NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT, No. 19 (July-August 1999) 1. DPRK Missile Tests North Korean nationals working in Russia or visiting the country have explained the reasons why the DPRK will continue to pursue a long-range missile program. The most important consideration is security-related. As the North Koreans point out, "The American threat continues to grow by leaps and bounds." They believe that only a counter-threat can sober up Washington and prevent it from undertaking a campaign of "Yugoslavian-type aggression" against the DPRK. One North Korean diplomat notes: "The Agreed Framework made American generals confident that the DPRK had become defenseless; the only way to correct this misperception is to develop a credible deterrent against the United States." The question of national sovereignty also figures prominently in the thinking of Pyongyang. All North Korean representatives adamantly defend "the unquestionable right of a sovereign state to test and produce missiles for any purpose, including for space exploration and the protection of the Motherland." They argue that if missile development is permissible for the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, then it is surely permissible for the DPRK. North Korean interlocutors do not hide the fact that "the missile card" could be quite useful in their bargaining with Washington. They argue that "If Americans are afraid of our missiles, let them conclude a peace treaty with the DPRK, lift economic sanctions, and do other things to demonstrate their sincerity and friendship. Then, the DPRK may reconsider its missile program." Most North Korean nationals also mention prestige as a motivation behind their missile program. As one DPRK journalist stressed in a private conversation: "Not many states in the world are capable of making long- range missiles. The mere fact that small, isolated [North] Korea- harassed by Washington-has managed to construct such missiles adds enormously to world respect for the DPRK." Another North Korean representative hinted that publicity surrounding the testing of long- range missiles helps Pyongyang promote sales of its short-range missiles, which are "a very valuable source of income for the state." North Korean sources don't deny that its Taepodong test program is aimed, among other things, at boosting the morale of the North Korean population. One official said: "Our people are experiencing serious material difficulties. During such a period, it is tremendously important for them to experience the remarkable achievements of their country. This makes them proud and confident in the future and deepens their love for the great leader Kim Jong Il even more." It seems that South Korea is also a target of Pyongyang's missile program. "The Taepodong makes the South Korean puppets less arrogant, more considerate, and more flexible," according to one high-ranking North Korean diplomat. He argues that "Because of the Taepodong, ordinary South Koreans have stopped believing [Seoul's] dirty anti-DPRK propaganda." Most North Korean representatives in Russia admit that long-range missile development may also lead to some negative consequences for relations between Pyongyang and its adversaries. These officials, however, are convinced that "the benefits will easily outweigh the disadvantages." According to some North Korean officials, "Threats of reprisal coming out of Tokyo or Washington should not be taken too seriously. Both Japan and the United States make noises about the DPRK missile program in order to have an excuse for their own militaristic plans." These North Koreans conclude that Tokyo and Washington "in fact need our missile tests." All of the above points do not mean, of course, that Pyongyang will necessarily test another Taepodong missile in the immediate future. Although it is true that preparations for a test are proceeding, a combination of pressure and concessions by foreign countries (both hostile and friendly to the DPRK) may yet convince Kim Jong Il to change his mind. 2. Russian Experts Predict More Extensive Missile Deployments by the DPRK The recent naval skirmish between the ROK and the DPRK, according to several Russian experts, has convinced Pyongyang of the absolute necessity to push forward the missile component of its armed forces. The armed clashes in the Yellow Sea, these analysts note, revealed "the enormous gap" between the military technology of the South and North. Now, according to these experts, it has become clear that in any large- scale war at sea, the North will be beaten by its adversary "in a matter of days." Most analysts in Moscow believe that the same holds true for the air force balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. The majority of the DPRK's fighter aircraft are slow and primitive. If a large-scale conflict were to break out, two-thirds of the Northern air force would be destroyed at the outset. Besides the low technological level of its weaponry, the DPRK's armed forces are plagued by numerous other problems, including severe shortages of fuel, spare parts, and technicians. Russia experts argue that, under these circumstances and given the hostile attitude of the United States, Pyongyang "has no choice but to deter the threats to its national security through the development of missiles." They argue that long-range missiles are especially valuable as a warning to the United States "not to make any missteps while dealing with the DPRK." 3. China Reassesses Its Korean Policy Various sources