NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** June 17, 1999 The following is a survey of US, European, and Asian specialists on Korea conducted at a recent conference on "Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula" conducted by the Korean Economic Institute of America (KEI), the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, and the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California at San Diego on May 26 and 27. This report consists of a summary of the survey results written by Peter Beck of KEI, followed by the survey statistics. -------------------------------------- June 9, 1999 Engagement or Confrontation: American, Asian and European Views on the Two Koreas Peter M. Beck Korea Economic Institute of America A group of American, European and Asian specialists on Korea strongly support a policy of engagement toward North Korea, but they also think it will take more than a decade before the two Koreas will reunify. During a recent conference on North-South relations and the role of the international community, participants were asked to complete an opinion survey. In addition to examining the perceptions of the participants as a whole, the survey also revealed striking differences in the views of the Americans, Europeans and Koreans. Three-quarters of Koreans view Germany as a model for Korean unification, but only one-quarter of European respondents shared the same view. In general, the Korean respondents most strongly support engagement. The Survey: The survey was conducted at the conference "Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula," which was organized by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, and the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California at San Diego on May 26 and 27. The participants consisted chiefly of policy makers, policy analysts and academics from China, France, Germany, Japan, Korea and the United States. Americans, Europeans and Koreans were nearly equally represented. A total of 25 participants responded to the survey. Engaging the North: None of the respondents favored a policy of confrontation toward North Korea, but they were almost evenly split on whether a policy of engagement or a mixture of engagement and confrontation should be pursued. When asked to be more precise on the mix of engagement and confrontational policies, Koreans were slightly more dovish (3.3 out of 10) than Americans (4.4) or Europeans (3.9). Nearly three-fourths of the participants, including all of the Korean respondents, believe that economic exchanges are the most effective way to engage North Korea. Roughly two-thirds of participants support President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy," but the Europeans were evenly divided. A similar number believe the Sunshine Policy will ultimately induce change in North Korea, with the South Korean respondents being the most optimistic. An even stronger majority of respondents believe that economic exchanges are the best way to promote North-South reconciliation, including at the governmental level. In spite of the modest progress made to date, more than three-quarters of the respondents believe that the Four Party Talks and the Agreed Framework are an effective means of engaging North Korea. The Regional Context: When asked about the preferences of the four major powers in the region (China, Japan, Russia and the United States), the respondents were split on whether the four favor continued division or a unified peninsula, but Europeans and Koreans were more likely to state that the four powers prefer a divided Korea. China and Japan were viewed as the countries most opposed to a unified Korea and the United Sates as the country most in favor of a unified Korea. However, the Europeans were almost evenly split between Russia and the United States as the country most favoring unification. The participants almost unanimously believe that improving relations between North Korean and Japan and the United States will ultimately contribute to improving North-South relations. Respondents were almost evenly split on the greatest threat posed by North Korea, with a slight majority selecting the North's ballistic missile program. However, by an almost 2-1 margin, respondents do not think that a NATO-style security organization should be created to address the North Korean threat. An even greater margin felt that humanitarian aid to the North should not be tied to the North's behavior. Should the North fail to comply with nuclear inspections, an overwhelming majority would continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Almost none would impose a military blockade or launch a preemptive military strike. Crystal Ball Gazing: The final set of questions asked respondents to make predictions about the future of North Korea and unification. In general, the respondents were highly pessimistic about the prospects for unification. When asked how long Kim Jong-il would remain the head of North Korea, one indication of how opaque the North Korean political system is is that this was the only question where all five of the choices received votes. A slight majority felt that Kim Jong-il would be running North Korea for between two and ten years. Responses also varied for the most likely outcome for North Korea, with half predicting that North Korea would muddle through and an almost equal number predicting that the North will implode. However, there was a clear difference between the different groups. A majority of Koreans believe that North Korea will implode, while a majority of Americans see the North muddling through. The respondents were highly pessimistic about the prospects for North-South reunification. 