NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK 
     *****   SPECIAL REPORT   ***** 

June 23, 1998

The following is the complete transcript of the June 19 briefing 
by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Stanley Roth.  Roth explained the reasons for US 
President Bill Clinton's upcoming trip to the PRC and answered 
questions on various aspects of US-PRC relations. 

-----------------------------------------------

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release June 19, 1998

REMARKS BY STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST 
ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Washington, D.C.

ROTH: Good afternoon. I gather you have already been briefed on 
the schedule at the NSC and Sandy Berger has walked you through 
the trip itself so I wasn't planning on doing that in terms of 
Xian, Beijing, Shanghai and ending up in Hong Kong. If there are 
any questions, feel free to ask about that.

I thought what I would do instead is provide an overview of what 
I think broadly defined what the three major objectives of the 
are and then after that open it up for questions. But I think 
that most people have tended to focus only on one objective, 
which is what you might call the deliverables, or the specific 
accomplishments of the summit, but I think there are two other 
very important pieces that I'd like to begin with because they 
set the context for the trip.

First, I think that one of the most important things that will 
transpire during the visit will be the continuation and expansion 
of the process of strategic dialogue that the President and Jiang 
Zemin really began during the prior state visit here last fall. 
What does this mean? I think this means that you're seeing a 
change in how the United States and China talk to each other. 
Instead of having discussions that are based primarily about 
problems in the bilateral relationship and focus almost 
exclusively on those issues, you're seeing more of a discussion 
that includes fair amounts of time about world issues that talks 
about how we see regions of the world, how they see regions of 
the world, trying to identify common interests, trying to 
identify places we can work together, and that this both deals 
with geopolitical issues -- specific places -- but it also deals 
with some of the new functional issues that have arisen closer to 
the top of the agenda in the post-Cold War period, like global 
warming and environmental issues.

And so what you have now, as I would say, it's a far more normal 
set of meetings -- more similar to the meetings between President 
Clinton and heads of other countries because it has a much 
broader base. The purpose of this is not, of course, merely to 
avoid tough discussions; there are plenty of tough discussions on 
the bilateral problems. But the purpose, I think, is to try to 
set a larger context for the relationship. It's the notion of two 
great powers that necessarily have to deal with each other. It's 
based on the premise that many global and regional problems are 
not going to be solved unless the United States and China can 
cooperate and, therefore, we have to talk about them.

Without belaboring the point, let me just give you two examples. 
One, of course, is North Korea. I can say this is -- I choose 
this issue because as the lead negotiator for the United States 
in the Four-Party Peace Talks in Geneva, it's rather near and 
dear to my heart. The interesting thing, I would say, is that I 
believe that as a result of the conversations that President 
Clinton and other senior American officials have had with the 
Government of China on North Korea, that we are extremely close 
in our policy positions. Indeed, I would suggest that I could 
practically have written the talking points for the Chinese 
delegation during the last round of the Four-Party Talks in 
Geneva; that their position was very similar to our own, meaning 
that they recognize and said repeatedly to the North Koreans that 
if there is going to be peace or tension reduction on the 
Peninsula, that it had to come about as the result of direct 
discussions between the two parties on the Peninsula itself. This 
is exactly the American position.

They also do not want to see a nuclear Korean Peninsula -- the 
position is the same as ours -- and they certainly don't want to 
see a conventional conflict which would have as great an 
implication for them, bordering North Korea, as it would have for 
us with our 37,000 troops there. So here's an area where I 
believe that we have been able to identify through discussions 
what our common interests are and start to coordinate policy. And 
we worked very closely -- I did, personally -- with the Chinese 
head of delegation in Geneva.

A more recent and higher level example, I believe, is south Asia. 
We saw at the special meeting that the Perm Five held in Geneva 
recently, a few weeks ago, in response to the nuclear testing by 
India and then Pakistan, again, very close policy coordination 
between the United States and the PRC. There was an excellent 
working relationship between Foreign Minister Tang and Secretary 
Albright at that meeting, but just as importantly, it wasn't only 
atmospherics, there was very close substantive positions between 
our two countries that, in fact, you saw the Chinese talking 
about almost exactly the same agenda as our own. They wanted to 
see adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban and the commitment to 
no more tests; they opposed letting either country into the NPT 
as agreed nuclear powers; they were for a cutoff of fissile 
materials; they were for serious discussions between the parties 
in order to try to reduce tensions on the Peninsula.

