From npr@igc.apc.org Mon Feb 12 17:52:55 1996 Return-Path: Received: from cdp.igc.apc.org by mail5 (8.6.12/Netcom) id RAA21457; Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:52:40 -0800 Received: from igc2.igc.apc.org (igc2.igc.apc.org [192.82.108.39]) by cdp.igc.apc.org (8.6.12/Revision: 1.214 ) with SMTP id RAA09580 for ; Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:51:44 -0800 Received: (from npr) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.11/Revision: 1.16 ) id RAA29697 for nautilus@netcom.com; Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:51:39 -0800 Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:51:39 -0800 From: Nautilus Institute Message-Id: <199602130151.RAA29697@igc2.igc.apc.org> To: nautilus@netcom.com Subject: USMilitary Status: O /* ---------- "US Military Survey on Korea" ---------- */ Korean Peninsula Security: A Survey of US Military Attitudes (Retired and Active Duty) Toward Korean Peninsula Issues Published in the Pacific Forum 5 January, 1996 The "Agreed Framework" reached in Geneva on October 21, 1994 between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) defused, at least temporarily, the immediate crisis on the Korean Peninsula. If all parties live up to the spirit and intent of the Agreement, it could also significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation on the Peninsula. However, even if this occurs -- and there is cause for some pessimism in this regard -- the Korean Peninsula will likely remain a potentially dangerous place. North Korea has one of the world's largest standing armies. Restraining its potential nuclear weapons capability will not eliminate this formidable conventional threat. And, since the Agreed Framework allows for a certain amount of ambiguity about past North Korean actions (and capabilities), the impact of a rudimentary nuclear capability on the overall military balance also needs to be assessed. The Pacific Forum CSIS remains concerned that the current preoccupation with the nuclear proliferation aspects of the problem has caused the broader issue of the military balance on the peninsula -- and the U.S. military's role in that equation -- to be overshawdowed. As a result, the Forum conducted a quick reaction survey to assess the views of a selected cross-section of former and some current U.S. military officers on the threat posed by North Korea and how the possession of a limited nuclear weapons capability in North Korean hands would affect this assessment. The survey also assessed the future role of (or requirement for) U.S. Korea-based forces, should the Geneva agreement be successfully implemented, while also seeking to identify confidence-building measures aimed at improving the security situation on the Peninsula. Over 70 retired and active duty military officers responded to the survey, providing thoughtful responses to a series of questions under five general headings. A brief summary of their views is provided here; a more detailed accounting is contained in a Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, Korean Peninsula Security in the Wake of the October 1994 Agreed Framework Between the U.S. and DPRK, which is available upon request. Reactions to the Agreed Framework: Reactions to the U.S.-DPRK agreement were almost equally divided between generally favorable and strongly opposed. Few, if any, respondents were strongly in favor of the Agreed Framework; most who expressed support provided a list of caveats or reservations. On the other hand, most of those with an unfavorable view seemed strongly opposed. Those respondents who had been retired ten or more years seemed considerably more inclined to view the Agreed Framework with suspicion. Most, but not all active duty respondents were generally supportive of the agreement; many cited pros and cons before concluding, on balance, that the Agreed Framework was a step in the right direction. The overwhelming majority of respondents felt that military viewpoints were not sufficiently considered in negotiating the Agreed Framework. While active duty respondents were more inclined to give negotiators the benefit of the doubt, most respondents were critical of the current Administration's lack of appreciation for the value of military input. The Military Balance on the Peninsula: When the DPRK's potential or suspected nuclear capability is set aside, the majority of respondents see either little or no change in recent years in the overall military balance on the Peninsula. Of those who perceive a change, more than two to one see the trends moving in favor of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Deteriorating economic and political conditions in the North and the South's increasing prosperity appear to be a greater factor in calculating the balance than specific conventional force improvements by either side. Few saw the current situation on the Peninsula as imminently dangerous. Nonetheless, there was great concern over the current size of the DPRK military and the apparent continued North Korean focus on military rather than economic or political development. Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Deterrence: The possession of even a few nuclear devices by North Korea was sufficient to increase the level of concern among most respondents and that concern increased as the number of warheads in DPRK hands increased. However, not one respondent predicted that the possession by North Korea of a modest arsenal (15 or more) warheads, even if combined with delivery systems capable of reaching Japan, would increase the likelihood of a North Korean-initiated attack. As long as the U.S. maintains its readiness and capability and clearly signals its resolve, North Korea should remain deterred from using any nuclear weapons at its disposal, given "the expectation that it will suffer a retaliatory (or even preemptive) strike should it use its weapons or make a sufficiently provocative threat of use." The military significance of 1-2 rudimentary devices was generally discounted, although many saw