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A ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE?

Case Study by THOMAS STERN

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


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FIFTEENTH SESSION

SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1972-73

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
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"It (the Department of State) might be, as a comedian said, 'It is like Gina Lollobrigida's elbow--everyone knows it is there, but who cares?'."

Editor, medium-size newspaper, South

"As the little girl said: 'I thought that was where they made fudge'."

Assistant Professor, large University,
Middle West

"I would prefer to have the State Dept. in charge of all int'l concerns and put the Dept. of Defense under the State Dept."

Assistant Professor, medium-size
University, Middle West

"The Department of State should be solely responsible for policy formulation.

It should have overall supervisory responsibility for all relations with foreign nations."

Professor, small College, South

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FOREWORD

This paper has been written under the auspices of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. It should be noted that both limitations of research time and length of paper were imposed on the officers attending the Seminar. For this particular paper, although I believe sufficient evidence has been presented to support the conclusions, the limitations have not permitted complete analyses of all possible statistical correlations which might have been elicited from the data collected.

It is recommended that the reader review the section on "Methodology" first. That background may make the comprehension of the main part of the paper somewhat easier.

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge a great debt of gratitude to Ms. Janice Pemberton and Ms. Nella Wade of the Institute and to Mr. William W. Francis and Mr. Dennis Lamb of the Department's Automatic Data Processing Division for their invaluable assistance.

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SUMMARY

In recent months, much has been written about the concept of monetary "floats". It is my contention that the Department of State has been in a state of organizational "float" for at least the last 12 years. This situation applies both to its role in Washington and to its internal organization.

A "float" exists when a government permits the value of its currency to be determined by the market-place; that is, in response to supply and demand. A "float" is "clean" when the country's central bank does not interfere at all with the market-place's operations; it becomes "dirty" when the bank intervenes to maintain the value of the currency at some level determined by the bank. The opposite of the "float" situation exists when governments arbitrarily fix the value of their currency in terms of a fixed standard (i.e., gold or dollars).

Since 1960, the Department of State has been in a "float" condition since its role (or "value") became less and less well-defined in relationship to the Office of the President and other Cabinet Departments and agencies. At times, Presidents have tried to establish the role ("a dirty float" situation) by issuing pronouncements which may have had some short-term effects, but were soon ignored by the bureaucrats ("speculators") either because they doubted the sincerity of the statement or because they felt they could re-establish a "clean float" situation through well-known bureaucratic techniques.

With no defined or established role in Washington, it became impossible for the Department to establish clear functions for its constituent organizational components. Since it was not able to define its goals, the Department could also not determine whether it had achieved them resulting in continual criticisms from various sources, all of whom probably had differing views of State's role. Within the Department, the "float" situation creates tensions, confusions and ineffectiveness, leaving the decision-making process in the hands of the aggressive and battle-wise bureaucrat, rather than the theoretically established authority. This environment also explains the communication gap existing among the various organizational levels of the Department on the subject of roles and anticipated actions. Each level, or perhaps even each individual, sees and defines the Department's role in Washington based on his or her own personal status both in the Department and with other agencies. That status is partially defined by the person's position and partially defined by his personality. This phenomenon undoubtedly occurs in every organization; it is however more acute and perhaps more critical in the case of the Department of State.

Most management experts would agree with Drucker and Peter that if the Department's role is as undefined as it seems to be, this would continue and perhaps even increase the Department's present irrelevancy. This comment applies to the institution and not necessarily to the individuals within it, who may, through personal attributes, continue to enjoy great influence. On the other hand, Harland Cleveland might describe the current situation as fore-runner of future organizational relationships.

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Without disputing Mr. Cleveland's contention which may prove to be quite correct.. I believe that at least for the short run, the Department's role must be defined in as specific terms as possible. But before the organization's objectives and goals are established, it would seem essential that there be a re-examination of terms such as "foreign policy", "international relations", "foreign affairs" and "coordination". I question the implicit assumption that these terms are commonly understood. Furthermore, some doubts have to be raised concerning the relevancy of these terms in today's world and note must be taken of the neo-isolationist trends in this country.

Finally, attempts should be made to clarify the apparent confusion between the roles of the Secretary of State and the Department of State. A similar confusion has arisen between the roles of the Foreign Service of the United States and the Department of State. Each of these entities has a distinct and definable life of its own; the lack of understanding of this fact merely aggravates an already over-amorphous situation.

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THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. As Seen By Respondents To Questionnaire

Several of the questions asked of media editors and APSA members were intended to elicit general responses concerning the status of the Department in the eyes of these two groups. It was important to determine whether the Department's activities were felt to be at all important; for if they were not, then the question of role might be immaterial. It would appear that in general the Department is still considered to be a vital element in the Federal structure. For example, in response to the question "If an Administration's foreign policy is successful, is it important or unimportant whether the Department is "effective" or has "good morale" the response was overwhelmingly on the side of "important".

	<u>Media</u>	<u>APSA</u>
Very Important	53.6%	44.3%
Relatively Important	33.7	39.7
Relatively Unimportant	4.0	9.4
Very Unimportant	.7	.7
No Response or Don't Know	8.0	5.9

No significant difference in response appeared between the two groups or among respondents of differing sub-groups.

On the question "Do you believe that in the field of foreign policy, the Department of State should have primacy over other Cabinet Departments in the policy making process?" the answers were predominantly "Yes" (83.1% from the media and 87.4% from APSA, when the "No response" were excluded)

However, significant differences arose among the various sub-groups. The representatives of the newspapers with larger circulation (100,000 and over) were only 76% in favor of State's primacy. One out of four editors living in the Northeast and West did not believe that State should have the primacy. Among the academics, the support for primacy ranged from 90% for persons living in the Northeast to 76% for respondents from the West. A similar wide range existed among the various academic ranks with the lecturers unanimously voting for primacy, as contrasted with only 81% of the associate professors. These variations are basically consistent with general attitudinal differences found among the sub-groups which will be described subsequently in greater length.

When it came to determining what specific functions might be assigned to the Department, an interesting pattern developed which was generally applicable to both the media and the APSA group. Below are the functions in order of preference, with the first listed function having received the most support:

	<u>Media</u>	<u>Ranking</u>	<u>APSA</u>
To identify crucial international relations problems	1		3
To present the U. S. views to foreign countries	2		2

	<u>Media</u>	<u>Ranking - continued</u> <u>APSA</u>
To protect American citizens abroad and to issue passports and visas	3	1
To provide continuity to US foreign policy	4	4
To intergrate and coordinate US overseas programs	5	5
To administer cultural and educational exchange programs	6	9
To formulate long-range policies	7	8
To represent the views of foreign governments in US Government councils	8	7
To formulate US policies (with the understanding that the President would approve major recommendations)	9	10
To serve as balance to US military policy proposals	10	6
To represent Administration views to Congress	11	12
To serve as balance to domestic protectionist economic policy proposals	12	11
To be responsible for resource allocations for all US overseas programs	13	13
To represent Administration views to the US public	14	14

It is interesting to note that both groups prefer a basically passive role for the Department, as exemplified by three of the first four functions. The first "managerial" function is listed as only fifth by both groups. The "activist" functions such as policy formulation, resource allocation responsibilities and the "balancing" to other interests rate low in the list. Also very low on the list are the functions of representation to the public and Congress, which would seem to indicate either a lack of confidence in the Department's ability to represent the Administration or a desire to have policy pronouncements and justifications emanate from other sources in the Administration, presumably the White House. Although all functions received the support of the majority of respondents, among the media representatives, the responsibility for representing the Administration's views to the public and for resource allocations would be assigned to the Department by only 50% of the editors. Fifty-three percent of the APSA respondents would assign these two functions to the Department.

It might be interesting to analyze some of the more contentious functions which substantial minorities of both groups indicate great reluctance to assign to the Department.

"To be responsible for resource allocations for all US overseas programs"

It is hard to understand why there seems to be so much reluctance to permitting the Department to allocate resources for overseas

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

programs when the respondents were greatly in favor of allowing the Department to integrate and coordinate overseas programs. Undoubtedly, there are some semantic problems involved with the terms used which must have been unfamiliar to some of the respondents. In my judgement, the essence of coordination and integration is resource allocation; without it, as the Department has long ago found out, the coordination function is empty, relying primarily on pleas for cooperation or on an overwhelming personality. The Middle West editors were consistent in their support, although in substantial varying percentages, for assigning both the coordination and the resource allocation functions to State. The same pattern existed for faculty members in the Comparative Government field.

