NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
     *****   SPECIAL REPORT   *****

December 12, 1997 

The following is the complete transcript from the United States 
Information Agency of the December 9 news briefing by US Defense 
Secretary William Cohen and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim 
Dong-jin. The briefing followed the 29th Security Consultative 
Meeting between the US and the ROK. 

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Tuesday, December 9, 1997 Joint Press Conference, Washington

 COHEN:  Good morning.

First, let me express my deep gratitude to Minister Kim for his 
flexibility and consideration in traveling to Washington so we 
could hold this very important meeting.

As you know, the meeting was scheduled to be held in Seoul last 
month. Minister Kim and I have just concluded a very productive 
session. This is the 29th Security Consultative Meeting between 
our two countries. The meetings demonstrate our shared commitment 
to security on the peninsula and our reliance on close 
consultation between our governments.

Today we reaffirmed our strong alliance and our efforts to deter 
aggression. These meetings showed our ability to work together on 
a variety of issues.

First, the United States agreed to return the 4,955 acre Tong du 
chon training area to the Republic of Korea control. In return, 
the United States receives guaranteed access to other appropriate 
training areas plus land, some 58 acres, necessary to connect 
Camps Casey and Castle.

This is a win/win change for the United States and for the 
Republic of Korea.

Second, we reviewed the uncertainty of future developments in 
North Korea and agreed to consult closely on preparations for a 
wide range of contingencies, including humanitarian challenges.

Third, we discussed the long-term future of the alliance. We 
agreed that the United States and the Republic of Korea will 
continue to share significant values and security interests after 
the threat of aggression has receded on the peninsula. We intend 
to protect our interests by adapting our bilateral security 
relationship to the changing conditions over the long term.

Finally, I'd like to note that the first meeting of the four-
party peace talks is taking place today in Geneva. Minister Kim 
and I are both very pleased that the initiative that has been 
launched by our two Presidents has reached this point. Such 
diplomatic progress would not be possible without a solid 
security relationship between the United States and the Republic 
of Korea.

KIM: First I would like to thank Secretary Cohen and his staff 
for allowing us to have the 29th SCM here in Washington. 
Originally it was scheduled to be held last month on the 14th, 
but due to the incidents in the Middle East, we were able to have 
these discussions here in Washington.

Secretary Cohen and I have discussed ways of improving the 
situation and countering the threat from the North Koreans, both 
local and of a surprise attack. We have shared and cooperated and 
exchanged thoughts on these issues so that we can improve on the 
relationship between our two countries and to strengthen the 
long-term relationship of both of our countries.

I feel that it has been a most productive and satisfying 
discussion and I'm sure that both countries will work on these 
issues in the future.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I might ask on another subject briefly. You 
announced this morning that you're postponing a six day trip to 
the Middle East next week in large part because of the Iraqi 
situation, although it's also Bosnia. Is U.S. foreign policy 
being manipulated by Saddam's indecisions? And are you being held 
hostage by situations?

COHEN: I'm not being held hostage. This was a decision on my 
part, in view of the fact that we have two major issues to deal 
with in the coming weeks, and I decided it would be prudent for 
me to be in Washington next week when the President is here. We 
do have to provide political guidance to the NATO committee, 
defense committee, that is now examining options about what 
future role the United States and NATO might play in Bosnia. That 
decision really has to be made in terms of giving the guidance, 
at least, during the course of next week. The President will be 
in Washington next week and I hope to be able to consult with him 
frequently on that issue.

Secondly, because the situation remains unsettled in Iraq, I felt 
it would again be prudent for me to be here where I can be in 
direct communication with the President and the national security 
team if we need to consult.

As you know, when we are traveling sometimes communications are 
difficult, certainly aboard aircraft, and when secure 
communications are necessary, it also becomes complicated when 
one is not able to have direct access. So, for those reasons, I 
felt it would be wise to postpone it for a period of time until I 
can reschedule it -- much as I had to postpone the trip to Asia 
earlier by virtue of what was taking place in Iraq. I think, 
under the circumstance, it is wise and does not hold me hostage 
here by any means, but I think it's important that I be nearby to 
give the President whatever advice is prudent under the 
circumstances.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has the situation in Iraq changed at all, or is 
it now stable? How would you characterize it?

