NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK *** SPECIAL REPORT *** [The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (located at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). It is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP.] The DPRK Report (September-October 1996) 1. Russia's Policy towards the DPRK A number of important factors have been moving the Kremlin lately to a more positive posture vis-a-vis the DPRK. First of all, the Russian elite--and society as a whole--are moving in a conservative direction due to their great difficulties with the process of reform. The present government, including the Foreign Ministry, has absorbed people with a more traditional outlook on foreign affairs. If some of the original liberal democrats are still in positions of power, they have by now changed their colors: either voluntarily or by necessity. The conservative mood is promoted by current developments in the outside world: Russia's problems with the former republics of the Soviet Union and other neighbors to the South, dissatisfaction with the West, and the growing instability and violence in many areas of the globe. It is clear that Russian foreign policy has already become less starry-eyed and more down-to-earth, less ideological (anti-communist) and more pragmatic, less internationalist and more nationalist, less pro-Western and more-Eurasian, and oriented more to the East and South. The Kremlin is moving to a more traditional diplomatic line, emphasizing security concerns and great power ambitions. These security concerns are pushing Moscow to resume a more active role in mediating differences between Seoul and Pyongyang. Especially, it has been realized in Russia that the North Korean regime will not necessarily collapse in the immediate future and that its collapse, if it does happen, may actually create even greater security risks. Such an approach requires an improvement of relations with the DPRK and a more balanced policy on the peninsula. Great power ambitions are also edging Moscow back towards North Korea. Russia is increasing its efforts to regain influence and prestige throughout the region and to show its flag wherever possible. It hopes to forge closer ties with new partners while returning, when possible, to former allies recklessly abandoned earlier. Restoration of links with North Korea is justified on the grounds that Moscow created Kim Il Sung's regime and spent considerable time and money nourishing it. Thus, while leaders come and go, people's memories and friendships endure. These feelings are reinforced by the Russia's envy towards American activities in the DPRK. It seems to Russia that the United States is stealing Moscow's former ally away to the American side. This is evident in the attempts of the North to sign a peace treaty exclusively with the United States, in the Seoul- Washington proposal on four-power peace talks, and in the forthcoming cooperation between the DPRK and the United States in the nuclear field. Russia's Ambassador to the DPRK Valeriy Denisov argues in this regard that the United States is undertaking a broad offensive without consideration of Russia's interests and is aiming at expanding its influence over the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in order to become the sole master of Korea's destiny. Ambassador Denisov stresses that an active Moscow does not coincide with American national interests. At the same time, as observers in the Kremlin have noticed, Washington continues to maintain its security alliance with the ROK basically without changes and continues to exert influence over its ally in the South. Meanwhile, Russia feels that its prestige and influence in the ROK have diminished lately precisely because of the weakening of Moscow's position in the North. Experts note that only by exerting influence over both Korean states can Moscow "stay in the game" and secure its position vis-a-vis a future reunified Korea. A deterioration of relations with the DPRK has "limited Russia's ability to play a meaningful role in developments in the immediate neighborhood of its border." China, in its turn, is cited nowadays in Russia as a perfect example of how to manage relations with the DPRK. It is pointed out that the PRC has been able to achieve excellent rapport and close economic cooperation with the South without undermining its own position in the North. Economic considerations are the third driving motive for Russia's activities in the Asia-Pacific region. South Korea continues to figure prominently among prospective partners, and Moscow will keep it high on the agenda. However, there is a certain disappointment--due to the limited investment activities of ROK companies in Russia and problems with loans and credits. As for North Korea, it certainly does not have an equal economic appeal in the eyes of Russia. Still, Moscow has recognized that the only way to get North Korea to repay its back debts is to smooth tensions with the DPRK. It is deemed profitable to continue employing North Korean loggers and other workers in the Russian Far East, and to buy the DPRK's valuable raw materials in exchange for Russia's finished goods. Russia may also someday participate in the modernization of the