It seems to me that the lack of agreement indicated on this function is a perfect illustration for the need to define key terms when describing an organizational role. It seems obvious that the word "coordination", for example, implies a different function to a large number of the respondents than it did to me.

"To represent Administration views to the US public"

I can only surmise that the large number of respondents who would not assign this function to State are stating a preference for Presidential statements. The other possible answer is that State's credibility has sunk so low that many would not rely on its statements in any case. There was wide disagreement among editors from small and large papers on one hand and the editors of medium-size papers on the other. The former group's majority would not assign this function to the Department. Similar opposition appeared among editors under the age of 40 and over the age of 60. The Northeast editors were the most skeptical of the geographic groupings.

Academics under 30 indicated the same reluctance as their newspaper contemporaries. APSA members living in the Southwest were most strongly opposed while a majority of their colleagues in the South favored State's discharge of this function.

"To serve as balance to domestic protectionist economic policy proposals"

A far greater percentage of the APSA respondents favored this role for the Department than did the media representatives. This might indicate a greater concern in the academic community for the possibility of serious protectionist sentiment in the federal government or perhaps a greater support for such sentiment among the media. Among the various APSA sub-groups there was very little differentiation on this issue. All sub-groups were relatively close to 71% of the total group who would assign this function to the Department.

Among the media sub-groups, there were some wide divergences. There was a steady increasing opposition to State's assumption of this responsibility with the newspapers with smaller circulation favoring the proposal by 70% with the papers with large circulations only showing 45% support. There also was a wide spread on a



geographic basis with the West showing the smallest agreement (38%) and the Middle West the highest (58%). The repeated pattern of strongest support from the Middle West and least support from the West is worthy of note. It had always been one of the cherished perceptions that the Middle West was the center of isolationism and the West in the forefront of an active foreign policy. If one can translate attitudes toward the Department into general views of foreign policy, then perhaps time has overtaken these perceptions. It may well be that with the ever-increasing agricultural trade that has been developing between the Middle West and the rest of the world, that this section of the country is becoming the center for support for international cooperation. The West on the other hand may feel it is delighted to be so far away from Washington and would wish to minimize all Federal governmental action.

"To represent Administration views to Congress"

Approximately only 65% of the respondents from both groups agreed that the Department should exercise this function. The usual pattern prevailed here with respondents under the age of 30 showing the greatest opposition to the Department. The Middle West media showed greatest support, with editors living in the Northeast and West showing least agreement.

I assume that the sentiment reflected by the "disagree" vote is similar to that indicated in response to the question concerning the Department's representation to the US public. A large number of the respondents would prefer to have the White House represent the Administration in the halls of Congress. One must ask whether this preference is absolute or whether it merely reflects today's situation and whether therefore the answers might differ under a changed set of circumstances. If the answer is that the preference is an absolute, then this would have serious implications for the Department's future.

II. As Seen by the Media

Among the media sub-groups, differences concerning the potential role of the Department become apparent. For example, editors in the West were less inclined to agree with the assignment of certain functions. Only a third of them would give the Department responsibility for resource allocations. Less than half of the Western editors would wish the Department to represent Administration views to the U. S. public. On the opposite end of the spectrum, editors from the Southwest were the strongest proponents for the assignment of the functions listed in the questionnaire to the Department.

A similar split appeared in the analysis of views by editors representing newspapers with varying circulations. Among the group representing circulation of 250,000-499,999, five of the possible fourteen functions did received support from less than half of the respondents. Editors representing newspapers with circulations of 500,000 and above were unanimous in six cases for assignment of the function to the Department. The responses also brought out a "generation gap" with respondents under the age of 30 being far more selective in their "agreements" than their colleagues in the 40-59 age bracket.

If one uses the standard that an "agreed" position by 80% or better of the respondents constitutes general agreement for the assignment of the function to the Department, then the media representatives see State basically as exercising the first eight functions of the fourteen possibilities listed earlier in this paper. A number of comments indicate the reluctance that a large proportion of the editors have in making the Department a major factor in the "foreign policy" decision-making process.

"I view the department as having as its primary role in foreign affairs the carrying out of policy, rather than bending efforts to persuade and mold."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
Northeast

"I believe the over-riding concern of American policy should be American national interest, and the essential element of national interest is security. For that reason, I hesitate in replying to those questions which would assign primacy to State in foreign policy. At the very least, State's formulations need to be harmonized with those of the Defense Department."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
South

On the other hand, the proponents of a "strong" Department state their views in vigorous terms.

"The need to reassert the State Department's position in the federal firmament is approximately as pressing--in terms of representational and constitutional gov't--as congressional reforms aimed at balance of power with the Pres. Not that the State Dept. is so much smarter--rather, the hedge against arbitrary, authoritarian decision would be much improved...."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
Southwest

"I am in favor a strong Department, non-partisan in flavor (if possible): think it should be premier dept. in federal government."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
South

One editor from a Northeast paper commented that "We are living through a situation where one wonders why have a State Department. Kissinger has taken over. Why not make him Secretary of State? It is about time the State Department be eliminated or be placed in its proper perspective....." This theme appeared in several comments.

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III. As Seen By APSA Members

In general, more APSA members tended to agree in the assignment of more functions to the Department than the media representatives. Using the same "four out of five" criteria, APSA respondents would question only four of the fourteen functions. Within the APSA group, some sharp differences do appear. For example, in analyzing responses by age, we find the same generation gap as in the media group. The older the respondent, the more inclined he was to assign functions to the Department. The same biases presumably was operating when full professors were more inclined to a "strong" Department than the instructors. Not surprisingly, persons in the field of international relations were more inclined to give the Department a vigorous role than faculty in the field of contemporary political systems.

The comments indicate the same range of disagreement on the possible role of the Department. There is the "information provision" school represented by:

"I would emphasize its directional (under President) coordinating (non-military), two-way informational role--not decision-making."

Clinical psychologist

"The role of the State Dept. is not one of policy formulation. That is the field of the people and their elected representatives. The State Dept. is to provide information to help those groups make the policy, then the Dept.'s role is one of aiding in its execution."

Instructor in Political Theory

The proponents of a vigorous Department feel very strongly about the currently perceived deficiencies of the Department.

"I feel the Dept. of State ought to adopt more of an adversary relationship to other departments (i.e., Defense) and do more in the area of developing a constituency power of its own."

Instructor in Comparative
Government

"DOS should: 1) be official representative of US abroad; 2) plan American foreign policy including MBFR; 3) manage day-to-day foreign relations."

Assistant Professor in
International Relations

"DOS should have full responsibility for all U. S. policies dealing with foreign states. There should be no separate presidential advisor on foreign affairs outside the D.O.S."

Associate Professor in
Comparative Government

And finally, the same questioning tone as was seen in the comment from an editor appears in this remark by an Associate Professor in Contemporary Political Systems: "...But events of the 1950's to the 1970's force me to ask what you people do that is truly relevant".

IV. As Seen By Authors and Official Documents

The official description of the role of the Department of State can be found in The Government Organization Manual:

"PURPOSE - It is to the Department of State that the President looks for his primary advice in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. As Chief Executive, the President has overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States.

The Department of State's primary objective in the execution of our foreign policy is to promote the long-range security and well-being of the United States. The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to our overseas interests, makes recommendations on policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy.

Five Assistant Secretaries direct the activities of the geographic bureaus, which are responsible for our foreign affairs activities in the major regions of the world... The Assistant Secretaries for these Bureaus are responsible for advising the Secretary in the formulation of US policies toward the countries within their regional jurisdictions and for guiding the operations of the US diplomatic establishments in the countries in their geographic area. They also direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters involving these regions." (1)

Many observers would seriously question the accuracy of this description. Many of the statements are subject to challenge. Does the President look to the Department "for his primary advice"? (What about his Special Assistants, the Treasury Department, etc.?) Does the Department "determine and analyze the facts?" (What of CIA, Defense, Treasury, etc.?) Furthermore, I would contend that the terms used are too amorphous to serve as meaningful goals.

