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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME I (U)

1994


*Prepared by the Command History Division  
Office of the Joint Secretary  
Headquarters USCINCPAC*

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028  
1996

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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



## VOLUME I (U)

1994

*Prepared by the Command History Division  
Office of the Joint Secretary  
Headquarters USCINCPAC*

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

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**ADMIRAL RICHARD C. MACKE, USN**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US PACIFIC COMMAND**

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## FOREWORD

The year 1994 was a dynamic year in the Pacific, encompassing significant events in which the United States and USPACOM played a leading role. The World War II Commemorations shifted into high gear as our many friends in the Pacific celebrated the victories of the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific campaigns of 1944. President and Mrs. Clinton visited the Philippines to honor the US and Filipino World War II veterans, reaffirming the importance of historically close security ties. Admiral Larson made a milestone visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, signaling a major step in rapprochement from the Vietnam War. He followed up with a memorable visit to the People's Republic of China, leading to the resumption of high-level military contacts curtailed after Tiananmen Square. General Xu Huizi returned the visit, keeping momentum in our growing military-to-military relationship with China. An historic foe, Kim Il-sung, "Great Leader" of North Korea for 46 years, died in July. Shortly before Kim's death, former President Jimmy Carter conducted an unofficial yet remarkably successful diplomatic mission to North Korea, paving the way for the Framework Talks.

During 1994, our Cooperative Engagement strategy served as a cornerstone of President Clinton's "New Pacific Community." The success of this strategy was reinforced in the new National Security Strategy. The draft version included the basic tenets of engagement that have worked so well in shaping an Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean region that supports America's national interests.

Our focus shifted from countering a global threat toward regional challenges and opportunities—from containment to engagement. Our USPACOM Cooperative Engagement strategy was a process of applying limited (and still shrinking) means in three principal ways—forward presence, strong alliances, and our capacity for crisis response—to achieve our ends, our strategic objectives. In the two years since its inception, Cooperative Engagement evolved to accommodate dramatic changes in the Pacific. This strategy employed not only military engagement, but economic and diplomatic engagement as well, and it worked best using an interagency, team approach.

The clearest example of Cooperative Engagement was the outcome of our withdrawal from Subic Bay. Instead of seeking another location for a major base, we developed a "places not bases" approach, seeking tangible support from our friends and allies. The result was increased access to ports, airfields, and training facilities across the region, actually enhancing the visibility of our forward presence. Doubts concerning US commitment were quickly assuaged as rumors of US withdrawal from the Pacific abated. Our relationship with the Philippines emerged anew, showing great promise for future cooperation and mutual benefit.

Another illustration of Cooperative Engagement in action was the emerging dialogue with several Asian nations including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia,

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New Zealand, Russia, and China. These relationships have already borne fruit—increased support for Joint Task Force-Full Accounting POW-MIA efforts and Joint Interagency Task Force West counter drug operations are two examples. An even more remarkable example was the first ever US-Russian amphibious operation (Cooperation From the Sea '94) conducted near Vladivostok. To foster even greater regional security dialogue, we organized an implementation team to develop the concept for the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. This center will be modeled after the Marshall Center in Europe, but with PACOM-specific characteristics. The centerpiece will be a college of strategic studies where US and Asian civilian and military security professionals can learn and exchange views in coursework and seminars.

The stability engendered by decades of resolute US engagement in Asia created conditions for unprecedented economic growth—expansion vital for our own prosperity. Portions of the region grew six times faster than the global average and offered economic opportunities essential to US prosperity: thirty-seven percent of America's trade was with the region (twice our trade with the European Union) and US exports to the region were almost \$140 billion (creating more than two million American jobs). Furthermore, this stability nurtured the advance of democratic pluralism clearly evident in over twenty countries, most notably the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia.

The opportunity for dramatic progress in advancing democracy, economic prosperity, and human rights in the Asia-Pacific region was greater than any time in history. Our challenge was, in an era of dwindling defense resources and downsizing, to seize this opportunity and help achieve President Clinton's "New Pacific Community." Despite our strategic accomplishments, the sobering situation on the Korean peninsula reminded us of the fragile nature of peace and the importance of our force readiness and crisis response capability. We must remain engaged, increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and sustain USPACOM force readiness to achieve US objectives while helping to shape a peaceful and productive Asia-Pacific future.



J. W. PRUEHER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Commander in Chief

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## PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff require the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command to submit an annual historical report that will enable the Joint Staff to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters USCINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the US Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the Commander in Chief. The report also preserves the history of the USPACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Staff by recording the effects of major decisions and directives concerning the CINCs.

This history describes USCINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with US military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters.

Annex A of the 1972 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Annex B of the 1976 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand. Annex E of the 1978 USCINCPAC history was the terminal history of the US Taiwan Defense Command. The designations of Annexes A, B, and E are reserved to facilitate future research and reference. The histories of US Forces Japan, US Forces Korea, Alaskan Command, and Special Operations Command Pacific, will retain the designations of Annexes C, D, F, and G, respectively. The annexes are included only for those copies retained at USCINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is the prerogative of the subordinate unified commander.

The 1994 history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for these volumes at the end of Volume II.


All classified source citations throughout this history bear the reclassification guidance "Originating Agency's Determination Required" (OADR), unless otherwise noted.

Mr. Robert S. Stubbs wrote Chapters II, IV, and VI. Mrs. Laine Skiendiel wrote Chapters I and VII. Chapters III and V were written by the undersigned. Chapter VIII, the Glossary, and the Index were joint efforts.

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The DOD Publishing and Printing Service Detachment Office,  
Pearl Harbor, printed and bound the volumes.



THOMAS F. GORDON  
Command Historian

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<sup>1</sup> Individual entries are unclassified. See Letter of Promulgation.

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## CHAPTER I(U)

### COMMAND STATUS(U)

#### SECTION I—THE US PACIFIC COMMAND(U)

##### Strength and Disposition of USPACOM Military Personnel(U)

(U) All Department of Defense manpower counts continued their downward spiral in Fiscal Year (FY) 94. Year-end numbers of military personnel assigned to US Pacific Command (USPACOM) shrank 21,956 from the prior year's count. On 30 September 1991, just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US military strength in USPACOM stood at 387,126. Since force cutbacks began in 1992, USPACOM strength has been reduced by nearly 57,000 personnel. Table I-1 below compares service strengths.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE I-1(U)

#### FY-END ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE(U)

	<u>30 September 1993</u>	<u>30 September 1994</u>
Army	51,075	51,213
Navy	181,814	164,310
Air Force	42,906	41,747
Marine Corps	76,311	72,880
Totals	352,106	330,150

(U) Other than Navy personnel with the fleet or Marine Corps personnel ashore in the Continental United States (CONUS), military personnel in the USPACOM area were concentrated in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Japan/Okinawa, and Korea. All sites except Korea experienced decreased manning. US forces in Korea were increased by over 2,600 as a cautionary measure against possible aggression by the North Korean government. The following table (Table II-2) compares USPACOM manpower statistics by geographic area.

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TABLE I-2(U)

## COMPARISON OF FY-END MANPOWER STRENGTHS (U)

	30 Sep 1993	30 Sep 1994	Change
Alaska	20,664	17,887	-2,777
Guam	6,324	5,458	-866
Hawaii	38,625	36,778	-1,847
Japan/Okinawa	44,758	43,737	-1,021
Korea	34,669	37,311	+2,642

(U) The next two pages contain photos of Headquarters Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (HQ USCINCPAC) key personnel. A chart depicting the authorized strengths of HQ USCINCPAC staff directorates, direct reporting units (DRUs), and Joint Task Forces follows. Additionally, selected sets of this History have a CINCPAC staff organization directory attached to the inside back cover of Volume II. Detailed data on the status of the Pacific Command in 1994 is located in Appendix I.

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# KEY USCINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL



**LTG DAVID A. BRAMLETT USA**  
Deputy Commander in Chief/  
Chief of Staff  
and Inspector General




**CHARLES B. SALMON, JR. AMBASSADOR CIV**  
Foreign Policy Advisor




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**Col LARRY H. HARRIS USAF**  
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Personnel, and Support



**CAPT LOWELL E. JACOBY USN**  
Director for Intelligence



**MajGen M. T. HOPGOOD USMC**  
Director for Operations



**Brig Gen ERVIN C. SHARPE USAF**  
Deputy Director for Operations



**Brig Gen F. KEITH TEDROW USAF**  
Director for Logistics  
and Security Assistance



**RADM MICHAEL A. McDEVITT USN**  
Director for Strategic  
Planning and Policy



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**GERARD P. BROHM**  
 Director for Command  
 and Control and  
 Communications Systems



COL  
**PETER J. DEPERRO**  
 Chief, Protocol



COL  
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 Chief, Public Affairs



Col  
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Lt Col  
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 Comptroller



CAPT, JAGC  
**DENNIS L. MANDSAGER**  
 Staff Judge Advocate



RADM  
**DAVID S. FROST**  
 Surgeon



BG  
**CHARLES R. VALE**  
 Commander,  
 Joint Task Force - Full Accounting



RADM  
**JOHN T. TOZZI**  
 Director,  
 Joint Interagency Task Force WEST

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TABLE I-3(U)

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF USCINCPAC, DIRECT REPORTING UNITS,  
AND JOINT TASK FORCES AS OF 30 SEP 1994(U)

		OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
J00	Commander in Chief	7	14	1	22
J01	Deputy CINC/Chief of Staff	3	1	1	5
J01LA	Legislative Affairs	2	0	1	3
J01P	Protocol	3	3	0	6
J01PA	Public/Gov'tal Affairs	7	4	5	16
J004	Inspector General	3	1	1	5
J006	Scientific & Technical Advisor	1	0	1	2
J005/J007	Foreign Policy and USIA Advisors	1	1	2	4
J02	Washington Liaison Office	1	1	0	2
J04	Joint Secretary	3	12	5	20
J05	Comptroller	3	2	8	13
J06	Staff Judge Advocate	5	3	1	9
J07	Surgeon	8	6	2	16
J1	Manpower, Personnel & Support	17	36	19	72
J2	Intelligence	37	20	16	73
J3	Operations	92	44	7	143
J4	Logistics & Security Assistance	48	17	11	76
J5	Strategic Planning & Policy	48	20	18	86
J6	Command & Control & Communications Systems	34	13	16	63
Subtotal		323	198	115	636
CMSA	Cruise Missile Support Activity	6	20	29	55
JICPAC	Joint Intelligence Center Pacific	183	630	127	940
PS&S	Pacific Stars and Stripes	3	31	69	103
ISSA	USPACOM Information Systems Support Activity	13	37	22	72
Subtotal		205	718	247	1170
JTF—FA	Joint Task Force—Full Accounting	43	116	23	182
JIATF WEST	Joint Interagency Task Force West	26	19	26	71
Subtotal		69	135	49	253
GRAND TOTAL		597	1051	411	2059

Source: J131 Report, 16 Jan 1996

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### Key USCINCPAC Staff Personnel Changes(U)

#### Change of Command(U)

(U) At 1000 hours on 11 July 1994 at Camp H.M. Smith's Bordelon Field, ADM Charles R. Larson's flag was hauled down and LTG Harold T. Fields, Jr.'s flag was broken, marking the change of command for the US Pacific Command. LTG Fields had been assigned to USCINCPAC as Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff since June 1993. His appointment as USCINCPAC was official but merely an interim measure; it was to last only until the US Senate confirmed a permanent successor.<sup>2</sup>

(U) The change of command had originally been scheduled for spring 1994 and was contingent upon the ability of ADM Stanley Arthur, USN, the initial nominee, to clear all the hurdles of the confirmation process. During confirmation proceedings, some senators, particularly Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MN), raised concerns about ADM Arthur's suitability for the position. Special attention was called to ADM Arthur's role in the dismissal of a female lieutenant from helicopter flight school. The officer, LT Rebecca Hansen, USN, claimed the dismissal was in retaliation for a sexual harassment claim. Furthermore, the senators were critical of ADM Arthur's seemingly overweight condition and of the manner in which he handled the investigation of a fire aboard USS RANGER (CV-61) in 1983. Problems of this magnitude had not been foreseen and the outlook for ADM Arthur's confirmation grew bleaker by the day. Approximately 1,000 invitations had been mailed out for a change of command on 2 May but as the controversy continued, plans were put on hold and all invitees were informed of the postponement.

(U) On 25 June 1994 ADM Arthur officially withdrew his name from contention. With this announcement, planning for installing

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an interim leader began at breakneck pace. Haste was necessary as two months had passed since the President had nominated ADM Larson for retirement and recall to duty as Superintendent of the US Naval Academy. ADM Larson's nomination to the Academy was precedent setting as the Superintendent's position had always been a three-star billet. Quickly, an 11 July date was agreed upon for a change of command between ADM Larson and LTG Fields. Due to the short-fused nature of the project, invitations were not mailed. About 500 invitations were issued by telephone and notice of the event was publicized in the local newspapers.

(U) On 28 April, VADM Richard C. Macke, Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, was nominated for appointment to the grade of Admiral and assignment as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. However, during the conflict over ADM Arthur's nomination, VADM Macke's name was instead submitted for assignment as USCINCPAC. He was confirmed by the Senate on 15 July and received his fourth star on Monday, 18 July, in the Hall of Heroes at the Pentagon. He assumed command of USCINCPAC the following day.

(U) The formal Assumption of Command ceremony, during which ADM Macke took command of CINCPAC from LTG Fields, was held on 1 August 1994 at Bordelon Field, Camp H. M. Smith. About 500 invitations were mailed out for this ceremony. Numerous dignitaries attended, including General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

### Deputy Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command(U)

(U) When LTG Harold T. Fields, Jr., USA, became the CINC, MajGen M.T. Hopgood, USMC, served as Acting Deputy CINC (DCINC) from 19 July. In August, LTG David A. Bramlett, USA, arrived on island and awaited Senate confirmation of his nomination as DCINC. Confirmation occurred on 23 September. LTG Fields had

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departed the island shortly after the change of command to go on terminal leave prior to retirement.<sup>3</sup>

### Scientific and Technical Advisor(U)

(U) Mr. Anthony F. Mickus succeeded Mr. Darrell E. Marsh as Scientific and Technical Advisor on 20 May 1994.

### USCINCPAC Liaison Office, Washington DC(U)

(U) Col William E. Mathis, USAF, took over the USCINCPAC Liaison Office from Lt Col Carl Critchlow, USAF, on 24 August 1994.

### Joint Secretariat(U)

(U) On 1 July 1994, Lt Col Patricia L. Priest, USAF, Joint Secretary, left the command. Her replacement, Lt Col Charlie A. Templeton, USAF, arrived on 1 August 1994; LCDR Stephen S. Campbell, USN, served as Acting Joint Secretary during the interim.

### Manpower, Personnel, and Support Directorate(U)

(U) On 18 July 1994, Colonel Larry H. Harris, USAF, began his tour as the Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Support. His predecessor, Colonel John F. Regni, USAF, departed on 15 July.

### Intelligence Directorate(U)

(U) Captain Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, became the Director for Intelligence, J2, on 15 April 1994. He succeeded Captain John E. Vinson, USN, who served as Acting Director between 17 August 1993

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and 14 April 1994. Captain Jacoby was frocked to Rear Admiral (Lower Half) (RADM(LH)) on 1 July 1994.

### Command and Control and Communications Systems Directorate(U)

(U) In June, BG Gerard F. Brohm, USA, was approved for promotion to MG. On 22 December he completed his tour as Director for Command and Control and Communications Systems Directorate (J6). The next day, Col John F. O'Sullivan, USAF, began serving as Acting Director of J6.

### Direct Reporting Units and Subordinate Unified Commands Key Personnel Changes(U)

#### Commander Alaskan Command(U)

(U) Lt Gen Lawrence E. Boese, USAF, succeeded Lt Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, as Commander Alaskan Command (COMALCOM) on 29 July 1994 in a change of command ceremony at Hangar 1, Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB).

#### Joint Interagency Task Force West(U)

(U) On 6 April 1994 two events affecting Joint Task Force-5 (JTF-5) occurred concurrently. JTF-5 was disestablished and replaced by Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF WEST). In conjunction with this change, RADM John L. Linnon, USCG, Commander of JTF-5 from 30 Apr 1991, was relieved by the head of the new organization, RADM Martin H. Daniell, USCG. Twelve weeks later, on 30 June, a combined change of command and retirement ceremony was held during which RADM Daniell retired and VADM Richard D. Herr, USCG, replaced him. About five-and-a-half months later, on 10 November, another change of command was conducted during which VADM Herr was relieved by RADM John T. Tozzi, USCG.

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### Joint Task Force—Full Accounting(U)

(U) On 7 July 1994, BG Charles R. Viale, USA, replaced MG Thomas H. Needham, USA, as the Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA).

### Joint Intelligence Center Pacific(U)

(U) Col John T. Wigington III, USAF, assumed command of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) on 12 February 1994. On 15 April at Mall Parade Field, Hickam AFB, he relieved CAPT Lowell S. Jacoby, USN, who had been selected to take charge of USCINCPAC J2 directorate.

### Component Commander Changes(U)

#### Commander, Marine Forces Pacific/Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific(U)

(U) LtGen Charles C. Krulak, USMC, replaced LtGen Henry B. Stackpole, USMC, as Commander, Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC)/Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) on 22 July 1994.

#### Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet(U)

(U) On 6 August 1994, ADM Ronald J. Zlatoper, USN, became the 18th Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). He relieved ADM Robert J. Kelly, USN.

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## SECTION II—COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS(U)

### Joint Interagency Task Force West(U)

(U) In April 1994, the US Interdiction Coordinator, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) issued the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan which directed replacement of some of the existing operational centers. Joint Task Force Five (JTF-5) was one of the centers scheduled for replacement. On 1 October 1994, JTF-5 was disestablished and the Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF WEST) was stood up in its place. Whereas JTF-5 had been tasked with drug detection and monitoring in the eastern Pacific, JIATF WEST's mission was stopping illegal heroin trade from Southeast and Southwest Asia. While the task force was truly interagency with personnel from all the services as well as from the US Coast Guard, US Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Marine Fisheries Service, it remained under operational control of USCINCPAC. The task force director reported directly to USCINCPAC and served as PACOM's agent for counterdrug assistance including equipment loans, transportation, and detection and monitoring, to US law enforcement agencies. In light of the interagency format of the organization, the commander bore two organizational titles. First, he was charged with assuming the duties and responsibilities of Director, JIATF WEST. Second, since he was responsible for the administration and discipline of US military personnel in the command, he was also designated Commander, JIATF WEST. VADM Richard D. Herr, USCG, who had served as Commander, JTF-5, since 30 June 1994, continued to lead the new organization until he was relieved on 10 November by RADM John T. Tozzi, USCG.<sup>4</sup>

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### Asia-Pacific Center(U)

(U) On 30 September 1994 President Clinton signed H.R. 4650 which included \$3 million dollars for the start-up of the "Nimitz Center" (named after ADM Nimitz of World War II fame). It was to be the Pacific version of the extant Marshall Center program in Europe. During the phase immediately following funding approval, a small group of active duty military, reservists, and contract employees (CUBIC Applications, Inc.) was situated at Camp Smith and began working on the proposal for establishment of the Center. On 2 December 1994, the CINC approved a recommendation by COL Jimmie R. Lackey, USA, that stand-up plans for the Center proceed. The CINC then appointed COL Lackey the Program Director. Some headway in setting up the Center was made in 1994 but the bulk of the progress occurred in 1995 and will be covered in the 1995 USCINCPAC Command History.<sup>5</sup>

(U) The Center was established to foster understanding, cooperation, and study of security related issues among military and civilian representatives of the US and other Asia-Pacific nations. Academically, the Center was geared towards developing the region's future leaders and decision makers. It was projected that about 75% of the students would be non-US citizens so planners favored locating the center at Fort DeRussy, Waikiki, to ease billeting logistics. However, this location became controversial since Department of the Army plans for the area did not include entities like the Center. By year's end, a permanent site for the Center still remained questionable.