And again, this is an area where through prolonged discussions 
with the Chinese on the part of the President, Secretary 
Albright, NSC Advisor Sandy Berger, I think we have really made 
major progress in how we can -- how we view this region of the 
world and how we can work together. So I would expect that during 
this trip there will be quite a bit of discussion about global 
issues, about regional issues, and about some of the functional 
issues in an effort to try to expand the number of areas where we 
can cooperate like this.

A second objective, and one which I believe has particularly been 
emphasized by President Clinton, is to give the American people a 
better understanding of China and what is happening in China. I 
believe that we in the administration have a sense that China is 
changing and that, in effect, you might say that to some extent 
there has been a demonization of China in the United States 
because of the large number of problems and issue areas that we 
have with them, and sometimes the big picture of what is going on 
in China itself is not as obvious. And I think by taking a 
lengthy trip going to a number of different cities and locations, 
highlighting different aspects of Chinese life and society, the 
President hopes that the American public will have an opportunity 
to become much better educated about what is happening in China -
- to see that there is a great deal of discourse in China now 
about the rule of law; that there is some excitement about 
village elections; that they're starting to think about 
environmental problems. Of course the staggering economic 
progress that has been made and out of this, I think, better 
known to the American people, but to make that more visual, what 
that means as you get a more prosperous, developing China. So I 
think that one of the purposes is -- I guess you could call it 
the human side -- to try to give the American people just a 
better sense of what China is all about.

And then the third piece -- to come back to where I started, of 
course -- is the accomplishments, or to use that horrible 
Washington word, deliverables. And I think here, we intend to 
continue with what was begun during the previous summit, which is 
working in all the different nine baskets that we discussed the 
last time, to try to come up with specific accomplishments. If 
you'll recall, our purpose was to try to broaden the number of 
issues on which we talked to the Chinese government about and to 
increase the number of interlocutors with whom we talked to the 
Chinese about these issues. So not just to have the kind of 
traditional foreign policy set of issues, but to work on a range 
of issues, and so we have baskets like rule of law, law 
enforcement, military to military relationship and the like, and 
we are pursuing all of those and I believe we'll have 
accomplishments -- deliverables -- in a number of areas.

But in terms of priorities, I think Sandy Berger actually laid 
them out in his press backgrounder the other day, but obviously 
they include non-proliferation. We believe we have made 
significant progress at the last summit, particularly with 
respect to the sale of cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles 
to Iran where the Chinese agreed not to sell it. We believe we've 
made significant progress on the nuclear side with China's 
commitment not to help the Iranian nuclear program and we've made 
some progress on control of nuclear-related exports, dual-use 
equipment, which has been codified since the summit. And this 
time around, we hope to make additional progress on other non-
proliferation issues including missiles, chemical weapons, 
biological weapons.

A second piece, of course, is human rights which remains a very 
high priority. I think we are all aware of the progress that has 
taken place since the last summit -- the release of Wei 
Jingsheng, the release of Wang Dan on medical parole to the 
United States. We've seen the signing of one of the one of the UN 
covenants and we've seen the intention on the part of China and 
its expressed intention to sign the political covenant as well in 
the near future. These are major breakthroughs on the process 
side that I think will make it easier in the future to pursue 
talks globally, not just between the United States and China, on 
human rights issues.

In addition to that, I expect the President will talk extensively 
about religious freedom. As you know, he met yesterday with the 
American delegation of religious leaders that had traveled 
earlier in the year to China and this is an issue that is 
certainly a priority on his mind. That delegation did get, of 
course, an hour meeting with Jiang Zemin. It was allowed to go to 
Tibet, including to visit a prison. I think that this is an area 
of dialogue that we want to continue and try to get some more 
results from that. And the issue of Tibet will, of course, also 
be discussed. The President raised it at some length the last 
time when President Jiang came here, and he will raise it again 
and the Chinese are aware of that. So human rights is another big 
priority item.