numerous Soviet-built enterprises in the DPRK. Future deliveries of nuclear reactors to the North and involvement in the development of the free economic zones in its shared border region are mentioned among the economic aims of Russia vis-a-vis North Korea. Another argument in support of these ties is that only through cooperation with the DPRK will it be possible to realize some of the large-scale Russian-South Korean projects, like the proposed natural gas pipeline from Yakutia to the ROK. The ideological factor, that is, spreading the democratic gospel, no longer figures prominently in Russia's policies in Asia and the Pacific. North Korea is no longer abhorred by the ruling elite of Russia as it was a couple of years ago. As for various opposition parties, the DPRK has become their new "darling." The Russian Communist Party has established permanent contacts with North Korean ruling circles, and regularly sends high-level delegations to the North. In joint statements and other documents, the two sides swear to unite "in the struggle for socialism and against reaction." Russian Communists use every opportunity to praise juche ideology, the "great achievements" of the DPRK in its socialist construction, and its pursuit of an "independent, proud" foreign policy. The strongest nationalist party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is even more eloquent in praising Pyongyang. Official steps are also being taken to improve Russo-North Korean relations. Indeed, since 1994, Moscow has been persistently trying to put its relations with Pyongyang back on a normal track. Of special importance was a visit by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister A. Panov to the DPRK in September 1994, after Kim Il Sung's death. Mr. Panov conveyed Yeltsin's message to Kim Jong Il and reached an agreement with his North Korean counterparts to reactivate bilateral ties. Lately, the political and economic dialogue between Russia and the DPRK has become more vigorous. In 1996, a Russian governmental delegation, headed by Vice-Premier V. Ignatenko, visited North Korea and held the first session of the Joint Russian-DPRK Commission on Trade, Economic-Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. Subsequently, a State Duma delegation, headed by its speaker V. Seleznev, also toured the North. Finally there was a round of consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers. Pyongyang has agreed to the Russian proposal to conclude a new bilateral treaty to replace the treaty of 1961 "due to changes in international circumstances." However, both sides are ready to honor the old document until the new one is agreed upon and approved by the two governments. The draft of the new treaty (being reviewed currently by the DPRK) includes the follow elements: - The two sides will continue to maintain and develop friendly relations based on the principles of respect for mutual sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, non- interference in the internal affairs of each other, equality, and mutual advantage, as well as other universally recognized norms of international law, and for this they will create appropriate mechanisms for a dialogue. - The two sides, deeming it quite significant to cooperate in world affairs, will make an active contribution to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, strict observance of norms of international law, and the prevention of armed conflicts. They believe that the strengthening of security and stability in the regional and global contexts will promote a reduction by all countries of their armed forces and armaments to the level of defensive requirements only. - The two sides will regularly consult with each other at different levels on all important issues concerning the interests of both sides. - Neither side will conclude treaties or agreements with third countries or will take actions, which could be harmful to the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or security of the other side. -In case a situation develops, which, according to the view of one of the sides, poses a threat to the international peace and security, the two Sides will immediately contact each other in order to conduct consultations on the removal of the emerging threat. There are other items in the Russian draft of the treaty that make it generally attractive to Pyongyang. However, North Korea has so far not commented on the draft, citing such "difficulties" as "insulting" articles in the Russian press and military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. All in all, it can be said that the political climate in Russo- North Korean relations has improved slightly. Russia is a more active player in this process, since North Korea now aims at getting closer to the United States. The Russian "card" is useful to tease Americans, but Pyongyang is cautious not to overplay that "card." There are also signs of movement in bilateral economic relations. In 1996, a number of agreements and understandings were reached which could reactivate bilateral cooperation. They concern the following issues: 1. The revitalization of cooperative ties between Russian organizations and North Korean enterprises built in the past with the Soviet assistance (Kim Chaek metallurgy plant, plants for car batteries, and enterprises producing micro-electrical engines); 2. The joint development in the DPRK of magnezite deposits; 3. The joint development in Yakutia of coal deposits; 4. The normalization of the process of timber harvesting in the Russian Far East; 5. The resumption of cargo shipment lines between Russia and North Korea; 6. The construction of a gas pipeline Yakutia-South Korea through the territory of North Korea; 7. The repayment of the DPRK's debts to Russia; 8. The reinstitution of clearing and barter methods in bilateral trade; 9. The establishment of joint ventures (of which there are now about 40); 10. The utilization of North Korean workers in agriculture, construction, and mining in Russia; and 11. The technical modernization of Soviet-built enterprises in North Korea. Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is also being gradually restored. There is an exchange of Defense Ministry delegations on the basis of an agreement signed back in 1992. Russia is ready to resume military supplies to the DPRK, underlining the fact that North Korea is a member of the United Nations enjoying equal rights and not subject to any sanctions, so no legal obstacles exist to commercial deliveries of arms and weapons. At the same time, officials point out that Russia can only supply weapons to meet the defensive requirements of Pyongyang (not offensive), and only on the basis of commercial profitability (and taking into consideration the overall security situation in the Far East). By contrast, Zhirinovsky's LDPR favors renewed subsidies for the supply of weapons to "the friendly North Korean state." The question of Korea unification figures prominently in Moscow- Pyongyang relations. To Pyongyang's satisfaction, the Kremlin welcomes normalization of relations between the DPRK and its traditional adversaries--Washington and Tokyo. It is stressed in Russia that the cross-recognition principle in Korea was originally advanced by the United States and was supported by Japan and the ROK. However, as Russians point out nowadays, although the Soviet Union and China did extend diplomatic recognition to South Korea, Washington and Tokyo failed to reciprocate by normalizing relations with the North. Moreover, the two powers began to pile up additional conditions for normalization. Pyongyang should be also pleased with Moscow's current opposition to any external attempts to undermine the communist regime in the North. Russia appreciates North Korean fears that the opening up of the lines of communications with the ROK, its allies and friends may cause interference with the internal situation in the DPRK. Because of its preference to establish a bilateral connection with the United States, however, Pyongyang is not too eager to promote Russian participation in the Korean settlement. Neither Moscow's "betrayal" in the past nor its military cooperation with the South compels the DPRK to be active in this respect. Yet, it can be expected that with further improvement of political and economic relations between North Korea and Russia (which looks quite possible) Pyongyang might want in the future to have the Kremlin at the negotiating table--as a counterweight to the United States and the ROK. 2. Russian Followers of Juche Ideas A large conference devoted to juche ideas was organized in Moscow in September. The following institutions co-sponsored the event: Moscow University, the Russian State Management Academy, the International Institute for the Study of Juche Ideas, and the international scientific association "Man in the Contemporary World." The financing came from the DPRK. Over 300 scholars and politicians from 30 countries participated along with Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korea's Workers' Party Hwan Chan Ob and North Korean ambassador to Russia Son Ser Phir. The Russian side was represented by professors and researchers of a pro-communist orientation, as well as by current leaders of the Russian Communist Party. Speaker of the Russian State Duma Seleznev (a Communist) sent a welcoming message to the participants. In their speeches Russian and foreign participants highly praised juche ideas and their creators and promoters--Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Dr. Porshnev, rector of the Russian State Management Academy, gave the following appraisal of the juche ideology: "Our scholars in their theoretical work pay a growing attention to the problems of men. On the eve of the year 2000, mankind dreams of a new democratic world. It is clear that such dreams can be realized only on the basis of new social theories. One of these theories is certainly the juche theory, because it is centered around man, builder of a new, more just world." One of the Communist leaders of Russia, O. Shenin (who had been among those who had masterminded the coup d'etat against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991) stated: "The theory and practice of juche represents the creative development of Marxism-Leninism in contemporary conditions. It is of a special importance because it has been successfully tested in the DPRK under guidance of the great leader comrade Kim Il Sung and his distinguished heir, comrade