COHEN: I would say the crisis has eased somewhat, but has only 
been deferred. Until such time as Saddam Hussein agrees there is 
unlimited access by the UNSCOM inspectors, then one cannot say 
the crisis has been resolved. So I think the tensions have eased 
somewhat, but it remains to be seen whether they will intensify 
again, depending upon what the reaction is on the part of Saddam 
Hussein. Mr. Butler, as you know, is going to be traveling, if he 
has not already set forth on his travels, to visit Baghdad and we 
will have to see the outcome of his visit to the region and what 
the answer's going to be as far as providing unrestricted access 
to the UNSCOM inspectors to carry out their duties.

So I'd say the tensions have eased somewhat for the time being. 
They could intensify in the future -- in the event we don't see a 
proper resolution of the issue.

Q:  There's no deadline for access to those questionable areas?

COHEN: There's no deadline. As I've indicated before, there is no 
set deadline, but obviously the process can't go on indefinitely 
without being resolved.

Q: Does your decision to postpone the trip to the Middle East in 
any way signal an increasing likelihood of military action?

COHEN: It should not signal anything other than what I've said 
here today. I have to devote considerable time and effort to help 
provide some political guidance to the NATO Defense Committee and 
Ministers so that they can formulate a number of options to be 
presented to NATO itself in the very near future. It will be more 
difficult for me to do that if I were to leave on Saturday when I 
was planning to leave, and then come back a week later. I think 
we have to move on a fairly accelerated time schedule under the 
circumstances. So Bosnia is one aspect of it; and because of the 
situation in Iraq, I believe it's prudent for me to remain here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the North Koreans are pressing for top-level 
general talks, direct talks with the United States, and that is 
in direct contravention of the military armistice commission 
agreement. What is your response to that?

COHEN: Minister Kim and I discussed this, as a matter of fact. We 
intend to reiterate, if it needs reiteration, that the North 
Koreans cannot hope to, in any way, separate the United States 
from the Republic of Korea. We act with the Republic of Korea's 
government, we consult with them. We are strongly in favor of 
maintaining our relationship as it is, and the North Koreans 
cannot hope to try to divide that relationship by seeking to have 
direct bilateral negotiations with the United States. That is not 
acceptable.

Q: Can I interpret this as a firm commitment on the part of the 
United States not to pursue top general level talks with the 
North Koreans?

COHEN: We will not proceed with direct talks with the North 
Koreans unless it were in direct consultation with the Republic 
of Korea government in terms of whether or not we would be 
together in any kind of discussions. We are not going to have a 
policy of allowing North Korea to try to set up bilateral 
negotiations with the United States.

Q:

COHEN:  I'm sorry?

Q: I mean you don't want to think of the bilateral meeting with 
North Korea, but my question, is there any (inaudible) that 
proposals of the general meeting between the UNC and KPA will be 
such a meeting between North Korea?

COHEN:  I'm not aware of any such...

Q: Let me correct my question. My question is, instead of the 
bilateral meeting with North Korea and the United States, is 
there any agreement that the UNC -- the general meeting between 
UNC and KPA, the North Korean People's Army will be held?

COHEN: There will be no separate negotiations at any level 
between the United States and...

Q: I mean the U.N.'s command. The United Nations command and 
North Korean People's Army.

COHEN: Let me reiterate. There will be no such discussions unless 
the Republic of Korea is part of such discussions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as you are aware of the famine in North Korea 
and other deteriorating conditions, and as you read the tea 
leaves and read intelligence reports, do you feel there is a 
greater risk of a North Korean invasion now than at any other 
time in recent history, even perhaps since the end of the Korean 
War? The second part of that is, do you or Minister Kim see any 
aggressive actions on the part of the North Korean military?

COHEN: I think the situation in the North remains unpredictable 
and unstable. Whether it is more unstable today than previously, 
I think is an open question. Obviously the food situation has 
exacerbated their domestic problems, but that appears to have 
eased somewhat on a temporary basis, but the long-term outlook 
should not be improved based upon what we have seen to date; so 
that will continue to be a source, I would estimate, of 
instability.

In spite of the food shortage problem that has existed in North 
Korea, the North Korean government still devotes considerable 
resources to their military. So it is, again, ironic and perhaps 
inconsistent that while people are starving, they're nonetheless 
devoting substantial resources to their military. But that is the 
situation that we face.

