THE SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY
NINTH SESSION
1966-1967

A PROFILE OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY--
THE CASE OF THAILAND

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified 12 years
after date of origin.

Wilfred D. Koplowitz

April 1967
# DECLASSIFIED

A PROFILE OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY—
THE CASE OF THAILAND

## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION TO INSURGENCY: Total Political War.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>INSURGENCY IN ASIA: Towards A Scientific Formula</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>TARGET THAILAND: How It Appears To The Insurgency Planner</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>THE FACE OF INSURGENCY TODAY IN THAILAND.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>THE ANATOMY OF THE THAI INSURGENCY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEXES

| A. | Synoptic Observations On The Nature And Techniques Of Communist Insurgency | 17 |
| B. | A View Of Thailand As A Target From The Perspective Of A Communist Insurgency Planner | 20 |
| C. | A Note On The Data Base, A Selective Bibliography, and Description Of Classified Sources Consulted | 28 |
The challenge of insurgency in our time cannot be avoided by citizens or officials in the United States as long as this nation fulfills its responsibilities as a global power, willing and able to exert resources outside of its borders on behalf of deeply rooted values and perceived interests. Such exertion need not mean a total, automatic or standard response to every insurgency everywhere. I only suggest here that insurgency has become a key weapon in the arsenal of revolution-makers whose doctrine of social and political change is the antithesis of our own. Moreover, if reciprocal nuclear deterrence holds, the probabilities are high that insurgency, in one form or another, will be a major conflict form in the decades ahead.

This case study was therefore stimulated by my belief that insurgency must be understood by responsible professionals in the field of foreign affairs whose area of concern, at one time or another, must impinge, either at the policy or operational level, on an insurgency problem, actual or potential. The Asian theatre is currently the most active and in Thailand there exists what may be called "underdeveloped insurgency"; it presents an interesting complex of political, economic, ethnic and psychological factors. My aim in this study was self-education rather than the enlightenment of the foreign affairs community. The study has been rewarding in this sense.

Assistance is acknowledged, with appreciation, from many persons in Washington and abroad. Encouragement, ideas, materials were provided by officials of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Service, the Government of Thailand, American personnel in Tokyo, Hongkong, Saigon, Vientianne, London, and especially in Bangkok and Udorn, Thailand. Since my concentration was on the insurgency side rather than on the counter effort, intelligence reports were essential as a basis for study. CIA officers concerned with the insurgency in Thailand were, without exception, highly knowledgeable and generous with their time.

The main body of the case study focuses on the insurgency itself, as presently perceived, placing it in a historical and geographic context. It is necessarily a condensation of a vast amount of material on the subject. On the chance that some readers may be interested in the broader ground covered by my own educative effort, I have included several annexes which hopefully add color and contour to the topography of the communist insurgency in Thailand.
One of the more compelling, complex and controversial facets of current history is summed up in the word "insurgency." Korea excepted, serious international conflict since the Second World War has, more often than not, been played out in the unconventional arena theatre of the guerrilla whose neo-classical scenario dominates the harsh drama of contemporary warfare as actually staged and not merely rehearsed in military games. The incidence of insurgency, the audacity of its goals, the elevation of its strategy to the level of doctrine in the communist world, the refinement of its tactics and techniques combine to support the assignment of special weight to insurgency in the current balance of international politics.

There is no paucity of literature on the subject. Bibliographies grow longer daily as theoreticians and practitioners expound ideas and distill experience to assert their insight or scholarship, or to instruct and inspire actual or prospective insurgents or counterinsurgents as the case may be.

Annex A consists of a deliberately incomplete outline of only a few aspects of the elements of insurgency to which I have recently been exposed and which seem most pertinent to the case of Thailand. The core points on insurgency as we have come to understand it may be further summarized as follows:

1) Insurgency is revolutionary guerrilla war aimed at the overthrow of existing authority, seizure of total power and the establishment of a new social order.

2) Its methodology and tactics are unconventional in the military sense and rely primarily on psychological and political techniques.

3) Insurgency is executed by a hard core of highly trained, disciplined, ruthless, marvelously motivated cadre working within the target country, often supported from abroad, and stressing clandestinity and mobility.

4) Attacking the incumbent authority at its most vulnerable points, modern insurgency relies heavily on breaking the links between people and government; it combines fear inducing terror with grievance exploitation and promise of progress to accomplish this aim.

5) Insurgency, if it is to succeed, creates a substructure of extra-legal government in the villages of the target country; this structure supports the guerrilla cadre and asserts part-time authority over the area in opposition to existing authority.

6) When enough population is brought under insurgent control, the insurgency moves into more active phases during which the governmental forces are challenged directly, first by harassment and ambush, later by direct frontal assault.

If two elements in insurgency were to be picked as most important and most impressive, it would be the imagination and daring of insurgent strategy plus the insurgent's capacity for organization--of recruitment, of training, of propaganda, of logistics, of communication, of terror and control. Surely it is organization which has been the key to the success of the Vietcong. As we shall see, thus far in Thailand, the same degree of precision and comprehensiveness seems to be lacking. But insurgency, as practiced and almost perfected (in China and Vietnam) by the communists, is a formidable thing indeed. In the informed words of Douglas Pike's new and superb study Vietcong (M.I.T. Press, 1966):

The concept of revolutionary guerrilla warfare is, we must acknowledge, a superb strategy, efficacious as an antidote to modern arms and in harmony with the world's temper, efficiently harnessing social forces already loosened. It opposes the aspirations of people while apparently furthering them, manipulates the individual by persuading him to manipulate himself . . . . In the endless debate as to whether communism's success has been due to its brilliant strategy or to its unresponsive opposition, in the case of Vietnam and revolutionary guerrilla warfare we must side with the former.
II. INSURGENCY IN ASIA: Towards A Scientific Formula

Insurgency per se is not originally, characteristically or uniquely an Asian phenomenon. A total listing of insurgencies would probably produce a fairly even East-West historical balance. It is nonetheless true that the volume of insurgency during the past thirty years, the nature and degree of American involvement, the impact on affected countries have all been so great as to lend special significance to the Asian theatre. This assertion is supported by familiar but weighty evidence:

- The theory and practice of insurgency as a special form of revolution based on the rural sector was given monumental impetus by MAO TSE TUNG and the Chinese Communist victory after twenty years of struggle.

- The historically dominant Chinese Asian presence has, since 1949, operated from a dynamic, radical, threatening posture with one salient feature, to wit: the constant incantation of insurgency (called People's War) as the correct and inevitable method of achieving China's own national goals, its external aims, and, indeed, of accomplishing political and social change everywhere.

- If the men of the Great March experimented and fathered modern concepts of "total insurgency," surely the Vietminh are the incredibly talented sons who, to quote Douglas Pike once again, "have attempted to raise the techniques employed in the Chinese Revolution and in the Viet Minh war against the French to a science, so as to be able to prescribe a formula that, if applied according to directions, would yield inevitable victory."

- In Vietnam we have witnessed, science or not, a spectacular example of insurgency which has come within a hair of total success and which today embroils almost a half million American and associated troops in opposition to it.

- Vietnam, the center ring of current Asian insurgency, is only one of many concentric and overlapping rings in which this kind of political warfare has been played in Asia. Recall the intense and highly instructive Philippine and Malaysian affairs not without their ominous remnant legacies. Observe the chronic dissidence--frequently endemic, ethnic, local or traditional, but which can more often be related to more pervasive and disciplined stimuli. This dissidence exists on virtually every border area in the region; they are the "remote areas" of classical insipient insurgencies: Thailand-Cambodia, Thailand-Burma, Thailand-Laos, Thailand-Malaysia, Malaysian-Indonesian, Laos-North Vietnam.

- There are three active insurgencies in Asia today: Vietnam, Laos and Thailand in that order of intensity. It is impossible to scrutinize any one without noting important interrelationships. The insurgency flow chart of Southeast Asia does not respect national boundaries. The core insurgency in South Vietnam cannot prevail without aid from the North of every kind. The prime conduit for this support is the Ho Chi Minh trail winding through central and lower Laos before entering South Vietnam. To protect that vital route, North Vietnam has entered into the insurgency between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Laotian Government and that intervention is now the decisive factor preventing victory over the Laotian insurgency. Whether or not the Thai insurgency was activated in support of the Vietnamese drive or as part of an over-all Chinese strategy, the communist terrorist organization in Thailand receives crucial assistance from the Government in Hanoi. The sophisticated politico-military training provided Thai cadre in North Vietnam, after arduous, well-planned exfiltration through Pathet Lao dominated territory, is a substantial factor in the development of cadre for the Thai effort. The Laotian turbulence thus facilitates this training and, at least as important, the supply of arms across the Mekong River.

Details of external support rendered the Thai insurgency will emerge in later chapters of this paper. The above outline by way of introduction serves to underline a view of communist insurgency in Thailand which places it in a historical and geographic perspective linking it with Chinese precedents, other Asian experience, and the on-going manifestations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare raging throughout the Indo-Chinese area. Thailand is neither an isolated nor a cauterized example of the communist insurgency process under discussion.
III. TARGET THAILAND: How it Appeals to the Insurgency Planner

Despite the increasingly energetic attempt to codify principles and practices—to develop a "science" of insurgency, each case is bound to present unique features deriving from specific cultures and politics. The insurgency master planner who has mastered the developing classical doctrine of his craft must address his target with enough imagination and flexibility to accommodate its special features. In order to dramatize this crucial process of target analysis, I have constructed an imaginary memorandum prepared by the Research Section for the guidance of the Operations Section of an imaginary Composite Command for Support to National Wars of Liberation (COCOMSUPNAWARLIB). The memorandum highlights both Thai vulnerabilities and resistants to the communist insurgent thrust which is about to increase in operational tempo. It could have been written in mid-1964 or early 1965. The full text of this "guidance" is attached as Annex B to this paper. Key points are summarized below; paragraph numbering is identical with that in the Annex.

