirteen Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) PDP-11/70-based AN/GYQ-21(V). Nine of the mainframes (the central node) were to be collocated in Building 20 of Camp Smith and interconnected by two (for reliability) independent time division multiplexer (TDM) buses. Each TDM bus

1. Ibid.
provided for direct communication between any pair of machines in the nine-
computer central node. The central node was connected via a number of channels 
(fiber optics) to the CINCPAC Command Center complex where another pair of 
machines would support Communications Center and automated message distribution 
functions.

(U) A 38.4 kilobaud line would connect the central node to the Fleet In-
telligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) node at Makalapa, where another pair of 
PDP-11/70's provided support to FICPAC's intelligence functions.

(U) Another 38.4 kilobaud line would connect the central node to the 
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) node at Hickam Air Force Base, where a pair of PDP-
11/70's would provide support to PACAF and the 548th Reconnaissance Technical 
Group (RTG). The two machines at Hickam were not included in the 13 DEC main-
frames discussed above because their software and hardware were being developed 
separately by the Air Force.

(U) At the central node, a pair of machines were designated hosts. Their 
primary task was to support an on-line integrated all-source data base, and 
to run applications which required heavy access to that data base. Another 
pair of machines at the central node was designed primarily to support user 
terminals, including those in Building 20 and the Command Center complex. The 
terminals in Building 20 (70 of them) were divided between the two machines. If 
one should fail, half of the terminals would be lost. However, sufficient 
terminals were provided, and they were distributed in such a way, that adequate 
casualty-condition services were provided to user groups in Building 20 with 
one of the machines not operating. The exception to this casualty-handling 
philosophy in support of terminals was for the terminals in the Command Center 
which supported the I&W watch. Those terminals were served by channels in the 
fiber-optics link previously mentioned and were switchable to the surviving 
terminal support machine.

(U) The two hosts and the two terminal-handling machines accounted for 
four of the nine machines at the central node. Functionally, the central node 
hosts were ported to the "outside" world through a front-end processor (FEP) 
which served a number of functions. The FEP interfaced with the 38.4 kilobaud 
lines to the FICPAC and PACAF nodes, served remote terminals in the WestPac, 
spooled bulk data transfers, and performed functions in support of remote users 
of the PDSC who were accessing it via the IDHSC. The IDHSC backbone node net-
work processor was itself one of the machines on the TDM bus in Building 20.
(U) The software which implemented the required PDSC functional capabilities consisted of vendor software, software adapted from other systems, new software development where required, and application software converted from existing IBM 360 environments. The primary functional areas for which software adaptation was planned were automated communications, message handling and distribution, the INDICOM network (I&W), IDHSC-II, and graphics. The system support software elements planned for the PDSC included operating systems, language translators, device handlers, and the data base management system (DBMS). DBMS-II was the system selected to support the integrated data base. It was designed to provide data base facilities for PDP-11 COBOL programs and any other digital host language which supported a CALL statement or equivalent, such as FORTRAN IV, FORTRAN IV-plus, and MACRO-11.

Hughes Report Observations²

(U) In the final report of the Systems Engineering/Systems Integration contractor, the Hughes people were generally satisfied that the hardware architecture was suitable in terms of total capacity, flexibility, maintainability, and growth potential. Integration pains could be expected, but no serious (i.e. expensive) problems were anticipated. In contrast, the report stated that the software for the PDSC involved greater uncertainties and risks. The desirable characteristics of performance, maintainability, flexibility, and growth potential, which were relatively easy to attain in modern hardware, were much more difficult to attain in software. This was, in some measure, because of the state of the art in software engineering, but also it was a consequence of upward trends in the ratio of software costs to hardware costs. The Hughes Report acknowledged that every effort was being made to capture or adapt existing software in order to reduce the new development software costs. Citing this effort as a commendable and necessary management approach, the Hughes Report cautioned that danger lay in carrying such efforts too far. "...almost every experienced programmer or systems analyst has worked on projects in which more effort was expended in adapting existing software (which ended up almost meeting the specifications) than was later expended in writing and testing software which did the whole job well...."

Contract Negotiations

(U) Early in 1978 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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Management approved the PDSC request for authority to contract for PDSC implementation. He also approved the PDSC systems specifications for hardware procurement. In February J2, IPAC and MITRE corporation personnel visited the RADC to coordinate the PDSC implementation statement of work (SOW) which would be used in a request for proposal. CINCPAC J2 and other PACOM members participated in the pre-negotiations and negotiation activities leading to the selection of a prime contractor. On 10 August 1978 the RADC announced that the Calspan Corporation had been selected as the prime contractor for PDSC development. The contract was signed on 15 August 1978 with INCO, Incorporated and AIL West as subcontractors to the Calspan Field Service, Incorporated (CFSI). INCO was the software and communications subcontractor, while the AIL was responsible for hardware maintenance.¹

(U) By November CFSI and the subcontractors had 28 personnel on the island of Oahu. They were active at FICPAC and the Camp Smith PDSC complexes.²

Funding the Contract

(U) In mid-year, IPAC received word that the negotiated price for the PDSC prime contract for the remainder of FY 78 would not exceed $500,000. On that basis, the RADC concurred with a reduction of IPAC's original military interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR) from $750,000 to $500,000.³

(U) In November 1978 the RADC requested FY 79 Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) funding authority in the amount of $1.936 million to cover FY 79 PDSC prime contract costs. At that time, IPAC had not yet received its total FY 79 O&M,N funding authorization. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was advised through the CINCPAC Comptroller of the need for funding authorization and, in December 1978, the total IPAC FY 79 O&M,N funding authorization of $6.358 million was received from the CINCPAC Comptroller. This was a reduction of $71,000, which was expected to be absorbed without adverse impact by reprogramming excess dollars then programmed for ADP equipment maintenance.⁴

(U) On 5 December MIPR's to cover the full FY 79 costs for the PDSC prime contractor ($1.936 million) and MITRE ($430,000) contract were dispatched to the RADC and the Electronics System Division of the Air Force Systems Command.⁵

¹. J21 HistSums Feb 78 (U), May 78 (U), Jun 78 (U), Aug 78 (U), and Sep 78 (U); IPAC HistSum Aug 78 (U).
². J21 HistSum Nov 78 (U).
³. IPAC HistSums Jun 78 (U) and Jul 78 (U).
⁴. IPAC HistSums Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
⁵. IPAC HistSum Dec 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

503
Hardware Delivery

(U) The PDSC hardware began arriving on the island of Oahu in July 1978. The first two PDSC DEC PDP-11/70 computers (official nomenclature: AN/GYQ-21 (V) Data Processing Station) arrived on 15 August 1978 and installation began at FICPAC, Makalapa. Acceptance of the first two computers occurred on 26 October 1978. These computers were scheduled to function as the Fleet Collateral System and the Fleet All-Source System portions of the PDSC. Until the PDSC IDHSC switch function moved to Camp Smith, that function would be installed and performed by one of the AN/GYQ-21 (V)'s at FICPAC. Functional turnover was tentatively scheduled for the spring of 1979.1

(U) The delivery of additional Data Processing Stations and their installation began in IPAC Building 20 in November. This delivery included front end processors, hosts, network control systems, and the backup IDHSC machines. By the end of the year all nine PDSC AN/GYQ-21 (V)'s had been installed in Building 20, and six had been accepted by the government. Shipment of the final two computers was being delayed pending the completion of the CINCPAC Command Center construction.2

GSA Contract Support

(U) In January 1978 IPAC provided the CINCPAC Program Manager (J2) with a draft of requirements for General Services Administration (GSA) contract support in the area of computer systems programming and operations. The support was required to implement parallel operations of the IBM 360/40 and the AN/GYQ-21 (V) systems during the development of the PDSC. After J2 and IPAC coordination, IPAC developed a statement for the GSA contract personnel support requirement and issued an MPR for $55,000 to fund 11 GSA contract personnel during the mid-1978 timeframe. Recruiting of the 11 computer personnel began in April by the Potomac Research Incorporated (PRI).3

(U) In early June recruitment activity for the 11 GSA contract personnel was slipped because of the lack of collateral level ADP work for them at IPAC while awaiting their special background investigations. An agreement was reached with FICPAC to utilize three of the PRI computer operators (eventually to be working in the PDSC parallel operation) to work in the FICPAC collateral ADP activity which utilized an IBM 360 computer system. Since the PRI personnel would be working as operators of the IPAC IBM 360 computer system during the PDSC project, the FICPAC activity allowed them to be gainfully employed on a

1. J2 HistSums Jun 78 (U), Aug 78 (U), Sep 78 (U), and Oct 78 (U).
2. J2 HistSums Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
3. IPAC HistSums Jan 78 (U), Mar 78 (U) and Apr 78 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

like computer system while awaiting their special intelligence/special activities office background investigation. On 30 November the GSA Data Services Division Hawaii Area Manager received a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between GSA Region 9 and IPAC. The MOU, signed by the Commander, IPAC and the PDSC Program Manager, delineated the terms of agreement for ADP systems and application programming and operational processing for the PDSC parallel operations project.¹

IPAC Relocation

(U) In May 1978 a work order was submitted to the Public Works Center at Pearl Harbor in the amount of $30,000 to cover the cost of relocating IPAC elements to Building 20. By June the electrical distribution system and the air conditioning equipment were operational and, on 5 July, IPAC began to re-locate its operations to Building 20. The PDSC Program Manager and MITRE staffs moved from office spaces in the CINCPAC headquarters building into Building 20 on 28 September 1978. It was expected that portions of the prime contractor work force would also move to Building 20 when spaces were available.²

(U) In mid-1978 discussions began between IPAC and the CINCPAC staff regarding the construction of an IPAC parking lot to assimilate the relocation of personnel, not only from CINCPAC spaces but also from Hospital Point. During a meeting in August the concept of funding the parking lot with IPAC O&M N funds was approved and the Commander of Camp Smith submitted a work order request to the Public Works Center at Pearl Harbor to construct the parking lot. In September the Commander of Camp Smith and the Commander of IPAC approved an interservice support agreement for installation support to IPAC. An IPAC project order for $70,000 was submitted to the Public Works Center, Pearl Harbor on 13 September 1978 for the construction of the parking lot adjacent to Building 20. An additional $5,000 was provided to the Public Works Center by the Commander of Camp Smith under a "joint funding arrangement for construction of a common-use parking facility at Camp Smith." The notice of acceptance of IPAC's project order was received from the Public Works Center on 29 September 1978.³

IPAC Personnel Augmentation

(U) In response to a request from the CNO and the CINCPAC Comptroller, IPAC provided civilian manpower management data for the Intelligence Production and Data Processing Occupational Codes covering the 58 authorized and the 82

1. IPAC HistSums Jun 78 (U) and Nov 78 (U).
2. IPAC HistSums May 78 (U), Jun 78 (U), and Jul 78 (U); J21 HistSum Sep 78 (U).
3. IPAC HistSums Aug 78 (U), Sep 78 (U) and Oct 78 (U).
required civilian positions in IPAC for FY's 79 through 83. In accordance with JCS manpower planning and programming guidance, the civilian personnel augmentation of 24 positions was to be implemented when the PDSC reached final operational capability in FY 81.1

Defense Analysis System (DAS)

(U) The DAS originated in 1976 as a study to define needed improvements in IPAC's Defense Penetration analysis capability. The DAS study addressed an automated capability to combine enemy orders of battle, weather and terrain data considerations, and penetrating aircraft and associated electronic warfare capabilities on video displays for further analytical review. Under RADC auspices, the Calspan Corporation submitted an approach to the problem which was accepted by IPAC and other commands as an acceptable solution to improving the existing penetration analysis capabilities. In June 1977 a draft DAS Plan and SOW had been received by IPAC. A DAS functional description, computer configuration, and data base configuration had been distributed to both IPAC and RADC, and full scale development and installation of the DAS was begun by IPAC. The DAS project was expected to be a multi-year effort, in conjunction with the PDSC project, with interim operational capability estimated to be early 1979. However, the U.S. Air Force apparently cancelled the program late in 1977 because of budgetary constraints.2

(U) Early in 1978 CINCPAC J2 queried the RADC regarding the status of the DAS project. Of interest was whether, in view of the work already accomplished by Calspan, any money could be recouped. In March CINCPAC was advised informally that the RADC would issue a stop-work order to Calspan for the DAS project effective 31 March 1978. In April IPAC forwarded a revised MIPR which reflected the withdrawal of $100,000 previously provided to the RADC for the IPAC DAS study.3

(U) By May 1978 a DAS follow-on project entitled Experimental Penetration Analysis Support System (EPASS) had been developed. At the same time, O&M, N funding in the amount of $100,000 was returned by the RADC to IPAC as a result of the cancellation of the contract with Calspan Corporation for DAS system support services. In mid-June IPAC forwarded a draft of the EPASS Statement of Requirements to the RADC, which was to prepare a penetration analysis management plan. The management plan was to be forwarded to the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Staff. Meanwhile, the RADC informed IPAC that the

1. IPAC HistSum Nov 78 (U).
3. IPAC HistSums Mar 78 (U) and Apr 78 (U).
amount of recoverable or usable work already accomplished by Calspan which could be applied to the follow-on project was unclear. Attempts were made during the remainder of the year to secure the DAS documentation.\(^1\)

**PACOM IDHS/IDHSC Activities**

(U) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Network was designed to provide the Intelligence community with communications up to the Special Intelligence/Special Activities Office level for interactive, on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange, using internettet IDHS computers on Oahu and in the Continental United States (CONUS). Related to this system was the Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) which incorporated the PACOM IDHSC Network. In May 1977 the nomenclature for this combined internettet system was officially changed to IDHSC II. The system included PACOM access to Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems (COINS) and the DIA On-Line System (DIAOLS).\(^2\)

(U) In August 1977 CINCPAC submitted specifications to the Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor for the FY 78 software development contract for the PACOM Switch. This contract, issued to the IBM Corporation, was expected to provide the necessary software development for smooth transition to the new PACOM AN/GYQ-2\(^1\)(V) Switch. With the arrival of the new AN/GYQ-2\(^1\)(V) Switch from Bunker-Ramo, system testing of the IDHSC II was proceeding and it was estimated, by the end of the year, that IDHSC II would be installed by the DIA in February 1979 and the Switch function transferred to IPAC in May of 1979.\(^3\)

(U) During 1978 a new generation of COINS was under development under the auspices of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The new system was entitled COINS II. In late 1978 the installation of COINS II software had begun with testing to begin in the spring of 1979.\(^4\)

**Secure Facsimile Capability**

(U) In May 1978 the Special Intelligence Communications Division of the CINCPAC Directorate for Intelligence (J242) informed the CINCPAC Staff and IPAC of the availability of Secure Facsimile (SECUREFAX) Communications within the headquarters. The unit utilized existing Automated Voice Network (AUTOVON) lines and was authorized for the sending and receiving of transmissions up to and including Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material.

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1. IPAC HistSums May 78 (U) and Jun 78 (U).
3. Ibid, pp. 380, 381.
4. J21 HistSums Jan 78 (U) and Nov 78 (U).
The CINCPAC SECUREFAX terminal was a subscriber to both the DOD Intelligence SECUREFAX System (DODISS) and the Naval Intelligence Command facsimile networks.¹

Delegated Production Program

(6) In 1974 the DIA initiated a program to delegate production of intelligence data so as to utilize available resources to the maximum extent. In 1975 a format was developed for the IPAC ground order of battle (GOB) to be placed on-line in the DIAOLS/COINS Network. Late in 1975, IPAC developed an on-line data entry system which permitted GOB analysts to input data on the Worldwide Military Command and Control System terminals for storage in card image format. Early in 1977 IPAC concurred with a DIA proposal to convert the DIA order of battle system (DIOBS) to a single "all-source" data base. IPAC developed and submitted to the DIA a proposed GOB delegated production file format as a "straw man." Later in 1977 IPAC began an analysis of the Defensive Missile Order of Battle (DMOB) as a part of the DIA delegated production program (DPP), and began testing programs to support the DMOB. By the end of 1977 IPAC, in coordination with the CINCPAC J2, had reviewed the schedule for the planning and programming phase of the new all-source GOB.²

(U) By early 1978 IPAC was involved with three systems under the DPP. These were the DMOB, the GOB, and the Air Order of Battle (AOB). Parallel operations for DMOB were taking place on the IBM 360/40 computer and additional countries were being incorporated into the system. The AOB was maintained, early in 1978, on the PACAF computer, but analysis and programming efforts were underway to create a DPP-compatible AOB on the IPAC IBM 360/40. IPAC analysts had begun systems analysis for the GOB to be processed on the initial processor (a DEC PDP-11/70) for the PDSC and measure design and code changes were underway. In January a meeting was held between IPAC representatives and representatives of the Navy Regional Data Automation Center Washington (NARDAC Wash), Pacific Detachment, to discuss the assignment of NARDAC programmers to help develop the IPAC GOB system. A SOW for the GOB programming effort was submitted to NARDAC as a guide for the provision of programming assistance.³

(U) Early in February IPAC initiated the first phase of DPP GOB development. Conforming with DIA standards, IPAC developed computer input formats, while, at the same time, designing some card formats for in-house usage only. On 1 February IPAC assumed full maintenance responsibility for the North Korean DMOB. The DIA was requested to send the latest version of the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF) in order to phase in the DMOB AIF records for Cambodia.

1. CINCPACINST 2304.1 (U), 18 May 78, Subj: Secure Facsimile Capability (U).
3. IPAC HistSum Jan 78 (U).
Laos, and Vietnam. The data requested were to be transmitted to IPAC via
the FICPAC DHSC Switch.¹

(U) In late April two of the requested NARDAC programmers had received
SAO clearances. The new GOB file was being designed for processing on the
first PDP-11/70 to be installed in Building 20, while, at the same time, the
existing GOB would be maintained on the IBM 360/40 until the new system was
operational. By the end of April the IPAC input into the GOB data base totaled
107 new records, 383 updates, with a total input of 12,329 data elements. In
mid-May a meeting was held to discuss the development of the DPP GOB and it
was agreed that a full file copy would be available by 1 October 1978 provided
the hardware was available. A request to grant access to a third NARDAC pro-
grammer had been submitted. A schedule for the transfer of tapes and documenta-
tion for AAA, SAM, CDOB, and air movements from PACAF to IPAC had also been
agreed in May. The initial turnover of combined defense order of battle (CDOB)
from PACAF occurred on 3 May. On 10 May the SAMOB documentation was turned over
and, on 17 May, the anti-aircraft artillery order of battle (AAAOB) was turned
over.²

(U) As of the second week in June, the DPP GOB data base design had been
completed. The program to convert the GOB data on the IBM 360/40, to be com-
patible with the DPP system when run on the PDSC, had been coded and testing
had begun. Moreover, all active targets in the Target Data Inventory (TDI)
for the AOB and DMOB through December 1978 for which IPAC had AIF mainte-
ance responsibility were completed by late July.³

(U) In October IPAC reached an agreement with the Pearl Harbor Naval Ship-
yard to allow the use of their PDP-11/70 computer by IPAC programmers. The
shipyard had the only functioning copy of the DBMS-11 which was scheduled for
use in the PDSC computer network. The agreement permitted IPAC’s use of the
computer system for 30 days. Shortly thereafter, agreement was reached with
FICPAC personnel regarding the use of the PDSC FICPAC Collateral System (FCS)
AN/GYQ-21(V) located at Makalapa. It was agreed that IPAC could use that
machine for the development of the GOB. Subsequently, GOB development was
transferred from the shipyard computer to the PDSC FCS AN/GYQ-21(V). The DBMS-
11 and the DBMS monitor, as well as a variety of other items, were generated
in the system as necessary prerequisites to the further testing and debugging
of the GOB data base design.⁴

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1. IPAC HistSum Feb 78 (U).
2. IPAC HistSums Apr 78 (U) and May 78 (U).
3. IPAC HistSums Jun 78 (U) and Jul 78 (U).
4. IPAC HistSums Oct 78 (U) and Nov 78 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

509
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) By the end of the year, work was still being performed on the PDSC machine at FICPAC, but was scheduled to switch to the AN/GYQ-21(V) in Building 20 when acceptance testing had been completed. Meanwhile, IPAC had completed its review of the new DPP AOB draft manual, which appeared to require major revisions of the file. Nevertheless, IPAC planned to accomplish the changes in time to meet the proposed 1 March 1979 transmission date for the AOB to the DIA. This depended upon assurance that the DIA would make no significant change to the DIA format prior to IPAC's programming effort. In December IPAC was advised that the DIA again planned to change the AOB production procedures manual. If the changes were major, IPAC expected some difficulty in meeting the DPP submission goals. By the end of the year, IPAC had not yet received the AIF data from the DIA needed to proceed with the AOB for the scheduled series of countries. However, AOB records had been completed for all North and South Korean entities and 24 percent of the 133 total Japan records had been completed.1

1. IPAC HistSums Oct 78 (U), Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
SECTION II--COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Support to Exercise TEAM SPIRIT

1. IPAC HistSum Jan 77 (C), GDS-84.
2. IPAC HistSums Jan 78 (S), GDS-86 and Mar 78 (U).

SECRET
1. SSO SAC 181339Z Jul 78 (BOM), XGDS-2, REVW 18 Apr 08.
2. COMUS Korea 250835Z Jul 78 (S), XGDS-2.
3. IPAC HistSum Jul 78 (S/WF), GDS-86.
4. IPAC HistSums Aug 78 (S), GDS-84 and Sep 78 (S/WF), GDS-84.
ELINT Exploitation

OEE Processing

(U) Efforts continued during 1978 to improve the daily Operational ELINT Exploitation (OEE) processing. Early in the year CINCPAC J2, IPAC, and Hughes Aircraft Corporation representatives discussed means to improve the special intelligence message traffic being processed into the IBM 360/40 computer. Because of the upgrade of the OEE processing system to handle special intelligence traffic, the equipment for transmission was no longer suitable to punch incoming messages onto paper tape. Several solutions were discussed, including a direct electrical connection into the 360/40 computer from the telecommunications center (TCC). That option was ruled out because of high software development costs, impact on processing and equipment expense. The most technically and operationally practicable option appeared to be to continue to input messages to the 360/40 on punch paper tape. This method required new punch equipment and modification to the equipment possessed by CINCPAC J2.¹

(RED) On 23 May 1978 the OEE Branch in IPAC began using the IBM 360/40 and the IDHSC Net to dispatch the daily ELINT summary report. In July the use of a compartmented source in electronic order of battle (EOB) production was directed. By November the new procedures were in effect and approximately 80 percent of the backlog had been analyzed and entered in the data base. The first products to primary consumers, utilizing the compartmented source, were the semi-monthly AUTODIN inputs to the DIA and EOB change message.²

EWIR Improvement

(SEC) IPAC, PACAF and Air Force Electronics Warfare Center began discussions in September on ways to improve the Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR) software. The Air Force representatives agreed that EWIR flagging data processing be modified so that the Air Force representatives would receive a daily message.³ IPAC solicited inputs and outputs of EWIR software from the Electronics Warfare Center in order to evaluate its performance as modified. In December 1978 the participants met to review the status of the EWIR flagging operation. It was agreed that a simple Memorandum of Understanding would suffice to define the areas of responsibility of the participants.³

１. IPAC HistSums Jan 78 (U) and Feb 78 (U).
２. IPAC HistSums May 78 (C), GDS-84, Jul 78 (C), GDS-84, and Nov 78 (C)¹³ι. GDS-84, and Dec 78 (U).
３. IPAC HistSums Sep 78 (C), GDS-84, Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
support was provided by IPAC to CINCPACFLT under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT. In November 1978 discussions were begun which resulted in agreement for CINCPACFLT and the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center Pacific (FOSICPAC) to resume the responsibilities in support of PACOM ocean surveillance efforts. CINCPACFLT agreed to provide IPAC with the required The turnover of IPAC responsibility was to be an evolutionary process with no specific target date.

Korea OEE

Early in 1978 IPAC developed software to produce pseudo-graphic geographic plots from the daily OEE input data. Plot points were generated on computer listings which were scaled to maps utilized by the IPAC OEE operation. As a result, the amount of time normally required by the intelligence analyst to hand plot the daily OEE activity was significantly reduced. The software was completed, debugged and operational by 8 February. The first application for the pseudo-graphic map display during OEE processing was to the Korean Peninsula north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The capability to use different scaling factors was included.

In August, in response to a previously expressed PACAF requirement, IPAC began to report the ELINT Summary for North Korea via GENSER communications to four PACAF operational wings and PACAF Headquarters. Other customers receiving the ELINT Summary Report by means of special intelligence channels were surveyed for possible changes to GENSER because faster processing would be possible.

In connection with a CINCPACFLT special project in October 1978, IPAC initiated an effort to provide air defense data on North Korea to CINCPACFLT.

1. IPAC HistSum Nov 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. IPAC HistSums Feb 78 (U) and May 78 (C), GDS-84.
3. IPAC HistSum Feb 78 (S/E/NF), GDS-86.
4. IPAC HistSum Aug 78 (S), GDS-86.
IPAC provided a recalculation of the expected radar detection range for the North Korean coastal defense/early warning and ground control intercept radars. The data was transmitted to CINCPACFLT and various agencies in Korea in late October 1978.1

Although deployment to Korea was not scheduled until May 1979, IPAC discussed with Army personnel the possible timely relay of the collected data to IPAC for OEE processing.2

1. IPAC HistSum Oct 78 (U).
2. IPAC HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
SECTION III -- TARGET INTELLIGENCE

PACOM Target Management


1. TAG Minutes, Aug 78 (S), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; IPAC HistSums Aug 78 (C), GDS-84 and Sep 78 (S), GDS-86.

2. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08 and Mar 78 (S/NE), GDS-86; IPAC HistSums Feb 78 (S), GDS-84 and Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; IPAC/Memo/S70 of 22 Mar 78 (S/NE), XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 08, Subj: Changes to CINCPAC OPLAN 5001 (PACOM Defense Plan) Target List (U).
1. IPAC HistSums Apr 78 (S/NF), GDS-86, May 78 (S/NF), GDS-86, and Jun 78 (S/NF), GDS-86.

2. IPAC HistSums Jul 78 (S/NF), GDS-86 and Sep 78 (S/NF), GDS-86; TAG Minutes Nov 78 (S/NF), REVW 29 Dec 88.

1. IPAC HistSums July 78 (SYNE), GDS-86 and Aug 78 (8), GDS-86.
2. IPAC HistSums Nov 78 (C), GDS-84 and Dec 78 (8), GDS-84.
3. TAG Minutes, Mar 78 (SYNE), GDS-86; DIA 7410/2821522 Mar 78 (8), GDS-86.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
PANWAS

(U) The PACOM Nuclear Weapons Analysis System (PANWAS) was a CINCPAC-developed software system to provide intelligence nuclear weaponeers with the ability to inflict the most damage to a given target considering the constraints surrounding the target area. The major information displayed by PANWAS was the target category, weapon, height of burst, yield, probability of damage and fatalities. A graphics capability was included to move the aimpoint as necessary to refine the optimal solution. After an operational demonstration of the PANWAS, FICPAC weaponeers requested that the system be installed. The installation was completed on 9 January 1978. Later, the Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) recommended that the PANWAS be incorporated into the target construction subsystem of the Nuclear Contingency Planning System (NCPS). Consequently, PANWAS was being demonstrated by the CCTC to representatives of the JCS and other nuclear commanders in chief as a candidate for inclusion into the NCPS of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. This would improve the capability of the NCPS, which rapidly produced generalized aimpoint solutions to targeting problems. PANWAS would enable the nuclear planner to utilize his experience, alter input parameters, and quickly view the impact of the change. That process would continue until an optimal aimpoint was created.

NOMS

(U) The Nuclear Operations Monitoring System (NOMS) was used by all unified commanders to monitor the entire spectrum of nuclear warfare from

1. TAG Minutes, Apr 78 (S/NF), GDS-86 and May 78 (S/NF), XGDS-2, REVW May 08 IPAC HistSum Apr 78 (S/NF), GDS-86.
2. TAG Minutes, Jun 78 (S/NF), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; DIA 3642/030005Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. J63 HistSums Jan, Mar 78 (U); J6 BWEBs 2-15 Jan and 13-26 Mar 78 (U).
selective release through full execution of the SIOP. In February 1978 extensive documentation was completed on the PACOM Nomex, and training began in preparation for general war exercises held in March 1978. Critiques of the exercise by CINCPAC J6 personnel resulted in software changes to the Nomex which improved reporting accuracy. In July 1978 standardization of all-alphanumeric command codes for unified commands was achieved. CINCPAC representatives presented for consideration a new report developed within CINCPAC for use by other airborne command posts. CINCPAC personnel also presented suggestions to improve the processing of the Coordinated Atomic Operations Standard Operating Procedure message traffic. These suggestions were incorporated into the SIOP-NOMEX. 

Cruise Missile Planning

Late in the year IPAC was tasked to provide target and defensive plots to support cruise missile mission planning. However, problems had developed

1. J63 HistSums Feb 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U).
2. IPAC HistSum Feb 78 (S/NF), GDS-86.
3. IPAC HistSums Jul 78 (S) and Oct 78 (S), both GDS-84.
with the IPAC plotting capability, and attempts to resolve the problem by CINCPAC automated data personnel were futile. As a result, cruise missile planning projects were slowed because of the absence of a reliable plotter.¹

**NKTTL Refinements**

(S/NOFORN) The North Korea Tactical Target List (NKTTL) was the basic North Korea conventional tactical target list in support of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027, Defense of Korea. The NKTTL was used by organizations at all levels for target planning, target materials production/management, and target files, and folder preparation.²

(S/NOFORN) In January 1978 COMUS Korea submitted nominations made by the Korean Joint Target Actions Group (JTAG) for inclusion in the NKTTL. The point was made that all of the nominated targets were also included in the Air Forces Korea (AFK) Tactical Target List (AFKTTL) which represented the analytical interaction of Allied Forces Korea and was the basic tactical target list in support of United Nations Command OPLAN 5027 and AFK OPLAN 536. For that reason, the nominated installations required priority maintenance at the national level and were submitted for inclusion in the NKTTL. After review by IPAC and subsequent discussion during the February TAG meeting, 14 of the 15 nominations to the NKTTL by COMUS Korea were approved.³

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1. IPAC HistSums Oct 78 (U), Nov 78 (U), and Dec 78 (S), GDS-84.
3. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08 and Feb 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; Hq USFK Ltr (S/NE) of 4 Jan 78, XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 07, Subj: NKTTL Nominations (U).
4. TAG Minutes Mar 78 (S/NE), GDS-86, and Jun 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.

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SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
During the last TAG meeting of 1978 in November, IPAC presented the latest additions, changes, and deletions to the NKTL, with which the membership concurred. The TAG Chairman noted that the NKTL was scheduled to undergo a series of changes. PACAF had proposed to list the targets by OPLAN; however, this was a long lead-time item because of software modifications. The PACAF proposal would require further examination. The NKTL foreword was being revised to reflect new plan identification numbers, which would complicate cross-referencing of NKTL with the various OPLANS.

1. TAG Minutes Jul 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; Hq USFK Ltr (SYNE) of 26 Jun 78, XGDS-2, DECL NBO, Subj: Recommendation for the NKTL (U).
2. TAG Minutes, Aug 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
3. TAG Minutes, Nov 78 (SYNE), REVW 29 Dec 08.
1. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (SKNF), XGDS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08; 314AD 230100Z Dec 77 (S), XGDS-2, DECL 23 Dec 07.
1. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (S/NF), XGDS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08, and Feb 78 (S/NF), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
2. TAG Minutes, Mar 78 (S/NF), GDS-86.
The last update of the IOCTL was provided to the TAG membership by the IPAC representative during the October 1978 meeting. A large number of changes were included because of revisions in the categoric designations of airfields and reserve bases in the target area.

Fleet Support

2. TAG Minutes, Mar 78 (S/NF), GDS-86; IPAC HistSum Mar 78 (S/NF), GDS-84.
3. TAG Minutes, Oct 78 (S/NF), REVW 8 Feb 09.
4. IPAC HistSums Sep 78 (U), Oct 78 (S/NF), GDS-86 and Dec 78 (S), GDS-86.
Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Materials Conference

(U) Early in February 1978 an ad hoc session of the TAG was called to consolidate and review the agenda items for the 1978 Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Materials (TI/TTM) Conference to be held at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida from 13-17 February. The Chairman of the PACOM TAG served as CINCPAC voting representative at the conference, which was also attended by representatives from PACAF, PACFLT, IPAC, and the 548th RTG. There were 90 items of target intelligence interest on the agenda and 38 items addressing tactical target materials. Of note was the fact that the Chairman of the TTM portion of the conference working group was Wing Commander Alan C. Smith, Royal Australian Air Force.1

TI/TTM Activities

TAPA

(U) The PACOM Target Analysis Pacific Area (TAPA) system had its origin in a CINCPAC requirement for a more timely response to crisis support than had been possible with existing target data bases. The TAPA data system was placed on-line in IPAC in October 1977. It consolidated, on a single computer system, all of the required targeting data elements necessary to accomplish CINCPAC-directed target analysis and weaponeering.2

(U) At the request of the DIA, IPAC provided a briefing on the TAPA system at the 1978 worldwide TI/TTM Conference. Prior to the conference briefing, IPAC also briefed CINCPAC J2 and component target representatives. The DIA considered TAPA to be an impressive capability.3

(U) Early in 1978 IPAC Automated Intelligence Installation File (AIF) and TAPA file coordinators began the development of software applications to permit the interface and absorption of IPAC's Lines of Communication Capabilities (LOCCA) transportation data base into the AIF. This long range program, on completion, would allow greater community-wide access and utilization of some 21,000 route records in the LOCCA covering...

1. J222 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; IPAC HistSum Feb 78 (U).
3. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (S/AF), XDGS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08; IPAC HistSum Jan 78 (S/AF), GDS-86.
4. IPAC HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-84.
In September the TAPA System was operated in a contingency action mode. Analytical and data base maintenance was performed by IPAC personnel on a continuing basis to simulate a war-time situation in Korea. Various reports, including new target lists, strike and photo data and data base confirmation lists were requested daily. This was the first operational test of the C-File segment of the TAPA system.

In December IPAC programmers began to test programs to update the TAPA file using the DIA electronic order of battle (EOB) file. Up to that time, the TAPA system had been updated from the IPAC EOB file. The two files were congruent; however, the IPAC file was normally more current by two weeks because of the time required for the DIA to update its file. The DIA file, however, was the standard for PACOM and the file used for the update of the TAP system. Also in December the PDSC Prime Contractor reached the point in data base design where a test data file was required to test PDSC compatibility. An extract of TAPA was requested to serve as the initial file. Upon the successful building of this test file, TAPA was expected to be the first to convert to the PDSC data base format.

ATTG Production

With what IPAC considered to be outstanding Automated Tactical Target Graphics (ATTGs) support from the 548th RTG, 116 CINCPAC conventional OPLAN targets were weaponized during January. In addition, IPAC continued in January 1978, its joint experiment with the 548th RTG and FICPAC which included target selection criteria in the "installation significance" portion of the ATTG text. This program provided the opportunity to disseminate to field operational units the analytical justification for targeting specific installations.

In the March 1978 meeting of the TAG, PACAF proposed to add low oblique and seasonal graphics to ATTGs on selected high priority targets. PACAF produced target support graphics (TSGs) and seasonal select prints (SSPs) as supplemental photography for ATTGs on approximately The purpose of these graphics was to assist aircrews in target acquisition, identification and mission planning. The TSG provided a large scale, low oblique graphic, uncluttered by annotations other than a

1. IPAC HistSum Sep 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 78 (U).
3. IPAC HistSum Jan 78 (C), GDS-84.
target outline and directional arrow.
PACAF proposed that these graphics be incorporated into the PACOM TTM program to increase management, production, microfilming, and distribution efficiency and to make the graphics available to a wider number of users. The CINCPACFLT representative to the TAG noted that the addition would create a non-standard ATTG package. The Fleet representative also noted that TTM producers could be required to provide special photography in support of requirements established by other Services at the expense of essential tasking in support of components. In the general discussion which followed during the TAG meeting in March, it was noted that the PACAF proposal appeared to be within its purview of providing support to its components. Noting that there was a need for seasonal photography, the TAG Chairman appointed an ad hoc committee to consider the PACAF proposal on optional ATTG photography.1

(U) The ad hoc committee reported to the TAG meeting in April 1978 that, according to the DIA, an ATTG was consistent with the guidelines set forth in DIA Manual 57-24. Thereupon, the CINCPACFLT representative withdrew his noncurrence for the proposal with the stipulation that supplemental photos would be added to the basic ATTG; that supplemental photos would be included as the last graphic pages to the ATTG; that only specified supplemental photography be specially annotated in the textual portion of the ATTG; and, that supplemental photography would be updated in accordance with established guidelines for ATTG validation or reaccomplishment. All representatives of the ad hoc committee agreed that the addition of optional photography to the ATTG should be limited.2

(U) In July 1978 the DIA advised CINCPAC of a proposal by the European Command to produce an annotated ATTG during crisis/wartime situations. The PACOM TAG appointed an ad hoc committee to review the proposal. The committee review showed that the proposal duplicated the abbreviated ATTG which had been approved during the 1978 TI/TTM conference. CINCPAC subsequently advised the

1. TAG Minutes, Mar 78 (S/NF), GDS-86; Hq PACAF Ltr (U) of 14 Mar 78; Subj: TAG Agenda Item Recommendation (U), with one enclosure: PACAF TAG Agenda Item (S), DECL 31 Dec 2008; CINCPACFLT/Memo (U) of 29 Mar 78, Subj: Addition of Low Oblique and Seasonal Graphics to ATTGs on Selected High Priority Targets (U).
2. TAG Minutes, Apr 78 (S/NF), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT/Memo (TAG Representative) to Chairman, PACOM TAG (U), Subj: Ad Hoc Report on Optional ATTG Photography (U), undated.
DIA of nonconcurrency with the European Command proposal, and the DIA indicated that the subject would be placed on the TI/TTM Conference Agenda for 1979 as recommended by CINCPAC.1

In July 1977 the PACFLT representative to the TAG reported that ATTG production had been discussed at several ad hoc meetings. The position of the TAG members was that the PACOM should cover at least the littoral nations affected by CINCPAC plans. However, because the matter could have implications for the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the proposal would be staffed through CINCPAC for a policy decision. In August 1977 CINCPAC was advised by CINCLANT that the Fleet reservists would produce

During the May 1978 TAG Meeting, the CINCPAC representative reported on discussions with CINCLANT on a PACOM counter proposal for the division of responsibility for ATTG production. The primary concern expressed by CINCLANT was the capability to produce large scale graphics desired by CINCPAC for weapon engineering.

