Perspectives on Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia

U.S. - R.O.K. Areas of Consensus Interim Report

March 2008

by

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Introduction

The Atlantic Council of the United States published a report entitled *A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia* in April 2007. The report was the culmination of deliberations of a working group of distinguished American scholars and practitioners with a wide range of experience on Korea and Northeast Asia and chaired by Ambassador James Goodby and General Jack Merritt. It laid out a program for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as part of a comprehensive settlement of a range of fundamental security, political and economic issues on the Korean peninsula. The working group first met in June 2006, shortly before the North Koreans test fired a series of missiles and about three months prior to the time Pyongyang exploded its first, and so far only, nuclear weapon on October 9. At the time the project began, the Six-Party talks were suspended and prospects for a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue looked dim.

Yet by February 2007 the talks had resumed and the parties had issued a joint agreement on February 13 that set in motion a process for dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program while dealing with other associated problems on the Korean peninsula. That process continued throughout 2007 with the fits and starts characteristic of negotiations on these difficult issues.

On December 6-7, the Atlantic Council, in collaboration with the East Asia Foundation and the Kim Dae-Jung Presidential Library and Museum of Yonsei University, convened a conference in Seoul with a panel of South Korean academics, journalists, and diplomats and several members of the original Atlantic Council working group. The conference examined the April report, identified points of agreement between the Koreans and Americans regarding the key security issues on the peninsula, and took stock of the progress made on the ground in the Six-Party process. It took place at a key moment just two weeks before the
South Korean Presidential election and three weeks before the end-of-year deadline for completion of the second phase of the Six-Party process. Also of relevance to the conference was the historic Pyongyang summit between South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il on October 2-4. Participants in the December conference and a conference agenda are contained in Appendix A.

This report first outlines progress in the Six-Party process since the publication of the Council’s April 2007 report. It then recalls the major recommendations of that report and reflects the Seoul conference discussions, including both the areas of agreement and disagreement between Korean and American participants about both the Council’s report and the discussion of progress in the Six-Party talks in meeting those recommendations.

**Chronology of Relevant Events**

- **Six-Party Joint Statement issued on February 13:**
  - North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications.
  - In return, the other five parties in the six-party talks will provide emergency energy assistance to North Korea in the initial phase of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), to commence within 60 days.
  - All six parties agree to take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.
  - All six parties agree on establishing five working groups - on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, economy and energy cooperation, as well as a joint Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.
  - The working groups will form specific plans for implementing the September 19, 2005, statement in their respective areas.
  - All parties agree that all working groups will meet within the next 30 days.
  - Details of assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.
  - Once the initial actions are implemented, the six parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the joint document and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

- **On March 19, the US Chief Negotiator Christopher Hill announced that all of the $25 million in funds belonging to the North Koreans in Banco Delta Asia (BDA) that were frozen before were being unfrozen to reciprocate the positive steps the North Koreans have taken towards freezing their Yongbyon nuclear reactor and readmitting IAEA inspectors, with a future goal towards total nuclear disarmament of the Korean peninsula.**
However, the financial transaction ran into some problems in terms of time and being cleared for the North Koreans, who refused to negotiate further until they received their money. The talks stalled after two days and were recessed at the end of the fourth day.

The 60-day deadline was obviously not met because of BDA. The U.S. urged North Korea to meet its commitments as soon as possible.

On June 11 Russia agreed to transfer the unfrozen North Korean funds from the Macao bank and transfer them to North Korea.

On July 14, after receiving fuel aid from South Korea, North Korea declared it had closed the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and reaffirmed its willingness to dismantle its entire nuclear program. On July 18 IAEA inspectors verified that North Korea had closed its facilities.