1) The Operations Section is advised that the Thai target presents a roughly balanced set of advantages and disadvantages for the insurgency movement, but that skill and perserverence can tip the scales.

2) The core of the target's vulnerability is the deep and chronic weakness of the central Government in the rural areas, most acute in the remote regions. The weakness is evident in the police, administrative and political structures and belies the apparent, but superficial elaborateness of bureaucratic forms long considered to be traditionally acceptable and in tune with Thai culture and psychology. The guidance discusses the uni-directional flow of political communications from the top down, the feelings of neglect and resentment among younger villagers and the possibilities for exploitation by the insurgency of this curious kind of political vacuum; possibilities for filling the communications and energy gap are increasingly clear in the villages of Thailand. Targets for terrorist action are identified.

3) A countervailing point is made by reference to the widely held feelings of nationality, of identification with Bangkok, albeit distant and often insensitive, and based on an emotional, symbolic sense of identity with the King. The insurgents are advised to handle the figure of the King with some care.

4) The operational opposition--Thai army and police--is described as somewhat less than formidable given the political proclivities of the military and the corruptability of the local security forces. Serious efforts at reform and retraining to cope with current challenges are noted in such a way as to guard against discounting these improving counterinsurgency elements.

5 and 6) Turning to the ethnic, geographic and economic topographies, the imaginary Researchers call their operating comrades' attention to the independent, tough, restive hill tribes in the North with some stress on the MEO peoples.

7) The Northeast offers the most fertile ground for insurgency even as its reluctant soil frustrates the unfortunately still primitive efforts of Thai farmers to improve their lot. Traditions of dissent and occasional outbreaks of separatism combine with relative economic depression to provide a backdrop for grievance exploitation and cadre recruitment. Reference is made to the wartime Free Thai Movement in this area, a movement which provided focus for dissident tendencies and gave the population an experience of insurgency. The current insurgent forces are advised to capitalize on this tradition and experience. The long difficult to patrol border with Laos along the Mekong River is noted as a crucial and favorable geographic feature.

8) The Mid-South has a large Sino-Thai population and many Communist Party of Thailand members have been recruited from this area which also contains mountainous areas along the Burma border, again difficult to police effectively.

9) The four southermmost provinces are presently providing sanctuary for a formidable, well-equipped and highly trained remnant of the Malaysian Communist Party-controlled Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO). Although allegedly and, in fact, heretofore not operating against the Thai Government, these Communist forces cannot easily be brought under control nor eliminated. The imaginary Communist memorandum points out that under certain circumstances, when the insurgency in Thailand has developed further, activation of these sophisticated insurgent elements could contribute to a multi-faceted, nation-wide offensive against Thailand.
10) The 3,000,000 ethnic Chinese in Thailand are described as the ambivalent community they are in Thai life. They struggle with a double identity and the need to accommodate Thai watchfulness and fears in order to pursue economic self-interests. At the same time, several possibilities for penetration and essential insurgency supporting activities are noted.

11) The strengths and weaknesses of the small clandestine Communist Party of Thailand are outlined. The point is made that Sino-Thai have been historically the majority in the Party, but there are some recent recruitments among ethnic Thai. A few key CPT members reside in exile in China and assist in the direction of the insurgency from there. Inside Thailand the structure is copied after the Party in China. For better or worse, the Operations people are told, in this imaginary guidance, to work through this mechanism despite its relative weakness as compared with local Communist apparatus elsewhere.

12) The large North Vietnamese refugee population in the northeast is described as still loyal to Ho Chi Minh and able to provide certain kinds of support.

13) The dominant Buddhist religion, as regards its practices, its institutions and hierarchy, is held to be, on balance, a resistant to the insurgency. Possibilities for creating severe schism between the Buddhist leadership and the Government appear minimal. The insurgents are advised to exploit a tendency to neutrality on the part of this institution and to avoid antagonizing it.

14) Lacking any evidence to date of either physical or moral courage on the part of the intellectual and student communities in Thailand, the Communist insurgent target analyst discounts the short run importance of these familiar breeding grounds of dissidence. However, there is a definite likelihood of accumulating frustrations due to limited social and political mobility. Opportunities for the insurgent should not be missed in any long-term program. Similarly the Labor picture is mixed; a natural area of grievance is circumscribed for immediate exploitation by the watchfulness of the authorities. Some organizational work has been done among the trade union underground and this can be increased.

15) The crucial question of a central cause to feed the insurgency is discussed in some detail given the lack of an obvious compelling national grievance which characterized other insurgencies in the area, i.e., the colonial issue. Neither economic nor political nor social discontent is so widespread among Thai classes or regions as to permit reliance on one single banner under which to recruit and rally insurgent forces. The orchestration and selective use of themes is advised with concentration on the continuing corruption in Thai political elite circles, the autocratic nature of the Government which has not lived up to promises of democratization, and, with ever increasing attention, the "subservience" of Thai ruling authorities to American policy and American officials who exploit Thailand for military bases and economic profit. The issue of colonialism, not present in traditional form, should be created out of the raw material of heavy American involvement in contemporary Thailand.

The summary presented above only provides the central points elaborated upon in the Annex which should be read by those interested in a fuller discussion of this complex insurgency terrain as it probably appears to the Communist planner of insurgency there.

IV. THE FACE OF INSURGENCY TODAY IN THAILAND

What is the face or rather the seen and cutting edge of the insurgency in Thailand? What are the overt acts which tear at the lives of people, at the structure and processes of government, at the fabric of society and nation?

These acts may be categorized as follows:

--Assassinations, attempted assassinations, and kidnappings.

--Destruction of public and private property.

--Harassment of security forces including direct attacks on official (especially police) installations and personnel; ambushes of police or military patrols.
Except for a dip in November 1966, allegedly because the terrorist forces decided to help harvest crops in an exceptional bit of civic action, the rate of so-called "incidents" in the aforementioned categories rises steadily since late 1964.

**Assassinations:**

There were 10 political assassinations of civilians in 1964, about 30 in 1965, and 112 in 1966, 23 of whom were Government officials. The assassination rate in 1967 thus far remains at about this level but is higher in the first three months of this year than in November and December of last. The 9 officials killed in January were a monthly high over the previous peak of 4 in October 1966. These totals should not be exaggerated as to scale keeping in mind that in South Vietnam 1,700 assassinations occurred from 1957 through 1960. A yearly peak there was reached in 1963 with 2,000 killings quickly tapering to 300 in 1965 as the Vietcong literally ran out of logistical targets. Thus far, in 1967, if we lump assassinations, attempts, kidnapping and other acts of terrorism and intimidation, the total is 45 separate actions in Thailand.

The significant points on assassination in the Thai picture to date follow:

1) the percentage increase in the rate over a three-year period;
2) the classic and effective selective targeting on unpopular officials and police informers with a strong admixture of village headmen and school teachers vital to the local structure of authority and the promise of progress under it;
3) the proved effectiveness of such murder as villagers withhold cooperation from police demonstrably incapable of protecting them from terrorist power thus exerted; in the wake of an assassination in their midst, they are close-mouthed and pretend not to have recognized the terrorists involved;
4) the probability that capacity exists for further increases in the assassination rates when the terrorists decide on such a course; (There is no firm evidence that terrorists specifically guilty of such acts have been apprehended and punished; resident village defense forces able to prevent a well-planned assassination are difficult to organize.)

**Armed Clashes:** (attacks, ambushes, harassment, fire fights of any kind)

There were only a handful of such incidents in 1964 and slight increases in 1965 as the communists concentrated on recruitment, training and indoctrination. The upturn begins in 1966 and continues throughout the year. The accepted 1966 total in the American Embassy in Bangkok is 221 armed encounters, most, but not all, stemming from communist terrorist initiative. Those encounters reflecting increased Thai security coverage and aggressiveness cannot be totally discounted as an indication of insurgent numbers, mobility or capability, especially since the apparent kill ratios are low, at least lower than suggested by the Thai Government claim that .27 terrorists were killed in action between December 1965 and February 1967 in Northeast Thailand alone. This is probably a generous figure given the loose criteria for confirmation in use. The rate of armed clash is higher in 1967 thus far with 111 reported as of April 1, mostly in the Northeast Province of Nakon Phanom.

The significant points on the armed clashes in the Thai insurgency profile are:

1) Their recent frequency and nature reflect a decision by the insurgents to embark on more offensive action in 1966. The rate of insurgent training, morale, weapons, and ammunition appear to have made this technically feasible but may, indeed, have been premature in terms of the real strength of the insurgent political and guerrilla organization. The counter-measures and greater vigilance induced by this type of direct challenge to authority may prove costly to a still underdeveloped insurgency.