1. TAG Minutes, Sep 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
3. Ibid.
The TAG members noted that approximately 20 percent of the targets in the IOCTL were within the geographic areas specified by the DIA for elimination. During the May 1978 TAG Meeting, the IPAC representative suggested that the DIA action presented an opportunity to reexamine the IOCTL and

(SYNOPFOR). In June 1978 the TAG Chairman advised the members that CINCLANT had proposed to take responsibility for ATTG production. In order to do so, CINCLANT proposed that the UCP boundary be returned to the 1976 line. In July the TAG Chairman advised the membership that CINCLANT and CINCPAC had agreed to table further discussions on production responsibility. In the interim, CINCLANT would produce

produce

This matter was pending at the end of 1978.2

CPFL Actions

(U) During the January 1978 TAG Meeting, the PACFLT representative inquired about the feasibility of producing the Contingency Planning Facilities Lists (CPFLs) in microfiche form. The CINCPACFLT representative noted that the microfiche version would save storage space onboard ship. An ad hoc committee was appointed to consider the CINCPACFLT recommendation and, in March 1978, the committee reported back to the TAG. With CINCPACFLT/FICPAC, PACAF, and IPAC representatives in attendance, all concurred that the CPFL format conversion from hardcopy to computer output microfiche (COM) was feasible and economically desirable. The committee discussed the customer's ability to fulfill its missions and functions. The IPAC representative on the ad hoc committee advised that conversion of CPFL to the TAPA file for a data base was underway and that if successful, IPAC would format the CPFL tape while FICPAC would only be involved in COM production. Responsibility for the maintenance of the CPFL including source data, release criteria and content had not been officially addressed since 1973. The ad hoc committee recommended that the Service components determine which of their commands, if any, absolutely needed a hard copy CPFL. During the subsequent March 1978 TAG Meeting, IPAC advised that mission

1. TAG Minutes, May 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL NBO; JCS 2350/151812Z May 78 (NS), GDS-86; DIA 2413/151914Z May 78 (NS), GDS-84.
2. TAG Minutes, Jun 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08 and Jul 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
support should not be provided in an arbitrary format, and that users should be queried as to their ability to use microfiche in their operations.1

(U) In early May 1978 IPAC reported that the CPFLs for North Korea (both the NOFORN and the ROK releasable versions) had been delivered to the printers. Both versions, formerly produced on the FICPAC computer, were developed for the first time from the TAPA System. The format for the ROK releasable version was unchanged; however, the format for the NOFORN versions was extensively revised, greatly improving its utility to all PACOM users. The information presented varied in each of the four sorts, making more installation data available. The category sort presented many more fields of data specifically useful to target analysis; the latitude sort presented map and chart reference fields; and, the basic encyclopedia number and name sorts continued to give basic identification data but with additional useful fields. During the May TAG meeting, the Chairman noted that, with the successful extraction of the CPFL from the TAPA file, CINCPAC, PACFLT, and IPAC would reexamine the authorities for the production of the CPFL. To that end, an ad hoc meeting would be held. During the same meeting, the members were briefed on the data additions to the CPFL. They had been based on a user survey conducted several years before, but could not be implemented without the TAPA system capability. The members were also advised that COMUS Korea had proposed to extend the data content of the CPFL to include LOCCA data, but this proposal was held in abeyance pending the resolution of production authorities for the issue of the CPFL.2

In July the TAG discussed the original COMUS Korea proposal that LOCCA files be included in the CPFL. IPAC determined that the CPFL was not

1. TAG Minutes, Jan 78 (SYNF), XGDS-2 and 3, DECL 31 Dec 08, Feb 78 (SYNF), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; Mar 78 (SYNF), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT/Memo (TAG Representative) to Chairman, TAG (U) of 30 Mar 78, Subj: Adhoc Meeting on CPFL Production.
2. TAG Minutes, May 78 (SYNF), XGDS-2, DECL NBO; IPAC HistSum May 78 (U).
3. TAG Minutes, Jun 78 (SYNF), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08; IPAC HistSum Jun 78 (C), GDS-84.

CONFIDENTIAL

535
the appropriate place for LOCCA data. Instead, IPAC proposed to publish a separate LOCD, North Korea. The TAG members concurred in forwarding a straw-
man of the North Korean LOCD to COMUS Korea for review by the JTAG. In September TAG meeting the Chairman reported that COMUS Korea had reviewed the proto-
type of the LOCD document and had recommended excellent long-range improvements in the data. During the September meeting the proposal to produce the CPFL in microfiche form was again discussed. It was noted that production problems with the CPFL which affected the timeliness of the document, combined with rising mailing costs, once again made microfiche a viable form for the CPFL. PACAF and PACFLT representatives agreed and noted that their units had some reader and reader/printer capability for microfiche. It was recommended that IPAC purchase a microfiche duplicator, so that FICPAC could make masters and IPAC would retain production and distribution control. It was agreed that the transition could begin after 1 January 1979 with a limited hardcopy being provided during the transition period. In the interim, IPAC would examine working agreements regarding COM and consider whether other documents could also be produced on microfiche. CINCPAC would review the transition procedures and, pending completion of the changeover, the ROK-releasable CPFL would continue to be published in hard copy.

Regarding the production of the [redacted] of the CPFL for North Korea in microfiche form, COMUS Korea advised that, although the reasons for converting to microfiche were understood, some of the field units in Korea would need to purchase portable viewing equipment with backup battery capability in order to use the new form. Meanwhile, the first extract of CPFL North Korea TAPA data was received by IPAC on 17 October. The hardcopy was scheduled for mailing to COMUS Korea and other recipients in November. On 21 November IPAC dispatched two CPFL tapes to the 548th RTG. These tapes satisfied a recurring PACAF/548th RTG requirement previously met by FICPAC as part of the CPFL program. This transmittal closed the loop regarding CPFL production and distribution responsibility from FICPAC to IPAC.

AIF Actions

In March 1978 IPAC reported that the total number of Field AIF (F/AIF) actions processed during the first quarter of 1978 exceeded 3,900. This was close to the total of 5,005 F/AIF actions processed during the full CY 77 and nearly doubled the number processed during CY 76. In May a software program

1. TAG Minutes, Aug 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08 and Sep 78 (SYNE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
2. TAG Minutes, Oct 78 (SYNE), REVW 8 Feb 09; IPAC HistSums Oct 78 (C), GDS-84 and Nov 78 (U).
was completed which eliminated human intervention in the F/AIF management system, except for analysis verification of the intermediate data. Using cards from other PACOM units, the program allowed updating to the Field AIF Records Management (FARM) file; i.e., the TAPA file.1

(U) During the May TAG meeting the group reviewed all IPAC targeting documents using the basic encyclopedia number as the primary sort field. COMUS Korea had requested that PACOM standardize the sequence to make the various documents under the purview of the TAG use the standard collating sequence used by the DIA AIF. During the May meeting the PACAF representative was appointed to chair an ad hoc committee to examine the production of AIF products in mirofilm/microfiche form by FICPAC and the 548th RTG.2

(U) On 30 June a program was completed by IPAC to update the TAPA system and the FARM from the same input medium. This was another step toward the integration of the AIF and orders of battle files. During the June TAG meeting, the Chairman informed the members that CINCPAC comments regarding the Contingency AIF (C/AIF) file had been forwarded to the DIA. In November 1978 IPAC was asked by CINCPAC to comment on a European Command message regarding the C/AIF support system. The IPAC position was that the C/AIF could support both national and theater commands. The master file would be controlled by unified and specified commands where action was occurring. IPAC's representative, during the November TAG meeting, noted that the TAPA system had been designed to support a concept such as the C/AIF.3

(U) Regarding the proposal to microfilm or microfiche AIF products, it was determined that both PACAF and PACFLT produced AIF products in miniaturized format. It was agreed that the service components would examine the AIF production for possible duplication and/or conflict and, if such existed, it would be resolved outside the TAG. Bearing on that subject was the future role of the PDSC regarding AIF production when it became operational.4

1. IPAC HistSums Mar 78 (U) and May 78 (U).
2. IPAC HistSum Jun 78 (U); TAG Minutes, May 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2, DECL NBO.
3. IPAC HistSums Jun 78 (U) and Dec 78 (S), GDS-84; TAG Minutes, Jun 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08 and Nov 78 (S/NE), REVW 29 Dec 08.
4. TAG Minutes, Aug 78 (S/NE), XGDS-2, DECL 31 Dec 08.
The ANZUS INDICOM was activated between CINCPAC and the New Zealand Director for Defense Intelligence in April 1977. The following month, activation was completed between CINCPAC and the Joint Intelligence Organization of Australia. In conjunction with the move of IPAC personnel and various intelligence terminals to the new facility in Building 20 on Camp Smith discussed in previous sections of this Chapter, the ANZUS INDICOM Network Terminal was

1. J223 Point Paper (S), 25 May 78, Subj: Intelligence Exchange Between ANZ Members (U), GDS-86.
SECRET

installed in Building 20 in November 1978.

Indian Ocean

Bilateral Intelligence Exchange

1. IPAC HistSum Nov 78 (U).
2. J223 Point Paper (S), 18 Aug 78, Subj: Intelligence Exchange with France (S), GDS-86.
3. J223 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-86; J223 Point Paper (S), 14 Dec 78, Subj: CINCPAC-Singapore Intelligence Exchange Conference (IEC) (S), REVW 19 Nov 95.

SECRET
(U) In October 1978 the J2 of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in South Korea, Major General Dong Ho Kim, visited CINCPAC and the principal on-island subordinate commands at the invitation of CINCPAC's J2. General Kim and his party briefed the organization, functions, and command relationships of the newly-formed CFC. In turn, they were briefed on the capabilities of the various intelligence collection and processing agencies available to CINCPAC.2

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1. J223 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; IPAC HistSums Feb 78 (S), GDS-86 and Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; J223 Point Paper (S), 19 Sep 78, Subj: CINCPAC-AFP Intelligence Exchange Conference (IEC) (S), XGDS-3, DECL 31 Dec 08.
2. J221 HistSum Oct 78 (U).
3. J223 HistSum Jun 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 86; IPAC HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
1. CINCPAC 270820Z May 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 090105Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84.
4. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 45/292054Z Jun 78 (G), GDS-84.
National Disclosure Policy

1. SECSTATE 166002/292306Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. J466 HistSum Mar 78 (S), GDS-84; SECSTATE 82455/040220Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-84; SECDEF 5637/142258Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. J466 HistSum Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; MDO Japan 141030Z Jul 78 (S), GDS-86.
4. CMDO Tokyo 103/040805Z Oct 78 (S), GDS-84.
CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY HIGHLIGHTS

SECTION I--OVERVIEW

Selected Chronology 1978

(U) This unclassified chronology was compiled from Department of State Bulletins, the periodical Current History, the wire service dispatches entitled "Significant News" sent to CINCPAC while away from his headquarters by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office, and the wire service chronology submitted by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office to the History Branch.

1 Jan - Following Cambodia's action in breaking diplomatic relations with Vietnam on 31 December, Vietnamese officials accused Cambodia of attacking and occupying Vietnamese territory along their joint border in Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province (the Parrot's Beak).

- In the closing seconds of 1977, five small navigation stations throughout the Pacific, each operated by a handful of U.S. Coast Guardsmen, uttered their final beep. This marked the silencing of the long range navigation (LORAN) system developed during the closing months of World War II to guide the massive U.S. war machine across the vast reaches of the Pacific.

- In Teheran, Iran President Carter met with Jordanian King Hussein for talks on the Middle East peace negotiations.

- In New Delhi, President Carter met with Prime Minister Morarji Desai.

2 Jan - President Carter addressed the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India.

3 Jan - President Carter arrived in Saudi Arabia from India, where he signed a joint U.S.-India Declaration that the spread of nuclear weapons must be halted. The Declaration did not specify how this would come about.
3 Jan - Vietnam warned Cambodia that the Phnom Penh Government would be held responsible for its "crimes" along their common border and for failure to accept Hanoi's offer of negotiations. Cambodia had accused Vietnam of invading its territory in force and plundering the Cambodia countryside.

- A 14-member U.S. Congressional Delegation headed by Representative Lester Wolff arrived in Tokyo by U.S. military jet on the first leg of a tour of Asia and Europe.

4 Jan - President Carter conferred with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Aswan, Egypt, where the two Presidents suggested that the Palestinians should "participate in the determination of their own future."

- President Carter arrived in France to meet with French officials.

- Peter Tali Coleman was sworn in as the first local and elected Governor of American Samoa.

5 Jan - Chiefs of U.S. Diplomatic Missions to 16 Asian countries, and U.S. Government officials from Washington opened the annual regional conference of Chiefs of Mission at the American Consulate in Hong Kong. The conference was attended by CINCPAC.

- The Congressional delegation headed by Representative Wolff arrived in the Philippines and met with President Marcos and his cabinet to discuss U.S.-Philippine relations.

- Leon Jaworski, Special Counsel to the House Ethics Committee investigating alleged South Korean influence-buying in Washington D.C. said, "We have requested that the South Korean Government make Tongsun Park available for testimony in the proceedings of the committee...."

6 Jan - President Carter visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and stated that the United States would include its European allies in negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms.
6 Jan - After an eight-day trip to seven countries on three continents, President Carter said in Washington that the United States would endorse a limited-choice referendum for Palestinians living on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip. He said that an independent Palestinian nation would not be one of the alternatives.

- An American guard was stabbed to death while chasing an intruder at a remote section of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The slain guard was a member of the Canine Patrol Team at the base.

7 Jan - The Philippines and Vietnam agreed to settle future differences amicably between the two countries. President Marcos and visiting Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh signed a statement regarding problems which might arise in the future regarding disputed territory.

8 Jan - In a televised interview in the United States, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said that the border conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia was really a "proxy war" between China and the Soviet Union.

9 Jan - The dollar closed at 241.90 yen in Tokyo, after having closed the week before at 240.80 yen.

- The Constitution of the Northern Marianas became effective at midnight and the district's first governor, Doctor Carlos Camacho, was sworn into office along with members of the bicameral legislature.

- The U.S. State Department's top official on human rights arrived in Manila for a three-day orientation visit. Ms. Patt Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was scheduled to call on senior officials of the Philippine Government and hold discussions with U.S. Embassy officials.

- The United States and South Korea concluded a mutual prosecution assistance agreement, setting the legal stage for the questioning of Tongsun Park.
11 Jan - Accompanied by his attorney, Tongsun Park signed an agreement in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul whereby he will submit to interrogation in Seoul and return to the United States as a witness at any trials that result from the investigation of influence buying by South Korea in Washington.

12 Jan - In Washington D.C., President Carter criticized the Soviet Union for its military support of Ethiopian forces against the Western Somali Liberation Front in the disputed area of Ogaden Province.

18 Jan - A military helicopter crashed in a snow storm near Mount Fuji about 100 miles west of Tokyo, according to the Japan Self Defense Agency.

19 Jan - The U.S. State Department announced that the yacht BRILLIG and the three American crew members had been released by the Vietnamese Government. The American yacht and its crew of one woman and two men had been seized in October 1977.

21 Jan - Representatives of the United States and four Western European nations met to review the worsening situation in the Horn of Africa where Ethiopia and Somalia were at war. The one-day consultations with Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy were part of the Administration's efforts to achieve a negotiated peace between the two African nations, currently fighting an undeclared war over the Ogaden region.

22 Jan - The Soviet Union accused Western powers of encouraging Somalia to attack Ethiopia. The Communist Party newspaper Pravda said that developments in the Horn of Africa "caused justifiable concern."

23 Jan - In the first report of heavy fighting in the strategic Horn of Africa in six weeks, Mogadishu radio announced an Ethiopian assault with ground troops, heavy artillery, and war planes. The attack, which the radio said was backed by "Russians and other stooge forces," appeared to be centered east of Harar. The wire service dispatch noted that since September, U.S. intelligence had reported more that 200 Soviet ships calling at the Ethiopian port of Assab with military hardware and some 50 flights from the Soviet Union carrying arms. The massive aid, according to this report, had prompted President Carter to protest against Moscow's "unwarranted involvement" in the conflict.
23 Jan - Somalia announced that Ethiopian forces had launched a counter-offensive to recapture the Ogaden region, but that Somali insurgent forces had repulsed the attack.

- The State Department estimated that Cuba had nearly one-fourth of its regular army of 100,000 in Africa. Other military sources, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said the Cuban Army was somewhat larger.

24 Jan - U.S. Government sources reported that Cuban troops were flying into Ethiopia from Havana and Angola aboard Russian-made jet transports to prepare for a counteroffensive against a Somali invasion force. According to the same sources, most of the Cubans in Ethiopia—around 2,500 at that time—had arrived since December 1977. The nature of the buildup—which included mechanized and artillery combat units—indicated that Havana would eventually deploy 5,000 troops or more.

- Mogadishu radio announced that Cuban soldiers had been captured by Somali insurgents for the first time in the six-month war in Southeastern Ethiopia. The broadcast, quoting the insurgent newspaper Danab, said "other allied troops" were killed in the clashes, an apparent reference to either Soviet or East European soldiers who had been accused of joining the conflict on the side of Ethiopia.

- A malfunctioning Soviet military satellite carrying a nuclear-powered generator disintegrated in the earth's atmosphere over northwest Canada.

- Military sources in the Philippines reported that Government forces had launched a major operation against a Moslem rebel group believed to be responsible for the massacre of an Army General and 34 of his men in October of 1977. The fighting was centered on Jolo Island, located 600 miles south of Manila.

- The official radio Phnom Penh reported that Cambodia had ruled out negotiations to end its border war with Vietnam. The radio also reported three new Vietnamese pushes more than a mile into Eastern Cambodia. The official radio apparently put to rest speculation that China was arranging negotiations between Vietnam and Cambodia with Peking officials as middle-men.
24 Jan - Eight U.S. Air Force F-15 EAGLES arrived in Korea to participate in a joint U.S.-South Korea air exercise called "CORONET CONDOR." The fighter planes, from the First Tactical Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, landed at Osan Air Base 35 miles south of Seoul.

- U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, arrived in Dacca, Bangladesh and met with Naval Chief Admiral Mosharaf Hossain Kahn and President Ziaur Rahman.

- The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on Status of Forces released a report blaming a faulty afterburner for the crash of a U.S. military plane in Yokohama in September 1977. The report said that inadequate assembly of the afterburner resulted from careless middle-level maintenance at a military unit in the United States, but that the U.S. Government refused to divulge information directly implicating the responsible parties.

25 Jan - Vietnam accused Cambodia of fresh attacks in seven of its eight border provinces during the past week.

- U.S. Airman First Class Stephen Bowerman drew a life term from a provincial court on charges of murder and arson, officials at the Korean Justice Ministry announced. Bowerman became the first American soldier to be sentenced to life imprisonment by a Korean court.

- For the eleventh day, Tongsun Park faced American and Korean investigators in Seoul, but the attitude of South Korean officials to American demands that Park and former Ambassador to Washington Kim Dong-jo testify before U.S. Congressional investigators in Washington had hardened.

- The House Armed Services Committee released a Central Intelligence Agency study which showed that dollar-wise, the Soviet Union invested 20 percent more than the United States in armament for the period 1967 to 1977.

26 Jan - U.S. Government sources reportedly stated that Cuban pilots had been identified flying MIG-17 jets supplied to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union for use in a counter-offensive to regain the Eastern Ogaden region. There was no evidence that the Cuban pilots had actually taken part in bombing missions, although they had taken off and landed at Addis Ababa Airport.
31 Jan - The United States began delivery to Somalia of $6 million in food aid—the first American assistance to Somalia since 1972. The aid agreement was signed after the Soviet Union was expelled from Somalia because of the military assistance it had granted to Ethiopian forces.

A State Department spokesman strongly denied charges by Ethiopia's military leader that the United States had encouraged Arab and European countries to supply Somalia with arms and troops.

- Unidentified sources in Washington were cited by the United Press as stating that planning documents approved by Defense Secretary Brown envisioned a smaller Navy which would pull back from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization flanks in case of war and have a reduced role in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The scenario called for landbased aircraft to control the ocean and air above on both the Northern and Southern NATO flanks. The projections were included, according to these sources, in the first "consolidated guidance" documents for the FY 79 budget. The guidance papers were reportedly critical of the role of aircraft carriers in a NATO defense. Japan, according to the sources, would have to protect its own shores and keep its own oil lifeline open through the Indian Ocean. The consolidated guidance papers also reportedly envisioned some expanded, but undetailed, naval role in the Middle East involving amphibious support for a combined Army and Marine force of more than three divisions which would be formed to handle Persian Gulf trouble spots.

1 Feb - While the Foreign Minister of the Royal Thai Government was conferring with the Cambodian Prime Minister and Communist Party Boss, the police in Thailand reported a new attack by Cambodian troops on a Thai police post in Northeastern Thailand.

- Radio Phnom Penh reported that Vietnamese troops had again attacked Cambodia, penetrating tiny villages not far south of the Laotian border. On 29 January the same source reported that Vietnamese forces had attacked along a northern highway two miles into Cambodia.
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1 Feb - Ethiopian war planes launched air strikes against two towns in northern Somalia, killing one person and wounding 16 others, according to a Somali news agency. The agency said that Ethiopian MIG-21s, MIG-23s, and American-supplied F-5s had attacked the northern district capital and a nearby town.

- U.S. Government sources reportedly stated that a number of Soviet cargo ships and three amphibious vessels had remained off the northern Ethiopian port of Massawa, where Eritrean guerrillas held part of the town and had cut off the garrison from land supply routes.

- In a statement released by the White House, President Carter stated that Arms Sales Agreements for Fiscal 1978 would total $8.6 billion to non-allied countries; the total of all sales would amount to more than $13 billion.

2 Feb - In his annual report to the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Harold Brown presented a tentative 5-year defense budget, including $116.8 billion for Fiscal 79 and rising to $172.7 billion by 1983 to keep pace with the Soviet Union.

- The State Department, in a carefully worded statement, said that Ambassador Woodcock, the U.S. liaison officer in Peking, was making his own assessment when he called for full diplomatic relations with China and withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan. The State Department spokesman said that United States policy toward China remained unchanged.

3 Feb - Prime Minister J. R. Jayewardene was sworn in as President and Sri Lanka adopted the French Presidential system of government.

- Radio Hanoi reported that invading Cambodian forces had thrust nearly ten miles into Vietnamese territory. At the same time, radio Phnom Penh reported that Vietnamese forces had failed in an invasion attempt in rugged northeastern Cambodia mountains.

- The Pentagon announced that a submerged U.S. submarine had test-launched two cruise missiles the day before but that one had sunk in the Pacific with apparent engine failure. The Pentagon spokesman said the TOMAHAWK missiles--the first to be launched from a submerged submarine--were fired off the southern California coast.

UNCLASSIFIED

552
4 Feb - In an interview with United Press International, the Somali Information Minister said that Ethiopia had launched a massive two-pronged attack from strongholds in the Ogaden region in an effort to slice through northern Somalia to the sea. One group was attacking east of the Ethiopian city of Harar toward the Somali City of Hargeisa and aimed at the capture of the key port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden.

- Somali insurgents reported a "heavy battle" raging around two cities in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. In an interview with Newsweek International magazine, Somali President Muhammad Siad Barre stated that the Soviet Union was out-maneuvering the United States in the Horn of Africa. At the same time, a newspaper in India reported that the United States and the Soviet Union had sought India's help in stopping the war in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia. The same newspaper reported that Iran and the Arab nations had also informed India that they would not stand by as spectators if, while pushing out the rebels and their Somali supporters, the Ethiopians invaded Somalia.

- State Department officials reported that Cuban pilots were conducting air strikes against Somalia from Ethiopian bases.

- The Mauritius Prime Minister said that he was concerned over "super power rivalry" in the Indian Ocean because it could be dangerous to countries in the area. He called for an end to rivalry and said the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace.

5 Feb - Responding to criticism of the planned troop pullout from South Korea, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said, "The situation in Northeast Asia isn't what it was ten years ago." During questioning before the House Armed Services Committee, one Representative stated that he had found no U.S. commander, military man, ambassador, State Department aid, or foreign official who agreed with the wisdom of the Korean withdrawal. As evidence of the enhanced equilibrium in Northeast Asia, Brown cited the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, the vastly increased strength of Japan, and the greatly increased economic and military strength of South Korea as changes from conditions of one decade ago.
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6 Feb - The frigate USS TRUETT was dispatched from the Mediterranean to beef up America's naval strength in the Indian Ocean, according to the U.S. Sixth Fleet headquarters. The statement did not say if the move was made because of the intensifying war between Ethiopian and Somali forces in the strategic Horn of Africa.

7 Feb - In Washington D.C., the Chief of Naval Operations stated that the Soviet Union had possibly launched a 20,000-ton nuclear-powered war ship.

13 Feb - According to intelligence sources, Soviet Air Force units were flying in Cuba's air defense system.

14 Feb - Vietnam evacuated thousands of civilians from a five-mile wide, 100-mile long strip of its southwestern border with Cambodia because of repeated Khmer Rouge attacks, according to refugees who had escaped from Vietnam.

- Two newspapers cited U.S. intelligence sources as having determined that Soviet pilots were helping to defend Cuba while Cuban airmen were aiding Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia.

- During a news conference, Ethiopia's military leader stated that Ethiopia would not invade Somalia after driving Somali forces out of the Ogaden. He thanked the Soviet Union and Cuba for their military assistance but did not elaborate on the exact role of the estimated 1,500 Russians and 3,500 Cubans in the country. He said that Ethiopia's second major war in the northern province of Eritrea could continue "for generations." He said Ethiopia would never grant independence to Eritrea.

16 Feb - Cambodian troops killed at least 165 Vietnamese soldiers in four battles during the previous week, according to radio Phnom Penh.

17 Feb - Western sources in Addis Ababa reported that Cuban troops in Ethiopia numbered about 3,500 and could reach 5,000 by March.

20 Feb - Defense Secretary Brown stated that the United States would strengthen its strategic forces in Asia because of growing Soviet strength.

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554
22 Feb - South Korean businessman Tongsun Park arrived in the United States to testify in Congressional hearings.

24 Feb - National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that a Soviet general was "providing direction" for the Ethiopian military in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

25 Feb - Vietnam massed its largest military force in three years along the embattled Cambodian frontier, military and intelligence sources said. The sources said this was the largest marshaling of forces by Hanoi since the 1975 offensive against Saigon.

28 Feb - A White House report on Soviet-U.S. compliance with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty stated that, although the Soviet Union had behaved in an "ambiguous" way, it had not violated the accord.

1 Mar - The U.S. dollar fell to 1.9920 marks to the dollar. This was the first time the dollar had fallen below 2 marks to the dollar.

3 Mar - A U.S. Marine CH-46 helicopter crashed into the East China Sea off the island of Okinawa killing all four crewmen aboard, according to a military spokesman. The chopper, belonging to the Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, went into the sea off Hamby Airfield while en route to the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni.

4 Mar - North Korea stated that the joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise TEAM SPIRIT 78 "gravely threatens peace and security in Korea" and demanded that the United States withdraw its troops from South Korea "at once."

5 Mar - Chairman of the Communist Party Hua Kuo-feng was reelected as Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China by the National People's Congress.

8 Mar - More than 100,000 combat-ready U.S. and South Korean troops were thrown into the field to officially start the largest joint U.S.-Korean military exercise since the Korean War.
8 Mar - The People's Republic of China labeled the joint Korean-U.S. U.S. military exercise TEAM SPIRIT 78 as "provocative." The official New China News Agency, in a report from Peking, said that the United States was giving the regime of South Korean President Park Chung-hee "a shot in the arm" rather than fulfilling its promises to withdraw all American troops from the United Nations Command within three years.

- In a radio broadcast from Mogadishu, a spokesman for the Western Somali Liberation Front stated that Somali forces had withdrawn from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia after artillery, plane, and infantry attacks by Soviet-supported Ethiopian forces.

9 Mar - In Washington, D.C, U.S. President Carter announced that Soviet and Cuban troops would leave the Ogaden region as soon as Ethiopian troops had reestablished control. The Soviet Government had agreed that neutral international observers could be sent to the area to insure that reprisals against Somalis were not taken by Ethiopian troops.

10 Mar - From his jail cell, Philippine presidential opposition candidate Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., appeared on television to rebut government charges that he was an employee of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

11 Mar - U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr., arrived in Seoul to watch the combined U.S.-South Korean exercise TEAM SPIRIT.

14 Mar - South Korean businessman Tongsun Park appeared before the Senate Ethics Committee.

16 Mar - A U.S. Navy A-7E Corsair II combat aircraft, on a close air support mission for Marines engaged in TEAM SPIRIT, developed mechanical trouble and crashed six miles east of Taegu, about 145 miles southeast of Seoul. The aircraft was operating from the USS MIDWAY and the pilot ejected safely, according to a U.S. military spokesman in Seoul.

- The Senate voted 68 to 32 to approve the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty.
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17 Mar - In a speech in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, President Carter warned the Soviet Union that the growth of Soviet military strength imperiled U.S.-Soviet cooperation; he also warned that the United States was prepared to increase its military arsenal if necessary.

18 Mar - In Mogadishu, a U.S. State Department delegation headed by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, arrived for talks with Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre on U.S. economic and military assistance. Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was found guilty of conspiring to murder a political opponent and was sentenced to death in Lahore, Pakistan.

21 Mar - The National Assembly of the Republic of China on Taiwan elected Prime Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, as President.

22 Mar - The Indonesian Congress unanimously reelected President Suharto as President for a third five-year term. Former Foreign Minister Adam Malik was elected Vice President.

27 Mar - Two crewmen aboard a Marine Corps F-4J PHANTOM escaped unharmed when the jet fighter crashed at Midway Island. The aircraft, attached to Marine Aircraft Squadron VMFA-212, veered off the runway, crashed and burned after a tire blew out during landing.

31 Mar - A senior Carter Administration official stated that Cuba had increased its troops in Ethiopia from 15,000 to 17,000 and was shifting them from the war with Somalia to the struggle against Eritrean secessionists. According to this official, there was some indication that Cubans would be employed massively in Eritrea. At the same time, a State Department spokesman in Washington stated that there were at least 15,000 Cubans in Ethiopia, most of them combat troops.

- Police were called to put down violence in a number of Iranian cities after a general strike was called by the underground political opposition.
1 Apr - Cambodian gunners fired into Thailand and for the first time hit a district capital with rockets, according to police sources in Thailand. Preliminary reports said that at least 20 mortar rounds hit a string of Thai villages, while three 107mm rockets struck the district capital itself.

- Somalia alleged that Ethiopian war planes had bombed the northern part of Somali territory but, at the same time, Addis Ababa implied that it eventually could invade Somalia with ground forces if a guerrilla war in the Ogaden continued. Diplomatic sources said that statements from both capitals underscored a new situation on the Horn of Africa.

2 Apr - In Washington, D.C., former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter admitted that U.S. agents had placed a listening device in the office of Korean President Park Chung-hee in the 1960's.

3 Apr - Beginning his testimony before the House Ethics Committee, Tongsun Park said that he distributed $850,000 in gifts and campaign contributions to President Richard Nixon's reelection committee and to congressmen and former congressmen and unsuccessful candidates for the House.

6 Apr - U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Sneider told Korean officials that the United States Government knew nothing about the alleged eavesdropping on President Park.

7 Apr - President Carter announced that he had "decided to defer production" of the controversial neutron bomb, a high-radiation warhead.

- In the Philippines, national elections were held for members of an interim national assembly; these were the first elections held since President Marcos imposed martial law in September, 1972. Marcos was not a candidate for office; a seat in the 200-member assembly had been automatically reserved for him.

8 Apr - Hancho C. Kim, a Korean-born businessman, was convicted by a federal jury of conspiring to bribe congressmen and of lying about this under oath.
9 Apr - A combined force of 300 Cambodian troops and Thai communists struck eight miles deep into Thailand killing 17 people in simultaneous attacks on a village at a border base, according to a radio report in Thailand.

- The United States granted full internal self-government to the 2,100-island Micronesian Archipelago through a 15-year "free association" formula under which Micronesia would handle its own foreign affairs but remain under the military umbrella of Washington.

13 Apr - In Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Ministry reported that 32 Chinese fishing boats, armed with machine guns, had taken up positions in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, 250 miles southwest of Okinawa, and refused to leave. Sixty additional Chinese vessels were in the waters beyond the 12-mile limit.

15 Apr - A Deputy Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China claimed that the presence of Chinese boats off the Senkaku Islands was "accidental."

- Japan reaffirmed its claim to the disputed Senkaku Islands in the South China Sea and said it would seek by all means an early withdrawal of Chinese fishing vessels from Japanese territorial waters around the Senkakus.

17 Apr - In New Delhi, India, Prime Minister Morarji R. Desai told Parliament that, with the full knowledge of the Indian Government, a joint Indian-U.S. intelligence team planted a nuclear-powered spy device in the Himalayan Mountains 12 years ago.

18 Apr - All 21 candidates of the Administration Party in the Republic of the Philippines, led by President Ferdinand E. Marcos' wife Imelda, were officially proclaimed winners in the 7 April legislative elections in Metropolitan Manila.

The U.S. Senate ratified the second Panama Canal Treaty by a vote of 68 to 32; the United States would turn the Panama Canal over to Panama by the year 2000.

21 Apr - President Carter ordered a sharp reduction in the pace of the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from South Korea because of uncertainty in Congress regarding military assistance to South Korea.
21 Apr - Soviet aircraft intercepted a South Korean commercial jetliner which strayed over a strategic air defense zone just below the Arctic Circle and forced it down to a crash landing on a frozen lake, according to Soviet authorities. At least two persons were reported killed and two others injured when the Korean Airlines Boeing 707--bound from Paris to Seoul via the Polar route and Anchorage, Alaska--touched down on the lake between Murmansk and the Finnish border.

- In Washington, D.C., President Carter stated that the Cambodian government was the "worst violator of human rights in world today."

24 Apr - Former Congressman Richard T. Hanna was sentenced to prison for conspiring to defraud the United States in the Korean influence-buying scandal.

25 Apr - About 200 Moslem rebels raid a hamlet in the southern Philippines, killing five residents in the third major insurgent attack in the region during April, according to the Philippine Defense Department.

- A former Chief of Naval Operations, Retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, said that President Carter's cuts in the U.S. defense budget were a disaster and would reduce the nation's chances of winning a major war from one-in-three to one-in-five. In an interview with a Honolulu television station, Zumwalt stated that the reduced military spending would sacrifice Pacific allies in the event of war and seriously jeopardize the chances of saving Europe. According to Zumwalt, the plans were to abandon U.S. allies in the Western Pacific in a war, to concentrate on the defense of Hawaii and Alaska in the Pacific, and to deploy most of the U.S. Navy into the Atlantic in an effort to save Europe. He also said that he did not believe that Pacific allies such as Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan could be defended during a war under the budget restraints Carter had proposed.

- A U.S. Air Force OV-10 BRONCO observation aircraft crashed about 25 miles southeast of Seoul killing both men onboard, according to an Air Force spokesman. The aircraft, assigned to the 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) at Osan Air Base 35 miles south of Seoul, was on a routine training mission when it crashed.
25 Apr - The Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front agreed to merge their forces to fight for the area's independence from Ethiopia.

26 Apr - Aided by Cuban fighter pilots, Ethiopian forces attacked rebel strongholds in Eritrea; this was the second major attack since Somali forces withdrew from the Ogaden in southeastern Ethiopia.

- Vietnam described the U.S. plan for troop withdrawals from South Korea as "just a cover for a military buildup." Nhan Dan, the official newspaper, cited President Carter's decision to slow the pace of American troop withdrawals "with the excuse that Congress has failed to act on military aid requests."

- The White House announced that President Carter would send National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to China on 20-23 May for consultations with government leaders in Peking. It was also announced that Brzezinski would visit Japan and Korea before returning to Washington.

- Administration officials in Washington announced that Vice President Walter Mondale would stop in Hawaii on 29 April on his way to visit the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand.

27 Apr - The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency reported that Chinese fishing boats had departed the waters around the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

- Dissident Army and Air Force units shelled, strafed, and bombed the Presidential Palace and other key buildings in the capital of Afghanistan and announced that they had overthrown President Mohammed Daoud in a military coup. It was announced that a "military revolutionary council" had seized power.

- Afghanistan radio reported a coup d'état by military insurgents. The government of President Mohammed Daoud was replaced by a military revolutionary council headed by Lieutenant General Abdul Khadir.

28 Apr - It was reported that former President Mohammed Daoud had been killed in the coup in Afghanistan; fighting continued in Kabul between rival military groups.
29 Apr - Radio Afghanistan confirmed the deaths of President Daoud, his brother and four other high-ranking government officials.

- In Leningrad, the pilot and navigator of the downed Korean passenger plane were pardoned by Soviet officials for accidently violating Soviet air space.

- A South Korean unit sank a 10-ton North Korean spyboat off the southern coast and killed two North Korean armed agents, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry.

30 Apr - The military junta in Afghanistan named a civilian, Nur Mohammad Taraki, as President of the Revolutionary Council. The Soviet Union announced official recognition of the new regime.

- It was reported in Dacca, Bangladesh that nearly 70,000 Burmese Muslims had fled to Bangladesh despite the attempt by Bangladesh to seal the border.

2 May - Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, and Minister of External Economic Affairs Nobuhiko Ushida arrived in Washington to confer with President Carter.

- Vice President Walter Mondale arrived in the Philippines at the beginning of a five-nation trip.

3 May - Vice President Mondale and Philippine President Marcos signed four new aid agreements totaling about $41 million in U.S. aid to the Philippines.

4 May - The United States and the Philippines reaffirmed an earlier agreement to place U.S. military bases under Filipino commanders during the visit to the Philippines by Vice President Walter Mondale. Mondale and President Marcos issued a joint statement assuring the United States of "effective command and control" over American military personnel and equipment and "unhampered military operations involving their own forces" inside the bases.

- In Bangkok, Thailand Vice President Mondale said that the United States was willing to take the lead in resettling some 100,000 Indochinese refugees.
4 May - Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng left Peking for a six-day official visit to North Korea, his first foreign visit since he became Prime Minister.

7 May - During a speech in North Korea, Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng denounced the United States and demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in Korea.

8 May - A U.S. Army helicopter crashed into a mountainside about 15 miles north of Seoul, killing both Americans on board, according to U.S. military officials.

10 May - Command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet passed from Admiral Thomas B. Hayward to Admiral Donald C. Davis. Hayward was scheduled to become the Chief of Naval Operations.

- Vice President Mondale completed his tour with an address at the East-West Center in Honolulu, where he reaffirmed that the United States was and would continue to be a Pacific power whose key Asian alliances were central to the success of American global policy.

11 May - Peking charged that Soviet troops, gunboats, and a helicopter penetrated two miles into China's northeastern territory and that an armed conflict was averted only because of Chinese "restraint." China charged that 18 Soviet boats, about 30 Russian troops and a helicopter had crossed the Ussuri River in an "organized military provocation."

14 May - After a successful coup d'etat in the Comoro Islands on the previous day by former Cabinet Minister Said Attoumani, President Aly Soilih was placed under house arrest.

- In Kinshasa, Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko claimed that on 11 May, 4,000 former Katangan rebels from Angola invaded Shaba Province and the copper-mining town of Kolwezi. He claimed that the rebels were supported by Cuba, Algeria, and Libya.

- Rejecting an apology by Moscow for the raid by Soviet troops, gunboats, and helicopters on the Chinese island in the Ussuri River, China declared that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable, and ordered military leaders to intensify the training of its armed forces.
15 May - About 200 Communist raiders from Cambodia attacked a Thai town, killing three Thai and wounding four in a three-hour gun battle with police. This terrorist raid was the latest along the violence-torn Thai-Cambodia border where nearly 200 Thai civilians and an unknown number of soldiers had been killed in the past 18 months.

- In the island nation of Nauru, Hammer de Roburt succeeded Lagumot Harris as President.

16 May - The Philippines and the United States quietly observed the 20th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Board—a body formed to enable the two countries to consult on military matters. A joint statement in the Board's annual report, signed by Admiral Maurice F. Weisner and General Romeo C. Espino, stated: "Looking back over 20 years of Mutual Defense Board activities, we feel that it has served us well by providing an excellent mechanism through which our two nations can continue the common pursuit of world peace, regional stability, and national security."

- The U.S. Defense Department placed the 82nd Airborne Division and the Military Airlift Command on alert for the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens in Zaire.

18 May - A U.S. Air Force F-4 PHANTOM fighter plane crashed at a U.S. Marine Corps Base in Okinawa, but its two crewmen parachuted to safety.

- Six Belgian military planes took off for Zaire as the vanguard of a joint western airborne mission to rescue more than 2,500 Europeans and 14 Americans trapped behind rebel lines in Shaba Province. Diplomatic sources in London said the preparations were begun with the approval of President Carter and the leaders of France and Britain, as well as Belgium. A State Department official stated that the United States would not supply troops or planes for the mission but could provide lesser logistical support of some kind.

19 May - The White House announced that 18 U.S. Air Force C-141 transports were participating in the Belgian-French airlift in Zaire.
19 May - Naturalized American citizen Hancho C. Kim was sentenced to six years in prison for his role in the Korean influence-buying scandal.