Similar questions could be raised about the description of the Department contained in The World Book Encyclopedia:

"STATE, DEPARTMENT OF, is the executive department of the United States government that handles U. S. relations with other governments. The head of the Department is the Secretary of State, the senior member of the President's Cabinet. The Secretary and his Department advise the President on foreign relations and provide him with information about conditions in other countries.. ..

.. ..

The Department, with advice from the U. S. Congress, plans United States actions in dealing with other governments. When the President approves these plans, they become the official foreign policy of the United States. The Department is responsible for carrying out foreign policy. It also coordinates the actions of other executive departments that affect foreign policy.

The Department negotiates treaties and agreements with other governments; handles official business with foreign embassies in Washington; speaks for the United States in the United Nations and other international organizations; and arranges for U. S. participation in international conferences. The Department of State is also the official custodian of the Great Seal of the United States, which is affixed to Presidential proclamations.

Members of the Foreign Service, the operating arm of the Department in other countries, represents the United States throughout the world. They deal with officials of other governments and report to the Department on developments that affect the United States. These reports give the President and the Secretary of State much of the information on which US foreign policy is based. Members of the Foreign Service also issue and renew passports; grant visas to persons visiting or emigrating to the United States; protect U. S. citizens and their property in other countries; and help businessmen promote U. S. trade and investment.

The Department of State carries on educational and cultural exchanges with other countries. It arranges for students, teachers, and leaders to visit the United States, and for U. S. citizens to study and teach abroad. It promotes public understanding of U. S. foreign policy in the United States through information services and publications." (2)

Let's look at the historical trend that is evidenced by the autobiographical or analytical books written in the last 20 years. Dean Acheson described the Department's role in his days in this manner:

"President Truman looked principally to the Department of State in determining foreign policy and--except where force was necessary--exclusively in executing it; he communicated with the Department and with the foreign nations through the Secretary." (3)

The importance of the Department is emphasized in this sentence:

"Increased tensions in Europe and Asia led the Administration to turn to the State Department as never before for new policies to meet the new dangers." (4)

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In commenting on Dean Acheson's stewardship, Ronald Stupak noted that:

"Acheson sees no organizational panacea for solving the problems of American foreign relations, but he strongly believes that a coordinated, centralized administrative structure is a prerequisite to the process of effective policy formulation.


The second role of the Secretary of State is that of fostering within the Department formulations of policy alternatives." (5)

One of the most recent analysis of the Department was written by I. M. Destler. It is a discerning discussion of the Department's weaknesses and includes several paragraphs describing the operations of previous administrations. Destler points out that "in an Eisenhower Administration where men worked tirelessly to build a logically structured foreign policy planning and implementation system, the Secretary of State" (6) insisted on divorcing planning from operations and established new agencies for specific programs. This distinction was erased by Kennedy, whose "staff concentrated heavily on what was happening at the moment. There was a corresponding lack of a comprehensive planning process such as the Eisenhower Administration had developed. The Eisenhower system tended to assume that decisions setting broad objectives or guidelines could and would shape specific actions. The Kennedy people doubted this, believing that day-to-day involvement in events brought more results than top-level statements of purpose and general direction". (7) It is this new approach to bureaucracy management that begun the Department's slide into the uncertainty of today.

In 1960, Robert Elder could write "The Department of State plays a key role in the making of foreign policy. Its mechanisms and personnel, and their relationships to the broader government-wide machinery, have a great influence upon the kind of policy which America will adopt to meet the challenge of our dynamic and confused contemporary world." (8) By 1967, David Willis would describe the situation in these terms: "Under Mr. Rusk, the machinery of American diplomacy is exactly what the word "machinery" implies: It keeps up the momentum of dealings abroad, and its more important cogs take day-to-day decisions in line with established policies. But it is the driver-the President-who alone presses the buttons that change speed and direction. The Secretary of State consciously limits himself to advice on what buttons to push and when." (9)

Halberstam, as well as many of the respondents to the questionnaire, appear to suggest that this more passive State role had direct consequences for the Administration's Vietnam policy. There are undoubtedly consequences arising from an organization's "personality"; whether a direct linkage to a major policy issue can be proven is still an open question.

Today, the Department's role is described by various observers as a coordinating mechanism, as the "principal staff arm in forging a national policy" (10), as the source of detailed knowledge on foreign countries, and as a conduit for foreign emissaries. Perhaps the most optimistic statement was written by Richard Johnson in 1971:



"The Department of State discharges four major foreign affairs responsibilities: it makes and executes political policy, except in a few highly specialized areas, and it supervises policy making in those areas; it coordinates the efforts of all agencies engaged in foreign affairs administration; it makes and executes policy in functional areas not claimed by other agencies; and it supervises the Foreign Service of the United States, which executes political policy abroad, conducts such other operations as are entrusted to it by the department and other agencies, and supports representatives of other agencies administratively." (11)

One must ask how many people in Washington, both inside and outside the Department, would agree with this statement. But perhaps even more importantly, there is a need for insuring that whatever the role might be, it be understood by all participants in the process.


If Mr. Johnson's statement had some validity, it should bear some relationship to the resources being devoted by the Department to the various programs. In fact, by analyzing the distribution of American officer positions which the Department had allocated as of December 31, 1972, (including both Washington and overseas) one finds the following distribution:

Executive and Program Direction	10%
Political Analysis	14%
Economic Analysis	11%
Research and General Analysis	4%
Consular	13%
Administration	40%
Miscellaneous	8%

Many of my colleagues will dispute the obvious conclusions that might be reached from this table. There are valid reasons for high proportion of administrative positions, since the Department supports not only itself, but many of the agencies operating abroad. Nevertheless, I believe that it is also true that an organization will tend to devote its time in proportions similar to the number of personnel assigned to each function. Therefore, looking at the Department overall, I think it can be said that it spends considerable energy in the discharge of its administrative and consular responsibilities. It may do this in part because the personnel involved in both functions have a relatively clear concept of their roles and the objectives of their programs. It is also true that, in general, the Department has less competition in Washington in these two functions than any of the other it might be attempting to discharge.

V. Possible Operational Activities

Although the analysis of the responses to the question concerning possible operational assignments must be viewed in light of the cautions outlined in the Chapter on "Methodology", some brief comments might be in order.



Just as in response to the question concerning possible responsibilities, respondents from both the media and the APSA group were overwhelmingly in favor of assigning consular, i.e. issuance of passports and visas) operations to the Department. A great majority recognized that the Department was already involved in this program.

It is also clear that a sizeable minority of the respondents were opposed to involving the Department in other operational programs, such as promotion of US exports and provision of military assistance to foreign governments.

But perhaps, the most important finding coming from the analysis of this question, supported by some of the written comments, has to be the inadequacy of information available on the present functions of the Department. For example, fourteen percent of the media representatives did not seem to know that the Department operates the educational and cultural exchange program; at the same time, almost a third of this group held the Department responsible for the operation of the military assistance program. Similarly, 25% of the APSA group believes that the Department is now involved in the promotion of US agricultural exports. I recognize the deficiency of this analysis since it is based on a poorly constructed question; nevertheless, there seems to be a crying need not only to re-define the role of the Department, but also to insure that at least two of the influential groups of the American public are better informed about the activities of the Department of State.

VI. Summary

The available literature quite clearly indicates a marked shift in the role of the Department of State since the Dean Acheson era. The Department has moved from an era in which it was quite clearly predominant in the field of foreign affairs to today's environment in which both the official description of duties and some of the unofficial observations are not entirely consonant with the facts, at least as seen by many of the Department's personnel. It also appears that there is a consensus among members of two key segments of the American public for assigning to the Department some relatively passive functions. The more active roles that the Department might pursue are viewed as agreeable by a majority of these groups, but with considerable less support and with increasing skepticism by the younger and more junior members. For certain functions, the younger respondents and those living in the West are in fact opposed to assigning them to the Department.

THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Several of the comments by the respondents as well as much of the literature indicates some confusion between the roles of the Secretary and the Department. In a speech given in 1970, Deputy

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Under Secretary for Management, William Macomber, stated "...But the personal influence of Secretaries of State and the institutional role played by the Department should not be confused". The Secretary of State is unique among his Cabinet colleagues for his role is in large measure governed by requirements imposed from outside his Department. All Secretaries spend a large proportion of their time travelling both around the world and in the United States and devoting many long hours discussing the Administration's views with Congress, its committees and its members.