2) The objective of armed clash from the incipient insurgent viewpoint is, like assassination, to demonstrate power to challenge authority successfully, to cow the population into denying support to the Government's security program and to assist the insurgency, to improve terrorist morale in the testing heat of battle and to intimidate the security force, if possible, in their vulnerable defensive postures. Some measure of success has probably been achieved along these lines.
Forced Propaganda Meetings:

Perhaps the most interesting and multi-purpose type of action in the insurgency is the so-called "forced propaganda meeting" conducted in a target village by armed terrorist bands, frequently in makeshift uniforms of green and black, or black and blue with red breast patches. Groups conducting such involuntary "town meetings" have reportedly ranged up to 100 in size. Meetings reflect planning and organization: the insurgents may divide into three subgroups—one guards entrances and exits to the village, another conducts the meeting and a third circulates to ensure attention.

One hundred forty-three such meetings were held in 1966 and 60 to date in 1967, with a concentration in Sakon Nakon. Only two, and this is most important, were interrupted by security forces in 1966. Normally lasting one or two hours, a few meetings have stretched to six. Village leaders are sometimes roughed up, some have been killed at these affairs. There have been cases of property destruction, kidnapping, and many forced levies of food and supplies associated with the meetings.

The main agenda item is, of course, the propaganda; a "pitch," unlike the coercion-oriented acts already mentioned, designed to enlist a positive response from the fearful, captive audience. For some individuals it may be the opening gambit in a longer process of recruitment. Now the insurgents play on local grievance and/or aspirations, stressing always the corrupt, unfeeling autocratic military dictatorship in distant Bangkok, lackeys of the American imperialists using Thailand as a base for profit and for killing other Asians, promising that a people's government of property destruction, kidnapping, and many forced levies of food and supplies associated with the meetings.

These propaganda meetings appear significant for the following reasons:

1) A meeting of this kind, especially a fairly long one under well-planned, controlled conditions, held without interference from any security force, shows the target village that the insurgents have power, organization, and determination. It demonstrates that the Government's ability to protect the village is faulty, indeed, that the existing structure of government may be weaker than the prospective one. Thus the meeting is part of the broad, various attack on governmental authority and the drive to split the people from the government.

2) Needed supplies are collected at these meetings.

3) While our information is poor on the question of the propaganda impact, it is not unlikely that a minority may be affected positively. Depending on the village roles played by the affected minority and on follow-up, this initial penetration may be an expandable wedge.

Propaganda:

There is a formidable propaganda thrust coming at the Thai people from outside the country, but in the name of the Thai people and exploiting certain Thai exiles in China. We can pick up that story on October 1, 1964, when the Communist Party of Thailand sent a message of greeting on the 15th Anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. It declared in part . . .

To meet the present situation, the Communist Party of Thailand now calls on all the forces (in Thailand) that are against the U. S. imperialist and their lackeys to unite immediately and form a patriotic democratic united front . . .

After expressing willingness to cooperate with all like-minded groups and individuals, the statement predicts final victory in the cause of independence and democracy after the fashion of the Chinese people (sic).

One month later on November 1, 1964, the Thailand Independence Movement (TIM) was founded. A published and broadcast manifesto set out the following program and policies repeated here because it reveals what is to be a central theme of the insurgency destined to become even more strident:
On January 1, 1965, a second front organization put its head above the menacing Chinese horizon, also based on the expatriate Thai community. Calling itself the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF), it promptly issued the familiar appeal to all "patriots" to unite and drive out American imperialism in favor of independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and prosperity. One year later, on January 1, 1966, the TPF escalated its propaganda tirade by calling for a Peoples War against U. S. imperialism.

These appeals were broadcast over the "Voice of the People of Thailand." This beacon of constant agitation operates in a professed "clandestine" manner, but is a 600 kilowatt station now believed by U. S. authorities to be located near Kunming, China. (A U.S.I.A. report of December 1965 had the station situated in North Vietnam, south of Hanoi.)

Together with Radios Peking and Hanoi plus the propaganda broadcasts originating with the Pathet Lao, the "Voice of the People of Thailand" maintains a steady stream of obvious propaganda into Thailand. The "message" is interlaced with slanderous and a heavy sweetener of entertainment beamed into the thousands of radios clutched as a prized possession by the villagers of Thailand who quite naturally listen most to the broadcasts with the strongest signal. And these transmitters do have such power.

The main lines of the radio propaganda are variations on the themes from the previous manifestos quoted above. Hardhitting and particular stress is put on the use being made of Thai soil by the "American imperialists" as a base for attacks on North Vietnam and Laos. That these bases really hurt the over-all communist insurgency in Southeast Asia is suggested by the crescendo of complaining propaganda. Still, a useful "cause" for the Thai insurgency arises out of the American military presence in the country, necessary and adroitly managed as it may be. For the sake of emphasis, I shall risk a small redundancy by reproducing a few paragraphs from a December 1965 U.S.I.A. research report on the radio output which remains valid to this date:

These (propaganda) themes in paraphrased summary form are as follows:

--The imperialist United States violates Thai sovereignty, exploits and represses the Thai people, and uses Thailand as a base for aggression against the people of Southeast Asia.

--The "Sarit-Thanom clique" (Thai Government) is the willing cats-paw of U. S. imperialism. They are willingly turning Thailand into a new-type American colony.

--The Thai Government represses the Thai people and denies them their democratic rights.

--The Government of Premier Thanom is the corrupt heir of the scandalous Sarit regime.

The communist black station places particular stress on the theme of government repression of the people. Almost any sort of constructive activity by the Thai Government is branded as an effort to repress or suppress the Thai people; e.g., feeder roads built in the Northeast are labelled a means to facilitate government suppression, and mobile information units "are in reality deceptive organizations scheming to control and spy on the people."

Similarly, Thai police reinforcements in the Northeast are designed only to repress the people.
Before commenting on the effectiveness of the propaganda described in the foregoing paragraphs, a brief word on the printed variety. Although there have been past attempts at clandestine newspapers and periodicals to function as a central piece in an over-all national covert campaign, no single item now exists which has achieved such status. A fairly large amount of uneven printed material is being produced—much of it inside the country on relatively unsophisticated reproduction facilities. As an example of the quantity and content of this propaganda, we can refer to a summary of an American official's review of material picked up by Thai officials between late August and October 1966. The material included:

. . . 13 leaflets, of which 10 are signed "People's Soldiers" or a similar name, two are signed "Thai Youths" and one is signed Patriotic Front of Thailand. The leaflets were directed to specific groups, distributed at village meetings, or dropped on public highways . . . . All have the same theme, to rid Thailand of the Americans and the Thanom-Praphat Government; the leaflets contain accusations of crimes against the people (examples provided) and claim the Americans are taking over the country. Also a 27 mimeographed pamphlet . . . is directed toward intellectuals. The pamphlet traces the history of Thailand, discusses the present situation, predicts a serious war between Communist China and the United States, and asks its readers to choose between the path to slavery to the U. S. imperialists and the path to freedom.

The specific groups referred to in the above summary are worthy of note. In addition to the item tailored for the intellectuals, the targets were Thai military and police (7 messages), Thai officials, teachers, and business men, Thai students, and several addressed to the Thai people in general.

The real effectiveness of all of the propaganda, radio, printed, word-of-mouth, is difficult to assess. Most officials contacted in Thailand expressed the strong view that many Thais listen to the communist radios because reception is superior and the fare is not exclusively propaganda and politics. Generally, the tendency is to discount the impact of the core message on the basis of audience disinterest. It is most likely that the Thai village audience reacts most positively to the entertainment, especially the unique (monotonous to the Western ear) Thai brand of political/folks singing called Mohlam. They are, however, probably not immune to propaganda of a more direct sort when the themes are simple, endlessly repeated, and, at least at times, conforming to long-standing manifest or latent resentments of the audience against existing authority. In short, there are enough small waves of credibility in the ocean of lies and distortion to make possible the erosion of audience disbelief or resistance.

V. THE ANATOMY OF THE THAI INSURGENCY

Behind and below the face of the insurgency is a complex human and logistical process . . . the body of the insurgency—muscles and brains: the recruitment, training, equipping, feeding, organizing, constant indoctrinating, maneuvering of cadre; the direction of the entire enterprise from the standpoints of ideology, propaganda, strategy and tactics and the internal communications required to accomplish it all.

The Size of the Insurgent Force:

This is one of the most difficult estimates to make, but there is fairly common agreement among the agencies concerned, based on collated observations of eye witnesses, deductions from the armed clashes, their scope, distribution, and mobility patterns, etc. The current estimate is 1,000 full-time armed militants possibly operating in 10 - 12 separate organizations with the larger groups breaking down into smaller units for specific actions.

A few cumulative figures compiled by the Thai Government may also indicate the scope of the insurgency force:
Deaths . . . . . 127
Arrests . . . . 1,379
Surrenders . . . 1,773

These figures are for the Northeast alone. In the South the cumulative figures are available only for the period June 30, 1966 through February 16, 1967:

Deaths . . . . . 6
Arrests . . . . 276
Surrenders . . . . 22

At least as important an indication of the insurgency's outreach into the society is the number of sympathizers, persons willing to take some assisting action, however small, on behalf of the cause. The figures used in the U.S. Embassy are between 6,000 and 8,000, while the Thai Joint Security Command in Udorn, possibly with a slip of the tongue, suggested that no more than 2,000 Thais should be in this category. I incline definitely to the larger figure. If we discount the above arrest figures by one half and the surrender figures by a third, we end up still with a formidable number of people who qualify as sympathizers. If we then multiply by a small factor to estimate the total, we end up at about 8,000.

