NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** October 30, 1998 The following is the complete transcript of the press briefing given by a senior US Defense Department official on October 27, regarding Defense Secretary William Cohen's upcoming trip to Asia. The official was speaking on "background" and therefore was not identified. The US Defense Department transcript was provided by the United States Information Agency (USIA) on October 29. -------------------- Background Briefing Secretary Cohen's Trip to the Far East Tuesday, October 27, 1998 -- 4 p.m. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: To finish up the day we have a briefing by yet another Senior Defense Official on Secretary Cohen's upcoming trip to the Far East. I think most of you are acquainted with our briefer, but for the purposes of your reporting if you would refer to him as just a Senior Defense Official. With that, I will turn it over to our esteemed Senior Defense Official who will provide a rundown on his upcoming trip. Senior Defense Official: I'll try not to make this too long. I'll give you just a general background on the trip and be happy to take any questions. On Thursday, Secretary Cohen leaves for about a week and two-day trip to Asia. We will begin in San Francisco. He will fly to Hawaii where he will have meetings with Admiral Prueher, the CINC, Commander-in-Chief. He will be having some private meetings with members of the Hawaiian Congressional delegation. Obviously in Hawaii he will want to be discussing Admiral Prueher's reactions to his most recent trip through the Asia-Pacific region. We will then make our way to Hong Kong. On the way we will stop at Wake Island for refueling and he will have an opportunity to look at the new nature preserve that has been established in the last several months. We will spend about a day and a half in Hong Kong. While there, he will have an opportunity to spend time with our chief there, our DCM, Chief of Mission, Richard Boucher, and he'll have an opportunity to meet with the chief executive, C.H. Tung. We will want to primarily underscore the determination of the United States to continue its defense involvement, so to speak, with Hong Kong. Our ship visits are a high level interaction. This is primarily to underscore the continuing unique role of Hong Kong, and I think there also will be some discussions about attitudes concerning economic and commercial developments in the Asia- Pacific region as a whole. Obviously, Secretary Cohen continues to be very interested not just in security issues but political and economic developments. From Hong Kong we will go to Korea. In Korea we will hold what are called the MCM and SCM meetings. These are annual meetings between our senior- most military and civilian leaders on both sides to reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-Korean security alliance. These will be relatively important since they are the 30th anniversary of these discussions and we have planned some special commemorative events to underscore the importance of the alliance, particularly during this period of uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. Obviously, while in Korea, Secretary Cohen will meet with the senior Korean officials responsible for national security, both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense and the so-called Blue House. He also will have an opportunity to meet with President Kim Dae-Jung. From South Korea we will proceed to Japan where Secretary Cohen will hold intensive deliberations with the Japanese government about the status of our various security common issues concerning defense guidelines, progress on theater missile defense, and shared perceptions of regional developments. While in Japan, in addition to meeting senior officials of the Japanese government, including Prime Minister Obuchi, Secretary Cohen will also meet with key diet members, both of the LDP, the ruling party, and also other parties in Japan to try to make the case to them how important defense guidelines are for the security of our common partnership. And then he will return to the United States next Friday. I believe that's the 6th of November. That is the general outlines of the trip, and if anyone has any particular questions I will be happy to take them now. Q: Sir, if you had to list the two most important issues to be discussed with both the Japanese and the Koreans, what would you say they are? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So you want four total or two total? Q: No, one would be on the economic situation and North Korea. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I would say, sir, the over-arching issue that will be present in every one of our discussions is the question of the U.S. continuing role in the Asia-Pacific region. That role is multi- dimensional. It's just not of a security and political nature; it's of an economic and financial nature as well. I think reaffirming that continually to Asia at a time of profound uncertainty is extremely important. One of the things I think you all -- those of you who traveled with us earlier this year to Asia -- have seen that the United States in many respects is the Big C. We're the big constant in the region right now and they want us to continue our engagement and our leadership at a time of uncertainty, and I think that's very important. So I think the one unifying thing that runs through all of our stops is U.S. commitment to remain engaged, as Secretary Cohen says, both in good times and in bad times. And I think another important subtheme, particularly on the Korean peninsula, is to hold very close, intimate discussions with South Korea about recent developments in North Korea and to make sure that everyone understands in the Asia-Pacific region that our deterrence remains strong and credible, and that we appreciate that any hope of diplomacy with North Korea rests on the reality of our deterrence with our South Korean partners. Q: A question regarding the Hong Kong leg. Will there be any meetings with Mr. Cohen's counterparts from the PRC while he is there or what, more specifically, will he be doing? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Secretary Cohen's primary official call with be with C.H. Tung, the chief executive. There may be some working level discussions with representatives of the PRC and Hong Kong. And that's totally a scheduling issue. We're trying to set those up now. Those have to be obviously worked not only in Hong Kong but in Beijing as well. Q: Can you elaborate any more on the theater missile defense talks? Will anything be signed regarding cooperation or further cooperation? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Between the United States and Japan? Q: Yes. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Nothing will be signed. Obviously we will be continuing our close discussions on theater missile defense. I think Secretary Cohen will be stating publicly that it is our hope that the United States and Japan will be able to move ahead smartly in the not too distant future on a plan to work together on TMD. Q: You've made that statement in Japan. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We've made it many times, but he will reaffirm it when he is in Japan. Q: South Korea has recently agreed to actually put the issue of U.S. troops in the DMZ on the cart with North-South talks. Is that a concern? It was something that the -- I guess it's new in terms of that they have agreed to talk about it. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: That isn't quite right. What has happened in Geneva is that as part of the Four Party talks mechanisms, there is an agreement to create a subgroup on confidence building measures. There are two, but one of them has to do with confidence and security building measures. We think that the first steps along that path are how to improve communications in the event of an inadvertent accident or miscalculation. I mean, you understand we've got forces at high levels of alert barely, you know, a hair's breadth away from one another and inadvertent escalation is one of our most worrying possibilities. And so we will be looking primarily at ways to increase communication and other ways to build confidence between North Korea and the combined forces command in South Korea. Q: Was this trip related to President Clinton's visit to Japan and Korea after the APEC, and the second question is Taiwan is looking for possibility to join the KEDO, so will this question be raised to Japan and Korea, including a new membership or participation? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The first question is, obviously, one of the reasons that Secretary Cohen is going to Japan and Korea now is to assure that security issues are ready for deliberation and discussion when President Clinton goes to Japan and Korea about two weeks from now. And obviously because the Secretary is in communication almost daily with the White House, we will be sure to be working closely hand-in-glove with them on the preparation of the President's trip. Obviously, financial and economic issues are at the top of the agenda, as I said earlier, both at the APEC meetings in Malaysia and also in terms of the President's trip to Japan. But security issues are also extremely important because we are committed to making sure that Asia is at peace and stable, and that is the best kind of environment with which to develop -- to come out of a very significant economic downturn that we have experienced. We think that sort of reassuring statement and presence is extremely valuable. On the KEDO discussions or the suggestion made by, I believe, Senior Elder Koo when he was in Beijing, I believe that there has been some discussion with the State Department. I am not aware of where that stands at the current time. Q: Hong Kong seems to be sort of the odd man out in this trip. Why was it determined to include Hong Kong in this particular trip? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, not really. If you think about it, one of the statements that President Clinton made and, in fact, all senior officials have made once Hong Kong reverted, was that it was in U.S. interests to insure that the uniqueness of Hong Kong continues. One of the ways that you underscore that uniqueness is to insure that senior officials have the opportunity to go and interact with the leaders and other representatives in Hong Kong. I just want to underscore for you that from the perspective of the Department of Defense, one of the things that we are most interested in and most pleased with is that in many arrangements, particularly in terms of ship visits, as you recall, our ship visits to Hong Kong number something on the order of between 75 to 80, maybe even more, a year. It is a very important stop for us. But I think more importantly, shall I say, quite reassuring for the residents of Hong Kong to open their curtains in the morning and see American ships in the harbor. That is a statement of our commitment, of our presence in the region, and we want to continue that. And I think Secretary Cohen is there to underscore that this commitment is not just a transitional commitment; it will last and it is an attempt to underscore the uniqueness that we feel that the role of Hong Kong in the Asia- Pacific region. Q: Did you say he is going to a nature preserve? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, what I said was we were stopping for -- you're right on this one here. No, I'm sorry. We're stopping in Wake Island. Wake, as you know, was closed for many years and it is a fascinating place, actually. I was there not long ago, and there is a recently opened nature preserve on Wake Island and during that refueling we'll get off the plane and just tour that very briefly. But it has some very rare birds and, in fact, when I was there I was surprised very little has changed since 1942 or 1943. It's really like going back in time. Q: What is China's attitude towards this? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Towards this, going to the nature preserve? They've been very supportive. Q: To Hong Kong. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Very supportive. Very supportive. China has been very clear about its commitment to sustain Hong Kong's uniqueness and that visits of high level U.S. officials is completely within the spirit of that commitment. And when we discussed this with our interlocutors in the PRC, they view this as simply business as usual. Q: (Inaudible) said in a presentation he made last week he advised -- what was it he advised -- that as for the guidelines you wanted to see be addressed within this week, this year, but considering what is happening in Japan it doesn't seem that way. And you said that the Secretary is going to meet with key Diet members in Tokyo to make a point that it's important. What kind of difference do you think you can make? Do you want to expedite the deliberations? It doesn't seem that it's going to happen before the elections that they're going to have next spring. What kind of difference are you trying to make? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: First, thank you for the question. It is extremely important from the U.S. perspective that we can not be seen to be meddling in another country's domestic politics, and so we can not in any way suggest that here is the timing for this and not for that. Our point is to simply underscore that the recent developments, including the satellite launch and other potential tensions in Asia-Pacific, underscore the importance that defense guidelines legislation be addressed as soon as possible. And so when Secretary Cohen meets with a whole host of Diet members, it will be to make a case that this is in the strong national interest of not just the United States but Japan and the region as well, and this should not be something that should not be left for leftover politics. It is something that we believe should be addressed expeditiously, as soon as possible. But that ultimate decision about when it is addressed is fundamentally a Japanese decision. Q: Will the Secretary be receiving any focus briefings on the extent to which the Asian financial crisis has impacted the defense policies of -- SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Another good question. We have actually tried to prepare the Secretary with a whole host of material and he will want to be discussing with his interlocutors in Japan and Korea about this subject. I think, as you know, we have talked about this in this briefing room before that the Asian economic crisis has had profound implications for defense spending throughout the region. Major procurement development programs that were put underway in many of the rising so-called new tigers in the 1990s, much of that development has either been stopped in its tracks, put on hold, or discarded. So we want to look at defense industry. We will want to look at either ways that the United States can assist countries that are experiencing tremendous difficulties associated with a fall in revenues associated with defense spending, and we will be looking to see what the United States can do to assist in that matter. I will tell you the most important thing is to continue our presence, because we are really the essence of stability in the region as a whole. Q: What details can you give us, if any, with regard to what Japan now is seeking in the way of missile defense, specifically anything about hardware, how much they might want to spend. Just where are they? Are they really motivated by the North Korean missiles? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Another good question. I believe that the North Korean satellite -- the aborted satellite launch or the missile test did have a galvanizing effect on Japanese public opinion and even elite opinion in Japan. As you know, we have been involved for several years in an intensive study with Japan about all aspects of TMD research, both the technical aspects of it, the strategic rationale behind it, the potential regional security implications of it. Those deliberations have picked up substantially and I think there is a broad consensus between the United States and Japan that some form of cooperation is in the interest of both the United States and Japan. We are now in the midst of defining what the nature of that possible cooperation might be. Ultimately, I think as I have indicated at our last session, there are a number of areas that Japan has very real capabilities, both in sensor technology and of writing software applications. As we look at research and as we look at beginning an intensive period of study for how to build such a system, we think Japan might have very real capabilities to bring to the table. But ultimately, that is a Japanese decision, the level and nature of their involvement. Q: But they definitely want to buy American, join with Americans? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I didn't quite say that. I mean, what we are talking about here is collaborative research and development. Remember, when you talk about buying American, we don't have a system yet, right? We are still in the process of developing and thinking about such a system, and I think that is the kind of interaction that we are having with the Japanese. Are there ways that we can begin a process of collaboration in the development and the research stages? Q: I wonder, will that kind of application of collaboration or cooperation with the United States will the Secretary talk about the importance of providing a financial commitment to cooperation? I think they have already chipped in a little bit but it's in the millions rather than the billions of the U.S. -- SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Let me just say that any -- fundamentally and ultimately, any TMD program will be expensive. It already has been expensive for the United States. These are cutting edge technologies. They are many technologies that are in their infancies, and so I think everyone who is involved in ballistic missile defense and theater missile defense research or budgeteering understands that this is not something that can be done with leftover scraps of budget authority. This is something that takes a national commitment to achieve success. Q: On the political aspect of the TMD, the U.S. has emphasized the defensive nature of this system but the Chinese, the PRC, has, you know, over and over again voiced their concerns, the latest instance of which being a few hours ago comments from the PRC ambassador to Japan. How do you see the differences can be solved, or are you going to just go ahead with the study and eventually, if possible, deployment? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, first, we are going to go ahead and we have tried to make very clear that this is -- that we see TMD as a profoundly defensive system, that in a country like Japan that has no nuclear deterrent and has a peace constitution, that this is designed not in any way against China but against very real near-term threats. And the most blatant example of that, of course, is the recent satellite launch over Japanese territory. I think we have tried to explain to our Chinese interlocutors how important it is that TMD research and development can commence both between the United States and Japan and that this is a profoundly defensive endeavor. I think much more dialogue will still be necessary between the United States and China. Our Undersecretary, Mr. Slocombe, was in the PRC last week. I was with him and TMD came up extensively. The one good thing I will tell you is that I do think the level of discussion about this is becoming more sophisticated. I think there is a greater sense that these are defensive capabilities and technologies. They are also expensive. They are not a magic bullet. They don't provide astrodome kind of assurances or guarantees, but they are relevant. They are an appropriate defensive response to a dangerous world in which we live. And one of the things that we'll want to have further discussions with China is to try to underscore the importance of this. Many countries in the world are involved in certain forms of TMD research, not least of which China has a TMD research program, and so we think this is a prudent step on the part of the United States. We believe it's critical for our national security strategy and we think it's also important for Japan as well. But ultimately, as I have said, that is a decision for Japan to make. Q: In your discussion how much -- I mean, before the deployment of the TMD program, how much money do you think Japan is likely to spend and how far is it? I mean, how much time is Japan going use. And, also, is any other country like Taiwan or South Korea going to join the theater missile defense coordination? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: First of all, it is almost impossible to tell how expensive ultimately these kinds of systems are. I think many of you who follow domestic procurement understand that several of the programs that are underway are under some significant strain in review because of performance criteria issues. So I can't make that kind of prediction. I will say that we have studied this intensively with Japan for coming up on now almost five years, four and a half years, and I think that dialogue has been very productive. We believe that there will be a number of countries that have also looked at TMD research and TMD cooperation with the United States. Most of those countries are in Europe, and we have had some discussions with South Korea. As you know, South Korea at this time doesn't have the financial wherewithal to make this kind of commitment and I think primarily has been satisfied with the Patriot systems that have been deployed to South Korea for some years now. We are in the midst now of a study that will be Congressionally mandated to look at TMD and its potential strategic significance in the Taiwan context. And as you know, the United States stands by its commitment to provide defensive equipment and providing a security assessment of the situation across the Taiwan Straits, and we stand by that commitment. We have had a discussion for several years now with Taiwan on TMD issues and I think it is extremely important as we discuss this kind of system, there tends to be a sense to look at it in one of two ways: either TMD is some kind of magic bullet that provides ultimate security or it is a sort of terrible, nefarious kind of potential with deeply destabilizing consequences. If you look at those, they tend to be different sides of the same coin. In fact, this is just another technology that is still in its infancy that we believe can enhance peace and stability. PRESS: Thank you. ----------------------- End of transcript