It is true, of course, that each Secretary in the last twenty years, saw his role differently from his predecessors and his successors, but they were all in agreement that most of their time had to be devoted to functions other than the management of the Department. Secretaries had close relationships with the Presidents they served. The following description of the present appears to be typical of the relationships between post-war Presidents and Secretaries with perhaps the single exception of President Kennedy and Dean Rusk, although even in this circumstance it is difficult to be precise about the nature of their rapport.

"In an administration where few men deal directly with the President, the Secretary has ready access. He makes use of this access, speaking with Nixon regularly by phone, and seeing him as much as several times a week. His judgment as an old and trusted friend is undoubtedly valued, and on the Middle East he has been able to play an important role." (12)

It is very difficult to translate the personal role played by a Secretary into an organizational role for the Department. This problem is little understood; there is continual mystification on the part of both parties when a President grants a broad charter to the Secretary of State, but nothing significant appears to happen to the operations and attitude of the Department. Ambassador Briggs noted that:

"It is important to recognize, however, that never before NSAM-341 has the delegation of authority for the conduct of foreign affairs been in such specific and comprehensive terms. Never before has a Secretary of State been assigned "authority and responsibility...for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-departmental activities of the United States Government overseas". (13)

I doubt that many would argue that the issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-341 made the Department more assertive, more positive and more effective in the role that this NSAM assigned to the Secretary. The Washington bureaucracy understands that the assignment of a responsibility to a Secretary of State, even if included in a Presidential document, does not necessarily alter the Department's role. An organization can only be expected to respond and can therefore only be measured against standards, goals and objectives established for the organization itself.

SECRET

This is not to depreciate in any way the need for a close Presidential-Secretarial relationship. I agree entirely with Johnson's comment that:

"Nevertheless, it remains essentially correct to affirm that the character and personal endowments of the Secretary of State and the closeness of his relationship with the President and the Congress still largely determine the ability of the Department and the Foreign Service to discharge their roles." (14)

But it is not enough. In addition, a definition of the Department's role is required and perhaps Dean Acheson was also correct when he found, according to Ronald Stupak that "the Secretary of State must struggle to retain a position of pre-eminence on the foreign-policy process. A number of operating procedures and techniques that will improve the power position of the Secretary of State in relation to other Presidential advisers and executive departments must be undertaken and perfected".

THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

It is of course impossible and unrealistic to attempt to divorce entirely an organization from its employees. Nevertheless, it appears that in the case of the Department, greater confusion than normal is engendered by the fact that it is perceived to be staffed primarily by Foreign Service Officers. There can be no doubt, based on many of the responses and on some of the writings that the reputation of the Foreign Service could stand improvement and that the potential of the Department is seen in some quarters to be limited as long as it is staffed by Foreign Service Officers.

"Much has been said about the declining influence of State in the realm of policy formulation. This may be due, to a degree, to inflexibility on part of Department personnel. While continuity of operation is desirable, it may not always be of paramount importance. New blood, new ideas, and new programs could make State the most dynamic department in government."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
Middle West

"The State Department is better than the BIA and not as competent as the Forest Service."

Editor, medium-size newspaper,
West

"The greatest problem I see with the Department is the over-conformity of its members."

Lecturer, University in West

Johnson

"Get rid of Eastern establishment FSO's."

Associate Professor, Contemporary
Political Systems, Middle West

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

"Effectiveness of role performance has been severely
limited by bureaucracy in State Dept."

Assistant Professor, American
Government, South

The fact that I am quoting these statements should not be interpreted to mean that the responses indicated a major anti-Foreign Service ground-swell. In fact, a number of very favorable comments were made. My purpose here is merely to illustrate the confusion that is created when an organization's role is analyzed in terms of the strengths or weaknesses of its employees.

Again, I do not wish to deny the relationship between an organization's effectiveness and the capabilities of its personnel. Chris Argyris and others have enough evidence to suggest that perhaps different personalities might make the Department into a different organization. I would not, however, support the following findings of Professor Rothstein:

"The State Department is a large organization dominated by a professional group with unique problems and perspectives. Only the Mafia seems to get a worse press, although for the opposite reason: the Mafia seems to work too well, whereas there are persistent doubts that the State Department works at all. It is difficult to find evidence that refutes either point of view." (16)

I would further stipulate that if the Department's role in Washington were sufficiently delineated, its employees would be considerably more effective and would enjoy a better reputation. No one has yet seriously challenged the intellectual capacity of the Foreign Service Officer. Repeated documentation indicates that he performs well in a variety of circumstances. Why then, it must be asked, is he often perceived as a failure in the Department?

It is important not to confuse the capabilities of the Foreign Service with the role of the Department. One could speculate, for example, on whether the Foreign Service could not be useful to the government, even if there were no Department of State (i.e., no meaningful role is developed for it). Conversely, it should be remembered that not too long ago, a great proportion of the Department's personnel in Washington was not Foreign Service.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

THE NEED FOR A ROLE DEFINITION

I. M. Destler agrees that "it would, of course, be very convenient if the problem of organizing the government for foreign policy-making could be reduced to one of designing a rational system where each official or unit played a preassigned role..".(17) Destler does not believe that such a system can be designed. I believe that it must be, unless one would wish to continue the present situation or look for even more drastic remedies. I tend to believe that Drucker's injunctions have considerable merit.

"It is not possible to be effective unless one first decides what one wants to accomplish. It is not possible to manage, in other words, unless one first has a goal. It is not even possible to design the structure of an organization unless one knows what it is supposed to be doing and how to measure whether it is doing it." (18)

"Specifically, this means that we need to know what "performance" means for this or that institution. We need to be able to measure, or at least to judge, the discharge of its responsibility by an institution and the competence of its management. We need to insist that institutions and their managements confine themselves to the specific tasks whose performance justifies their existence and their power. Everything beyond is usurpation." (19)

It seems to me indispensable for an organization to have its role defined, to know its goals and objectives if it is expected to achieve. It cannot be evaluated without such goals and it cannot very well have an enlightened self-image if it has no expectations. Laurence Peter points to the communication of objectives as one of the cardinal principles of competent leadership. Two of Peter's prescriptions are also applicable to this issue:

"PETER PRESCRIPTION 26 The Peter Prospect:
Identify your objective

An objective is a description of what things will be like when a goal has been achieved. It is a statement identifying the intended conditions for the conclusion of an activity." (20)

"PETER PRESCRIPTION 34 The Peter Precision:
State objectives in specific, observable, or measurable terms." (21)

As suggested in the opening "Summary", there is of course the possibility that the Department is in the forefront a managerial revolution which eventually will bring all organizations to work in a loosely defined environment, as described by Harland Cleveland:

"The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems interlaced

webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural. "Decision-making" will become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral brokerage both inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at least announcing, the decision. Because organizations will be more horizontal, the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative." (22)

I suspect that we may yet see the day when Mr. Cleveland's description will be accurate, but it is not likely to come in the near future. I therefore, at least for the present, prefer the Drucker-Peter theories.

It would not do for a paper written about the Department of State not to include some comments by Henry Kissinger. Although to my knowledge Dr. Kissinger has never publicly addressed the problem of a role for the Department, he has some firm views on the capabilities of bureaucracy.

"The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A bureaucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected occurrence or with the need for innovation. Bureaucracy becomes an obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant to the problem.

When this occurs, the bureaucracy absorbs the energies of top executives in reconciling what is expected with what happens; the analysis of where one is overwhelms the consideration of where one should be going. Serving the machine becomes a more absorbing occupation than defining its purpose." (23)

These comments would suggest that Kissinger would not be opposed to defining the role of the Department, but he would probably limit the goals to routine and repetitive functions. In fact, he seemed to recognize the need for a role definition when he said, as quoted by Destler, "The nightmare of a modern state is the hugeness of the bureaucracy and the problem is how to get coherence and design in it".

Despite the relatively obvious need for role definition, it is interesting to note how few authors have attempted to do so. What work has been done in this area uses terms of "conventional wisdom" such "coordination", foreign policy" and "policy execution", all which seem to me to be "buzz words" requiring considerable definition.

THE NEED FOR DEFINITIONS

Two of the authors who have attempted to define the meaning of various words or phrases have been Ambassador Briggs and Mr. Destler. It is interesting to compare their statements as an illustration of the difficulties involved in reaching definitions and the importance of doing so.