Recruitment:

Thorough work by Rand Corporation (Davison and Zazloff) on the Vietcong Cadre revealed almost constant mixed motivations in the Vietcong recruitment process. Patriotism (anti-colonialism), grievances (against the supposedly repressive Diem regime) and desires (for adventure, advancement, education, belonging) were rarely present singly to a strong enough degree to prompt association with the Vietcong. Rarely were pitches made in the name of Marxist ideology. Crucial to Vietcong recruitments were the active, highly personal efforts of already existing cadre on a man-to-man basis. There are analogies in the Thai situation.

The recruitment stories I have read suggest the following observations:

1) An effort has been made to attract younger people, underemployed, lacking higher education, but sometimes wanting it; people with natural ability unable to develop themselves under existing conditions. This angle is often more prominent than the heavy political pitch although more impersonal political and social grievances are always introduced.

2) Often the recruitment will initially be in the name of a front group more innocuous and more relevant to local problems than a Communist Party. The principal front in the Northeast has been the Farmers Liberation Association.

3) When operating at optimum and classical efficiency, the recruitment will be unhurried and follow a long process of assessment and personal cultivation. One case, that of Nom Suriyawan is instructive. Nom was a 24 year old farmer in the Mukdahab District of Nakom Phanom Province. A summary follows of a lengthy report detailing his recruitment and early indoctrination:
The man who recruited me into the Farmers' Liberation Association and later sent me to North Vietnam for training was Mr. Phae, a native Thai who first came to our village in early 1964 from Ubon Province. In February 1965, when I had known him about a year, Phae began talking to me about government oppression of the farmers and finally persuaded me to join with him to overthrow the Thanom Government. Shortly after agreeing to join him, I received, through one of my close friends, a secret document for study and application for the Farmers' Liberation Association, which I filled out as requested. After filing this application I attended three meetings conducted by Phae and became a member of a three-man unit. I was assigned no duties and made only a contribution of one baht to the association. On 23 April 1965, Phae came and offered me the opportunity to study abroad, not telling me what or where this study was to be. I accepted the offer, hoping to gain training that would help me to improve my own economic status, and on 25 April I left my home to begin my journey to North Vietnam.

4) Very often in Thailand to date the communists have recruited almost casually, without long assessment as to suitability. They have been content with what was obviously a superficial acceptance by the recruit of the proposition of training and service in a good cause. The Thais are agreeable people, willing to take a chance on some project which sounds sensible or fun, without careful consideration of the implications. From this group have come defectors and drop-outs representing lost investment of tremendous time and energy.

Training:

Recruits destined to become cadre require training and the quality of this effort directly affects the quality of cadre.

Training has definitely occurred in China, Laos, and North Vietnam; specifically in Peking, Mahaxay in Laos, and at Hoa Binh in North Vietnam. The emphasis in the China schools has been on politics and propaganda; in Laos and North Vietnam on the tactics of terror and armed guerrilla struggle in addition to political indoctrination. We recently learned a few details of an important training episode which took place in the early 50's in Peking. The course was two years long; 50 Thai were enrolled. Aliases were used. Most trainees came from Central Thailand. Travel to China took place through Laos and North Vietnam or by sea.

Perhaps the heaviest training load in the past three years has been carried by the installation at Hoa Binh about 80 kilometers southwest of Hanoi. We have detailed reports on this training, the exfiltration and reinfiltration routes used, the installation itself, the training content and the students.

The following summary statistics on training in North Vietnam were sent to senior Government officials at the end of February 1967:

As of 21 February 1967 thirteen Thai nationals trained in North Vietnam have either surrendered or been arrested by Thai authorities. Of this number, four have been interrogated and three others are now being interrogated by Thai authorities.

44 other partial or tentative identifications have been made in true name and an additional 125 Thai nationals by alias. Thus we have partial identification of 169 Thai nationals who reportedly have been trained in North Vietnam between 1962 and the end of 1965. During the same period at least 350 Thais are reported to have been trained in North Vietnam broken down as follows: 30 in 1962, 60 in 1963, 140 in 1964, and 120 in 1965. Only one, eight-month course a year was possible due to the length of travel involved in the exfiltration and reinfiltration process.

(Note that this North Vietnamese support predates any Thai assistance to U.S. effort in Vietnam.)
I believe these numbers to be generally accurate and at least indicative of the scale of the North Vietnamese training effort. Similarly reliable figures are not available on training in China. A Defense Department summary of training quotes, but does not evaluate reports which use such numbers as 500 trainees in southern Yunnan Province. Another notes that 700 students from Laos, Burma, Thailand, India, China, and Indonesia enrolled in an intelligence collection school in Chon Nai during 1962 and that 2,000 students were at this same school in March 1965. Without corroboration I believe these figures high. The British report that in May 1965 a course in subversion and guerrilla activity was run in Peking for a single Thai student taught by three Army officers and an ex-Bangkok newspaper editor.

The content of training reflects the classical insurgency doctrine of the Chinese and Vietminh schools. The routes taken to Hoa Binh were through Laos; they were rigorous and well-organized, a rugged introduction to the insurgent career. A few direct quotations from several dissemination summaries will illustrate:

**Report A:**

I left my home in Mukdahan on 25 April 1965 to attend (as I later learned) a guerrilla warfare school in North Vietnam. After passing between contacts and way stations in the Mukdahan-Nakhon Phanom area, I crossed the Mekong into Laos at midnight on 26 April with a party of three other Thai trainees. Our party of four was escorted through Laos by North Vietnamese Army and Pathet Lao troops, stopping at two hill camps designated Plod Noi and Plod Yai .... From the last camp we went on to North Vietnam by motor transport, being driven all the way to Hanoi, where we stayed for three days before going on to our school site near Hoa Binh. On my return I covered the same route with some variations arriving at my home on 30 March 1966. On the following day I surrendered to Thai authorities on the advice of my family.

Intensive instruction was given by North Viet Army personnel in techniques of ambush, attack on fortified camps and village defense. Instructions in ambush and attack included two or three field exercises in each tactic with teams of students operating against each other as aggressor and defender forces.

**Report B:**

From June 1965 until February 1966 classes in guerrilla warfare and Communist political indoctrination were given to a group of 130 Thai students at two installations within a ten kilometer radius of the town of Hoa Binh, Hoa Binh Province, North Vietnam (NVN). The first installation was a semi-permanent construction about five kilometers west of Hoa Binh. The second was in a heavily wooded and farming area about five kilometers east of Hoa Binh. There were no permanent buildings at the second installation. The school was moved in November or December 1965 because of the danger of air strikes. The school staff, with the exception of three Thais, was made up of officers and men of the North Vietnamese Army (NVNA). Students arrived in small groups over a prolonged period. No classes were given until the student complement numbered 130. The day before classes opened there was an opening ceremony featuring a party, speeches, and a requiem ceremony for two Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) leaders who were executed in 1962. For the first six months, classes were divided between political indoctrination and practical military training. The last two months the non-political classes centered on military theory and tactics. The school day began at 0530 hours and continued to 2100 hours.

**Report C:**

Political courses concentrated on the Vietnamese and Thai revolutions and methodology of revolutionary action. There was no reference to Communist front organizations in Thailand, but only to the CPT. Military training concentrated on ambush, attacks on camp and fortified areas, resistance to sweep operations and village defense. Students were given training with rifle, pistol, submachine gun, carbine, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and grenades. Examinations were given at the end of the course. Following these examinations and a commencement ceremony, the students began to leave the school in small groups of five and six. No specific assignments in Thailand were discussed before departure. At the school the students were formed into a three platoon student company, with their own officers--appointed by the school. The majority of the students were young, poorly educated men from northeast Thailand, but other classes and areas were represented.
Declassified

Report D: A group of 130 Thai Guerrilla trainees who attended a school near Hoa Binh, North Vietnam were told that they were to carry out the first revolution in Thailand. This revolution is to be carried out in the following five stages—survey the country and select the best area for infiltration by the revolutionary forces; select promising individuals for recruitment; gain their confidence and recruit them; give them political indoctrination and guerrilla warfare training; and lead these recruits in guerrilla warfare in the countryside and in open demonstrations against the government in the villages. In discussion of recruitment techniques, special attention was given to women, minorities and soldiers. In the initial stages of infiltration of an area, the use of terrorism against agovernment officials is to be based on its acceptability by the local population. Once an area is consolidated, it is to be used as a base for expansion into neighboring areas.

Logistics and Materiel:

The armed bands require food first of all. This can be obtained by straight purchase if insurgent finances allow. Food can be collected, prepared, stored, and brought to the insurgent bands outside the village by key sympathizers in the village. Food can be requisitioned by force through an incursion for this purpose alone or at a forced propaganda meeting where the insurgents pass empty sacks to be filled. All of these techniques have been used, the last named more frequently of late.

The arms and ammunition story is interesting and disturbing. Although a few are Japanese, Chinese, or French, weapons captured from armed terrorists are usually U. S. manufactured carbines, M-1 rifles, M-3 submachine guns, 45 calibre pistols and native flintlock. A few reports indicate mortar training is in process. A careful report was done in 1965, based on interviews with Thai officers concerned with the Mekong border area. It produced a collective opinion that in the first six months of 1965 between 2,500 and 3,000 small arms, with as much as 90,000 rounds of ammunition were smuggled illegally into Thailand. It is generally believed in Thailand that much of this traffic originates with the U. S. supplied Royal Lao troops who conveniently "lose" their weapons to the nearest smuggler. Officials consulted in Vientianne do not discount a certain traditional and commercial traffic in this direction, but insist that the estimates of leakage are exaggerated and, in any case, cannot be ascribed to the communist insurgency. Whether traditional, commercial, or political in its organization, the fact remains that the insurgents are able to satisfy their armament needs without undue difficulty and much more effective countermeasures will be required to alter this.