A third piece, of course, is the economic or commercial piece, 
and here Charlene Barshefsky is in Beijing as we speak. We are 
trying our best to get as big a market access agreement as we 
can. This would be a prelude, of course, or a necessary part or 
piece of a WTO accession agreement. And I can't prejudge the 
outcome of her talks, but we obviously attach high priority to 
getting this agreement because we believe this is the best way of 
dealing with China's large surplus, trade surplus, with the 
United States. For us it's a question not of the numbers but of 
access, the so-called level playing field, and a market access 
agreement could help us to deal with that problem.

Finally, a fourth high priority piece is one near and dear to the 
Vice President's heart. In particular, he's taken the lead 
although, of course, the rest of us as well, and that is energy 
and the environment. And I find this one of the most interesting 
baskets because I believe it's an example of one of most dramatic 
shifts in Chinese policy that I have personally witnessed in my 
dealings with them over the years. It was not that long ago -- I 
think you could even say perhaps as little as a year or two -- 
that any discussion with the Chinese government about the 
environment was rather unpleasant, that this was a western trap 
to try to keep China impoverished, that the United States and the 
rest of the west had developed by polluting the environment and 
then they cleaned it up afterwards, and why were we trying to 
change the way they did business.

Now I believe, partly as a result of the extensive conversations 
we've had with them on these issues and partly because of the 
obvious economic and medical costs of the environmental 
degradation that is occurring in large parts of China, China has 
really started to engage quite seriously on the question of the 
environment. And this is an area where we should be able to work 
together, given the particular advantage we have in terms of 
clean technology and more sophisticated technology in the 
environmental area.

On the energy side as well, we've seen a dramatic change. China 
is now, of course, an energy importer and this is a huge 
difference in the equation. As a result of its phenomenal 
economic growth, it has now become an importer and this means 
that it has much more interest in acquiring sources of energy. As 
you saw the last time, we approved the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy agreement and we'd like to move forward on that. Also, 
there are other opportunities for progress in the energy field 
and we hope to make some concrete progress there as well.

Why don't I stop at that point and open it up for questions.

Q: On the Pakistan issue, what specifically are you trying to get 
from the Chinese in terms of Pakistan? I mean, clearly they were 
part of the statement in Geneva which said, you know, no 
cooperation with those programs. But my understanding is that 
there is some effort by the US to try to get a specific statement 
out of China on this issue. Can you talk about that?

ROTH: Well, I think that what we want, in a sense, is more of the 
same. What we're interested in is keeping up the international 
pressure on both parties to begin serious discussions with each 
other concerning the subcontinent region and trying to reduce 
tensions on the subcontinent, and that necessarily involves a 
discussion of Kashmir, amongst other issues. And we want China's 
support for that as well.

I think, basically, it is the nuclear piece plus it's the 
dimension of the no further tests, the fissile materials, 
Comprehensive Test Ban, but also then the idea of trying to 
diminish tensions in the subcontinent through dialogue. And there 
Chinese support can be very influential, particularly given their 
special relationship, as they see it, with Pakistan.

Q:  Will there be a statement on Pakistan though?

ROTH: Well, we don't envision this time having a joint statement 
the way we did at the last summit. I think that is more a 
reflection of the fact that we expect summits to occur with some 
regularity and you can't have a major joint statement each time 
you meet. It creates a set of expectations that's not real, so I 
wouldn't attach a great deal of policy significance. But the 
question of whether we have something to say singularly or 
individually or whatever, is still something we're talking about.

Q:  You didn't mention Taiwan.  Will that come up?

ROTH: Well, of course, Taiwan will come up. It always comes up in 
every meeting at any senior level with the Chinese. But the 
question is, I think from our perspective, simply a reiteration 
of policy. We do not expect any new initiatives vis-…-vis Taiwan.

Q: Some people in Taiwan are worried that there will be a fourth 
communiqu‚ or a fourth joint statement.

ROTH: I've said it repeatedly publicly -- let me say it again 
here -- there will not be a fourth communiqu‚ at the summit.

Q: Mr. Roth, regarding India and India's -- this nationalist 
government's view, especially Mr. Fernandes' view and statements 
about China being the potential threat to India, if not at 
present at least in the future, and specifically with regard to 
the improvement of air bases in Tibet and allegedly the storage 
of nuclear weapons in Tibet, the proliferation and help of 
Pakistan and some other actions that India views as hostile, 
could you go back into this matter of how our policy parallels 
the Chinese? And could you specifically answer the issue of India 
developing its nuclear capacity to deter China?