(U) Naming the center after ADM Nimitz also became controversial. The European center bore the name Marshall to commemorate GEN George C. Marshall's great acts of statemanship (Marshall Plan, Nobel Peace Prize), not his military feats. No one affiliated with the Pacific had credentials paralleling GEN

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Marshall's; hence the center was redubbed the "Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies."

### Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs(U)

(U) On 2 May, the third and final step in the reorganization of the Public and Governmental Affairs (J03) directorate was announced by the DCINC, LTG Fields. He declared the dissolution of J03 and established Legislative Affairs (J01LA) effective 1 May 1994. The first segment of the reorganization occurred about a year earlier, in March 1993, with Protocol splitting from J03 and becoming a staff agency. On 28 February 1994, Public Affairs (J01PA) split from J03. Col George W. Titus, USAF, who had been the Public Affairs Division Officer (J302), continued in that role but with the responsibilities of Chief of a staff agency. Col Titus retired on 22 April and his deputy, CDR Robert S. Pritchard, USN, served as Acting PAO until COL Joseph W. Chesley, USA, assumed charge on 25 August.<sup>6</sup>

(U) Likewise, LTC Fred F. Serene, Jr. USA, who had been the Legislative Affairs Division head (J031), transitioned to the Chief, J01LA slot. Although the slot had been upgraded to an O-6 billet effective 1 May, LTC Serene served until his retirement on 1 June. (Official approval for the upgrade to O-6 came on 6 October.) The Chief position was vacant between 1 June and 27 July and LTC Charles S. Breckenridge, USA, served as Acting Chief. On 28 July, Col William E. Hopewell, USAF, took over as J01LA Chief. On 1 November 1994, the Joint Staff gave official approval to the J01LA and J01PA changes.

### CINC's Study Group, J00X(U)

(U) In 1 May 1993, ADM Larson established the CINC's Study Group (CSG), J00X. Its mission was to conduct special studies

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and perform streamlined actions for the CINC. Some of its taskings were: format and write the CINC's narrative to his Quarterly report to SECDEF; write for the CINC's approval and byline, specified articles and opinion-editorial pieces targeted for journals, periodicals, and newspapers; and develop for the CINC's approval, position and concept papers, messages, or testimony targeted for the CJCS, SECDEF, members of congress and other national policymakers. The Director of CSG was COL Douglas M. Harris, USA.

(U) In May 1994, with the departure of ADM Larson imminent, JOOX was disbanded. On 27 May 1994, COL Harris officially announced that JOOX was dissolved but instructed J62 to "Retain the capability to quickly resume service should the new CINC eventually decide to reconstitute a JOOX-like office."<sup>7</sup>

### Joint Meritorious Unit Award(U)

(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged JICPAC for its exceptionally meritorious achievement from 3 July 1991 to 1 April 1994 by awarding it the Joint Meritorious Unit Award. JICPAC had effected "fundamental change in warfighter support through total command involvement and unparalleled dedication of its people." JICPAC also coupled forward thinking with new, dynamic methodologies to meet increasing demands in a period of declining defense assets.

(U) All military members who were assigned to JICPAC and its Japan Detachment during the period were authorized to wear the Joint Meritorious Unit Award ribbon. All civilians who were JICPAC employees during the period were awarded a civilian Joint Meritorious Unit lapel pin.<sup>8</sup>

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## SECTION III—FOREIGN LABOR POLICY AND PROGRAMS(U)

### Wage and Benefits Adjustment for US Forces Korea Employees(U)

(U) The US Forces Korea (USFK) wage and benefits survey was conducted 18 April-16 June by the Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) to ascertain local prevailing wages. To make the data reliable, the committee members attempted to match private sector jobs and USFK foreign nationals (FN) jobs as closely as possible. Their results indicated private sector jobs had received an 11.6 percent average annual pay increase. However, the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) had given its employees only a 6.6 percent pay increase. Since the DOD Appropriations Act capped USFK FNs pay increases at the ROK level, USFK FN's pay hike was also capped at 6.6 percent.<sup>9</sup>

(U) In 1993, the JLPC found data which seemed to indicate that providing college-level tuition assistance (TA) was a prevailing practice in the private sector. However, the JLPC wanted to verify the practice through the 1994 survey results. When the 1994 results confirmed the practice, the level of TA was increased to accordingly. The JLPC set the 1994 tuition assistance rate at 637,000 won (US \$787.00), up slightly from 551,000 won (US \$731.00) in 1993. Previous criteria, such as limiting the number of TA recipients to two students per family, and using TA for middle school and high school, were still in effect.

### Japanese National Employment(U)

(U) In September 1994, Commander US Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN) was subjected to a freeze on hiring Japanese Nationals (JNs). In November, Commander, Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN) indicated efforts to reduce on-board counts had been effective and anticipated even better results in December

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when numerous retirements were expected occur. They said they had accomplished this by filling vacancies in only the most essential functions. However, on 22 December, COMUSJAPAN issued a message chastising Fifth Air Force (5 AF) and COMNAVFORJAPAN for exceeding their ceiling point allocations. With just three months left in the Japanese FY, each command was 86 positions over ceiling. COMUSJAPAN reminded these commands that exceeding the ceiling violated the country-to-country agreement and could impact Special Measures Agreement (SMA) talks. Only US Army Japan had remained within its allocation. COMUSJAPAN instructed 5 AF and COMNAVFORJAPAN to report their plans for reduction and requested a report by 17 January 1995.<sup>10</sup>

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## SECTION IV—MANPOWER, PERSONNEL PROGRAMS, AND PLANS(U)

### Manpower(U)

(U) The decommissioning of Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility, Western Pacific (FOSIF WPAC) resulted in the transfer of one officer and 20 enlisted Navy billets to USCINCPAC-Special Activities. These billets were used to build up PACOM ADP Server Sites (PASS) Japan in August 1994.<sup>11</sup>

### Civilian Personnel Policy Division(U)

(U) On 3 August 1994, Mr. George M. Wyman, Civilian Personnel Policy Division chief, retired after an illustrious 38-year career in Federal Civil Service. He came to USCINCPAC in 1970 and in 1980 was promoted to Chief of the Civilian Personnel Policy Division. At the time of his retirement, his responsibilities included managing PACOM foreign labor policy and administering the civilian personnel, civilian mobilization, and Navy Drug Free Workplace programs. He had played a key role in solving the work force problems encountered during the DOD withdrawal from the Philippines. He was also instrumental in solving Labor Cost Sharing (LCS) problems in Japan. In the late 1970's, Japan paid for only 77 percent the labor costs for US Forces Japan. Through his management, a more equitable situation for USFJ was established and on 1 April 1995, Japan was slated to bear 99 percent of the labor costs. In recognition of his exemplary services, the CINC presented the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award to Mr. Wyman during his retirement ceremony.<sup>12</sup>

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### Joint Task Force—Full Accounting(U)

(U) Assurance that JTF-FA could proceed with its mission for two more years was secured when the Joint Staff approved funding for 144 billets in April 1994.<sup>13</sup>

### Performance Management Review System(U)

(U) In May 1994 CINCPAC brought its performance appraisal system in line with Public Law 103-89. Prior to its passage on 1 November 1993, managerial positions at grades 13-15 had been classified into a pay plan (GM) separate from General Schedule (GS) positions. Positions classified in the GM pay plan were evaluated by a separate performance appraisal system called the Performance Management Review System (PMRS). Public Law 130-89 cancelled PMRS and the GM classification. Positions previously classified in the GM pay plan were grandfathered. As a result of the change, a uniform performance appraisal system for all white-collar positions was established and all positions fell in same rating cycle (1 May-30 April).<sup>14</sup>

(U) On 30 April 1994, CINCPAC instituted a new performance appraisal system, the Alternate Performance Appraisal System (APAS), which allowed evaluation of work in direct support of the headquarter's mission. Since this system replaced both the Performance Appraisal Review System (PARS) and PMRS, all GS and GM positions were covered by this system.

### Headquarters Training(U)

(U) Of the \$70,000.00 budgeted for training of headquarters military and civilian personnel, \$40,000.00 was allocated for Local Area Network (LAN) and computer training. All other training, including audio and video tapes for the new Resource Library, was funded from the remaining \$30,000.00. The Resource

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Library, located in J12, was intended to serve as a convenient, year-round source of materials to improve employee job performance.

(U) Throughout the year, numerous no-cost, on site, computer software literacy training sessions were conducted by J66. Approximately 1,200 military and civilians attended classes such as Microsoft Word, Access, and Excel in Bldg. 20. Additionally, the command met its requirements for conducting mandatory training in Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Prevention of Sexual Harassment Ethics, and HIV/Aids awareness. Participation was also mandatory and attendance was as close to perfect as could be expected in view of things such as illness, temporary duty assignments, etc.

### Civilian Payroll Issues(U)

(U) On 6 August 1994, CINCPAC headquarters employees were subjected to the third change in payroll offices in as many years. On this date, Defense Finance and Accounting Service-CL Pensacola (DFAS Pensacola) began on-line service to the headquarters and several commands subordinate or attached to CINCPAC. With this, the headquarters became responsible for monitoring, inputting, correcting time and attendance information, and changing payroll payments for not only its employees but for JICPAC, JTF-FA, JIATF WEST, SOCPAC, and ALCOM. As a result of the increased workload, an additional billet was approved for J122.