Six-Party Joint Statement issued on Friday, July 20:

- The six parties expressed satisfaction with the constructive efforts made by all parties to advance the Six-Party Talks process and welcomed the productive bilateral consultations and coordination conducted to enhance their mutual trust and improved relations with each other.
- The parties restated their commitment to the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, and the agreement of February 13, 2007, and undertook to fulfill their respective obligations under those agreements in line with the principle of "action for action."
- North Korea confirmed its agreement to disclose all nuclear programs and disable all related facilities.
- The parties agreed that the five working groups would meet before August to discuss plans for the implementation of the general consensus.
- Talks would resume in September to hear the working groups’ reports and work out a roadmap for implementing the general consensus. After the end of the next phase of talks the six parties would hold a ministerial meeting in Beijing as soon as possible to confirm and promote the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement, the February 13 agreement and the general consensus, and explore ways and means to enhance security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

On September 6, Israeli Air Force jets carried out a raid in Syria destroying a building that was later alleged to have been a nascent Syrian nuclear facility reputedly built with North Korean assistance.

On September 7 in Sydney, President George Bush said "We're looking forward to the day when we can end the Korean War. That will happen when Kim Jong-II verifiably gets rid of his weapons programs and his weapons."

Yasuo Fukuda took office September 26 as Japanese Prime Minister, replacing Shinzo Abe. Fukuda has since pledged to improve ties with North Korea.

Six Party Joint Second Phase Actions Agreement issued October 3:

- North Korea agreed to disable all nuclear facilities subject to the September 2005 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement, including the disablement of three

- North Korea agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear materials, facilities, and programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by December 31, 2007.

- North Korea and the U.S. would increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. The U.S. would fulfill its commitments to the North (to begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act - TWEA - to the North) in parallel with North Korean actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.¹

- North Korea and Japan would hold intensive consultations to make sincere efforts to normalize their relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration.

- In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) would be provided to the North. Specific modalities would be finalized through discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.

- The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time. A final meeting will be decided on before the end of 2007.

- South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun met with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-Il in the Second North-South Summit in Pyongyang October 2-4. Among the agreements reached at the Summit were:

  - Strengthening military confidence building measures in the West Sea by combining security concerns and economic benefits in the form of the West Sea Peace Cooperation Special Zone.
  
  - Institutionalizing talks between the two governments from the Summit to prime ministerial, vice prime ministerial, ministerial and working group levels (talks at all these levels followed in the next three months).

  - The need to end the current armistice and build a permanent peace regime. The two sides agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war. South and North Korea to make joint efforts for the smooth implementation of the September 19 and February 13 six-nation nuclear agreements.

- On December 19 Lee Myung-bak was elected President of South Korea. He is due to be inaugurated as President on February 25, 2008.

¹ As he has done on other occasions, on February 6, 2008, Ambassador Christopher Hill suggested that the U.S. commitments in fact go further than stated in the October 3 agreement: “Under the October 3 agreement, the United States…reaffirmed its intent to fulfill its commitments regarding rescinding the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and the termination of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.”
• The December 31 deadline passed without the completion of the Second Phase actions agreed to on October 3. Disablement, which had been delayed at first because of safety considerations at the cooling pond and later because of North Korean concerns over slow delivery of energy assistance, continued at Yongbyon but was not completed. Of eleven steps identified in the agreed-to dismantlement process eight have been completed, and the ninth step, discharging the fuel rods in the reactor, as of February 2008, is currently underway at a slow but acceptable pace. The North Koreans had not submitted a complete and correct declaration of their nuclear programs, although Ambassador Hill said on February 6, 2008, that discussions continue with Pyongyang on the declaration. He also said that “complete and correct” means complete and correct, i.e., the declaration must include all nuclear weapons, programs, materials, and facilities, including clarification of any proliferation activities. By early February almost 200,000 tons of HFO had been delivered to the North, but not the full one million tons of HFO equivalent. Discussions had been held between the U.S. and North Korea on the processes of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to the DPRK, but those actions had not been completed.

• Ambassador Hill said on January 10, 2008, following a meeting with President-elect Lee in Seoul, that it would be desirable to complete all Phase Two actions by the February 25 inauguration of the new South Korean President and urged North Korea to provide a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs by that date. He made clear then and since that this was not a new deadline.