Briggs

"By international relations, called interchangeably foreign affairs and foreign relations, is meant the intercourse of states, through their governments...

Diplomacy, which in a restricted sense is the art of negotiating agreements between states, has come to mean the business of conducting relations among governments. Negotiation, representation, and reporting remain the fundamental activities of professional diplomacy. The New Diplomacy would add propaganda, intelligence operations, cultural osmosis, the Peace Corps, aid programs, management and harbingers of a more abundant international life. None of them are essential. They are adjuncts to foreign relations, sometimes useful and sometimes futile, but never controlling" (24)

"A foreign policy is a course of action adopted by a Government in order to further its national interests. Foreign policy represents both implementation of a national interest and mobilization of a nation's resolution. A foreign policy is specific rather than general, and is often comparatively short-lived." (25)

Destler

"International relations" can be narrowly defined as "political" relations, whatever that may mean. If stress is put on "diplomacy" separated from "operations" that other agencies run anyway; if concern is focused on "political" (distinct from economic? military? development?) policies, and attention riveted to communicating with Embassies about these "political" problems, inter-agency conflict is reduced. And the Statesman can hold the comforting belief that his own business is primary, too important to be compromised by such activities as aid, information, etc." (26)

"Foreign policy," as used here, means activities by government officials which influence (and whose purpose, in large part, is to influence) either events abroad or relationships between Americans and citizens of other countries, especially relations between the U. S. government and other governments. Specifically included is a wide range of defense issues, since our armed forces are intended mainly for providing security against actual or potential threats from other countries, influencing events beyond our borders, or strengthening our international bargaining position generally. Thus our use of the term "foreign policy" encompasses what others call "national security policy." It also includes international economic policy, specifically aid, trade, monetary, and commercial policy." (27)

It is particularly important that the terms "foreign policy" or "international relations" be re-examined and redefined. As Rothstein points out, "the distinction then between foreign and domestic policies is a matter of degree." (28) Destler suggests that international issues are becoming more and more intertwined with a range of domestic policy interests, from the textile industry fighting Asian imports to young men resisting the draft of a foreign war." (29) One of the respondents with great insight felt that at least one of the questions could have differing answers depending "on your definition of foreign policy".

And what is the relationship of multi-national corporations to the present definition of "foreign policy"? How does one incorporate the independent activities of an airline pilots association or the dock workers into the concept of "foreign affairs"? Rothstein's analysis is worth considering:

"There is no single right relationship between foreign and domestic policies; there are only relationships that exist at historical moments. Thus, there have been periods, and they may return again, when it was accurate to describe foreign policy as an autonomous and superior realm. In our time, all the signs are not perfectly clear, but it does seem beyond dispute that domestic factors are exercising an increasing influence on the style and content of foreign policy, not only because foreign policy is becoming domesticated (that is, embroiled in the partisan play of domestic politics), but also because the issues that dominate foreign policy are no longer solely the traditional issues of war and security. Economic and social issues that once fell primarily within the domain of domestic politics have now become internationalized: they can no longer be handled in isolation by individual states, no matter how powerful, for the international system has become too interdependent--at least on these kinds of issues--to make autonomous decision-making very reasonable. This hardly means that the security issue has disappeared or been transcended, but simply that an additional range of concerns has become a legitimate international issue."

One should also bear in the mind the ever-increasing pre-occupation of this country's population with domestic problems. There are reasons to believe that in the short run at least Americans will see "foreign affairs" as an extension of domestic policies. This trend was well documented by Watts and Free in their book "STATE OF THE NATION".

"Q 25 H We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity at home.

Agree 73% Disagree 20% Don't Know 7% (31)

"Table I MAJOR NATIONAL ISSUES AND DEGREES OF PUBLIC CONCERN (1972)

1)	Rising prices and the cost of living	90
2)	The amount of violence in American life	90
3)	The problem of drug addicts and narcotic drugs	89
4)	Crime in this country	89
5)	The problem of Vietnam	88
6)	Cleaning up our waterways	84
14)	Keeping our military and defense forces strong	77
15)	Maintaining respect for the U. S. in other countries	76
16)	Maintaining close relations with our allies...	76
21)	The threat of communism at home and abroad	69
22)	The danger of a major war breaking out in the near future	66
24)	The problem of Communist China	61
26)	Improving mass transportation...	56" (32)

The increasing difficulty in differentiating between foreign and domestic issues was clearly illustrated in the responses to Question III. There were probably more comments, particularly from APSA members, about the impossibility of determining whether the "Environment" was, for example, primarily a foreign or a domestic policy issue. Only "Welfare", "Housing", "Economic Development in the U. S.", and "Environment" were perceived to be clearly domestic issues. The "size of U. S. military establishment" produced an interesting result:

	<u>Both</u>	<u>Foreign Policy</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Domestic</u>
Editors	9.3%	36.4%	6.6%	47.7%
APSA Members	7.7	55.1	5.2	32.1

As for the other listed problems, a majority of respondents saw them as foreign policy issues although it was quite clear from the comments that many felt uncomfortable about having to make a distinction.

It may be that this perception of the indivisibility of problems between domestic and foreign led an overwhelming majority of respondents to consider that the "effectiveness of the Office of the President" to be the primary determinant of a successful foreign policy (although a number of people raised the question of how one would define a "successful foreign policy"). The "effectiveness of the Department of State" and "events outside the control of the United States" were seen as secondary factors far behind the first choice.

If this increasing concern with domestic problems coupled with the recognition of the difficulty of separating problems into foreign and domestic should continue, one must raise the question whether it is still timely to discuss "foreign policy" or "international relations" or whether one should not be viewing the problem of the

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environment in its domestic and foreign segments; that is, to approach issues on a functional basis, recognizing that they may have two separate geographical manifestations. This approach would of course have grave implications for the organization of the federal government and in particular for the future of an organization such as the Department of State, which is primarily geographically orientated.

I am certainly not competent to solve the large number of issues that I have raised. I am however confident that a re-examination and redefinition of some of our "conventional wisdom" is certainly overdue. It is in the interest of the Department of State that this process be undertaken before it becomes entirely irrelevant to the decision-making process of the federal government.

REFUSED

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

The data for this project was collected from two sources: selected writings and a questionnaire.

The writings selected are listed in the bibliography. Basically, authors were chosen for their knowledge of the subject matter. Undoubtedly, I have missed a number of additional books that should have been included, but tailoring the reading to the available time became a very difficult problem. I am also indebted to a number of the questionnaire respondents who led me to some writings that I might have otherwise overlooked.

The questionnaire was prepared with the assistance of Professor Philip Burgess, who in addition to his academic pursuits conducts the Ohio Poll. I have been seriously delinquent in not following one of his suggestions, namely that the questionnaire be pretested. Once again, time was a serious limiting factor. I have also come to the conclusion that the pretesting would have had to take place with a sample of the actual group of respondents since it would appear from some of the comments written on the returned questionnaires that words have different meanings to people of differing occupations.

I selected two groups of the American public to serve as sources. The first group, selected from a list of editors or editorial writers of American newspapers and TV stations, was chosen as one of the major influences on the perceptions of the American public. It was my assumption that on a subject such as "The perception of the role of the Department of State" most of the American public would have to rely on its media for the basic information. I was also curious to determine the degree of interest in this matter among media representatives. The response from the media group was gratifying: 439 questionnaires were sent out and 151 responses were returned, or a percentage of 34%.

The second group chosen consisted of members of the American Political Science Association. Although responses were received from persons in business, law, and other occupations, 93% of the respondents were from the academic community. I have therefore used the terms "APSA members" and "academics" interchangeably. The response from this group was even better with exactly 50% (or 287) of the questionnaires serving as the analytical base.

As I suggested earlier, the questionnaire obviously created difficulties for a number of the recipients, particularly those in the APSA group. It was apparent that in addition to the design problems, some respondents were most reluctant to make the choices required. A number would have preferred not to confront the dilemmas, but the problem areas were carefully selected as basic issues to be faced by anyone who would have to determine the role

of the Department of State. Obviously, in the real world, few issues are decided entirely without some compromises; nevertheless, the decision-maker must start with some basic assumptions (arbitrary as they may be) if conclusions are not to be hopelessly confused. It was these basic assumptions that the questionnaire was intended to test.