### Federal Employees Family Friendly Leave Act(U)

(U) In October 1994, President Clinton signed the Federal Employees Family Friendly Leave Act. This pilot program, which took effect on 22 December 1994, allowed federal civil servants to use sick leave to care for family members or for purposes

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relating to the death of a family member. (Previously, federal civil servants could use sick leave only when they themselves were ill.) The law enabled employees to use up to 40 hours a year for these purposes. Additionally, employees with considerable amounts of sick leave were allowed to use another 64 hours as long as their sick leave balance did not fall below 80 hours. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) planned to evaluate the program in 1997 and subsequently make recommendations to Congress about continuation of the program.<sup>15</sup>

### Affirmative Employment Program Plan(U)

(U) In 1994, authority to fill vacancies was restricted by billet authorization and budgetary problems. Consequently, the Affirmative Employment Program at the Headquarters turned to internal recruitment as a hiring vehicle. The Department of the Navy's Upward Mobility and trainee/developmental-level programs became favored recruitment methods. The Assistant Protocol Officer position and a Management Analyst position were both filled by women from the secretarial field. Nevertheless, women continued to be over-represented in the clerical levels, filling 97.8 percent of these jobs. In grades GS-9 through GS-11, women were closer to parity as they made up 37 percent of the workforce. Only 24 percent of the GS-12 through 15 positions were held by women.

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## SECTION V—PERSONNEL AND HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT(U)

### Enlisted Person of the Year(U)

(U) On 22 February, ADM Larson announced SSG Tile Siliga, Jr., USA, of the Manpower, Personnel, and Support Directorate (J1), as the winner of the Enlisted Person of the Year competition for 1993. He was selected from a field of eight contenders. An eleven and a half year veteran of the Army, he had been assigned to CINCPAC since December 1992.<sup>16</sup>

### Combined Federal Campaign(U)

(U) The 1994 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) for HQ CINCPAC was conducted in October and November 1993. LTC Robert O. Burns, USA, Army Branch, Military Personnel Division, managed the drive. USCINCPAC exceeded its CFC goal of \$141,424.00 by \$21,666.52 for a total of \$163,090.52, or 115.342 percent of its goal.<sup>17</sup>

### Stripes for Exceptional Performer(U)

(U) On 13 December 1994, SSgt Jose N. Gutierrez, USAF, from J301, was immediately promoted to TSgt by Brig Gen Tedrow, Air Force Element Commander and J4 Director, through the Air Force's Stripes for Exceptional Performer (STEP) program. Selection for this honor was based on supervisory and leadership abilities and performance of duties. SSgt Gutierrez was the sole STEP selectee within PACOM.<sup>18</sup>

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SECTION VI—RECORDS MANAGEMENT(U)

Freedom of Information Act Activities(U)

(U) During calendar year 1995 there were 72 new requests for information/documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Of these, 12 were granted in full, 27 were denied in part, two were denied in full, and 31 were denied for other reasons; e.g., request canceled by the requester.<sup>19</sup>

(U) Of the \$65,144.19 HQ CINCPAC expended on the FOIA program in 1995, all but \$922.94 was chargeable to manpower for investigation and research. Of this amount, \$726.35 was spent on office copy reproduction costs. Table I-4 contains a breakout of USCINCPAC's 1994 FOIA-related requests:

TABLE I-4(U)

Freedom of Information Act Expenses(U)

I. Personnel Costs:		
A. Direct Man-year Costs (1.05 man-years)		42,071.00
B. Other Man-year Costs by Category:		
(1) Search Time	1,568.00	
(2) Classification review/excising	4,789.00	
(3) Coordination/approval/denial	2,120.00	
(4) Correspondence/form preparation	724.00	
(5) Other activities	105.00	
(6) Total (1) through (5)		9,306.00
C. Overhead (25 percent of B.)		12,844.25
D. Total Personnel Costs		64,221.25
II. Other Case-Related Costs		
A. Computer search time	12.00	
B. Office copy reproduction	726.35	
C. Microfiche reproduction	0	
D. Printed records		
E. Computer copy	0	
F. Audiovisual materials	0	
G. Other	0	
H. Subtotal ((A) through (G))		738.35
I. Overhead (25 percent of Other Costs)		184.59
J. Total Other Case Related Costs		922.24
III. TOTAL COSTS		65,144.19

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## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

- 1 Rpt (U) Component commands (PACAF, USARPAC, PACFLT, and MARFORPAC) (As of 30 Sep 93), and DOD Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area (MOS Report), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 30 Sep 93.
- 2 Msg (U) USCINCPAC to JANAFPAC, "Assumption of Command," 112200Z Jul 94 (SD 1-1); msg (U) CHNAVPERS to VCJCS, "Flag Officer Assignments/14-94," 210051Z Apr 94 (SD 1-2); msg (U) CHNAVPERS to VCJCS, "Flag Officer Assignments/17-94," 280051Z Apr 94 (SD 1-3); msg (U) USCINCPAC to JANAFPAC, "Assumption of Command," 191700z Jul 94 (SD 1-4).
- 3 Msg (U) DA WASHDC to AIG 7300, "General Officer Nominations," 232042Z Apr 94 (SD 1-5).
- 4 Msg (U) USCINCPAC to CJTF FIVE, "Assumption of Command," 302000Z Jun 94 (SD 1-6); Fact Sheet (U), JIATF WEST, 29 May 95 (SD 1-7); msg (U) USCINCPAC to CJTF FIVE, "Activation of Joint Interagency Task Force West," 051700Z Oct 94 (SD 1-8).
- 5 House of Representatives Conference Rpt 103-747 (U), "Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995, and for Other Purposes," 26 Sep 94 (SD 1-9); Intvw (U), Laine A. Skiendiel, Historian, with LTC Michael Hackerson, USA, USCINCPAC J541, 23 Jun 95.
- 6 E-mail (U) USCINCPAC J13 to USCINCPAC J044, "FW: FY94 Command History Input," 10 Nov 94 (SD 1-10); E-mail (U) USCINCPAC J131 to USCINCPAC J044, "Historical Records," 28 Nov 95 (SD 1-11); SSS (U) USCINCPAC J04, "Public and Governmental Affairs Directorate and Legislative Affairs Division Realignment," 2 May 94, (SD 1-12).
- 7 Mission statement CINC's Study Group (CSG), undated (SD 1-13); SSS (U) USCINCPAC J00X, "Changes to Director/Deputy Director, CINC's Study Group," 4 Oct 93 (SD 1-14); SSS (U) USCINCPAC J00X, "Dissolution of J00X Office Code," 27 May 94 (SD 1-15).
- 8 Rpt (U), JICPAC SS, "JICPAC Administrative History Submission for August 1994," Aug 94 (SD 1-28).
- 9 SSS (U) USCINCPAC J1, "Command History-J12 Annual Inputs," 30 Jan 95 (SD 1-16); msg (U) COMUSKOREA to CDRUSARPAC, "US Forces Locality Wage and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations," 170039Z Jun 94 (SD 1-17).
- 10 Msg (U) COMNAVFORJAPAN Yokosuka JA to BRMEDCLINIC Atsugi JA, "Japanese National (JN) Hiring Freeze Guidance," 300730Z Nov 94 (SD 1-18); msg (U) COMUSJAPAN Yokota AB JA to CDRUSARJ-IX CORPS Camp Zama JA, "Observation of JN Employment Ceiling," 220700 Dec 94 (SD 1-19).
- 11 SSS (U) USCINCPAC J1, "Command History," 16 Aug 1994 (SD 1-20).
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- 13 Msg (U) Joint Staff Washington DC to USCINCPAC, "Extension of USPACOM JTF-Full Accounting Manpower Billets," 112317Z Apr 94 (SD 1-22).
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
CHAPTER II(U)  
THREAT AND INTELLIGENCE(U)  
SECTION I—THREAT(U)

North Korea(U)

~~(S)~~ The only serious active war threat in the USPACOM area of responsibility was from North Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This closed, militaristic society had the majority of its troops stationed within a relatively short distance from the DMZ. Adding to the perceived threat were the death of Kim Il-sung on 8 July 1994 and the rise of his son, Kim Chong-il, to power, indications of food shortages in the North, a shrinking economy, and a stalemate in negotiations over international inspection of the North's nuclear sites.<sup>1</sup>

~~(S)~~ Kim Chong-il's government positions were: Supreme Commander of the North Korean Armed Forces (since 1991), Chairman of the National Defense Commission (since 1993), Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) (since 1973), and member of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee (since 1980). His positions as Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and National Defense Commission Chairman make Kim Chong-il the paramount authority over the North Korean military.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not he would assume his father's former role as President remained to be seen.<sup>3</sup> Not much was known of Kim Chong-il. In April 1994, just prior to Kim Il-song's death, ADM Charles R. Larson, USCINCPAC, gave his views of the son:

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
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(S) North Korea depended upon the armed forces to implement national policy which gave the military top priority for personnel, supplies, and resources. This military priority caused chronic disruptions and shortages in the civilian sector and severely degraded the standard of living, but it also made North Korea largely self-sufficient for most military equipment, weapons, and supplies. Although the military was affected by shortages, it remained the highest national priority for allocation of resources.<sup>5</sup>

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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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South Korean Balance (U)


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
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
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
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North Korean Nuclear Threat(U)

(S) Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in January 1992. Since that time six inspections occurred. In March 1993, Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the NPT citing threats by "US nuclear war maneuvers" (Exercise TEAM SPIRIT) and "the unwarranted acts of some circles of the IAEA Secretariat." It seemed the North, fearing additional incriminating discoveries at its nuclear facilities, probably hoped that by making the announcement during TEAM SPIRIT 93, it could justify its claim it faced a US threat. Following US/North Korea dialogue in New York City in early June 1993, Pyongyang suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT.<sup>14</sup>

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
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(e) North Korea and the US signed a North Korea/US Framework Agreement on 21 October 1994 after nearly 17 months of negotiations. The agreement was designed to freeze North Korea's nuclear program under IAEA supervision, halt the construction of nuclear facilities, and ensure the disposition of spent fuel rods. In return, the US agreed to head up a consortium to finance and supply light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea and make arrangements for the consortium to offset the energy forgone due to the freeze of its graphite reactors. Washington and Pyongyang were also to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations, including exchanging liaison offices in each other's capitals.

