NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** The following "DPRK Report" is the product of joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) at the Russian Diplomatic Academy (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS. ------------------------------------------ THE DPRK REPORT, No. 13 (June-August 1998) 1. The DPRK's Alleged Construction of a New Nuclear Facility Most Russian experts express doubts about the recent U.S. reports that the DPRK may be building an underground nuclear facility northeast of Yongbyon. They argue that Russia does not possess any positive proof to support these allegations and that satellite photographs provided by American intelligence sources "do not show anything but some construction work." These experts argue that similar work is being constantly performed throughout North Korea for a variety of purposes. They note that "Pyongyang builds underground plants, storage facilities, roads, telecommunication lines, etc. It may also be a military installation, but unrelated to the nuclear program." From the logical point of view, these Russian experts contend, this particular construction project in the mountains cannot be nuclear- related. If Pyongyang had decided to break out of the Agreed Framework and resume its nuclear program, it have would simply restarted its already-built facilities. A new project requires tremendous effort, as well as considerable time and money. To build such a facility underground would take five to eight years and would totally deplete North Korea's currency reserves. In addition to wasting resources, Pyongyang would in the process lose everything it expects to get through the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. The conclusion of these Russian experts is that the U.S. charge against the DPRK is an attempt by hard-liners in the U.S. Congress, as well as in the Clinton Administration, to freeze the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework and to stop Congressional funding for it. These observers believe that North Korea is pre-occupied instead with survival and that it presents no nuclear threat to anyone. 2. North Korea's Appraisal of U.S. Policies North Korean officials complain bitterly to Russian representatives about current U.S. policy vis-a-vis the DPRK. They explain that Pyongyang's ultimate goal right from the start was to engage Washington in a constructive dialogue and to achieve full normalization of bilateral relations. The full normalization presupposed a firm U.S. obligation to cease subversive activities against the Korean socialist state and to halt its attempts to help the South absorb the DPRK. In addition, it expected that Washington would discontinue discrimination against the DPRK in the economic sphere. According to North Korean officials, Pyongyang considered the 1994 Agreed Framework as "the first step in the normalization process and as an important test of American intentions and plans." North Koreans now say that their initial hopes were apparently "naive." Washington, from today's vantage point, "never had any intentions of forging normal relations with the DPRK." Instead the United States was using the agreement to thwart North Korean defensive efforts and technological advances. North Koreans complain that the United States now shows not even the slightest interest in lifting economic sanctions and in normalizing relations. Moreover, its actions show that it does not want to fulfil its obligations to the 1994 Agreed Framework. There is no progress in construction of the light-water reactor and there are delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries. Outside the Agreed Framework, North Koreans accuse Washington of "stalling" in the Four-Party Talks, "spreading lies" about the construction of a new nuclear facility in the DPRK, and "undermining" the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo. Pyongyang is also angry about the continued freeze on its assets in U.S. banks, the ban on the export of agricultural and medical goods, transfers of money, telecommunications cooperation, and other initiatives. North Korean officials complain to Russian representatives that the DPRK "has been had by Washington." One high-ranking North Korean diplomat notes that the Americans "duped us into signing the 1994 agreement and succeeded in weakening our defensive capabilities." The DPRK, however, as its officials warn, is not ready to tolerate this "cheating." Pyongyang is serious about "shedding its chains"--the 1994 Agreed Framework--if Washington continues its "obstructionist" policies. 3. Pyongyang's Reaction to Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" Policy North Korean diplomats hint in private conversations that Pyongyang does appreciate the "honest" attempts by new South Korean President Kim Dae- jung to improve relations with the DPRK. Among the positive points cited in Kim Dae-jung's proposals, North Korean diplomats mention his rejection of attempts to absorb the DPRK and his readiness to develop economic ties, as well as his calls on the United States to lift sanctions against the North. North Korean diplomats are nevertheless skeptical, due to the fact that "reactionary forces in the South Korean ruling class" are opposed to a détente on the peninsula and will not allow Kim Dae-jung to implement his plans. Besides, they note that the current South Korean economic crisis makes Seoul "even more dependent now on Washington than before." This puts the United States in a strong position to block South Korean initiatives. Conversations with North Korean diplomats, however, also show that Pyongyang is not ready yet to respond positively to this "sunshine" policy. It is too preoccupied with internal difficulties and too afraid of the impact of South Korean influence on its population to start a real dialogue with the ROK. While Pyongyang is demonstrating some flexibility toward the South, it is only to impress the Americans and get concessions from them. 4. The Food Situation in the DPRK Most Russian economists believe that the food situation in the DPRK remains "quite tense." Recent floods have destroyed much of the upcoming fall crop, and the prospect is that North Korea this year will produce only 60-70 percent of the amount of grain it needs. If Pyongyang uses all of its hard currency reserves, it will be able to cover the deficit through imports, but then other needs of the regime will suffer. To avoid such a prospect, according to Russian economists, the DPRK will continue its policy of using foreign aid to feed the population. Of course, this will require allowing representatives of international relief agencies and individual states into the country. But Pyongyang seems to be willing to agree to such visits as the political price they must pay for the aid. Most Russian economists, however, disagree with Western reports that two million DPRK citizens may have died during the last three years of famine. Moreover, they insist that "famine" is not the correct term to describe the situation in the DPRK. It is rather a "shortage of food," a phenomenon that has always existed in the country, but in recent years has gotten more pronounced due to a number of factors: natural calamities, the obsolescence of farm equipment and the irrigation system, deficiencies in the Stalinist agricultural model, the overall crisis of the economy, and the termination of food supplies from the former "socialist" states. These economists suspect that North Korean authorities will deliberately exaggerate their hardships in order to get more international food aid. 5. Kim Jong Il's Plans to Consolidate Power The assumption of the presidential post will put under Kim's direct control all three crucial elements of power in the DPRK-the military, the party, and the state apparatus. Kim Jong Il is known for his "weakness" for the military. Leading experts in Russia believe that Mr. Kim will continue to rely on the army, since he depends on it to assure order in the crisis-stricken country, to prevent and to quell disturbances, and to solve urgent economic tasks (such as fighting against natural calamities, building roads, harvesting and distributing grain, etc.). The army is also needed to defend Mr. Kim from challenges within the leadership and to guarantee the security of the regime from threats outside the country. The pro-military feelings of Mr. Kim are strengthened by the memories of what happened to the leaders of the East European communist regimes who lost the support of their military establishments. Most Russian experts stress that it would be wrong, however, to consider Kim Jong Il as a "captive" of the military. They note that North Korean generals are not united in acting to exert influence vis-a-vis the supreme leader. Instead, the existing structure forces each general to stand virtually alone, exposed to control and punishment by the leader. No conspiracies or even joint positions detrimental to the will of Mr. Kim are possible within the military. Any attempt at individual or group dissent is crushed right away, according to these experts. As holder of the top party and state positions, Mr. Kim will have many more opportunities to enforce his personal cult on other layers of the North Korean ruling class. Potential reformers will have even fewer chances to voice objections and advance new ideas, since the party and state bureaucracies will now have clear and constant orders from the top and will have to concentrate on implementing the "general line." These Russian experts note though that if the economic crisis in the DPRK continues indefinitely (and they believe it will) then sooner or later pressure for change will arise within the ruling class of the country. At that point, the erosion of Mr. Kim's power base will begin.