- The United Nations Law of the Sea conference concluded an eight week session with little progress reported.

- U.S. Defense Secretary Brown stated that the United States might provide limited logistic support for the operation to rescue foreigners trapped by fighting in Zaire. A Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the United States already had flown planes with supplies of aircraft fuel to the Zaire military base 125 miles north of Kolwezi. Meanwhile, the Pentagon ordered about 1,500 Army paratroopers to return to normal status after nearly three days on alert for possible rescue of American civilians in Zaire.

20 May - Tokyo's embattled new international airport, Narita, opened while riot police fought repeated sabotage attempts by ultra-left radicals trying to destroy it.


- An American oil tanker rescued 35 Vietnamese refugees from their sinking boat in the South China Sea some 400 miles southwest of Manila, according to the U.S. Navy.

- The South Korean Navy sank a North Korean spyboat in a naval battle off the eastern coast near the North Korean border and captured eight armed North Korean sailors, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry.

- Belgian and French troops took control of Kolwezi.

22 May - Tokyo International Airport (Narita) officially began full operations with nearly 14,000 policemen maintaining security in and around the controversial new airport.

23 May - National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski arrived in Tokyo to talk to Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda after visiting Peking.
23 May - Moslem rebels, pressured by constant military bombardment and ground assault, unconditionally released 56 hostages seized from a domestic cargo vessel hijacked in the Southern Philippines some three weeks before.

27 May - In Washington, administration officials revealed that Brzezinski had disclosed details about U.S. security goals and Soviet-American strategic arms talks to Chinese officials. Brzezinski's visit to China was described as the "fullest and most extensive consultations" with Peking since China and the U.S. resumed contact in 1971.

29 May - Former Comoros Island President Soilih was shot and killed after reportedly attempting to escape from house arrest.

30 May - The aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE picked up 13 Vietnamese refugees from their sinking boat in the South China Sea near the Philippines, according to the U.S. Navy.

6 Jun - After an earlier announcement by the PRC that it was sending ships to Vietnam, apparently without consent from Hanoi, Vietnam said that China could send ships to pick up ethnic Chinese only after Peking and Hanoi had negotiated as equals on the subject.

- A large Russian Navy task force was reported to be moving toward the Japanese-claimed Kuril Islands in the North Pacific in apparent preparation for military maneuvers in open defiance of the protest by Japan. All Japanese boats had withdrawn from the region where the Soviet Union had stated that firing exercises would be conducted.

- The Japanese Defense Force reportedly disclosed plans to turn Iwo Jima into a key strategic base for national defense in the Southern Pacific. A defense force spokesman said that initial plans called for the building of a comprehensive practice range on the island for air, ground, and sea self-defense forces by 1983.
7 Jun - The Soviet Union moved into a naval base built by the United States at Cam Ranh Bay in southern Vietnam, according to a Chinese-American employee of Yale University. Howard Chao of Yale's East Asia Language and Literature Center stated that his information came from prominent Chinese expelled from Vietnam. He was also told that Vietnam had positioned five Army divisions along its Chinese border.

- Japan's Kyoda News Agency, in a dispatch from Peking, said the Soviets had built a STYX missile base for the Vietnamese less than 100 miles south of the Chinese border. The news agency also said that the 15 Army divisions, comprising more than 200,000 men, had been placed on alert in the South China cities of Kunming and Canton, because of the tension over the expulsion of Chinese from Vietnam.

- Ignoring a Japanese protest, the Soviet Union launched maneuvers off northern Japan with an estimated 2,000 air, ground, and sea troops taking part, according to the Japan Self Defense Agency.

- During a visit to Thailand, Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping ruled out immediate negotiations with Vietnam on the split between the two countries and indicated that China intended to begin a policy of tit-for-tat retaliation against Vietnam. He said China had reduced its aid to Vietnam because of the border conflict and was considering further retaliation.

8 Jun - A Thailand police report said that a large communist force killed 11 government defenders and a civilian at an outpost in southern Thailand. The attack also left 18 combat police wounded but heavy casualties were inflicted on the attackers, who numbered an estimated 300 communists.

- New U.S. Ambassador Richard W. Murphy presented his credentials to President Marcos in Manila. Murphy replaced Ambassador David Newsom. Referring to on-going negotiations between the United States and the Philippines on a new military bases agreement and related military assistance and mutual defense pacts, Murphy stated that he was certain that both sides would achieve mutually satisfactory solutions. President Marcos said that he too was confident that the United States and the Philippines would solve their bilateral problems, particularly the military bases issue.

UNCLASSIFIED

567
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9 Jun - Following the attack on 7 June in southern Thailand, police reported that Thai communist guerrillas had struck two government outposts in northern Thailand, killing five defenders and wounding 15 others. The two attacks indicated that Thailand's 13 year old insurgency was on the upswing.

- Vietnam charged that Chinese border troops with cocked rifles covered a raid into Vietnam by village-plundering ethnic Chinese. Although radio Hanoi gave no indication that the Chinese troops fired on the Vietnamese militiamen, the radio stated that, in one village alone, thieves from across the border had taken more than 400 buffalo with Chinese troop support.

12 Jun - A joint Philippine-U.S. police team arrested 22 persons, including three Americans, at the U.S. Navy armory at Subic Bay. They were believed to be members of a gun-running syndicate selling high-powered arms to the Communist New People's Army.

14 Jun - Japan and China agreed to resume negotiations on the long-pending peace and friendship treaty between the two countries. Japan had formally proposed to reopen the talks on 31 May and, after reports from Peking said China had replied, the Japanese Foreign Minister acknowledged the agreement before a Diet committee.

16 Jun - The United States ended its two-week airlift to Zaire, but skirted disaster at the last moment when Zairean troops threatened to open fire on the last U.S. C-141 transport to fly out of Shaba Province. The incident occurred when the troops demanded that an automobile belonging to a French Foreign Legionnaire aboard the transport be unloaded. They threatened to fire on the plane if it wasn't.

17 Jun - The Secretary of the "campaign for an independent East Timor" said in Australia that the American Central Intelligence Agency had sent military advisors to fight with Indonesian forces against Fretelin guerrilla independence fighters in East Timor. He claimed that the American military advisors were taking part in a "second invasion" of East Timor following the arrival of 15,000 fresh Indonesian troops in Timor in May.

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568
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18 Jun - After the report by China that equipment and funds for Vietnam had been cut because of the influx of 130,000 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, Vietnam announced that China had refused to meet to discuss the two nations' problems and accused China of "carrying out an anti-Vietnamese policy."

24 Jun - Vietnam criticized the United States for keeping troops in South Korea, charging that the U.S. military presence was the "main obstacle to the reunification of Korea."

27 Jun - The sinking of a 30-ton North Korean ship in South Korean waters was followed by close-range gunfire between naval vessels of the two Koreas, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry. The Northern vessel sank about 4.5 miles south of the western border between North and South Korea after colliding with a South Korea naval vessel.

29 Jun - A North Korean newspaper sharply criticized the United States for continuing exercises over South Korea with Guam-based B-52 strategic bombers, saying that it was proof of American intentions to provoke another nuclear war.

- According to Mogadishu radio, Ethiopian war planes struck into populous central Somalia in an apparent effort to force Somalia to end its support for insurgents fighting the regime in Ethiopia. The radio reported that three planes of the Ethiopian Air Force bombed a city just 225 miles north of the nation's capital. In the previous week, according to this report, Ethiopian war planes bombed towns in northwestern Somalia, killing 13 persons and wounding 50 others. These bombings--the first since the so-called Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia ended in March--were seen as retaliation for frequent Somali guerrilla forays into Ethiopia's southwestern provinces.

30 Jun - A major Vietnamese newspaper stated that seven meetings between Vietnamese and Chinese officials had failed to resolve differences over Chinese residents of Vietnam.

- Cambodian forces had pierced Vietnamese lines, driven up to six miles into Vietnam and taken control of six villages, according to Hanoi radio. The radio report denied that Vietnamese troops were operating deep inside Cambodia.

UNCLASSIFIED

569
30 Jun - A spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry reportedly stated that South Korea would not tolerate interference by China in a joint oil exploration with Japan in the East China Sea. The statement was in response to repeated protests from Peking over an agreement signed between South Korea and Japan to explore for oil in an area of the East China Sea known as Block No. 7. Both China and Taiwan claimed territorial rights to the area but Peking was more vocal and threatened to intervene in any drilling operations in the area.

- China and Vietnam broke off their talks on the repatriation of ethnic Chinese. Two Chinese ships had been at anchor off Vietnam's territorial waters since 19 June.

1 Jul - In Phnom Penh's version of wildly differing reports of fighting along the bloody Vietnam-Cambodian border during the previous two weeks, Phnom Penh radio claimed that Cambodian forces had beaten back two Vietnamese incursions in late June, killing or wounding 3,500 Vietnamese soldiers.

- In response to a proposal made on 25 June by President Park of South Korea for economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea, North Korea rejected the proposal in the form of an editorial in the official publication of the North Korean Communist Party. The editorial called the Park proposal a "phony."

3 Jul - In Peking, the Government press agency reported that all economic aid to Vietnam had ended; the Government withdrew all aid advisors to Vietnam. Over the past 40 years, China had given Vietnam nearly $10 billion dollars worth of economic assistance.

5 Jul - The State Department announced that President Carter had ordered U.S. ships to pick up refugees fleeing from Indochina and that they would be allowed to resettle in the United States.

6 Jul - A U.S. military observation plane crashed into a mountainside 50 miles northeast of Seoul, killing both crewmen on board, according to U.S. military sources. The OV-10 BRONCO observation plane from the First Marine Wing based on Okinawa went down at a point about 10 miles south of the truce border separating North and South Korea.
6 Jul - South Korean President Park Chung-hee was reelected to his fifth six-year term by Korea's electoral college.

7 Jul - After 85 years of British rule, the Solomon Islands became independent.

- A U.S. District Court judge sentenced former United States Information Agency employee Roland Humphrey and Vietnamese graduate student David Truong to 15 years in prison as spies for Vietnam; the men had been convicted on espionage charges on 19 May.

10 Jul - Presidential Science Advisor Frank Press met with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping in Peking to discuss an exchange of technological information.

12 Jul - On the eve of Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda's departure for the world economic summit talks in Bonn, West Germany, the Government reported that it planned to reduce its trade surplus by $4 billion. This would be accomplished by increasing imports, including $1 billion worth of enriched uranium ore from the United States.

16 Jul - Leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Canada, West Germany, Japan, the United States and the Common Market's Executive Commission met in Bonn, West Germany, to discuss world economic conditions. During this summit conference, President Carter reaffirmed the United States agreement to reduce oil imports and to strengthen the dollar.

22 Jul - It was reported that France had carried out its biggest underground nuclear test to date in Tahiti.

25 Jul - The U.S. Senate approved 94-0 an amendment warning President Carter to consult with the Senate before making any changes in the 24-year old Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

- The Nuclear Events Agency of the Department of Defense reported that the Soviet Union had gained or was moving towards superiority in ten out of 13 strategic nuclear weapons systems and nuclear forces.
25 Jul - Following a statement made in an interview in which he said that the Japanese Army had the right to make a decision to attack, General Hiromi Kurisu, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, was dismissed.

- Japanese employees at U.S. military bases in Okinawa staged a sitdown demonstration to protest the possible large-scale loss of jobs. The action followed an announcement by the U.S. Army on the island of plans to consolidate its administrative facilities with those of the Air Force.

26 Jul - A Thai negotiating team in Hanoi delivered a letter from the Thai Prime Minister, Kriangsak Chomanan, to Vietnamese Premier Pham Vong Dong asking for the repatriation of about 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand.

- The U.S. Senate approved 81-7 an amendment warning President Carter to consult with Congress before ordering any further troop withdrawals from Korea. Spokesmen for the amendment, which was attached to a foreign aid bill, said they would not object to administration plans to withdraw some 3,400 troops between 1 October 1978 and 1 January 1979. However, they said any reductions after that would have to be done in close consultation with Congress. The Amendment approved by the Senate said: "it is the sense of the Congress that further withdrawal of ground forces of the United States from the Republic of Korea may seriously risk upsetting the military balance in that region and requires full advance consultation with the Congress." Another amendment to the bill, also approved, said the President should report to Congress on the affect of any proposed additional withdrawal on preserving deterrence in South Korea, the reaction anticipated from North Korea, the effect on Japan, and the impact on the U.S.-China and U.S.-Soviet military balance.

27 Jul - China officially broke off more than one month of fruitless Embassy-level talks in Hanoi on the schismatic issue of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam. In a note delivered to the Vietnamese Embassy, the Chinese Foreign Ministry also said that it had ordered the two ships anchored outside the Vietnamese ports of Saigon and Haiphong for the past month to return to Canton, according to the official Vietnam news agency.
27 Jul - After the Senate approved the authority requested by President Carter to transfer selected ground force equipment to Korea's Armed Forces in connection with the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea, a State Department spokesman stated: "As the (Senate) debate demonstrated, any potential aggressor should not be so misguided as to assume that recent political issues between the United States and South Korea have in any manner weakened Congressional backing for the strong commitment of the United States to the deterrence of aggression against South Korea."

28 Jul - The government press agency in Ethiopia reported that government troops had liberated Asmara, the Eritrean capital, from rebel control.

29 Jul - Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda said his government would let the U.S. dollar find its own value despite its crash to the post-war low in New York and London the day before. Fukuda told newsmen "the dollar will follow a natural course of events. A weak dollar is pushing the yen higher." This statement was made after the U.S. dollar closed at a level of 190 yen in New York and London transactions the day before.

1 Aug - The U.S. House voted to permit President Carter to end the embargo on arms sales to Turkey; the embargo repeal was an amendment to a $99.3 million foreign military aid authorization bill.

3 Aug - The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Ethics Committee) announced its acceptance of a South Korean Government offer to allow former South Korean Ambassador to the United States Kim Dong-jo to answer written questions about his purported role in the South Korean influence-buying scandal.

- In Washington DC, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand—opened talks with U.S. administration officials on economic and political issues.
8 Aug - The World Bank approved a $90 million package of virtually interest-free loans to Vietnam aimed at easing critical food shortages and the financing of a dam and irrigation project on the Saigon River in order to increase rice production. This was the first World Bank loan to Vietnam since the Communists took control 40 months ago.

12 Aug - In Peking, Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua signed a 10-year peace and friendship treaty, including a clause opposing hegemonism. Simultaneously, TASS, the Russian Government news agency, stated that the Sino-Japanese treaty endangered detente and threatened security in Asia.

14 Aug - A U.S. Navy plane carrying 31 persons crashed into the Philippine Sea 16 miles southwest of Guam.

17 Aug - The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to recommend the Solomon Islands as the 150th member of the United Nations.

19 Aug - In a speech on the 25th Anniversary of his government, the Shah of Iran said that demonstrations against his government were instigated by "rioters who receive orders from the Communists."


- In Abadan, Iran arsonists set fire to a theater, killing at least 377 people.

22 Aug - Iranian police arrested 10 people in connection with the theater fire; they were believed to be ultra-conservative Muslims who believe that the westernization of Iran conflicted with the teachings of the Koran. In Abadan, demonstrations broke out against the government and the Shah, whom the demonstrators blamed for the holocaust because fire-fighters were delayed in reaching the scene.

- In retaliation for the expulsion order for all French Embassy personnel from Vientiane, Laos, France broke diplomatic relations with her former colony.
23 Aug - Iranian Government troops arrived in Abadan to maintain order following the outbreak of violence.

- In Hanoi, the Premier told visiting U.S. Congressmen that Vietnam was eager for full relations with the United States. He stated that the remains of 11 U.S. servicemen killed in the Vietnam war would be returned. He restated his Government's dropping of demands for $3 billion in war reparations from the United States.

- The Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia al Haq, stated that France had withdrawn an offer to sell Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant.

- The U.S. Defense Department reported that the U.S. Navy had successfully tested a laser beam to destroy high speed anti-tank missiles.

24 Aug - South Korean Hancho C. Kim pleaded guilty to tax-evasion charges in U.S. District Court in Washington. The charges grew out of his connection with alleged South Korean Government influence-buying of Congressional members. Kim had been convicted on 18 April on charges related to the alleged conspiracy.

26 Aug - In Vientiane, the Government returned to American officials the bodies of four U.S. servicemen killed in the Indochina war. This was the first time the Laotian Government had made such a gesture.

- In three agreements totaling $60 million, the United States resumed direct aid to India. Aid was suspended in 1971 after the outbreak of fighting in what is now Bangladesh.

29 Aug - The Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait stated that the unrest in Iran was part of a super-power scheme to undermine Gulf security. His statement followed an unprecedented Saudi appeal to support the Shah, made by the Saudi Defense Minister the previous week.
29 Aug - Military sources in Thailand reported that, in the first serious clash in nearly one month, Thai and Cambodian troops had fought a five-hour border battle, killing six Thai soldiers. Fighting broke out when a jeep carrying five Army men and a village defense volunteer was ambushed on a road near the Cambodian border 140 miles east of Bangkok. The Thai soldiers radioed for help, saying that they were under attack by about 50 Khmer Rouge troops. A column of about 50 Thai soldiers rushed to the ambush site, coming under heavy attack before reaching the scene. Three helicopter gunships, ordered into the battle, bombarded the Cambodian positions until the soldiers could reach the jeep. All six men in the jeep were found dead.

30 Aug - Defense Ministry sources in the Philippines announced that heavily-armed Moslem rebels had ambushed coconut-gathering farmers during the previous week in the southern Philippines and had killed 14 civilians. These authorities said 33 people had been killed in the previous two weeks during intermittent clashes in the South.

- After Aid agreements worth $60 million had been signed between the United States and India the previous week, the retiring Chief of the Indian Air Force said India had signed the contract to purchase $1 million worth of drone aircraft. The planes cost about $50 thousand each.

- Vietnam gave China formal warning against further border violence involving stranded Chinese refugees in a statement that brought deteriorating relations between the two former allies to a new low. The warning came within hours after China had accused Vietnam of creating "an atmosphere of war, terror, and panic" at the border where thousands of ethnic Chinese were stuck with no place to go.

- The 137 islanders of Bikini were evacuated from the radioactive atoll in the Marshall islands. The Bikinians, who had been resettled several times, were ordered from their home islands after new surveys showed dangerous amounts of lingering radiation.
2 Sep - The U.S. Treasury Department announced that Japan had agreed to purchase $1 billion worth of enriched uranium from the United States and to pay for it in advance of its 1979 delivery. In a move to shore up the faltering dollar, the transfer of the funds was expected to reduce pressure on the dollar in relation to the Japanese yen.

3 Sep - A U.S. Navy spokesman announced that authorities had recovered most of the $100 million worth of checks lost when the door of a U.S. Navy mail truck in the Philippines was forced open on 30 August while on a mail run. The spokesman said that seven of 10 packages containing the checks were recovered along the route from Subic Bay Naval Base to Manila. Another 1,000 pounds of regular mail and 20 pieces of registered mail were either lost or stolen.

4 Sep - Military authorities in the Philippines announced that at least 59 persons had been killed and 53 wounded in 21 encounters during the previous week in the rebellion-torn southern Philippines. Moslem rebels, waging a nearly six-year-old separatist movement in the Mindanao-Sulu region 500 miles south of Manila, lost 48 dead and 31 wounded. The Government suffered 11 dead and 22 wounded.

- Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Iran protested the government's policies and demanded that exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini be permitted to return to Iran.

5 Sep - President Carter welcomed Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to Camp David, MD for Middle East peace talks in virtual seclusion and under a news blackout.

6 Sep - Twenty-eight Vietnamese refugees plucked from the China Sea in separate rescue incidents by a U.S. Navy ship and a Philippine vessel arrived in Manila. The USS ASHTABULA rescued the refugees after discovering them adrift aboard a tug-boat with a broken engine off Vietnam's coast.

7 Sep - In Teheran, hundreds of thousands of political and religious demonstrators defied the 6 September ban on political demonstra-

UNCLASSIFIED

577
8 Sep - The Shah of Iran declared martial law in Teheran and 11 other cities in an attempt to control the growing disorders.

12 Sep - Cuban President Fidel Castro arrived in Addis Ababa to meet with Ethiopian military leader Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Ethiopian Government was celebrating the fourth anniversary of the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie.

13 Sep - The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference ended in New York with little progress reported.

17 Sep - After 13 days of negotiations, the Camp David conference ended. President Carter appeared on nation-wide television with Sadat and Begin to announce agreement on a framework for a "just, comprehensive, durable settlement" for the Middle East.

- General Zia al-Haq was sworn in as the President of Pakistan.

26 Sep - South Korea successfully test-fired long and medium range surface-to-surface guided missiles fully designed and produced with Korean technology at an undisclosed sea base, according to Korean Defense Ministry reports. President Park and other high-ranking South Korean civilian officials, as well as U.S. and South Korean military leaders, were on hand for the test-firings. Also tested, according to the report, were multiple-loaded rockets and anti-tank missiles developed by South Korea.

- President Carter formally ended a three-year old embargo on arms shipments to Turkey. This coincided with an announcement that Carter had signed into law the foreign military aid act which empowered him to lift the Turkish arms embargo if he determined Turkey was seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem.

27 Sep - Military authorities in the Philippines reported that a town mayor in northern Luzon had been gunned down by unidentified men armed with Armalite rifles on 25 September. Authorities were not able to give a reason for the attack but official reports indicated that guerrilla activities of the rebel New People's Army had intensified in northern Luzon.
28 Sep - Japanese military sources reportedly announced that an 80,000-ton floating drydock would be delivered to Vladivostok in Soviet Siberia by November 1978, thus paving the way for possible deployment of Soviet aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

29 Sep - Thailand's politically-sensitive list of military promotions was announced. A strong supporter of Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chomanan was promoted over several more senior generals to the most important post—Commander in Chief of the Army. The promotion of General Prem Tinsulanond was expected to tighten Kriangsak's control over the Army.

- The Commander of Thailand's Air Force announced that Thailand would buy another squadron of American-made F-5s for $100 million. He said he had signed the purchase order for the fighter-bombers on 28 September. The first squadron of F-5s had been purchased at a special price of $75 million by agreement between Prime Minister Kriangsak and U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale during Mondale's visit to Thailand earlier in 1978.

- Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said that the Philippine-Moslem rebellion was the biggest deterrent to lifting martial law because of the continued flow of arms to the rebels from outside sources. Marcos did not name the foreign sources of arms.

- President Marcos linked the dropping of the Philippine claim to Sabah to agreements on border crossings and joint patrols with Malaysia. In August 1977 President Marcos had announced the withdrawal of the Philippine Government's long-pending claim to Malysian state of Sabah during the conference of the leaders of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur. At that time, he did not mention conditions for the withdrawal.

1 Oct - A nine-island Pacific nation, Tuvalu, 2,000 miles northeast of Australia, became independent of Great Britain.

3 Oct - The Turkish National Security Council voted to permit four U.S. intelligence installations in Turkey to reopen; the bases were closed in 1975 in retaliation for the U.S. arms embargo, which was lifted on 26 September of this year.
7 Oct - The Indian Defense Minister announced plans to purchase 40 JAGUARS (Anglo-French deep penetration strike aircraft) from Great Britain for $1.6 billion.

9 Oct - In major Iranian cities, anti-government demonstrations continued. Civil employees were demanding pay increases.

11 Oct - In what was billed as a major policy statement, U.S. Ambassador Morton Abramowitz said increased U.S. involvement in Thailand would be economic rather military. Abramowitz became Ambassador to Thailand in July 1978 after a four-year stint as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, Abramowitz said, "I believe that the economic and commercial area offers the greatest prospect for increased U.S. involvement in Thailand. We neither seek nor desire the reestablishment of U.S. bases in Thailand."

15 Oct - In an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh of North Yemen, nine members of the Yemen Army were killed. Saleh had been appointed on 17 July to succeed Ahmad Ghasmi, who was assassinated on 24 June.

17 Oct - The third American-made Bell helicopter to crash in Indonesia in five months smashed into a mountain in central Sulawesi, injuring all crewmen aboard, according to the English-language Indonesia Times.

23 Oct - Vietnam and Cambodia each claimed victories in stepped up fighting along their borders. Radio Phnom Penh reported that Cambodian troops had killed 950 Vietnamese invaders in October. At the same time, Vietnam claimed that its forces had killed or wounded more than 400 Cambodian soldiers and sunk five enemy ships.

- During a visit to Japan, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping formally exchanged the documents of the Chinese-Japanese peace treaty signed on 12 August with the Japanese Prime Minister.

26 Oct - The United Nations Command accused North Korea of digging a tunnel under the Demilitarized Zone about one mile from the Panmunjom camp where Military Armistice Commission talks were under way. North Korea denied the charge. (The existence of the tunnel had been officially confirmed by the United Nations Command on 17 October).
27 Oct - Ten of the 15 men whose U.S. Navy P-3 ORION aircraft ditched into the frigid North Pacific were rescued by a Russian trawler, according to the U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard officials said that the bodies of three other crewmen were also taken aboard the ship. The propeller-driven submarine hunter had made a controlled ditch 690 miles west-southwest of Adak. The survivors had spent the night riding in 10-foot seas about 600 miles east of the northern Soviet port of Petropavlovsk.

29 Oct - Units of the Seventh Fleet rescued 40 Moroccan sailors from their wrecked ship in the South China Sea, according to a U.S. Navy spokesman.

31 Oct - Iran's oil exports were reduced by 40 percent when 37,000 oil refinery workers went on strike. The workers were demanding higher pay and a repeal of martial law.


- The dollar fell to record lows of 1.722 German marks to the dollar and 175.5 Japanese yen to the dollar.

1 Nov - Iranian officials reported that 23 anti-government demonstrators had been killed and 56 injured in clashes with government troops who were attempting to protect the oil wells and refineries from saboteurs.

3 Nov - Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The treaty pledged mutual cooperation in economics, science and technology, culture, education, socialist politics and defense of the underdeveloped countries of the world. Article 6 of the treaty read, "in case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries."

- An anti-submarine jet from the U.S. Seventh Fleet carrier USS CONSTELLATION crashed into a mountainous training area 60 miles northwest of Manila, killing all four persons aboard, according to U.S. Navy authorities.
4 Nov - Vietnam announced that it was holding the bodies of six Chinese soldiers killed in the worst military clash between the two communist countries and had rejected Chinese demands that the bodies be handed over at the border. Vietnam accused China of preparing further attacks on two border fronts, backed by a 100,000-man Chinese military force in Cambodia. This, alleged the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, was an effort to remove Vietnam as an obstacle to Chinese domination of Southeast Asia.

5 Nov - After a trip to China, Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger arrived in Tokyo for discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda.

6 Nov - A State Department spokesman said that Taiwan's request for advanced jet fighter planes had been denied but that the United States would supply Taiwan with 48 F-5Es, which were considered to be defensive in nature.

- In Bangkok, PRC Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-peng warned Thai officials against Soviet "expansionist activities" in Southeast Asia.

- The Shah of Iran declared nationwide martial law and appointed a new cabinet.

7 Nov - The United States and South Korea activated a Combined Forces Command to integrate efforts for South Korean security in view of the announced phased withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea. South Korean President Park personally attended the ceremony at the U.S. military command complex in Seoul. U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown led the U.S. delegation.

9 Nov - After a 5-day visit in Bangkok, PRC Deputy Prime Minister Teng arrived in Kuala Lumpur.

- In Tokyo, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown met with Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda for talks on maintaining U.S. troops in Japan. The Japanese officials reportedly agreed to increase their financial support of the United States' presence to about $700 million per year.

12 Nov - Deputy Prime Minister Teng arrived in Singapore and was greeted by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
17 Nov - A Malaysian cabinet member stated that none of the 2,500 Vietnamese refugees on board the freighter HAI HONG anchored off the Malaysian coast would be admitted unless their acceptance in a third country had already been guaranteed.

In a meeting with 12 U.S. Senators in Moscow, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said the Soviet Union tested a neutron weapon "many years ago."

18 Nov - Vietnam, according to a Tokyo newspaper, was permitting Soviet naval vessels to use the former U.S. coastal base at Cam Ranh Bay for refueling purposes. The newspaper quoted a former White House aide as saying that the United States had been aware of this Soviet presence since 1976.

19 Nov - In a formal reply to Soviet President Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union was against interference in the internal affairs of Iran, the State Department replied that the United States had no intention of interfering in Iran's internal affairs.

24 Nov - It was reported that the Vietnamese had increased their ground and air attacks into Cambodia, flying as many as 40 combat missions daily.

25 Nov - A flotilla of some 35 boats carrying an estimated 10,000 Vietnamese refugees was reported to be floundering southward along Malaysia's east coast with police boats keeping vigilance to prevent their landing. About 12,000 Vietnamese refugees were reported by Malaysian officials to have landed in that country during November, bringing the total number to more than 40,000.

26 Nov - In Montreal, Canada, 159 Vietnamese refugees arrived from the freighter HAI HONG, the first of 600 refugees accepted by Canada.

27 Nov - The South Korean Defense Ministry alleged that North Korean intruders were believed to be involved in a series of killings along South Korea's western coastal areas.
27 Nov - Following his defeat by Masayoshi Ohira in a primary election for the presidency of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda submitted his resignation as Prime Minister of Japan. Ohira, the former Foreign Minister, succeeds Fukuda as Prime Minister on 6 December.

- The U.S. Agency for International Development announced that the United States had airlifted $1.5 million worth of emergency disaster relief supplies to the 150,000 victims of the cyclone which hit Sri Lanka on 24 November.

1 Dec - The Soviet Ambassador to Thailand denied that the Soviet Union had established a military base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. He also called for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Southeast Asia, but denied knowledge of a reported 20-30,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos.

2 Dec - A cluster of islands near the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea were made a municipality of the Philippines, according to senior military officials. Philippine officials disputed claims that the Kalayaan Islands were part of the potentially oil-rich Spratlys, claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, as well as the Philippines.

5 Dec - In Moscow, Prime Minister Noor Mohammad Taraki of Afghanistan and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.

- President Marcos of the Philippines ordered that all criminal cases be transferred from military tribunals to civil courts.

12 Dec - At a White House news conference, President Carter stated that the Shah of Iran "has our support and he also has our confidence."

13 Dec - The first group of U.S. combat ground troops left for home as an initial step to fulfill President Carter's campaign pledge to withdraw all U.S. ground troops from South Korea by 1982. The 212-member first group, all belonging to the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division departed from Osan Air Base aboard a commercial aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED

15 Dec - In a televised speech from Washington DC, President Carter announced that on 1 January 1979, the United States would establish mutual diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; at the same time, the United States would terminate diplomatic relations and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China). The United States would withdraw its remaining military forces from Taiwan within four months.

16 Dec - In Peking, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng announced that China and the United States had agreed to establish diplomatic relations (15 December in Washington).

20 Dec - According to an authoritative newspaper on Chinese affairs in Hong Kong, the United States Seventh Fleet would continue to patrol the Formosa Strait after the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China. It was speculated that the move had received Peking's tacit consent.

- The U.S. dollar closed on the Tokyo foreign exchange market at 193.2 yen per dollar.

- China accused Vietnam of deliberately creating "bloody incidents" by bombarding frontier outposts, beating up guards, and gunning down residents. The New China News Agency alleged that 2,000 armed Vietnamese personnel had invaded China's territory and provoked more than 200 border incidents.

21 Dec - Malaysia braced for another Vietnamese refugee onslaught as authorities reported sighting a flotilla of 14 refugee boats heading for Malaysia's northeast coast.

- A State Department spokesman announced that Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher would go to Taipei, Taiwan to discuss the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan.

22 Dec - The South Korean cabinet voted to grant amnesty to 4,000 political prisoners, among them President Park's political rival, Kim Dae-jung.
26 Dec - The Pentagon's research chief was reported to have said that Russia had successfully tested a new radar and missile system which posed a serious threat to low-flying American bombers and fighters invading Soviet air space. He stated that a Soviet MIG-25 fighter had made at least one successful look-down-shootdown attack, destroying a target drone the size of a small fighter plane. He also was reported to have said that when the new system was in use, it would have significant implications for the ability of U.S. fighters and bombers to survive.

27 Dec - President Park Chung-hee formally began a new six-year term in office, pledging to build South Korea into a highly industrialized welfare state. President Park declared a sweeping Presidential amnesty for political prisoners and freed his chief political opponent, Kim Dae-jung, from prison. Five years before, Kim had been kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel and taken to Seoul in an incident which severely strained relations between South Korea and Japan.

28 Dec - The dollar fell sharply on the Tokyo foreign exchange market and the Bank of Japan was forced to buy dollar currency when it reached a rate of 193 yen.

- In Manila, Vietnamese refugees aboard the freighter TUNG AN, which had arrived in Manila Bay the day before with about 2,300 refugees aboard, complained that they did not have enough food despite Philippine Government pledges that they would receive adequate supplies. At the same time 2,700 Vietnamese refugees stranded at sea off Hong Kong begged authorities to take children and aged people ashore.

- New anti-Shah violence rocked cities across Iran, and the opposition said troops had killed at least four protesters. Iran's strike-plagued oilfields ceased all production, according to the Iran state radio.

29 Dec - After a ten-day effort by a former cabinet member to form a new coalition government in Iran, the Shah asked an opposition leader to form a new government. The Shah's mother and other members of the royal family arrived in the United States. In Washington DC, U.S. and British intelligence officials reported that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Libyan government had provided aid to the exiled opposition leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
29 Dec - Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his delegation, which included Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, concluded two days of talks in Taipei; tensions between the United States and Taiwan had not been resolved.

30 Dec - The U.S. House Ethics Committee issued its final report that, although it lacked direct proof, it believed that the South Korean Government attempted to influence members of Congress with cash gifts from South Korean businessmen like Tongsun Park.

- According to U.S. Administration officials, a U.S. Navy task force, including the carrier CONSTELLATION, was ordered to steam toward the approaches of the Indian Ocean as the United States kept a close eye on developments in Iran. The administration officials said that the CONSTELLATION, together with its screen of destroyers and auxiliaries, was ordered to sail from Subic Bay in the Philippines to the South China Sea. No orders, however, had been given for the ships to enter the Indian Ocean.

- The Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, Leonard Woodcock, announced that Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping would visit the United States beginning 29 January 1979.

31 Dec - U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan recommended that dependents of Americans working in Iran leave the country, at least temporarily.

- President Marcos of the Philippines announced that the United States and the Philippines had reached agreement on amendments to the Military Bases Agreement. The formal exchange of notes covering the amendments took place on 7 January 1979 between U.S. Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo.

Recapitulation of Chronology

(U) In the preceding chronology, there could be little argument that the announcement on 15 December by President Carter of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China was the most important entry. The impact

1. See chronology.
UNCLASSIFIED

on geo-politics and the potential impact on the military balance of power was of global significance. Of lesser global significance, but an event long sought by the United States, was the successful negotiation of amendments to the Military Bases Agreement in the Philippines. This was achieved after 10 years of intermittent but fruitless attempts to reach a solution militarily acceptable to the United States and politically acceptable to the Philippines. The breakthrough occurred by separating the operational military issues from those essentially political in nature. The U.S. negotiators were led by two former CINCPAC senior staff members who also had held senior military commands in the Philippines. Because such an application of military diplomacy was unique, it is addressed in detail in Section III of this chapter.

(U) In South Asia, the April assumption of power in Afghanistan by a Marxist-oriented government was followed by increasing violence and unrest in Iran. The so-called Ogaden War in the Horn of Africa ended when Somalia announced the withdrawal of forces from the region, but Cuban troops continued to assist Ethiopian forces against the Eritrean insurgents.

(U) In Southeast Asia, the year ended with increasing violence on the Vietnam-Cambodian border and increasing tension between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China caused by the flight of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The tide of refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia was a problem for the other Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

(U) In Northeast Asia, a reappraisal of the threat to South Korea by North Korea prompted President Carter to slow down the planned withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea. The Koreagate scandal was laid to rest and President Park Chung-hee acknowledged the human rights concerns of the U.S. Congress and American people by declaring a major amnesty for political prisoners.

(U) On the bright side, Asian perceptions of U.S. resolve were strengthened by the visits of high ranking U.S. civilian and military officials to various Asian nations. The most important of these was Vice President Walter Mondale's five-nation visit in May. At other times during the year senior Cabinet officials and influential U.S. Congressmen visited throughout the Pacific Command. In addition to his personal involvement and that of his staff in political-military relationships throughout the Pacific Command, Admiral Weisner's visits to various countries throughout the year enhanced U.S. credibility as a reliable ally.
SECTION II--CINCPAC'S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Terms of Reference

(U) In November 1977 President Carter addressed a memorandum to the heads of the executive departments and agencies in which he cited Public Law 93-474 regarding the authority and responsibility of U.S. Ambassadors as chiefs of the American diplomatic missions. He requested the support and cooperation of the executive departments and agencies in insuring that relations between them and the chiefs of mission were conducted in accordance with the Public Law, which stated:

Under the direction of the President--(1) the United States Ambassador to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States government officers and employees in that country, except for personnel under the command of a United States area military commander; (2) the Ambassador shall keep himself fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the United States government within that country, and shall insure that all government officers and employees in that country, except for personnel under the command of the United States area military commander, comply fully with his directives; and (3) any department or agency having officers or employees in a country shall keep the United States Ambassador to that country fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of its officers and employees in that country, and shall insure that all of its officers and employees, except for personnel under the command of a United States area military commander, comply fully with all applicable directives of the Ambassador.

In that regard, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, addressed the relationship of CINCPAC to the diplomatic missions in the Pacific directly. He noted that, during a visit to CINCPAC headquarters, he had been impressed with the importance of CINCPAC's role in the development of the U.S. Asian and Pacific foreign policy, and the need for CINCPAC to be well informed on all major foreign policy undertakings. Therefore, he requested that all diplomatic missions in

1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 27/020225Z Jan 78 (U).
the Pacific Command insure that CINCPAC was an information addressee on all important cables sent to Washington. He noted that, in instances where the nature of the subject matter required limited distribution, Admiral Weisner could still be informed on an exclusive basis. This January 1978 message to the diplomatic missions was repeated in August by Secretary Holbrooke for the information of the many new arrivals to the region since its original distribution. Two months later, after an inadvertent failure by the State Department to include CINCPAC as an addressee on a substantive matter, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke assured CINCPAC that there had been no change in the policy agreed upon whereby CINCPAC would be advised of and involved in all matters of mutual interest. He undertook, once again, to remind all posts in East Asia to be sure that CINCPAC was included in important message traffic.¹

Chiefs of Mission Conferences

On 5-6 January 1978 Admiral Weisner attended the annual Chiefs of Mission Conference in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Conference was hosted by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke. Among other Washington officials attending the conference was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Morton Abramowitz. Admiral Weisner and Abramowitz led a presentation of defense views on the strategic situation in the Pacific theater. Secretary Holbrooke and the Ambassadors present at the conference urged a strong commitment of U.S. Forces to Asia and no diminution of U.S. presence beyond the moves already planned in Korea. In his report to the JCS on the conference, Admiral Weisner noted that considerable attention was given to the human rights program and a search for ways to implement U.S. policy in that area without damaging State-to-State relations and thus the U.S. security position in the area. Also discussed were the refugee problem, arms control and disarmament, and the importance of the U.S. military/ naval power in the western Pacific.