(e) Implementation of the Framework Agreement was underway. Since the agreement was signed, the US and North Korea met in Pyongyang to discuss the disposition of the spent fuel rods, they met in Beijing to discuss the construction of light-water reactors, and they met in Washington to discuss the opening of liaison offices in each other's capitals. Additionally, North Korea allowed the IAEA inspectors into Yongbyon to verify and establish a baseline for the freeze.<sup>16</sup>

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
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
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
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat(U)

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
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


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North Korean Arms Sales(U)

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


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
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
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
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
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Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities(U)

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
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## SECTION II—INTELLIGENCE(U)

### J2 Goals(U)

(U) CAPT(P) Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, (frocked RADM on 1 July 1994) who became the new USCINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2) on 15 April 1994, presented his goals at the first meeting of the Pacific Intelligence Board (PIB) on 20-21 April 1994. CAPT Jacoby had come to HQ USCINCPAC from being commanding officer at Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) and was well aware of Pacific intelligence needs and issues. The goals were:<sup>29</sup>

- (U) Re-establish a theater baseline of operational requirements and tailor our efforts to meet these needs through a committed validation and prioritization effort. We need a shared sense of urgency and responsiveness to operator requirements which begins with the PIB membership and extends down the chain of command.

- (U) Intelligence support for Korea was key. We must prepare for a Korea contingency as if it were going to occur on our watch.

- (U) Establish production (JICPAC and national/service center partners) and dissemination (USPACOM ADP Server Site (PASS)) as co-equal top priorities.

- (U) Communications within the theater are important. We must work together to streamline our operations and look for smarter ways of doing business. It is then incumbent on all of us to explain what we are doing theater-wide and why and invite feedback.

### Pacific Intelligence Board(U)

(U) The PIB is a board of all senior intelligence officers in the Pacific theater for decision-making discussions. Voting members were USCINCPAC J2 and the senior intelligence officer of

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each of the components, subunified commands, SOCPAC, standing JTFs, and JICPAC; others were invited as non-voting members. There were three PIBs held in 1994.<sup>30</sup>

### Intelligence Support to Joint Operations(U)

(U) In 1991, intelligence resources in USPACOM were consolidated into the JICPAC. Budget cuts and manpower drawdowns were the primary driving forces behind this. Advanced technology, however, had not only made the consolidations possible, but it was also a factor driving the consolidation. Further, the consolidations allowed for more effective ways of gathering and providing intelligence for the warfighters. ADM Larson's "two-tier" system of command during crisis or conflict both advanced the concept of consolidation and, in part, made consolidation possible. In USPACOM, JICPAC was the single source for theater intelligence analysis and production.<sup>31</sup>

(U) JICPAC's Operational Intelligence Center (OIC) was the focal point for monitoring events and providing intelligence to subordinate commanders under all conditions—peace, crisis, or conflict. The OIC and the Crisis Action Support Cell (CASC), which was activated during crises, were the keys to providing tactical and strategic intelligence at theater and Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) levels. The CASC was the single point of entry into JICPAC for intelligence updates during the initial phases of a crisis. Once a primary JTF was activated and direct liaison authorized by USCINCPAC, the CJTF defined JICPAC/CASC taskings and the division of labor between JICPAC and JTF intelligence resources supporting JTF operations.

(U) The four precepts for intelligence support in USPACOM were jointness, consolidation, streamlined flow of intelligence, and warfighter "pull" of tailored intelligence. First, operations were joint with the USCINCPAC J2 having primary

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responsibility for ensuring quality intelligence is provided to all levels of command, including USCINCPAC as the combatant commander, the JTF, the JTF components, and supporting commands. Second, intelligence capabilities were consolidated at JICPAC. Third, intelligence management was streamlined so that the CJTF communicated directly with JICPAC as well as with his components; this "two-tier" system authorized direct communications without passing through either USCINCPAC or his major component commanders. Additionally, there was a standardized (common) dissemination scheme to support each headquarters. Finally, it was assumed that when the operator in the field was provided with adequate baseline intelligence, he then became the best authority to determine what gaps needed to be filled. It then was JICPAC's responsibility to provide information to fill those gaps by providing tailored usable intelligence which was "pulled" by the operational commanders in response to their needs and not to "push down" unneeded intelligence information. Providing expanded tools for operators to pull intelligence from JICPAC was central to theater intelligence policy and planning.<sup>32</sup>

### JICPAC Intelligence Augmentation Teams(U)

(U) JICPAC maintained two six-person intelligence augmentation teams (IATs) to augment the CJTF intelligence staff with a cadre of personnel trained in joint intelligence operations, contingency communications and support procedures, and operation of the Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS).

(U) The IAT normally deployed as part of the USCINCPAC DJTFAC and served to ensure JICPAC's analytical and production capabilities focused properly on the CJTF's needs. Upon arrival the IAT integrated with the CJTF intelligence staff and worked for the CJTF Director for Intelligence (J2). The IAT provided the bridge between the CJTF J2 and the resources of JICPAC.

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JICPAC, in turn, linked the CJTF J2 and the resources of service and national intelligence agencies.<sup>33</sup>

### JICPAC Detachment Intelligence Support Teams(U)

(U) When tasked by JICPAC, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Detachment (J-Det) provided joint trained and equipped deployable intelligence support teams (ISTs) to CJTF components or sub-unified command components during exercises and contingencies. The J-Det was organized to deploy 4 four-person ISTs. The purpose of the ISTs was to assist the CJTF component or sub-unified component commander to transition to joint operations and to provide an intelligence bridge from the component to the CJTF or sub-unified commander. The ISTs reported directly to the component intelligence officer.<sup>34</sup>

### Intelink(U)

(U) Intelink achieved initial operational capability (IOC) at USPACOM on 1 December 1994. Intelink was designated as the future means for dissemination of finished intelligence products throughout the US intelligence community. Intelink incorporated technology used on the public Internet and provided user access to a world-wide network of multi-media intelligence information including text, imagery, graphic, audio, and video products.<sup>35</sup>

(U) A key feature of Intelink was that information was "pulled" by users rather than being "pushed" down by producers. This allowed for a more efficient intelligence production system and a significant reduction in the amount of hard copy disseminated. The long-term goal was for Intelink to provide multi-media, interactive, finished intelligence to the largest possible population of intelligence consumers and users. The initial implementation of Intelink in USPACOM consisted of a theater server hosted at JICPAC, running at the TS/SCI level.

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Any user with a workstation having Intelink software and with access to Defense Secure Network 3 (DSNET-3) or the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) could access intelligence-related information related to USPACOM or any other AOR worldwide.

(U) Near term plans called for the implementation of similar servers at other PASS nodes and the implementation of a similar secret-level intelligence information server network (Intelink-S). A concept of operations (CONOPS) was being developed to guide the planning and implementation of Intelink in the theater. Approval of the CONOPS by USCINCPAC J2 was expected in early 1995.

JICPAC Detachment Relocation(U)

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Joint Intelligence Training Activity(U)

(U) USCINCPAC responded to the requirement for joint intelligence training with the stand up of the Joint Intelligence


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
Training Activity, Pacific (JITAP). The Concept of Operations was signed on 6 October 1993. The mission of the JITAP was to maximize the readiness of USCINCPAC operating forces and staffs to provide intelligence support to joint operations under the theater "two-tier" command and control war fighting structure. JITAP was collocated with the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific (FITCPAC) in San Diego, California. The FITCPAC commander also served as the JITAP director. The CJCS Joint Training Master Plan, including intelligence training requirements, was published in February 1994.<sup>37</sup>

Enhanced Moving Target Indicator(U)

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## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

- <sup>1</sup> JSR: ON-215-94 (S/NF/NC-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea/North Korea: Peninsula Deterrence and Defense (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-1).
- <sup>2</sup> Fact Sheet (S-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-3).
- <sup>3</sup> JSR: ON-132-94 (S/NF-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "North Korea: Is Kim Chong-il Ill? (U)," 26 Aug 94 (SD 2-12); Msg (S/NF-DECL-OADR), JICPAC/ON to PACOM IDHS/DO, "North Korea: Kim Chong-il: An Initial Assessment; JICPAC Special Report ON-122-94, DIPS ID PA423 (U)," 092250Z Aug 94 (SD 2-16); Msg (S/NF-DECL OADR), JICPAC/OIC to COMMARFORPAC, "Succession Status and Regime Stability in North Korea (U)," 011415Z Oct 94 (SD 2-13); JSR: ON-218-94 (U), JICPAC/ONK, "Kim Chong-il: Succession Issues (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-14).
- <sup>4</sup> EOT Intvw (S/NF-DECL OADR), Command History (J044) with ADM Charles R. Larson, USCINCPAC, 19 Apr 94, p.16.
- <sup>5</sup> Information Paper (S), JICPAC/ONK, "North Korea: Conventional Military Capabilities (U)," 4 Jan 95 (SD 2-2).
- <sup>6</sup> Information Paper (S), JICPAC/ONK, "North Korea: Conventional Military Capabilities (U)," 4 Jan 95 (SD 2-2).
- <sup>7</sup> JSR: ON-215-94 (S/NF/NC-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea/North Korea: Peninsula Deterrence and Defense (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-1).
- <sup>8</sup> Fact Sheet (S-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-3).
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> JSR: ON-215-94 (S/NF/NC-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea/North Korea: Peninsula Deterrence and Defense (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-1).
- <sup>11</sup> Fact Sheet (S/NF-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-4).
- <sup>12</sup> JSR: ON-215-94 (S/NF/NC-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea/North Korea: Peninsula Deterrence and Defense (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-1).
- <sup>13</sup> Fact Sheet (S/NF-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Republic of Korea (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-4).
- <sup>14</sup> Fact Sheet (S-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea (U)," 19 Dec 94 (SD 2-3); JSR: ON-219-94 (S/NF/WN-DECL OADR), JICPAC/ONK, "North Korea: Nuclear Issues/Threat (U)," 19 Dec 94 (information used is Secret)(SD 2-5).