Recommendations in A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia

The original Atlantic Council report contained a number of recommendations to the U.S. Government to achieve a comprehensive settlement of security, political and economic issues on the Korean peninsula, including the North Korean Nuclear issue. This analysis examines each recommendation in light of the Seoul conference.

1. **Express a strong U.S. commitment to achieve a comprehensive settlement in Korea both to facilitate the success of the denuclearization talks and to resolve other critical security, political and economic issues.**

The conclusion of the February 13 agreement in the Six-Party talks, the efforts by the U.S. government to encourage fulfillment of that agreement by all parties, including the solution to the Banco Delta Asia impasse in the spring of 2007, and the October 3 agreement in the Six-Party talks to complete Phase Two by the end of 2007 reflect a strong U.S. commitment to a comprehensive settlement. Several participants in the Seoul conference noted a new, more active, American approach to this issue following the North Korean nuclear test and the Democratic victory in the 2006 mid-term Congressional elections.
2. Proceed reciprocally and step-by-step in a Denuclearization Agreement toward the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

The February 13 Six-Party agreement outlined a step-by-step, action-for-action, approach to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. While the timetable for the various steps slipped during the course of 2007, the process continued through the end of the year and future steps were contemplated after the (delayed) completion of Phase Two.

3. Pursue a four Party agreement among South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United States to replace the 1953 Armistice with a new overall political and legal structure for long-term peace and stability on the peninsula.

At the October 2-4 North-South Summit in Pyongyang, the two sides agreed on the need to end the current armistice and establish permanent peace and to push for a declaration of the ending of the Korean War. A rather odd formulation was used to describe this process: “The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned meet on the Korean Peninsula and declare an end to the war.” After some confusion and a sharp reaction from Beijing, South Korea confirmed that this was to be a four-party meeting that would include North and South Korea, China and the United States.

At the December Atlantic Council conference, most of the Korean participants advocated convening an early meeting in Korea attended by the leaders of the four countries. Most suggested that this should take place as soon as possible after the expected completion of all Phase Two activities at the end of 2007, i.e., early in 2008. The advocates of this position said that this would provide the necessary incentive for North Korea to make the hard decisions needed to move forward with Phase Three steps to complete the denuclearization process. This was a position advanced by South Korean officials as well as academic and media participants.

Most of the American participants noted that President Bush had stated that agreement on a new security arrangement for the Korean Peninsula would be possible when North Korea fully dismantles its nuclear program. However, it would be politically impossible for President Bush to meet with Kim Jong-Il in any forum until the denuclearization process was completed or at least much further along than envisaged at the end of Phase Two. Ambassador Hill suggested on February 6 that discussions about a peace agreement might begin after the completion of Phase Two, though conclusion of such an agreement would not be possible until after complete denuclearization.

While all participants in the conference agreed that it would be necessary at some point to declare an end to the war and to replace the Armistice with a lasting peace regime, the question of a four-party summit to declare an end to the war was the most contentious subject in the conference.
4. **Negotiate a bilateral agreement with North Korea – in close coordination with South Korea – to settle outstanding political and legal issues, normalize diplomatic relations, and provide U.S. assistance to foster economic development and economic reform in North Korea.**

One of the achievements of the February 13 Six Party agreement was the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea Working Group on the normalization of bilateral relations. An important first step in this process was the agreement announced at the October 3 meeting that the U.S. would fulfill its commitments to the North (to begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the TWEA to the North) in parallel with North Korean actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations. The December 31, 2007, deadline to complete the parallel actions announced on October 3 passed without any public action on the U.S. commitments because North Korea had not issued a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs and because the dismantlement at Yongbyon was not complete.

Participants in the Council's December conference agreed that further progress on normalizing U.S.-North Korean relations remains crucial to completing the denuclearization of North Korea, but they noted that further steps beyond those announced on October 3 will have to be part of later phases of denuclearization.