Our reaction is that we intend to maintain a very strong 
deterrent, and the United States and the Republic of Korea, by 
being strong allies in this regard will deter any aggression on 
the part of the North. Should they ever seek to move militarily, 
we would respond in substantial fashion and not only deter, but 
defeat such actions.

So our best procedure right now is to maintain the strength of 
that deterrent capability, to improve it in any way we can, to be 
aware that there may be a chemical or biological capability on 
the part of the North, and be prepared to deal with that as well. 
Perhaps General Telelli and others can comment more specifically 
on that later, but that is our current capability now. We think 
we have sufficient forces and capability to deter any active 
aggression and to defeat the North should they be foolhardy 
enough to launch an attack for any reason -- be it a total loss 
of control of their domestic situation, or for whatever reason.

With respect to any aggressive actions, I think that we can say 
that we don't see at this point any act of aggression that would 
cause us to think there is any imminent danger. But I have to 
qualify that. They still have roughly a million men under arms; 
they still are forward deployed; they still have a capability 
that warrants our careful day by day, hour by hour, minute by 
minute scrutiny. So to say that we don't see any preparations 
that would indicate any imminent danger -- there's always an 
inherent danger just by virtue of the large force that they 
possess and the military capability that they have. So we are on 
alert and on the watch all the time.

KIM: We have almost two million men under arms. The risk of a 
second Korean War has never been absent. But as of now I don't 
have any indication of imminent North Korean attack. But the 
likelihood of a war there still exists.

Q: What concrete steps, if any, do you see coming out of Geneva 
this week? I'd like to ask you both, please.

COHEN: One can only speculate, at this point, what steps might 
come out of the meeting in Geneva. I think the important thing is 
that they're meeting. I would expect this to be a fairly long 
period of negotiations, given the history of dealing with the 
North Koreans. I think this is not something we look at in terms 
of spontaneous or very quick solutions to a long-standing 
problem. I think the important part is the process is on today 
and hopefully will continue, and that they're meeting and talking 
and not shouting at each other and we're not shooting at each 
other. So that is progress in and of itself.

Q: A follow-up to Minister Kim. The four-party talks, do you 
believe the North Koreans are sincere in their desire to make 
peace, to have a lasting peace? Are they going to talk to South 
Korea there in Geneva or any time soon? What is your assessment 
of their intentions?

KIM: First I welcome the talks after lengthy 19 month 
negotiations between the related countries. The fundamental 
purpose of the four-party talks is to have a long-term stable 
peace agreement along the Korean Peninsula. Because the talks 
have only started today, it is very difficult to foresee what the 
results will be, but we must not forget the purpose of these 
talks.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific 
said recently that the North Koreans appeared to be making 
preparations to deploy the No Dang missile. Is that missile close 
to deployment? If so, what kind of a threat will that pose to the 
forces in the region?

COHEN: I can say that the No Dang, the development of it, has 
been completed. Whether or not there are preparations underway 
for deployment or whether they have been, in fact, deployed, is 
not clear. But, obviously, any time you have a missile with 
increased range, that does pose a threat to the South and to 
perhaps others in the region.

Q: What steps is the U.S. going to take to counter those missiles 
once they're deployed?

COHEN: As you know, we are, in fact, developing a number of 
theater missile defense systems. We have a fairly vigorous 
program underway including our PAC-3 which, among the other 
programs, we will, in fact, take into account to counter such 
threat and to protect our troops.

Q: Secretary Cohen, as you prepare your Bosnia guidance, does the 
United States oppose any follow-on mission in Bosnia that doesn't 
include a certain firm withdrawal date as the last mission, 
since, as you know, there was some debate at NATO about whether 
or not there should be an open-ended commitment.

COHEN: I think that's yet to be determined. Again, the military 
committee, as such, defense committee, will make recommendations 
on options, and so I think it would be premature to indicate or 
speculate as to whether or not it would have a date certain or 
some other definition of what would take place.

Q: But that's not a requirement for a U.S. mission, to have a 
firm withdrawal date?

COHEN: I said it's an open question at this point. It's not been 
decided. The President has yet to make a decision on this. I 
believe he will need to stay in consultation with key members of 
Congress as well as his national security team which, again, is 
one reason I'm remaining in town for the next week.

Q: How soon do you anticipate a decision from the President on 
this? Don't they need to get going with the planning if there are 
going to be any changes?