Kim Jong Il. Notwithstanding an international blockade, the DPRK continues to build a just, socialist society. This is a brilliant proof of the strength and immortality of juche ideas." Moscow State University professor V. Titov expressed regrets that juche ideas were not upheld by the Russian people: "If now we were guided by the outstanding theory of juche, Russia could escape the shame of being a semi-colony of the USA and of the severe exploitation of working men by dirty capitalists." None of these people had been particularly fond of juche and Kim Il Sung back in the Soviet days. To Shenin and company, the North Korean leader had looked rather like an arrogant chieftain who had stupidly dared not only to challenge Moscow's supremacy, but to invent a ridiculous theory as proof of his false theoretical abilities. Now that the Soviet Union and its Communist system have dissolved, anyone still professing adherence to Communism has become dear to Russian Marxist- Leninists. They admire Pyongyang not only for its ideology but because it does not like Russian democrats and the West. Kim Jong Il is for Shenin and company simultaneously an ideological and political/strategic partner. Russian nationalists share respect for the strategic value of North Korea. In this respect, it should not be surprising that leader of the LDPR Zhirinovsky lavishly praises North Korean leaders and the "grandiose achievements" of the DPRK. Juche, says Zhirinovsky, "means independence and bold actions, that's why we admire juche ideas." Analyzing the reasons of this new love of Russian Communists and nationalists towards Pyongyang, one more factor should not be overlooked: the red-carpet reception given to Russian "friends" who visit the DPRK. Zhirinovsky admitted in a recent television interview: "They treated me in the DPRK as a head of state, actually as a king. Military guards saluted in my honor, I was driven in black limousines, stayed in fairy-tale state houses. North Koreans know how to behave!" 3. The North Korean Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) The military doctrine of the DPRK stipulates that all efforts must be utilized to make the country a military "fortress," to spare no resources--human, fiscal, or material--in order to provide the armed forces with modern equipment and weapons and to strengthen their ability to withstand a major war. Up to the end of the 1980s, Pyongyang aimed at the capability of checking the enemy in the early stage of hostilities until its allies--the Soviet Union and China--could enter the war. Now, the North Korean leadership must rely exclusively on own its forces. The military emphasis in the development of the DPRK economy, which existed all along, has been even more pronounced lately. As a result, the economic structure is becoming more unbalanced and it is becoming less and less feasible to run the economy effectively. Such a policy, instead of helping the military sector, hurts it along with civilian sectors. Civilian sectors are not able to provide metals, technology and many other ingredients necessary for military programs. According to the estimates of the Institute of Contemporary International Problems, up to 50 percent of the DPRK's national income is spent now in one way or another on military needs. Much of these funds are channeled through the budget into civilian branches, but are in fact spent for military purposes. The unquestionable priority of military tasks and the permanently tense situation on the Korean Peninsula makes the MIC the dominating force in the DPRK. The MIC consists of the commanding corps of the Korean People's Army, the apparatchiks of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (the Military Committee and the Military Department), the DPRK Defense Commission (DC), and the leading ministries and agencies working under the auspices of the DC. There is perhaps no other country on earth where the MIC exerts as much influence on non-military segments of the government, economy, and society. The production of weapons--and particularly advanced types-- is performed by military and civilian plants in cooperation with specialists and designers engaged in industry, industrial research institutes, and the Academy of Natural Sciences. In working towards fulfillment of these tasks, all state agencies and their units are supposed to aim at raising the economic readiness of the country to wage a war. The level of readiness is said to be determined by the amount of material and human resources made available to the armed forces, the ability of major branches of the economy and the defense sector to function in wartime, the survivability of the entire economic structure, and preparedness of industrial and other facilities for utilization right from the start of combat activities. The existing concept presupposes that, accordingly, the basis of the war industry should be assembly plants and shops under the supervision of the central authorities that produce the main types of military hardware. In their turn, assembly plants and shops should have cooperative links with industrial amalgamations, whose core should be constituted of enterprises of various specialization, including machine-building. In 1975, the DPRK had about 420 