NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following is a transcript of a briefing held by a Senior US official (who was briefing on background, and thus was not identified) on the US- Japan Defense Talks held on September 24, 1997. According to the official, the new Defense Guidelines would clarify the role that Japan would play in assisting the US in a crisis as well as Japan’s level of involvement in UN Peace-Keeping Operations. 24 September 1997 TEXT: SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS BRIEF ON U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE TALKS (U.S.-Japan security goal is to make force unnecessary) (3600) New York -- The ultimate goal of the U.S.-Japan security and political relationship is to shape the political environment in such ways that the use of force is actually not necessary, according to a senior U.S. official. In a background briefing for reporters September 23, the official noted, however, that the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines go much further and try to specify three particular kinds of areas in which the United States and Japan could conceivably cooperate together. "Perhaps 80 to 90 percent of the Defense Guidelines are assurances that the government of the United States is seeking from the government of Japan in terms of how the United States and Japan would work together in a crisis. Specifically, those areas in which Japan would provide support, use of facilities, other kinds of things that would allow the United States to conduct its mission more effectively -- that's number one," the official said. "Number two," the official said, "we've also tried to articulate clear areas where Japan can assist the United States in a crisis in areas that do not violate its constitution. And those are specified very clearly in the document. We're talking about situations such as mine sweeping in international waters, enhanced surveillance operations, the potential for intercepting contraband on the high seas, and also dealing with the evacuation of refugees. Those of specific missions that the United States and Japan have identified that are both valuable to the United States and also can be conducted without violating the Japanese constitution." The third and final area, the official said, is that Japan increase its participation in United Nations operations and peacekeeping situations. "We've seen Japanese involvement in Cambodia, in Goma, in Zaire. Currently Japanese troops are serving on the Golan Heights and also in Mozambique," the official said. These are small scale activities but they indicate Japan's desire to be a responsible member and player in the UN arena. And the United States wants to take steps -- when Japan decides it's in its interest -- to support these operations that the United States will support Japan, either with the provision of assistance, information or intelligence to allow those operations to move forward on the ground." Following is the transcript of the briefing: (begin transcript) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both sets of ministers and the secretaries started with good statements. We'd be happy to take any questions you have. Any questions? Q: Can you tell us anything more about the comprehensive planning mechanism, the bilateral coordination? Is this going to be a permanent body, an actual building or place that it's located or -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, we will -- I think as my colleague indicated in our private meeting before -- we believe that this is an important process today -- an important first step, but that the next steps are as important and that we will need to keep up the momentum. The next step in this process will be a meeting at the working level, among the people who think about the mechanisms of the U.S.-Japan political and security relationship. And at that time, we will begin to sit down and think about the appropriate institutions that are necessary in order to ensure that the Defense Guidelines become a reality. Some of those things that we might look at would be some kind of comprehensive planning mechanism which would allow for more in-depth coordination and cooperation among our military officials, both in Japan, U.S. forces Japan, CINCPAC, and also Japanese self-defense forces. Furthermore, we will look and consider the possibility of some sort of joint, consultative or crisis coordination center, which the United States and Japan potentially would man in the event of a crisis, to allow further coordination between the two sides. Those, pits the mechanisms that are already in place that allow for very close coordination and cooperation between the United States and Japan, we think will allow the Defense Guidelines to move ahead. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't have much to add to that, except to say that our concentration up until now has been on producing defense guideline, and now that we've done that, we can begin to work on the implementing details. Q: Yes, I think we understand that this is supposed to be situational, not country specific, but in all due respect, the language of the hand- out we've been given really gives very little sense of just how things would operate. Can you give us any specificity at all? I mean, this says things -- make effort to prevent further deterioration of the situation while initiating -- I mean, this is basically gobbledy-gook, with all due respect. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I think you're -- there are a number of section of the Defense Guidelines. The section that you're referring to indicates how important it will be for the United States and Japan to take steps at an early stage in a crisis, diplomatically, to try to prevent that crisis from escalating. Clearly, the ultimate goal of the U.S.-Japan security and political relationship is to shape the environment, to shape the political environment in such ways that the use of force is actually not necessary, right? But the Defense Guidelines go much further and try to specify three particular kinds of areas in which the United States and Japan could conceivably cooperate together. About 90 percent -- perhaps 80 to 90 percent of the Defense Guidelines are assurances that the government of the United States is seeking from the government of Japan in terms of how the United States and Japan would work together in a crisis. Specifically, those areas in which Japan would provide support, use of facilities, other kinds of things that would allow the United States to conduct its mission more effectively -- that's number one. Number two, we've also tried to articulate clear areas where Japan can assist the United States in a crisis in areas that do not violate its constitution. And those are specified very clearly in the document. We're talking about situations such as mine sweeping in international waters, enhanced surveillance operations, the potential for intercepting contraband on the high seas, and also dealing with the evacuation of refugees. Those of specific missions that the United States and Japan have identified that are both valuable to the United States and also can be conducted without violating the Japanese constitution. And the third and final area is that Japan, as Secretary Cohen indicated, is increasingly participating in United Nations operations and peacekeeping situations. We've seen Japanese involvement in Cambodia, in Goma, in Zaire. Currently Japanese troops are serving on the Golan Heights and also in Mozambique. These are small scale activities but they indicate Japan's desire to be a responsible member and player in the UN arena. And the United States wants to take steps -- when Japan decides it's in its interest -- to support these operations that the United States will support Japan, either with the provision of assistance, information or intelligence to allow those operations to move forward on the ground. So, I think most of those issues are spelled out fairly clearly in the Defense Guidelines. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- I'm not sure I can turn gobbledy-gook into the kind of specificity you'd like but if you -- Q: I don't expect you to say that this tells how the two countries would plan -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If there was a situation developed future, you know, I mean, whether it's 15 miles off the coast of Japan or 1,500 miles of the coast of Japan -- if it's something that the Japanese are concerned about with regard to their peace and stability and it's something where we have shared interests to resolve that situation, then consultation will be conducted to see just what kind of cooperation will take place. And with regard to trying to plan for some of those things, as my colleague has mentioned, some of the areas where we probably will conduct more robust planning than we have in the past -- a lot of that will be in the area of logistic support; in the area of communications, cooperation, intelligence sharing and those sorts of broad categories of cooperation. Q: The Japanese Government is now planning to send some officials to China and South Korea and other surrounding countries to explain this final report of guidelines. Do you, on the United States side, have any plan to send the officials to those countries to explain this final version of them? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's actually a diplomatic question, and I'll let my colleague take that. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the initial step will be for both the Defense Department and the State Department in Washington to brief officials of the Japanese embassy -- of foreign embassies. That's step one. I think one of the things we have to consider is whether we would like to send -- whether it's necessary to send people to areas, or to countries in East Asia and the Pacific region. As you know, after the release of the interim report, my colleague and other officials from the United States Government did visit a number of countries, including China and Korea, and discussed the guidelines with them. So we'll just have to see. I would just say that we -- as you think about next steps, as my colleague has indicated -- as you think about next steps, the important thing to realize about Defense Guidelines is it takes on many planes. And the question that you asked for is the public, the open plane. And I think we both recognize that the fact that this process has been conducted in a transparent way has assisted in its understanding in places like South Korea and Southeast Asia. And I think we've begun to make some inroads in China. I myself will be in China in the next two weeks and I have planned to have discussion with my counterparts on these issues. I think Secretary Albright has indicated that tomorrow in her -- excuse me, this evening, in her meeting with the Chinese foreign minister, that this will be an issue of discussion. And I think you can imagine that the Japanese Government has indicated that they, too, will send officials to the region. I don't think that this is something that's going to stop. I think it's something that we're going to continue to brief on. And I have found that the more we make the process, our goals and ambitions clear, the more understanding that we're receiving in the region. Q: Is it clear from the Japanese side, who's going to participate in the planning -- actual, detailed planning? The reason I ask is there's always been a degree of sensitivity from the Japanese side as to how much leeway to give the uniformed people to conduct detailed planning without the presence of or the great degree of involvement by the civilian side. The U.S. doesn't seem to have that kind of sensitivity. So, who's going to participate from the Japanese side in this detailed planning? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As my colleague already said, we have a very robust -- set of robust plating mechanisms in place already that have served us well in the past and will continue to serve us well. The issue, really, is the requirement to broaden the representation within the Japanese equivalent of our interagency and I would have to characterize that as still work in progress. Those planning mechanisms, as my colleague said, will be developed in the immediate aftermath of the Defense Guidelines approval, which is the next couple of months. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And just to build on what my colleague said, it's not only a civil-military issue in Japan, it's a civil-civil issue between sort of federal or central agencies and local ones, I think, as described today in The Wall Street Journal. And so the issue of how Japan responds in a crisis is a very complex constitutional, political and operational matter. This is an important first step, but it is by no means the last step. And in fact, I think in many respects, our next several meetings will be as critical in terms of determining what's necessary as we go forward. Q: Today's new guidelines do not include any specific region or any other countries as an objective. Do you know, then, the very serious discussions inside the major camp whether it does include a specific region, particularly Taiwan Straits? Was there any discussion in today's two-plus-two meeting on this issue? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll take a first crack and then my colleague will perhaps follow up. Let me first say that the United States and Japan have very consistent policies in regard to the Taiwan Straits, and in regard to our larger engagement policy towards China. As both of our foreign ministers have said on numerous occasions, no two countries have a great interest in positively engaging China than the United States and Japan. And to the extent that China has benefited from the peace and stability that has been a consequence of the U.S.-Japan security partnership over the last 25 years, then they also have an interest of the maintenance of this relationship. We believe that the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act serve as the critical foundation of our diplomatic engagement between the United States, the PRC and Taiwan both the United States and Japan, as I indicated, have a one-China policy and we expect that the situation, the process of dialogue across the Taiwan Straits will be conducted peacefully. Let me also indicate that both the United States and Japan believe that the best possible next steps across the Taiwan Straits are for the beginning again -- the restart of the cross-Straits dialogue that would include both political and security matters; and that both Beijing and Taipei refrain from provocative actions that could unsettle the balance, and those provocative actions could either be military or diplomatic. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't have anything to add to that. Q: During your talks in this past one year, I'm sure you had a discussion about the collective security issue. Was there any -- what was that -- was there that kind of issue taking place? And what was the do you have the feeling that the Japanese side have some kind of evolution or some kind of change in the -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that really is a question for the Japanese side, I think. I mean, what I think is absolutely clear is that we have said that we -- the guidelines discussion took place within the framework of Japan's current constitution. Q: When you meet with the Chinese Contingency this afternoon -- the Chinese foreign minister -- I think the Secretary is expected to have a meeting with him. How are you proposing to mollify the Chinese Government's disappointment with the new alliance that was sort of applauded today by the two Secretaries? This is obviously going to come up, and what will you all -- how will you deal with this? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I just -- there was one of the questions that was asked at the press conference was, aren't these two process -- the process of diplomatic engagement between the United States and China and the process of revitalizing the U.S.-Japan security and political partnership -- aren't these two goals inconsistent? And the fact is that they are entirely consistent, and they actually support a long-term American strategy in the Asian-Pacific region. We believe that it is in our interests and in Japanese interests, as I indicated, that China play a strong, responsible role in the Asian- Pacific region. And we encourage that. We also want to underscore that the U.S.-Japan political and security relationship is not some new kid on the block. We have a long history behind us, and it is a history of promoting peace and stability. And that track record has been critical -- it's been critical for the United States; it's been critical for Japan. However, it's also been critical for other states in the region, including China. And what we are trying to do is to acknowledge that the security environment of the Cold War period has changed and that it's important for institutions to remain relevant. It must adapt, these institutions must adapt to new conditions. And that's exactly what the U.S.-Japan security and political partnership is trying to do -- respond to new challenges, new security challenges in the post-Cold War world. If we did not respond to those challenges, then this alliance that has been so valuable in the last 40 or 50 years, would lose relevance rather than gain it into the 21st century. Q: I guess what is happening then would be to convince or assure China that you're just refining something that's, like you said, that's been on the works for a number of years. You're not changing a policy or ganging up on China. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, I think one of the things that bears in this is the terms of reference that were issues last Summer, and that is we said that security treaty is what it is and remains what it is. So, I mean, it is on that basis. I mean, it's not a new alliance, it's a old alliance and we are working, as my colleague said, to update it. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I also think, as my colleague has underscored, both the United States and Japan, perhaps, are -- for both countries -- the highest order of importance over the next several months is for both countries to improve their relationships with China. Prime Minister Hashimoto acknowledged that when he was in Beijing that was a critical goal of Japanese foreign policy. And it's no secret that the United States government considers the upcoming summit, which -- and President Clinton -- of the most important kind of foreign policy event. We think, again, that both goals -- strong, engaged partnership with China alongside the long-standing strategic partnership between the United States and Japan -- is in everyone's interest. Indeed, we think for there to be overarching peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region that increasingly there has to be more lines of communication and more trust and transparency among the three great nations of the Asian- Pacific region -- the United States, Japan and China. Q: In answering the question on Taiwan, you didn't address specifically whether the issue -- whether Taiwan itself came up in the meeting today among the leaders. Can you talk a little bit about that and give us a flavor for it, if it in fact did? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what I described is almost precisely how both sides addressed the issue. Q: So, obviously Taiwan itself was discussed and then there was sort of a restatement of U.S. policy. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, no. In fact, we talked about China in terms of our mutual commitment to the three communiques, Taiwan's Relations Act -- in that regard, yes. Q: Concerning the section in the guidelines that discusses the enforcement of economic sanctions, it indicates that Japan could participate in accordance with UN resolutions. Now, does that mean that Japan can only participate under those circumstances? For example, just if China, for example, were to veto a UN resolution regarding economic sanctions, does that mean Japan could not participate? Concerning certain ships, I'm talking about. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me ask my colleague in a second to answer this, but let me make a very -- I think very general but important point about the Defense Guidelines. Defense guidelines allow for the bureaucrats and the officials of the two sides to generate options, to generate possibilities in terms of a variety of responses to crisis in the Asian-Pacific region. These then give political leadership in both countries options for how to respond. Our problems in the past have been that we have not had those options and that sometimes we have not been able to react as swiftly to the fast changing events of the Asian-Pacific region. This does not necessitate political decisions in either Washington or Tokyo. So the kind of question that you ask if very situational, and it's hard to judge what the consequence of that would be in advance. And also, I would just urge you that it's not the responsibility of the United States to make that kind of call. It's the responsibility of the government of Japan. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the only thing I add from our view of the world is, the answer is, it depends. And it depends on what the interests are, the concern, the threat, where's the situation coming from with regard to these sanctions you're talking about and is it in our mutual best interest to cooperate. And that's for Japan to determine -- Q: I guess I was asking you if, in the discussions, the Japanese side had explicitly, forcefully said to you, we can only participate in searching ships if there's a UN resolution that allows it. Did that message come through to you hard and clear? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Any other questions? Thank you very much. (end transcript) Return to Washington File home page