NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (located at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). The report is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP. The report is distributed through NAPSNet in collaboration with the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. ----------- THE DPRK REPORT No. 7 -- May-June, 1997 1. North Korean Military Policy As can be seen from its press reports and official statements, the DPRK remains heavily steeped in political dogma. For this reason, analysts of the North Korean military must pay close attention to state priorities in the area of ideological indoctrination. The DPRK's military policy is based on the well-known concept of juche, whose four "guiding principles" include: 1) self-defense in national security; 2) juche in ideology; 3) independence in foreign policy; and 4) self-sufficiency in economy. According to Article 46 of the Statute of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK), "the Korean People's Army is the revolutionary armed forces of the WPK which has inherited the glorious revolutionary traditions of the anti-Japanese military struggle." This gives the WPK and its Central Committee the right to define all aspects of the military policy and to maintain strict control over the armed forces through the party committees that have been created in all military units and in all structures of the Defense Ministry. As Article 27 of the WPK Statute makes clear: "The Military Committee of the WPK Central Committee discusses and takes decisions on questions related to the implementation of party policy in military affairs; organizes and directs work on strengthening the ... armed forces and on the development of military production; and manages the armed forces of our country." The Party Committee of the Korean People's Army (KPA) is directly subordinated to the WPK Central Committee. The same subordination is prescribed for the Main Political Directorate of the KPA. The numerous tasks entrusted to party committees of the army units and sub-units deserve closer attention. Article 48 of the WPK Statute reads: "Party organizations at all levels struggle to transform the entire army on the basis of juche concepts; to firmly establish a unified ideological...system among party members and army personnel; and to educate them as genuine soldiers of revolution, who are ready without any hesitation to give their lives for the sake of the party and the Leader, in the name of our Motherland and the people..." The goals and tasks that the KPA is called upon to solve are also determined by the WPK Statute. "The most pressing goal of the Worker's Party of Korea is to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the Northern part of the Republic and to fulfill the mission of national liberation and people's-democratic revolution on a country-wide scale; its final goal is to transform the whole society on the basis of the juche concepts and to construct a communist society." The statutes goes on to call for the "withdrawal of the aggressive armed forces of American imperialism from South Korea; the removal of colonial domination and the frustration of Japanese imperialism's attempts at new acts of aggression; active support for the struggle of the South Korean people for social democratization...; and efforts to reunify the Motherland on the premise of self-dependence..." The fact that the North Korean leadership is actively pursuing these goals is readily apparent, which naturally causes justifiable alarm and suspicion on the part of South Korea. The Constitution of the DPRK of December 27, 1972, and the amendments introduced on April 9, 1992, in defining the role of the state in securing the country's national defense, also show the ideological guidance of the WPK in the military sphere. In accordance with Article 59 of the Constitution, the armed forces "are called upon to guard the working people's interests, to uphold socialist order and the gains of revolution from aggression by foreign invaders, and to defend independence, the freedom of the Motherland, and peace." The doctrine on "self-defense in national security" was put forward in the 1960s by Kim Il-sung, and after three decades has undergone no cardinal modifications. As present, DPRK leader Kim Jong-il constantly states that the implementation of the principle of "self-defense in national security" means: - to have national armed forces capable of the country's self- defense; - to defend the country using these forces; - to establish an all-people's, all-state system of defense; - to make the whole army professional and modernized; - to arm the entire people and turn the whole country into a fortress; - to demonstrate the ideological and political superiority of the people's armed forces; - to build a self-sufficient national defense industry; and - to strengthen the rear by all means. The North Korean government stresses that the course of the country's simultaneous economic and military construction allowed it to insure war readiness and the provision of necessary war materials, thus reliably strengthening both the front and the rear. The above doctrines -- when taken as a whole -- represent the North Korean understanding of national values, interests, and purposes as expressed through its military policy. North Korean military perspectives are influenced first of all by the environment, which has been conditioned by several factors: First of all, the division of the Korean nation, which was the unfortunate result of World War II. Second, the status of the armistice, which has been in effect in Korea from the end of the war of 1950-1953. The unfinished peace process and the lack of a peace treaty remain a permanent source of tensions. Third, the prolonged stagnation of the inter-Korean dialogue, which has meant that neither side is ready for a rapid rapprochement or movement from peace declarations to practical steps. Fourth, the process of "cross-recognition" of the two Korean states by the major powers, which has still not been completed. The United States and Japan still lack official relations with Pyongyang, despite both Moscow's and Beijing's normalization of relations with Seoul. In terms of threat perception, the approach of the contemporary North Korean military has remained largely unchanged since the time of Kim Il-sung. The principal