NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT, No. 17 (March-April 1999) 1. North Korea's Reaction to the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia has apparently had a very deep impact on the thinking of North Korean authorities. DPRK representatives say privately that their government now "has discarded all illusions about Washington's intentions." According to these officials, the bombing has "completely and irreversibly" convinced Pyongyang that it is dealing with "a new Hitler" who is "determined to conquer the entire world through intimidation, pressure, and aggression." Pyongyang reportedly now has no doubts that, given the slightest opportunity, the United States will attack the DPRK like a "vulture." To deter this aggression, North Korea, while continuing to talk and bargain with Washington, will reportedly speed up its missile development and related military programs. "It is a matter of our national survival," said one high-ranking North Korean official, "and the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it can check the DPRK's missile development through cooperation with other countries or by any other tricks." North Korean officials hint that their country intends to acquire such a significant deterrent force that Washington "will not dare even to think about attacking the DPRK." North Koreans believe that Washington, if confronted with stiff resistance by the Serbs and worldwide condemnation of "NATO aggression" against Yugoslavia, may become temporarily more flexible in other parts of the world, including Korea. In their view, the situation around Yugoslavia presumably broadens opportunities at this juncture to woo the United States into agreements favorable to the DPRK. The North hopes to use this advantage to develop formal diplomatic relations with the United States, remove U.S. economic sanctions, and join international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The situation will be even better, North Korean representatives add, if the United States gets tied up in Yugoslavia for a long time. As one official notes: "Then, Washington will really have to act from the position of weakness. The myth of American invincibility will be destroyed. The prestige and influence of the United States in the world arena will vanish, and the Clinton administration will be seriously damaged at home." 2. The Status of North Korean Military Maintenance and Readiness According to various Russian assessments, North Korean conventional forces are suffering from a shortage of fuel, spare parts, ammunition, and repair facilities. Though quantitatively the armed forces are impressive, the qualitative side is rather backward. To overcome the widening gap compared to the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. troops stationed there, Pyongyang is now trying to upgrade the technical level of its air force and army. Local research and development is being augmented by imports of high-tech weaponry from abroad, which is being acquired through the export of North Korean missiles. A particular emphasis is being made to develop the country's missile potential as the main deterrent against external threats. It cannot be also excluded that non-conventional arms are being made as well. While the technical component of the DPRK's military might leave much to be desired, the human component should not be underestimated. Experts believe that the fighting spirit and physical condition of the officers and soldiers remain very high. There is no lack of food for the DPRK's armed forces, so this factor should not be construed as one weakening the military's readiness. While they may not be well trained in dealing with sophisticated weaponry, North Korean troops may prove superior to their opponents in any prolonged conflict. 3. The First Russian-South Korean Forum on Relations with the DPRK The First Russian-South Korean Forum of governmental, parliamentary, provincial, military, media, and academic leaders took place at the Russian Diplomatic Academy in Moscow on March 22-23, 1999. As one of their priority subjects, the two sides discussed policies towards the DPRK. The Russian delegation expressed its full support for Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy," describing it as "the only sensible strategy to promote peace and security on the Korean Peninsula." For its part, the South Korean delegation approved of Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang, including signing a new peace treaty. Seoul's only request is that this treaty include the same provisions as those of the Russian-South Korean treaty. The Russian side assured South Korean representatives that this was the case and that the treaty with the DPRK would not be aimed against any other party. 4. The Impact of South Korean Tourism on the North According to various sources, Kim Jong-il personally initiated the recent overtures that allow South Korean tourists to visit North Korean resort areas. There are two main motives behind the decision: the first is to make some easy money for the North Korean government, which is urgently needed; the second is to broaden possibilities for influencing large portions of the South Korean population. As North Korean representatives point out, "Those who come to the North will go back with very positive impressions of the scenic wonders and the friendly treatment they receive. They will then spread good feelings among other compatriots about the DPRK." It appears that Pyongyang is not particularly worried about the ideological impact of tourism on its own population. Contacts between South Korean tourists and ordinary North Koreans are extremely limited. Only trained personnel connected with (or watched by) DPRK security organs actually deal with the guests from South Korea. This self-confidence of North Korean authorities, according to Russian analysts, may be unfounded. Russian experts believe that if tourism develops and becomes a large-scale and permanent phenomenon, it will eventually contribute to the ideological "softening" of North Korean society and to the increased longing of the local populace for the ROK's material and spiritual values. They point to the existence of similar precedents from the history of human contacts between Western visitors and citizens of the former Soviet Union, East Germany, and other communist countries.