From npr@igc.apc.org Wed Feb 1 13:42:23 1995 Return-Path: Received: from mail.igc.apc.org by mail.netcom.com (8.6.9/Netcom) id NAA00297; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:42:11 -0800 Received: from igc2.igc.apc.org (igc2.igc.apc.org [192.82.108.39]) by mail.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.57 ) with SMTP id NAA07740 for ; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:42:48 -0800 Received: (from npr) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.7 ) id NAA07769 for nautilus@netcom.com; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:42:36 -0800 Date: Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:42:36 -0800 From: Nautilus Institute Message-Id: <199502012142.NAA07769@igc2.igc.apc.org> To: nautilus@netcom.com Subject: Selin (Energy) Status: O HEADLINE: TESTIMONY January 19, 1995 IVAN SELIN CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SENATE ENERGY NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT BODY: STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO THE FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM PRESENTED BY IVAN SELIN CHAIRMAN SUBMITTED: JANUARY 19, 1995 Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to provide views on the North Korean nuclear program from the perspective of the NRC. Nuclear safety, as you know, is our mandate -- I will focus my remarks on that area of expertise. FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 The U.S. has accumulated nearly 40 chronological and 2000 operating years ofreactor experience. We have concluded that, regardless of country, nuclear safety remains dependent on three critical elements: (1) technical excellence and operational safety, which are the prime responsibility of the operators but must be reinforced by tough- minded, independent regulators, (2) a sound economic climate over the long term, because a nuclear program must be sufficiently well supported to afford first- rate training programs and sustained investment in maintenance and equipment, and (3) solid organization and management, which includes high quality staffing,rigorous training, a strong safety culture, realistic goals, and responsible leadership. The NRC believes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) could develop and operate a safe light water reactor program if over the next 10 yearsit meets or makes substantial progress toward meeting the following three broad conditions. FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 (1) It must devote adequate resources to developing and empowering a strong,functionally independent regulatory organization to oversee the safety of its nuclear activities. (2) It must concentrate on hiring and intensively training a relatively large cadre of highly-competent safety personnel to operate and maintain its nuclear power plants. (3) And it must forge regional and international safety ties which enable itto interact with and learn from the experience and advice of others, so its reactor program is not run in isolation. A tall order certainly, but one that is feasible if the DPRK is determined to accomplish it; therefore, there is no compelling reason that civilian power safety concerns need become a critical obstacle to the successful implementationof the Framework Agreement. This judgement is based on the premise that the DPRK would proceed with a light water reactor program using the Republic of Korea's (ROK's) Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP) design. The NRC is very pleased that this will be the reactor destined to be installed in the DPRK; in fact, the NRC considers this the only practical approach. Although there are many safe designs FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 worldwide, the shared Korean language, culture, and physical proximity would facilitate tremendously and invaluably the exchange of all of the technical information which must accompany the design, construction, and operation phases of any nuclear power plant project. And the efficiencies achieved by adopting standardized reactor designs are enormous, allowing the DPRK program to benefit from the KSNP design and experience - another safety lesson learned. Furthermore, the NRC has cooperated extensively with the ROK in the development and enhancement of its safety and regulatory program which, as a result, incorporates and reflects much of the NRC's regulatory philosophy, practices, and procedures. Since it is likely the ROK will be called upon to export its regulatory expertise as the DPRK seeks to establish its own safety capability, the NRC could work through and with entities modelled extensively upon itself ifcalled upon to render safety advice or assistance. This would facilitate our response and interaction as well. The safe use of nuclear energy depends upon many factors: economic, scientific, industrial, institutional, and legal. One of the most important of these is the early establishment and fostering of a nuclear safety culture in which safety is accorded a high priority in the decision-making process and which is derived from fundamental principles which have international application. Subject to future guidance from the President and the Congress, the NRC stands ready to work bilaterally with the DPRK, as well as with our FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 regulatory counterparts in other countries and international organizations, to help.the DPRK build a safety culture from scratch that hopefully will assure thesoundest possible foundation for its nuclear power