United States policy toward Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was discussed in the context of message traffic regarding the fighting in Cambodia. There

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1. AMCONSUL Hong Kong (from Assistant Secretary Holbrooke) 166/050509Z Jan 78 (f), GDS-84; SECPACT 220261/300135Z Aug 78 (f), GDS-84; SECPACT 254853/ 061750Z Oct 78 (f) (EX), GDS-84.
2. CINCPAC TDY Manila 080127Z Jan 78 (f) (EX), GDS-86.
was general agreement that Hanoi's actions against Phnom Penh would add greatly to the security concerns of the Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines. It was also agreed that the relationships among the United States, China, and Russia impacted very heavily on the balance of power in the entire world. Problems in connection with Taiwan and normalization of relationships with the People's Republic of China (PRC) were discussed, and it was recognized that, although no timetable existed, the long-term push toward recognition of the PRC was apparent, motivated by global balance of power considerations. Admiral Weisner advised the JCS that he considered his one-on-one discussions with various Ambassadors to be very profitable from a military point of view, and considered the conference to have provided a useful overview and insight into policy problems with impact on the Pacific Command.¹

Upon his return to Washington, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke briefed Secretary of State Vance on the Hong Kong Chiefs of Mission Conference and, based on conclusions reached during that conference, generated a paper setting out the priorities, objectives, and goals in the Pacific Command.² Among these were visits of high-ranking U.S. officials to the Asian/Pacific region, visits of Asian leaders to Washington during 1978, and global speeches and statements which included specific mention of the importance of Asia to U.S. foreign policy. He also addressed regional objectives, citing specifically South Korea, Japan, the PRC/Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific. Holbrooke also covered in considerable detail such functional objectives as economic policies, human rights, refugees, and narcotics control.²

The year ended with planning for the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Bangkok on 3-6 January 1979. Because of conflicts in his schedule caused by participation in the Christopher Mission to Taiwan on 27-28 December, CINCPAC was unable to attend the January 1979 Chiefs of Mission Conference. By the same token, the prospective host of the conference, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, was also unable to attend because of the heavy press of high level work on China. An unusual facet of this conference was the planned attendance on the third day by a traveling congressional delegation. The Pacific Study Group of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Senators Nunn, H. Byrd, Hart, Tower and retiring Senator Bartlett) had initiated a major long-range review of U.S. strategic policies and force structure in East Asia, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. As part of that review, the Congressional Study Group

1. Ibid.
2. SECSTATE 37544/132053Z Feb 78 (EX), XGDS, REVW 14 Feb 86.
intended to participate in the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Bangkok and visit the PRC, Japan, and South Korea. Also scheduled to attend were Senator John Glenn and Congressman Lester Wolff. In the event, the Congressional delegation at the Chiefs of Mission Conference expressed great interest in the reaction to and policy implications of the North Korean order of battle reassessment (See Chapter II).

On the topic of improving the U.S. posture in Asia, the U.S. Ambassador to the PRC stated that the best single thing to that end would be to increase the U.S. Naval presence in numbers as well as quality. That statement was strongly supported by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan.1

CINCPAC's Trip to South Asia

As noted in the following chapter of this history, Admiral Weisner visited the countries of South Asia in the latter part of January and early February 1978. In addition to CINCPAC's report to the JCS, the U.S. Ambassadors in each country reported separately to the State Department on the Admiral's visit. In Dacca CINCPAC met with President Zia, the operating heads of the military services, and the defense and foreign secretaries. Major topics discussed included the status and needs of the Bangladesh military, Bangladesh relations with India, and the presence of the "super powers" in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Embassy noted that a press release had not been issued on the Admiral's visit, and that press coverage was sparse, with a single short announcement on the front pages of most daily papers of his arrival on 23 January. In Kathmandu CINCPAC paid courtesy calls on the prime minister, the foreign minister and the Army chief of staff. Informally, he met with other high-ranking military officers and defense officials. Admiral Weisner explained CINCPAC's responsibilities and his interest in visiting South Asia to familiarize himself with that area of his responsibilities. During his talks with Nepalese officials, CINCPAC was questioned about the Korean situation, relationships in Southeast Asia, and the growing Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. As in Bangladesh, the visit to Nepal, reported the Ambassador, was low-key and did not attract much attention. There was no press release.2

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1. SECSTATE 327071/300156Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84 and 327072/300157Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84; JUSMAGTHAI 061008Z Jan 79 (S), REVW 6 Jan 99 (from BGEN T.C. Pinckney, JCS-35).
2. AMEMB Dacca 599/2710452 Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; AMEMB Kathmandu 550/310602Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84.
The Admiral's visit to India from 28-31 January was similarly low-key, but CINCPAC called on the foreign secretary, the defense secretary, and the chiefs of staff of the military services. The Ambassador reported that the foreign secretary had described India's foreign policy in general terms, stressing the objective of conveying better understanding among other nations. He noted particularly that the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty did not interfere with India's relations with other countries, citing the visit by President Carter, recently concluded, as illustrative of this. The foreign secretary stressed India's desire to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to promote stability in the area. He considered the conflict in the Horn of Africa to be unfortunate and stated that India was generally not in favor of the Cuban presence in Ethiopia. The Ambassador noted that, since CINCPAC's visit had been billed as "in-house," the Embassy had made no effort to publicize the visit and, except for one article which appeared before the Admiral's arrival, there was no mention of the visit in the Indian press.1

During CINCPAC's 3-5 February visit to Afghanistan, he met with President Daoud, the foreign minister and the chief of the general staff. At these meetings, and associated social functions, the topics discussed included the small U.S. military assistance program in Afghanistan, Afghanistan's foreign policy and relations with its neighbors, and a review of CINCPAC's area of responsibility. According to the report by the U.S. Embassy, the atmosphere throughout the visit was cordial and helped to demonstrate American interest and presence in Afghanistan. Admiral Weisman was the first military figure of high rank to visit Afghanistan since World War II. According to the Embassy report, CINCPAC's visit to Afghanistan was a success, judging by the play in the media and the cordial reception accorded him. President Daoud maintained that Afghanistan would protect its national independence, and expressed strong support for the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Somewhat prophetically, in view of his overthrow in April 1978, President Daoud expressed a pessimistic view of the world, noting that the increasing division between the rich and the poor enhanced opportunities for Leftist ideologies to make headway in the poorer countries.2

The last country included in CINCPAC's South Asia itinerary was Pakistan where, reported the Embassy, CINCPAC's visit provided an opportunity for the United States to show its continuing interest in Pakistan's security and well-being, to strengthen the cordial ties between military leaders on both sides, and to allow the CINCPAC and the Embassy to exchange views in depth. All of the high-ranking Pakistan leaders expressed strong support of

1. AMEMB New Delhi 1642/311312Z Jan 78 (N), GDS-84 and 1892/031259Z Feb 78 (N), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Islamabad 1070/061142Z Feb 78 (N), GDS-84.
Somalia in the Horn of Africa, noting the strong support to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union, and presenting a widely-held Pakistan view that the United States was abdicating to the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa by failing to support Somalia. The Pakistani officials expressed a continuing desire for a military supply relationship with the United States, but were ambivalent in their opinions concerning the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).  

(C/O NOFORM) In his personal report to the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Weisner noted that the Soviet Union and the PRC were competing for influence on the Indian Subcontinent, but in a relatively low-key manner. The Soviet influence was dominant in India and Afghanistan, but the other South Asian countries were concerned over Soviet intentions and were more inclined toward the PRC in an effort to balance the Soviets and/or India. All five countries expressed the desire for a closer relationship with the United States and, although CINCPAC had extensive discussions in each country, he found virtually no desire for the United States to reduce its presence in South Asia or the Indian Ocean. CINCPAC noted, however, that in India the subject was carefully avoided by those with whom he spoke. CINCPAC informed the Chairman that he had spent much time discussing the U.S. posture in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Vietnam-Cambodian conflict, the U.S. position in the Indian Ocean talks, the Horn of Africa and the situation in the Middle East. He stressed especially that Cuba, which claimed to be non-aligned and was a colleague of the non-aligned nations of the area, was deeply involved, along with the Soviet Union, in the conflict on the Horn of Africa. President Zia of Bangladesh stated to CINCPAC that, "if you are not going to increase your force levels in the Indian Ocean, then you should keep what you have."

The Indians were concerned about the situation in the Horn of Africa, considering that the Cuban presence there clearly created problems. Pakistani officials, reported CINCPAC, were deeply suspicious of India, concerned about the Soviet presence and influence in South Asia, and strongly supported Somalia's position in the Horn of Africa. This support was based on the historical friendship between Pakistan and Somalia and previous Somali support of Pakistan's position in 1971.

1. AMEMB Islamabad 1325/071145Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. CINCPAC 100857Z Feb 78 (E) (EX), GDS-84.
Although this official did not propose an arms race, he concluded that if one side has already been given arms, the other side should be likewise supplied; otherwise, there was no incentive for the side with the arms to negotiate. The Pakistan Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited a perception of a lack of deterrence in CENTO and that that organization did not receive as much interest on the part of the United States as it should. CINCPAC was requested to support an increase in the training funds supplied by the United States and in the acquisition of new U.S. aircraft, and increased supply priorities. He stated that the Indian Ocean talks were "fine in theory" but doubted their practicality.¹

(C/NOPORM) In Afghanistan, President Daoud told CINCPAC that, in his view, small countries were being challenged. No country could be truly non-aligned, and small countries must choose between East and West; i.e., Communism or Democratic Government. This was the cause of the great turmoil in the world. The Afghanistan foreign secretary expressed the view that tensions had transferred from Southeast Asia to South Asia, not only because of the oil routes through the Indian Ocean, but also because of economic exploitation of small countries. Although not clear, this statement, CINCPAC considered, could have referred to the interests of the Soviet Union in Afghan natural gas, high-grade ore, and oil exploration. As in the other countries, Afghanistan officials purportedly supported strongly the continued presence of the United States in both the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans.²

Asian Perceptions

(5) After his attendance at the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Hong Kong, CINCPAC noted, in a message to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, that a common theme at the Chiefs of Mission Conference had been

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 270245Z Jan 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
In reply to CINCPAC's message, the Chairman of the JCS (General Brown) noted that the Assistant Secretary of Defense had received CINCPAC's message as well as many others on the same subject from diplomatic posts in the field. The Chairman advised that discussions with Defense Department personnel indicated that the problem of Asian perceptions was well understood and that various actions were underway to bolster the perceptions of Pacific/Asian leaders of U.S. resolve to remain a regional power. In addition to specially designed speeches by senior U.S. officials, a series of official trips was planned to the Far East during 1978 in order to shore up allied confidence. The Chairman advised that there was obvious agreement on the need to upgrade the perception of U.S. commitment to the Pacific/Asian region.  

CINCPAC's concern had been, in part, prompted by the omission of a statement of the United States commitment to the Pacific/Asian region in the President's January State of the Union address. During a discussion between the Chairman of the JCS and Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, Holbrooke stated that many foreign policy matters had not been discussed in the President's speech, including the strategic arms limitation talks. The Chairman of the JCS assured CINCPAC that his mutual concern had been registered with the staff of the National Security Council.  

In mid-January the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on a draft document entitled "Consolidated Guidance," which was to replace the defense guidance document, planning and programming guidance, and fiscal guidance with a single document. One of its functions was to guide the services/defense agencies in the preparation of program objective memoranda. CINCPAC also noted the disadvantages of the narrow focus in the draft consolidated guidance on the NATO central front and the need to protect U.S. interests worldwide (i.e., U.S. interests were more extensive in scope than NATO's interest, and war in Europe would be a worldwide war with the Soviet Union). There was also a need, stated CINCPAC, for discussions on international and regional environments, and assessment of the worldwide threat, regional objectives and U.S. policy.  

1. JCS 2977/152327Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.  
2. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 44/250340Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86 and ALFA 94/270506Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 8762/011734Z Feb 78 (E) (EX), GDS-83.
SECRET

evaluate the forces required for contingencies in addition to those for worldwide war with the Soviet Union, and the strategic weaknesses of "swinging" Pacific Command forces to Europe.¹

Upon being advised of the planned visit to the Pacific theater by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan in March, CINCPAC noted that this trip could improve perceptions on the part of Japanese and South Korean officials and their staffs as well. CINCPAC recommended arrival and/or departure statements in both countries emphasizing the importance of the region to the free world.²

Illustrative of the interests evinced by Asian leaders in statements by senior U.S. officials was the comment relayed by the U.S. Embassy in Singapore regarding a speech on 21 February by Secretary of Defense Brown. Although no Singapore officials commented publicly on Brown's speech, the speech had been examined closely by the highest Singapore leadership. Through informal sources, the Embassy received a comment from the Singapore Foreign Minister that, "this is the first positive statement by an American leader defining the nature of American presence in our part of the world. I think it should go a great way towards clearing up ambiguities of U.S.-Pacific policy."³

Once again, in May, CINCPAC addressed the perceptions of the U.S. staying power in the Pacific/Indian Ocean area. When Defense Secretary Brown read the most recent of many CINCPAC quarterly reports which emphasized the subject, Brown asked what actions would have the best effect. CINCPAC acknowledged that trips to the Pacific area by the Secretary and the Vice President were helpful, but suggested that it was necessary to back up public pronouncements with visible, tangible actions. A number of initiatives had been taken in the Pacific Command which were intended to focus on the vital importance of the U.S. interests in Asia and convince Asian-Pacific people that the United States was resolved to remain in Asia. As one example, CINCPAC cited the comprehensive, illustrated Command briefing on U.S. strategic interests and the U.S. military posture in Asia and the Pacific. It also highlighted the threat faced by each region in the theater. This briefing had been given to a large number of selected foreign and U.S. audiences. CINCPAC also noted that U.S. and foreign media were regularly hosted on visits and tours. He encouraged flag and general officers in the Pacific Command to visit countries in the area including the smaller, less developed "third world" nations. CINCPAC cited

1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 44/250340Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86 and ALFA 183/010411Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Singapore 1023/030930Z Mar 78 (S), XGDS-1.

SECRET

597
ship visits, cruises, and the potential for "show the flag" visits/training by Air Force and Army elements. Other on-going initiatives included intelligence exchanges, combined exercises and planning, and the quarterly "Asia-Pacific Defense Forum" published by CINCPAC.

And finally, CINCPAC suggested continued visits by senior administration officials and key congressional leaders, greater participation by U.S. Government departments in regional seminars and trade fairs, and the use of U.S. military airlift and sealift to support such initiatives.

As previously noted, the most important visit to take place in 1978 in the Asian/Pacific area was that of Vice President Mondale in May. The State Department informed the diplomatic posts concerned that the President desired to make clear the strong U.S. commitment to Asia and the Pacific, particularly those countries with whom the United States had a history of close relations. However, previous commitments would prohibit the travel of the President to the Pacific in 1978. As a concrete indication of U.S. interest and commitment, the President asked the Vice President to make an official, working visit as his personal representative to the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

After he had visited the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, Vice President Mondale returned to Hawaii where he made a major speech. He noted that, after the American withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia had declined, aid levels had dropped, and for several years high-level American visitors were few. These developments had induced a deep concern that the United States would abandon the area. He reaffirmed that the United States was unalterably a Pacific power, and that the United States would preserve, protect, expand and strengthen its key Asian alliances, the freedom of the sea lanes in the Pacific, trade with Pacific Basin nations, and the U.S. relationship with the PRC. These objectives, stated the Vice President, required that America remain strong in the Pacific. He noted that U.S. security concerns were the sharpest in Northeast Asia, where the interests of all the major powers directly intersected; however, a line could not be drawn across the Pacific and assume that what happens in Southeast Asia would not affect Japan and Korea. Mondale acknowledged that, although the non-communist nations in Asia did not seek the direct military involvement of the United States, they did want the United States to sustain a military presence to serve as a deterrent and a source of psychological

1. J5313 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 08001Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
3. SECSTATE 37056/112018Z Feb 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
reassurance. He reaffirmed the U.S. intent to maintain America's multilateral and bilateral security commitments and to preserve a balanced and flexible military posture in the Pacific.¹

(U) Later in May, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, who had accompanied National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski on a special mission to the PRC, returned to Honolulu to deliver an address at the Western Governors' Conference on 16 June 1978. Holbrooke noted that Mondale and Brzezinski, who had stopped in Korea and Japan after his visit to the PRC, indicated publicly and privately at every stop the firm resolve of the United States to continue to play a major role in the Asia-Pacific region; with every ally they reaffirmed the American treaty commitments to that country. Subsequently, Holbrooke enumerated four major elements of U.S. Asian and Pacific policy, the first of which was the U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong, flexible military presence in the Pacific in order to maintain the balance of power. He noted that, except for the planned withdrawal of ground troops from Korea, the level of military and naval forces in the Pacific would be maintained and that, in addition, the number of tactical aircraft in Korea would be increased by 20 percent during the balance of 1978. After noting the intention of the United States to sustain stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S. commitment to the maintenance of two important U.S. bases in the Philippines, Holbrooke cited the second element of U.S. strategy to be the relationship with Japan. This, he stated, continued to be the cornerstone of U.S. Asian policy. The third element in U.S. Asian and Pacific strategy, as propounded by Holbrooke, was the U.S. commitment to normalization of relations with China. And, the fourth key element of what Holbrooke called the United States "post-Vietnam/Asia policy" was a strong emphasis on the promotion of U.S. trade and investment in Asia.²

(U) These speeches and visits, combined with those later in the year by Secretary Brown, General David Jones, the Chairman of the JCS, and other high ranking U.S. officials, reflected a deliberate effort on the part of the U.S. Administration to convince Asian allies of U.S. resolve. They also were not lost on potential enemies. For example, a clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand radio broadcast, on 8 June 1978, commented on a trip by CINCPAC. The broadcast noted that, after making a 12-day tour of Asia, which included visits to South Korea, Thailand, and other countries, CINCPAC had reiterated to newsmen the intention of the United States to maintain its influence and its bases in Asia in order, "...to compete with the Soviet Union for supremacy in this region." Admiral Weisner was quoted as having said that the United States' bases on Guam could not replace the bases in Asia, and that the U.S. presence

1. CINCPAC 102230Z May 78 (U)
2. SECSTATE 153770/161836Z Jun 78.
in the Philippines served notice to all Asian people that the United States intended to remain in the region. The broadcast stated, "U.S. bases in the Philippines are essential to the United States' interests in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and Africa." CINCPAC was quoted that Philippine bases played a paramount role in U.S. efforts to control oil routes from the Middle East to the North American continent, and that the United States would increase the number of U.S. Air Force personnel in South Korea by an additional 20 percent after the withdrawal of the first element of U.S. Army personnel from that country.\(^1\)

**State Department Recapitulation**

\(^2\) As previously noted, Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke was unable to attend the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Bangkok in early January 1979. He did, however, forward a message to the Chiefs of Mission and other senior participants. He noted that no recent year, with the exception of 1975, had seen so much change as 1978--most of which was highly favorable to the United States. He listed the following objectives as having been achieved during the year:

- The Vice President's trip to Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand--its symbolic value as a sign of American interest in the area, and the follow-on results.
- The broadening and deepening of American relations with China during the first eleven months of 1978, prior to normalization, as symbolized by the expansion of trade and exchanges, and the visits of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Press, James Schlesinger, and Bob Bergland.
- The second U.S.-ASEAN dialogue, a remarkably successful meeting in Washington in August.
- The emergence of a regional policy towards the new mini-states of the South Pacific--in close coordination with Australia and New Zealand.
- The Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, which although not directly involving the United States, was encouraged by the USG.

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1. FBIS Bangkok 090705Z Jun 78 (U)
2. SECSTATE 324/022219Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 2 Jan 85.

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• The historic announcement on December 15 by the President that we would recognize the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979.

• The conclusion on the last day of 1978 of the long-thwarted Philippine Base Agreement, along the lines that we had long envisaged and hoped for.

Difficult problems still to be faced, according to Holbrooke, were:

• About 65 percent of our world-wide trade deficit in 1978 was with East Asian countries. Forty-one percent of the total was with Japan alone; the rest scattered among Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Indonesia. Put this together with a steadily rising protectionist tide in the Congress, and we face trouble of a sort that could even threaten our strategic position.

• The mounting refugee tide pouring across every frontier of Indochina is putting great stress on the other countries of the region, particularly Malaysia and Thailand. Whether we like it or not, we are drawn into the problem, and it presents us with an exceedingly difficult combination of humanitarian, political, administrative, and logistical problems.

• The question of relations between the United States and Vietnam hangs in limbo as the new year begins. The technical obstacles have been removed, but a combination of three new regional factors--the Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty, the spreading war between Cambodia and Vietnam, and the refugee flood--have made it much more difficult to move forward. This problem requires careful study.

1. Ibid.
CONFIDENTIAL

- The Korean situation remains, as it always has been, a left-over from another era, but with explosive potential.

- The Taiwan question—that is, how to build the proper post-normalization relationship between the People of Taiwan and the People of the U.S.—now becomes a pressing concern, with substantial political importance.

- We made few significant inroads in 1978 into the drug traffic from the Golden Triangle; but we can say that it continues to grow as a high priority for the USG.

- In addition to the question, mentioned above, of the trade deficit, we also face the great need to increase America's competitiveness against other countries, especially the Japanese, in getting markets and contracts throughout the region.
SECTION III—PHILIPPINE BASES NEGOTIATIONS

(U) As previously noted, the central issue during 1978 in the Philippines was the renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA), around which all other political-military relationships revolved. On 26 December 1978, a referendum agreement was reached in the military-to-military discussions regarding amendments to the MBA, even though the agreements were not formally signed until 7 January 1979.

Replacement Cost of Philippine Bases

Political Overview

In late March 1978, just prior to his departure from the Philippines, U.S. Ambassador David Newsom conveyed his impression of the Philippines to the State Department. He stated that power clearly was vested in the Marcoses.

1. J443 Point Paper (C), 28 Aug 78, Subj: Dollar Value and Replacement Costs of Philippine Bases and Costs to Build Elsewhere (U), GDS-84.
The Ambassador considered that, based on his own limited observations, there had been genuine development in the Philippines, particularly in the rural areas, under President Marcos. The U.S. role in that development was clearly recognized. During Newsom's farewell call on the President, Marcos said that the United States had made three significant, lasting contributions to the Philippines—its educational system, the Rice Research Institute, and rural electrification. Another contribution, according to the Ambassador, was a dynamic, private enterprise, middle class. The Ambassador's impression was that the Philippines gave a considerably lower priority to ASEAN than did Indonesia, and that this stemmed partly from a Filipino view that the Philippines played on a bigger stage. The desire to establish conspicuous relations with major countries such as China, to demonstrate the Philippine's pivotal position between East and West, and to generate business for the new International Conferences Center in Manila outweighed a narrower interest in ASEAN. Regarding an evident feeling of neglect, not only on Marcos' part, but well beyond that circle, the Ambassador confessed to a feeling of understanding. He noted that high-level speeches talked about "our traditional ally, Japan," and said nothing of the Philippines. The Ambassador also noted that the 1978 Defense Posture Statement had made no mention of the Philippines, where 12,000 U.S. servicemen were stationed. According to the Ambassador, Americans tended to react with animus toward expressions of Philippine nationalism in economic and political relations which would be accepted as normal from another developing country. Newsom concluded by noting that the nature of the regime or utterances of Filipino pique should not be allowed to obscure a very solid base of friendship and cooperation toward the United States.2

(5/NOFORM) A somewhat different view of the political climate in the Philippines was offered by the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREP PHIL) in response to a query from the Commander of the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) about three weeks after the Ambassador's report to the State Department.

1. AMEMB Manila 4909/290433Z Mar 78 (EX), GDS-84.
2. Ibid.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

604
also noted that, over the previous several months, there had been a definite
gradual increase in the intensity of hostilities in the Southern Philippines.
It was noted that, when Marcos was attempting to gain Arab world support for
the Philippine Government position relative to the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), he had held the military in check. However, after the massacre
of Brigadier General Bautista on Jolo Island in October 1977, Marcos appeared
to have loosened his tight rein on the military. CINCPACREP PHIL expected
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) combat activity to increase, with
the main limiting factor being the availability of weapons and ammunition to
the Armed Forces.\footnote{CINCPACREP PHIL 21D1222 Apr 78 (SNE), GDS-86.}
These oppositionists voiced strong criticism of President Marcos and his regime. The Ambassador concluded that the generous amounts of time which the President and his wife and other Filipino officials afforded the congressional delegation were evidence of the importance which Marcos ascribed to the U.S. connection. However, the uninhibited views of human rights issues voiced by the oppositionists served to point up a potential for serious complications in the bilateral relationship.1

At the same time that the U.S. Embassy was laying the groundwork for the visits by CINCPAC, Holbrooke, and Abramowitz, it was also preparing for a visit by Assistant Secretary of State Patt Derian. Prior to her arrival, however, the Ambassador criticized seriously a report generated in the U.S. State Department which, in his judgment, was misleading in its conclusions regarding human rights in the Philippines. As it stood, according to the Ambassador, its heavy emphasis on earlier reports of torture gave an impression of a continuing and wide-spread practice which was not, as far as was evident, a fair image of the current Philippine scene. The Ambassador believed that the report as it stood (particularly with its emphasis on torture) would serve only to reinforce the congressional judgment that the Philippines was a "gross violator," and significant aid legislation could be affected accordingly—and perhaps, unnecessarily.2

On 11 January Assistant Secretary Derian held meetings with President Marcos, Foreign Minister Romulo, Defense Minister Enrile, and other Government of the Philippines (GOP) officials to discuss the human rights issue in regard to the Philippines. In these discussions, she was very outspoken in expressing the seriousness of purpose concerning human rights of the U.S. Government. She emphasized that the human rights situation in the Philippines created tension between the two Governments and was a subject of major international concern. She pressed the GOP officials to end martial law and return to democracy. She stressed the importance of a free press in this process and also focused on torture, the role and independence of the Supreme Court, the fate of Benigno Aquino, and the actions of various religious groups in opposition to the Government. The GOP response was strongly defensive in nature, citing conditions prior to the imposition of martial law. When Secretary Derian linked the position of the United States on loans from international financial institutions to human rights conditions in various countries, Marcos responded somewhat sharply, saying, "you don't need to twist our arm and you don't need to employ

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1. J512 HistSum Jan 78 (G), GDS-84; AMEMB Manila 20364/290617Z Dec 77 (G), GDS-83 and 335/070504Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 333/032009Z Jan 78 (G)(EX), GDS-84, which transmitted AMEMB Manila 19 of 3 Jan 78 and SECSTATE 342/032038Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84, which transmitted AMEMB Manila 4 of 2 Jan 78.

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CONFIDENTIAL

606
dollar diplomacy." Although GOP officials insisted that there was no intention of perpetuating an authoritarian government, they offered little promise that the martial law structure would be dismantled quickly.¹

Secretary Derian also met with prominent political figures in the opposition and with others active in the human rights area. Among those with whom she held discussions was former senator Aquino, who expressed his determination to remain in detention as a symbol of suppressed opposition. He asked Ms. Derian not to press for his release and exile, at least until after the interim parliamentary elections expected in the spring.²

In late July a press dispatch from Washington reported on an appearance by Imelda Marcos, wife of President Marcos, before a congressional committee in Washington. She was requested to testify regarding human rights in her homeland. According to the newspaper report, "things got a bit rough," with divergent reactions by the Congressmen involved in the hearing. One Congressman stated, "they gave her an opportunity and she struck out...she was totally unresponsive." Another Congressman, however, considered the questioning to be like the "Spanish Inquisition" and the wrong way to treat a visiting First Lady. This Congressman stated, "I thought it was discourteous, uncalled for, and I left." Still another Congressman, referring to questions put to Mrs. Marcos about reports of torture in the Philippines, stated, "we were talking to the tooth fairy," he said, "it doesn't exist. She never heard of any of the accusations." Prior to the meeting, Mrs. Marcos had signed a World Bank loan for $88 million and met with Vice President Mondale, to whom she conveyed a message from President Marcos. The message from Marcos stated that Mondale's visit to the Philippines had "increased understanding" on both sides.³

As noted elsewhere in this History, Vice President Mondale began a five-nation visit to the Pacific theater early in May. The State Department advised the Embassy in Manila that the visit was meant to symbolize U.S. interest in Asia and would be of special importance for twin U.S. objectives in the Philippines of obtaining a revised bases agreement and advancing the human rights situation. Prior to the Vice President's arrival in the Philippines, the first stop of his trip, press coverage of the forthcoming visit ranged from optimism about the results to vilification of the U.S. motives. One newspaper carried a story, datelined Washington, which stated that Mondale's visit augured well for the future of the region, which had been virtually ignored by the Carter Administration. In this article, it was speculated that the visit would spur a break-through in the bases negotiation and resolve

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1. AMEMB Manila 721/130908Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84.
2. J5121 HistSum Jan 78 (G), GDS-84; AMEMB Manila 719/130914Z Jan 78 (G), GDS-84.
3. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 55/280332Z Jul 78 (U).
long, drawn-out negotiations for a new trade treaty between the two countries. Mondale was labeled as one of the President's top trouble-shooters and advisers, in the category of the National Security Adviser, the Presidential Assistant, the Secretary of State, and the UN Ambassador. This same reporter noted that newly-appointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom (former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines), who had been sworn into office on 19 April, could be counted upon to serve as Asia's spokesman, but, "...he is considered not close enough to influence White House decisions."

(U) On the other side of the coin, a notorious American-baiting columnist in Manila, Teodoro Valencia, referred to the recent reduction by the U.S. Congress of military aid to the Philippines by $5 million, and quoted Representative Wolff as having stated that the cut was made to indicate the displeasure of the United States to the Philippines over the human rights situation. Valencia called this blackmail calculated to improve the bargaining position of Vice President Mondale while discussing the base negotiations and the trade treaty with President Marcos. Regarding human rights, Valencia's article stated in part:

When Americans speak of 'human rights' and of nations that violate those rights, what they mean is that the country alluded to does not do what the Americans want them to do. 'Human rights' is universally accepted but the Americans have converted the word into an ugly one--as a clout to hit disobedient independent nations. One of the human rights that is not in the book is for a country like the USA to use money and power to clobber friends and allies with. Surprisingly, the United States is unable to preach human rights to those of their size, only to weak nations that she mistakes for dollar-hungry ones...

Following a 90-minute private meeting between Vice President Mondale and President Marcos on 4 May, an open session was held involving the principal advisers on both sides. The discussions focused on the base negotiations and economic issues. The MBA issues of sovereignty, delineation of base areas, and rules and regulations to define the roles of the Philippine Base Commander (PBC) and the U.S. Commander (USC) were discussed, as well as compensation, criminal jurisdiction, controls on trade, and possible development assistance for the cities of Olongapo and Angeles. It was during Mondale's visit that the suggestion for military-to-military discussions was advanced by Mondale.

1. SECSTATE 29795/040016Z Feb 78 (EX), GDS-86; USICA Manila 250600Z Apr 78 (U) and 270530Z Apr 78 (U).
2. USICA Manila 290700Z Apr 78 (U).
and accepted by President Marcos. Marcos appointed General Romeo C. Espino, the Chief of Staff, AFP to head the GOP military team. On the U.S. side, the tentative agreement was that CINCPAC's Representative in the Philippines and the Commander of 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base would head the U.S. team. Although a joint U.S.-Philippine statement was issued to the press which outlined the discussions in general terms, on 6 May Marcos went into considerable detail during a speech. He stated that, based upon impressions gained by the GOP during the meeting, Clark AB would be reduced from 52,000 hectares to 4,500 hectares and Subic Naval Base from 17,000 hectares to 8,000 hectares. He also stated that the Philippine flag would fly over the bases, that U.S. forces would be authorized the use of the facilities at the bases under conditions still to be agreed upon, and that the Philippine panel on further negotiations would be led by Espino. No official report on the private meeting between Mondale and Marcos was transmitted through military channels; however, a 5 May New York Post editorial stated that Mondale had served warning to the Marcos regime that U.S. support for economic development abroad was firmly linked to human rights concerns. The editorial maintained that Mondale had upheld Carter's human rights policy by speaking out in public, meeting with opposition figures, and privately giving Marcos blunt warnings that continued repression would hurt bilateral relations.  

During a mainland visit, the CINCPAC Chief of Staff had a lengthy discussion with Vice President Mondale, who was en route to Andrews Air Force Base on Air Force Two after his Asian trip. LT GEN LeRoy Manor advised CINCPAC of Mondale's belief that, based upon the groundwork laid in discussions with Marcos, the military-to-military talks should proceed with dispatch. His impression was that Marcos was anxious to conclude an initial agreement, setting aside for the time being matters of compensation and criminal jurisdiction. A point about which the Vice President felt very strongly was that the $5 million dropped from the Philippine security assistance program should be restored. Mondale informed Manor that he intended to work with the U.S. Senate in an attempt to get the funds restored. The Vice President had specifically requested that these points be conveyed to CINCPAC.  

On 13 May the Secretary of State informed the U.S. Embassy in Manila that, after personal appeals by the Vice President and the Secretary, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had voted to restore the full $18.1 million requested by the Administration for grant aid. However, a joint Senate-House

1. J512 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 7196/0317432Z May 78 (U), 7272/040955Z May 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86, and 7454/080824Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPACREP Phil 040800Z May 78 (S)(EX), XGDS-2; SECSTATE 117715/091724Z May 78 (U).
2. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 76/130209Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
conference and appropriations bill remained ahead. The Secretary requested the Ambassador to pass his message to Admiral Weisner, who was scheduled to arrive in the Philippines in mid-May, and expressed the hope that the Ambassador and Admiral Weisner could find ways to improve relations with GOP Defense Minister Enrixe, who had appeared to be unhappy regarding the result of the Mondale visit.¹

(5) On 25 May Secretary of State Vance met with GOP Foreign Minister Romulo at the United Nations. In response to query, Romulo answered that the Philippine side was ready to begin MBA negotiations, its military panels had begun to study the issues, and approval had been received to begin the talks. The GOP Solicitor General Mendoza noted that important differences of position would certainly arise during the talks on Subic Bay waters and the Subic Bay watershed. The GOP position was to provide what was needed by the U.S. Navy to operate without hindrance in Subic Bay, but not to include the waters as a U.S. facility. On the watershed, the GOP wanted joint management, possibly with the area set aside as restricted, but not included in the U.S. facility. Mendoza also raised the issue of criminal jurisdiction, saying that, although it had been set aside as too tough to resolve, it continued to pose serious problems for the GOP. Secretary Vance reiterated the U.S. Government position on foreign criminal jurisdiction, which was that the United States could not go beyond the worldwide position which reserved to the U.S. Government the ultimate judgment on official duty status. During this meeting, Romulo elaborated at length on mistaken perceptions of Philippine human rights, stressing that cultural and economic differences produced different human rights priorities for the United States and the Philippines; e.g., a full stomach took priority in the Philippines while free expression might take priority in the United States.²

**Mutual Defense Board (MDB) Meetings**

(U) On 15 May 1958 the MDB was established under the umbrella of the Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers. "The purpose of this board is to provide continuing inter-governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippines and United States authorities on military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through continuing military cooperation, the common defense of the two sovereign countries." Monthly meetings were sponsored alternately by major U.S. and Philippine military commands. The co-chairman for the United States was CINCPAC, who was normally represented by CINCPACREP PHIL as acting U.S. co-chairman. The co-chairman for the Republic of the Philippines was the Chief of Staff, AFP.

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1. SECSTATE 122535/130111Z May 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. SECSTATE 135469/262311Z May 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
CINCPAC normally attended at least one meeting per year in the Philippines, usually the May anniversary meeting, which was sponsored by either the U.S. Embassy or the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs. The MDB had four standing committees. These were intelligence, plans, metes and bounds, and the legal affairs committee. The 20th Anniversary Meeting of the MDB was held at the U.S. Embassy in Manila on 16 May 1978. Admiral Weisner presided as co-chairman at the meeting, which was hosted by the U.S. Embassy. Representing the U.S. Secretary of State at the meeting was U.S. Charge d'Affaires Donald Toussaint. Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manuel Collantes represented Minister of Foreign Affairs Romulo for the GOP. The meeting was low-key and pro forma.1

In response to recommendations from CINCPACREP Philippines, CINCPAC established the date 28 November-2 December 1978 for MDB meeting 11-78 to be held in Hawaii with CINCPAC as the host. The MDB delegation from the Philippines, headed by General Espino, arrived in Honolulu on 29 November, and MDB meeting 11-78 was held on 30 November at Pacific Command Headquarters. The meeting was hosted by Admiral Weisner, who also presided as U.S. co-chairman.2

This meeting was also pro-forma. While the GOP delegation was in Hawaii, however, Admiral Weisner had the opportunity for private discussions with General Espino. Items related to the MBA negotiations were discussed, and General Espino assured Admiral Weisner that his access to President Marcos on military-to-military discussion issues was intact. Espino also stated that criminal jurisdiction continued to be a most sensitive issue, but one which was obviously above the level of the military-to-military discussions. He noted that some land areas on U.S. bases, scheduled to be returned to the GOP, were being considered for economic, industrial, and military uses. Noting that his were thoughts which needed definition and normalization, he also surfaced the possibility of moving Manila military units, including the Armed Forces Headquarters, from Manila to the returned land areas. Espino also invited Admiral Weisner's attention to the fact that, despite severe budgetary problems, President Marcos had released money for the installation of barriers at Basa Air Base (see Security Assistance Chapter), and also had authorized the commercial procurement of radars for the Philippines (see Security Assistance and Communications Chapters).3

1. CINCPAC Command History 1977 (TS/ERD), Vol. III, p. 629; J512 HistSum May 78 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 140643Z May 78 (U); AMEMB Manila 8067/160933Z May 78 (US), GDS-84.
2. J512 HistSum Aug 78 (U), GDS-84, Sep 78 (U), GDS-84, and Dec 78 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 240600Z Jul 78 (US), GDS-84 and 150253Z Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 071924Z Aug 78 (US), GDS-84 and 192130Z Sep 78 (US), GDS-84.
3. J512 HistSum Nov 78 (U) and Dec 78 (U); CINCPAC 012244Z Dec 78 (U), 022313Z Dec 78 (US)(EX), REVW 1 Dec 98, and 0405532 Dec 78 (US)(EX), DECL 1 Dec 86.
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) Negotiations

Attempts to negotiate a new or revised MBA between the GOP and the United States had been pursued intermittently since 1970. In 1977 negotiations were hampered by the fact that almost seven months elapsed between the departure of Ambassador William Sullivan in April and the arrival of Ambassador David Newsom in November. Negotiations continued in joint task forces and working groups but with little measurable progress. Of note during 1977 was the designation of a former CINCPAC Director for Plans, RADM W. R. McClendon, as the Senior Military Advisor (SMA) and principal deputy for the base negotiations. Admiral McClendon had retired from the CINCPAC staff, and based on a CINCPAC recommendation to the JCS, McClendon's assignment as SMA was approved by ASD/ISA on 5 October 1977. In early November, in response to newly-arrived Ambassador Newsom's request, McClendon proceeded to Manila.

On 11 November 1977 Ambassador Newsom presented his credentials to President Marcos and, at the same time, delivered a letter from President Carter indicating the President's interest in resolving the outstanding issues between the United States and the Philippines. Newsom advised that he had been directed to continue personally the discussions on matters of concern between the two countries. The purpose of such a direct review stemmed from the feeling of the United States that it was important to reach certain agreements on basic issues before resuming any formal negotiations. President Carter's letter had also proposed that a team from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) visit the Philippines early in 1978 to assess the arms requirements of the AFP. It was agreed between President Marcos and the Ambassador that the GOP would submit a proposed security equipment list, the proposed guidelines for the PBC, and the GOP position on the criminal jurisdiction issue and perimeters of U.S. facilities within Clark AB and Subic Naval Base. The Ambassador agreed that charts and maps delineating the areas of the bases required for U.S. operations would be provided. It was in November 1977 also that the long-sought U.S. objective to have President Marcos personally involved in the base discussions had introduced a new factor into the negotiations. During discussions regarding perimeter security, President Marcos had asked the very hard and logical question: "Over what area does the Philippine Base Commander exercise authority so that he can carry out a security responsibility?"