indicate that, in the aftermath of the NATO air war against Yugoslavia and the general deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations, Beijing has begun to reassess its Korean policy. China's former displeasure with its stubborn and unruly partner, Pyongyang, has been largely put aside. The leadership is instead gradually moving to the conclusion that the main threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula now emanates from the United States. As Chinese officials point out, Washington is putting pressure on the DPRK that is "provoking" it to take countermeasures, including missile development. As a result of these American policies, according to the Chinese, the arms race on the Korean Peninsula and in the Far East at large is intensifying, while the current peace is becoming increasingly fragile. Chinese officials believe that the prospect of the U.S. unleashing aggression against the DPRK in a scenario similar to the Yugoslavian events is even more threatening. Such aggression, argue Chinese officials, would pose grave problems for China. First of all, it would create "a hot spot" right on China's borders. Second, Beijing's non-interference in the conflict would mean that it would be surrendering to American "dictatorship" in Asia. Third, in case the United States were to win such a war and impose its control over the North, the outcome would mean that the U.S. military would be gaining a foothold in the direct vicinity of Chinese territory. Citing all these circumstances, some Chinese officials do not exclude the possibility that U.S. aggression against the DPRK might push the PRC into a military alliance with Russia and trigger joint actions by Beijing and Moscow against the aggressor. These Chinese representatives, however, emphasize that such a prospect would certainly not be welcomed in Beijing. According to these officials, this is why China is trying hard to facilitate U.S.-DPRK and DPRK-ROK dialogue, as well as the normalization of relations. Simultaneously, Beijing is increasing its support and aid to Pyongyang in order to boost its morale and to prevent it from undertaking "rash actions," while at the same time warning Washington against similar activities. The highlight of this revised Chinese policy toward Korea may be a planned visit by Kim Jong Il to the PRC. At the same time, however, it should be noted that Sino-North Korean relations are still plagued by a number of issues, including Pyongyang's disgust with Chinese "capitalist" economic reforms, China's opposition to the DPRK's construction of a missile base near the Chinese border, as well as a bilateral territorial dispute. Thus, there are limits to the current warming trend. 4. The Food Situation in the North Russian observers in North Korea report that the food situation in the DPRK is better this summer than last year. The previous shortage of about 2 million tons of grain has been eased by food aid from the United Nations and other international bodies, countries like the South Korea and China, as well as by North Korean grain purchases in international markets. Interviews with North Korean citizens and on-the-spot observers confirm the fact that there are fewer cases of malnutrition and hunger-related deaths then in previous years. Russian experts also note that the social and political situation in the DPRK appears to be more stable. There are fewer instances of social unrest, a reduction in people migrating around the country in search of food, and a visible tightening of official control over market activities. This apparent improvement can be explained not only by a better food supply, but also by a crackdown by Kim Jong Il and intensified popular indoctrination, backed up by the artificial escalation of tensions on the peninsula. The conclusion of Russian watchers of North Korea is that, at least for now, Kim Jong Il's regime remains firmly in power. However, the permanent economic crisis, the maturation of the younger, post- revolutionary generation of North Koreans, and the increased flow of information penetrating from abroad create a time bomb for the current system. At some point, it is bound to explode. 5. Pyongyang's Displeasure with Moscow Despite some progress in Russian-North Korean relations in the past few years, Pyongyang is still unhappy with its former "elder brother." The most frequent complaint of the North is that it is ridiculed, harassed, and denounced by the Russian media. Official explanations that Russian television stations and periodicals no longer follow the Kremlin's orders are dismissed by North Korean authorities as "false," "irrelevant," and "absurd." Russia's renewed romance with Seoul is no less offensive to the DPRK leadership. Pyongyang was displeased with the warm Russian reception accorded to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung during his state visit to Moscow last spring. The DPRK leadership is also angry at the further promotion of military ties between Russia and South Korea. The fact that Moscow does not have plans to resume aid to its former ally does not help to promote friendly feelings in Pyongyang either. Finally, North Koreans are not anxious to intensify contacts with the Kremlin because, as they believe, the current Russian government is not stable and will not last long. However, Russia is too big, too proximate, and too important a state to be shunned by the DPRK for long. It seems that the improvements witnessed in Russian-North Korean relations in recent years will continue, albeit slowly.