NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK 
*****   SPECIAL REPORT   *****

October 12, 1999

The following is the complete official transcript of remarks by 
former US Defense Secretary William Perry to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on 
October 12.  Perry presented his "Review of United States Policy 
Toward North Korea."

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Testimony before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

By Dr. William J. Perry Special Advisor to the President and the 
Secretary of State

October 12, 1999

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you 
and other Members of this Committee to discuss my review of U.S. 
policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I also want to express my thanks to President Clinton for the 
confidence he expressed in me when he requested that I take on 
this review.  I remember well the serious crisis in the summer of 
1994, when I was Secretary of Defense, over the North Korean 
nuclear program at Yongbyon.  That crisis raised the very real 
prospect of a horribly destructive war on the Korean Peninsula, a 
prospect averted by negotiation of an Agreed Framework freezing 
nuclear operations at Yongbyon.  I thus approached this 
assignment with a full awareness of its seriousness.

In early September I sent to the President a classified report of 
my recommendations and findings, which I understand was forwarded 
to the Hill the week of September 13th.  As you well know, this 
report took many months to prepare, and I want to convey my 
appreciation to Congress personally for its patience in what has 
been a difficult and complicated process.  Since you and other 
Members had a prominent role in the creation of this policy 
review, I am especially gratified to be here today to speak for 
the record about my review.

Circumstances Leading to the Review

Mr. Chairman, for more than 45 years since the end of the Korean 
War, the Korean Peninsula has had not peace, but an armed truce.  
The DPRK maintains an army of over a million men, most of whom 
are deployed near the border.  These forces are deterred by 
Republic of Korea and U.S. forces which are only half the size of 
North Korea's forces, but are well trained and equipped, and are 
backed up by the highly ready American forces in Japan, Hawaii, 
Alaska, and the West Coast of the United States.  As a 
consequence, deterrence is strong, and peace has been maintained 
on the Peninsula for the last four decades.

But five years ago, we narrowly avoided a military conflict with 
North Korea over its nuclear program.  The DPRK nuclear facility 
at Yongbyon was about to begin reprocessing nuclear fuel, which 
would have yielded enough plutonium to make about a half-dozen 
nuclear bombs.  We believed that the introduction of these 
nuclear weapons could upset the deterrence posture on the 
Peninsula, and we were within a day of imposing severe sanctions.

North Korea said that it would consider the imposition of these 
sanctions as an act of war.  Although some argued that this was 
only rhetoric, it could not be dismissed.  We therefore undertook 
a detailed review of our war contingency plan, and the U.S. began 
preparations for sizable reinforcements to our troops in the ROK.  
In the event of a war, we were confident of a clear allied 
victory, but not without high casualties on all sides.

Fortunately, that crisis was resolved not by war, but by a 
diplomatic agreement known as the Agreed Framework.  The 1994 
Agreed Framework provided for a freeze of nuclear facilities at 
and near Yongbyon, to be followed in time by the dismantlement of 
those facilities.  Today those nuclear facilities remain frozen.  
That result is critical for security on the Peninsula, since 
during the last five years those facilities could have produced 
enough plutonium to make a substantial number of nuclear weapons.  
The dismantlement of those nuclear facilities awaits construction 
of less proliferation-prone light water reactors called for in 
the Agreed Framework, and completion of that construction is 
still several years away.

About a year ago we appeared to be headed for another crisis like 
the one in 1994.  U.S. intelligence had reported the construction 
of an underground site at Kumchangni, North Korea, which was 
believed to be large enough to house a reactor and a reprocessing 
facility.*  Additionally, the DPRK was pursuing the development 
of two longer-range missiles, the Taepo Dong I and Taepo Dong 2, 
which would add to an existing No Dong ballistic missile arsenal 
capable of reaching all of Japan.  The Taepo Dong I and Taepo 
Dong 2, which could reach targets in parts of the United States, 
as well as Japan, aroused major concern in both countries, 
because it was believed that these missiles could have warheads 
employing weapons of mass destruction.

This concern came to a head a year ago, when North Korea flew a 
Taepo Dong I over Japan in a failed attempt to launch a 
satellite.  This test firing provoked a strong reaction both in 
the U.S. and Japan, and led to calls for a termination of the 
funding which supported the Agreed Framework.  But if the Agreed 
Framework were to be aborted, there is no doubt that the DPRK 
would respond with a reopening of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.  
And this in turn would put North Korea in the position of 
producing the plutonium that would eventually allow them to 
weaponize these missiles.

During this turbulent and dangerous period last fall, President 
Clinton decided to establish an outside policy review as called 
for by the Congress.  President Clinton asked me to head this 
effort, and I agreed, believing that the time had come for a 
serious, solid review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK.  Much had 
changed in the five years since we had resolved the last crisis 
with the signing of the Agreed Framework, and I believed that the 
stakes had become even higher -- for Americans, for Koreans, and 
for the Japanese.