of such amalgamations. Approximately 100 of these currently consist of huge modern complexes, some of which have been built using foreign equipment. A number of large and medium-sized civilian plants under central subordination regularly take orders to manufacture various types of armaments, parts, components of explosives, and liquid or solid fuels. These include: the tractor plant in Kian and "Kimsong" tractor plant; the "Renson" machine-building conglomerate's plants in Mangende, Tokch'on, Kian, Renson, and Pakwon; the machine-tool conglomerates "Khichan" and "Kuson" plants in Pyongyang and Ch'ongjin; the automobile plants in Tokch'on; the automobile-repair plant in Pyongyang; the electro- mechanical equipment and tool plants in Pyongyang and Tean; the shipbuilding facilities in Ch'ongjin, Wonsan, and Sinp'o Nampo; the petrochemical facilities in Anju and Ungi; specialized shops of the metallurgic enterprises in Nampo and Sonnim; and others. Besides those listed above, small military plants and repair shops under jurisdiction of military districts, as well as local civilian enterprises, take orders to produce and repair light arms, munitions, spare parts for less complicated equipment, uniforms, and accoutrements. The fact that different categories of enterprises participate in military production complicates to a certain degree their ability to function in a synchronized manner. However, Pyongyang believes that such a system will increase the survivability of wartime industries, while strengthening ties between the military and civilian sectors of the economy in peacetime. North Korea studies closely the consequences of military conflicts in other geographical regions from the point of view of their impact on the economy. The North Koreans paid special attention to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, as well as the impact of American and allied missile strikes on Iraqi industry. The conclusion reached was that modern local wars have an extremely destructive nature and, consequently, that additional measures need to be taken to secure the survivability of economy and to protect the population in case of a military flare-up. It is perceived as necessary to accumulate resources and construction materials for the restoration of economic facilities destroyed in combat activities. Additional efforts are made to create self-supportive military and economic districts (MED). At the present time, some of the more economically developed provinces have become such districts. Among them are North and South Hamgyong, South Pyong-an, and the Pyongyang military- industrial district. The MED has to have a complete administrative-economic system of self-maintenance. This aim can be achieved through the priority construction of medium- and small-sized enterprises and their functioning on the basis of local resources. In an emergency, these enterprises must become centers of production for light weapons, munitions, and spare parts. The MEDs that do not have a developed industrial structure (such as in Jagang, Kangwon, Yanggang county provinces) must create a certain number of diversified machine-building enterprises fit for small-scale production. This role, in practice, is often played by reconstructed auto, tractor, electronic, and other local enterprises. They are equipped with additional machine tools, measurement tools, and other necessary items. In peacetime, this equipment is generally stored, and may be used only in case of an emergency. Another direction for increasing the survivability of the economy has been the dispersion of defense facilities and the transfer of military enterprises to the northern provinces, distant from the DMZ. In 1993-96, the DPRK took new steps to guarantee smoother functioning by disconnected military industries and R & D enterprises, to overcome the difficulties of specialization, and to attack the resultant higher costs of finished products. But these enterprises continue to function only thanks to constant financial and material injections, increases in the working day, and mobilization activities (when workers are borrowed from the civilian sector in countries and provinces). There is no data confirming the existence of a developed network of specialized research institutes working for the military- industrial complex. This work, as a rule, is handled by the design offices (DO) attached to the enterprises of the military or civilian sectors. Institutes of the Academy of Sciences, as well as closed specialized laboratories and the DO in the technical colleges, orient themselves to the needs of the armed forces. In some directions, the lack of qualified cadres in the industrial DO leads to a low level of work in the designing of new types of arms. The war industry in the DPRK, having drained for many years major resources from civilian enterprises of the same profile, undermines the ability of the civilian sector to expand production and to conduct R&D that can be used to develop the civilian branches, as well as the MIC itself. It seems that this fact is appreciated nowadays by some North Korean leaders. Certain small steps are being taken periodically to adjust some military production facilities to consider local and regional interests. ICIP, Moscow