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CHAPTER III(U)  
OPERATIONS(U)  
SECTION I—READINESS(U)

USCINCPAC Force Readiness Concerns(U)

(U) In May 1993, Admiral Larson outlined his readiness concerns in a think-piece entitled "Force Readiness Concerns: A USCINCPAC Perspective." In that paper, he identified current problems, disturbing trends, and resultant readiness concerns, and focused on three warning signs which indicated degradation to the core of readiness. Although USCINCPAC's concerns were covered in the 1993 Command History, the warning signs are repeated below as an introduction to subsequent developments. They were:

- ~~(FOUO)~~ It became necessary to increase operational tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements to meet routine commitments.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Funds had to be transferred among accounts to support increased OPTEMPO, unforeseen operations, or contingencies.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Planned training or logistics support activities had to be decreased, canceled, or deferred.

~~(FOUO)~~ In August 1994, Update #1 to the May 1993 perspective was published, fostered by a heightened level of interest and greater dialogue piqued by Senator John McCain's July 1993 report entitled "Going Hollow: The Warnings of Our Chiefs of Staff." The anonymous author of Update #1 noted that the best way to check on the status of readiness was to listen to commanders. The last biennial CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR) submitted in August 1993 reported that USPACOM could accomplish tasks assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), noted shortfalls in strategic lift and the need to modernize equipment and systems, and marked an emerging pattern

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of concern over personnel and operational readiness. That concern signified the degradation at the core of readiness mentioned above.<sup>1</sup>

(FOUO) With the awareness of core degradation readiness indicators, USPACOM component commanders began forwarding personal readiness assessments to USCINCPAC monthly beginning in July 1993 and continuing through August 1994.\* In addition to continuing to report high front line readiness levels, they included examples of increasing challenges in sustaining those levels. Their concerns were generally consistent with those reflected in the CSPAR. For example:

- (FOUO) The Naval component, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), reported warning signs in training, manning, and OPTEMPO. To pay for contingency operations in the Persian Gulf, the number of deployed ships in carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) was reduced, and steaming days for non-deployed ship were cut. Some non-deployed ships tied up, and non-deployed aircraft squadrons stood down, with the resultant loss of training opportunities and reduced readiness for those next in line to deploy. Losses of skills and proficiency were manifested by increasing numbers of key personnel failing in vital qualification areas such as engineering readiness examinations and fire fighting certification.

- (FOUO) For US Army Pacific (USARPAC) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), missed training opportunities and manning challenges were concerns. For USARPAC, reduced manning levels and the need to borrow military manpower to make up for underfunded base operations programs affected both training and quality of life. For PACAF, an additional missed training opportunity

\* Adm Macke changed the reporting interval to quarterly beginning 28 Sep 94.

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concern was the lack of exercise participation by the Air Combat Command (ACC) caused by the reductions in Air Force-funded bilateral training exercises.

(FOUO) The component commanders were doing all they could and were working within their respective services to absorb the impacts, yet the readiness concerns remained valid and the need to continue to seek out and anticipate future readiness risks. One such risk was the difference between real versus advertised savings.

(FOUO) Real savings were associated with reduced manpower and hardware drawdown or program termination—advertised savings were those to be realized through such things as reforms to the acquisition process, base closings and consolidations, and other streamlining efforts. Unfortunately, the advertised savings were based on “best possible” rather than “most likely” estimates, and budget planners were using the advertised savings figures in planning current and future year budgets.

(FOUO) When the forecasted savings could not be realized, the risk of having to pay for the resulting shortfalls in force readiness was heightened. The shortfalls resulting from unrealized savings had to be found elsewhere in the DOD budget, and historically O&M funds were among the first to be affected. Such actions struck at the core of readiness, and to possibly prevent the effects of unrealized savings two things were necessary. First, the dynamic between any real versus advertised savings mismatch and force readiness had to be better understood, and second, safeguards had to be in place.

(FOUO) Future budget deficits would have to be paid for, and shortfalls that occurred during a budget year might have to be paid for by diversion of O&M funds. Mid-term budget fixes were often paid for by reducing people or entitlements and

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benefits, while long-term solutions involved reducing research, development, and acquisition programs which in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) had been determined essential to national security. In every case, readiness would be affected, and such scenarios could not be allowed to play out. Permanent safeguards were needed, and while seeking to develop and implement them, a way to identify and flag potential shortfalls was needed immediately so suitable workarounds could be found.

Status of Readiness(U)

First Quarter 1994(U)

(S) During the first quarter of CY 1994, the primary readiness concerns throughout USPACOM were personnel shortages, equipment shortages, transitions and reorganizations, deactivations, and decommissionings. Readiness assessments in only six of twenty measured areas declined during the quarter, while five showed improvement and eight remained steady.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPACFLT reported 59 deployed ships, with 94% rated at C3 or above, down only 1% from the previous quarter. There were 4 ships rated C4 or C5, all of which were homeported overseas in the Overseas Family Residency Program (OFRP) and undergoing scheduled maintenance. The number of non-deployed ships remained steady at 106, with 9 rated C4 and 32 rated C5 or only 61% rated C3 or above, the lowest readiness levels since the current tracking system was implemented in 1990. Ship readiness was affected by the lack of targets for essential AAW exercises, and as ship AAW qualifications expired, there was no way to re-qualify. None of the 26 deployed aviation squadrons were rated below C3, but 13 of 52 non-deployed squadrons (25%) were rated either C4 or C5. Squadron training was affected by non-traditional operational commitments which were conducted at the expense of training for traditional missions. Several non-

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deployed squadrons were impacted by required airframe inspections, and one (VAQ 137) had no operational aircraft available.

(S) COMMARFORPAC reported 88% of 35 aircraft squadrons rated at C3 or above, down 3% from the previous quarter with 4 units at C4. Support and ground combat units reported either no change or slight improvements, but all MARFORPAC units were experiencing reductions in qualified personnel. Most units were at the low end of their C-levels and close to dropping to the next lower rating..

(S) CG, USARPAC reported a 12% decrease in the number of fire support units rated C3 or above with the drop of one of eight units to C4. One maneuver unit attained a higher rating, raising all 18 maneuver units at C3 or above.

(S) Within PACAF, only one of eighteen squadrons was below C3 for a rating of 95%. The unit involved was the 31st Special Operations Squadron (31 SOS), an MH-53J-equipped unit based at Osan Air Base (AB), Korea, which was C4 due to lack of spare parts.<sup>3</sup>

Second Quarter 1994 (U)

(S) Primary readiness concerns throughout USPACOM units remained personnel shortages, equipment shortages, and lost training. Overall ratings did not reveal a decline in readiness; assessments in nine of the twenty measured areas improved, four remained steady, and seven declined.<sup>4</sup>

(S) CINCPACFLT reported an increase in the percentage of deployed ships assessed at C3 or higher to 98%, with only one of 43 ships rated C4. The number of non-deployed ships increased to 111, with 10 of them rated at C4, 28 at C5, for a rating of 66% of total non-deployed ships rated at C3 or higher. Long term readiness was affected by personnel shortages, lost training

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opportunities due to operational commitments, and shortages of weapons for shipfill were the most cited difficulties. Ship qualifications continued to expire with no means to re-qualify. All 25 deployed aviation squadrons were at C3 or higher, for a rate of 100%, but non-deployed squadrons reported only 78% rated above C3, with 9 at C4, 2 at C5. Lack of flying hours, assigned aircrews, and degraded training caused by operational commitments affected all flying units. One squadron, VAQ 137, still had no operational aircraft because of cannibalization of all leading edge slats.

(S) COMMARFORPAC reported 30 of 33 squadrons above C3, for a rate of 91%, up 2% from the previous quarters. Ground combat units were all rated at 100% at or above C3, but support units dropped 14%, 7 or 18 units rated at C4 or C5. All units reported reductions in qualified personnel, and several were still at the low end of their C-level.

(S) Within USARPAC, one maneuver unit was rated C5 due to inactivation, dropping the rate to 94% at C3 or above. Support units dropped 23% with 7 units reported as C4 and another 5 as C5, all due to inactivations or transitions/reorganizations. The 25th ID(L) remained C2 overall. One maneuver unit was rated as C4, dropping the readiness rating for such units to 89% with 6 at C2 and 2 at C3. Fully half of the division's 10 support units were rated at C4 or C5, and none were at C1. Personnel and equipment shortages were the most cited difficulties causing decreased readiness. The 2nd Aviation Battalion reported that unscheduled maintenance, and shortage of aviation refuel systems and night vision goggles impacted their combat capability, and 2 combat support battalions reported C4 because of major equipment and vehicle shortages and lack of available training.

(S) PACAF reported that all 18 squadrons were rated at C3 or above, with 16 (89%) rated as C1. Support units fared nearly

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as well, with 96% at C3 or above and 2 reported as C5 pending inactivation.<sup>5</sup>

Third Quarter 1994(U)

(S) During the third quarter, short term readiness trends revealed a slight increase in readiness. However, primary readiness concerns in USPACOM remained personnel and equipment shortages and lost training. Ship qualifications continued to expire without assets available to re-qualify. Overall, improvement was noted in seven of the twenty measured areas, no change in seven areas, and the remaining six dropped.

(S) CINCPACFLT had 33 deployed ships and 15 deployed squadrons, with only a single ship rated at C4. The deepest drop in readiness occurred in non-deployed ships and squadrons caused by keeping a deployed carrier air wing at C1 for two additional months. The resulting cuts in funds for non-deployed squadrons caused 14 squadrons to put 70% to 100% of their aircraft in preservation, which severely impacted operational readiness, and 5 additional squadrons were affected by shortage of aircrews. A total of 6 ships reported the lack of firing exercises caused expired qualifications.