71 percent of respondents believe that it will be more than ten years before the two Koreas unify. Only 8 percent believe that unification will occur in the next five years. The Americans were the most pessimistic group, with all stating that it will take more than ten years. One of the questions that most divided respondents was how long U.S. troops should remain on the Korean peninsula after unification. A plurality of 36 percent responded that American soldiers should remain indefinitely. An equal number answered less than five years. Finally, the respondents were almost evenly split on whether Germany's unification experience can serve as a model for Korea. Most interestingly, 75 percent of the Koreans view Germany as a model for Korean unification, but only 25 percent of European respondents shared the same view. Conclusions: One should be cautious in drawing sweeping conclusions from this survey given the small sample size and the simplistic format of the survey. Nevertheless, several tentative conclusions can be drawn. First, there is overwhelming support among the American, Asian and European conference participants for an engagement-based policy toward North Korea. However, a majority believe that the "carrots" must be combined with some "sticks." The Koreans were the most strongly in favor of engaging North Korea while the Europeans and, to a lesser extent, the Americans were more cautious. This was most clearly highlighted in the question concerning the applicability of the German model. Surprisingly, the Korean and non-Korean respondents were almost equally likely to believe that the great powers support the continued division of the peninsula. However, the Europeans stressed the role Russia can play in bringing about reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. Finally, a clear majority of the participants were pessimistic about the prospects for unification in the short or medium term. The participants favor a policy of engagement, but it may take considerable time before it bears fruit. Center for Applied Policy Research (Munich), Korea Economic Institute of America and U.C. San Diego Conference "Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula" Participant Survey May 27, 1999 (25 respondents) 1. South Korea and the rest of the world should pursue a policy of ___________ toward North Korea. ( ) Engagement ("carrots") 44 percent ( ) Containment/Confrontation ("sticks") 0 percent ( ) Engagement and containment/confrontation 56 percent 2. What is the proper mix of engagement and containment policies? Engagement 70-30 50-50 30-70 Containment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 3.7 3. Which of the following is the best way to promote North-South reconciliation? ( ) Cultural exchanges 2 percent ( ) Economic exchanges (trade and investment) 74 percent ( ) Official North-South negotiations 20 percent ( ) Reuniting separated families 4 percent 4. Is President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" the most appropriate policy toward North Korea? ( ) Yes 72 percent ( ) No 28 percent 5. Will the "Sunshine Policy" induce change in North Korea? ( ) Yes 65 percent ( ) No 35 percent 6. Will expanding private inter-Korean contacts promote governmental contacts? ( ) Yes 80 percent ( ) No 20 percent 7. Are the Four Party Talks an effective way to engage North Korea? ( ) Yes 76 percent ( ) No 24 percent 8. Is the Agreed Framework (KEDO) an effective way to engage North Korea? ( ) Yes 80 percent ( ) No 20 percent 9. China, Japan, Russia and the United States prefer continued division of the peninsula rather than reunification. ( ) Agree 48 percent ( ) Disagree 52 percent 10. Which country most opposes Korean unification? ( ) China 48 percent ( ) Japan 38 percent ( ) Russia 0 percent ( ) United States 14 percent 11. Which country most favors Korean unification? ( ) China 14 percent ( ) Japan 8 percent ( ) Russia 24 percent ( ) United States 54 percent 12. Would improved relations between North Korea and Japan and the United States help improve North-South relations? ( ) Yes 96 percent ( ) No 4 percent 13. Which of the following poses the greatest threat to East Asian security? ( ) North Korea's nuclear program 43 percent ( ) North Korea's ballistic missile program 57 percent ( ) North Korean incursions and kidnapings 0 percent 14. Should a regional security organization similar to NATO be created to deal with North Korea? ( ) Yes 36 percent ( ) No 64 percent 15. Should humanitarian aid to the North be linked to the North's behavior? ( ) Linked 32 percent ( ) Unlinked 68 percent 16. Which course of action should be taken if North Korea fails to comply with nuclear inspections? ( ) Continue to seek a diplomatic solution 88 percent ( ) Request the United Nations to pass an economic sanctions resolution 10 percent ( ) Implement a military blockade 2 percent ( ) Launch a preemptive military strike 0 percent 17. How long will Kim Jong-il remain the head of North Korea? ( ) 0-2 years 5 percent ( ) 2-5 years 38 percent ( ) 5-10 years 29 percent ( ) 10-20 years 10 percent ( ) More than 20 years 19 percent 18. Ultimately, what is the most likely outcome for North Korea? ( ) Economic reform and resurgence 4 percent ( ) Explosion (launch an attack on the South out of desperation) 0 percent ( ) Implosion (collapse) 44 percent ( ) Muddling through 52 percent 19. When will the North and South reunify? ( ) 0-2 years 0 percent ( ) 2-5 years 8 percent ( ) 5-10 years 21 percent ( ) 10+ years 71 percent ( ) Never 0 percent 20. How long should U.S. troops remain on the Korean Peninsula after unification? ( ) Less than 1 year 12 percent ( ) 1-5 years 24 percent ( ) 5-10 years 28 percent ( ) Indefinitely 36 percent 21. Can Germany's reunification experience serve as a model for Korea? ( ) Yes 44 percent ( ) No 56 percent Respondent's nationality: ( ) American 32 percent ( ) European 28 percent ( ) Korean 32 percent ( ) Other Asian 8 percent