The Review Process

Mr. Chairman, as you know, a policy review team, led by myself 
and working with an interagency group headed by Ambassador Wendy 
Sherman, Counselor of the Department of State, was formally 
tasked in November 1998 by President Clinton and his national 
security advisors to conduct this extensive review.  The review 
lasted approximately eight months, and was supported by a number 
of senior officials from the U.S. government and by Dr. Ashton 
Carter of Harvard University.  We were also very fortunate to 
have received regular and extensive guidance from the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor 
and senior policy advisors.

Throughout the review I consulted with experts, both in and out 
of the U.S. government.  As you are aware, I made it a special 
point to come here to the Capitol to give regular status reports 
to Members on the progress of this review and looked forward to 
the comments I received on the ideas that my North Korea policy 
review team and I were developing.  I also exchanged views with 
officials from many countries with interests in Northeast Asia 
and the Korean Peninsula, including our allies, the ROK and 
Japan.  In Beijing, I spoke with high-level Chinese officials.  I 
met with prominent members of the humanitarian aid community.  I 
saw large and small groups, during formal and informal settings, 
talked with people by phone and received a wealth of written 
material, solicited and unsolicited.  Members of the policy 
review team held meetings with many other individuals and 
organizations as well.  In addition, I traveled to North Korea 
this past May, as President Clinton's Special Envoy, to obtain a 
first-hand understanding of the views of the DPRK Government.

The results of my review reflect the consensus that I saw emerge 
from the team's countless hours of work and study.

In conducting this review, my policy review team and I have made 
a number of findings and policy recommendations.  Of course, you 
have already seen the classified version of my report.  However, 
I have also submitted an unclassified version to the Committee 
for the record.  Rather than going through the report section by 
section, I would like to call your attention here today to 
certain portions of my report.

Findings and Observations

Mr. Chairman, during this review, we came to a number of findings 
and observations that supported our primary policy 
recommendations.  Let me highlight a few of these for the 
Committee.

First, the military correlation of forces on the Korean Peninsula 
strongly favors the allied forces, even more than during the 1994 
crisis, and I believe that this is understood by the DPRK.  
Therefore, deterrence is strong, unless it is upset by the 
introduction of nuclear weapons, especially nuclear warheads on 
ballistic missiles.

Second, there has been no production of fissile material at 
Yongbyon since the Agreed Framework came into force, but that 
production at this site could restart in few months if the Agreed 
Framework were aborted.  There is no doubt in my mind that ending 
the freeze at Yongbyon remains the surest and quickest path for 
North Korea to obtain nuclear weapons.

Third, a security strategy based on the Agreed Framework has 
worked these past five years, but is unsustainable in the face of 
continued DPRK firings of long-range missiles, since these 
firings undermine the necessary support for the Agreed Framework.

Finally, we have determined that, while North Korea is undergoing 
terrible economic hardship, these hardships are unlikely to cause 
the regime to be undermined.  We therefore must deal with the 
DPRK regime as it is, not as we would wish it to be.

The Recommended Policy Alternative

After considering a variety of policy alternatives, the policy 
review team decided to recommend a multifaceted strategy aimed at 
dealing initially with priority U.S. concerns over DPRK nuclear 
weapons- and missile-related activities.  This alternative was 
developed in close consultation with the governments of the ROK 
and Japan and has their support at the highest levels.

This recommended alternative involves a comprehensive and 
integrated approach to U.S. negotiations with the DPRK.  In 
essence, we have recommended that the allies establish two 
alternative strategies.  In the first, if the DPRK is willing to 
forgo its long-range missile program as well as its nuclear 
weapons program, we should be willing to move step-by-step on a 
path to a comprehensive normalization of relations, including the 
establishment of a permanent peace.  Alternatively, however, if 
North Korea does not demonstrate by its actions that it is 
willing to remove the threat, we must take actions to contain 
that threat.

Containing a North Korean threat is expensive and dangerous, so 
obviously the first strategy is preferred.  But the United States 
cannot unilaterally enforce the first strategy.  The first 
strategy requires continued support of the Agreed Framework by 
the American Congress and the South Korean and Japanese 
parliaments, and I believe that we will get that support, as long 
as the DPRK continues to exercise restraint on long-range 
missiles as well as nuclear weapons.  Also, successful execution 
of either strategy requires full participation of the governments 
of Japan and the ROK, and I believe that we will have that full 
participation.

During the course of the policy review, the governments of the 
U.S., ROK and Japan have worked together more closely than ever 
before, and I believe this tripartite cooperation will endure 
into the future, and be applied to other problems in the region, 
as well.  Indeed, this close trilateral consultation is an 
extremely important result of this review -- something that I am 
proud to have been a part of.  And, of course, the viability of 
the first strategy depends on full cooperation from North Korea.

A May 1999 Trip to Pyongyang

To determine whether that cooperation would be something we could 
expect, our policy team traveled to the DPRK late in May to 
explore with the North Korean leadership our working concepts.  
We were received in Pyongyang with courtesy, and held extensive 
and serious discussions.  And while we disagreed on many issues, 
the talks were constructive and entirely without polemics.

