NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** September 10, 1998 The following are complete transcripts of testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific September 10, by US Special Envoy Charles Kartman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt M. Campbell. The two officials discussed several aspects of US policy toward the DPRK, including the recently concluded US-DPRK talks in New York, the DPRK missile test, and the Agreed Framework. -------------------------------------------------- RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREA TESTIMONY BY SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE KOREAN PEACE PROCESS CHARLES KARTMAN BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC September 10, 1998 Senator Thomas, the last time I appeared before you was to seek confirmation as the U.S. Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Process. Subsequently, the Secretary also appointed me the U.S. Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, more commonly known as KEDO. I want to thank you again for your and the Committee's support. And I reiterate to you my intention to consult regularly with you as we proceed with North Korea. It has been a busy month since I assumed my duties. As you know, I returned from New York September 5, following two weeks of intensive negotiations with the North Koreans. Those negotiations resulted in commitments from the DPRK to take a number of steps toward resolving key U.S. concerns about North Korea's suspect underground construction, its August 31 launch of a new, longer-range missile, and its implementation of the Agreed Framework. Let me make clear that, in these as in past negotiations, the U.S. approach was one of seriousness with respect to the security risks at stake, coupled with deep skepticism. Let me be clear, we do not trust North Korean intentions. It remains indisputable that North Korea represents a major threat to peace and stability not only in northeast Asia, but also in other volatile areas in the region. We have no illusions about our dealings with North Korea. There are no assured outcomes. But I must underscore the significance of the commitments we just obtained in New York. They will facilitate our ability to deal squarely with the issues of great and immediate concern -- suspect underground construction and the North Korean missile program. It will also lead to the quick conclusion of the spent fuel canning -- thus dealing with an otherwise serious proliferation risk. The understanding we have reached also will lead to a resumption of Four Party talks in the near future. We made clear in New York that the North Koreans need to satisfy our concerns about suspect construction in the DPRK. This is essential for the Agreed Framework. Reaching an agreement to deal with our concerns in this area is a top priority. Further talks on this issue, which we intend to continue in the coming weeks, will get into the details of clarifying DPRK activities to our satisfaction; clarification will have to include access to the site. We made it quite plain to the North Koreans that verbal assurances will not suffice. During our recent talks, in close consultation with our South Korean and Japanese allies, we put the North's missile program and alleged nuclear activities front and center, insisting that the DPRK address U.S. concerns in these areas. As a result, North Korea has agreed to resume missile talks October 1. During these upcoming negotiations we will seek to curtail North Korea's efforts to develop, deploy and sell long-range missiles. But, if there is anything more dangerous than a long-range missile, it is a long-range missile with a nuclear warhead. That is why we sought and obtained in New York a North Korean commitment to resume by mid-September, and to complete quickly and without interruption, the canning of their remaining spent nuclear fuel. This will put an end to their threat of recent months to reprocess this spent fuel. Finally, the North Koreans have agreed to convene a third round of Four Party peace talks by October. It is understood by all, including the North Koreans, that the participants must move on to practical business such as tension reduction. We remain convinced that firm and steadfast use of available channels is the best way to achieve the results we seek with respect to North Korea. This is the basic approach we used in New York, and it is one that proved to be of value during our negotiations of the Agreed Framework in Geneva. While we are hopeful that the resumption of the various talks agreed to in New York will result in concrete benefits, we also firmly believe that the Agreed Framework must continue to be the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the DPRK for some time to come. Though not perfect, the Agreed Framework is still the only viable alternative we have that has a chance to keep North Korea's nuclear activities in check and keep the North engaged on other matters. Without the Agreed Framework, North Korea would have produced a sizeable arsenal of weapons-grade plutonium by now. We have prevented that for close to four years, and we are committed to ensuring that the DPRK nuclear program remains frozen for the future. This is without doubt in the interest of the U.S. and our friends and allies in and beyond the region. We are clearly better off with the North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon frozen. To cite specifics: the nuclear facilities are under IAEA inspection; Pyongyang has agreed as a result of this past round of negotiations to can its remaining spent fuel; the DPRK is not reprocessing nuclear fuel. In other words, the compliance record for the existing facilities is good, and a dangerous program at Yongbyon is frozen and under inspection. We have made it crystal clear to the North Koreans that we expect them to continue to live up to these obligations under the Agreed Framework. In conclusion, what we seek in our present dealings with the DPRK is to avoid a return to the circumstances of 1993-94 when tensions between North Korea, its neighbors, the United States and the international community were dangerously high. We will continue to look for ways to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but we will also continue to be firm and deliberate with the North. With the proper support, we can go a long way toward eliminating North Korea's ability to threaten its neighbors and to export that threat to other parts of the world. There is no question that much depends on North Korean intentions. But, with the limited tools we have, I can assure you that we will press the North to take substantive steps to comply fully with its obligations; we will push to resolve questions about suspect underground construction; and we will persist in our efforts to eliminate the destabilizing nature of the North's missile program, including testing, deployment and exports of missiles. As we have explained on many occasions, however, this strategy will be best served if we are honoring our own commitments undertaken in the Agreed Framework, and specifically the provision of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK through KEDO. Mr. Chairman, this Administration has worked closely with Congress as a partner in our broader policy toward the North and will continue to do so. Together, along with our allies and friends, we can make a difference and do what we can to ensure that Koreans in both the North and South can live on a peaceful and secure