enemies of the DPRK are still the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Sometimes, for tactical reasons, certain accents are slightly tuned up to put forward either one or another country from the three mentioned. On the working level, the current evaluation of external threats and of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula is performed by the Military Department of the Central Committee of the WPK and by similar structures of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff under it. For instance, the Operational Department of the Central Committee of the WPK is closely interconnected with the Main Intelligence Directorate. The main focus of this analytical work are questions related to the balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula and its component parts: the correlation of forces between the South and the North, and the state of military ties between Seoul and Washington (and between Tokyo and Washington). North Korean experts also pay attention to the emerging military and technological cooperation between South Korea and Russia. Among the security threats facing North Korea are a number of non-military problems, such as possible cultural and ideological penetration by imperialism that could undermine the ideological pillars of North Korean society. As a result, a high priority in operating the North Korean military system is given to ideological, political, and psychological indoctrination of military personnel and the entire population of the country. In light of the above points, a natural question arises: can one expect in the near future any changes in the military doctrine of North Korea or in its attitude towards South Korea? Russian analysts generally respond in the negative to this question. The reasons for it are the following. From the North Korean point of view, no fundamental changes have occurred in the system of external threats to the DPRK: the withdrawal of American troops from the South has not taken place and inter-Korean rapprochement has been postponed. Moreover, a drastic transformation (and worsening) in the approach of Moscow and Beijing to their alliances with Pyongyang has taken place. Kim Jong-il, for internal political reasons, is not ready yet to start revision of his father's ideological guidelines. Therefore, keeping a strong alliance with the military will be his top priority. On the whole, Russian analysts predict that in the foreseeable future North Korean military policy will retain its present features, though certain tactical maneuvers cannot be excluded. However, Russian specialists do not agree with the thesis that North Korean military strategy may shift from one of general vigilance to the adoption of a "surprise attack" strategy. At the same time, resumption of the inter-Korean dialogue, in principle, may promote a better atmosphere influencing various aspects of North Korean policy, including its military component. It is also probable that additional steps in the implementation of the U.S.-North Korean agreement on the nuclear problem could induce the two Koreas to look for ways of promoting disarmament and adopting confidence-building measures. The political regime in the North has for decades demonstrated its viability and survivability in difficult and complicated conditions. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that it could become stronger as a result of the successful implementation of the nuclear agreement and promotion of economic ties with the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Such developments may open a new stage in the coexistence between the North and the South, when their relations will increasingly be determined by mutual economic interests. 2. Changes in North Korean Propaganda It is an accepted fact that propaganda plays a decisive role in keeping the North Korean regime afloat. Though sounding primitive and simplistic to outsiders, this propaganda remains rather effective inside the DPRK. This can be explained by the fact that for decades the informational space of the country has been closed to any external influences. All this time the population has been forced to consume myths devoid of any semblance of reality. The minds of the people have been tuned to a specific terminology: they have been reacting to certain coded signals which have existed only in the distorted world of North Korea. However, North Korean propaganda does not remain static. Kim Jong-il obviously realizes that changing realities in and beyond the DPRK require new ideas, stereotypes, methods, and styles in propaganda. Some fresh features can already be identified in Pyongyang's propaganda. Firstly, notwithstanding the recent declarations about adherence to the heritage of Kim Il-sung and juche ideas, Kim Jong-il is making an effort to reserve the right for "creative development" of this ideological foundation. In his recent work, as well as in the media, one can find statements that changes in specific time periods and new developments can bring up a number of problems that have no solutions within existing theories of socialism. These statements emphasize that the party of working class must give its top priority to ideological and theoretical activity: developing socialist ideology step in stride with the changes and with the progress of the revolution and national economic construction. Interestingly, they also highlight the danger and inadmissibility of dogmatism in ideological and theoretical work. For the time being, Kim Jong-il -- out of pragmatism -- speaks about his strict adherence to "revolutionary traditions." He implies that the principles and goals of Kim Il-sung and the "old guard" still remain sacred for him. However, this does not mean that, depending on the situation or changes in the course of the "progress of the revolution and construction," they could not be revised. Secondly, Kim Jong-il has pushed to the forefront among all juche ideas the principle of "self-dependency." "Self-dependence" -- compared to Marxism-Leninism -- is much more attractive to the masses. That is why progress towards communism, as the ultimate goal of the North Korean revolution, is no longer postulated in Kim Jong-il's pronouncements. Moreover, in correlation with the terms and notions coined by the young leader -- such as "to live our own way," "socialism of the Korean pattern," or "our