Our visit had four goals.  First, we wanted to make meaningful 
contact with senior North Korean officials, to establish a base 
for future discussions: That goal was achieved.

Second, we wanted to reaffirm the principles of the nuclear 
restraint that had been established in the Agreed Framework.  
That goal was achieved, with both sides reaffirming the 
principles of the Agreed Framework.  Critical to that agreement 
was the visit by an expert team to Kumchangni, which established 
that this site was not suitable for the installation of a nuclear 
reactor and reprocessing plant.

Third, we wanted to explore whether the DPRK had interest in 
going down a path to normalization.  Was the North willing to 
create an entirely new relationship with the United States and 
end the decades of tension and strife between our two countries?  
That goal was achieved in the sense that it was clear that they 
were interested, but not clear that they were prepared to take 
that step at that time.

Fourth, we wanted to explore whether the DPRK was willing to 
forgo its long-range missile program, and begin moving with the 
U.S. down a path to normal relations.  North Korean officials 
were not able to agree to that goal while we were in Pyongyang.  
It was clear that they regarded their long-range missile program 
as important, for reasons of security, prestige, and, of course, 
hard currency.  But, it was also clear that they understood that 
these missiles were an impediment to normal relations.

We explained that our ultimate goal was to terminate North Korean 
missile exports and indigenous missile activities inconsistent 
with MTCR standards, but that suspending long-range missile 
testing was the logical first step.  The answer to our 
proposition was not clear in our Pyongyang meetings, but the DPRK 
subsequently agreed to follow-on meetings to discuss this issue 
further.

Recent Developments

Three meetings have followed since then; the first two in Beijing 
and Geneva were not conclusive.  After the last meeting in 
Berlin, earlier last month, the U.S. decided to take a small but 
positive step that was consistent with the Agreed Framework, in 
order to improve the atmosphere in our bilateral relations with 
the DPRK.  The Administration took this step with the 
understanding and expectation that the North would suspend long-
range missile testing while we worked to improve relations.  A 
couple of weeks ago, we learned of an equally positive step by 
the North when it announced its unilateral decision to suspend 
missile testing for the duration of our high level discussions 
aimed at improving relations.  It is my hope that this step will 
lead to an even more concrete and public undertaking by the DPRK 
in this area in the weeks ahead.

Still, I wish to be very clear -- much more remains to be done.  
Nonetheless, we are started.  And -- if we are unsuccessful in 
persuading North Korea to remove the threat through cooperative 
dialogue and a significant improvement in relations, then we must 
be prepared to protect our interests and those of our allies and 
return to a course to contain that threat.

However, I truly believe that will not be necessary.  Instead, I 
believe the step each side has taken can start a process to 
remove the threat of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.  And 
that with this threat removed, a better environment will be 
created which will make all other problems easier to resolve, 
including bilateral issues between the ROK and DPRK, and 
bilateral issues between Japan and North Korea.

Concluding Thoughts

Mr. Chairman, please let me conclude with the following thoughts:

First, the approach recommended by the policy review is based on 
a realistic view of the DPRK, a hardheaded understanding of 
military realities and a firm determination to protect U.S. 
interests and those of our allies.  It is a flexible approach and 
does not depend on any one set of North Korean intentions -- 
benign or provocative -- to protect our interests.

Second, we should recognize that North Korea may send mixed 
signals concerning its response to our recommended proposal for a 
comprehensive framework and that many aspects of its behavior 
will remain reprehensible to us even if we embark on this 
negotiating process.

Third, no policy toward North Korea will succeed without the 
support of our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan.  If 
tensions were to escalate, the ROK would bear greatest risk; 
Japan has vital security interests in Korea as well.

Fourth, considering the isolation, suspicion, and negotiating 
style of the DPRK and the high state of tension on the Korean 
Peninsula, a successful U.S. policy will require steadiness and 
persistence even in the face of provocations.  The approach 
adopted now must be sustained into the future, beyond the term of 
this Administration.  It is therefore essential that the policy 
and its ongoing implementation have the broadest possible support 
and the continuing involvement of the Congress.

Finally, I wish to point out that a confluence of events this 
past year has opened what my policy review team and I strongly 
feel is a unique window of opportunity for the U.S. with respect 
to North Korea.  There is a clear and common understanding among 
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang.  The 
PRC's strategic goals--especially on the issue of North Korean 
nuclear weapons and related missile delivery systems--overlap 
with those of the U.S.  Pyongyang appears committed to the Agreed 
Framework and for the time being is convinced of the value of 
improving relations with the U.S.  The year 1999 may represent, 
historically, one of our best opportunities for some time to 
come, to begin a path to normalization, which after decades of 
insecurity, will finally lead to a Korean Peninsula which is 
secure, stable, and prosperous.

*A subsequent site visit in May removed this particular concern 

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