ROTH: Well, in many ways you are getting outside my beat, which 
is not the subcontinent itself. My intersection is more when it 
intersects with China. I think that the way our policy parallels 
each other is obvious: China does not want to see a nuclear arms 
race, certainly does not want to see a nuclear exchange on a 
region that borders its own. And so I think that is a very 
obvious similarity of interests and it also is one that is quite 
a change from where they were, shall we say, 20 years ago. And 
this is a recognition, I think, that China has come very far 
along in its own thinking on nonproliferation generically from an 
avowed proliferator in the early 1980s to, basically, a member of 
almost all nonproliferation regimes as we get to the end of the 
1990s. And that is a huge change.

Similarly, I think that we have a parallel interest in terms of 
what we want to see happen on the subcontinent now in terms of 
all the things I just laid out: the Comprehensive Test Ban, 
fissile materials ban, talks to diffuse tensions on the 
subcontinent itself. I think we really are parallel there.

Q: Should we go to the Chinese and say, "The Indians are 
concerned about you militarily and your actions. Could you back 
off, perhaps, and perhaps cool this nuclear race down?"

ROTH: I think, first of all, I wouldn't want you to accept that 
everything that was said by the official you mentioned is 
accurate, so that we don't accept all the charges he made about 
Chinese behavior. Second, I would point out that it is not 
exactly a new phenomenon that China is a nuclear power. We're 
talking about something that happened in the 1960s, and that this 
is not a new element in the strategic equation and India, in 
fact, started its initial response in the 1970s.

So in that sense, this is not an issue that has just been 
discovered, and the question is why did this government choose to 
respond to it differently than all the previous governments since 
the early '70s. And I think that is the focus that one should 
have.

Q: Mr. Roth, on the matter of missiles, you said there might be 
some agreement on that. Is that going to be related to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime? Will China agree to adhere to 
something that's called, I guess, the annex that involves 
technology?

ROTH: We are still right in the middle of negotiations with the 
Chinese on a range of issues, including many of the 
nonproliferation issues, so I'm simply not in a position to tell 
you yet what they will or won't be. It's one of the issues we're 
working on.

Q:  So the prospects are -- it's possible?

ROTH:  It is possible.

Q:  What is?

ROTH: That there would be some agreement on nonproliferation 
issues.

Q: Would it be possible there will be some agreement on adherence 
to the MTCR annex?

ROTH:  It's possible.

Q: You have been emphasizing Chinese as cutting down criticism of 
the presence of US forces in the Asian region in these days, but 
I think the Chinese ambassador the other day said the nuclear 
umbrella over Japan is a kind of a threat to Chinese. How do you 
see these comments?

ROTH: I hadn't seen the comment but, clearly, I don't agree with 
it. I think it's very obvious that the American security 
relationship with Japan is defensive in nature. I think we have a 
track record of many decades demonstrating the validity of that 
proposition, and so I certainly wouldn't give any credence to 
that statement.

The comments that I have been referring to in my public 
statements were on the conventional side, that several years 
back, particularly right after the deployment of the carriers in 
March of '96, there was an offensive by a lot of Chinese think 
tanks, diplomats and others against the presence of American 
forward-deployed troops in the Asia Pacific region. And that has 
really been considerably pulled back and died down, and that was 
what I was trying to emphasize.

Q: To what extent do you think the economic difficulties of the 
region are going to intrude onto this visit, or do you think that 
your support for the yen in the last couple of days has put that 
aside from the table?

ROTH: Well, I'm not sure I would use the word "intrude." I think 
I would say that obviously the Asian financial crisis is going to 
be a topic of discussion, a serious topic of discussion during 
the visit, because it does affect China. It's both -- well, to be 
more broad, not only does it affect China, but how China responds 
affects a lot of others. And so I think it's pretty obvious that 
we need to talk about, one, the situation itself and how we see 
it progressing, and we want to talk about the significance of 
China maintaining its current policy, which is publicly 
reassuring the region that it will not devalue the RMB, which has 
been a stabilizing event. You saw the jitters last week when 
there was a suggestion that this might change and we want to 
reinforce the notion with Chinese leaders that their original 
policy is the correct one and the stabilizing one and one for 
which they've gotten enormous credit in the region.