development and operation. The NRC has engaged in a formal program of technical information exchange and cooperation in nuclear regulation with numerous power reactor countries overthe last two decades, with the aim of enhancing the safety of nuclear power bothdomestically and worldwide. The last several years have witnessed a dramatic increase in our assistance efforts (as well as those of other western regulators) with the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as we have urged them to recognize, establish, and/or strengthen a nuclear safety culture based on a strong, independent regulator, in contrast to an approach driven primarily by unimpeded energy production. We have found three principlesto be essential to the establishment and operation of an effective regulator everywhere. We have no reason to believe they would not be equally applicable to the DPRK: (1) A strong and effective regulatory authority, to monitor and enforce highlevels of safety, must be based on a firm legal foundation. (2) The regulators must have the necessary resources to support a welltrained and adequately paid staff to perform on-site inspections, review FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 plants at all stages from design to decommissioning, analyze errors to improve future operations, and develop and maintain a confirmatory research capability. (3) Both the operators and the regulators must apply rigorous nuclear standards which cover all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. One such set of principles has been incorporated into the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which I will return later. In addition, a state, by national law or international commitment, must put into place legal and financial protection arrangements to provide adequate compensation for damages in the event of a nuclear accident, while setting appropriate limits on third party liability. Such protection holds both the nation and the nuclear power plant operators ultimately accountable for the safety of each plant, while assuring the public the right to redress any injury it might suffer as a result of negligence or improper operation. Although the DPRK undoubtedly has a number of decrees, statutes, or other legal instruments which provide the legal basis for its current program, these instruments should be carefully reviewed to determine whether they are adequate for the purpose of implementing the nuclear power program under consideration. And beyond the legal basis, I reiterate, it is vital that the DPRK develop and empower a strong, independent regulatory body which can oversee its light FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 water reactor program from its inception. We do not want the DPRK to become yetanother safety concern as it moves to operate western technology. Given the fact that the U.S. maintains the world's largest nuclear power program, with 108reactors currently in operation, the NRC has gained broad experience in both thelegislative and regulatory aspects of nuclear safety - experience which we, along with our regulatory counterparts from countries with advanced reactor programs, would share with the DPRK. In addition to scheduling detailed discussions with the DPRK on institutional and technical regulatory areas, wherewe would stress the importance of people and their work culture to nuclear safety and the necessity for openness in the regulatory process, the NRC could provide the DPRK with a "library" of fundamental regulatory documents to bolsterits regulatory program. We could also offer limited but vital regulatory training through on- the-job assignments within the NRC staff, hands-on attachments to our regional and resident inspector offices, and formal classes in reactor technology, inspection, health physics, and emergency preparedness atour dedicated safety training center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. All transportation and per them costs would be at the expense of the DPRK sponsoringagency, but the NRC would provide the actual training. Because of the nature ofthe Framework Agreement, particularly the direct involvement of other partners, the NRC would not expect the DPRK to pose a huge or immediate new demand on its resources. FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is pleased that the Executive Branch will actively pursue these safety interests from the outset of the OPRK reactor initiative. The NRC is now engaged in preparations to discuss with the DPRK thegeneral principles and elements required to assure the safety of civilian nuclear power plants. In addition to outlining the U.S. approach to nuclear regulation, we will be able to point to a clear international consensus on the key elements needed to assure a high level of safety at such facilities. This consensus was embodied in the International Convention on Nuclear Safety which was opened for signature last September in Vienna. Virtually all nations currently operating civil nuclear facilities have signed the Convention. We shall seek to persuade the DPRK that joining this important international instrument would not only reassure the world community about its intention to give priority to safety in its nascent nuclear program, but would provide a framework for developing its internal safety arrangements. It would also draw the DPRK into the Convention's peer review process for assessing compliance withthese basic international norms of nuclear safety. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you and the Committee may have.