(S) Overall COMMARFORPAC readiness increased, but the number of units reporting C1 decreased and the number reporting C2 increased. The percentages of ground combat and artillery units reporting C3 or above dropped 9% and 14%, respectively, but the other three measured areas improved somewhat. Shortfalls in qualified personnel continued to be reported, and several units that were in the low end of their C-level last quarter fell to C4. Twenty percent of unit commanders reported they required additional training to meet their wartime missions.

(S) Both USARPAC and the 25th ID(L) reported overall increases in readiness, degraded by unit transitions, reorgani-

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zations, and personnel shortages. Aviation units reported that unscheduled maintenance, shortage of parts, and equipment shortages impacted unit combat capability.<sup>6</sup>

New Readiness Reporting System(U)

(U) On 22 November 1994, the Joint Staff distributed a memorandum to the CINCs announcing the Chairman's Readiness System. Noting that although readiness had the highest priority in defense planning, the system to monitor readiness from a joint perspective was not well developed.\* A new readiness system that would measure critical readiness areas, identify shortfalls and potential problems, and propose remedies as appropriate was being developed, and the Chairman had approved the framework for the new system. The memorandum noted that there would be monthly reviews of readiness and projected the first for mid-January 1995. However, CJCS changed the date to 23 December 1994, and the first inputs from the CINCs were due to JCS 15 December.<sup>7</sup>

(U) The new system defined readiness to fight as composed of joint readiness and unit readiness. The services had primary responsibility for unit level readiness, and readiness at the joint level was the responsibility of the combatant commanders. Joint readiness was defined as a CINC or JTF commander's ability to integrate and synchronize forces and support assets to execute assigned missions, and the Chairman required visibility of both to fulfill his statutory responsibilities. To that end, the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) system integrated Service readiness reporting under the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) with the new readiness reporting system. The first JMRR (pronounced "Jammer") was held on 22 December 1994.

\* Admiral Larson's May 1993 prophetic think piece anticipated these ideas, and in places closely resembled the new system.

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(U) New definitions of C-levels were established for the joint system, as follows:

- (U) C1 - The command had only minor deficiencies with negligible impact on capability; correction was possible within the command.

- (U) C2 - The command had only minor deficiencies with minor impact on capability; may require external assistance to correct.

- (U) C3 - The command had significant deficiencies which reduced capability to perform some assigned missions; external assistance required to correct.

- (U) C4 - The Command had major deficiencies which prevented performance of some missions; significant external assistance required to correct.

(B)(1) (1.4a)

(B)(1) (1.4b)

(U) Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance:


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
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
(U) Special Operations:

(B)(1) (1.4a)




(U) JTF Capability:

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(U) Logistics/Sustainment:

(B)(1) (1.4a)




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(B)(1) (1.4a)



- (~~S~~) MRC-E (SWA): C3 because sustainment shortfalls addressed in the Current and MRC-W comments existed in this scenario and were compounded by initiation of MRC-E at D+45.

(U) Strategic Mobility:

(B)(1) (1.4a)



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### (U) Infrastructure:

- ~~(S)~~ C2 because of the overall age and condition of facilities and the need for replacement and renovation. The backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR) was over \$1 billion and growing.

- ~~(S)~~ +12 Month: C2 because no growth in BMAR funding expected to fix current facilities.

- ~~(S)~~ MRC-W (Korea): C2, as existing facilities and services needed repair or upgrade to meet wartime demand. Taxiway and runway repairs were required at both Kunsan and Osan air bases to support increased sortie rates. There was a shortfall of facilities to support reception, staging, and onward movement integration (RS&OI) of ground augmentation forces.

- ~~(S)~~ MRC-E (SWA): C3 for same rationale as above, except the available engineering effort would be further diminished to support two MRCs.

### (U) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4):

- ~~(S)~~ Current: C2 because the capacity of the existing PACOM communication pipes were marginal to handle the projected command, control, and intelligence (C2I) volume in a fully stressed environment. Lack of interoperability between joint C4 systems hindered effectiveness.

- ~~(S)~~ +12 Month: C1 as the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) reached IOC and additional commercial capacity became available for lease.

- ~~(S)~~ MRC-W (Korea): C3 because theater super high frequency (SHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) requirements exceeded existing satellite capacity. In addition, the Government of Japan (GOJ) had not approved frequencies for use with new systems, and the current communications systems in Korea were not sufficiently robust and survivable.

- ~~(S)~~ MRC-E (SWA): C3 because SHF and UHF capacity would be saturated.

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(U) On 23 December 1994, the Joint Staff notified the CINCs that JMRR 1-95 would be conducted in the Operations Deputies Conference Room (ODCR) in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) on 30 January 1995. Inputs were due to the J3 on 23 January.<sup>9</sup>

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SECTION II—OPERATIONS AND TRAINING (U)


Global Naval Force Presence (U)

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Carrier Battle Group Schedule (U)

(B)(1) (1.4a)




\* The USCINCPAC 1993 Command History (S/NF/DECL OADR), pp. 137-143, contains a description of the GNFP and naval presence.


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(B)(1) (1.4a)



(B)(1) (1.4a)




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
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Amphibious Ready Group Schedule(U)

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
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
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


CVBG Schedule Modified for Korea(U)

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


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
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
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\* Cheju-do (Cheju Island) was an island off the southwest tip of the Korean peninsula.


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
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
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
USCINCPAC Reconnaissance Operations (U)

Policy and Guidance (U)



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- (U) Ocean surveillance aircraft patrol and sea surveillance missions.
- (U) Aircraft conducting survey operations.
- (U) Weather reconnaissance.

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(U) As with any program, there were exceptions to published guidance. The following reconnaissance operations were exempted from the policies and guidance contained in USCINCPAC Manual 5157:

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- (U) Emergency reconnaissance operations.

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New Policy Guidance Issued(U)

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PARPRO Operations Reassessed(U)


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
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PONY EXPRESS Operations(U)

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First PONY EXPRESS for 1994 (U)

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... and First AEGIS Collection(U)

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PONY EXPRESS 94, Act Two (U)


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
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
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PONY EXPRESS 94, Back to Misawa(U)

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PONY EXPRESS 94—A Busy Season(U)

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
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
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
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OBIS Back on Station(U)

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DISTANT PHOENIX Operations(U)

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
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


GUARDRAIL Deployment to USPACOM(U)


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


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
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
U-2 Operations (U)

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


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USCINCPAC Special Operations(U)

(U) Policy development and oversight of special operations (SO), civil-military operations (CMO), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), evasion and recovery (E&R), disaster response and humanitarian assistance, counter terrorism

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(CT), and antiterrorism (AT) within USPACOM was provided by the Special Operations Division (J32).

(U) Special operations in USPACOM were conducted by the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), a subordinate unified command of USCINCPAC. SOCPAC headquarters were located at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, in the same building occupied by USCINCPAC. The commander of SOCPAC (COMSOCPAC) during 1994 was BG Ronald F. Rokosz, USA. Special operations activities and programs for the year are discussed in detail in the SOCPAC Annual History, which is attached to this history and is identified as Annex G.

Psychological Operations(U)

(U) USCINCPAC's FY 95 Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Program (OP3), was the concept for implementing OP3 in support of the Pacific Command Strategy of Cooperative Engagement. The strategy had three parts:<sup>51</sup>

- (U) In peacetime, engagement and participation, to be partners in the evolution of a peaceful Pacific region.
- (U) In crisis, to be able to react promptly and decisively, to deter hostilities, and to protect US citizens and interests, in cooperation with regional friends and allies.
- (U) In conflict, swift victory—multilaterally if possible, but unilaterally if necessary.

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- (U) Exercises - PSYOP participated in a number of joint exercises.

- (U) Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) - PSYOP soldiers to augment embassy operations for two to six months while simultaneously improving their language skills.

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OP3 for Korea(U)

(U) USFK submitted their proposed FY 94 OP3 for review in June 1994, and received approval from the JS in September. They submitted their FY 95 plan in November 1994. It was designed to support CINCUNC's mission of deterring aggression and defending the Republic of Korea (ROK).<sup>52</sup>

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## USCINCPAC Counterdrug Operations(U)

### Evolution of the USCINCPAC Counterdrug Program(U)

#### The Threat(U)

(U) The national drug threats remained the same, namely: cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. USCINCPAC's priority was focused on heroin, but other significant theater drug threats included cocaine in the Eastern Pacific (EASTPAC), cannabis (marijuana and hashish), and methamphetamine (commonly called "ICE"). Each drug had its own production source, transit routes to and distribution methods within the United States, and in most instances the sources and transit routes crossed theater boundaries as well as national borders. Transit routes and distribution methods continually changed as demand changed or as the result of counterdrug (CD) operations.<sup>53</sup>

(U) In EASTPAC, cocaine was moved by large, highly centralized and generally international trafficking organizations. In the Western Pacific (WESTPAC), small and decentralized ethnic Chinese and Sino-Thai heroin organizations operated in a highly personalized marketing chain of separate buyer-seller transactions. Other drugs were produced and trafficked by a variety of organizations as diverse as the cultures resident in the theater.

(U) Geography and relationships among the nations in USPACOM's area of operations (AOR) created an environment that influenced the USCINCPAC CD strategy. The vast area (roughly half the earth's surface), lack of transit choke points, the huge number of ports, and available transit modes precluded extensive use of random search techniques. In addition, the US maintained bilateral relationships with the nations in the region, which reduced the opportunity for a multinational structure to combat drugs. There were also several key drug producing countries in the region with which we had no relationships or no law enforce-

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ment representation. The environment led to a need for an integrated intelligence effort that built on existing relationships while attempting to improve cooperation where there was none currently.

(e) On any given day in the USPACOM AOR, there were approximately 5,000 ships underway, of which only perhaps 20 were suspected drug smugglers—in an AOR without choke points. By comparison, of the 300 or so ships underway daily in the Caribbean, some 30 to 40 were suspected drug smugglers, and over 50 percent of the maritime seizures were cold hit busts. In the USPACOM AOR, there had been only two cold hits since 1986. Drugs such as opiates, heroin, and crystalmeth were smuggled by way of personal effects aboard scheduled airline flights, concealed in the mails, or concealed in sealed containers of legitimate cargo on commercial ships and aircraft.