The SMA noted that, whether or not the United States associated the relinquishment of land to command arrangements, it was quite clear that President Marcos did. Nevertheless, a geographic approach to the PBC responsibilities, rather than a purely functional approach, complicated the issue of perimeter security responsibility. On 13 December the Ambassador presented the maps, accompanied

by an Aide Memoire to President Marcos, and also informed Marcos of the pro-
spective visit early in January of Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Abramowitz, and Admiral Weisner. During
the balance of the year, the military headquarters concerned with the MBA
discussions--13th Air Force at Clark AB, Naval Forces Philippines, their parent
commands in Hawaii, and CINCPAC discussed the status quo. At the end of 1977
it was obvious that the issues of control of Subic Bay waters, the Subic water-
shed, Subic training areas, and base perimeter security were paramount. The
most difficult issue for the United States--compensation--had not yet been
addressed directly during the discussions in late 1977. President Marcos had
been advised of stringent U.S. limitations on compensation, and had modified
his previous insistence on "rent" for the bases to focus on a joint review of
military equipment requirements for the defense of the Philippines. The long-
awaited list was finally presented to the Ambassador on 22 December 1977.1

The Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Philippines
in Manila forwarded the AFP military equipment requirements list (MERL) to
CINCPAC for review. The MERL contained an extensive item-by-item list of
defense equipment desired by the GOP. The overall comments by the Chief
JUSMAG regarding the AFP list were augmented in a 14 January 1978 message
from CINCPAC to the JCS, giving CINCPAC's assessment of the MERL. CINCPAC
noted that the MERL contained items far beyond the capability of the AFP to
absorb, operate, or maintain. The MERL revealed little consideration for
initial investment and subsequent support costs, and little awareness of the
weaknesses of the AFP logistics and training capabilities. The AFP equipment
list also contained several advanced technology items, including F-16s, REDEYE
and WALLEYE missiles, etc., which not only implied a threat not perceived by
U.S. intelligence, but also would violate U.S. policy against the transfer of
high-technology arms. Lastly, CINCPAC considered the MERL to be primarily an
effort to establish a high multi-billion dollar baseline for further quid pro
quo negotiations.2

In preparation for meetings to be held on 9-10 January to be attended,
as previously stated, by Holbrooke, Newsom, Abramowitz and Weisner, the State
Department provided an outline agenda and talking points for use by U.S.
negotiators. The subjects on the tentative agenda included the U.S. defense
posture in East Asia, defense consultations, the MERL, compensation, and the
form of agreement.3

1. Ibid. pp. 667-691.
2. J53T HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; CHJUSMAG PHIL 221300Z Dec 77 (S), GDS-85;
   CINCPAC 142210Z Jan 78 (S), GDS-86.
3. SECSTATE 3034/060106Z Jan 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
SECRET

After two days of intensive discussions between GOP officials headed by President Marcos and the Washington-CINCPAC team, President Marcos stated flatly his desire to move ahead rapidly with amendments to the base agreements incorporating elements relating to Philippine sovereignty. To accomplish this, Marcos indicated his willingness to set aside the question of criminal jurisdiction until a later phase of negotiations and to proceed on the basis of an "indication" of compensation. On the basis of previous U.S. submissions, the conferees agreed on the delineation of Clark AB, except for Crow Valley, and the delineation of Subic Bay except for the waters, Grande Island and the watershed. Identified but not resolved were the issues of delineation of Subic waters, including Grande Island, the responsibility for watershed management at Subic, precise duties of PBCs and USC s, the status of Crow Valley, and compensation to the Philippines for perimeter security arrangements. On the duration of any agreement, the two sides concurred that the agreement would be reviewed on every fifth anniversary from the date of modification until the agreement became subject to termination (1991). On compensation, it was agreed that the United States would seek to identify items on the list provided by the Philippines consistent with the exchange of Presidential letters and that a DOD team would visit the Philippines to make a technical survey. After congressional consultation, the United States would provide an indication of an order of magnitude of military (and possibly economic) assistance which could subsequently be incorporated in a "full-faith" or "best effort" letter.1

In a report to the JCS on the two-day meeting, Admiral Weisner noted that the Philippine position at that time apparently was the reversion to AFP control of Crow Valley, Subic Bay waters, Grande Island, and the watershed at Subic. CINCPAC advised that, perhaps because maps had not been submitted by the U.S. side on those facilities, the initial interpretation by the GOP officials during the meeting was that the United States would give up the San Miguel Communications Station, Wallace Air Station, and Camp John Hay. The GOP was advised that maps delineating those areas on the same basis as those facilities at Clark and Subic would be developed and provided by the U.S. negotiators. Obviously, stated CINCPAC, the above issues presented severe difficulties, some of which could be a matter of interpretation. In any event, the SMA (RADM McClendon), MAJ GEN Freddie Poston (13AF Commander), and RADM Huntington Hardisty (CINCPACREP Phil/COMUSNAVPHIL) would discuss the issues in AFP and U.S. Service channels in coordination with the Ambassador. CINCPAC noted that the statement by Minister Enrile, that the GOP expected compensation for costs involved in the additional perimeter security effort, was a new position.2

1. J512 HistSum Jan 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 483/100943 Jan 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC TDY Yokota 102100Z Jan 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86, and 110845Z Jan 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.

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614
After his preliminary summation of the meeting, Ambassador Newsom submitted a lengthy message to the State Department containing a detailed account of the discussions during the two-day meeting. This message, which was to be referred to time and again during subsequent correspondence as the position at the beginning of 1978, cited the issues not yet resolved as the base boundaries, base perimeter security and costs, the compensation question, and the criminal jurisdiction question. Regarding the delimitation of base areas, the GOP submitted to the Embassy an Aide Memoire which referred to the maps and the Aide Memoire submitted by the Ambassador on 13 December 1977 regarding the delimitation of Clark and Subic. This Aide Memoire stated:

In connection with the United States proposal for the use of certain facilities and the areas where they are located at Philippine Military bases as indicated in the maps and the Aide Memoire from the United States Ambassador dated 13 December 1977, the Philippines authorizes the use by United States forces as U.S. facilities, under terms and conditions to be agreed upon, the following:

1. Clark proper with approximate area of 4,500 hectares except for about 500 hectares which will be segregated for use by the AFP, and except for the U.S. Department of State communications facility of about 100 hectares.

2. USAF HF transmitter site at O'Donnell.

3. USN transmitter site in Capas.

4. USAF radar site at a hilltop in Zone D.

5. In Subic Naval Base built up area of about 6,000 hectares to include the Mt. Sta.Rita radio relay site except for about 300 hectares which will be segregated for use of the AFP.

(6) The Crow Valley gunnery range of about 18,500 hectares will be under the administration of the Philippine Base Commander. U. S. forces may continue to operate and maintain the gunnery range for the use of U.S. and Philippine forces.

1. AMEMB Manila 561/111020Z Jan 78 ($)(EX), GDS-86 and 610/120830Z Jan 78 ($)(EX), GDS-86.
(7) The continued use of the U.S. Department of State regional communications at Clark proper and at O'Donnell will be agreed upon in a separate agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

(8) The harbor waters in Subic Naval Base will be under the administration and control of the Philippine Base Commander. The Philippines guarantees free access and movement, berths, moorings, and anchorages for vessels of U.S. forces.

(9) The watershed at Subic Naval Base will be under the administration and control of the Philippine Base Commander. A forest conservation and management program to ensure that the watersheds yield maximum water for use of the base will be jointly planned and implemented by the Philippines and United States forces.

(§) On the basis of the "understandings" reached during the 8-10 January meetings, the U.S. Ambassador proposed an exchange of notes at a suitably high level which would encompass the basic elements of the understandings on sovereignty reached ad referendum along with a complementary document entitled "Agreed Implementing Arrangements" to be signed simultaneously with the notes. The Implementing Arrangements (IA) would be sufficiently specific to preserve all U.S. operating rights, and the difficult negotiating issues would be addressed in that document, which would be similar to, and in lieu of, agreed minutes to an exchange of notes. The Embassy was advised by State that there was no apparent opposition in Washington or the field to the basic approach of the draft note with a separate IA. On 20 January the Embassy submitted to the State Department a proposed draft on the IA. Although the draft had been prepared as a joint military/Embassy effort, there was disagreement between CINCPACREP PHIL and the Ambassador on provisions for U.S. control of Subic Bay waters and Grande Island. Whereas CINCPACREP PHIL urged an initial negotiating position retaining U.S. control of Grande Island within slightly reduced water areas, the Ambassador preferred to concede Grande Island to GOP control as the initial U.S. position.

(§) The CINCPACREP PHIL non-concurrence with the committee recommendation was promptly supported by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in a message to CINCPAC on 24 January. The message stated that CINCPACFLT was

1. AMEMB Manila 795/160941Z Jan 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; 1077/200830Z Jan 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; 1078/200830Z Jan 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; SECSTATE 14679/190104Z Jan 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; CINCPACREP Phil 210215Z Jan 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86.
increasingly concerned over the way the IA for the MBA were being formulated. Apparently, he stated, essential U.S. military concerns over fundamental arrangements to assure operating flexibility were being forfeited in a desire to reach an agreement acceptable to the GOP. CINCPACFLT challenged the Ambassador's position, and invited CINCPAC's attention to what appeared to be a trend to achieve agreement without due regard for the concerns of those who would ultimately be responsible for the implementation of any agreement eventually reached. CINCPAC agreed with the concern expressed by CINCPACFLT and encouraged him to provide additional supporting rationale and to express strongly through Service channels the position of the Fleet on the Subic Bay/Grande Island issue. After receiving informal information that elements of the State Department strongly favored an option on the Subic/Grande Island issue under which Subic Bay and Grande Island would revert to AFP control, and that elements within the DOD favored option III (a smaller depiction of water control and joint usage of Grande Island), CINCPAC also weighed in to the JCS noting the potential problems and restrictions on Navy operations in connection with the Embassy-proposed Subic Bay/Grande Island position. At the same time, CINCPACFLT acted on CINCPAC's recommendation and submitted amplification of the potentially critical situation to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In that connection, CINCPACFLT emphasized that the importance of Grande Island was not limited to its use as a recreational facility; the island also had a significant operational role. Because of its strategic location at the harbor entrance, it was the linchpin for assuring the security of the Bay and control over U.S. ingress/egress, the navigational channel, associated navigation aids, the adjacent anchorage areas, the naval magazine piers, and the bay-side approaches to the magazines and Naval Air Station, Cubi Point. After a detailed explanation of the operational impact of AFP "administration" of the Subic Bay/Grande Island area, and the importance of Grande Island as a recreational facility (approximately 2.5 million Seventh Fleet liberties at Subic) CINCPACFLT made the general observation to the CNO that concessions by the GOP had been insignificant compared with the steady modification of the U.S. negotiating position. Motivated by a U.S. desire to appear forthcoming and to present substantial movement in the U.S. position, the U.S. Aide Memoire of December 1977 had been essentially a bottom-line position, yielding all that could be given up without significant risk to essential U.S. security and operational interests. The latest proposals, according to CINCPACFLT, represented additional significant watering-down of the U.S. position which could only encourage GOP expectations that the bottom-line in the U.S. position had not in fact been reached. CINCPAC strongly endorsed the rationale expressed by CINCPACFLT and reaffirmed his full support in a message to the JCS.1

1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 67/252243Z Jan 78 (EX), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 260410Z Jan 78 (E), GDS-86 and 260411Z Jan 78 (E), GDS-86; CINCPAC TDY Kathmandu 260823Z Jan 78 (EX), GDS-86 and 260041Z Jan 78 (E), GDS-86.
SECRET

(§) In early February, correspondence between Washington, CINCPAC, and Manila indicated considerable disagreement within the Washington agencies regarding the eventual disposition of the Subic Bay/Grande Island issue. The JCS had taken an adamant position in support of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, and, on 10 February, the State Department forwarded to the Embassy in Manila the rationale for the text of the exchange of notes and the agreed IA in which the previously delineated waters of Subic Bay and Grande Island were retained under the control of, and as part of, the U.S. facility. This position was flexible in that it permitted some AFP use of the Grande Island recreational facilities.

(§) CINCPAC acknowledged the latest transmittal of instructions regarding the exchange of notes and the IA by stressing to the JCS that, in his judgment, the proposal regarding the Subic Bay/Grande Island depicted area was the absolute bottom-line to maintain effective operational flexibility for the U.S. Navy in the Philippines. The Ambassador presented the U.S. position to President Marcos on 13 February; it included a package of proposed notes, implementing arrangements and maps relating to the U.S. military facilities and other installations. After the package was presented, Marcos stated that time would be required to study the latest U.S. proposal and indicated that it might be two weeks before a response would be forthcoming. During this meeting, Marcos also acknowledged the preoccupation of GOP officials with the forthcoming elections.

(§) Meanwhile, the MERL which had been submitted to Ambassador Newsom by Minister of National Defense Enrile had been reviewed by CINCPAC, the State Department and other agencies in Washington. State advised that the list was far too large. It was more than twice as long as its 1976 predecessor, and approximately 65 percent of the items on the list were new additions since 1976. Moreover, the list was not prioritized, and, in many cases, many items were far too general and imprecise. As had been previously decided, State advised that a DOD Equipment Survey Team would visit Manila in early February. In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC nominated two staff members to serve as members of the DOD Equipment Survey Team. They were COL F. W. Paige, USAF, who was Chief of the Logistics and Security Assistance Programs Division, South Asia, of CINCPAC's Directorate for Logistics and Security Assistance, and COL R. H. Horn, USA, who was Chief of CINCPAC's Force Planning and Strategy Division, Directorate for Plans. The team was headed by BGEN Irwin.

1. ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 270/050105Z Feb 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; JCS 9243/040130Z Feb 78 (§), GDS-86; SECSTATE 35222/100049Z Feb 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86 and 35223/100051Z Feb 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86.
2. CINCPAC 120540Z Feb 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 2396/130739Z Feb 78 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86 and 2397/130739Z Feb 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86.

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P. Graham, USAF, Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Directorate for Plans, J-5 JCS. Other members of the team included representatives from the Joint Staff, the U.S. Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. As planned by the State Department, after consultations at CINCPAC, the team would arrive in the Philippines on 2 February to consult with the Embassy and other mission elements in order to review positions and procedures. Subsequently, the team would meet with GOP civilian and military officials.¹

(§) Late in January, before the team arrived in the Philippines, the Ambassador outlined some of the potential problems which could emerge during the team's visit. He noted that the AFP had an exaggerated notion of what the equipment team would be empowered to do and would be pushing for specific indications of help from the United States. Also, some in the AFP continued to view the equipment list as a simple issue of quid which did not require the usual justification in terms of force structure, capability to absorb, etc. In the terms of reference transmitted to the U.S. Embassy by the State Department, it was stipulated that the team could not make decisions regarding the scope or composition of arms transfers, and that all GOP requests for equipment would be subject to extensive Washington coordination, including congressional consultation. A report of the team's findings would be required as soon as possible after returning to the United States as a basis for further U.S. Government discussions with the GOP. One CINCPAC representative (Colonel Horner) would return to Washington to participate in the preparation of the report. Prior to departing the Philippines, the team was to brief the U.S. Ambassador and, en route to the United States, to brief CINCPAC in Hawaii. While in the Philippines, the chief and team were to serve under the overall supervision of the U.S. Ambassador. The Embassy was responsible for arranging discussions with the AFP. Participation in discussions by other U.S. Government agencies and/or personnel would be at the discretion of the Ambassador.²

(§) At the opening session on 6 February with GOP officials, senior attendees included Under Secretary of Defense for Munitions Castro, General Espino, the Service chiefs and senior joint staff representatives, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Embassy Political-Military Adviser, and the Chief JUSMAG Philippines. During the session, the AFP Joint Staff Director for Plans, BG En Manipul, formally presented a list of AFP priorities in connection with the MERL. The first three items on this list:

1. SECSTATE 2774/052304Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-86 and 17462/231642Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84; JCS 7367/141552Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Manila 1332/260420Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84; SECSTATE 24967/310323Z Jan 78 (§), GDS-84.
were radar systems, combat aircraft with missile systems, and combatant ships with missile systems. During subsequent meetings it was apparent that the AFP officials were concerned that the MERL was being considered as a security assistance program rather than a separate compensation package (e.g., legislation). The team finished its consultations with GOP officials and departed the Philippines on 15 February. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the highly professional performance of the team and the long hours and unstinting dedication demonstrated in the pursuit of a difficult assignment.1

At about the same time that the DOD Equipment Survey Team completed its mission and departed the Philippines, and apparently in anticipation of a lull in base discussions, the SMA (RADM McClendon) also left the Philippines for leave on the Mainland. Once again the Ambassador expressed his thanks for the superb counsel and assistance provided by Admiral McClendon during the recent round of base discussions. On his way to the Mainland, RADM McClendon stopped at CINCPAC to debrief the CINCPAC staff on the negotiations to date.2

During the latter half of February 1978 the JCS, the CNO, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPAC agreed that, insofar as the Subic Bay/Grande Island issue was concerned, there could be no additional fallback position. The CNO, referring to Admiral Weisner's message regarding a bottom-line position, reviewed for CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT the developments in Washington regarding the MBA negotiations which culminated in the transmittal of the State Department position on 10 February. The CNO acknowledged awareness in Washington that neither CINCPAC nor CINCPACFLT had changed their preferred positions on the delineation of Subic Bay Naval Base; i.e., the delineations on maps provided to Marcos on 13 December 1977 which retained exclusive use of Grande Island, Subic Bay and the Subic watershed. The Navy had supported that position in every form, but had been unsuccessful in carrying the day against strong opposition in State, stubborn skepticism in the International Security Affairs Branch of the Defense Department, and, "...less than full support from all the Services...."

The CNO acknowledged Admiral Weisner's strong support, which had engendered the same strong support from the Joint Staff. However, it had been insufficient to overcome the opposition. The CNO noted that, although the latest State position did relinquish a small segment of the Bay as compared with the 13 December 1977 proposal, and did allow the AFP to use recreational facilities at Grande Island, and did allow a role in the management of the watershed, nevertheless provided for the full application of all provisions of the MBA.

1. CHJUSMAG PHIL 070830Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 2659/160918Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
2. AMEMB Manila 1851/160918Z Feb 78 (S), GDS-84.
to all water areas left outside U.S. facilities, specifically including Articles III and IV which provided for U.S. operational requirements. The CNO advised that, from the Navy standpoint, continued obdurate pursuit of the original options would place the Navy in an ineffectual position outside the orbit of those who would eventually write the final position, and could generate pressures sufficiently strong to overrule the Navy and the JCS at the Secretary of Defense level. The Chairman of the JCS weighed in with his acknowledgement of Admiral Weisner's position that no room existed for additional fallback with regard to Subic. General Brown suggested that the response from the GOP could depend to a great extent on the compensation package, which had not yet been presented to the GOP.¹

At the same time that the colloquy was taking place among the various military parties, the DOD and the Embassy were working on the composition of a base compensation package to be presented to the GOP. Under consideration was the proportion of the total package to be devoted to increments of grant military assistance (MAP), grant security supporting assistance, foreign military sales (FMS) credits, and economic assistance. Equally important was the eventual magnitude (total cost) of the package, plus the fact that once a decision had been reached, consultation with Congress would be necessary before negotiations with Marcos could be authorized. President Carter had approved the Policy Review Committee's determination that the previous (1976) offer of $500 million in economic assistance and $500 million in military assistance should be repackaged to induce Marcos to accept a lower offer and/or to solicit congressional support for the level offered in 1976. Although Marcos had been informed that the United States could not match the 1976 offer, AFP expectations continued to be very high, and it was believed unlikely that Marcos would accept an offer significantly lower than the previous one, or lower than compensation packages already offered to Spain, Greece, and Turkey.²

As transmitted to CINCPAC by the JCS, State had determined that the issues for decision were whether security supporting assistance should be included in the compensation offer, whether grant aid military assistance should be included, whether economic development assistance should be included and if so, how it would relate to an MBA amendment, and the total cost of the package. CINCPAC acknowledged the JCS transmittal of the basic issues connected with the development of the compensation package, and provided observations which could assist in the development of the package. Regarding MAP funding, it was apparent that the GOP considered military assistance to be the principal element of the base compensation package. In the AFP view, the funding support

1. CNO 172230Z Feb 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86; JCS 6233/181817Z Feb 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 230005Z Feb 78 (S) (EX), GDS-86.
2. OSD/ISA 1866/182258Z Feb 78 (S) (BOM), GDS-86.

SECRET

621
for the defense items to be provided in the base compensation package related
directly to the enhancement of the Philippines defense posture. Because an
enhanced defense posture would tend to ensure the continued support of Presi-
dent Marcos by the AFP, it would lend itself also to GOP stability. Conse-
sequently, CINCPAC recommended that the MAP portion of the compensation package
be as large as possible. CINCPAC also noted the unfortunate fact that the
inclusion of substantial amounts of FMS credit would not be viewed by the GOP
as appropriate compensation because eventually such credits must be repaid.
Therefore, even though FMS credit was considered by the U.S. Government to be
a significant element in the overall security assistance program, and did in-
volve appropriated funds (10 percent federal financing guarantees) it would
not be received with great enthusiasm in Manila. On the other hand, the in-
clusion of security supporting assistance in the compensation package could
well be attractive to President Marcos because he realized the inherent flexi-
ibility in allocating the funds and the consequent political benefits of visi-
bility with the populace.  

CINCPAC concluded that, although the ultimate size of the compensation
package to be provided in return for the use of the military bases would be
determined by the Congress, the negotiations were being conducted by the
Administration, with both U.S. military and State Department participation.
Therefore, the size of the package proposed to the Congress should reflect
Executive Branch judgment of appropriate compensation. Since the entire process
of reaching the ultimate decision would be highly visible to the GOP, the
result should reflect both the good faith of the Administration and the will of
the Congress. Based on the options then under consideration, CINCPAC recom-
manded a package with more emphasis on grant aid and security supporting assistance
and slightly less emphasis on FMS credit—but with a total amounting to the
same (approximately $450 million).

In the Philippines, after a Country Team meeting, Ambassador Newsom
confirmed that he would depart Manila on 27 March to accept a new appointment
as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He also announced that
Deputy Chief of Mission Lee Stull would soon be relieved by the former Charge
d’Affaires in Indonesia, Donald Toussaint. During this Country Team meeting,
the Ambassador reviewed a recent trip to Washington during which he and
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke had presented a summation of the situation re-
garding the MBA negotiations to the Policy Review Committee. The tentative
compensation package was also presented. On 12 March CINCPAC commented to
the JCS on the draft State message of instructions to the Ambassador regarding

1. JCS 1965/231841Z Feb 78 (ex), GDS-86; CINCPAC 270745Z Feb 78 (ex),
   GDS-86.
2. Ibid.

SECRET
the presentation of the compensation package, in which CINCPAC expressed doubt that the level of compensation presented would be accepted by the GOP. The JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's comment, but noted that the composition and level of the package had been specified by the Policy Review Committee and approved by the President.1

( ) On 15 March the State Department authorized the Ambassador to transmit the compensation offer to President Marcos. Specifically, the offer authorized up to $150 million in security supporting assistance during FY 80-84; MAP grant aid amounted to $30-50 million; and FMS credits ranging from $200-250 million. This was not to be presented as a binding commitment, but as an indication of the level of compensation the Administration would attempt to obtain from the Congress. Within the broad outlines cited by the State Department, the Ambassador was authorized to adjust the package, leaving room for upward adjustment in the event that the GOP asked for more compensation. On the following day, the State Department transmitted the MERL as developed by the DOD Equipment Survey Team and authorized the Ambassador to present the rationale for the equipment listed, which amounted to a price and budget estimate of $700 million. On 16 March the Ambassador presented the compensation offer at a level of $400 million, and on 18 March the AFP also received the U.S. response to the MERL request. On 16 March the Ambassador suggested the return of the SMA to be on hand for a forthcoming 21 March meeting at which the GOP reply to the U.S. proposals would be received.2

( ) At the end of the 21 March meeting, the GOP rejected the compensation offer and the equipment list as not meeting Philippine requirements nor the need for military self-reliance. Rejected at the same time were the 13 February U.S. proposals on the sovereignty issue (exchange of notes and implementing arrangements) which would have served as an amendment to the MBA. Marcos informed the Ambassador that the GOP would prepare a compensation counter-proposal sometime after the scheduled April elections for an interim legislative assembly. An Aide Memoire outlining the GOP position was passed to the Ambassador during the 21 March meeting. The Aide Memoire essentially reverted to square one on the implementing arrangements and rejected outright the compensation package. As part of the Aide Memoire, the GOP referred to the Regional Relay Facility located on Clark AB, the operation of which had been

1. CINCPACREP PHIL 090700Z Mar 78 ($) GDS-86 and 090710Z Mar 78 ($) GDS-86; CINCPAC 122712Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86; JCS 2889/152042Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86.
2. J512 HistSum Mar 78 ($), DECL 31 Dec 86; SECSTATE 67001/152301Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86 and 67410/160203Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 4222/160748Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86; 4258/160940Z Mar 78 ($) (EX), GDS-86; 4542/210644Z Mar 78 ($), GDS-84.

SECRET
addressed in a separate note. The Aide Memoire stated that, in the Philippine view, continued operation of the Regional Relay Facility would require the grant by the United States of reciprocal rights, on the same activities under similar conditions, not presently enjoyed by the Philippine Embassy in United States territory. Another development was the introduction of the criminal jurisdiction question in connection with the implementing arrangements, even though that subject had, by common consent, been deferred for later government-to-government discussions.

The Ambassador acknowledged to the State Department that the reply from the Filipinos was disappointing. However, he considered it one further step in the negotiating process and took encouragement from the fact that Marcos, although present at the 21 March meeting, did not clearly endorse the position put forth in the Aide Memoire. Newsom advised State that he intended to pay a farewell call on the President on 24 March, during which he intended to explore Marcos' views in a private session and to stress the problems presented by the Aide Memoire. State agreed that the Ambassador should have a very frank talk with Marcos on 24 March, and to follow that talk up with individual meetings with Enrile, Espino, and Romulo. During that meeting, and following the announcement that the Ambassador would leave the Philippines for reassignment in Washington shortly, President Marcos aroused speculation that he desired to reach agreement on the sovereignty issue prior to the departure of the Ambassador, and requested one more meeting with the Ambassador before Newsom departed. He suggested a tentative meeting on Tuesday, 28 March. He reiterated that he would like to reach agreement on the sovereignty issue, but that compensation was more complicated and would have to wait.

Before the 28 March meeting took place, CINCPAC invited the attention of the JCS to the unsatisfactory nature of the 21 March Aide Memoire and cautioned against divergence from the U.S. game-plan or giving the GOP an impression that the United States might retreat from the last-stated position. CINCPAC noted that the interests of the United States could best be served at that point by "listening and asking questions." On the same day that CINCPAC expressed his reservations regarding the Aide Memoire, the Ambassador stated once again that, although the GOP position was a setback from the progress apparently made previously, it represented the first official statement of Philippine positions since 1976. It had its positive points, stated the Ambassador, but it still fell far short of U.S. minimum requirements and did not,

1. AMEMB Manila 4590/211014Z Mar 78, 4591/211015Z Mar 78, 4592/211015Z Mar 78, and 4589/211245Z Mar 78 all (§)(EX), GDS-86.
2. JS12 HistSum Mar 78 (§), DECL 31 Dec 86; SECSTATE 75549/232259Z Mar 78 (§)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 4683/220910Z Mar 78, and 4723/240826Z Mar 78 all (§)(EX), GDS-86.

SECRET

624
at that time, justify a reformulation of the U.S. proposals.¹

Marcos met with his advisors on 27 March and with the Ambassador on 28 March, at which meeting the GOP verbally clarified some points and presented another Aide Memoire which essentially demanded that the United States relinquish all base areas to the GOP, followed by the GOP designation of areas within the bases which the United States would be allowed to use. As reported by the Ambassador, the GOP officials in attendance during the 28 March meeting stressed the point that the first thing to be done was to develop a document which would relinquish the bases for subsequent designation of operational areas by the GOP. Nevertheless, the Ambassador subsequently advised the State Department that he considered the Aide Memoire presented to the United States by the GOP on 28 March, together with the discussion which ensued, a step forward in the discussions. The 28 March Aide Memoire stated.²

The Philippine Government is aware that a state of continuing deadlock between the Philippines and the United States on the bases negotiations does not promote the best interests of both countries. Both governments recognize the need to keep the negotiating process alive, maintain the momentum of discussions and ensure further progress.

In the hope that it would contribute to this objective, the Philippine Government feels that it is desirable to formulate new approaches.

In this spirit and in its desire to facilitate the early resolution of the military bases negotiation, the Philippine Government wishes to state its preference for the settlement of the issue of sovereignty on a priority basis. The matter of "compensation" for the use of the bases shall be considered as a separate issue which may be discussed in detail at an appropriate time.

The Philippine Government therefore wishes to propose to the United States Government the turn-over of all base areas occupied by the United States forces at the earliest practicable date.

1. CINCPAC 250414Z Mar 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 4728/251045Z Mar 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
2. SECSTATE 78380/272103Z Mar 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 4890/281135Z Mar 78, 4934/290753Z Mar 78, and 4888/281130Z Mar 78 all (S)(EX), GDS-86.
In this respect, the Philippines is prepared to designate Philippine base commanders who shall receive the military bases from the U.S. Government on behalf of the Philippine Government. Philippine base commanders shall control and administer the military bases in accordance with agreed mechanisms of administration.

After the turn-over of the base areas, the Philippines shall undertake to give full permission to the U.S. to use the built-up areas within the Philippine military bases in which its facilities are presently located. In this connection, the Philippines offers its guarantee to allow the U.S. to manage and direct certain activities inside these facilities, including certain designated portions of Subic Bay, in order to ensure unhampered military operations for its forces.

After the formal relinquishment and turnover of all base areas to the Philippine Government, the United States may also be allowed to operate under such arrangement as lease back or other similar devices certain tracts of land such as Grande Island, Camp Wallace, Camp John Hay, Crow Valley gunnery range, San Miguel Communications Station, the Subic watershed, etc., within the relinquished base areas for continued U.S. use, subject to rules and other provisions promulgated by Philippine authorities in consultation with appropriate U.S. authorities which will be contained in separately worked-out documents between the two governments.

On the cost-sharing for the security and administration of the military bases at Clark and Subic, the Armed Forces of the Philippines will be spending for the next five years approximately $15 million per annum at current prices and dollar-peso conversion rate. The estimated total capital expenditure of $35 million, although incorporated as an amount equivalent to roughly $7 million per year, spread over the five-year period, may in fact be spent within the first few years of implementation. In anticipation of the proximate installation of Philippine base commanders, the Philippine Government would welcome specific suggestions or arrangements from the United States Government on how the concept of cost-sharing on the maintenance of the bases could be achieved.

On the question of criminal jurisdiction, the Philippines proposes that when jurisdiction over a criminal offense
committed by a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, a member of the civilian component or a dependent, is not resolved by agreement of both governments, the issue shall be decided by the Philippine court which has jurisdiction over the offense. In this manner, the issue will be decided objectively on the basis of the evidence.

As the month of March ended, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the latest GOP Aide Memoire had generated no immediate actions and that both State and Defense saw no need to respond quickly to the obviously unacceptable Aide Memoire. The JCS also advised CINCPAC of their desire that the SMA, who had proceeded to the Philippines upon the request of the Ambassador and who had attended the latest meeting between the principals, visit Washington after his debrief at CINCPAC. On 30 March the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN LeRoy Manor, the CINCPAC Director for Plans, RADM Shelton, and the CINCPAC Political Adviser, Mr. Leo Moser, met with Ambassador Newsom at the Honolulu International Airport on his way to Washington. Also attending that meeting were the SMA, RADM McClendon; CDR Deboe (legal adviser to the SMA and a former CINCPAC assistant Staff Judge Advocate). The Ambassador reiterated his belief that the most recent Aide Memoire reflected progress and that a prompt reply from the United States in a positive vein was needed very soon.

Military-to-Military Talks

Early in April the JCS forwarded a proposed Aide Memoire to be submitted by the U.S. Government in response to the GOP Aide Memoire of 28 March and requested CINCPAC's comments. The Memoire suggested that military-to-military discussions be undertaken in an attempt to resolve MBA problems on an ad referendum basis. CINCPAC posed no objection to the draft Aide Memoire, but noted that the outcome of the proposed military-to-military discussions would not be easy to predict. CINCPAC believed that any such discussions should come to the point quickly in order to avoid protracted panel discussions, such as those held in 1976, and to minimize the interruption in the higher-level political dialogue which had previously taken place. On 20 April the State Department transmitted to the Embassy in Manila the U.S. Government Aide Memoire which suggested the military-to-military discussions to seek agreement on specific implementing arrangements ad referendum. The Charge d'Affaires, Lee Stull, delivered the Aide Memoire to Foreign Secretary Romulo on 21 April.

1. JCS 1504/292026Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 11/310245Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; CDR Deboe had been assigned by the JCS to augment the legal assistance available to the U.S. negotiators.
Romulo's only comment was, "we seem to be making some progress." 

As previously noted, the visit to Manila of Vice President Mondale and his meeting with Marcos and other GOP officials on 3 May had the desired effect of moving the MBA discussions off dead-center. The principals agreed that military-to-military discussions should proceed as rapidly as possible and, as also previously noted, General Espino was designated by President Marcos to head the Philippine military panel and CINCPAC designated his Representative in the Philippines and the Commander of 13th Air Force to represent the United States on the military panel. Another interesting development was a speech by Marcos on 6 May stating the impression of the GOP, "...from positions expressed by the U.S. Government in the negotiations..." that Clark AB would be reduced from 52,000 hectares to 4,500 hectares, and Subic Naval Base from 17,000 hectares to 8,000 hectares. He also stated that the Philippine flag would fly over the bases and that the United States would be authorized the use of the facilities at the bases under conditions still to be agreed upon.

In response to a request by Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke that Admiral Weisner attempt to improve relations with GOP Minister of National Defense Enrile, CINCPAC reported to the Chairman of the JCS that, on 16 May, prior to the MDB meeting, he met with Minister of Defense Enrile and General Espino in that order. Enrile agreed that Vice President Mondale's visit had been beneficial, but was not sanguine about the MBA negotiations. He stated his position that the MBA and military assistance agreements were linked and that the GOP should not have to be concerned about the U.S. policy of terminating MAP world-wide when the GOP and the United States had a bilateral agreement for mutual benefit that was good for an additional 15 years. He considered it impudent and improper for U.S. Government officials to concern themselves with human rights in the Philippines, and, regarding the compensation issue, he stated that he did not understand how the United States could expect the GOP to accept less than they had offered previously (Kissinger in 1976). General Espino disclaimed any previous knowledge of President Marcos' public statement that Espino would head the Philippine military-to-military discussions. He had no instructions but was ready to proceed when directed. On 20 May the Manila press again carried stories on comments made by Marcos on 19 May indicating that the United States had voluntarily offered to limit the areas it needed at the bases to a "few thousand hectares." Marcos reportedly was...

1. J512 HistSum Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; JCS 5495/072150Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 120142Z Apr 78 (S), GDS-86; SECSTATE 101006/200023Z Apr 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 6373/210454Z Apr 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
2. J512 HistSum May 78 (S), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 7272/040955Z May 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 7454/080824Z May 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPACREP Phil 050800Z May 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
that the United States wanted only the portions essential for U.S. operations, but he was not free to give the actual boundaries.¹

(§) On 23 May Charge Toussaint met with President Marcos. Marcos recommended that the U.S. base commanders contact General Espino regarding the beginning of military-to-military talks. Marcos stated his intention to instruct Espino on the principal problems to be addressed—"the amount and boundaries of land required by U.S. facilities, the arrangements for security of the bases and of the U.S. facilities, the disposition of Grande Island, the Subic watershed, the Subic training area, the waters of the base, etc." CINCPAC informed CINCPACREP PHIL that he interposed no objections to moving ahead with the military-to-military discussions and directed that, along with MAJ GEN Poston, the 13AF Commander, CINCPACREP Philippines was to act as the overall coordinator and to keep CINCPAC advised of the progress. It could also be anticipated, stated CINCPAC, that, at an appropriate time, RADM McClendon (SMA) and CDR Deboebe could be made available to assist. Charge Toussaint informed the State Department of the proposed subjects for discussion, recommending that the subjects be pursued one base at a time. This would insure that the United States team would not be fragmented and that the effort would remain carefully focused and controlled.²

(§) CINCPAC advised CINCPACREP PHIL that he had no basic disagreement with the base-by-base approach in the development of the agenda. He noted that the discussion regarding Clark AB would most likely be less contentious; on the other hand, if Subic issues were discussed first, it could have the advantage of determining at the outset the rigidity of the GOP position. CINCPAC then recapitulated the ground-rules and objectives for the forthcoming discussions. He reminded CINCPACREP PHIL that it was important to come directly to the point in order to avoid prolonged panel discussions. Second, agreement should be sought, on an ad referendum basis, for specific implementing arrangements to serve as the basis for higher authority to conclude an agreement. Initial discussion, recommended CINCPAC, should focus on the delimitation of facilities, duties and responsibilities of the PBCs and USCAs, security arrangements, and should exclude such subjects as customs, immigration, taxation, etc. The U.S. negotiators should also continue to insist on an approved package (umbrella amendment to the MBA and implementing arrangements) before any implementation. On 30 May CINCPACREP PHIL informed CINCPAC that, as of 29 May, General Espino had not yet received instructions from President Marcos on the military-to-military discussions. On 30 May General Espino informed RADM Hardisty that he

1. J512 HistSum May 78 (§), GDS-86; AFSSO 13AF/CINCPAC TDY 162315Z May 78 (EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 8339/2003444Z May 78 (C), GDS-84.
2. J512 HistSum May 78 (§), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 8506/231109Z May 78 (EX), GDS-86; and 8595/241010Z May 78 (EX), GDS-86; CINCPAC 240417Z May 78 (EX), GDS-86.
had received his instructions and requested a meeting in his office to be attended by RADM Hardisty and MAJ GEN Poston. On 31 May a joint State/DOD message approved the beginning of military-to-military talks.

On 1 June the CINCPACREP Philippines and the 13AF Commander met with General Espino and several of his officers. Espino reviewed his instructions, citing authority to discuss bases delimitations and the duties of the PBCs and USCS. He was very positive and spoke with conviction and authority in stating that, as professional military men, they recognized the problems, understood each other's requirements, and could reach agreement for consideration and action by higher authority. He cautioned that, in his government as in the United States, the military was subject to civilian control and authority, but he was optimistic that progress could be made in the areas authorized for discussion. They agreed on the composition of the panels and that the only issues to be discussed would be bases delimitations, the duties of the PBCs and U.S. Facilities Commanders (USFCs), and base security. Clark AB would be discussed first, because Espino considered it an easier problem. Following the initial meeting between the military principals, Admiral Weisner advised the Charge in Manila that he had directed RADM Hardisty to make his report of the on-going military-to-military talks in military channels, keeping the Embassy in Manila fully informed and included as an information addressee on his reports. CINCPAC advised that he had also kept higher authorities (Defense, State, and the JCS) fully informed. As to the attendants at the talks, CINCPAC advised that the talks would be limited to uniformed military personnel and that he had so instructed RADM Hardisty. He also advised the Embassy that Ambassador (Designate) Richard Murphy, who was in Hawaii for briefings from CINCPAC, had been so informed.

Ambassador (Designate) Murphy visited CINCPAC on 2-3 June and was thoroughly briefed on the history of the MBA negotiations. The Ambassador advised the State Department that he had arrived in Manila and had assumed charge on 5 June.

As previously noted, Ambassador Murphy presented his credentials to President Marcos on 8 June 1978 and delivered a letter from President Carter which thanked Marcos for the hospitality accorded Vice President Mondale. He expressed his hope that the Mondale visit provided the impetus needed to resume

1. CINCPAC 270821Z May 78 (SS), GDS-86; CINCPACREP Ph1 300530Z May 78 (SS), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACREP Ph1 010900Z Jun 78 (SS), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 9115/011021Z Jun 78 (SS)(EX), GDS-86 and 9230/030435Z Jun 78 (SS)(EX), GDS-86; SSO CINCPAC 032201Z Jun 78 (SS)(B)(M), GDS-84.
3. CINCPAC 040510Z Jun 78 (SS), GDS-86 and 040513Z Jun 78 (SS), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 9232/050030Z Jun 78 (U).
the talks, initially at the military level, but eventually to proceed as quickly as possible to reach full agreement. CINCPACREP Philippines informed CINCPAC that the new Ambassador appeared to be conversant with most of the issues in the Philippines and voiced good support for the military position.