I am indeed grateful to all who took time to respond to the questionnaire. I am grateful to the approximately half a dozen people who characterized the effort in terms such as "I really wonder why the DOS should support a questionnaire like this", or if "the quality of this questionnaire is an indication of the quality of trainees me thinks there is need for prayer". I am even more grateful to the considerable number of respondents who took the time to indicate that the subject matter was interesting and the methodology acceptable.

There was one major fault in the questionnaire. Under question V, I neglected to include a "Should not be assigned" column. It had been my hope that recipients who had wished to make that choice would just not have checked any of the available columns. In fact, most of the respondents indicated that they had followed this procedure, but I should have stated my assumption in the instructions or added the other column. Although I believe that the views of the respondents were captured relatively accurately on this question, my analysis needs to be read in light of the methodological problem.

There were in addition apparently some minor semantic problems, particularly with the words "represent" and "present". From the written comments received, however, I do not believe that this problem created any distortion in the analysis. A number of returned questionnaires also raised the question whether under question I (f) the phrase "that the President would approve major recommendations" would include "disapproval" as well. This I believe is a clear example of the problems of communications; it would never have occurred to me that the authority to approve would not automatically encompass the right of disapproval. Any analysis based on the questionnaire techniques is subject to certain deficiency (small, I would hope) resulting from communication gaps.

One final word should be said about the methodology. In one of the following annexes there is a summary of the characteristics of the respondents. I have no way of judging whether the respondent group is representative of either the media representatives or the APSA membership in total. A superficial analysis would indicate that it might be approximately representative, but only additional and considerable more research would verify this conclusion.

APPENDIX B

REFERENCES


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2. World Book Encyclopedia	673
3. Acheson, Dean PRESENT AT THE CREATION	734
4. Ibid	345
5. Stupak, Ronald THE SHAPING OF FOREIGN POLICY	68
6. Destler, I. M. PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS AND FOREIGN POLICY	38
7. Ibid	101
8. Elder, Robert THE POLICY MACHINE	6
9. Willis, David THE STATE DEPARTMENT	10
10. Macomber, William MANAGEMENT STRATEGY	
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APPENDIX C


THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- 1) Various authors have suggested that the Department's primary strength should lie in its managerial role. Others have emphasized the policy formulation responsibility. A third group has suggested that the Department should devote maximum effort to playing the "balance wheel" role. Below are listed a number of responsibilities that could be assigned to the Department. For each, please indicate whether you agree with such an assignment.

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Don't Know	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a) To integrate and coordinate U.S. overseas programs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b) To be responsible for resource allocations for all U.S. overseas programs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c) To identify crucial international relation problems.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d) To represent the views of foreign governments in the U. S. Government councils.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e) To present the U.S. views to foreign countries.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f) To formulate U.S. policies (with the understanding that the President would approve major recommendations).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g) To formulate long-range policies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h) To serve as balance to U.S. military policy proposals.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Don't Know	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
i) To serve as balance to domestic protectionist economic policy proposals.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j) To provide continuity to U.S. foreign policy.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
k) To represent Administration views to Congress.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
l) To represent Administration views to the U.S. public.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
m) To administer cultural and educational exchange programs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
n) To protect American citizens abroad and to issue passports and visas.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
II. a) Do you believe that the success of an Administration's foreign policy is primarily determined by: (Please rank 1-4 with "one" being the most important)					
The effectiveness of the Office of the President				<input type="checkbox"/>	
The effectiveness of the Department of State				<input type="checkbox"/>	
The effectiveness of other Cabinet Departments				<input type="checkbox"/>	
By events outside the control of the United States				<input type="checkbox"/>	
b) If an Administration's foreign policy is successful, is it important or unimportant whether the Department is "effective" or has "good morale"?					
	Very Important	Relatively Important	Don't Know	Relatively Unimportant	Very Unimportant
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



III. Do you consider the following subjects to be primarily American domestic problems or foreign policy problems?


	Foreign Policy	Don't Know	Domestic
Environment and Ecology	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
International Trade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
U.S. Military Bases overseas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Housing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
International Payments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sale of Agricultural Commodities overseas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic Development in U.S.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Size of U.S. military establishment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

IV. Do you believe that in the field of foreign policy, the Department of State should have primacy over other Cabinet Departments in the policy making process?

Yes No

V. Which of the following operational responsibilities are now assigned or should be assigned to the Department of State?

	Now Assigned	Should Be Assigned	Don't Know
Educational and cultural exchanges	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Military assistance to foreign governments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



27

	Now Assigned	Should Be Assigned	Don't Know
Economic assistance to foreign governments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Issuance of passports to U.S. citizens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Information activities overseas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Promotion of U.S. commercial exports	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Promotion of U.S. agricultural exports	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Issuance of visas to foreign visitors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

VI. In recruiting for the Department of State, would you put greater emphasize on broad representation from the American society (e.g. economic class, race, religion, geography, ect.) or on achievements of the candidates without regard to other factors?

Primarily Broad Representation


Don't Know

Primarily Personal Achievements

VII. Any narrative comments you may wish to make on the role of the Department of State would be gratefully received.


OPTIONAL

The following information would be appreciated for the purpose of analysis:



a) How many students (graduate and undergraduate) are there at your University (or college)?

- Less than 1,000
- 1,000 - 4,999
- 5,000 - 14,999
- 15,000 - and above



b) Your University (or College) is in?

- NorthEast
- South
- Middle West
- South West
- West



c) Your University (or College) is?

- Private
- Public



d) Your age?

Your religion?


- Catholic
- Protestant
- Jewish
- Other (Specify)



From what University (or College) did you receive your highest graduate degree?

e) Your profession:

- Legal
- Business
- Government
- Military
- Academic
- Medical
- Other (Specify)



f) If in the Academic Profession,
your area of specialization:

Contemporary political systems	<input type="checkbox"/>
International relations	<input type="checkbox"/>
Political theory	<input type="checkbox"/>
Public administration	<input type="checkbox"/>
Comparative Government	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Specify)	_____

Your Academic rank:

Lecturer	<input type="checkbox"/>
Instructor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Assistant Professor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Associate Professor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Full Professor	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Specify)	_____

g) You have travelled abroad as:

Tourist	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Student	<input type="checkbox"/>
Lecturer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Businessman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Armed Forces	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
U.S. employee	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Specify)	_____

During your travels, you have had contacts
with American Embassies:

Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

-29-

E

OPTIONAL

The following information would be appreciated for the purpose of analysis:

SECRET
-30-

a) The circulation (or estimated viewership) is?

- Less than 5,000
- 5,000 - 9,999
- 10,000 - 49,999
- 50,000 - 99,999
- 100,000 - 249,999
- 250,000 - 499,999
- 500,000 plus

b) Your newspaper (or station) is located in?

- NorthEast
- South
- Middle West
- South West
- West

c) Your newspaper (or station) is?

- Independent
- Affiliated

d) Your newspaper (or station) is?

- Family Owned
- Public Owned
- Other (Specify)

e) Your age is?

f) Your newspaper (or station) has editorialized on this subject in the last 12 months?

- Yes
- No

g) You have travelled abroad in the last five years?

- Yes
- No

During those travels, you have contacted the American Embassy?