Peninsula. ---------------------------------------------------------- STATEMENT BY DR. KURT M. CAMPBELL Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Asian and Pacific Affairs) HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Committee on Foreign Relations September 10, 1998 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to represent the Department of Defense in this hearing on U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. I would begin my statement by emphasizing that in a time of uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the 44-year old U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea serves as a bulwark against any forces that would seek to disturb the existing peace. The stability fostered by this close security relationship has benefited not only the U.S. and South Korea, but has also permitted much of the Asia-Pacific region to pursue economic growth and democratic development. In deterring aggression from an often unpredictable and highly militarized North Korea, the U.S. has helped create an environment in which Asian states could pursue a development course compatible with American values and beliefs. This is particularly true in the case of South Korea. As a result, the security alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea is more than a treaty commitment -- it is a close, mutually beneficial partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and free markets. Our alliance is an essential element of the strategy for achieving our long-standing security goal -- a non- nuclear, democratic, and peacefully reunified Korean Peninsula. Even after the North Korean threat passes, the U.S. will coordinate fully with the ROK to maintain a strong bilateral alliance in the interest of regional security. The need for a combined U.S.-ROK military command and force structure to protect our common values is more compelling than ever. Today the United States and South Korea confront twin security challenges on the Korean Peninsula -- deterrence of armed conflict and preparation for crises short of war. On the first challenge, North Korea's large conventional military forces continue to threaten the security of the Republic of Korea. Two-thirds of its 1.1 million military personnel are positioned within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone, with a substantial artillery force capable of striking Seoul with little advance notice. In addition, as North Korea demonstrated by its recent missile launch, it possesses missiles that not only range the entire Peninsula but reach far beyond it as well. The U.S. and ROK continue to focus their security cooperation on deterring the use of this military capability, whether in an all- out attack on South Korea or in a more limited military provocation. At the same time, deteriorating economic conditions within North Korea and a serious food shortage rooted in the structural failure of the North's agricultural management system raise questions about future developments in the North. In this setting, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. and ROK not to consult closely and be prepared for a range of contingencies that could occur on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean state and its security apparatus still exercise absolute control over their country and show no sign of loosening their grip. But the U.S. and ROK cannot ignore the possibility, given the trajectory of North Korean domestic developments, that potentially destabilizing conditions could arise in the North in the form of famine, massive refugee flows, or other disturbing scenarios. The U.S. and ROK would seek to address such situations in a way that was least disruptive to regional stability and to resolve them at the lowest level of tension possible. Without a close defense alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, we would not be able to respond effectively to these challenges to our security interests. It is also important in a time of transition and uncertainty that we give no signals to North Korea that the calculus of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, which has served us so well, is changing. We will continue to strongly counter any perception in Pyongyang that it can drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK on security issues. U.S.-ROK combined forces are well-equipped and prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. But maintaining capable and ready forces is a constant process. The U.S. is engaged in ongoing efforts to modernize its Peninsular force of about 37,000 military personnel with the latest military equipment. These measures have been complemented by ROK efforts to outfit its military with the most modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and fighter aircraft. The ROK commitment of resources to defense has been impressive, even during the current economic crisis. The ROK maintains 670,000 personnel in uniform and has pledged more than $1 billion in cost-sharing support for U.S. military forces on the Peninsula from 1996-1998. Our security objectives in Korea have been greatly aided by diplomatic breakthroughs during the past several years. In particular, the engagement process begun by the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which froze the North's nuclear program at Yongbyon and its destabilizing potential, has defused the most immediate source of tension and deflected what could have been a military confrontation with North Korea. With the agreement and our underlying security commitment, we have preserved stability on the Peninsula and created an opening to pursue the Four Party peace proposal and other issues of concern, such as missile proliferation and the recovery of Korean War remains. The Agreed Framework has also provided greater access to North Korea and some North-South contacts. At the same time, the Agreed Framework has been under stress as a result of irresponsible and provocative North Korean acts. We are determined to address these concerns with the DPRK and ensure its full compliance with the agreement. Permanent peace on the Peninsula will be accomplished only through diplomatic/political means, and the Agreed Framework and Four Party peace proposal begin that process by laying a groundwork for uncoerced reconciliation between South and North Korea. We must recognize, however, that these are only initial steps in a long and difficult course. Our desire for a long-term, stable peace on the Peninsula will not be realized overnight, but that reality does not diminish the value of current initiatives toward North Korea. The alternative could very well be direct conflict with the North, which would take a devastating toll in lives and resources. For this reason, it is important for the U.S. to back the Agreed Framework, and the international consortium that implements its provisions, with the resources that will permit it to succeed. Until North and South Korea find a peaceful solution to their differences, we remain committed to the terms of the 45-year old Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement and its mechanisms must remain until an appropriate arrangement supersedes them. Only South and North Korea can resolve the division of Korea; therefore, replacement of the Armistice by an appropriate agreement can come about only through direct dialogue between South and North Korea. The U.S., while addressing near-term security concerns, has worked hard to promote such a dialogue. ------------------------------------------------------ End text