In a private meeting following the presentation of credentials by Ambassador Murphy, President Marcos raised the subject of resumption of military-to-military talks. Marcos stated that he had instructed his representatives to deal with the proposals the American side had tabled, specifically the requirement for future military facilities. He noted that the United States wanted to retain approximately 4,500 hectares at Clark AB in the built-up area, as well as the communications complex outside of that area (at Camp O'Donnell) and to continue to administer the Crow Valley Range. He acknowledged other U.S. Air Force requirements at Baguio and the radar station at Wallace. He had directed General Espino to meet with his American counterparts, and in the first instance, to sound out the American opinions regarding the future utilization of base lands returned to the Philippines for industrial development, either by American or Filipino firms. Marcos recalled that the proposal to place the returned areas under industrial use had been part of the original GOP proposal, but it had not been discussed recently. Marcos also stated that there was a similar question relating to Subic Naval Base where a shipyard was already under construction near the Bay (the Kawasaki ship repair facility). Without acknowledging the possible industrial uses of relinquished base lands, the Ambassador welcomed Marcos' assurance that the GOP was ready to move on the MBA discussions.

On 9 June the U.S. military panel met with the AFP panel for two hours. General Espino formally introduced his panel as BGEN Bocanegra, BGEN Alejandro (the prospective PBC at Clark), and Commodore Cruz (the prospective Subic PBC). RADM Hardisty formally introduced MAJ GEN Poston and himself as the U.S. panel and noted that RADM McClendon (SMA) would arrive at a later date. At this meeting, the two sides agreed to develop working papers based upon the subjects at issue. In a follow-up summation of the 9 June initial meeting, the CINCPACREP Philippines noted that the principals on both sides were positive and frank in their discussions. RADM Hardisty continually reminded the participants that any agreements would have to be structured with language not dependent upon the good will and cooperation of the present incumbents. He also informed CINCPAC that he anticipated at least twice weekly meetings in the near future and that the attendance of the SMA would be very much appreciated. In view of the information from the CINCPAC Representative, CINCPAC requested that CDR Deboes be made available to participate in the next-scheduled meeting of the military-to-

1. CINCPACREP Phil 080800Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-84; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 49/ 080136Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Manila 9620/081030Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
military discussions, and informed the JCS that the presence of RADM McClendon would be highly desirable very soon thereafter. Ergo, CINCPAC requested the JCS to arrange for the travel of the SMA to Manila as soon after 22 June as possible in order to lead the discussions. CINCPAC also requested that the SMA stop in Honolulu for one day of consultations en route.

(U) After the April elections, in which an interim national legislature, the Batasang Pambansa, was established, as well as a parliamentary form of government, the first meeting of the body was held on 14 June. Extensive Manila press coverage was given to an interview with newsmen during the session. All of the news articles labeled Marcos as Prime Minister, and all agreed that Marcos had stated that, during the initial military-to-military discussions, the panel "came to terms" on the actual survey of the base boundaries and an inventory of the facilities desired by the United States. Marcos also reportedly stated, during this interview, that the powers and the process of coordination between the Filipino and American commanders in each of the bases had been agreed. He reportedly stated his presumption that the first facility to be scrutinized would be the Crow Valley Range at Clark AB because the GOP was building a road between Capas, Tarlac, and Botolan, Zambales. The problem for the panel, stated Marcos, was to decide whether the Botolan-Capas road would pass through the Crow Valley Range or skirt it. Reference was made in all of the press articles to the visit by Vice President Mondale as having provided the impetus for renewed MBA discussions.

Prior to the arrival of RADM McClendon and CDR Debobes, which was scheduled for 26 June and 23 June respectively, a military-to-military panel discussion took place on 22 June. During this meeting, the modus operandi of face-to-face meetings between the U.S. base commanders and the prospective PBCs to explore solutions at that level, supplementing the formal plenary military-to-military meetings, was adopted. The CINCPAC Representative, who as also the Commander of U.S. Navy Forces in the Philippines and the Commander of the Subic Naval Base, met with Commodore Cruz on 27 June. RADM McClendon and CDR Debobes attended this meeting. The participants discussed the delimitation of the Naval Base at Subic, the duties of the PBC and the USFC, and base perimeter security. RADM Hardisty made the point that the GOP proposal regarding Subic Bay was unrealistic and that further negotiations were called for. PBC and USFC functions were discussed, and a draft proposal on the duties of the PBC was presented to Commodore Cruz. Regarding the Subic Bay waters, Grande Island, and the watershed, the U.S. participants reiterated that the security of the U.S. waters in Subic Bay, as well as Grande Island, must remain a U.S.

1. CINCPACREP Phil 091300Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 110530Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; J512 HistSum Jun 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPAC 140617Z Jun 78(S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACREP Phil 150324Z Jun 78 (U).
responsibility. The first "face-to-face" meeting between MAJ GEN Poston and BGEN Alejandro took place on 28 June. The participants agreed that such small, joint groups could focus on appropriate base negotiations in an atmosphere conducive to fruitful discussions. MAJ GEN Poston advised the prospective PBC that the SMA had returned to the Philippines, and explained the "overall responsibility" ascribed to the SMA by the United States. The actual delimitations of Clark AB proper, the Crow Valley Range, the duties and responsibilities of the PBC and USFC were discussed. MAJ GEN Poston stated that the Filipino participants appeared to be receptive to suggestions for compromise positions. He briefed the Ambassador, the SMA, and selected staff members on the meeting with BGEN Alejandro, and the U.S. participants agreed on the requirement for a common Subic and Clark position on such items as the PBC and USFC responsibilities. The SMA stated that he would examine the overall status of the discussions and decide on the feasibility of continuing "face-to-face" base commander meetings.\(^1\)

\(^1\) After several "face-to-face" meetings were held between the Air Force and Navy elements of the military-to-military working groups early in July, the tendency during the rest of the month was toward plenary sessions involving both the SMA and General Espino. Exchanges of working papers and discussions continued in a cordial atmosphere. On 12 July the SMA reported to CINCPAC that the delimitation of Clark AB, including Crow Valley, was agreed ad referendum. General Espino and RADM McClendon affixed their signatures to a large-scale map of Clark (which also delimitated Crow Valley) and to a separate map of Clark AB proper. They also signed explanatory papers attached to the maps. On 14 July the SMA advised that the delimitation of Wallace Air Station was agreed ad referendum, and the two principals signed off on the map and the accompanying explanatory text. On 17 July a text and map delimiting the San Miguel Naval Communications Station was agreed ad referendum but was not signed pending the resolution of the first stage of the delimitation of Subic Naval Base. On the following day (18 July) ad referendum agreement was reached on the Subic Naval Base-proper delimitation and that paper, along with the San Miguel Naval Communications Station paper, was signed by the two principals.\(^2\)

\(^2\) On 20 July RADM McClendon advised CINCPAC that he would continue his present assignment through the first week in August and that he desired to terminate his temporary duty assignment as SMA and to depart the Philippines on 7 or 8 August. On 1 August the JCS advised CINCPAC that LT GEN LeRoy Manor, USAF (Ret) had been appointed as the SMA to replace RADM McClendon effective

1. JCS 7902/161607Z Jun 78 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 220930Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; COMUSNAVPHIL 270900Z Jun 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; 13AF 281230Z Jun 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACREP Phil 120905Z, 121000Z 140810Z, 140825Z, 170815Z, and 181034Z Jul 78 (all S)(all EX), all GDS-86.
9 August 1978. LT GEN Manor had retired on 30 June as the Chief of Staff, CINCPAC.¹

During the first half of August, military-to-military discussions continued on Subic Bay waters, the Subic watershed, Grande Island, perimeter security, and the role of the PBC and the USFC. Before departing Manila, RADM McClendon summarized what had been accomplished and identified the issues yet to be resolved in subsequent discussions. On the following day, he met with Admiral Weisner and the CINCPAC staff in Honolulu and briefed LT GEN Manor, who was en route to Manila.²

At the diplomatic level, Ambassador Murphy reported to the State Department on a 9 August meeting with President Marcos. Marcos evinced considerable interest and concern regarding U.S. Congressional actions relating to Philippine MAP and requested the Ambassador to keep him fully briefed on Congressional developments. The Ambassador speculated that Marcos' interest in the outcome of the Philippines MAP authorization would inevitably influence his estimate of U.S. credibility regarding an overall compensation package. During this meeting, Marcos also repeated that he did not want the subject of criminal jurisdiction to be introduced during the on-going MBA discussions, noting that he anticipated considerable difficulty in fending off opposition pressure regarding the criminal jurisdiction question as well as the question of "rent" for bases. One week later, on 16 August, General Espino announced, during an abbreviated plenary session of the military-to-military panel, that he had been directed by highest authority to request a recess in the discussions.

The Embassy conceded that the motivation behind Marcos' decision to recess the discussions was nebulous. The Embassy saw no cause for alarm, nor was it desirable for the United States to convey any signs of anxiety to the GOP. The best course, stated the Ambassador, was to wait patiently and quietly, and to be particularly attentive to the press and media in the coming days. CINCPAC agreed with the Embassy comments, and advised the SMA (LT GEN Manor) that he desired the SMA to remain in the Philippines for 10 days to two weeks until the eventual length of the recess would be clearer. Meanwhile, CINCPAC suggested that informal, unofficial meetings with AFP officials to clarify issues could be held if desired. Marcos informed the Ambassador on 21 August that a cabinet meeting had been called in order to review the progress to date, and that he (Marcos) envisaged doing so on a monthly basis. The Ambassador

1. CINCPACREP Phil 2009002 Jul 78 (S), GDS-84; JCS 7521/011345Z Aug 78 (U); CINCPAC 020213Z Aug 78 (U).
2. J512 HistSum Aug 78 (S), GDS-86; CINCPACREP Phil 070820Z Aug 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
3. AMEMB Manila 13751/091026Z Aug 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 14128/160418Z Aug 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
considered the thrust of Marcos' comments to be that he did not intend to sign an MBA amendment consisting only of the results of the military talks. Next for discussion, stated the Ambassador, would be compensation and then the "thorniest of all,"--criminal jurisdiction.

The military-to-military discussions resumed with a two-hour meeting on 13 September. At the start of the meeting, General Espino proposed that the discussions begin where they had left off when they were recessed on 16 August. After several subsequent meetings, the SMA informed CINCPAC that ad referendum agreements had been reached on the Subic Bay waters issue. However, the paper was neither signed nor initialed, because both sides were treating the three Subic areas, i.e., Grande Island, Subic Bay waters, and the Subic watershed, as inter-related and part of one package.

During discussions in the first half of October, the military-to-military panel exchanged additional working papers and, on 17 October, a paper on the Zambales training area was agreed ad referendum. On 19 October the U.S. panel working paper on the Tabones training complex was also agreed ad referendum.

Later in October, Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, Chairman of the Senate Operations Committee, visited the Philippines for the primary purpose of discussing the status of the MBA negotiations with President Marcos. He indicated that he was particularly interested in reviewing the "price-tag" and that it was his desire to transmit to Marcos and the GOP a message regarding congressional attitudes on the issue of compensation. On 24 October Senator Inouye met with the Embassy staff in Manila, together with the military principals in-country. He informed the U.S. officials that his purpose was to relay to President Marcos the mood of the U.S. Congress regarding not only compensation, but also criminal jurisdiction as it related to the military bases. He advocated a hard line on the criminal jurisdiction issue and explained the difficulty he foresaw in obtaining congressional approval of a compensation package of the magnitude offered in late 1976 by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Inouye also stated that, in his opinion, the U.S. State Department had mishandled the human rights issue with respect to the Philippines. He believed that more could be done to improve the image of the GOP in the United States.

1. AMEMB Manila 14216/161054Z Aug 78 (EX), GDS-86 and 14591/211225Z Aug 78 (EX), GDS-86; CINCPAC 170027Z Aug 78 (EX), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Manila 16032/130708Z Sep 78 (EX), GDS-86; CINCPACREP Phil 230430Z Sep 78 (EX), GDS-86.
3. J512 HistSum Oct 78 (EX), GDS-86; CINCPACREP Phil 170700Z Oct 78 (EX), GDS-86 and 190600Z Oct 78 (EX), GDS-86.
4. J512 HistSum Oct 78 (U); SECSTATE 266724/232220Z Oct 78 (EX), GDS-84; CINCPACREP Phil 250700Z Oct 78 (EX), GDS-86.
SECRET

Senator Inouye had a 90-minute private conversation with President Marcos on 25 October. During this meeting the Senator said he would like to discuss the current base negotiations and to begin by taking the liberty of sharing two observations: one on compensation and one jurisdiction. The Senator said that, although he was not in the Philippines to suggest any level of compensation, the amount that Dr. Kissinger allegedly suggested would be extremely difficult to sell to the Congress. The Senator emphasized that, whatever the compensation package, it was desirable that it be submitted as part of the official presentation of the Administration's fiscal year 1980 budget. He then informed Marcos that the best he could expect regarding criminal jurisdiction was what the United States had agreed to in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. He expected no more and no less for the Philippines. Marcos' response was to suggest that the criminal jurisdiction problem could be resolved if the AFP were given the authority to provide-perimeter security for the American facilities. He felt that the criminal jurisdiction issue would be moot if contact could be avoided between the U.S. military and Filipino civilian intruders.

During a later meeting with Marcos attended by both Senator Inouye and Ambassador Murphy, Marcos observed that the Senator had brought home to him the desirability of moving forward to conclude the base negotiations. He asked the Ambassador whether the United States was ready to join in discussions of the more difficult issues of compensation and criminal jurisdiction. The Ambassador assured him that that was the case. All agreed that it was desirable to speed up the military-to-military discussions. The Ambassador informed Marcos that the two main unresolved issues concerned the Subic watershed and the Subic waters, since it had been agreed that the entire Subic Bay issue would be considered as one package. Marcos stated that he was counting heavily on new perimeter security arrangements to insulate the American military police from frequent contact with Philippine intruders on the bases, and linked that statement with a question on whether the United States would be willing and prepared to pay for the security costs incurred by the GOP. He stated his hope to develop the reverted lands and to find agricultural products which would help "uplift" the depressed population in those areas. He also mentioned his hope that the U.S. military at Subic and Clark would be prepared to buy more produce from Philippine suppliers.

Once again referring to the compensation package, and cautioning that nothing could be guaranteed, Inouye approached the possibility that a five-year authorization bill might be obtainable, even though the appropriations would be subject to yearly determination by Congress. Marcos appeared to be impressed with this suggestion. In summary, the Ambassador concluded that the Inouye

1. AMEMB Manila 19159/260852Z Oct 78 (EX), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.

SECRET
The Inouye visit brought to a head several peripheral issues which had lurked in the background of the military-to-military discussions but had not yet been specifically addressed. For example, in March President Marcos had raised the possibility that a criminal jurisdiction formula similar to the Status of Forces Agreement in Japan could be adapted to the Philippines. This suggestion by Marcos was apparently based on his knowledge of an article stating that an official duty certificate would, in any judicial proceedings, be sufficient evidence of the fact unless the contrary were proved. What he did not know was that an agreed view of the Joint Committee in Japan provided that the proof referred to in the agreed minutes would be presented to the Joint Committee for consideration, and that subsequent disagreement was not addressed. The Ambassador noted that, regarding the official duty concept, the GOP position was that the United States had primary jurisdiction only over those criminal acts which were required or authorized to be done by a specific military duty. That position, in effect, nullified the official duty concept because no offenses were authorized or required by duty. Thus, there was reasonable doubt that a joint GOP-U.S. body could ever reach agreement on a particular official duty case under the prevailing Philippine view as to what constituted official duty. The Ambassador suggested that a possible course of action would be to propose that disputed official duty cases be referred to a joint committee. A separate agreement, possibly classified, would provide for the U.S. determination to prevail if no agreement were reached within a limited and specified time.³

1. Ibid.
2. SSO CINCPAC 292159Z Oct 78 (O) BOM, REVH 29 Oct 86; AMEMB Manila 19438/311228Z Oct 78 (U).
3. AMEMB Manila 4725/240905Z Mar 78 (O) EX, GDS-86.
In response to a request for guidance, the State Department noted that provisions specifying time limits on deliberations of the Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee, after which the United States would be free to exercise jurisdiction, could be accepted if such stipulation were contained in a classified side agreement. By specific instructions from Marcos, the subject lay dormant until 20 October, when the State Department provided the Embassy with a specific proposal regarding the criminal jurisdiction issue in connection with official duty determinations. State provided two optional approaches to the question: the first involved the agreed minute approach, with a possibly classified side agreement into which all references to circumstances under which the United States would be free to exercise jurisdiction were transferred; the other option, which would become part of the MBA amendments, avoided explicit reference to phrases such as "official duty certificates," "duty determinations," and to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.

Another of the subjects to resurface during the Inouye visit was the use of the reverted base lands for commercial and industrial purposes. In July a State Department draft response to President Marcos' query of Ambassador Murphy about such usage began by cautioning that possible problems in maintaining unhampered operations could arise, but suggested that by careful handling, the question could be used to bolster the U.S. position. Although cavetated to a small degree, it essentially proposed that Marcos be informed that what the GOP did with the base lands was a matter for them to decide. The JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on the State draft response. CINCPAC acknowledged State interest in utilizing President Marcos' query to bolster the U.S. position. He was concerned, however, that in the anxiety to be responsive to President Marcos, it could be forgotten that the proposals for land reversion had evolved and been formulated in part in response to Marcos' remarks that Philippine forces could not be asked to assume responsibility where their own authority over an area was uncertain. The subsequent U.S. position laid the groundwork for a geographic, as well as functional, role for the PBC and had been predicated upon the condition that the existing base lands remained part of the Philippine military base, that the Zambales training range lands not part of the base be incorporated into the base, and that unhampered operations by the United States were insured. CINCPAC considered that, in part, the State Department message appeared inconsistent with and to retrogress from that premise and to welcome discussions on industrial projects desired by the GOP. CINCPAC recommended that President

1. SECSTATE 77929/252356Z Mar 78 (SECRET), GDS-84 and 266162/202047Z Oct 78 (SECRET), GDS-84.
SECRET

Marcos be approached in such a way that he understood the need for some consultation/agreement on the use of the reverted base lands for the mutual benefit of both parties.¹

Later in July, the Ambassador noted the satisfactory progress reported during the military-to-military discussions, but "sensed" that the time had arrived when a response to Marcos regarding the use of the base lands, not required by the U.S. Government, for industrial and commercial purposes be provided. State replied that the concept that lands outside the U.S. facilities would remain within Philippine bases and be available for U.S. use would not necessarily preclude GOP economic and agricultural development in those Philippine base areas not required for, or in support of, military operations. For example, State cited the desirability of improving economic conditions in the Angeles and Olongapo areas, which had already been discussed. Nevertheless, the Stated reply incorporated all of the concerns expressed by CINCPAC to the JCS regarding the use of the reverted lands. State subsequently advised that the Defense Department concurred and that the State message should have been a joint State/Defense message.²

The subject of the procurement of produce from local Filipino suppliers first surfaced in a letter handed by General Espino to LT GEN Manor on 12 October. The letter noted that the ad referendum agreement regarding Clark AB would result in the reversion to the GOP of approximately 31,000 hectares (excluding the Crow Valley Range) of the Clark reservation. The letter stated that the GOP planned to utilize this returned area for military-socio-economic development purposes. Because the area was largely marginal and would require significant development effort to improve its productivity, the letter stated that Espino had been requested by his superiors to inquire of the U.S. Government, through the U.S. military panel, about the feasibility of the United States providing assistance in the development of the returned land. He had also been directed to convey the desire of the GOP to have local Filipino suppliers provide the food requirements of the U.S. forces in the bases, particularly meat, poultry products, fruits, and vegetables. This would benefit the local economy and contribute further, according to the letter, to the mutuality of advantages to both parties.³

CINCPAC informed the JCS that he did not consider the contents of the letter an appropriate subject for military-to-military discussions, except for

¹ ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 102/0201402 Jul 78 (S), GDS-86, which cited JCS 232017Z Jun 78.
² AMEMB Manila 12210/190339Z Jul 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; SECSTATE 187767/252158Z Jul 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 190579/280005Z Jul 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
³ CINCPACREP Phil 120630Z Oct 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
whatever impact on perimeter security might be involved. CINCPAC had instructed the SMA to inform General Espino that the text of the letter had been forwarded to Washington agencies for appropriate consideration. In a supplemental message, CINCPAC noted that the letter raised two issues very similar to those introduced by the GOP during the 1976 negotiations: conversion of bases and local procurement. CINCPAC noted the possible connection between the letter and Marcos' recent query regarding U.S. views on commercialization/industrialization of the returned base lands. CINCPAC suggested that a proper perspective, a careful approach, and recognition that the subjects were not new but closely related to broader queries/issues was essential. The 1976 GOP proposal on conversion provided that the United States develop, at its own expense, and "in consonance with Philippine development requirements" any facilities relinquished as a result of a new MBA or during the term of the MBA. The GOP would be granted veto power over United States plans and programs and empowered to compel expensive and costly projects of interest to the GOP, such as international civil aviation at Clark AB. The United States would also have been obliged to make arrangements for training Philippine manpower in connection with such development. The U.S. negotiators took a firm opposing position throughout the 1976 discussion, primarily because of prohibitive costs and the setting of precedent. An agreement was not reached on the issue. Another GOP proposal in 1976 would have required U.S. forces to procure all materials and supplies locally for use in the facilities, except when such were not available. CINCPAC concluded that, although the local procurement practice of U.S. forces regarding food was open to examination, development assistance was a more contentious issue and warranted very careful assessment of costs, security, and operational flexibility aspects. CINCPAC reiterated his previous admonition that the United States had entered the military-to-military discussions on the basis that the returned areas would remain a part of the Philippine military base.

The JCS requested CINCPAC to provide information on the local food procurement policy in the Philippines, the actual amounts being procured locally, the feasibility of expanding local procurement programs, and a recommendation as to how the topic should be forwarded to the GOP. CINCPAC replied that all subsistence support to the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines was a direct responsibility of the Defense Logistics Agency through the Defense Personnel Support Center. The Naval Supply Depot at Subic Bay served as worldwide integrated management of subsistence agent on behalf of the Defense Personnel Support Center and the Defense Subsistence Region-Pacific office in the United States. Procurement of local food products at Subic Naval Base was accomplished in accordance with guidelines of applicable naval supply systems and the average

1. CINCPAC 142352Z Oct 78 (§) (EX), GDS-86 and 192239Z Oct 78 (§) (EX), GDS-86.
monthly dollar expenditure for locally-procured food at Subic was $102,400. There was little potential for expansion and producers could not be depended upon to provide quantity and quality levels needed over a protracted period of time. At Clark AB, purchase of produce was through the U.S. Navy, either by spot buys (lowest bid with established quality) or period contracts (four-six month agreements to lowest bid with established quality). All purchases were required to meet stringent U.S. Department of Agriculture standards. Clark AB procured about $11,000 worth of fruits and vegetables per month from local suppliers. In addition to produce, Clark AB also bought approximately $10,000 worth of sugar and around $1,500 worth of cola syrup from local sources. The total monthly expenditure for locally-produced food averaged about $22,500.

As the delimitation of the bases progressed, the question of base perimeter security, and more specifically, who would pay for it, grew in importance. In March 1978 the Defense Department requested the Services to prepare estimates of requirements for the AFP to carry out perimeter security. On 28 March 1978 the GOP was informed that the United States was prepared to equip (e.g. through MAP) the necessary security components at the bases, and that a complete proposal on security costs would be provided. The JCS advised that a Department of State message was being composed which contained a proposal on assisting the GOP to meet the perimeter security costs. Based on the information to be provided by the Services, the proposal would outline the approximate number of AFP personnel and the amount and type of equipment which the United States considered to be required. The draft proposal also would indicate that the United States Government would assist the Philippines in meeting the costs, since the United States was likely to derive some benefit from the Philippine security effort. The proposal would also include the necessary equipment to outfit an agreed AFP security force, assist in the modification or construction of needed structures, and assist in meeting a portion of the recurring costs. Military pay and allowances or other personnel costs would not be funded. The GOP costs would be met in the MAP element of the compensation package or, if that were not available, from Service budgets. CINCPAC's comments were requested.

CINCPAC replied that the general approach seemed to be reasonable, and that data previously provided by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF through Service channels was valid. CINCPAC also noted that funding for the AFP Forces should come either from GOP sources or be provided in the overall compensation offer. He did not support the alternative suggestion in the proposed State message that perimeter security be funded from Service budgets. Both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF agreed.

1. JCS 5253/232109Z Oct 78 (C), GDS-84; CINCPAC 030444Z Nov 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACREP Ph11 290445Z Mar 78 (S), GDS-86; J512 HistSum May 78 (U); JCS 2072/032210Z May 78 (S), GDS-86.
agreed. In addition, PACAF recalled a previous CINCPAC comment that it was necessary to insure that no partial implementation of perimeter security arrangements was undertaken before the whole arrangement was in focus and in writing in an agreed document. In other words, perimeter security costs should be an integral part of the overall compensation package and not addressed in isolation.¹

(§) On 22 May a JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense advised of concurrence in the U.S. Government proposal on perimeter security compensation for the GOP, subject to certain comments and modifications. The JCS stipulated that security requirements for Wallace AS, John Hay AB, and the San Miguel Naval Communications Station should not be addressed in the proposal because of the uncertainty about the delineation of U.S. facilities within those bases and the different security requirements existing there. Moreover, the JCS believed that the U.S. Government should not indicate to the GOP that such a benefit was likely to be derived by the United States from the Philippine security effort, because such a statement could be perceived by the GOP as obliging the United States to pay the costs of receiving that benefit. The JCS recommended that the U.S. Government indicate to the GOP that it was willing to meet recurring costs because this could result in an indefinite, long-term U.S. funding commitment. The JCS also recommended that the costs to the GOP for providing perimeter security should be figured in Service budgets. The presentation of the proposals to the GOP should indicate that assistance in meeting security costs would be offered by the United States as part of the overall compensation package. And finally, because perimeter security compensation was not a major issue in the base discussions, and because many issues with regard to the joint security remained to be resolved at that time, the JCS recommended that the proposal be presented in the military-to-military talks. Although President Marcos should be informed that a presentation had been made, the proposals should not be a topic of a specific meeting with him.²

(§) On 10 June the Secretary of Defense provided CINCPAC with estimates related to the requirements for perimeter security at Clark and Subic for use, as appropriate, in the military-to-military talks. In the presentation, it was to be made clear to the Philippine side that they were estimates only, and that a review to arrive at a mutually agreed figure was possible. The estimate included only base perimeter security needs, and did not include other security requirements which the GOP might need internal to their base areas. The U.S. Government position on funding and on such items as construction or modification

1. CINCPAC 090101Z May 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 060330Z May 78 (§), GDS-86; Hq PACAF 060215Z May 78 (§), GDS-86.
of buildings and recurring costs would await the development of the actual perimeter security force concept at the bases. The messages cited the figures previously provided by the Services relative to Subic and Clark.¹

(§) Even though the subject was broached during the military-to-military discussions, the GOP panel was reluctant to discuss AFP security requirements for any of the bases. Accordingly, the SMA recommended to CINCPAC that, pending acknowledgement of the subject by the GOP panel, estimates of AFP security requirements at smaller bases be provided. Once again CINCPACFLT and PACAF provided the requested information, and, on 10 November the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that an issue paper on the perimeter security financing was being drafted within the Defense Department. If and when the GOP panel was prepared to discuss perimeter security, the U.S. representative should be prepared to address and work toward an ad referendum agreement on estimates of GOP requirements for the perimeter security effort. If, however, the issue of U.S. participation in the security effort were raised, U.S. officials were directed to indicate that they were not prepared to address the issue.²

(§) Meanwhile, in military-to-military discussions in November, ad referendum agreement was reached on the Tabones training complex (for the second time), Part I of the powers and responsibilities of the PBC and USFC, and the Subic watershed area. After an interval during which General Espino and other members of the AFP traveled to Hawaii for the CINCPAC-hosted MDB meeting mentioned previously, the military-to-military discussions resumed on 9 December. Ad referendum agreement was reached on the security paragraph of the PBC-USFC paper. Ad referendum agreement was also reached on a working paper regarding the presence of representatives of the PBC in the Clark radar approach control, and in the base operations office at both Clark and Subic. During a meeting on 11 December, the GOP panel presented smooth-typed versions of the several ad referendum agreements pertaining to Subic which had not yet been signed. Specifically, the papers covered Subic Bay waters, Subic watershed, Grande Island, Zamboal amphibious training area, San Miguel, and a paper reflecting arrangements pertaining to areas and structures in the main-gate area at Subic. General Espino and LT GEN Manor affixed their signatures to the papers and the maps which accompanied the papers.³

(§) During the military-to-military meeting on 13 December, the AFP representatives presented for consideration a position paper on perimeter security

1. SECDEF 4905/100800Z Jun 78 (§), GDS-86.
2. J512 HistSum Nov 78 (§), GDS-84; CINCPACREP Phil 280615Z Oct 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPACFLT 040150Z Nov 78 (§), GDS-86; CINCPAC 221830Z Nov 78 (§), GDS-86; SECDEF 100027Z Nov 78 (§), GDS-86.
3. CINCPACREP Phil 060700Z, 100630Z, 202332Z Nov 78, 090545Z, 110630Z, 110645Z Dec 78 all (§)(EX), GDS-86.
at Clark AB. Several questions for clarification were asked, but the U.S. panel did not otherwise comment on the paper. On 15 December, a referendum agreement was reached on Wallace AS and the paper was signed by General Espinio and LT GEN Manor. At the same time, Manor noted the desirability of reaching ad referendum agreement on the "implementing arrangements" document during the military-to-military discussions. He noted that the U.S. panel had redrafted the diplomatic exchange of notes and had incorporated into the implementing arrangements three annexes with accompanying maps and charts, including several paragraphs previously a part of the diplomatic exchange of notes. The diplomatic exchange of notes had been redrafted and a copy had been provided to the Embassy staff. The redraft repeated verbatim the paragraphs of the 13 February exchange of notes except for those subjects which had already been resolved during the military-to-military discussions. On the same day, the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC of concurrence in the use of the estimates for AFP perimeter security, provided previously by the Services, as the military-to-military discussions proceeded. The previous stipulation that there would be no discussion of funding remained valid. It was desirable, stated the Defense Department, to have reached agreement on the estimates of the requirements (personnel and equipment) and on the general security plan before discussing any aspects of funding. In any case, it was not envisioned that personnel costs would be funded by the United States. Defense also acknowledged that, in view of Marcos' public linkage of perimeter security with criminal jurisdiction, agreement on perimeter security could enable the completion of the current round of negotiations by the end of the year.1

During a military-to-military meeting on 18 December, a working paper on Grande Island was signed off as an ad referendum agreed paper. This was a result of a minor addition to the previously agreed text submitted by the U.S. panel. On 22 December, the Tabones training complex paper was signed and, on 23 December, the accompanying map for the Tabones training complex and the ad referendum agreement on John Hay AB were signed. The AFB panel reopened the Subic watershed paper and, after a balanced revision, the ad referendum agreed paper was signed. During the 23 December meeting, previous Service-to-Service discussions regarding AFP security requirements continued in side meetings in an attempt to reach common agreement in terms of numbers of personnel and types and quantities of equipment. A large portion of the meeting was devoted to a continuing discussion of working papers on the powers and responsibilities of the PBC and the USFC. Tentative agreement was reached on all paragraphs of the

1. J512 HistSum, Dec 78 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 130845Z, 132241Z, 140230Z Dec 78 all (EX), GDS-86.
2. CINCPACREP Phil 150900Z and 150915Z Dec 78 both (EX), GDS-86; SECDEF 2753/152234Z Dec 78.
SECRET

PBC-USFC paper, except for one paragraph on the training of AFP personnel at the facilities. LT GEN Manor reported that, with ad referendum agreement having been reached on all delimitation papers and maps, as well as the tentative agreement on all but one paragraph of the powers and responsibilities of the PBC-USFC, the panel agreed to meet on the following day (Sunday, 24 December) at which time the AFP security requirements, the implementing arrangements and all three annexes thereto would be discussed with the goal of reaching tentative agreement on all matters. It was also agreed to meet on 26 December to finalize ad referendum agreement on the entire package.1

On 26 December General Espino indicated that he wished to have signed copies of the perimeter security papers for presentation to President Marcos. However, the U.S. side pointed out that the papers were not yet ready for signature because they did not yet have higher headquarters approval, and that moreover, some of the cost figures needed refinement. It was agreed that the papers would be initialed provided that a statement that they represented tentative positions which required higher headquarters review and refinement was included. The text of the papers was initialed and LT GEN Manor forwarded them to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. The meeting on 26 December lasted for eight hours and was the final session of the military-to-military discussions. The only contentious issues remaining pertained to one paragraph (construction) of Annex III to the implementing arrangements. The discussions ended with ad referendum agreement on all matters with the exception of that paragraph. The Service representatives met intermittently during the session in an effort to reach tentative agreement on the concept of and requirements for the provision of perimeter security by the AFP. Tentative agreement was reached by both the Air Force and Navy working groups. The meeting closed with the signing by the panel chairmen of a covering Memorandum of Record and their initialing of all pages of the arrangements and annexes (all maps had previously been signed). The panel chairmen also initialed a paper detailing the security concept and the requirements of the AFP for perimeter security, with the notation that such was subject to review by higher authority. The Joint Memorandum of Record, entitled "Military-to-Military Talks on the Philippine-United States Bases Negotiation" noted that the positions of both the Philippine and United States panels for the construction paragraph were included in the copy of the Implementing Arrangements, which was entitled "Arrangements regarding delineation of the United States facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Base; powers and

1. J512 HistSum, Dec 78 (U); CINCPACREP Phil 181030Z, 181045Z, 230730Z Dec 78 all (5)(EX), GDS-86.

SECRET

645
responsible of the Philippine Base Commanders and related powers and responsibilities of the United States Facilities Commanders; and the Tabones training complex."

($S$) On 30 December CINCPAC informed the JCS that the joint Memorandum of Record, the Implementing Arrangements and related maps were being hand-carried to the JCS for U.S. Government review and approval. The package had been approved by CINCPAC. CINCPAC also remarked that, having forwarded all ad referendum agreed texts/maps in advance of the official package, and in view of the ongoing diplomatic dialogue and President Marcos' stated goal of 7 January 1979 for completing negotiations, it was desirable that the review in Washington be accomplished expeditiously and in consonance with the Ambassador's timetable. He noted that the ad referendum agreed text and maps were the result of almost seven months of difficult negotiations and represented a delicately-balanced and interwoven package which could easily be upset if significant changes were posed by either government. These tentative agreements had originated from those most knowledgeable of the bases situation, and CINCPAC looked forward to full support of the U.S. position during the review process and in any further negotiations with the GOP.\(^2\)

($S$) In that regard CINCPAC considered it important to note that, in the spirit of meeting President Marcos' stated desires for Philippine sovereignty over the bases, the United States had agreed to return to the Philippines large portions of the bases and had made major concessions on some issues very important to U.S. operations in instances where the Philippine panel had been inflexible or acting on direction of higher authority. As examples of such concessions, CINCPAC listed the Crow Valley formula, Subic Bay waters and Grande Island not within the U.S. facility, the Tabones training area not within the military reservation, John Hay AB not a U.S. facility, and the removal of language on selected timber harvesting in the Subic watershed from the text. In all cases, the U.S. panel and CINCPAC had sought and developed alternative approaches which were the bottom-line necessary to insure unhampered military operations. He noted that agreement had been reached on all issues set out for military-to-military discussions except that involving construction outside the U.S. facility but within the base. He also recognized that the implementing details and funding for perimeter security had not yet been finalized.\(^3\)

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1. CINCPACREP Phil 261220Z and 261225Z Dec 78 both ($N$;(EX), GDS-86; Joint Memo of Record (U), 26 Dec 78, Subj: Military-to-military Talks on the Philippines-United States Bases Negotiation ($N$), GDS-86, with 1 attachment: Arrangements regarding the delineation of United States facilities at Clark AB and Subic Naval Base; powers and responsibilities of the Philippine Base Commanders and related powers and responsibilities of the United States Facilities Commanders; and the Tabones training complex (U).
2. CINCPAC 300030Z Dec 78 ($N$;(EX), GDS-86.
3. Ibid.
To summarize the military-to-military discussions, the following areas were excluded from the U.S. facility with the stated understanding that they would remain available for the use of U.S. military forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Acres within base before delineation</th>
<th>Acres within facility after delineation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subic</td>
<td>58,250</td>
<td>10,000(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hay</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>625(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>193,720</td>
<td>21,567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\). Represents only land areas within U.S. facility; does not include Subic Bay "Depicted Reserved" waters outside U.S. facility, Grande Island, Subic watershed, Zambales training area, nor depicted anchorages reserved for military use.

\(b\). Represents "Depicted Area" at John Hay, but not now a U.S. facility.

\(\dag\). The major concession/trade-offs made by the U.S. panel, but only after assurances of unhampered U.S. operations, included:

- Crow Valley: U.S. panel agreed to exclude Crow Valley Range from the Clark facility provided U.S. operating rights were assured and the Philippine Base Commander's role in "administering" the range would be only for the purpose of perimeter security.

- Grande Island (including Chiquita Island): The U.S. panel agreed to exclude Grande Island from the U.S. facility, but only after satisfactory arrangements for Subic Bay waters had been worked out.

1. CINCPACREP Phil 080845Z Feb 78 \(\dag\), GDS-86.
2. Ibid.
SECRET

- Subic Bay waters: The U.S. panel conceded to exclude Subic Bay waters from the U.S. facility provided the "depicted waters" under U.S. control were reserved for military use and suitable provisions for unimpeded access, egress, were included in the arrangement.

- Subic watershed: The U.S. agreed to delete reference to "selective timber-harvesting" to which the GOP panel objected, in return for acknowledgement by the GOP panel in plenary session that the agreed language did not preclude such harvesting. The GOP panel further noted in plenary session that the United States could certainly remove fallen and dead trees and the PBC and USFC could agree to limited removal of other trees if such was necessary to maintain the watershed.

- Tabones training complex: The United States accepted the GOP formulation which reaffirmed the Mendez-Blair exchange of notes of 22 December 1965, thereby conceding its position that the training complex should be incorporated in the base. This was agreed only after language was included stipulating that any changes to pertinent operating procedures would be made through the Mutual Defense Board.

- John Hay AS: The U.S. panel compromised and agreed to exclude John Hay AS from the U.S. facility, accepting a "depicted area" concept which guaranteed U.S. rights under the MBA to that area.

The Diplomatic Level

In early November the Ambassador advised the State Department that he considered the progress evidenced by the military-to-military panel to present a promising opportunity to reach early agreement on an amendment to the MBA. To take advantage of that opportunity, he considered that he would have to deal with President Marcos. State agreed and recommended such talking points as the security supporting assistance portion of the proposed compensation package, the assumption by the AFP of the base perimeter security function which could mitigate the criminal jurisdiction issue, and advised the Embassy

1. Ibid.
that State would explore the possibility of including the first year of a five-year Philippine package in the Administration's FY 80 budget request. On balance, the Ambassador believed that Marcos was inclined, or at least receptive to, putting aside the formal question of criminal jurisdiction until experience with the perimeter security provisions had indicated whether the problem would be significantly reduced.