At the same time, I assume they will have some questions about 
our intentions. We think that will be a lot easier discussion in 
light of what transpired over the last few days. There had been 
some criticism -- unfair, we think -- from Chinese leaders that 
we were not doing our piece to help maintain the value of the yen 
or that we were even responsible for its decline, which we 
totally reject. But now we don't have to fight over that, I 
think, in light of the intervention that took place, but I think 
we can talk about next steps in the future and the importance of 
both of us trying to coordinate policy to help Asia through this 
difficult period.

Q: Would you want another public reassurance from China that the 
renminbi, indeed, won't be devalued?

ROTH:  I think that would be very helpful for the entire region.

Q: Will the President be meeting with Xu Wenli or any other 
dissidents and, if so, in what context?

ROTH: At this point, I believe the schedule has already been 
announced and I don't believe we are going to have dissidents on 
the schedule.

Q:  Why not?

ROTH: I think that one of the main considerations, of course, is 
what would happen to people if you met with them and the 
possibility that what could result is exactly the opposite of 
what you want, instead of advancing the cause of freedom, 
democracy and human rights, you end up worsening it.

Q:  Could you explain why there won't be a -- 

ROTH: Let me just add on this point, I think that one has to draw 
a very clear distinction between the rather narrow issue of 
meeting with dissidents and the question of speaking one's mind 
on human rights, and I think it's absolutely clear that the 
President will speak his mind, just as he did during the previous 
visit, about human rights and what our differences are with the 
government. So this should, by no means, be interpreted as 
acquiescence into China's human rights policies whatsoever.

Q: Why won't there be a joint press conference between President 
Clinton and President Jiang, just like last October?

ROTH:  There will be.

Q:  The press availability is -- 

ROTH:  They'll be standing side by side.  That's pretty joint.

Q:  Will they answer questions?

ROTH:  They'll answer questions.

Q: Can I follow up on the dissident question, because 
historically American presidents -- I mean, it used to always be 
Russia that we were talking about -- usually went out of their 
way to try and meet some dissidents and usually took the view -- 
and it was usually found true -- that for dissidents to meet with 
a senior American was good for their safety, not bad for it. I'm 
just wondering why you think it would be dangerous for dissidents 
to meet with the President of the United States.

ROTH: I think we've had some precedents in China and I think 
there are many countries around the world where it has not been 
possible to meet with dissidents, so I'm not sure I would accept 
your characterization.

Q: Mr. Roth, two questions, first a brief one. After the issuance 
of the '82 August 17 communique, the US gave Taiwan six 
assurances. So my first question, do those six assurances remain 
valid?

ROTH: I think I've been as clear as I could be that there will be 
no change in US policy towards Taiwan as a result of this visit, 
and I think we demonstrated that at the previous summit and that 
will hold for this one as well.

Q: Following on your point that there will be no change in US 
policy toward Taiwan, I would like to ask you, yesterday when you 
testified on the Hill, in your testimony you said eventually in 
the end the security of Taiwan really depends on the two sides 
coming to terms on a political basis. And your colleague, Susan 
Shirk, said more or less the same thing three weeks ago when she 
appeared on the Hill.

So my question to you is, is this US kind of pushing Taiwan to 
come to the negotiating table with China to resolve the long-
standing problem? If that's the case, that will be contrary to 
one of those six assurances the US gave Taiwan.

ROTH: I think what it is is a reflection of what is patently 
obvious; that the security of Taiwan ultimately depends on the 
state of cross-Straits relations. This is not an issue that is 
going to be resolved militarily. It is going to have to be 
resolved, I think, by virtue of the relationship between both 
sides of the Straits. And I think that United States policy has 
been very clear. We have urged both sides to resume a cross-
Straits dialogue that they themselves had initiated several years 
ago and which had made some promising, gotten off to a promising 
start before it was disrupted in 1995. We have had many 
indications that that dialogue is going to be resumed this year 
at the high level, the Wang-Ku level, and we are very encouraged 
by that. We think that is the path that might lead ultimately to 
the most progress and most help to Taiwan's security.