nation is most perfect" -- the principle of "self-dependence" provides a reasonable basis for building bridges to nationalistic forces in South Korea and, possibly, for the future "re-unification of Motherland." North Korean ideologists, in this sense, clearly feel the spirit of our times and the needs of the new political elite to have attractive, populist, and nationalistic programs formulated. The ideology of juche undoubtedly will be developed further by Kim-junior as a nationalistic ideology, able to add some attractiveness to a regime which certainly is aware of its notoriety. Thirdly, the last writings by Kim Jong-il show a definite intention to turn the allegedly "scientific" theoretical heritage of Kim Il-sung into a new religion for his people. Besides the well-known formula concerning "the immortal political life" provided to people through their unity and devotion to "the social and political organism" (i.e., the leader and his party), a new notion has appeared in recent writings: "service to the people as if to God." The unfolding of this expression presupposes that since the leader and people are a single whole, then the people should serve the leader as if they are serving God. The further development of these notions opens for the ideologists of the North Korean regime unending vistas for mastering the minds and feelings of the people by means of the new religion and of the idolized leader. In this respect, the achievements of sects like Aum Shinrikyo, the Unification Church of Reverend Sun Myung Moon, and others might look promising to ideologists within the North Korean regime. Fourthly, though the last works by Kim Jong-il contain a decisive rebuff to attempts by the "multi-system approach" in economics and by "market forms of ownership" to destroy the regime from within, this does not mean that regime ideologists would not be able a "theoretical basis" for the introduction of market elements into the country's economy if the economic situation in the country were to deteriorate completely. 3. Activities of the Pro-Pyongyang Lobby in Russia Despite the DPRK's visible troubles in all fields, pro-Pyongyang lobbyists in Russia continue to praise the "outstanding achievements" of the North Korean regime. Among such lobbyists are functionaries of the Russian Communist Party, who see in the DPRK an ideological friend and use the regime as an example for Russia. For nationalists, North Korea is an available geopolitical and military partner vis-a-vis the United States and Japan. In many cases, admiration of the DPRK is not real but rather dictated by hopes of personal gain. Some are directly bribed or financed by the North Korean government. Others are engaged in economic cooperation with counterparts in the DPRK. Lobbyists also enjoy the red-carpet treatment they get while visiting "the land of juche." One influential Russian politician, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, admitted recently that nowhere else on earth is he received with such honors as in Pyongyang. In providing propaganda for North Korea, Russian lobbyists advance the following arguments in the media and various gatherings, including parliamentary sessions: - The peoples of Russia and the DPRK are closely interconnected spiritually and historically. - North Koreans possess admirable traits of character: generosity, patriotism, and allegiance to their chosen principles. - Russia and Korea have historically never been at war with each other. - The North Korean economy, despite all its shortcomings, is connected to the Russian economy. The DPRK requires huge quantities of Russian technology, equipment, and spare parts. In turn, it is ready to supply Russia with various raw materials. If Moscow chooses the correct policy, Russia-North Korean trade could immediately jump to $2.5-3 billion. In a long-term perspective, North Korea could become a much more valuable partner than South Korea because Seoul developed its economy in isolation from Russia (and the Soviet Union) and is oriented to other markets. - It is wrong to say that Pyongyang rejects changes in its practical policies. While holding to a firm and time-proven basis of "juche-ism," the North Korean leadership is making determined efforts to update its economic policy to correspond with present- day realities. - Kim Jong-il is the recognized leader of the DPRK in ideology, politics, and economics. It is only thanks to him that after the death of Kim Il-sung the Korean Peninsula has not been turned into a battlefield much more destructive than the war in the former Yugoslavia. - Kim Jong-il is not very visible to the outside world, but this is only because he observing a period of mourning for his deceased father. As for meeting average Koreans, Kim Jong-il does this on a daily basis. The current DPRK leader is a versatile, talented, and well-educated man, who writes poems and music and speaks several foreign languages, including Russian. Kim Jong-il has a deep knowledge of many fields of theory and practice. He is also known for unparalleled bravery, according to these lobbyists. - The DPRK has quite a few achievements superior to those of South Korea and the West. It boasts good air, crystal-clean rivers, and fresh, unpolluted parks. Its society is characterized by order and discipline, mutual respect among its citizens, and hard and happy work. Old people and children are cared for. The entire nation is united by common goals and ideas. North Koreans live according to the principles of collectivism. - There are some economic difficulties in the DPRK. But the main reasons for them are extremely bad weather and a shortage of raw materials, spare parts, and marketing opportunities for the plants and factories built in the past by the Soviet Union. However, North Koreans are quite optimistic and are determined to overcome these difficulties. - The young generation of the DPRK remains faithful to the ideals of "juche-ism." This is a guarantee that the state has a good future. Russian lobbyists attack the Russian media for "distorting" the facts concerning North Korea and for "slandering" Kim Jong-il and his regime. Presumably, because of such disinformation Russian leaders are currently following a mistaken policy regarding Pyongyang. ICIP, Moscow [End of DPRK Report No. 7] Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Berkeley, CA, USA; July 25, 1997