We have next to no information on exact funding needs, availabilities, or channels. There is one oft quoted report in 1965 of large Red Chinese purchases of baht in Hongkong and the U. S. Consulate General's attempts to confirm this report in Hongkong banking circles were inconclusive.

Concerning medical supply: The insurgents are instructed in basic first aid, have been known to train a fair number of nurses (one defected) who live with the guerrilla units, and obviously obtain simple medicines locally. Occasionally a sick villager has been aided in an effort to gain sympathy.

The communications question is one of the most controversial. One opinion has the terrorists communicating extensively by radio both within Thailand and with China and North Vietnam. Another stresses the slower courier system. We do know that very recently the terrorists have attempted to zero in on police radio equipment and have succeeded in appropriating a certain amount of it.

Finally, the very important question of bases, camps, sites for training, storage, sanctuary, etc. No solid collated report on this subject was available. However, Thai officials have uncovered such camps. One in Nong Khai District (a hotbed of the insurgency) had triangular shaped fortifications with trenches and paraphernalia for military training. Another location had two connecting camps, each of which could handle about 30 men. Back in August 1965 a camp was located near the village of Pakao, 15 minutes away, along a good path; built around a clearing used to raise food. A hut occupied by a woman with typewriter and mimeograph machine turning out communist propaganda... a waterproof oil drum was buried in the brush nearby and contained writings of Mao, songbooks, handwritten papers on communist party police and filled in C. P. application forms.

The most recent camp discovery was reported in January as follows:
Both sources were recruited inside Thailand by other Thai. Both had demonstrated some special ability, but neither had served in any leadership capacity. One was a frustrated school teacher unable to live decently on his low salary. Both men traveled to Peking for training, going one way by sea and the other overland via Laos and North Vietnam. As indicated in the section on Training, arrangements were complex and smoothly handled. The courses were long, involved political and military subjects, including specific jungle warfare training. Both men returned to Thailand and led, and given guidance by North Vietnamese experts directed from Hanoi (possibly via its Embassy in Vietnam), decimating the Thai Communist Party elite will affect the insurgency very little.

There are several other "control" possibilities, each with relevant operational ramifications. A vocal school believes the line of direction leads straight to Peking which, while working through both Thai and Vietnamese nationals, does so under conditions of strict discipline. A less vocal, but not to be ignored point of view suggested the possibility that the real heart of the insurgency is non-communist, Northeastern, Free Thai derivated, socialist-oriented, and is attempting to exploit communist assistance (in the absence of any other) for its own national revolutionary purposes.

Before attempting a summary conclusion on this controversial issue, a review of the key elements pertaining to each "control" possibility seems in order.

The Communist Party of Thailand:

This paper is being completed at a moment of special importance in the acquisition of intelligence on the CPT. After many months of careful joint effort, Thai and United States officials may be developing strong new insights into the apparatus of this elusive organization. It has not been possible to peruse all of the raw material now available and finished analysis has not been completed. What follows, therefore, is only an indication of the kind of new and necessarily piecemeal data recently circulated in the intelligence community.

It has been confirmed that three secret party assemblies occurred since the founding Congress in 1942. Policies were established and Central Committee members elected. As stated in Annex B (paragraph 11), there are 30 active Central Committeemen and 11 members of the controlling Politbureau. The estimate of 1,000 active members in CPT at large is probably accurate, of whom about 100 have been trained in China. While actively engaged in the current insurgency, the CPT has historically used the more conventional tactics of infiltration, especially during the 1956-58 period when political parties briefly emerged before the military coup which ended this experiment. Communist defectors affirm that all parties were penetrated by the CPT at that time and, due to more aggressive and creative political action, the communists exerted influence greater than their numbers.

Two prime sources in the current breakthrough described their recruitment, training and disaffection experiences. These are summarized below because they are pertinent to assessments of CPT strengths, weaknesses, and relationships with the Chinese.

Both sources were recruited inside Thailand by other Thai. Both had demonstrated some special ability, but neither had served in any leadership capacity. One was a frustrated school teacher unable to live decently on his low salary. Both men traveled to Peking for training, going one way by sea and the other overland via Laos and North Vietnam. As indicated in the section on Training, arrangements were complex and smoothly handled. The courses were long, involved political and military subjects, including specific jungle warfare training. Both men returned...
From historic national, cultural, and geopolitical standpoints, China can be expected to aim at a position of paramountcy in the Southeast Asian area. Old concepts of suzerainty, in which deference and tribute were paid without total political or administrative control by the Chinese, may be illuminating in this connection. Communist China probably does not envisage, even in its maximum projection, a directly governed colonial empire. The precise pattern of desired politics for the ring of states is more difficult to determine. At the more extreme end of the spectrum, it would be described as a ring of puppet governments modelled rigorously after Communist China with leaders serving at its pleasure, and with virtually all important decisions made in Peking or censored there. At the moderate end of the spectrum, it could be pictured as a ring of nations recognizing the primacy of Chinese power in the area, taking no major actions inimical to Chinese interests, automatically conferring with an obtaining approval of Peking before embarking on any major change in policy or strategy, and finally, granting full latitude to a powerful Chinese Communist oriented political party which may operate either from a position of governmental power or in influential opposition. The middle view has China moving between these two acceptable poles of influence taking the model, puppet variety when the conditions are favorable and smartly tolerating the more autonomous national spheres of influence when necessary.

Of equal interest is the matter of Chinese methodology in pursuing its long range interests in the area. Committed by experience and doctrine to the rectitude and effectiveness of "people's war," there is little chance that this central theme in Peking's symphony of propaganda and political action will fade to pianissimo. At the same time, it is unlikely that China will, in the foreseeable future, embark on foreign invasions with Chinese troops, regular or guerrilla. The Chinese will provide a significant support of all kinds to indigenous insurgencies as they are doing in Vietnam (ideological, political, logistical, training, expertise, non-military manpower in the construction field, anti-aircraft gun crews, and the like); they will exert strenuous effort on behalf of such national wars of liberation, but will not risk the kind of retaliation which might ensue from more massive participation. This seems to assume rationality applied to China's national interest, but it also reflects the thought of Mao Tse Tung and his sometime heirs, notably promulgated in the Lin Piao article published on September 2, 1965, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War." Believing firmly in the inevitability of victory through "protracted struggle" the Chinese see no need to contradict their basic view of proper insurgency which holds that success comes only to "wars of national liberation" truly indigenous in personality, if not in character. Few responsible observers would hazard predictions on the impact of the current "cultural revolution" and power struggle inside China on the evolution of revolutionary export. It is obviously conceivable that some future victorious faction could take an even more aggressive and direct approach to the sacred "wars of national liberation."

The possibility of non-communist central direction of the Thai insurgency is remote, but fascinating. There is a real probability that a non-communist elite element does, in fact, exist. There are countless historical precedents for left wing socialist groups honestly rejecting a communist label but striving to capitalize on communist power, i.e., to turn the united front tactic against its master player. This reverse play rarely succeeds forever. There is new, as yet unevaluated, information that such a socialist element may be operating in Peking within the Thai exile community. That element may have connections in Thailand, both in Bangkok and in the Northeast. Free Thai experiences noted earlier may have provided the point of departure.

Without more reliable data and certainly in advance of further analysis of data now being collected, it is impossible to describe one clear line of command. The command and control pattern appears mixed but not necessarily muddy, if one accepts the idea that well-trained guerrilla and insurgent cadre can and must operate with a substantial autonomy. The most plausible pattern appears to be the following:

While a strong basic impulse to insurgency comes out of China, on-the-spot direction of the Thai insurgency probably rests with the Communist Party of Thailand. Its leadership is based in Bangkok, but top officials direct operations in the field from time to time. A few key CPT leaders reside in exile in Peking, thus facilitating the over-all political supervision provided by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government (Thai Section of the Foreign Office).
During the past three years the North Vietnamese role has increased. While perhaps responding to a joint Thai and Chinese request, but primarily for their own ideological and self-serving national interests, the North Vietnamese provide strong and crucial support in the training field stressing the guerrilla side. There is fresh indication of Vietnamese unit leaders operating on the ground in the Northeast. These men undoubtedly accept guidance from the CPT but clearly owe primary allegiance to Hanoi and receive orders from that source. While it seems logical to infer coordination and communications activity in Vientiane through the Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese and Chinese installations there, hard intelligence on this process is lacking.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

There are no conclusions to a story which has not yet reached its climax, which is still being written, and where the end has not been devised or defined. If a summing up is needed, perhaps I can accomplish something of the sort by recalling my first conversation in Bangkok with an able, aggressive officer who had spent a long, difficult tour in Saigon before taking on the Thai assignment. When asked for advice on approaching the subject of insurgency in Thailand, he quickly retorted: There are only four questions worth talking about: 1. Is there an insurgency? 2. Is it a classical insurgency as we have come to know it in Asia? 3. Is it inspired and directed by Communist China? 4. Is there a Communist Party of Thailand running the insurgency in this country?

The reader will have observed that these four questions reflect some lingering debate and doubts in Washington and Bangkok about the true extent of the insurgency, its potential, its larger political and international implications, and, as I have already asserted, an important operational point for counterinsurgency operations.

His quick reply to his own questions was, "The answer to all of them is Yes!"