5. **Negotiate a trilateral agreement among the United States, South Korea, and North Korea to implement military confidence-building measures as well as to adjust deployments and force levels on the Korean peninsula. In these talks, the U.S. and South Korea would first agree between themselves and then negotiate the implementation of military measures with North Korea.**

One of the major elements of the October North-South Summit was the announcement of a program to develop military confidence-building measures (CBMs) between the two sides. The subsequent meeting of Defense Ministers moved the process along. Although consultations between the U.S. and South Korean governments have taken place on this important issue, it is clear that Seoul will be taking the lead with the North, at least in the early stages of this process.

It was noted at the December conference that CBMs should be part of a larger concept of building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Much of the discussion at the conference, particularly by the Korean participants, dealt with the steps necessary to establish a peace regime.

6. **Aggressively explore establishing a new multilateral organization for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia both to manage North Korea-related issues and to help realize U.S. strategic policy goals for the region as a whole.**
One of the working groups established by the February 13 joint agreement was on a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. The working group has met, but the results of its deliberations have not been made public.

The concept of a new Northeast Asian peace and security organization was mentioned widely in the December conference, usually as part of the discussion of a peace regime. Some thought that if it succeeded in resolving the nuclear issue, the Six-Party Talks could be a potentially important permanent forum for discussing other security issues in the region. The participants agreed that this would be one of the last elements that would be created by the Six-Party process, after the completion of denuclearization, a declaration of the end of the Korean War and replacement of the Armistice, U.S.-North Korean normalization, North-South reconciliation (if not unification) and the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula. There were different views about the nature and purposes of a regional peace and security mechanism that were not resolved during the conference.

7. **Convene an on-going series of meetings of foreign ministers of the countries involved in negotiating a comprehensive settlement for the purpose of overseeing these negotiations and forming the nucleus of a new multilateral organization. An initial meeting of foreign ministers, agreed to in the Six-Party “joint agreement of February 13, 2007,” should take up these issues.**

Because of delays in implementing the first and second denuclearization phases, the ministerial mentioned in February 2007 has not yet taken place, although it is widely expected after the completion of the second phase.

At the December conference, there was agreement by the Koreans and Americans that high-level attention was necessary to the success of the Six-Party process, and that meetings of foreign ministers would be a crucial part of that attention. While the Korean participants strongly encouraged an early Summit of the leaders from at least the four parties directly connected with the Korean War armistice for the purpose of declaring an end to the War, most of the Americans urged instead the consideration of an early ministerial as a means of highlighting senior engagement in the process as a more practical approach, at least for the United States.

8. **Immediately propose interim military confidence-building measures, from among those contemplated for a trilateral agreement, to foster the necessary political confidence among the parties for negotiating a comprehensive settlement.**

The limited confidence-building measures announced at the Summit include some of the kinds of interim measures discussed in the Council’s report, but these are strictly bilateral and do not formally include the United States.

9. **Seek bipartisan consensus in the Congress on U.S. diplomatic objectives regarding Korea.**
The Bush Administration has consulted closely with the Congress throughout the Six-Party process and will continue to do so. In particular, Congressional support will be necessary at a minimum in removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act.

This subject was not discussed in any depth at the December conference.

10. **Synchronize U.S. strategy more effectively with South Korea. Washington should exert all possible efforts to coordinate its negotiating positions with Seoul and strengthen cooperation through the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP).**

One of the major themes at the December conference was the extent to which bilateral Seoul-Washington relations have improved in the last year or two. Both Korean and American participants anticipated this trend would continue and grow stronger with the expected election of Lee Myung-bak as the new President of South Korea. There was considerable discussion of the reasons for recent bilateral difficulties, not least of which was the split between progressives and conservatives on Korean issues in both governments. Participants cautioned that the bilateral relationship needs continuous tending, but they were optimistic that things are moving in the right direction. This will be essential for the success of the denuclearization process, since a strong common U.S.-South Korean front is crucial for dealing with the North.