Q:  That is quite different.  Can I -- 

ROTH:  Two is plenty.  Go ahead.

Q: In a more sort of philosophical note, do you think that the 
appointment of an Asian American to be John Shattuck's 
replacement will help you make your human rights case in China 
and throughout Asia?

ROTH: Actually, I don't think it will make any difference. I 
think John Shattuck has done a superb job in advocating the human 
rights interests of the United States. He has been active in 
virtually every region of the world. He has been in Europe and he 
has been in Africa. He has certainly been in Asia. And I think 
that to assume that you have to be of a certain ethnic group to 
have an impact was not a way I'd want to go. I think that I would 
expect his successor to do an equally good job globally, but I 
don't think I see any major conceptual change just by virtue of 
the appointment.

Q: I don't mean to disparage Mr. Shattuck, of course. I was just 
wondering on the other end it might be received --

ROTH:  It will make no difference whatsoever.

Q: Certainly you've heard those critics who have said 
specifically the release of Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, while 
promising steps, certainly do not speak to the thousands of 
people who are still in China's prisons. And your comment there, 
the fact that an American president is thinking twice and has 
decided not to meet with any members of the Chinese dissident 
community because of fears of what might happen to them as a 
result of that visit, what does that say about the condition of 
human rights in China today and what does this administration 
want to see from China for its next step, now that it has 
released the two most famous of all the dissidents?

ROTH: Well, I think, first of all, it says that there is a long 
way to go on human rights in China. That seems to me very 
obvious. We have been very clear that much as we appreciate the 
release of these two individuals on medical parole to the United 
States, that that doesn't check the box and get China off the 
hook on human rights issues; that there's a whole range of issues 
left. I tried to highlight at least four of them in my initial 
statement. We have made it very clear that there are many other 
dissidents. We have had conversations, including during Secretary 
Albright's trip, about the desirability of trying to get 
individuals who were imprisoned on counter-revolutionary charges 
released on the basis of reconsideration of the cases. We have 
raised a number of cases relating to religious freedom. I think 
we have been absolutely clear on that.

So by no means are we saying that we're satisfied just as a 
result of what's been achieved but, at the same time, find it 
hard to accept that there's been no progress. The fact that these 
two individuals are out here in the United States in good health 
is quite different from where we were six, eight months ago when 
there was enormous concern about their very lives.

Anyone that hasn't gone yet?  Okay, we'll start over.

Q: Can I ask you about the satellite reconsideration that we see 
reports of, the satellite sale? Is it being reconsidered, the 
initial preliminary approval for that sale to go ahead, and would 
you expect a decision on whether or not to approve it prior to 
the President's arrival there?

ROTH: I think Acting Under Secretary Holum and Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary Lodal spoke rather exhaustively yesterday -- 
seven hours worth, I think -- on satellite issues. My 
understanding of this case -- and I'm not the best expert in the 
government on it -- is that this is not a question of 
reconsidering the original sale but, rather, a request for an 
upgrade, and that the upgrade is being considered under normal 
procedures which involve review by the full inter-agency process 
which, of course, includes State Department, Defense, and the 
rest of the agencies of the US Government. And as Jamie Rubin 
indicated in his comments earlier, that sometimes takes some 
time. I can't give you a specific timetable for it.

Q: You don't know whether it will be completed in time for the 
President's visit?

ROTH:  No idea.

Q: Could we have an update on the President's wish to speak live 
to the Chinese people? Is there any update on that?

ROTH: That's the flip side of what I mentioned before, the 
President's desire to give the American people a better 
understanding of China. He would obviously like to give the 
Chinese people a better understanding of the United States, and 
one of the most effective ways to do that in a country as vast as 
China, despite the length of this trip and the number of cities 
he's going to, is obviously a minute percentage of the Chinese 
population that he'll be exposed to, is by being able to 
communicate directly through mass media. And so it is our hope 
that the Chinese will permit that. There are mixed precedents 
from previous presidential visits, but we think that China should 
have the confidence that its people can withstand any message 
that President Clinton will make, which of course will be done in 
a proper spirit, I think. He is a guest in a foreign country but 
he also wants to reflect the American message.

Q: Any discussion made regarding the recent announcement that 
North Korea has developed missiles for export to foreign 
countries?