My answers are, as should be evident from preceding chapters, "Yes, but . . . ."

Is there an insurgency? Yes, but it is in relative terms, underdeveloped; and there are many inherent and other inhibitions to its growth. Still, it surely must be termed an insurgency and treated in dead earnest as such.

Is it a classical insurgency? Yes, but the impression is strong that the communists for some reason violated their own precepts of careful preparation of the vital underground, subversive sub-structure and activated armed guerrilla action before the ground was fully prepared.

Are the Communist Chinese the key foreign sponsors? Yes, but the North Vietnamese role is large and may be growing. Under certain circumstances the Vietnamese contribution may be the crucial one. If withdrawn for some reason, or even reduced, the impact would be very great on the insurgency.

Is the CPT directing the insurgency locally? Yes, but the CPT has no real following in the country, has demonstrated some capacity for conspiracy but less for effective action in the past. The Thais have not proved that they have the total discipline and incredible stamina needed for the long haul, or the flair for organization demonstrated by the Vietminh.

A final observation: The insurgency is a prominent feature of Thai life. It dominates the newspapers. It is used as an excuse for postponing the activation of the constitution. It permeates the daily routine of every Thai government agency. It may be the spur to a slow but steady revolution, or at least reform, of the relationship between central government and village. If the insurgency remains at a relatively low level of threat to the Thai nation, the stakes in the final analysis are nonetheless high. And every one to whom I spoke in Thailand, whether optimistic or pessimistic, Thai or American, said to me--"You know, the communists never give up."

And, neither can we!
ANNEX A

Synoptic Observations on the Nature and Techniques of Communist Insurgency
Insurgency is revolutionary guerrilla war initiated and waged essentially by forces within a country often, but not always, with external support aimed explicitly at the overthrow of existing political authority, the seizure of total power and a new social order.

The methodology of conflict is irregular since conventional military organization is not initially available to the insurgents and the disparity of tangible resources is great.

The core of the insurgency is the guerrilla - as an individual, but more importantly, as part of a small band. These are supported by a subversive substructure of recruited sympathizers in the target areas led by covert organizers and agit-prop personnel. While the kernel of the insurgency will be so-called hard-core communists or allied radical nationalists, it is essential that a steady flow of new cadre be recruited, trained and activated. This flow must be larger than the rate of cadre attrition due to defection and death or captivity resulting from counterinsurgency action.

The insurgency's prospects will be decisively affected by the quality of cadre: their basic ability, their motivation, their stamina, their training, the ongoing efficiency of their management. Resilience and endurance are the twin requirements and these are made possible by leadership, self-discipline and morale. One observer (Charles W. Thayer) believes that a guerrilla insurgent must be "fortified and inspired by a strong idea, patriotic, religious, political or a mixture of all three." There is evidence from the Vietcong experience that this may not necessarily be true at the middle and lower levels of insurgent organization.

Without debating this question of a supporting ideal, it seems clear that the keys to the success of the cadre are an almost supernatural discipline, a thoroughly understood set of operational goals and tactics, a special ethic which creatively and ruthlessly combines raw terror and apparent compassion in an extraordinary but efficient "mix" which ultimately must translate into population support. Such popular support (political allegiance) is not, contrary to a conventional view, vital to the insurgency in the build-up stages. During this period the insurgency only requires cooperation (food, supplies, recruits, information, non-cooperation with government forces, etc.) and this can, more often than not, be extracted by coercion, intimidation, assertion of enough power to suggest ultimate victory. As one perceptive critic (Charles Wolf, Jr.) of insurgency doctrine has stated, "...the main concern of insurgency efforts should be to influence the behavior and action of the populace rather than their loyalties and attitudes." But ultimately loyalties and attitudes govern behavior and so we come back to the eventual need for popular support of a more political nature.

In any case, the crucial difference between conventional war and insurgency, the one which most affects the nature of the conflict, is that population is the prime target rather than territory. Only in the last stage of insurgency when the modalities become more conventional due to the buildup of insurgent paramilitary forces does territory become central. Political and psychological considerations are at the nerve center of the struggle. Purely military factors do not exist.

Exploitation of real, imagined or induced grievance and frustration is an essential method of cadre recruitment and generation of sympathizing population. Aggressive and shrewd concentration on the administrative weakness of existing authority is the jugular, for the key early stage objective is to divide the government from the people.

There is a constant pervasive underlying theme of insurgency which is as important as any substantive cause, or perhaps can almost substitute for it; namely, that the insurgency will never cease. Its ultimate victory is inevitable. With victory will come the "new system" and those who have not cooperated will suffer. Thus not only the discontented or desperate or venturesome will associate themselves with the insurgency, but the prudent will take out some insurance to protect themselves with future rulers. This psychology of victory exerts a
powerful pull, at best, to active participation; at the least, to passive support.

Central to the above and especially to the coercive motor power by which passive populations are induced to cooperate with insurgency is terror. It can be, when properly used by an insurgency, the most telling and difficult to handle element in it. Douglas Pike in his book Vietcong refers to Thomas Perry Thornton's list of the five proximate objectives of terrorism. That list seems complete and is repeated here: morale building within the movement; advertising the movement within the general population; disorientation of the population including the psychological isolation of the individual through destruction of the structure of authority that was previously a source of security; elimination of opposing forces; and, provocation, either forcing the incumbent toward more authoritarian means or causing him to take such elaborate precautionary defense measures that a general feeling of insecurity is communicated to the population at large.

Once the substructure of support has been established, armed action can begin with the timing crucial. Initially the armed bands concentrate on harassment and a hit-and-run approach paying prime attention to conserving the insurgent strength. As Sir Robert Thompson has ably pointed out, the insurgent strategy is based on a proper use of time and space; with consummate patience, operations are scaled down and cadre preserved when conditions are unfavorable, but always time is used to forge the revolutionary organization. The insurgency attempts to expand throughout the geographic and population sectors of the target country and ultimately must do both to succeed.
ANNEX B

A View of Thailand as a Target
from the Perspective of a Communist Insurgency Planner
MEMORANDUM

TO: Operations

FROM: Research

SUBJECT: TARGET - THAILAND

1. While never doubting the inevitability of your success, the Operations Section will do well to take full account of the special difficulties involved in prosecuting Peoples War in Thailand. The scale of vulnerabilities to be exploited and obstacles to be overcome is remarkable for its balance. The deciding weight will be placed on the scale by ourselves or the enemy depending on our contending skill, courage and perseverance.

2. Governmental and political structure.

The weakest single spot in the Thai society from our standpoint, and the first guide to your early action, is the soft underbelly of the police, administrative and political structure in the rural areas, that weakness being greatest in the remote villages of the country. Do not be deceived or put off by the superficial, almost comic, even unbelievable elaborateness of the Thai bureaucracy as it is depicted on civil service charts or maps. Do not be unduly discouraged by the seeming acceptance of central Government authority, spasmodically applied in the villages; or the deeply rooted, well-known patron-client relationships of the people to Government.

Without ignoring these deeply rooted features of the Thai people's relationship to government let us look rather at recently obvious inadequacies in this relationship, the cumulative resentment and apathy, the subtle political vacuum in which the Thai villagers lead their lives. Our study of political communication in Thailand shows it to be one-directional, from the top down, to be entirely administrative rather than political or popular, to be conservative and often suppressive rather than creative or responsive. While this form of government conforms to Thai tradition and perhaps to Thai psychology, the manner of its operation has lately deviated from the rituals, the reciprocal courtesies which are important to the villager. You will frequently find these villagers critical of government officials, but all will agree on their inability to exert influence on them; they accept the existing political order because they have never believed another possible. It is clearly feasible to introduce the idea and the practicability of an alternative political order.

In doing so, you must exploit the fact that the Thai villager conceives of his government as one which demands corvee labor, collects taxes, or exercises power for personal gain.

It is true that under the less crude regimes of Sarit and of Thanom the requirements of "loyalty" are less tangible. Nevertheless, these tough, almost cynical peasants still see the new efforts to win loyalty by providing new services as deriving not from their understood needs, but from (we quote from a young American anthropologist) "whimsical and erratic decisions of the rulers"; these are changes from the top, disseminated at the direction of the top, promulgated, not legislated, all reinforcing the feeling of impotence in upward communication. As communists devoted to democratic centralism we see some merit in the Thai system, but must exploit its weaknesses for our ends. There is thus a communications gap and energy gap. We must fill both by penetrating the villages with our agents and workers who will gather information and build organizations to mobilize the energies of the idle and disaffected.

In breaking the links between people and government in Thailand you will wish, of course, to utilize creatively and selectively, but ruthlessly and without mercy, the tested techniques of terror which have proved so useful elsewhere.
Research will not presume to guide Operations on this point except to point out the double edge of this crucial weapon and to suggest the key targets in the Thai context. They are unpopular police informers about whom little need be said, schoolteachers and village headmen. A word about the latter two groups might be useful to your understanding of their selection as targets for kidnapping, assassination and harassment.

The teachers have no formal power of authority in the administrative sense, but their informal authority is considerable indeed, perhaps paramount in some villages. They enjoy special respect in the villages because they are relatively modern in their thinking and have had a relationship with most of the young people in the area. We have a report that in intra-village problems and conflicts the person most often sought out for advice or mediation is the head schoolteacher, along with the local Buddhist abbot, both in preference to the village headman.