- Yes
- No

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APPENDIX D


DECEASED
PROFILE

MEDIA RESPONDENTS

151 Responses

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
<u>Circulation</u>		
Less than 5,000	4	2.6
5,000 - 9,999	19	12.6
10,000 - 19,999	56	37.1
50,000 - 99,999	33	21.9
100,000 - 249,999	25	16.6
250,000 - 499,999	7	4.6
500,000 and over	7	4.6
<u>Location</u>		
Northeast	34	22.5
South	37	24.5
Middle West	43	28.5
South West	16	10.6
West	21	13.9
<u>Type</u>		
Independent	96	63.6
Affiliated	51	33.8
No response	4	2.6
Family owned	100	66.2
Public owned	25	16.6
Other	22	14.6
<u>Age</u>		
Less than 30	9	6.0
30-39	34	22.5
40-49	53	35.1
50-59	40	26.5
60 and over	15	9.9
Have editorialized in last 12 mos.	82	54.3
Have not editorial. in last 12 mos.	65	43.0
No response	4	2.7
Have travelled in last 5 years	68	45.0
Have not travelled in last 5 years	81	53.6
No response	2	1.4

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Contacted Embassy	31	20.5
Did not contact Embassy	108	71.5
No response	12	8.0



APSA RESPONDENTS

Size of University (or College)		
Less than 1,000	18	6.3
1,000 - 4,999	83	28.9
5,000 - 14,999	84	29.3
15,000 and above	84	29.3
Not responding	18	6.2

Location of University (or College)		
Northeast	89	31.0
South	47	16.4
Middle West	81	28.2
South West	18	6.3
West	34	11.8
Not responding	18	6.3

Nature of University (or College)		
Private	117	40.8
Public	152	53.0
Not responding	18	6.2

Age		
Less than 30	33	11.5
30 - 39	110	38.3
40 - 49	66	23.0
50 - 59	51	17.8
Over 60	26	9.1
Not responding	1	0.3

Religion		
Catholic	34	11.8
Protestant	154	53.7
Jewish	28	9.8
None	64	22.3
Not responding	7	2.4

Profession		
Legal	2	0.7
Business	2	0.7
Government	7	2.4
Military	1	0.3
Academic	266	92.7
Medical	-	-
Other	9	3.2

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Area of Academic Specialization		
Cont. Pol. System	44	16.5
International Relations	73	28.4
Political Theory	29	10.9
Public Administration	35	13.2
Comparative Government	33	12.5
Other	49	18.4
Not responding	3	0.1
Academic Rank		
Lecturer	4	1.5
Instructor	16	6.0
Assistant Professor	75	28.0
Associate Professor	69	25.9
Full Professor	94	35.3
Other	6	2.3
Not responding	2	1.0
Travelled Abroad		
Yes	279	97.2
No	8	2.8
Contacted American Embassy		
Yes	158	55.1
No	120	41.8
Not responding	9	3.1

APPENDIX E

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION I
MEDIA

VARIABLE TA		COORDINATE U.S. OVERSEAS PROGRAMS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
AGREE	1.	134	88.7	
DISAGREE	2.	5	3.3	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE TB		RESPONSIBLE OVERSEAS RESOURCE ALLOCATION		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	20	13.2	
AGREE	1.	76	50.3	
DISAGREE	2.	55	36.4	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE TC		IDENTIFY CRUCIAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	1	0.7	
AGREE	1.	149	98.7	
DISAGREE	2.	1	0.7	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE TD		REPRESENT FOREIGN VIEWS IN U.S. MEETINGS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
AGREE	1.	115	76.2	
DISAGREE	2.	24	15.9	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE TE		PRESENT US VIEW TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	1	0.7	
AGREE	1.	148	98.0	
DISAGREE	2.	2	1.3	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE TF		FORMULATE US POLICY FOR APPROVAL BY PRES		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	3	2.0	
AGREE	1.	142	80.8	
DISAGREE	2.	26	17.2	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IG		FORMULATE LONG RANGE U.S. POLICY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	5	3.3	
AGREE	1.	124	82.1	
DISAGREE	2.	22	14.6	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IH		BALANCE U.S. MILITARY POLICY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	10	6.6	
AGREE	1.	110	72.8	
DISAGREE	2.	31	20.5	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE II		BALANCE DOMESTIC TRADE PROTECTIONISS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	17	11.3	
AGREE	1.	82	54.3	
DISAGREE	2.	52	34.4	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IJ		PROVIDE CONTINUITY TO U.S. FOREIGN POLIC		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	4	2.6	
AGREE	1.	144	95.4	
DISAGREE	2.	3	2.0	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IK		REPRESENT ADMINISTRATION VIEW TO CONGRESS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	9	6.0	
AGREE	1.	95	62.9	
DISAGREE	2.	47	31.1	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IL		REPRESENT ADMINISTRATION VIEW TO PUBLIC		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	10	6.6	
AGREE	1.	76	50.3	
DISAGREE	2.	65	43.0	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IM		ADMINISTER CULTURAL & EDUCATIONAL PROGRA		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	6	4.0	
AGREE	1.	126	83.4	
DISAGREE	2.	19	12.6	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE IN		PROTECT AMERICAN CITIZENS OVERSEAS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	3	2.0	
AGREE	1.	146	96.7	
DISAGREE	2.	2	1.3	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION II A
MEDIA

VARIABLE IIA		EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	99	64.9	
SECOND	2.	39	25.8	
LEAST	4.	2	1.3	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE IIB		EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPT OF STATE		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	18	11.9	
SECOND	2.	61	40.4	
THIRD	3.	55	36.4	
LEAST	4.	5	3.3	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE IIC		EFFECTIVENESS OF CABINET DEPTS.		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	2	1.3	
SECOND	2.	6	4.0	
THIRD	3.	30	19.9	
LEAST	4.	101	66.9	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE I10		EFFECT OF EVENTS OUTSIDE CONTROL OF US		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0	12	7.9	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1	23	15.2	
SECOND	2	37	24.5	
THIRD	3	46	30.5	
LEAST	4	33	21.9	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION II B
MEDIA

VARIABLE I1E		EFFECT OF GOOD MORALE AT DEPT OF STATE		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0	3	2.0	
VERY IMPORTANT	1	81	53.6	
RELATIVELY IMPORTANT	2	51	33.8	
DON'T KNOW	3	9	6.0	
RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT	4	6	4.0	
VERY UNIMPORTANT	5	1	0.7	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION III
MEDIA

VARIABLE I1IA		ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0	15	9.9	
FOREIGN POLICY	1	16	10.6	
DON'T KNOW	2	6	4.0	
DOMESTIC	3	114	75.5	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE I1IB		INTERNATIONAL TRADE		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0	9	6.0	
FOREIGN POLICY	1	126	83.4	
DON'T KNOW	2	5	3.3	
DOMESTIC	3	11	7.3	
	TOTAL	151	100.0	

VARIABLE IITC US MILITARY BASES OVERSEAS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	9	6.0
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	118	78.1
DON'T KNOW	2.	10	6.6
DOMESTIC	3.	14	9.3
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE IITD WELFARE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	4	2.6
DON'T KNOW	2.	4	2.6
DOMESTIC	3.	143	94.7
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE IITE HOUSING

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	4	2.6
DON'T KNOW	2.	4	2.6
DOMESTIC	3.	143	94.7
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE IIF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	8	5.3
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	124	82.1
DON'T KNOW	2.	5	3.3
DOMESTIC	3.	14	9.3
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE IIG SALE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OVERSEAS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	13	8.6
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	92	60.9
DON'T KNOW	2.	7	4.6
DOMESTIC	3.	39	25.8
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE IIIH		ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN U.S.		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	2	1.3	
DON'T KNOW	2.	6	4.0	
DOMESTIC	3.	131	86.8	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE TITI		SIZE OF US MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
	0.	14	9.3	
	1.	55	36.4	
	2.	10	6.6	
	3.	72	47.7	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION IV
MEDIA

VARIABLE IVA		SHOULD STATE HAVE PRIMACY OVER OTHER DEPTS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	2	1.3	
YES	1.	123	81.5	
NO	2.	25	16.6	
	3.	1	0.7	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION V
MEDIA

VARIABLE VA		CULTURAL & EDUC EXCHANGE RESPONSIBILITY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	12	7.9	
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	102	67.5	
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	18	11.9	
DON'T KNOW	3.	19	12.6	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE VB MILITARY ASST. TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS			
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	18	11.9
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	29	19.2
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	43	28.5
DON'T KNOW	3.	61	40.4
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE VC ECONOMIC ASST. TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS			
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	14	9.3
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	66	43.7
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	34	22.5
DON'T KNOW	3.	37	24.5
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE VD PASSPORT ISSUANCE			
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	11	7.3
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	107	70.9
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	15	9.9
DON'T KNOW	3.	18	11.9
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE VE INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS			
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	18	11.9
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	63	41.7
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	43	28.5
DON'T KNOW	3.	27	17.9
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE VF PROMOTE US COMMERCIAL EXPORTS			
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	26	17.2
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	28	18.5
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	30	19.9
DON'T KNOW	3.	67	44.4
TOTAL		151	100.0

VARIABLE VG		PROMOTE US AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	27	17.9	
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	18	11.9	
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	33	21.9	
DON'T KNOW	3.	73	48.3	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