**Conclusion**

The Atlantic Council’s report *A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia* was by design the product of deliberations just by Americans, without the participation of South Koreans or experts from any of the other Six-Party countries. The December conference was intended as a second stage in the Council’s effort to devise a successful strategy for strengthening relations with South Korea, reversing U.S. relations with North Korea and achieving the broader goal of establishing peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The terminology used by the participants in the conference differed in some significant respects from that used in the Council’s report, largely because they based the discussion more on the words used in the Six-Party process than on the report.

Nonetheless, there were significant areas of agreement by the Koreans with the substance of the report. The major disagreement dealt with the prospects and timing for a Summit meeting of the four parties directly involved with the Korean War to declare the end of the War as an early step in establishing a peace regime on the peninsula. The Koreans, reflecting the recent North-South Summit declaration on this subject, urged that a meeting take place sooner rather than later. The Americans, citing domestic political considerations, said that an early meeting at the highest level is not feasible and could only happen after considerably more progress on denuclearization.
The Council now plans to arrange discussions with scholars and other experts from Russia, China, Japan and North Korea, i.e., the remaining members of the Six-Party process, on the April report, this interim report and further Six-Party progress. We will then issue a final report to guide U.S. policy-makers in their efforts to bring about a framework for peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia.

Acknowledgements

The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Korea Foundation for its financial support for this project. The Foundation funded the deliberations of the original Council working group and the publication of the April 2007 report, the December conference in Seoul and the publication of this interim report. The Foundation has also agreed to support the next phase of the project involving the other four Six-Party members and the publication of the final report.

We would also like to express our appreciation for the assistance of the Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum of Yonsei University and its Director Professor Sang-young Rhyu and the East Asia Foundation and its Secretary General Hyung Taek Hong in conducting the December conference. The qualifications of the Korean participants chosen by both local organizations could not have been greater and the arrangements for the conference were superb.

Finally, the Council expresses its gratitude for the work done by Senior Fellow Donald Gross, who has directed this project from the beginning and who was responsible for coordinating with Professor Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University to set up the December conference.
A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia

Conference Hall
Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum
Seoul, Korea

Thursday, December 6 – Friday, December 7, 2007

Agenda

Thursday, December 6, 2007

15:00–15:30 Registration

15:30–18:00 Session 1: Building Consensus on US and ROK Policy Goals toward the DPRK

Topics for Discussion: ROK & U.S. Policy Goals
- Dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear program
- Reaching a comprehensive settlement for the Korean peninsula which replaces the 1953 Armistice
- Strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance
- Ending mutual hostility in US-DPRK relations
- Promoting Korean unification
- Ending the DPRK’s development and export of missiles
- Ending the DPRK’s illegal activities, including counterfeiting & drug trafficking
- Furthering reform and openness in the DPRK
- Resolving the DPRK’s structural economic crisis
- Continuing ROK humanitarian contacts with the DPRK
- Assisting the DPRK in building large-scale infrastructure
- Establishing a South-North Economic Community
- Encouraging normalization of Japan-DPRK relations

Moderator: Se Hyun Jeong, Former Minister of Unification; Distinguished Professor, Ewha Womans University, Korea; Member of 2nd Inter-Korean Summit special attendant
Presenters:
1. David Straub, Pantech Fellow, the Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, USA
2. Haksoon Paik, Senior Fellow, the Sejong Institute, Korea
3. Sun-won Park, Secretary to the President for National Security Strategy, Cheong Wa Dae, Korea

Discussant: Hayong Moon, Distinguished Professor in Diplomacy, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Korea

19:00 Dinner

Friday, December 7, 2007

09:00–12:00 Session 2: Taking Practical Measures towards Peace Arrangements on the Korean Peninsula