For his initial meeting with Marcos in an attempt to reach final agreement, the Ambassador proposed that he be authorized to raise the compensation offer from the $400 million authorized in March to at least $450 million and, only if needed to seal the deal, authorization to raise the total offer to $500 million. He also proposed to inform Marcos that the United States was prepared to again examine specific requests for items of military equipment previously denied for reasons of worldwide arms transfer policy. He also proposed to inform Marcos that the United States was prepared, if Marcos was interested, to examine the feasibility of opening a line of credit with the Export-Import Bank for Philippine projects requiring imports of U.S. products for as much as $100 million a year. The United States would also be prepared to consider housing guarantees, which was a device for making U.S. private funds available for Philippine shelter projects. In that regard, the Embassy referred to initial surveys already made in Angeles City and Olongapo. The Ambassador also proposed to reiterate that the United States remained ready to find ways of improving conditions in Olongapo and Angeles City. The United States would also be prepared to assist in developing the already-reverted Zone D at Clark AB to more productive economic use. This referred specifically to the agricultural potential of the area, with particular reference to the feasibility of small farmer production and the marketing of high-value crops.

On 1 December the State Department provided instruction to the Ambassador regarding his proposed meeting with Marcos. State advised that the offering of an additional $50 million in security supporting assistance, which would bring the total compensation package to $500 million, could not be approved. The Ambassador was authorized, however, to go as high as the $450 million offer, but State suggested that the Ambassador might wish initially not to go to the limit of his authority; rather, State recommended an indirect approach, attempting to draw Marcos out on the specifics of the compensation issue (in the absence of his counter-offer), and then tentatively to state that the Ambassador could recommend an increase of approximately 10 percent above the original offer of $400 million. State recommended that the Ambassador emphasize the need to submit any compensation package to Congress in time for

1. AMEMB Manila 20094/1107002 Nov 78 (S)(EX), GDS and 20251/111113Z Nov 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; SECSTATE 287372/112143Z Nov 78 (S)(EX), GDS.
2. AMEMB Manila 20338/151054Z Nov 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
inclusion in the FY 80 budget. State agreed that the Ambassador should refer to a reexamination of the military equipment list and that the question of criminal jurisdiction should not be raised unless first raised by Marcos. State also agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion regarding housing guarantees and assistance to the cities of Angeles and Olongapo, as well as Zone D at Clark. In reply to a previous request of the Ambassador that he be supplied with a letter from President Carter to Marcos indicating Carter's anticipation of an early agreement, State transmitted such a letter for the use of the Ambassador. The letter, dated 22 November, referred to the visit by Senator Inouye and reports from Ambassador Murphy indicating that the talks between the military officials on base negotiations were progressing. Carter stated that the United States was prepared to move ahead rapidly to reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory amendment to the MBA and that, if this could be done in the next few weeks, the Administration would be able to include funds for the first year of an agreed compensation package in the FY 80 budget request. Carter also stated that, if agreement were reached on all elements of an amendment to the MBA, he was prepared to send another letter stating that his Administration would use its best efforts each year to secure the appropriations from Congress needed to fund the compensation package.

On 4 December the Ambassador met with Marcos on a one-on-one basis and noted not only the need to reach agreement as soon as possible, but also that negotiations were being observed with interest by the ASEAN nations, South Korea, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. Ambassador Murphy reviewed with Marcos the status of the military-to-military talks, renewed the previous offer of $400 million in the compensation package, as well as the other subjects related to economics. The Ambassador summarized his report of the meeting by noting that the delivery of President Carter's letter had had an impact, as evidenced by Marcos' decision to convene, immediately on the heels of the Ambassador's meeting, a session with AFP military officers to discuss how the negotiations could be accelerated. In a 16 December meeting with Marcos, the Ambassador reported that Marcos had met with General Espino and had reviewed the remaining outstanding issues, which he listed as the status of John Hay AS and the role of the base commanders. He stated that he planned to convene the military panel during the first week of January in order to make a final review, upon which the Ambassador stressed the extremely short time remaining if the compensation package were to fit into the U.S. Government budgetary cycle. He urged Marcos to consider an earlier review, which Marcos did.2

1. SECSTATE 300318/272251Z Nov 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 304895/012353Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Manila 21514/041009Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), XGDS-3, REVW 4 Dec 98 and 22390/160546Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
On 19 December State reminded the Ambassador that, before going to Congress with an amendment to the FY 80 budget, Marcos' concurrence with the military-to-military agreements negotiated ad referendum would be needed, as well as his oral assurance that the compensation package was acceptable. The Ambassador replied that he intended to stress the need for an early decision, but noted that the best he was likely to get from Marcos was oral assurance that he was considering the compensation package favorably and was satisfied with what he knew of the military-to-military talks. The Ambassador also advised State that, in order to complete the deal, he expected to have to use his authority to raise the compensation package $50 million in the security supporting assistance area, bringing it up to the $450 million total. In so doing, the Ambassador assured State he would explicitly associate the sum as designed in part to cover security perimeter equipment costs. In 20 December meetings with Marcos, the Ambassador advised that, although unwilling to be drawn out on the compensation issue, Marcos demonstrated genuine interest in completing all MBA issues by 7 January. He also stated that he desired to complete the military-to-military talks by 26 December, when he planned to depart on a three-four day provincial tour.

After President Marcos had set 7 January 1979 as his target date to wrap up the base negotiations, the Ambassador noted that there undoubtedly would be some significant problems until then and possibly even beyond. Therefore, he considered it essential to have LT GEN Manor remain in Manila as the Senior Military Advisor until it was clear that most problems had been eliminated. He cited Manor's historical background, his knowledge of current issues, and his personal contacts with the Filipinos, all of which could be key factors in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. Consequently, he requested CINCPAC support in obtaining permission for LT GEN Manor and CDR Deboes to remain in Manila. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he concurred strongly with the Ambassador's request and stated his intention for both Manor and Deboes to remain in Manila per the Ambassador's request. He so advised the Ambassador.

During meetings on 28-29 December between the Ambassador and LT GEN Manor on the U.S. side and President Marcos and General Espino on the GOP side, the President commented that there were really only two outstanding issues: jurisdiction and compensation. The Ambassador was persuaded that Marcos was serious about reaching an agreement in time to permit submission of the package to Congress in the second half of January. Marcos had planned a meeting with his advisers on 31 December in the afternoon, and had requested a further

1. STATE 319242/192217Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86; AMEMB Manila 22468/200325Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86 and 22622/201912Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS-86.
2. AMEMB Manila 22880/270617Z Dec 78 (S), GDS-84; CINCPAC 280150Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 27 Dec 84; ADMIN CINCPAC ALFA 33/280350Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 27 Dec 84.
meeting with the U.S. officials for that evening. At the end of the 31 December meeting, President Marcos announced during a press conference that Philippine and U.S. negotiators had reached agreement on amendments to the MBA which reaffirmed Philippine sovereignty over the bases, provided for each base to be under a PBC, provided significant reductions in the areas for use by United States within the Philippine military bases, provided for AFP perimeter security responsibility, assured the United States of unhampered military operations, and called for a thorough review of the agreement every five years. Marcos stated that these amendments, together with U.S. undertakings to provide continuing security and development assistance, were under the final stages of review. He also stated that there would be a formal exchange of notes between the two governments covering the amendments.1

The Ambassador’s report of the 31 December meeting alone with Marcos advised State of Marcos’ agreement to set aside the issue of criminal jurisdiction, to accept the compensation package, including the additional $50 million offered as part of the $450 million package, and his agreement that the GOP would fund the costs of perimeter security. He also agreed to the MBA amendment package, subject to the resolution of several issues of concern. During a long session with Marcos, the Ambassador, and their respective advisers present, the GOP officials expressed concern relating to the Subic watershed, construction in the land areas to be returned to the GOP and the use of the reverted lands. The Ambassador stressed to Marcos alone and later to his advisers the importance of not revealing publicly the details of the compensation package, and all agreed. After the 31 December meetings, the Ambassador was convinced that Marcos was anxious to complete the negotiations and LT GEN Manor agreed. On 1 January the Manila press carried extensive coverage of Marcos’ comments during the press conference of the previous day.2

As reported by the Ambassador, the entire day of 2 January was spent in full-dress talks between U.S. civilian and military officials and their GOP counterparts. The purpose was to seek agreement on the wording of the diplomatic notes regarding the MBA amendments (to be referred to Washington) as well as problems in connection with criminal jurisdiction, military construction, and the non-military development of base lands. The military construction and non-military development papers were reported separately to CINCPAC for action, while the draft diplomatic note was forwarded to Washington for approval. On 3 January the Ambassador informed the State Department that final agreement with the GOP on the MBA amendment appeared to be within reach. His concern was

1. AMEMB Manila 23115/291353Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), GDS-88 and 23126/311420Z Dec 78 (U).
2. AMEMB Manila 23127/311530Z Dec 78 (S)(EX), XGDS-3, REVW 29 Dec 86 and 13/020409Z Jan 79 (U).
SECRET

that the approvals and concurrences required from the U.S. side be provided in time to nail down with Marcos what had been achieved on 2 January before his advisers, the opposition, or the press encouraged him to ask for greater attention to other issues. The Ambassador stated that every day which passed before the note and the amendment package were formally signed offered the potential for someone influencing Marcos on yet another issue. He requested special attention by the State Department in order to obtain Washington clearance of the diplomatic note, the amendment package, and letters from Secretary of State Vance to Foreign Minister Romulo and from Ambassador Murphy to Romulo as soon as possible. He noted parenthetically that Marcos had scheduled one of his monthly press conferences for Friday, 5 January.1

(Ex) On 4 January the Ambassador advised that Minister of Defense Enrile and Solicitor General Mendoza were reviewing four notes, previously approved by Washington for passing to the GOP, covering miscellaneous sites and activities, the State Department Regional Relay Facility on Clark AB, the Voice of America at Wallace AS, and the American Military Cemetery and Memorial at Fort Bonifacio. The miscellaneous sites referred to included the pipeline from Subic Bay Naval Base to Clark; the seismic research site within the Philippine AS at Del Monte, in Bukidnon Province; the communications site within the Philippine Army installation at Mt. Cabuyao, in Benguet Province; and other sites or activities already the subject of agreements between the parties, which had not been referred to in the MBA of 1947 as amended. On 5 January the State Department forwarded to the Embassy the text of the "best-effort" letter which would be transmitted from President Carter to President Marcos at the time of the exchange of notes. On the following day State forwarded concurrence in the diplomatic notes drafted by the Embassy, as modified by the State Department. State also advised that the Vance-Romulo letter and the Murphy-Romulo letter were approved, that the Presidential "best-effort" letter had been signed by the President and that the Implementing Arrangements were approved. State advised that the Defense Department concurred with these documents.2

(Ex) In a major media event with President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, the Marcos children, the Cabinet, top military personnel, interim assembly members, and the media on hand, Romulo and Murphy exchanged covering diplomatic notes approving the MBA amendment package and exchanged three notes (miscellaneous military sites and activities, the Radio Relay Facility, and the Voice of America).

1. AMEMB Manila 68/021310Z Jan 79 (Ex), GDS 2 Jan 85; 69/021453Z Jan 79 (Ex), GDS 2 Jan 85; 70/021513Z Jan 79 (Ex), XGDS-3, REVW 2 Jan 88; 103/030541Z Jan 79 (Ex), GDS 3 Jan 85.
2. AMEMB Manila 196/050126Z Jan 79 (Ex), GDS 4 Jan 84; SECSTATE 3199/051827Z Jan 79 (Ex), DECL on publication; SECSTATE 3694/060031Z Jan 79 (Ex), GDS 5 Jan 85.

SECRET

653
In a private meeting preceding the signing ceremony, Marcos said that the only document the GOP wished to publicize would be the covering diplomatic note regarding the MBA amendment along with the implementing arrangements and Secretary of State Vance's letter to Foreign Minister Romulo. He said publication of the other notes and letters would only serve to confuse the public. Later, however, he read out all of the main parts of the Carter "best-effort" letter in the course of remarks during the signing. In his speech at the end of the ceremony, Marcos stressed the importance of the amendment to Philippine-American relations, the elimination of vestigial U.S. sovereignty, the reduction of confrontations between U.S. service personnel and Filipino civilians, and stability in Asia. He also revealed the compensation package, reading all of the main parts of the letter from President Carter.1

(U) Regarding the question of criminal jurisdiction, the diplomatic note amending the MBA was released by the GOP following the 7 January signing ceremony. The operating paragraph, which had avoided the criminal jurisdiction issue, stated:2

* * * * *

The two parties also take note of the decision by the Government of the Philippines to assume responsibility for perimeter security at the bases. This should significantly decrease contacts between Filipino civilians and American Servicemen on official duty involving security. The parties also note the decision of the United States to retain accused personnel in the Philippines for a reasonable time, and to prevent their inadvertent departure, in order to provide opportunities for adequate discussions between the two governments relating to the jurisdictional question in official duty cases.

(U) On 7 January, after the MBA amendment had been accomplished by the exchange of notes (the U.S. note was numbered: NO.7), LT GEN Manor and CDR Deboes expressed their appreciation for the extraordinary effort provided by Admiral Weisner, RADM Shelton (J5), CDR Russell (J5123), and the various CINCPAC, PACFLT, and PACAF staff members in getting the missions accomplished. On the following day, Ambassador Murphy passed a message to retired RADM McClendon announcing the conclusion of the MBA negotiations, and citing the almost three years' effort to which McClendon had so significantly contributed as CINCPAC.

1. AMEMB Manila 398/071321Z Jan 79 (U), GDS 7 Jan 84; State had authorized a final offer of $500 million, which the Ambassador considered to have been the deciding factor.
2. AMEMB Manila 460/080901Z Jan 79 (U).
UNCLASSIFIED

J5 in 1976, the SMA to the Ambassador in 1977, and as Chairman of the U.S. panel for military-to-military discussions in 1978. From CINCPAC's standpoint, perhaps the most meaningful kudo came from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, who expressed his appreciation to Admiral Weisner, his staff, and people in the field for a job well-done. General Jones stated that the result was a splendid example of military diplomacy.

1. CINCPACREP Phil 071540Z Jan 79 (U); AMEMB Manila 464/080937Z Jan 79 (S), GDS-84; JCS 7880/102353Z Jan 79 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

655 (Reverse Blank p. 656)
CHAPTER XI--SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--LEGAL

Legal Support in Thailand

(U) The legal support function in Thailand was reviewed during the early part of 1978 by CINCPAC staff members of the Performance Evaluation Group (PEG), the Directorate for Personnel (J1), and the Staff Judge Advocate (J73). The PEG team verified that the lawyer stationed in Thailand (an Army O-4 assigned to Chief JUSMAG Thailand) was providing useful services but determined that less than 50 percent of his time was devoted to purely security assistance matters. It was suggested that the JUSMAG consider transfer of the space to the CINCPAC Miscellaneous Joint Manpower Program (JMP). While the suggestion was being studied, the Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia submitted a request for additional legal support. Subsequently, it was proposed that the CINCPAC Miscellaneous JMP space be used to provide a lawyer with duty station in Bangkok and additional duty of periodic legal assistance in Jakarta. However, before this arrangement could be finalized, the American Ambassador in Thailand indicated opposition to maintaining a legal billet in-country in view of the anticipated additional reduction in U.S. military strength. Following the departure of the JUSMAG Staff Judge Advocate in June, J73 arranged for the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Japan to assist in closing the JUSMAG legal office and to provide limited legal assistance to JUSMAG on a TDY basis.¹

1978 PACOM Legal Conference²

(U) The annual PACOM Legal Conference, sponsored by the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate, was held in Honolulu from 6 to 9 March 1978. Seventy-three military and civilian conferees, including Ms. Deanne Seimer, DOD General Counsel, two judges from the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, the Judge Advocates General for the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, and representatives from the Army and Air Force Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as legal offices throughout PACOM attended sessions at the Hale Koa Hotel and at CINCPAC Headquarters.

(U) One of the conference highlights was a presentation by Ms. Seimer which conveyed several proposed changes to military legal procedures. The

¹ J73 HistSums May-Jun 78 (U); J73/Memo/103-78 of 9 May 78 (U); CINCPAC 220150Z Jun 78 (U).
² J731 HistSum, Mar 78 (U); Report of PACOM Legal Conference 1978 (U).
first was a move to apply provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act to overseas U.S. activities. Implementation of such a policy would require environmental impact statements and protection methods in areas and categories which heretofore had been exempt. Since this could mean a substantial change in current procedures, DOD wished to develop any necessary implementing regulations rather than to have such regulations emanate from the Council on Environmental Quality.

(U) The second subject Ms. Seimer addressed was two legislative proposals regarding the Court of Military Appeals (COMA). The first would abolish the COMA and transfer its jurisdiction to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (near Washington) in three increments with completion by 1981. The structure of the military justice system had changed over the years and the question was whether or not the military justice system need remain totally independent of the civilian system. The proposal would also give the Fourth Circuit Court jurisdiction over questions of law arising under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial. Another proposal, which would also affect the COMA, was to restructure the jurisdiction of the COMA to eliminate its legislative and administrative functions.

(U) A third topic was a proposed transfer of authority to military judges to issue orders authorizing wire tapping in overseas areas for law enforcement purposes in cases involving U.S. personnel, and a fourth was a new system being devised for searches in the intelligence area. The latter included the use of electronic devices, sophisticated signal intelligence capabilities, physical searches, mail openings, and concealed television cameras or beeper devices. Ms. Seimer referred to a forthcoming Executive Order 12036, which imposed constraints on searches for intelligence purposes, and the consequent need to distinguish between law enforcement purposes, which could be handled under current military procedures, and intelligence purposes. The latter would require approval of the U.S. Attorney General to conduct a search.

(U) The conference included presentations on international agreements procedures, Philippine base negotiations, overseas environmental law issues, and updates on Law of War and Law of the Sea. Other featured subjects were a panel discussion on the impact of UCMJ cases on SOFA functions and seminars on the impact of foreign civil jurisdiction on military operations, trends in administration of criminal jurisdiction provisions of SOFA, and the role and function of Designated Commanding Officers and CINCPAC Representatives.
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SECTION II--CINCPAC BUDGET

(U) In 1978 CINCPAC was in the funding chain only for military missions, subordinate unified commands, and IPAC. For COMUS Korea only WWMCCS funds flowed through CINCPAC. All other funding was via respective Service channels. Funds allocated to CINCPAC for FY 78 amounted to $22,685,575. Distribution by activity for each type of funding follows:

**Operations and Maintenance, Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Program 2 (General Purpose Forces)</th>
<th>Program 3 (Intelligence &amp; Communications)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Staff</td>
<td>$6,339,500</td>
<td>$1,752,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>307,300</td>
<td>135,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>1,301,200</td>
<td>121,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,134,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIPAC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,033,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,948,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,177,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military Assistance, Executive**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Funding Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T10 (Administrative Expenses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>$ 357,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T20 (Military Mission Expense)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMAAG China</td>
<td>231,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Korea</td>
<td>3,084,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Philippines</td>
<td>535,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMDO Japan</td>
<td>775,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSDLG Indonesia</td>
<td>431,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Thailand</td>
<td>743,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODC India</td>
<td>106,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDR Pakistan</td>
<td>190,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>21,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>8,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Dependent Schools</td>
<td>20,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,514,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Official Representation Funds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Operating Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>$14,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCRC</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>3,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>6,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Australia</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Guam</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP Phil</td>
<td>2,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS Exercises</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$29,445</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**MAP Representation Funds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Operating Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Korea</td>
<td>$ 4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMDO Japan</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMAAG China</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Philippines</td>
<td>2,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUSDLG Indonesia</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHJUSMAG-Thailand</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODC India</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDR Pakistan</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$16,730</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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SECTION III--RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OFFICE

Management of Studies and Analyses

(U) The formalized structure for the management and conduct of studies and analyses continued to function effectively in providing high command visibility, maximizing the efforts of limited analytical resources, eliminating duplication of effort, and insuring that the studies and analyses annual program was responsive to CINCPAC's priorities and requirements.

(U) The studies and analyses management structure had originally been directed by CINCPAC in November 1976. A CINCPAC Steering Committee for Studies and Analyses had been established (consisting of the deputies J1 through J6), a Senior Review Group (the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff), with CINCPAC being the final authority. The Research and Analysis Office was designated as Executive Agent. The CINCPAC Steering Committee met on an as-required basis or at the call of the chairman, the Deputy Director for Plans, during the calendar year.

(U) The Steering Committee was convened on 5 June to formulate the FY 79 annual CINCPAC Studies Program input to the Department of Defense, which was due on 1 September. The Research and Analysis Office coordinated and formulated the FY 79 program, which was approved and forwarded to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The plan noted that limited analytical resources available to CINCPAC dictated a need for flexibility in the program to insure that it was responsive to CINCPAC's changing requirements. This flexibility was provided through a continuing review of individual study progress and adjustment of priorities, if needed, by both the CINCPAC Studies and Analyses Steering Committee and the Senior Review Group.

(U) The FY 79 program was responsive to CINCPAC requirements in three major areas: military force planning analyses, analytical support to subordinate commands, and C4 systems design and engineering. Individual studies and analyses within the first two areas consisted primarily of military planning assessments and internal evaluations for CINCPAC and his staff. These studies did not meet manpower or funding requirements for individual reporting and they were aggregated by generic study objectives into the above categories for reporting purposes. In support of those generic categories, CINCPAC O&M funds were used, where appropriate, to procure or contract for specialized analytical services in the areas of data analysis, field services, and technical services, to include programming and the application of wargaming and simulation techniques to problems of joint Service interest in the PACOM.

1. J77 HistSum Jan-Dec 78 ($), DECL 4 Sep 85.
(U) C4 systems design and engineering supported the improved command and control, communications and computer systems capabilities necessary to support the PACOM mission. The complexity of PACOM's requirements, and the breadth of capabilities that were expected to become available from systems under development by many different National and Service agencies, required that a system approach be pursued. This effort identified the required elements of the PACOM C4 system architecture per the PACOM Command and Control Master Plan and established a plan of action to be taken by the CINCPAC staff to achieve that architecture. Cognizance of programs and developments of the Military Departments and other agencies was required to insure compatibility with related Defense Department activities such as the Worldwide Military Command and Control System selected architecture.

(U) The Studies and Analyses Steering Committee conducted its final program review of the year on 24 November, and subsequently presented an informational brief on the status of ongoing efforts to the Senior Review Group on 12 December.

(U) During 1977 a concerted effort had been made to phase out contractor analysis support. Two additional civil service billets were established in the Research and Analysis Office with the understanding that two contractor billets would be eliminated. Recruiting, halted by a civilian hiring "freeze," had resumed in December 1977. Two civilians were hired in February 1978, eliminating the requirement for two contractor billets.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Activities

(U) In April the Research and Analysis Office conducted an evaluation of the Advanced Command Control Architectural Testbed (ACCAT) Remote Site options. ACCAT had been begun by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in FY 76 as a project funded jointly with the Navy. Its purpose was to evaluate new information processing technology and new command and control architecture. The central computer facility was being developed at the Naval Ocean Systems Command at San Diego, and remote sites were scheduled for the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, various fleet units, and CINCPACFLT.

(U) As opposed to existing Research and Analysis Office simulation models that used expected values or "Monte Carlo" techniques and which could be iterated many times to determine optimum decisions, the ACCAT wargaming system resulted in a conflict occurring only once, with the participants often making less than perfect decisions. ACCAT, therefore, was useful because it introduced realism, and enabled the user to see the effects of imperfect decisions on the outcomes of an analysis.
(U) A particularly attractive feature of ACCAT for CINCPACFLT, and potentially for CINCPAC, was that the system could be used for interactive wargaming of operational analyses and for simulations to assess the adequacy of CONPLANS and OPLANs. In addition, the system could be used to train operational commanders to make decisions in the simulated environment of wartime contingencies. Three teams—RED, BLUE, and umpires—operated consoles with alphanumeric and graphic, multi-color displays, and interacted on a real-time basis. The system accepted data bases that included land, air, and naval conflict parameters.

(U) Unfortunately, ACCAT had potential problems. The first concerned preparation of data bases for the various scenarios to be simulated. Secondly, ACCAT was still being developed and its wargaming capability via a remote site module had not been tested. Every new computer system had to be debugged. Specifically, real-time communications between the remote site and the central computer facility in California via the existing ARPANET might be difficult. Finally, the system was expensive. CINCPACFLT had contributed about $120,000 to a total system cost of almost $2 million. The estimated cost of a remote site module was about $315,000 for acquisition and $130,000 for yearly O&M.

(U) The question of whether or not an interactive wargame produced results that justified the additional man months of work needed for data base preparation and the remote site acquisition/O&M costs did not have a quantitative answer. The results of those wargames, in spite of their realism, might not be any more useful for planning than the approximations, or estimates, derived with existing available computer simulations and analytical techniques. The Research and Analysis Office expected to continue to monitor ACCAT system development.

(U) In May Research and Analysis Office representatives attended the International Conference on Systems Modeling in Developing Countries (SMDC) sponsored by the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand. The conference was attended by over 150 technical experts from more than 27 Pacific-Asian nations. This was the second international conference on systems analysis that had brought together analysts from numerous PACOM countries. The first conference had been held in Taipei in October 1976.

Analyses in Support of CINCPAC (c)
Economic Importance of Asia and Japan

(U) As a result of comments in the Draft Consolidated Guidance FY 80-84, the Research and Analysis Office undertook an examination of the economic importance of Asia vis-a-vis Europe. The results were published in a Memorandum for Record on 9 February 1978. The basic conclusion of this initial effort was that the statement in the Draft Consolidated Guidance on the economic importance of Asia compared to Europe should be reversed. The fact was recognized that Asia and Japan were of primary economic importance to the United States and considerably more important economically than Europe. Additional assessments in this area during 1978 revealed that specifically:

- Asia in general, and Japan in particular, were of primary economic importance to the United States.
- Japan was our leading trading partner worldwide.
- U.S. imports from Asia exceeded those from Europe by $9 billion per year.
- U.S. exports to Asia amounted to $22.8 billion, with $10.5 billion to Japan alone.
- The Republic of Korea's trade with the United States had grown by 551 percent in six years, Japan's by 195 percent, and the Federal Republic of Germany's by 153 percent.
Exports to Asia were increasing by 22 percent per year while imports from Asia were increasing by 35 percent per year.

U.S. trade with Asia was increasing at a greater rate than U.S. trade with Europe.

Asian countries averaged 2.3 percent of their Gross National Product on defense, European countries 3.6 percent.

Military manpower strength in Asia exceeded Europe by 20 percent.

The U.S. trade deficit with Asia was balanced by an equivalent trade surplus with Europe. (The overall unfavorable balance of payments for the United States was due primarily to heavy oil imports from the petroleum exporting countries.)
Japanese Logistic Study

(U) On 14 June 1978 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation requested comments on a draft study on Japanese Self-Defense Force logistics. The study was designed to highlight problem areas in the Japanese logistic system and provide the United States with a source document for future reference. The Research and Analysis Office coordinated a response to this request with COMUS Japan; Commander U.S. Naval Force Japan; the Chief of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office; and the CINCPAC staff. The response was completed in July and included general comments on methodology format of the draft study, and answers to specific questions on data unavailable to the author of the draft study.

Soviet Non-Military Fleet Study

(U) In early September the Chief of Staff requested preparation of a study outline and terms of reference for consideration by the CINCPAC Studies and Analyses Steering Committee as to whether analytical resources should be expended for a detailed study of the economic, political, and military implications of the Soviet non-military fleet. The overall results of this effort consisted of a document search and compilation from numerous government agencies including the CIA, commercial sources, and other research organizations. Data gleaned from this effort were useful as inputs to CINCPAC speeches and background papers. An executive summary working paper was published on 28 November entitled, "The Political, Economic, and Military Implications of the Expanding Soviet Non-Military Fleet." This was circulated for staff comment and a recommendation to the CINCPAC Studies and Analyses Steering Committee was expected early in January 1979. Steering Committee indications were that the executive summary would satisfy the immediate requirement for such a study.
Sea Lines of Communication Review

(U) On 17 November the Chief of Staff requested a review of JCS and CNO posture statements in conjunction with a review of recent studies dealing with defense of the Pacific sea lines of communication. The results of this review indicated that prior studies had based measures of effectiveness of SLOC defense on regional sea or air superiority. What was needed, it was believed, was a comprehensive study using "materials throughput" as a measure of effectiveness. This review was briefed to the Chief of Staff on 8 December, to the Senior Review Group on 14 December, and a decision brief was presented to CINCPAC on 15 December. The decision to pursue the SLOC study was still pending as of 31 December.

Analysis Support to Subordinate Commands

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness

(U) In May CINCPACINST 5420.3A specified the Research and Analysis Office as the single point of contact in the PACOM for JTCG/ME matters. Support to subordinate commands and allies continued throughout the year. In July, Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) were provided to the Republic of Korea and China, programs and calculations were provided the ROK Army, ammunition fusing data was provided to COMUS Korea, and a users manual was provided to the ROC on air-to-air JMEM programs.
Weapons Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Values Methodology (WEI/WUV)

(U) The Research and Analysis Office was successful during September in obtaining release of the WEI/WUV methodologies developed by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) to Japan and the Republics of Korea and China. These CAA documents contained methodologies useful for calculating relative combat strengths, attrition coefficients, and performing static and dynamic force comparisons at several levels of aggregation. The volumes were sent to the appropriate military Service headquarters and/or Defense agencies on 19 September.
(U) The Chief of the ROK Navy analysis office plus two of his staff arrived at CINCPAC headquarters on 7 June for two weeks temporary duty. The purpose of the visit was to gain some insight and assistance in outlining ROK Navy force structure problems for solution. Following this visit, further contacts were made to continue ROK navy analytical support in conjunction with JUSMAG Korea.

(U) On 27 November, 17 members of the ROK Operations Research/Systems Analysis Long Range Planning Group arrived in Hawaii to meet with PACOM, PACFLT, and PACAF analysis groups. Briefings and working sessions were arranged at CINCPAC and component command headquarters during the period 27 November to 1 December. On 1 December the Planning Group departed for Washington, D.C. to continue meetings with various analytical organizations.
SECTION IV--OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Trips and Associated Speeches

(U) The trips and associated speeches made by Admiral Weisner are highlighted below and are listed chronologically. Also included are selected lists of distinguished visitors to the Command, meetings with news media personnel, and local addresses.

(U) American Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan Trip, 31 December 1977-10 January 1978: Admiral Weisner, accompanied by two principal staff members and Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) Richard C. Holbrooke, arrived in Pago Pago, American Samoa on Sunday 1 January where he met with Governor-elect Coleman. The following day he proceeded to Nandi, Fiji and on 3 January met with COL Paul Manuelli, Commander, Royal Fiji Military Forces. Later that day he traveled to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (PNG) where he visited with American Ambassador Mary S. Olmsted and, on the morning of 4 January, met with PNG Secretary of Defense Thomas Ritako prior to departing for Hong Kong. On 5 January Admiral Weisner attended the annual Chiefs of Mission Conference held at the American Consulate. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) Morton I. Abramowitz and Admiral Weisner briefed the conferences on "Strategic Concepts"--a worldwide defense approach, U.S. dispositions and regional problems. On Saturday 7 January Admiral Weisner traveled to the Philippines. On the 8th he conferred with General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, and American Ambassador David D. Newsom to discuss Philippine base issues, and met with President Ferdinand Marcos on 9 January. The following day he proceeded to Yokota Air Base, Japan where, on 11 January, he held meetings with the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan and later with the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan at Yokosuka, Admiral Weisner returned to Hawaii on 12 January.

(U) The Philippines, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan Trip, 21 January-7 February: After a brief stop at Cubi Point in the Philippines, where he met with General Espino on Sunday 22 January, Admiral Weisner proceeded on his initial visit to the above countries to demonstrate U.S. interest

1. Material for this section was taken from J03/74 HistSums Jan-Dec 78; J03 BWEBs Jan-Dec 78; J03/LA Congressional Visitors Log; Protocol Itineraries; Admiral Weisner's Guest Book for 1978; Chief of Staff's Calendar Entries for 1978; J00 trip files; J03/742/Memo 438-79 of 11 Sep 79, Subj: 1978 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft; all (U).
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and to strengthen U.S. ties. This was the first visit of a CINCPAC to Bangla-
desh, Nepal, India, and Afghanistan. In each country the Admiral met with key
members of the American mission for briefings and discussions prior to meetings
with host country officials. While in Dacca, Bangladesh from 23 to 26 January
Admiral Weisner met with the Secretary, Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Naval
Staff, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, the Air Chief of Staff, the Foreign
Secretary, and President Ziaur Rahman. Admiral Weisner also toured the Bangla-
desh Defense Services Staff College.

(U) After his arrival in Kathmandu, Nepal on Saturday 26 January, Admiral
Weisner met with the Chief of the Army Staff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense on 27 January. The Admiral's
visit to India, from 28 to 31 January, included calls on the Defense Minister,
the Defense Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Army Chief of Staff, the
Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff; he also met with
Prime Minister Desai. While in India Admiral Weisner also witnessed the "Beat-
ing Retreat" ceremony and was the guest of honor at dinners by U.S. Ambassador
Robert F. Goheen and Admiral Cursetji, Chief of the Naval Staff.

(U) The CINCPAC party traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan on 31 January. On
1 and 2 February Admiral Weisner met with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs Committee,
the Secretary General in Chief at the Ministry of Defense; the Chief of the
Naval Staff; the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs; General Mohammad Zia-Ul-
Haque, Chief of the Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator; and President
Fazal Elahi Chaudhry. Other activities in Pakistan included a visit to the
Tarbela Dam project, aerial sightseeing, and a drive through the Khyber Pass.
On 4 February Admiral Weisner met with Afghanistan President Mohammad Daoud,
the Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense and Army
Commander, and the Chief of the General Staff. Admiral Weisner returned to
the Philippines on Sunday 5 February to meet with Major General F.L. Poston,
13th Air Force Commander; Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty, CINCPACREP Philip-
ippines; General Espino; and Ambassador Newsom before returning to Hickam Air
Force Base on 7 February.

(U) Dallas, Atlanta, Ft. McNair Trip, 13-16 February: Admiral Weisner
departed Hawaii on 13 February for Dallas where, on the morning of the
14th, he met with the Editorial Board of the Dallas Morning News and attended
sessions of the Dallas Council on World Affairs as a panelist to present a
PACOM briefing. In the afternoon he traveled to Atlanta GA. On 15 February
he held a background briefing for the editors of both Atlanta newspapers--
the Journal and the Constitution--prior to addressing the luncheon meeting of
the Southern Center for International Studies on "Pacific Perceptions and
Challenges." News coverage emphasized increasing Soviet force levels and
capabilities and the U.S. forward basing concept. The following day the Admiral

UNCLASSIFIED

672
traveled to Washington DC, where he gave a classified lecture on the Pacific Command to the students, staff, and faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College at Ft. McNair before returning to Hawaii.

(U) Norfolk VA Trip, 29 March-1 April: On 29 March Admiral Weisner departed Hawaii for Norfolk where, on 30 March, he presented a classified briefing to students of the Armed Forces Staff College on the importance of the Pacific area and how the PACOM military posture complements U.S. economic and strategic national interests. He also met with Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., CINCLANT that day and, on 31 March, participated as the principal speaker in the COMNAVAIRLANT change of command ceremony aboard the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. His return to Hawaii was on Saturday 1 April.

(U) Chicago, Washington DC Trip, 23-28 April: Admiral Weisner traveled to Chicago on Sunday 23 April. On Monday he met with an interviewer from the Chicago Sun Times, gave a luncheon address to the Union Club of Chicago, and met with the Editorial Board of the Chicago Tribune. A member of the CINCPAC presentations staff delivered the PACOM overview brief to six military and civilian groups in the Chicago area on 25, 26, and 27 April. Meanwhile Admiral Weisner proceeded to Washington where, on the 25th, he met with Admiral James L. Holloway, III, Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral Patrick J. Hannifin, Director of the Joint Staff; Thomas B. Ross, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; LT GEN Arnold W. Braswell, USAF, Joint Staff Director of Plans; Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr.; the Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey; and General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also attended the President's Press Conference. On 26 April Admiral Weisner held discussions with Admiral H.E. Shear, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; LT GEN C.J. LeVan, USA, Joint Staff Director of Operations; Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) David E. McGiffert; LT GEN W. Y. Smith, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman, JCS; Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia and Pacific) Richard Holbrooke, and the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsom. The next day the Admiral had breakfast with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, met with VADM Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director of the National Security Agency, General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air Force and had lunch with Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers prior to returning home.

(U) Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand Trip, 9-20 May: Accompanied by three principal staff members and nine newsmen, Admiral Weisner departed Hawaii on 9 May and arrived at Yokota AB in Japan on the 10th. The following day he had breakfast with Ambassador Mike Mansfield, key members of the Embassy Staff, and the Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office. He called on Japan Defense Agency Minister Kanemaru, Parliamentary Vice Minister Shuichi Takenaka, and
Administrative Vice Minister Maruyama, followed by luncheon with the three ministers plus General Takashina, Chief of Staff JGSDF; General Takeda, Chief of Staff JASDF; and VADM Makihara, Vice Chief of Staff JMSDF. On the 12th Admiral Weisner met with U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders at Yokota prior to flying to Seoul, Korea. On the same day, he had meetings with the Korean Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Kim Chong-hwan and Minister of National Defense Ro Jae-hyun and a conference with General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. During the visit to Korea Admiral Weisner also met informally with key ROK Government officials including the Speaker of the National Assembly, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, and the Chiefs of the military Services. Principal U.S. Embassy and military personnel attended social events hosted by General Vessey, General Kim, and Ambassador Sneider. On 15 May the Admiral traveled to Clark AB to attend the Mutual Defense Board meeting held on 16 May at the American Embassy. While in the Philippines he met with U.S. military commanders and embassy officials, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Enrile, and General Espino. On 17 May the party proceeded from Clark AB to Bangkok, Thailand where Admiral Weisner was greeted with an honors ceremony sponsored by Thai military officials. This was followed by meetings with the Chief JUSMAG Thailand and the Country Team. The Weisners were guests of honor at a dinner given that evening by Ambassador Charles C. Whitehouse. Among those present at the dinner were the Thai Defense Minister, chiefs of the Thai military Services and other key U.S. and Thai government personnel. On the 18th Admiral Weisner conferred with the Thai Defense Minister; General Kriangsak Chomanan, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander, Thai Armed Forces; and Minister of Foreign Affairs Upadit Pachariyankun. The Admiral's party departed Bangkok on 19 May and made brief stops at Cubi Point in the Philippines and on Guam prior to returning to Hickam on Saturday 20 May.

(U) Washington, DC Trip, 5-10 June: Admiral Weisner flew to Washington on 5 June for meetings with Defense Department officials and Secretary of State Vance on the 6th and to attend the 26th ANZUS Council Meeting on the 7th and 8th of June. At the first session Admiral Weisner led discussions on U.S. and Soviet military postures in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On 9 June the Admiral attended the ANZUS Military Representatives meeting, which was held at the Marine Corps Development Center in Quantico VA, before departing for Hawaii.

(U) Los Angeles Trip, 16-17 June: The Admiral traveled to Los Angeles CA on 16 June to be the keynote speaker at the June Week Naval Academy Alumni Association dinner meeting at Long Beach on Saturday the 17th. The meeting was aboard the Queen Mary, where he addressed the status of U.S. national interests in Asia and the Pacific from CINCPAC's perspective. He returned to Hawaii the same evening.
(U) Washington DC, Pope AFB Trip, 27 June-3 July: On 27 June Admiral Weisner traveled to Washington DC where he spent the night before proceeding on the 28th to Pope AFB NC. There he received briefings on the U.S. Army 18th Airborne Corps and the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. He also observed Special Forces demonstrations on the 28th before returning to Washington. On 29 June he attended retirement ceremonies and a luncheon by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in honor of Mr. Naka Funada, Vice President of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and Diet member. The following day the Admiral attended a farewell review for JCS Chairman General George S. Brown at Andrews AFB and also the ceremony honoring the assumption of duties by the new CJCS General David C. Jones, USAF. He also met with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) David McGiffert that day. Admiral Weisner attended the CNO change of command at Annapolis MD on Saturday 1 July, traveled on 2 July to North Island Naval Air Station, CA for a meeting with VADM Robert P. Coogan, COMNAVAIRPAC and returned to Hawaii on 3 July.