ROTH: The issue of North Korean missile exports is not new. The 
only thing that was new was the very public fashion in which 
North Korea chose to announce that it wasn't planning to 
reconsider its policy. So in that sense, this is not something 
that's coming up for the first time, but I would think that the 
bigger picture of what happens on the Korean peninsula, how we 
proceed with the peace process, how we proceed in dealing with 
the humanitarian crisis, and preserving stability in the 
peninsula will certainly come up.

Q: Just a couple of points of clarification. So you haven't 
gotten the final word from the Chinese on the live broadcast, 
right?

ROTH:  Right.

Q: Okay. The other day, my recollection was that Berger had said 
that Clinton would meet dissidents, so this is a change?

ROTH:  Not that I'm aware of.

Q:  Not that you're aware of.  All right.  And on the MTCR -- 

ROTH: If it was, I misspoke. Berger would be the more 
authoritative.

Q: Okay. On the MTCR, the possibility of an MTCR agreement, now, 
the United States had offered to allow more satellite launches as 
part of that discussion. Presumably, that's still in the mix, 
right?

ROTH: I'm sorry, I'm still thinking about the previous one. Let 
me give you -- my understanding, what I recall Sandy saying, is 
that the President will have a range of meetings on his trip and 
during that trip he'll have opportunities to try to meet with 
people who reflect many aspects of Chinese society and the 
changes that are going on in Chinese society and, of course, it 
will not only be with government officials. And that is quite 
correct. But if you ask me in terms of people that you and I 
would talk of as dissidents, like Wang Dan or Wei Jingsheng, my 
impression is not. I will get you a clarification if one is 
needed, okay?

Q: And MTCR. The US offered that if China agrees to sign up to 
the annex that the United States would allow more satellite 
launches. This is still the offer that's out there, right? That's 
what's under discussion?

ROTH: We've had pretty extensive negotiations beyond the original 
offer, but I can't characterize them at this point because 
they're ongoing.

Q:  But that's still a component of it?

ROTH: It's moot. I mean, there has been additional wrinkles in 
the discussion, but it's just under consideration. I can't tell 
you what the final package might look like.

Q: Regarding confidence-building measures such as de-targeting of 
missiles, General Halliger of STRATCOM has been to six or seven 
different missile bases in Russia. The Russians have been to this 
country and it seems to be improving relations. Will you take 
that good news of opening the strategic forces on both sides to 
the Chinese and try to convince them to do the same, to de-target 
the US?

ROTH: Sure. This has been an area we have been interested going 
back to the previous summit and before, and one where we hope 
eventually to reach agreement with them.

Q: There was some kind of suggestion about the lifting of the 
economic sanction against China, including the lifting of the ban 
of the OPIC, Overseas Private Insurance Corp. What is going on on 
that packet?

ROTH: I think the question of sanctions relief largely relates to 
the overall results of the summit and the question of whether 
progress is made on a whole range of issues, including some of 
the issues for which the sanctions were imposed in the first 
place. So it's not an issue that can be considered in the 
abstract but, rather, it's a piece of the entire picture and will 
have to be decided as a result of the entire summit outcome.

Why don't we just take the last question.

Q: Could you address the comment you made about the demonization 
of China? Isn't a lot of that happening in Congress? And related 
to that, is the President planning to take any Congressional 
critics on his trip? I mean, maybe, I don't know, try to get some 
--

ROTH: Sure. Let me start with the latter point. The President had 
invited the Congress to appoint a bilateral delegation to 
accompany him, and so far only Democrats have accepted. But 
that's not something that was tried to be imposed from the 
administration side, and so that's really up to the Congress 
itself and that question should be addressed to the leadership, 
really, in the Congress.

I would not want to place the unfair burden on the Congress of 
saying that the majority of criticism of Chinese behavior in the 
US is limited to the Congress or even that that's the sole 
source. I think there has been no shortage of critics in the 
literature -- in some of the books that were published last year, 
some of the articles, many of the public statements -- and that 
is the nature of our process here, that there has been a lot of 
criticism. And what I am trying to suggest is that one hopes that 
we can show a different face of China that gives a broader 
picture. It doesn't mean that the problems don't exist, but one 
that shows that there are other facets of the relationship as 
well. And that is one of the purposes of the trip.

Thank you.

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