Topics for Discussion: ROK & U.S. Measures for Policy Implementation

- Achieving an Agreement to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear program
- Reaching a four-party agreement among the ROK, DPRK, China and the U.S. to replace the 1953 Armistice
- Achieving a U.S.-DPRK bilateral agreement which normalizes relations
- Concluding a trilateral agreement among the ROK, DPRK and the U.S. on Military CBMs and conventional arms reductions/redeployments
- Taking measures to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance
- Ending the DPRK’s development and export of missiles
- Removing the DPRK from the U.S. terrorism list
- Lifting economic sanctions against the DPRK
- Ending the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
- Taking measures to promote and support Korean unification
- Facilitating the DPRK’s relations with the international community to bring greater reform, openness and economic development
- Establishing a South-North economic community
- Normalizing U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relations
- Providing large-scale energy assistance to the DPRK
- Instituting a verification and compliance regime for the DPRK’s nuclear dismantlement

Moderator: Donald Gross, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States, USA

Presenters:
1. Leon Sigal, Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council, USA
2. Keun-Sik Kim, Professor, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Korea (a member of special attendant of 2nd inter-Korean summit)
3. **Tae-ho Kang**, Senior Reporter, Foreign and Inter-Korean Relations Department, The Hankyoreh Shinmun, Korea

**Discussant:** **Wonhyuk Lim**, Research Fellow, Korea Development Institute, Korea

12:30 –14:00  Lunch

14:00–16:00  **Session 3: Multilateral Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia: Interests, Power, and Regional Dynamics**

**Topics for Discussion: ROK & U.S. Policy Goals**
- Creating a security community in Northeast Asia
- Peacefully resolving disputes and promoting non-use of force
- Encouraging transparency and preventing miscalculations
- Limiting North Korea’s hostile activities
- Encouraging peaceful Korean unification
- Improving Japan-China relations
- Reducing tension on the cross-strait issue
- Enhancing regional economic cooperation
- Promoting free movement of people, information and ideas
- Fostering improved mutual understanding of culture & history

**Topics for Discussion: ROK & U.S. Measures for Policy Implementation**
- Institutionalizing the Six Party talks
- Supporting the 2+4 consultation system
- Promoting the unification of the Korean peninsula
- Expanding the multilateral security system
- Promoting a U.S.-led multilateral security system in Northeast Asia
- Concrete measures to enhance the prosperity of Northeast Asia

**Moderator:** **Joseph Snyder**, Director, Asia Program, The Atlantic Council of the United States, USA

**Presenters**
1. **Alan Romberg**, Director, the East Asia Program, Henry L. Stimson Center, USA
2. **Chung Min Lee**, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Korea
3. **In-kook Park**, Deputy Minister, Department of International Organization and Global Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea

**Discussant:** **Sang-young Rhyu**, Director, Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum, Yonsei University, Korea

16:00–16:30  **Coffee Break**
16:30–18:00  
**Session 4: Roundtable and Wrap-up**

*Moderator: Chung-in Moon*, Director, East Asia Foundation; Professor, Department of Politics, Yonsei University, Korea

19:00  
**Dinner**

**Participants List**

**Jeong Se Hyun**, Former Minister of Unification and Distinguished Professor Ewha Womans University

**David Straub**, Pantech Fellow, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

**Paik Haksoon**, Senior Fellow, the Sejong Institute

**Park Sun-won**, Secretary to the President for National Security Strategy, Cheong Wa-Dae

**Moon Hayong**, Distinguished Professor in Diplomacy, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

**Donald Gross**, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States

**Leon Sigal**, Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council

**Kim Keun-Sik**, Professor, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

**Kang Tae-ho**, Reporter, Foreign and Intern-Korean Relations Department, the Hankyoreh Shinmun

**Lim Wonhyuk**, Fellow, Korea Development Institute

**Joseph Snyder**, Director, Asia Program, The Atlantic Council of the United States

**Alan Romberg**, Director, East Asia Program, Henry L. Stimson Center

**Park In-kook**, Deputy Minister, Department of International Organization and Global Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

**Lee Chung Min**, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

**Rhyu Sang-young**, Director, Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum, Yonsei University

**Moon Chung-in**, Professor, Department of Politics, Yonsei University