(U) San Diego Trip, 25-30 July: The Admiral, accompanied by three key staff members, flew to San Diego CA on 25 July to meet with Secretary of Defense Brown, Korean Minister of National Defense Ro, and to attend plenary sessions as a delegate to the 11th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, held at the Naval Amphibious Base on Coronado. Other high level officials attending the meeting included the Korean Ambassador to the United States, the Korean CJCS, General Jones, Assistant Secretary Ross, Assistant Secretary McGiffert, and General Vessey. The Admiral stopped at Alameda Naval Air Station on 28 July to meet with VADM Inman and returned to Hawaii on Sunday 30 July.

(U) Mauna Kea Trip, 25-27 August: Admiral Weisner traveled to the Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on the island of Hawaii to attend sessions of the Eighth Pacific Conference Board—an organization formed to improve the quality and effectiveness of business leadership. He delivered a speech on how the presence of PACOM forces complements economic and diplomatic initiatives to preserve U.S. national interests in the Pacific and Asia to 50 business leaders from the Pacific area, the United States, and Canada on the 25th. He returned to Honolulu on Sunday 27 August.

(U) New Orleans, MacDill AFB Trip, 29 August-5 September: On this trip, Admiral Weisner was a principal speaker at the change of command ceremony for the Chief, Naval Reserves aboard the USS LEXINGTON on 1 September. He also traveled to MacDill AFB FL to meet with LT GEN John J. Burns, USAF, Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff, U.S. Readiness Command, receive briefings, and tour the base. After the Labor Day weekend the Admiral returned to Hawaii on 5 September.

(U) Japan, Korea Trip, 26 September-1 October: Admiral Weisner arrived at Yokota AB Japan on the 27th for briefings and discussions with the Commander,
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U.S. Forces Japan. On the following day, he was guest of honor at a reception at the Imperial Hotel. On the 29th the Admiral breakfasted with Ambassador Mansfield, held discussions with U.S. military officials, and met with the Japanese Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council. On the morning of 30 September, Admiral Weisner flew to Seoul, Korea where he met with the ROK CJCS and Minister of Defense. On Sunday 1 October the Admiral attended ROK Armed Forces Day ceremonies at Yoi-do Island, had lunch with Ambassador William H. Gleysteen, called on Korean Prime Minister Choe Kyu-ha and President Park Chung-hee, and attended a reception and dinner by Minister of Defense Ro before departing Korea for Hickam AFB.

(U) Knoxville, Norfolk, Carlisle Barracks, Pensacola, Offutt Trip, 3-15 November: Departing Hickam late on 3 November, Admiral Weisner traveled to McGhee-Tyson AFB near Knoxville TN. On Monday, 6 November, the Admiral had meetings with representatives of the Tennessee Press Association and the Knoxville Sentinel Editorial Board and traveled to Norfolk VA that afternoon. Early the following morning he met with Mr. Gunther Rosinus, prospective USICA Adviser to CINC PAC, and Admiral Harry D. Train, CINCLANT prior to addressing the 64th Armed Forces Staff College student body on the current situation in the Pacific-Asia-Indian Ocean areas. In the afternoon he traveled by helicopter to Carlisle Barracks PA where he delivered a similar address the following day to students of the Army War College. After returning to Langley AFB (Norfolk) the Admiral flew to NAS Pensacola FL where he spoke at the 10 November commissioning ceremony of the Aviation Cadets on the rise of Soviet military capabilities, the status and role of the U.S. Navy as related to national defense strategy, and the Cadets' future role as naval officers and leaders. On Monday 13 November the Admiral flew to Offutt AFB (Omaha) NE for the annual Unified Commanders' Conference on the 14th and 15th. During the conference Admiral Weisner provided a geopolitical-military assessment of the PACOM area and discussed defense matters with Secretary Brown and General Jones.

(U) Japan Trip, 25-27 November: Arriving at Yokota AB on 26 November Admiral Weisner held preparatory discussions with U.S. military officials and Ambassador Mansfield prior to attending the 17th U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Meeting on 27 November. The meeting was hosted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonoda and Minister of State for Defense Kanemaru at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The party returned to Hawaii the same date (date-line crossing).

(U) Washington DC Trip, 19-21 December: Following President Carter's announcement that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on 1 January 1979 and terminate the U.S.-Republic of China on Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 January 1980, Admiral Weisner and four principal staff members flew to Washington on 19-20 December
for briefings by senior military and civilian officials. On 21 December he participated in the initial meeting of the DOD Steering Group for Implementation of the U.S.-PRC Normalization Agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to inform attendees of inter-agency developments concerning the implementation of the normalization agreement; to identify and discuss those issues concerning implementation which required immediate attention; and to discuss and approve a proposed memorandum to the President outlining the initial steps that the DOD would take to implement his decision. The CINCPAC party returned to Hickam on the same day.

(U) Taiwan Trip, 26-29 December: Admiral Weisner traveled to Taipei as part of the U.S. Delegation to the ROC led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to establish a framework for non-official relations between the U.S. and the ROC after 1 January 1979. Other members of the delegation on the CINCPAC aircraft were Herbert Hansel, Legal Advisor from the State Department; Roger W. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia; Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs); W. Dean Moran, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce; Morton Smith, Director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the International Communications Agency; LT GEN Ernest J. Graves, USA, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency; RADM Arthur S. Moreau, USN, CINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance; Jack Cannon, State Department Public Affairs Advisor and Steven Oxman, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State. Upon arrival at Taipei late the evening of 27 December, large crowds of demonstrators blocked the party's motorcade and broke windows of several cars; however, no injuries were sustained. On Thursday the 28th the Admiral met with Admiral Soong Chang-chin, Chief of the General Staff, President Chiang Ching-kuo, and other U.S. and ROC officials. The plenary sessions on the 29th were brief and the party departed Taipei on the same day.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command,
Meetings with News Media Personnel, and Local Addresses during 1978

9-11 January - Senators Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Virginia), Sam Nunn (Georgia), and Dewey Barlett (Oklahoma), members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, visited Hawaii to initiate a broad survey of all forces under CINCPAC. Briefings and discussions were conducted by CINCPAC, his component commanders, and members of their staffs on such subjects as size, location, and type of forces; readiness capabilities of personnel and materiel; interface of joint training with allied forces; sea lines of communication; and contingency planning.

12 January - Vice Admiral Frank D. McMullen, Jr., USN, Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.
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13 January - Representative Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R-VA).

13 January - The Honorable Mike Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador to Japan met with Admiral Weisner and key Staff members.

14 January - Representative Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY), en route from Manila to Washington, met with Admiral Weisner, component commanders and principal CINCPAC Staff members to discuss the impact of planned withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

14 January - Mr. Ko Maruyama, Administrative Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency who was in Hawaii for the 10th session of the Subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee.

18 January - The Honorable Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).

20 January - Vice Admiral R. R. Monroe, USN, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency.

3 February - Dr. William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) met with the Chief of Staff and key Staff members for briefings en route to Korea.

9 February - LT GEN John H. Cushman, USA, CG I Corps (ROK/US) Group Korea (Departing).

10-20 February - High-level discussions on the proposals for withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea took place at CINCPAC headquarters. Admiral Weisner, General John W. Vessey, CINCUNC/COMUS Korea/CGEUSA, and members of the CINCPAC staff briefed General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The Secretary was accompanied from Washington by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Under Secretary of the Navy, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs). While in Hawaii Secretary Brown held a press conference at which he announced that for the first time Exercise TEAM SPIRIT 78 would be open to multi-national media coverage. He also addressed officer and enlisted personnel of the the CINCPAC staff.

18 February - Mr. Bernard Weintraub, Pentagon correspondent for the New York Times, interviewed Admiral Weisner, General Vessey, and component commanders concerning Korea withdrawal planning.
21 February - Virginia Biggins, military reporter for the Newport News Times-Herald, interviewed Admiral Weisner.

24 February - Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

2 March - Following a CINCPAC View briefing, Admiral Weisner held a question and answer session with four members of national new media: Ted Bell, Sacramento Bee; Bill Currie, Chicago Tribune; Robert Welsh, Cincinnati Enquirer; and Bob Miller, UPI.

3 March - MAJ GEN Jack Mackmull, USA, Commanding General J. F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance.

4 March - The Honorable Richard L. Sneider, Ambassador to Korea who was returning from Washington.

6 March - Deanne C. Siemer, General Counsel of the Department of Defense met with Admiral Weisner and addressed the PACOM Legal Conference.

9 March - The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense visited CINCPAC, accompanied by the Honorable Gerald P. Dinneen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence; the Chief of Staff Hq Marine Corps; the Director Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs).

10 March - The Honorable David T. Schneider, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh.

18 March - Dr. Robert J. Herman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence discussed communications problems in PACOM with Admiral Weisner and members of the CINCPAC and component staffs.

23 March - Mr. Richard C. Steadman and Admiral J. P. Weinl, USN (Ret), Head and Study Director, respectively, of a special OSD Study Group on the National Military Command Structure.

28 March - Admiral Weisner held a retirement ceremony at Camp Smith for MAJ GEN Norman W. Gourley, USMC, his Director for Operations.

29 March - General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff.
UNCLASSIFIED

3 April - The Honorable Kim Yong-shik, Korean Ambassador to the United States.

18 April - Admiral Weisner hosted a question and answer session for 40 USICA/DOD-sponsored news media following an unclassified briefing on the Pacific Command.

20 April - Admiral Weisner was interviewed by Peter Barnett, Australian TV, concerning the U.S. military in the Pacific.

20 April - VADM Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director, National Security Agency.


7 May - Eight members of the Tennessee Press Association were Admiral Weisner's guests at a luncheon and received briefings at CINCPAC and component headquarters prior to accompanying Admiral Weisner on a WESTPAC trip to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand from 9 to 20 May.

25 May - Discussions between Admiral Weisner and members of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin editorial board on PACOM issues.

26 May - VADM Willard P. Arentzen, Surgeon General of the Navy.

27 May - Admiral Weisner met with and held a dinner in honor of Admiral Sa-ngat Chaloyu RTN (Ret), Chairman, National Policy Council of Thailand.

30 May - BGEN YAACOB bin Mohamed Zain, Chief of Staff, Malaysian Ministry of Defense, called on the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN LeRoy Manor.

2 June - The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, incoming U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, called on Admiral Weisner, received the CINCPAC Command Briefing, and held discussions on Philippine base negotiations with members of CINCPAC, PACFLT, and PACAF staffs prior to proceeding to his new post in Manila.

6 June - The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Under Secretary of the Navy, called on the Chief of Staff.

12 June - Air Marshal Richard B. Bolt, Chief of the New Zealand Defence Staff.
15 June - Admiral Weisner spoke at the CINCPACAF change of command ceremony.

15 June - Mr. Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State (East Asia and Pacific Affairs) called on Admiral Weisner.

16 June - LT GEN Manor met informally with Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese K. T. Mara of Fiji upon his arrival in Honolulu.

20 June - The Honorable Armistead I. Selden, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand called on Admiral Weisner.

24 June - Admiral Weisner held an honors ceremony for His Excellency Shin Kanemaru, Japan's Minister of State for Defense, followed by briefings on the Pacific Command.

26 June - LT GEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency met with Admiral Weisner.

29 June - The Honorable Charles S. Whitehouse, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand met with the Chief of Staff.

30 June - Representative Lester L. Wolff (D-NY), 11 other Representatives plus 25 staff members and wives, who were en route to the People's Republic of China, stopped in Honolulu to conduct hearings on narcotics, receive PACOM briefings, and to visit the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL).

30 June - Admiral Weisner conducted a retirement ceremony for LT GEN LeRoy J. Manor, USAF, Chief of Staff at Camp Smith's Bordelon Field.

6 July - The Honorable Naka Funada, Vice President of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and Member of the Diet, met with Admiral Weisner and was his dinner guest. Mr. Funada, accompanied by the Secretary of the Japanese Diet, also received an orientation of P-3C aircraft at Barber's Point.

12 July - General T. R. Milton, USAF (Ret), held background discussions with Admiral Weisner for future articles on Pacific defenses and airlift for Air Force Magazine.

14 July - The Honorable William H. Gleysteen, Jr., incoming U.S. Ambassador to Korea, received briefings by Admiral Weisner and other principal staff members enroute to his new assignment.
14 July - The Chief of the Australian Naval Staff, VADM Anthony M. Synnott, called on Admiral Weisner.

16 July - Admiral Weisner met informally with Korean Minister of National Defense Ro Jae-hyun as he transited Honolulu.

18 July - Admiral Weisner addressed members of the Honolulu Rotary Club at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

18 July - The Honorable Edward E. Masters, American Ambassador to Indonesia, met with Admiral Weisner and held discussions with key CINCPAC staff members.

18 July - The Right Honorable Brian E. Talboys, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand called on Admiral Weisner and was his guest at dinner the previous night.

23 July - General Vessey and General Kim Chong-hwan, Chairman of the ROK JCS, were met by the Chief of Staff at Hickam as they transited Hawaii.

24 July - The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, incoming U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.


2 August - General William G. Moore, Jr., USAF, Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command.


8 August - Admiral Weisner met with LT GEN Manor (USAF-Ret) and RADM McClendon (USN-Ret). The former was replacing the latter as the JCS Senior Military Adviser to the Philippine Base Negotiations.

9 August - Mr. J. Kenneth Fasick, Director of the GAO's International Division.

14 August - LT GEN Philip D. Shutler, USMC, Director for Operations of the Joint Staff, called on Admiral Weisner.

19 August - The Honorable Allan McCready, Minister of Defence, and Mr. John F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence for New Zealand were received by Admiral Weisner and were his guests for luncheon and golf.
19 August - Representative G. V. Montgomery (D-MS), accompanied by seven other Representatives, stopped in Honolulu en route to Vietnam and Laos where they were to receive remains of U.S. servicemen missing in action. While in Honolulu the party received update briefings on Southeast Asia at CINCPAC Hq and visited the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL). The delegation returned to Hawaii on 27 August and proceeded to CONUS on the 28th.

29 August - Admiral Soong Chang-Chih, Chief of the ROC General Staff, met with Admiral Weisner and was his guest at lunch and golf.

5 September - RADM Yves R. L. Leenhardt, Commander of Armed Forces of French Polynesia/Pacific Nuclear Experimentation Center, Tahiti.

18 September - General Donn A. Starry, USA, Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

20 September - The Honorable Peter R. Rosenblatt, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, met with Admiral Weisner as well as with Admiral Davis, CINCPACFLT and State of Hawaii officials.

21 September - Admiral Weisner spoke at the first Pacific Armies Management Seminar at the Hilton Hawaiian Village.

23 September - The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines met with Admiral Weisner and attended discussions with component commanders and key CINCPAC staff members.

25 September - MAJ GEN Winston W. L. Choo, Chief of the General Staff, Republic of Singapore Armed Forces, called on Admiral Weisner and component command representatives and received briefings and tours at key military installations on Oahu.

2 October - Perry Fliakas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing).

4 October - Orr Kelly, Military Editor of U.S. News and World Report, interviewed Admiral Weisner.

6 October - The Honorable Leonard Unger, American Ambassador to the Republic of China attended Staff discussions chaired by Admiral Weisner.

11 October - In a speech to the 52nd Annual Convention of the Propeller Club of the United States and the 1978 Merchant Marine Conference at the Sheraton Waikiki Hotel, Admiral Weisner reviewed the role of maritime trade
and commerce in pursuit of U.S. interests in the Pacific and Asia and the expansion of the Soviet merchant and naval fleets.

11 October - MAJ GEN Sven H. Torfgard, Chief, Swedish Delegation, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Korea (Dsg).

13 October - Sir Neil Cameron, Marshal of the Royal Air Force.

13 October - Admiral Jal Cursetji, Chief of Naval Staff, India.

17 October - Representative Charles W. Wilson (D-CA) met with Admiral Weisner and LT GEN Boswell, CINCPAC Chief of Staff.

18 October - Air Vice Marshal W.D.H.S.W. Goonetileke, Commander of the Sri Lankan Air Force.

19 October - MAJ GEN J. E. D. Perera, Commander of the Sri Lankan Army.

23 October - General Goro Takeda, Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self Defense Force, met with Admiral Weisner and LT GEN Boswell.

31 October - Admiral Mohammad Shariff, Chief of the Naval Staff, Pakistan.

1 November - General Richard H. Ellis, USAF, Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command/Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and members of the latter staff presented the annual SIOP briefings to Admiral Weisner and members of his staff.

9 November - The Honorable Ieremia Tabai, Chief Minister of the Gilbert Islands, called on the Chief of Staff.

9-10 November - Representative Melvin Price (D-IL), 11 other Representatives plus 25 staff members and wives, who were en route to Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, stopped in Honolulu and received CINCPAC briefings and met with the Chief of Staff.

9-11 November - Representative Joseph P. Addabbo (D-NY) led a delegation of nine Representatives plus 24 staff members and wives to Japan and the Philippines. During their stopover in Hawaii the group received PACOM briefings and members of the House Science and Technology Committee visited the NASA site on Kauai.
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10 November - Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Public Affairs) and (International Security Affairs), and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia and Pacific Affairs), met with component commanders and principal CINCPAC staff members at Barber's Point. The Secretary's party was returning from Korea where they had participated in the inauguration of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and discussions with Korean officials.

20 November - Representative George V. Montgomery (D-ME) was guest of honor at a Honolulu Navy League Luncheon at which Admiral Weisner received the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps Distinguished Service Award.

25 November - A Congressional delegation led by Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME) which included four Senators, five Representatives, and 14 staff members and wives, stopped in Honolulu upon their return from the PRC and received a PACOM operations and intelligence update briefing.

30 November - Admiral Weisner hosted the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board meeting 78-11. The Philippine delegation, led by General Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff of the Armed forces, included the military services chiefs: MAJ GEN Fortunato U. Abat (Army), MAJ GEN Samuel O. Sarmiento (Air Force), RADM Ernesto Ogbinar (Navy), and MAJ GEN Fidel V. Ramos (Constabulary).

1 December - Representative John M. Slack headed group of eight Representatives plus staff members and wives who stopped in Hawaii and received CINCPAC briefings en route from the PRC and the Philippines to Washington.

5 December - General Lew Byong Hion, Deputy Commander in Chief of the newly formed Combined Forces Command in Korea and the CFC Deputy for Operations.

5 December - LT GEN Osamu Kozake, Chief, J3 Division, JSO, Japan Defense Agency.

7 December - The Honorable Philip C. Habib, Diplomat in Residence at Stanford University (former U.S. Ambassador to Korea and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) held meetings and discussions with Admiral Weisner and General Lew concerning Korea.

8 December - The Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Secretary of the Navy.

11 December - Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE) called on Admiral Weisner and attended the Pearl Harbor Memorial Ceremony on 7 December.

UNCLASSIFIED

685
15 December - Mr. Minoru Tamba, Chief Security Division of the American Affairs Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the Chief of Staff.

18 December - Senator Harrison A. Williams (D-NJ), accompanied by four other Senators, ten staff members and wives, stopped in Honolulu en route to the PRC. The senators and three of their staff members were Admiral Weisner's guests at breakfast and received a CINCPAC briefing.

25 December - Prime Minister of Australia Malcolm Fraser was met by the Chief of Staff at Honolulu Airport as he transited Hawaii.
GLOSSARY

A

AAM
Air-to-Air Missile

AB
Air Base

ABNCP
Airborne Command Post

ADD
Agency for Defense Development (Korea)

ADP
Automatic Data Processing

AECA
Arms Export Control Act

AEW
Airborne Early Warning

AFB
Air Force Base

AFP
Armed Forces of the Philippines

AIF
Automated Installation Intelligence File

ANZUS
Australia, New Zealand, United States

APOD
Aerial Port of Departure

APOE
Aerial Port of Embarkation

ARIS
APOLLO Range Instrumented Ship

ARPA
Advanced Research Projects Agency

AS
Air Station

ASC
Automatic Switching Center; AUTODIN Switching Center

ASD(ISA)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

ASD MRA&L
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics

ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASW
Antisubmarine Warfare

ATTG
Automated Tactical Target Graphics

AUTODIN
Automatic Digital Network

AVGAS
Aviation Gasoline

AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System

B

BOM
By Other Means

C

CFC
Combined Forces Command

CG
Commanding General; Civil Guard; Consolidated Guidance

CHJUSMAG-K
Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea

CHMAAG
Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group

CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CIL  Central Identification Laboratory  
CINCCFC Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command  
CINCEUR Commander in Chief Europe  
CINCLANT Commander in Chief Atlantic  
CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific  
CINCPACAF Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces  
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet  
CINCPACREP PHIL CINCPAC Representative, Philippines  
CINCUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command  
CNO Chief of Naval Operations  
COMJTF Commander Joint Task Force  
COMMIDEASTFOR Commander Mid-East Forces  
COMSEC Communications Security  
COMUS Japan Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan  
COMUS Korea Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea  
COMUSNAVPHIL Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines  
COMUSTDC Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command  
CONPLAN Concept Plan (Operation Plan in concept format)  
CONUS Continental United States  
CPD Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)  
CPFL Contingency Planning Facilities List  

D  
DAO Defense Attache Office  
DAS Defense Audit Service; Defense Analysis System  
DASD/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
DAST Disaster Area Survey Team  
DCA-PAC Defense Communications Agency Pacific  
DDPG Draft Defense Policy Guidance  
DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition  
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs  
DFAA Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)  
DFR-PAC Defense Fuel Region, Pacific  
DFSC Defense Fuel Supply Center  
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency  
DLA Defense Logistics Agency  
DMZ Demilitarized Zone  
DNA Defense Nuclear Agency  
DOD Department of Defense  
DOE Department of Energy  
DOMSAT Domestic Satellite Communication System  
DPDR Defense Property Disposal Region  

UNCLASSIFIED

688
### A

- **DPQ**: Defense Planning Review Questionnaire
- **DPRK**: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
- **DRIS**: Defense Retail Interservice Support
- **DSAA**: Defense Security Assistance Agency
- **DSCS**: Defense Satellite Communications System

### B

- **ELINT**: Electronic Intelligence
- **EMI**: Electromagnetic Interference
- **EUSA**: Eighth U.S. Army
- **EX**: Exclusive (for)

### C

- **FAA**: Federal Aviation Administration; Foreign Assistance Appropriations; Foreign Assistance Act
- **FICPAC**: Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
- **FMS**: Foreign Military Sales; Field Maintenance Squadron
- **FMSCR**: Foreign Military Credit
- **FORSTAT**: Force Status & Identity (Report)
- **FOSIC**: Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center
- **FY**: Fiscal Year

### D

- **GAO**: General Accounting Office
- **GAPSAT**: GAPFILLER Satellite
- **GFE**: Gross Feasibility Estimator
- **GOA**: Government of Australia
- **GOB**: Ground order of Battle
- **GOI**: Government of India; Government of Indonesia
- **GOJ**: Government of Japan
- **GOP**: Government of Pakistan; Government of the Philippines
- **GOS**: Government of Singapore
- **GSL**: Government of Sri Lanka

### E

- **HANKAM**: Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
- **HUMINT**: Human Resources Intelligence
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I

ICA
Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network

IDHSC
International Military Education and Training Program

IMETP
International Telecommunications Satellite

IPAC
Intelligence Center Pacific

ISA
International Security Affairs; Interservice Support Agreement

I&W
Indications & Warning

J

JASDF
Japan Air Self-Defense Force

JCRC
Joint Casualty Resolution Center

JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

JDA
Japan Defense Agency

JFY
Japan Fiscal Year

JMSDF
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

JOPS
Joint Operation Planning System

JSCP
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOP
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

JSPD
Joint Strategic Planning Document

JSPDSA
Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis

JTB
Joint Transportation Board

JTCG-METCAL
Joint Technical Coordinating Group Metrology and Calibration

JUSMAGK
Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea

JUSMAGPHIL
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines

JUSMAGTHAI
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

L

LGB
Laser Guided Bomb

LOA
Letter of Offer/Acceptance

LOC
Line(s) of Communication

LORAN
Long Range Navigation

LRC
Logistics Readiness Center

M

MAAG
Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC
Military Airlift Command; Military Armistice Commission

UNCLASSIFIED

690
### UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>Military Bases Agreement</td>
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<td>MCEB</td>
<td>Military Communication-Electronics Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Mutual Defense Board</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Office</td>
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</tr>
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<td>MEECN</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Military Equipment Requirements List (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
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<td>Military Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<td>Military Assistance Program Order Amendment; Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>Mobile Support Team; Mutual Security Treaty</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>Non-Appropriated Funds; Naval Air Facility; Numbered Air Force</td>
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<td>NAMRU</td>
<td>Naval Medical Research Unit</td>
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<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVCAMSEASTPAC</td>
<td>Naval Communication Area Master Station Eastern Pacific</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Disclosure Policy</td>
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<td>NEACP</td>
<td>National Emergency Airborne Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOFORN</td>
<td>Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency; National Security Advisor</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>Naval Supply Center; National Security Council</td>
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<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>Operation Plan Package Appraisal</td>
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SOFA
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Status of Forces Agreement
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Strike Study Group (Korea)

I

TAC
TACAMO
TACAN
TAG
TASS
TCC
TDC
TOA
TOW
TPFDD
TPFDL
TTPI

Tactical; Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air
Control
Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio
Broadcasting
Tactical Air Navigation
Target Actions Group
Tactical Air Support Squadron; Towed Array Sensor System
Telecommunications Center; Troop Contributing Country
Taiwan Defense Command
Total Obligation Authority; Transportation Operating
Agency
Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-Command (Link
Guided Missile)
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
Time-Phased Force Deployment List
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

U

UCP
UN
UNC
USACSG
USAF
USARJ
USARPAC
USDAO
USDLG
USFC
USFJ
USFK
USMC
USN
USSR
USTDC

Unified Command Plan
United Nations
United Nations Command
U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army, Japan
U.S. Army Pacific
U.S. Defense Attache Office
U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
U.S. Facilities Commander
U.S. Forces, Japan
U.S. Forces, Korea
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Navy
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S. Taiwan Defense Command

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693
VLF

Very Low Frequency

WESTCOM
WESTPAC
WIN
WRM
WRSA
WWMCCS

Western Command (U.S. Army)
Western Pacific
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
War Reserve Materiel
War Reserve Stocks for Allies
World-Wide Military Command and Control System
Calibration Consolidations, 270-273
CAPTIVE LIGHTNING V, 242
Casualty Resolution. See Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Central Identification Laboratory. See Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Ceylon. See Sri Lanka
China, People's Republic of
recognition of, 114, 587, 588
threat
to South Korea, 109, 110
to Taiwan, 113, 114
China, Republic of (Taiwan)
exercises, 235-238
normalization, 114, 587, 588, 590
personnel phasedown in, 62-68
programmed depot maintenance (PDM), 290-292
PRC threat, 113, 114
Security Assistance, 395-406
aircraft requirements, 397-401, 405, 406
cooperation programs, 397-401
LRORP Cameras, 400-403
tanks for, 404, 405
ship visits, 68, 208
U.S. Forces and bases, 62-68
U.S. ship visits, 68
War Reserve Materiel On, 288-290
CINCPAC
agreement with SACLANT, 179
Airborne Command Post, 43-46
Alternate Command Post, 325
Briefing, 597
Command Center, 40-43, 325, 359, 370, 371, 501, 504
diplomatic relationships, 589-592
distinguished visitors to, 677-686
Kunia facility, 325
official activities, 671-686
plans
5044, 261-264, 327, 520, 521
5025, 327
5047, 264, 265, 327, 521-523
5047, 327
GRAPHIC HAND, 172, 173
11st, 163-172
Report of Major Issues and Activities, 185-187
Speeches, 672-676, 682-684
Staff
  personnel changes, 15, 16
  threat assessment, 77, 78, 80, 89, 95-97, 109-112, 117, 119
  Trips, 671-677
Combined Federal Campaign, 497
Combined Forces Command. See Korea, Republic of, Combined Forces Command
Command and Control
  communications, computers, 327, 357-359, 365-367
  facilities, 40-43
Command relationships, 31-36, 37-40
Commanders' Conference, 21
Communications-Electronics
  AUTODIN Switching Center (ASC) Requirement, 335-340
  Command and Control, 325-327, 330, 331, 357-359
  COMMANDO LION, 342-345
  Message Traffic, 361-363, 368-371
  MEECN Reliability, 329, 330
  Project APACHE, 325-327
  satellites, 328-335
    ARIS, 330, 331
    CINCPAC Airborne Command Post Capabilities, 329, 330
    GAPFILLER, 329
    terminals, 331-335
  security, 247, 357-364
    Japan, 340-342
    Korea, 340-342
    Required Operational Capabilities 4 and 9, 357, 358
Conferences
  Chiefs of Mission, 590-592, 671
  Commanders', 21, 676
  Legal, 657, 658
  PASOLS, 377, 378
  Security Assistance, 378, 379
  Surface Shipping, 303, 304
Congressional Presentation Document, 379, 441, 471
Consolidated Guidance, 138-141, 551, 596, 597
Consolidated Guidance studies, 152-162
Construction
  Japan 337-340
Contracts
  Intelligence, 499, 502-506
COPE JADE CHARLIE, 218

697
COPE THUNDER, 218
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.S. Forces overseas. See specific countries
Cruise missile
  capabilities, 85-88
  planning, 367, 368, 524, 525
Customs programs, 495, 496

D
Defense Department organization studies, 25-31
Defense Policy Guidance, 142, 144
Diego Garcia
  POL Storage on, 281-284
Disaster relief, 248-256
DRIS
  Conference, 269
  Honshu Calibration Consolidation, 272, 273
  Manual, 270

E
EAGLE, 237, 238
Electronic intelligence, 515-517
ELITE TROOPER-78, 223, 224, 266, 267
Eniwetok, cleanup, 309
Ethiopia, 77, 97, 119
European Command, support to, 90, 91, 95
Exercises, 221-244. See also individual names of exercises
  Worldwide Scheduling Conference, 221

F
F-15 Aircraft to Japan, 189, 190
Facilities
  Japan, 312-324
  Korea, 57, 310-312
Fiji, 201, 202
FOOD CHAIN IX, 235, 236, 669
FORCE LIST-78, 226, 227
Foreign Assistance Act, 375, 376, 390, 444, 445
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
  Philippines. See Ch. X, Section III
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). See individual countries
FRIENDSHIP I, 238-240
GRAND LEGEND, 241

Guam
   Land Use Plan, 310

Homeporting, Korea, 53, 54
Human Rights
   Philippines, 604-608, 628, 635

Ignatius report, 25-31
India, Security Assistance, 406-411
Indian Ocean
   arms control, 192
   operations, 194-197
   Shipping protection agreement, 179
   Soviet influence and interest, 77, 93, 95-97, 119
   Surveillance, 196, 197, 540
Indonesia
   Security Assistance, 411-419
      aircraft, 411, 412-415, 417-419
      coproduction, 414
Intelligence
   Center Pacific facility, 505
   computer systems, 506-510, 515-519, 523-525, 530, 531, 536, 537
   Data Systems Center, 499-505
   ELINT, 515-517
   Exchange of, 539-543
   INDICOM, 539, 540
   National Disclosure Policy, 543
   Order of Battle data base, 508-510
   photographic reconnaissance, 511-514
   Korea, 514, 516, 517, 525-528, 543
   target
      data base, 519-529
      hardened, 521-523
      Indian Ocean, 528, 529
      Korea, 525-528
      materials, 530-534
      nuclear, 519-525

SECRET

699
Intelligence Data Handling System, 507
International Security Assistance Act, 375, 427, 440
Interservice Support, 269-274
IVORY ITEM, 222, 223

Japan
COMMANDO NEST, 189-190
Communications, 335-345, 347, 348, 372, 373
cost sharing, 313-320, 488, 489
defense cooperation, 313-320
economic importance, 664-665
housing, 315, 320, 322, 337-340
Labor cost sharing, 488, 489
Logistics study, 667
Okinawa petroleum distribution system, 285
Security Assistance 419-424
threat to, 111, 112
U.S. Forces organization, 37-40
Johnson-Ohira Agreement, 318-320
Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 257-259
Joint Operations Planning System
CONUS/Surface Movement Study 5027N, 264, 265
Revised 5001 Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), 261-264
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 151, 152
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. See Joint Strategic Planning Document
Joint Strategic Planning Document, 144-151

KEEN WIND, 669
Kenya, P-3 Operations, 217
Korea, North
aggression, 88-90, 101-109
tunnels, 88-90, 101-103
force capability, 104-109
targeting of, 521-523, 525-528
threat, 88-90, 101-109
Korea, Republic of
Agency for Defense Development, 427, 428, 430
analysis support, 670
Combined Forces Command, 55-61, 89, 232-235, 361-363
Combined Planning, 175-178
Command relationships, 55-61
Communications, 336, 337, 340-347, 360, 372
forces and basing, 47-53, 424
infiltration of, 103, 104
Logistics support, 286, 287
Sea lines of communication, 665-666
Security Assistance, 424-445
  aircraft for, 438-440
  fiscal year funds, 424, 425
  JUSMAG Manning, 440-445
  Local national employees, 489, 490
  missiles for, 429-435
  Submarines, 429-435
  tank improvement program, 436-438
Security Consultative Meeting, 427, 429, 430, 436, 441
Strike Study Group, 430-433
threat to, 88-90, 101-110
U.S. Forces and Basing, 47-53
U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Tactical Air Beddown, 311, 312
Withdrawal of ground forces, 47-53, 89, 90, 424
  Announcement of, 588, 592
  Offset measure, 53-55

L

LARK, 237, 238
Legal activities, 657, 658
Lines of Communication, 78-80, 84, 93, 97, 119
Local National Employees. See Personnel

M

Malaysia, Security Assistance, 446-449
MAP. See Security Assistance
Mariana Islands. See Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Marine Corps, deployments, basing, 180-183, 219, 220
Message processing, 361-363, 368-371
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Mid-East Force, 196, 197
Military Airlift Command, 299-302
Military Assistance Program. See Security Assistance and individual countries
Missing in Action. See Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Missiles, 292, 293, 382-384, 403-405, 408-411, 427, 429-435, 451, 458
Mine Storage, 313-315

SECRET

701
Munitions
  movement planning factors, 295
  PACOM Summary, 294

Naval Medical Research Unit-2, 68
New Zealand
  exercise, 243
  Nuclear-powered ship visits, 202-205
NIFTY NUGGET, 224, 225, 267, 268, 667, 668
North Korea, See Korea, North
Nuclear Plans, 519-525, 663-664
Nuclear-powered warship visits, 198-210. See also individual countries
  Nuclear weapon deployment, 190-192

Ohira View, 316, 318
Okhotsk operations, 198
Operations. See also individual names of operations
  Indian Ocean, 194-197
  P-3, 214-217, 244-246
  security, 247
  tests, 220
OPLANS, CINCPAC. See CINCPAC Plans
Order of Battle, Soviet Pacific Fleet, 98, 99

P
P-3 Maritime Air Patrol Operations, 214-217, 244-246
PACER DOT, 292
Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar, 377, 378
Pacific Command
  airlift, 299-302
  boundaries, 21-25
  command and control facilities, 40-43
  DRIS Conference, 269
  force readiness, 77, 78, 133-135, 193, 194
  Legal Conference, 657, 658
  personnel strengths, 1, 78
  Security Assistance Conference, 378, 379
  Surface Shipping Conference, 303, 304
  Watercraft Study, 304-306

SECRET

702
Pakistan, Security Assistance, 449-454
Perceptions of U.S. strength, 183-185
Persian Gulf Study, 666
Personnel
awards and decorations, 483, 495
Cost of Living Allowance, 484, 485
dependent schools, 496, 497
handicapped/disabled, 484
housing allowance, 493
Local National Employees, 492
GAO Study, 485-487
Japan, 486-489
Korea, 489, 490
Philippines, 490, 491
Taiwan, 491
strength, Taiwan, 62-68
training, 484
Upward Mobility Program, 483, 484
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL)
AVGAS, 278, 280
Diego Garcia Storage, 281-284
Issues in PACOM, 279, 280
Okinawa
Petroleum Distribution System, 285
Standard Bulk Petroleum Prices, 274-276
Storage Facilities, 276, 277, 281-284
Philippines, Republic of the
Bases, U.S.
Alternatives to, 603
Compensation for, 621-623, 628, 629, 635, 636, 648, 651-655
Negotiated areas, 609, 647, 648
Security, 641-646
Defense of, 349-351
Exercises, 238-240
Human Rights, 604-608, 628, 635
Insurgency, 605
Local National Employee Benefits, 490, 491
Military Bases Agreement, negotiations, 454, 456, 468, 469, 588, 609, 610, 612-655
Military Equipment Requirements List, 454, 456-458, 612, 613, 618-620, 623, 649, 650
Mutual Defense Board, 470, 610 611
Mutual Defense Treaty, 456
Property Disposal, 296, 297
Radar, 349-353, 611
Security Assistance, 454-465

R

Readiness of PACOM forces, 193, 194
Reconnaissance
Foreign ships, 213, 214

S

SACLANT-CINCPAC Agreement, 179 Satellite communications, 328-335 SALT, 84, 85, 86 SAND GROPER, 242-244 Search and Rescue Agreements, 246 SEA SIAM VII, 238-240 Sanno Hotel, 312, 313 SEASTRIKE, 529

SECRET

704
Secure voice communications, 357-364
Security Assistance. See also individual countries
    fiscal year funds, 385, 386, 424, 425
    IMET, 379, 380, 387, 390, 393, 406, 413, 457, 463-464, 471, 473
    International Security Assistance Act of, 375
    training, U.S. personnel, 380
Seychelles, 205, 206
Singapore
    Security Assistance, 465-471
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam, Socialist Republic of
Solomon Islands, 206, 207
Somalia, 96, 529
Soviet Union
    detente with, 82, 83
    non-military fleet, 667
    order of battle, Pacific Fleet, 98, 99
    recovery of USN crew, 244-246
    threat in Southeast Asia, 97, 100
    threat to United States, 77-88, 95-97
Sri Lanka, 207, 208, 248-256
    Security Assistance, 471-473
STEADFAST-78, 225
Steadman report, 25-31
Surveillance of foreign ships, 213, 214
Swing Strategy, 126-128, 136, 139, 142, 146, 151, 152-162, 187, 225

Taiwan. See China, Republic of
Targeting. See Intelligence Chapter
TEAM SPIRIT-78, 227-232, 511, 555, 556
Telephone notification exercise, 225
Thailand
    Legal support, 657
    Security Assistance, 473-481
Threat, Communist
    Communist Chinese threat, 109, 110
    North Korea, 88-90, 101-109
    Soviet Union, 77-88
    to Japan, 90-93
Tonga, 208
Transportation
    PACOM Surface Shipping Conference, 303, 304
    Thailand, MAC service to, 300, 301
Tropical Cyclone Conference, 248
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 70-75
  Civic Action Teams, 74, 75
  political status, 70-74
Tuvalu, 208, 209

ULCHI-FOCUS LENS-78, 232-235
Unified Command Plan, 21-25
United Nations Command, Rear, 61-62
United States
  Army command structure, 31-37
  Army, division orientation, 187-189
  forces and bases
    Korea, 47-61
U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union

Vietnam, Socialist Republic of
  border conflict, 588
  Soviet frigates delivered, 117, 118
  threat, 116-118
  treaty with Soviet Union, 117, 118
  visit to JCRC, 257, 258
Visitors to the command, 677-686

War Reserve Materiel (WRM), 288-290
  WRM on Taiwan, 288-290
  War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), 286
WESTCOM, 31-37
Western Samoa, 210

Yemen, South, 77, 96, 119, 529