The following discussion of the village headman in Thailand suggests some of his vulnerabilities, his weaknesses as a pivot of government in the rural areas, and the ripe possibilities for eliminating certain of the less popular and more effective of these individuals in the course of your penetration of the rural sector. We are reproducing in full a section from a classified study prepared by the so-called Advanced Research Projects Agency, the notorious ARPA, in June 1964, just a few weeks ago and which has been obtained by our agents in the enemy camp. Its authors are N. P. Phillips and D. A. Wilson, two competent American authorities on Thailand.

The role of the village headman...

"varies considerably from one part of rural Thailand to another; in some villages he is a dynamic community leader; in others, a passive (and often senile) messenger boy for the district officer. In many instances his authority is not commensurate with what one would expect from his official title. Most headmen perform their official functions quite adequately; they keep birth and death records, inform villagers of decisions made by the district officer, detain suspected criminals until the arrival of the police; record land and livestock sales, see to it that the villagers pay special taxes and entertain visiting officials. But the possession of true power clearly is not an intrinsic attribute of this role. Some headmen have nevertheless achieved power by virtue of their personalities. The majority, however, have no genuine authority over their fellow villagers. They are in parts of northern Thailand, but ineffectual brokers between their villagers and the district officer. Their position is a result not only of the totally different sets of expectations that their two 'clients' have of them, but also of the fact that they have little to offer either client. The villagers...expect that the headman will 'not fear the officials' and will 'protect the community from the government.' The district officer expects that the headman will organize and recruit villagers for road construction and other district needs. When the headman meets the demands of the district officer he loses leadership and prestige in the eyes of the villagers; when he meets the expectations of his villagers, he loses his value to the district officer. In other parts of Thailand the problem is somewhat different. In the Central Plain, for example, administrative units have become so gerrymandered - through administrative oversight rather than political intention - that very often there is no relationship at all between a 'natural' community, sociologically viewed, and the constituency of the headman. Thus a single community may cut across the territories of several different headmen who make their homes in other villages. In some cases, one community even overlaps the territory of two different district officers, and the result is conflict, confusion and often inertia. Under these circumstances the role of the headman is an extremely difficult one."
3. Thai Nationality and Kingship.

While the relationship between the Thai villager and his central government is not a dynamic and healthy one, do not underestimate the feeling of national consciousness which pervades the society. It is not a political sort of nationalism, but an emotional and symbolic sense of identity with the King (who lives in Bangkok), a King who exemplifies what a Buddhist layman can be if he devotes his life to "making merit" in this and past existences. The King is also a source of supernatural power with which the peasant wants to be connected. We do not believe this traditional regard for the Kingship to be a serious problem if your insurgent personnel will take care not to degrade the King but rather to depict him as a captive of corrupt ministers, generals and foreign, anti-Buddhist imperialists who must be overcome.

4. The "Operational Opposition."

The weakness of your operational opponent is considerable, but may be correctable and therefore transitory. The Thai Army numbers about 100,000 and is under strength. There are a few excellent general officers, but the Army has been more of a political than a military establishment and thus more interested in its power and profit than in its technical proficiency. Younger officers are restive, but unorganized and also tempted by the imminent prospect of rewards from the existing system. The American tutelage is in full swing; it has not yet produced a mobile, sophisticated, well-motivated force able to deal with our unconventional threat. The rest of the Thai Security Forces are a plethora of police organizations: semi-autonomous, overlapping, loosely coordinated, understaffed, half-trained. Fortunately for us Thailand remains for the moment under-policed in the remote areas where the ratio is sometimes 1:2500 with the 2500 spread over a considerable area. There are efforts at improvement but pay and morale remain low, corruption persists and the policeman's status in the society is poor. Do not count on an indefinite continuation of this condition, but be assured that your selective assassination and harassment can impede the process of correction.

5. People, Land and Economy.

The ethnic topography of Thailand is related to the geography in turn related to the economic situation and all three are highly pertinent to our plans. Successful insurgency, as is well known, requires a geographic environment which is not hostile. It can benefit from a similar ethnic environment and feed on economic grievances. The Thai setting is not ideal from these standpoints; neither is it foreboding.

6. The North.

The Northern Provinces of Chiengrai, Chiengmai, Lampoon, Lampang, Tak Maehongsan, Nan, Phrae, Uttarit and Sukhothai are adjacent to Pathet Lao controlled areas and uncontrolled areas of Burma. The key group in the North is the Miao, a tough, independent hill tribe with special customs, primitive and resentful of Central Thai superiority. They are akin to the Miao of Laos, and if carefully approached, susceptible to dissident organizing. The hill tribes live in defined mountain areas while the Northern Thai live in the basins. They spill over into contiguous parts of Burma and Laos. Concepts of frontier or deep allegiance to particular governments are fragile at best. If these small hill populations can be made hostile to the Thai Government, they could control extensive border territory, deny it to the Government and trained to fight guerrilla action against communications and other facilities in the low lying areas. The Northern section is not easily cut off from the rest of the country, however, since river valleys lead down to the central plains.


The Northeast region is pivotal for insurgency. It is called ISAN by the inhabitants. You are familiar with the Thai-Lao makeup of the population. That ethnic fact together with the geographic separateness has fed a traditional
strain of dissent and occasionally even political separatism. We believe the latter to be a false issue, however, and weaker than the ties that bind the Lao-Thai of ISAN to the nation whose seat is Bangkok. This ethnic angle can be useful only in combination with grievance exploitation. In addition to the Lao-Thai do not ignore the Thai Khmer peoples in the southern sector of the Northeast along a Cambodian border easily crossed without detection; also, the Puthai bordering the Mekong River in the province of Nakorn Phom extending into Kalasin. The Puthai are an enterprising, ambitious, mobile people many of whom leave the village temporarily to work elsewhere, aspire to become schoolteachers and do, or to advance in the Buddhist monkhood. The Puthai may be at that useful stage where desire and expectations outrun fulfillment under the present autocratic system run from Bangkok.

These people of ISAN live in what is essentially a large plateau, the Khorat, it tilts from a height of 1000 feet in the Northeast to 200 feet in the Southeast. Vast expanses of slow-growing hardwood forests, unfertile and insufficiently watered soil, creeks lined by thorny branches too dry in one season and flooded in the next. Although one-third of the population live here in one-third of the land, pressures are higher since only 25% of the land is under cultivation. Economically the region has always been the poorest of the four regions in the country with a per capita gross domestic product half the national figure. Ninety percent of the people engage in subsistence agriculture, but yields of rice, maize and cotton are below the national average. While you will not find poverty as harsh as in other villages of Asia, your operations can exploit the relative depression in the Northeast by stressing official neglect and the promise of progress under a government more representative of Northeastern interests.

Perhaps a richer soil for your subversion will be found in the history of political dissidence whose center has been clearly to the left of national politics. Throughout the nineteenth century Bangkok struggled to incorporate the calcitrant ISAN into a national system. The early twentieth century reforms of King Chulalong Korn were not completed when the 1932 coup overthrew absolute monarchy in favor of a regime in which the Northeast's oppositionist, left-wing political strains could be played with greater volume and impact on the national scene. The first concert master of this performance was Pridi Phanomyong, the Socialist civilian leader who has been in Canton since 1949. Although initially a member of the collaborating militarist war-time government of Marshall Phibun, Pridi secretly organized the Free Thai Movement uniting conservative and leftist elements opposed to Phibun, ready to subvert the Japanese and support the Allies. While our forces succeeded in penetrating this movement, we did not control it. Your operations can perhaps utilize the Free Thai tradition by claiming association with it and you may find remnants which were affected by the war-time liaison with our own revolutionary movements in Laos and Vietnam. There were, after all, trained, well-motivated guerrillas with strong local loyalties operating here during the war. Your efforts are a new chapter in a book we did not begin, but should finish.

The final point on the Northeast is a gratuitous reminder that the long border with Laos which follows the Mekong River offers a main approach for the support our Command will provide and help arrange from external sources. It is a key feature in the geography of our planned Thai insurgency.

8. The Mid-South.

In the mid-South (provinces of Surat Thani, Nakton si Thamnarat, Trang, Phatthalung, Ranong, Chumphon, Phangnga, Phuket, Krabi) you will find conditions of vulnerability in this mountainous area, accessible to Burma and lacking good communications. There is a large Sino-Thai population and a half-assimilated Chinese group. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has drawn substantial following from this area.
9. The South.

The four southermost provinces of Nara Thiwat, Yala, Satun and Pattani are of special interest although not for the initial phases of your operations. There is a small, somewhat disaffected Chinese population but more significant is the Thai Muslim majority group related religiously and racially to the Malays across the nearby border of Malaysia. You will find rugged mountains there and heavy forests. Thai security coverage is sparse.

In devising your operational plan you will want to incorporate suitable use, at the right moment, of the existing Communist Terrorist Organization. These CTO forces are remnants of the Chin Peng Malayan Races Liberation Army completely interlocked at all levels with the Malayan Communist Party. But the word "remnants" is misleading. They are between 500 and 700 strong, actually the most dedicated and experienced of all. Moreover, there are at least 1000 additional young villagers trained by the CT's, returned to their homes and in a kind of reservist status.