some potential political value in the possession of even a limited number. The military and political assessments did not change appreciably when the numbers increased to 5-15 devices, since "the possession of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear weapons are still two very different things." The addition of a missile delivery system that put U.S. bases in Japan at risk, while not changing opinions about the likelihood of use, did change the strategic calculus. At a minimum this would increase the need for theater missile defenses. At the extreme, it could prompt a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the region and/or justify preemptive strikes against missile and nuclear-related facilities in North Korea. North Korean possession of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems raised questions about possible reactions by its neighbors as well. The major fear, as echoed by many respondents, concerned "the ultimate pressure they place on Japan and Korea to develop an offsetting capability." Confidence Building Measures: By a better than two to one margin, retired respondents saw the utility in cautiously pursuing confidence building measures (CBMs), although many were unsure if the current DPRK regime would participate in good faith. Active duty respondents were even more supportive of CBMs but, like their retired colleagues, were not overly optimistic about near-term prospects for major breakthroughs. Those who did not support CBMs at this time were convinced that North Korea would not participate or would attempt to use the process to pursue ulterior goals. Several respondents underscored the need for North-South dialogue as a prerequisite or centerpiece of any CBM attempt while several others stressed the need for close U.S.-ROK consultation and cooperation in developing any CBM regimes. A few also stressed the importance of Chinese involvement. Improved ROK defense capabilities (especially in the area of missile defense) and improved intelligence collection were seen as generally non-threatening measures the ROK could take to reduce the likelihood of war without undermining broader CBM efforts. Future Role of U.S. Forces in Korea: The presence of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea is tied to the ROK-U.S. alliance and the overall security challenge, and not to the Agreed Framework per se. As a result, the overwhelming majority of respondents saw a continued need for U.S. forces on the Peninsula, even if the Agreed Framework is fully implemented. In fact, many saw this presence as necessary to guarantee full implementation and future compliance with the agreement. By a roughly five to one margin, most also envisioned some type of continued U.S. military presence even in the event of a North-South confederation." Most pointed out that their answer was scenario-dependent, but the predominant view was that a U.S. presence was important to "keep Pyongyang honest" and otherwise make the confederation work. Nonetheless, a number of respondents thought that force levels could be cautiously reduced under some confederation scenarios. A post-reunification U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula was favored by slightly less than half of those specifically addressing this question; the majority view was that a continued presence was either not necessary or not sustainable or both. Those who favored a post-reunification U.S. military presence normally cited broader U.S. regional security (and economic) interests and concerns. General Observations: While the Agreed Framework has several safeguards and milestones built in, there was wide-spread concern about North Korean compliance and the adequacy of (or U.S. willingness to apply) verification mechanisms. One respondent's assertion that "we gave concrete and costly concessions in return for promises to do something in the future" generally captures this mood. Clearly, the Administration needs to do a better job in informing an otherwise generally well-informed retired military public on the various protections built into the agreement. Demonstration of U.S. resolve was the recurring theme in responses to the deterrence question. DPRK nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems were seen as more politically than militarily relevant. Countering the psychological impact required clear political signals of continued U.S. resolve, backed up with improved defenses and other visible symbols of the U.S. commitment to the ROK. While confidence building measures seem worthwhile over the long term, the key to their success, in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of respondents, rested with a change in historically-demonstrated North Korean attitudes; a necessary but admittedly hard to measure prerequisite for future progress. The DPRK needs to demonstrate, by words and deeds, that it is committed to cooperation and peaceful reunification. A resumption of North-South dialogue, followed by other measured (and measurable) CBMs, seems the best way to start. The phrase that reappeared over and over again in regard to the future U.S. military role on the Peninsula was "careful assessment." Few thought that any future scenario, with the possible exception of a completely peaceful reunification, should automatically result in a total U.S. military withdrawal from Korea or Northeast Asia in general. "Close consultation" was also stressed, with both Seoul and Tokyo. Nonetheless, even among U.S. military officers fully committed to the defense of the ROK today, serious questions exist as to whether a post- reunification presence is justified or publicly supportable. This message should be sobering to those in the U.S. and Republic of Korea who anticipate or support a continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula after the South and North reunite. It is not too soon to begin devoting serious attention and analysis to this question. The Pacific Forum CSIS is grateful to The Rockefeller Foundation for its generous support for this project.