COHEN: The planning has to be underway in terms of presenting 
guidelines to NATO itself, I believe by the 18th; in terms of 
giving the guidance. Then the options will be developed, and then 
there is a period of time following that, obviously, that the 
President will want to review those options as will all of NATO 
Ministers and then make a decision. So I would assume it would 
take place within the next several weeks, or sometime during 
January/February.

Q: A question for Minister Kim. Relating to the recent economic 
crisis in Korea, I expect that there will be some sort of effect 
on the ROK/US security structure that you have there. For 
example, on cost sharing and the modernization program. Has the 
Korean government relayed its position to the United States? And 
what was the response the United States showed to the position?

KIM: During today's discussions, there were no discussion 
concerning the Korean economy. Although it is true that the 
Korean government is having difficulties with its economy, I do 
not feel that it should or that it will affect the alliance 
structure that we have between our two countries. Additionally, 
because of the forthcoming tight budget, I do feel there will be 
some restrictions on the purchase of foreign weapons and exchange 
of personnel between countries.

Q: In connection with Minister Kim's answer, the South Korean 
government recently, reportedly, concluded an agreement to 
purchase four AWACS airplanes from the United States, and the 
ongoing financial crisis brewing in South Korea is certainly a 
fact, as you said, of the procurement agreement between the 
countries. How do you expect -- do you think the financial crisis 
will affect negatively to the purchasing process of the AWACS and 
others, the Apache helicopters and the Comanche helicopters and 
so forth?

COHEN: That really is a question that should be addressed to 
Minister Kim. The Republic of Korea government must make a 
decision based upon its current economic situation in terms of 
how it balances its economy with its need for an appropriate 
defense. We have to make similar types of decisions, whether we 
have a strong economy or a weaker economy, always looking at what 
options are presented to us. Under the circumstances, obviously 
this is a decision that has to be made on the part of the Korean 
government. The Republic of Korea must decide what it can afford 
under which circumstances. So it's not something that the United 
States can decide for the Republic of Korea. That's a decision 
that rests with them.

Obviously, they are very much concerned with the potential of the 
threat that the North poses and they have to balance what is 
needed in order to offset that. Whatever modifications would be 
made would be something that they would do in their discretion. 
I'm sure they would also consult very closely with U.S. defense 
planners, General Telelli, to find out and examine what sort of 
tradeoffs would be possible given budgetary constraints, what 
that would do to the warfighting capability. That's something 
that would take place in the normal, routine discussions of our 
affairs.

Q: Minister Kim, if I might just follow up briefly, are you 
saying that no decisions have been made yet on what types of 
military sales might be postponed or canceled? And are you also 
saying that South Korea will not cut its economic support for the 
37,000 U.S. troops on the peninsula?

KIM: As you said, no final decision has been made on the status 
of our modernization program. It is our government's policy to 
maintain the 37,000 U.S. forces as long as we face the North 
Korean threat.

Q:  So you will not cut financial support for those troops?

KIM: We'll be bearing the fair burden of responsibility in terms 
of budget.

Q: North Korea has said they're seeking the elimination of those 
U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula. What kinds of things would 
have to happen before the United States would consider any troop 
reductions in Korea? Or would you?

COHEN: First of all, the position stated by the North Koreans is 
completely unacceptable, as far as demanding that before 
discussions can be underway or continue in any fruitful fashion, 
that the United States must either reduce or remove its troops; 
that is not a negotiable item. Secondly, I think the United 
States only, in consultation with the Republic of Korea, could 
consider any kind of modification of our current structure after 
there were a demonstrable reduction in the threat -- and that 
would have to be deep and long-term, and we would have to consult 
very closely in terms of whether there should be any 
corresponding reduction in the size of the Republic of Korea's 
forces or the United States' forces. So that's something that is 
long-term in nature, there has to be demonstrable evidence of 
their commitment to reduce the nature of the threat, and we would 
make no decision until we had closely consulted as to whether it 
should be met with any kind of reciprocity.

Q: You mentioned a need for U.S. troops in Korea after peace has 
been established with North Korea?

KIM: As you know, our alliance has been threat driven so far. In 
other words, as long as there is a threat from the North, the 
U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula is very vital to the 
security of Korea. But we strongly believe the role of U.S. 
forces is very vital in maintaining peace and stability on the 
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. So the future of the U.S. 
role will be closely consultative when such things as a reduction 
of tensions occurs in the future.

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