VARIABLE VH		ISSUE VISAS TO FOREIGN VISITORS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	11	7.3	
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	107	70.9	
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	17	11.3	
DON'T KNOW	3.	16	10.6	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION VI
MEDIA

VARIABLE VIA		RECRUITMENT PRACTICE		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	6	4.0	
BROAD REPRESENT.	1.	36	23.8	
DON'T KNOW	2.	7	4.6	
PERSONAL ACHVMT	3.	102	67.5	
TOTAL		151	100.0	

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION I
APSA

VARIABLE I A COORDINATE U.S. OVERSEAS PROGRAMS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	8	2.8
AGREE	1.	263	91.6
DISAGREE	2.	16	5.6
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE I B RESPONSIBLE-OVERSEAS RESOURCE ALLOCATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	23	8.0
AGREE	1.	152	53.0
DISAGREE	2.	111	38.7
	3.	1	0.3
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE I C IDENTIFY CRUCIAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	7	2.4
AGREE	1.	273	95.1
DISAGREE	2.	7	2.4
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE I D REPRESENT FOREIGN VIEWS IN U.S. MEETINGS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	21	7.3
AGREE	1.	234	81.5
DISAGREE	2.	32	11.1
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE I E PRESENT US VIEW TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	9	3.1
AGREE	1.	274	95.5
DISAGREE	2.	4	1.4
TOTAL		287	100.0

DETAILED

VARIABLE IF		FORMULATE US POLICY FOR APPROVAL BY PRES		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	17	5.9	
AGREE	1.	240	80.1	
DISAGREE	2.	40	13.9	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IG		FORMULATE LONG RANGE U.S. POLICY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	14	4.9	
AGREE	1.	240	83.6	
DISAGREE	2.	33	11.5	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IH		BALANCE U.S. MILITARY POLICY		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	14	4.9	
AGREE	1	242	84.3	
DISAGREE	2.	31	10.8	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE II		BALANCE DOMESTIC TRADE PROTECTIONISTS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	29	10.1	
AGREE	1.	205	71.4	
DISAGREE	2.	53	18.5	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IJ		PROVIDE CONTINUITY TO U.S. FOREIGN POLIC		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	8	2.8	
AGREE	1	269	93.7	
DISAGREE	2.	10	3.5	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IK		REPRESENT ADMINISTRATION VIEW TO CONGRESS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	11	3.8	
AGREE	1	190	66.2	
DISAGREE	2.	86	30.0	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IJ		REPRESENT ADMINISTRATION VIEW TO PUBLIC		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	11	3.8	
AGREE	1.	152	53.0	
DISAGREE	2.	124	43.2	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IM		ADMINISTER CULTURAL & EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	19	6.6	
AGREE	1.	230	80.1	
DISAGREE	2.	38	13.2	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IN		PROTECT AMERICAN CITIZENS OVERSEAS		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	6	2.1	
AGREE	1.	278	96.9	
DISAGREE	2.	3	1.0	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

RESPONSE TO QUESTION II A
APSA

VARIABLE IIA		EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	25	8.7	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1	167	58.2	
SECOND	2.	83	28.9	
THIRD	3.	11	3.8	
LEAST	4.	1	0.3	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IIB		EFFECTIVENESS OF DEPT OF STATE		
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO RESPONSE	0.	25	8.7	
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	28	9.8	
SECOND	2.	84	29.3	
THIRD	3.	133	46.3	
LEAST	4.	27	9.9	
	TOTAL	287	100.0	

VARIABLE IIC EFFECTIVENESS OF CABINET DEPTS.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	25	8.7
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	4	1.4
SECOND	2.	14	4.9
THIRD	3.	50	17.4
LEAST	4.	194	67.6
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE IID EFFECT OF EVENTS OUTSIDE CONTROL OF US

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	25	8.7
MOST EFFECTIVE	1.	69	24.0
SECOND	2.	86	30.0
THIRD	3.	64	22.3
LEAST	4.	43	15.0
TOTAL		287	100.0

RESPONSE TO QUESTION II B
APSA

VARIABLE IIE EFFECT OF GOOD MORALE AT DEPT OF STATE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	7	2.4
VERY IMPORTANT	1.	127	44.3
RELATIVELY IMPORTANT	2.	114	39.7
DON'T KNOW	3.	10	3.5
RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT	4.	27	9.4
VERY UNIMPORTANT	5.	2	0.7
TOTAL		287	100.0

RESPONSE TO QUESTION III
APSA

VARIABLE IIIA ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	33	11.5
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	50	17.4
DON'T KNOW	2.	13	4.5
DOMESTIC	3.	191	66.6
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE IIIB INTERNATIONAL TRADE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	24	8.4
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	225	78.4
DON'T KNOW	2.	12	4.2
DOMESTIC	3.	26	9.1
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE IIIC US MILITARY BASES OVERSEAS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	5	1.7
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	256	89.2
DON'T KNOW	2.	8	2.8
DOMESTIC	3.	18	6.3
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE IIIC WELFARE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	2	0.7
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	1	0.3
DON'T KNOW	2.	4	1.4
DOMESTIC	3.	280	97.6
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE IIIE HOUSING

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	2	0.7
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	2	0.7
DON'T KNOW	2.	3	1.0
DOMESTIC	3.	280	97.6
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE III F INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	23	8.0
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	209	72.8
DON'T KNOW	2.	20	7.0
DOMESTIC	3.	35	12.2
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE III G SALE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OVERSEAS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	31	10.8
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	155	54.0
DON'T KNOW	2.	28	9.8
DOMESTIC	3.	73	25.4
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE III H ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN U.S.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	20	7.0
FOREIGN POLICY	1.	21	7.3
DON'T KNOW	2.	12	4.2
DOMESTIC	3.	234	81.5
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE III I SIZE OF US MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
	0.	22	7.7
	1.	158	55.1
	2.	15	5.2
	3.	92	32.1
TOTAL		287	100.0

RESPONSE TO QUESTION IV
APSA

VARIABLE IVA SHOULD STATE HAVE PRIMACY OVER OTHER DEP

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	7	2.4
YES	1.	245	85.4
NO	2.	35	12.2
TOTAL		287	100.0

RESPONSE TO QUESTION V

APSA

VARIABLE	VA	CULTURAL & EDUC EXCHANGE RESPONSIBILITY	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE			0.	9	3.1
NOW ASSIGNED			1.	216	75.3
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED			2.	28	9.8
DON'T KNOW			3.	34	11.8
			TOTAL	287	100.0

VARIABLE	VB	MILITARY ASST. TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE			0.	48	16.7
NOW ASSIGNED			1.	29	10.1
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED			2.	116	40.4
DON'T KNOW			3.	94	32.8
			TOTAL	287	100.0

VARIABLE	VC	ECONOMIC ASST. TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE			0.	29	10.1
NOW ASSIGNED			1.	134	46.7
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED			2.	76	26.5
DON'T KNOW			3.	48	16.7
			TOTAL	287	100.0

VARIABLE	VD	PASSPORT ISSUANCE	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE			0.	5	1.7
NOW ASSIGNED			1.	248	86.4
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED			2.	16	5.6
DON'T KNOW			3.	18	6.3
			TOTAL	287	100.0

VARIABLE	VE	INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE			0.	32	11.1
NOW ASSIGNED			1.	144	50.2
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED			2.	74	25.8
DON'T KNOW			3.	37	12.9
			TOTAL	287	100.0

VARIABLE VF PROMOTE US COMMERCIAL EXPORTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	57	19.9
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	49	20.6
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	68	23.7
DON'T KNOW	3.	103	35.9
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE VG PROMOTE US AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	57	19.9
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	45	15.7
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	75	26.1
DON'T KNOW	3.	110	38.3
TOTAL		287	100.0

VARIABLE VH ISSUE VISAS TO FOREIGN VISITORS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	10	3.5
NOW ASSIGNED	1.	226	78.7
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED	2.	19	6.6
DON'T KNOW	3.	32	11.1
TOTAL		287	100.0

RESPONSE TO QUESTION VI
APSA

VARIABLE VIA RECRUITMENT PRACTICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO RESPONSE	0.	18	6.3
BROAD REPRESENT.	1.	71	24.7
DON'T KNOW	2.	11	3.8
PERSONAL ACHVMT	3.	187	65.2
TOTAL		287	100.0

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