NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** January 7, 1998 The following is the complete text of an article by Charles Kartman, US principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, on US foreign policy towards Japan and the ROK. Kartman recently served as the chief US negotiator to the four-party peace talks in Geneva. The article was published in January in the US Information Agency's electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda." ------------------------------------ 07 January 1998 TEXT: CHARLES KARTMAN ARTICLE ON JAPAN, KOREA (USIA electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda") (1920) From the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has focused its attention on the Pacific, and we will remain vigorously engaged in the Pacific region for the foreseeable future. In the post-World War II era, U.S. efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region have depended on a number of bilateral alliances with key partners in the region. Since the end of the Cold War, these relationships have not lost their relevance. Indeed, as we have worked with our allies to respond to changing circumstances, these alliances have demonstrated their continuing utility and importance. The U.S.-Japan security alliance is crucial to U.S. engagement in the region. And the historic peace talks recently begun in Geneva offer the best chance since the conclusion of the Armistice in 1953 to achieve a reduction of tensions and a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. JAPAN The U.S.-Japan security alliance serves as the foundation of U.S. security policy in East Asia and the Pacific and of the U.S. military's forward deployment in the region. The basic purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance has always been to ensure the security of our two countries, and in the nearly 40 years since the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was first signed in January 1960, the alliance has done precisely that. By ensuring the peace and stability of Japan, as well as of the United States, the alliance binds our countries together in a productive, positive partnership and provides concrete, tangible benefits for both our peoples. At the same time, the U.S.-Japan security alliance plays a much wider role. In the preamble to the Security Treaty, the United States and Japan recognized that they have a common interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Asia- Pacific region. It is widely recognized throughout the region that the security alliance has, in fact, played a key role in maintaining stability and facilitating prosperity throughout East Asia and the Pacific. The origins of the U.S.-Japan security alliance date from the time of the Cold War, and now that the Cold War has ended, some have suggested the alliance may be a relic of the past and have questioned the need for its continuation. Such sentiments could not be further from the truth. Although the Cold War is indeed over, the potential for crises and instability persists in the Asia-Pacific region, and the stabilizing influence of the security alliance remains as vital as ever. Nevertheless, the political and security environment in the region has continued to evolve, and the U.S.-Japan alliance must evolve as well to keep up with these changes. President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto recognized this necessity at the time of the April 1996 Tokyo Summit, when they agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. This review was completed in September 1997, when the Security Consultative Committee issued new Guidelines. The aim of the new Guidelines is to enhance security cooperation between the United States and Japan and to create the basis for more effective and credible coordination under normal peacetime circumstances, in response to an armed attack against Japan, and in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Much work remains to be done to implement the Guidelines so that they can become the effective tool for enhancing the security alliance that they were intended to be. The governments of the United States and Japan are committed to implementing the Guidelines in a timely fashion and are working vigorously to accomplish this task. Although the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation will enhance and reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan security alliance and make it better able to cope with the challenges of the evolving security situation in the region, they will not change its fundamental framework. The rights and obligations of either party under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements will not change either. In addition, Japan will continue to conduct all of its actions within the limits of its constitution and will maintain its exclusively defense- oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. The new Guidelines are not aimed at any other country. The U.S.-Japan security alliance continues to enjoy the broad support of the people and the political leaders of both countries. The alliance also requires the continuing sacrifices of the American and Japanese people. We in the United States are grateful for the generous Host Nation Support that Japan provides to U.S. forces in Japan. At the same time, Japan enjoys the benefits of the sizable U.S. defense budget. Additionally, the U.S. and Japanese governments recognize the burdens imposed on the Japanese people by the presence of U.S. military bases, particularly in Okinawa where these facilities are highly concentrated. For this reason the two governments established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1995 to study the question of consolidating, realigning, and reducing U.S. facilities in Okinawa consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The SACO Final Report, issued in December 1996, is a concrete plan and timetable for the return of approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa and for the adjustment of training and operational procedures of U.S. forces. We remain firmly committed to the implementation of the SACO Final Report. KOREA For the past 44 years, the Korean Peninsula has been regarded as one of the most dangerous potential flashpoints in the world, a place where threat of renewed warfare has never completely receded. U.S. security policy has focused on deterring potential aggression from the North, and the bedrock of that policy remains our firm security commitment to the South, embodied in the U.S.- Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. Roughly 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the ROK, and we maintain a regular schedule of exercises, conducted in a non-threatening manner, to help maintain readiness of U.S. and ROK forces. But as we maintain an effective deterrent capability, we and our South Korean ally have also sought to end the North's isolation and encourage it to undertake a more cooperative and constructive role in the international community. The United States has long believed that the key to a reduction of tensions, and ultimately the realization of lasting peace, on the Korean Peninsula lies in productive dialogue and cooperation between the South and North. But, despite many initiatives over the years, sustained dialogue and cooperation have not emerged, and there has been little progress toward achieving peace. To achieve these goals, President Clinton, during a visit to the ROK in April 1996, and South Korean President Kim Young Sam jointly proposed Four Party Peace Talks involving the United States, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the People's Republic of China. After many months of effort, the opening session of these talks took place December 9- 10, 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland. Though likely to be a lengthy and difficult process, the Four Party Talks offer the best opportunity since the end of the Korean War to achieve a lasting peace. Not very long ago, concerns over North Korea's unsafeguarded nuclear program and the North's announcement in March 1993 that it would abrogate its obligations under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty focused world attention and ignited fears that confrontation and conflict could again engulf the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's announcement led the United States, after close consultations with our ROK ally and others in the international community, to initiate a bilateral dialogue with the DPRK in June 1993 aimed at addressing the nuclear issue. These efforts culminated in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, which laid out a series of steps to freeze existing North Korean nuclear activities, dismantle its present nuclear facilities, arrange for the safe storage and shipment out of that country of spent nuclear fuel that could be used to reprocess plutonium, and ultimately bring the DPRK into full compliance with its safeguard obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In return, a multinational consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, will provide two light-water reactors, which pose a significantly lower threat of proliferation problems. As we seek to address the broader issues of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula through the Four Party Talks, the Agreed Framework provides for the development of improved bilateral political and economic relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. This improvement is to come as the Agreed Framework is implemented and as the DPRK addresses matters of concern to the United States, including cooperation on the return of remains of persons unaccounted for from the Korean War and the issue of missile proliferation. There have now been four joint recovery operations involving U.S. and North Korean forces and the repatriation of remains believed to be those of Americans. DPRK development of missiles and sales of missiles and missile technology are of serious concern to the United States. We have held two rounds of talks with the DPRK on this issue -- in April 1996 in Berlin and April 1997 in New York. Dates for a third round are currently under discussion but have not yet been set. CONCLUSION Strong U.S.-ROK relations and a firm U.S. security commitment remain the keystone of our policy toward the Korean Peninsula. And success in the Four-Party process, through a series of steps to reduce tensions and to transform the status quo to a state of peace, is the path that can lead to the most significant changes in the DPRK's relations, not only with us, but with its neighbors, especially the ROK, and with others in the international community. The implementation of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation and of the SACO Final Report will strengthen and invigorate our security alliance with Japan, and, with the continuing support of the U.S. and Japanese people, enable it to continue to play its crucial role in ensuring the stability and prosperity of both our countries, as well as of the entire Asia- Pacific region as we enter the 21st century. Finally, it should be noted that our bilateral security relations with Japan and Korea have always been relevant to one another. The pattern of trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK consultation developed in recent years helps ensure that this will remain true in the future. ------------------------------------- End of text