These CT forces have wisely avoided clashes with the Thai authorities who chose to ignore their very existence for some time. They have created the impression of desiring only sanctuary while awaiting a turn of events permitting resumption of our Malaysian project. While we have this definitely in mind believing the setback there to be temporary, you will be equally alert to the possibly more imminent opportunities to use the professional CT strength in this area as part of a coordinated multi-regional push in and against Thailand. This CT organization has mastered our classical insurgency doctrine: they are selective in their recruitment shrewdly exploiting local grievance; they are complete and rigorous in their training; they have a totally integrated political/military structure; they live off the land by enforcing a program of money taxation through terror and a model protection system, using the proceeds to purchase supplies on the open market; they have blended in with the local Muslim population and have conducted imaginative local civic action projects of benefit to the area.

When the time comes, this force will be a useful asset.

10. The Chinese Communities.

It is well known that three million Chinese live in Thailand, half in Bangkok which is thus half Chinese. They dominate certain key sectors of economic life, but are themselves ambivalent toward the host society and are treated with similar, frequently hostile ambivalence by that society. Neither Chinese schools nor labor unions are legal and the Chinese have not been active in politics at least overtly. The Chinese are industrious and enterprising, opportunistic and manipulative, quite capable of riding the corruption of Thai officialdom to the lucrative shore of protection and privilege. This community has a double identity and cannot be assumed homogeneous in any way. As a community it is not an asset to your insurgency. Remember these people have a stake in private enterprise. It must be analyzed and penetrated in hopes of attracting individual supporters to be organized in cells and utilized primarily for support of a financial nature and eventually in Bangkok operations. In this connection, you will recall that several boatloads of Chinese were repatriated from Thailand in 1956 (2-3,000 people) of whom around one-third were very young people. They have been educated in the doctrine of the great Mao Tse-Tung. Possibilities exist for return to Thailand by a few of the most able revolutionaries among this group.

You should know that our agents have, in fact, penetrated the Chinese business community and all assets have not been liquidated as a result of the celebrated Boon Bosawan case. Our use of this man, revealed in 1961, has made the Thai more vigilant, but many Thai officials have been compromised by connections and continued receipt of favors from sources under our influence.

11. The Communist Party.

The Communist Party of Thailand leaves much to be desired as a control mechanism or vehicle for the insurgency. But it has a history, it does exist and in some ways has been toughened by many years of clandestinity and harassment. We now have about 1000 members. Largely Sino-Thai in make-up, ethnic Thai have also been recruited. The Party is modeled after the great Communist Party of
China and is controlled by it. It is directed in Thailand by a Political Bureau of 11 members and a Central Committee of 30. Its origins as a Party go back to 1928 and the Comintern but the first formal Congress was held in 1942. A second convened clandestinely in 1952, and a third in 1961. We have managed to exfiltrate and train a number of able people down through the years (our computer is not working and the exact figure is unavailable). The hard core of the CPT remains small but there have been recent successes in recruiting cadre in the Northeast. Several CPT members are resident in China and are helping direct the various front groups based there as well as the radio propaganda campaign.

For better or worse, you will have to depend on the CPT leadership and cadre for your on-the-ground management and communications. It does not offer the same solid platform on which you have stood to good advantage elsewhere.


After World War II our struggle against the French in Vietnam forced many inhabitants of the area to flee to Thailand, specifically the Northeast. Close to 50,000 settled there. They were at first welcomed by a Thai Government hostile to the French due to the latter's insistence on the return of certain territories taken in 1941. The reactionary Thai Government soon realized that the Vietnamese remained loyal to Ho Chi Minh and began a repatriation program. Still many refugees remained, some by choice and some because the repatriation agreement was broken by the North Vietnamese Government. Exact figures on the current size of the group are unavailable, but we believe that due to births and failure to register at the time of census there may be 60,000 in the area. They remain loyal to Ho Chi Minh and can provide useful support to the insurgency while avoiding overexposure to Thai security forces.

13. Buddhism.

Turning from political cadre to the question of religion, you will find little help readily available either in the Buddhist monkhood or in the policies and practices of the religion itself. We will not attempt to describe the whys and wherefores of Buddhist resistance to our ideological challenge but there is little that is compatible in a careful comparison of substance. The fact is that there are few tensions for us to exploit either between the majority Buddhists and other minorities or between the non-political Buddhist hierarchy and the government, a relationship of mutual tolerance not likely to be disturbed. You will do well to avoid confrontation with Buddhist principles or with respected monks and count on their gentility, laziness, tolerance and desire for non-involvement in the mundanities of this life.


Before the advances in Marxism-Leninism made by Chairman Mao, it was thought that intellectuals and students operating in the vanguard of the industrial working class would mold and make the revolution. We know that in Asia this is not the way. In Thailand specifically the intellectuals and students have shown little aptitude for ideological commitment, conspiracy, agitation, revolt and the intellectual or physical courage demanded thereby. At the same time, as the process of modernization ensues, as the university reaches greater numbers and as long as Thai political and social structures remain limited in their horizons and internal mobility, there remains the possibility of individual recruitments and a long-term program of infiltration which may one day bear fruit. Some attention must be paid to this sector if for no other reason than that the Soviet revisionist enemy may be expected to do so.

On the labor side, Chinese prominence in the work force has made Thai authority especially wary. The non-recognition of unions has definitely obstructed this familiar avenue of organization but has also provided a useful cause for our clandestine organizers who exploit the natural drive of the worker to organize and who can either identify themselves as Communist or not as the situation may allow. Concentration has been on transportation and communication sectors.
15. Causes.

We have left for last the prominent question of "causes" for two reasons. Some of the causes and contradictions which will feed your propaganda and recruitment have been noted in previous paragraphs. Secondly, in the case of Thailand we do not see any one decisive, comprehensive cause to provide the central beat of the insurgent drum. Issues and grievances are present but neither crystallized nor grievous nor national in scope. Colonialism is not and never has been present although foreign interference and domination present real possibilities. While an oligarchy with military and royal trapping reigns, democracy has never been experienced and the previous excesses of a Phibun or a Sarit administration have been tempered under Prime Minister Thanom. The hand of government may be unfeeling or irritating but it is not oppressive or cruel. Economic hardship exists but nowhere is it unbearable and regional discrepancies focused on the Northeast will have to be made more acute in the minds of the people. Neither land tenure nor usury are broadly aggravating and, in fact, development is now showing impressive growth rates. Religious conflict is absent. Ethnic disaffections are circumscribed. International disputes are muted.

But a cause is needed and it must be one designed to separate the people from the government. It should be based on the weakness of the Thai political structure in the countryside and on the gradually enlarging area of cooperation with and deference to the Americans. With every increase in American presence that cause can be made more persuasive as the specter of foreign domination is given flesh and muscle. The twin causes of corrupt, uncaring military despots who are selling the country to American imperialists will serve as the basis for a national insurgency which will make concrete on-the-ground gains by exploiting specific local contradictions and causes on a province-by-province, district-by-district, village-by-village basis.

16. The further services of the Research Section are available to Operations on request.
ANNEX C

A Note on the Data Base,
A Selective Bibliography

and

Description of Classified Sources Consulted
The data base is a controversial and pertinent question, the answer to which affects our assessment of insurgency in Thailand.

The raw information on which the U.S. Government assesses the Thai insurgency is very largely from Thai Government sources. There is, however, an ever-enlarging American tap-in at the lower levels of the Thai bureaucracies concerned with the insurgency. There is the extensive grass-roots activity of field USOM personnel and the multiplying American contract researchers working at the village level. There is a large flow of collected, sifted, organized, analyzed observations of hundreds of persons who have witnessed or felt the cutting edge of the insurgency described in the body of the paper. These descriptions are not by trained observers. There is frequent vagueness and disagreement within a given village about such matters as how many terrorists attacked, from where they came, how long they stayed and how they were armed. We do have an increasing number of detailed debriefing reports of arrestees, and defectors. These increase in quality over the past two years as the guidance of American professionals takes hold or is specifically applied to individual key interrogations. We have the periodic assessments of Thai officials, the very extensive and ubiquitous American community, official, semi-official (the contract types) and the purely private. We have the sum of British wisdom on the subject and important contributions to specific aspects from other friendly services such as the Malaysian Special Branch on the far South. We have not had active in-place penetrations of the insurgency apparatus either at top control points or in the field cadres. Without deprecating their utility in any way, there are some who believe that effective counter-insurgency may be feasible without such classic penetrations of the operational apparatus if the defection and apprehension rates are high and fully exploited, if there is an efficient informant system and, perhaps, most important, if the affected population cooperates with the security services and not with the insurgents. On the assumption that the Communist Party of Thailand provides vital direction and has extensive, if not complete, knowledge of the insurgent apparatus, careful work has been done on this target.

Before concluding this note on the information base it should be pointed out that there are scoffers who believe the Thais to be inflating the insurgency data in order to step up the flow of American aid, or to obtain additional resources for personal bureaucratic empires. On the other hand, an opposing school of skepticism insists that the insurgency's potential and even actual strength is being underestimated to vindicate current counter-insurgency programs, again a self-serving distortion.

As is often the case, reality probably rests uncomfortably somewhere in the middle.

Selective Bibliography

On Insurgency:


On Thailand:


ASIA, Autumn 1966.


Classified Material:

In addition to the above items, a large number of classified documents were scanned, read, summarized or exploited in the course of preparing the case study. They ranged across a spectrum from research reports by contract organizations to raw intelligence debriefings, to finished disseminations, to periodic collations of intelligence reports, to national estimates and policy memoranda, despatches and cablegrams. These constitute the main source material and cannot, of course, be listed individually.

I would like to call special attention to the extensive work of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in both Vietnam and Thailand, and especially to several projects prepared by the Stanford Research Institute which were highly pertinent and helpful.