#### Joint Task Force 5 Activation(U)

(U) USCINCPAC's CD role was derived from the Defense Authorization Act of FY 89 (DAA FY/89), other related legislation, and resultant Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance designating the Department of Defense (DOD) as the lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Also assigned to DOD was the secondary task of coordinating communications and intelligence sharing between federal agencies.

(U) To conduct the anti-drug air and sea detection and monitoring (D&M) mission, USCINCLANT and USCINCPAC formed JTFs 4 and 5, respectively. JTF-5 was designated as the single DOD point of contact for all CD efforts in the USPACOM AOR, and was activated on 10 February 1989. It had a permanent personnel strength of 90: 64 military personnel and 26 civilian employees. In addition, law enforcement agency (LEA) liaison officers from the United States Customs Service (USCS), the Drug Enforcement

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Agency (DEA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), were permanently assigned to JTF-5.

(U) USCINCPAC decided to collocate JTF-5 with the Pacific Area Coast Guard (PACAREA COGARD) headquarters in Alameda, California, for several reasons:

- (U) PACAREA had an existing command center with established communications connectivity to LEAs.
- (U) It had an existing intelligence facility with CD collection and analysis expertise and data base.
- (U) Neither an existing command center with established connectivity to LEAs nor an intelligence facility with CD collection and analysis expertise or data base existed elsewhere in USPACOM.
- (U) An upgrade and expansion of the Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (MARDEZPAC) spaces in Alameda was already in progress, was partially funded, and available for occupancy by JTF-5.
- (U) The west coast location was more feasible than Hawaii for coordination and liaison with the LEAs, whose regional or district officers were located in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and San Diego.
- (U) Alameda allowed the immediate activation of JTF-5 with the lowest cost and staffing requirement.
- (U) Duplication of facilities was precluded, which was prohibited by DOD guidance.
- (U) It provided immediate access to USCG expertise in planning and execution of anti-drug operations.

(U) Activities of JTF-5 from activation through the end of 1993 are covered in earlier volumes of the USCINCPAC Command History. The first commander of JTF-5 was RADM William P. Leahy, Jr., USCG, who assumed duties in February 1989 when the task force was activated. RADM John L. Linnon, USCG, relieved RADM Leahy on 30 April 1991, and relinquished command to VADM Martin

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H. Daniell, USCG, on 6 April 1994. Admiral Daniell's interregnum ended with the appointment of VADM Richard D. Herr, USCG, to the director position on 30 June 1994.

LEA Philosophy(U)

(U) DOD was a supporting agency for most CD operations, a role which many in DOD found difficult to accept. LEAs worked under different rules than most military personnel. CD operations were their area, and when working with them the military had to be cognizant of their traditional methods and idiosyncrasies. Police work was based on trust and, unless a good personal relationship existed, most police officers would not confide in military personnel no matter what position they held. The main reason for this was that, lacking the military's security classification systems, they secured information by only disseminating to persons whom they knew and trusted.

(U) In addition, the LEAs did not understand AORs, particularly at the field office level where operational support requests most often originated. The LEAs tended to call the DOD point of contact (POC) with whom they were most familiar and at ease, which drove the DOD agencies to a concept of "one-stop shopping"—the agency called served as the LEA's single POC for the duration of the case (one call does it all). This method avoided the perception (or reality) of the bureaucratic runaround and, in most cases, speeded the action in DOD channels.

(U) LEAs were also fiercely protective of their cases and the arrests that resulted from their personal investigation. Passing case file information from one LEA to another without the originator's permission was a sure way to sour the relationship, and for that reason it was a cardinal DOD rule that the LEA which brought a DOD agency into a case owned it until they passed it to another LEA.

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## Security Issues (U)

(U) The security threat to individuals was a grave concern. Bribes of as much as \$40,000 per week to relatively low-ranking US LEA personnel had been documented, and the lives of LEA members were at risk. For operational security (OPSEC) reasons, JTF-5 would not provide case file level information on current or future operations to higher headquarters unless assistance was required. In addition, the distribution of CD message traffic was held to the absolute minimum required.

## Command and Control Structure Review (U)

### Background (U)

(U) On 3 November 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 14 which provided the guidelines for a US Western Hemisphere Drug Policy, and tasked for the development of a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) on heroin and non-Western Hemispheric drug problems. Predating PDD 14 by one day, DOD released on 2 November a new policy guidance memorandum that promulgated the department's new policy, and which tasked USCINCPAC inter alia to review intelligence centers and functions for economies or consolidations—the basis for the reprieve that left JTF-5 intact for FY 94.\* In the 23 November 1993 FY 94 CD budget review, conducted by the Joint Staff and the Deputy Assistant SECDEF (DASD) for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S), USCINCPAC gained the commitment to maintain the current CD structure for FY 94 pending the PRD, which was expected by June 1994. Then, on 6 December 1993, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) co-authored a proposal to

\* The proposed demise of JTF-5 was discussed in the 1993 USCINCPAC Command History, pp. 171-176.

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streamline existing CD organizations to form two joint inter-agency task forces (JIAFTs). All of these actions were described in the 1993 USCINCPAC Command History.

### USCINCPAC Objections(U)

(U) USCINCPAC did not concur with the restructuring proposed by the ONDCP proposal because it did not adequately address the increasing Asian heroin threat and the unique counter-heroin capabilities in USPACOM AOR by JTF-5. To dismantle JTF-5 or scatter its functions to activities not properly prepared or equipped to handle them would be premature in light of the anticipated PRD on heroin. If DOD was to have a role in the national heroin strategy, USCINCPAC would be tasked to provide CD support, coordination, resource management, and integration into the overall US policy for the Pacific Region, and USCINCPAC noted in the response to the Joint Staff that to date those functions had been carried out remarkably well by JTF-5 at a very nominal cost. USCINCPAC had structured efforts in SEA in accordance with the methods used for CD source nation support in the Western Hemisphere, and the program worked well. To continue the program, the command needed the operational flexibility and authorizations of a CD-supported CINC. In sum, USCINCPAC believed the unique functions performed by JTF-5 should be carefully and deliberately considered as the national strategy was fine-tuned, and that at a minimum, JTF-5 functions should not be prematurely terminated until the PRD was factored into the overall strategy. USCINCPAC's position was endorsed by the Joint Staff, SECDEF, and the Department of State (DOS), and forwarded to ONDCP.<sup>54</sup>

(U) The ONDCP-prepared National Interdiction Command and Control Plan was forwarded to DEP&S on 28 February 1994, which articulated recommendations for streamlining the drug interdiction structure and to make the process more efficient. It

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ignored the position supported by DOD, and remained basically as originally presented. It had several key features:<sup>55</sup>

- (U) Established a Joint Interagency Task Force (South) in Panama to coordinate detection and monitoring efforts in the departure/source country zone.

- (U) Established a Joint Interagency Task Force (Transit) in Key West, Florida, to coordinate interdiction/D&M efforts in the transit zone.

- (U) Established a Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) to coordinate air interdiction at and within the US border.

- (U) Consolidated the two existing Customs Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) facilities into the DAICC which would be located at March AFB.

- (U) Disestablished the existing JTF-5 and transferred its interdiction/D&M coordination functions to JIATF (Transit).

(U) The ONDCP proposal surprised both the Joint Staff and DASD(DEP&S), who indicated that upon receipt of a USCINCPAC reclama, they would deliver and represent it personally to the Director, ONDCP. Nevertheless, DOD's position prevailed and the final version of the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan was signed on 7 April 1994. Its concept of operations provided for three geographically-oriented CD JIATFs and the DAICC. Areas of responsibility for the three task forces were:<sup>56</sup>

- (U) JIATF (South): Focus on source country initiatives and drug trafficking departures and end-games with the Central American countries. AOR the same as SOUTHCOM's.

- (U) JIATF (East): Focus on north-south and south-north air tracks of interest. AOR that of JTF-4 in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Eastern Pacific to 92° West longitude.

- (U) JIATF (West): Focus on illegal drugs from SE/SW Asia and south-to-north flow west of 92° West.

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(U) Signing of the plan formalized the redesignation of JTF-5 as JIATF (West), and specified it would be established around the current structure of JTF-5 in Alameda, California. Identification of the Director and Deputy Director, initially to be filled by USCG personnel, was the responsibility of DOD. The plan gave JIATF (West) the three-fold primary mission of:

- (U) Providing actionable intelligence for heroin and other illegal drugs originating in SE and SW Asia.
- (U) Support of host nations within the PACOM AOR.
- (U) D&M responsibilities for EASTPAC west of 92° West.

(U) These changes completed a refocus of the PACOM CD mission from its original, almost exclusive, maritime D&M center to a heroin-focused intelligence and operations center servicing the national priority drug source and transit nations of Southwest and Southeast Asia.<sup>57</sup>

### Activation of JIATF WEST(U)

(U) In due course, JTF-5 was disestablished on 1 October 1994, and JIATF WEST\* was activated the same date in accordance with the provisions of the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. USCINCPAC conducted a comprehensive review of the requirements for the transition of JTF-5 to JIATF WEST. The first officer to carry the title of Director, JIATF WEST, was VADM Richard D. Herr, USCG, who assumed the duties of Director, JTF-5, upon his assumption of command of USCG PACAREA on 30 June 1994. His appointment perpetuated the relationship established in February 1989 whereby the USCG provided a flag officer to

\* The parentheses in the title were dropped upon activation and establishment of a plain language address (PLAD).

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the command billet of the JTF, who reported directly to USCINCPAC. The director was also appointed as Commander, Military Element JIATF WEST to facilitate the administration of discipline, since Service regulations provided for non-judicial punishment authority of "commanders" vice "directors." The appointment also maintained the synergistic and productive relationship established with the USCG and other LEAs that had facilitated a DOD/LEA partnership approach. However, the guidance in the plan stated the director was normally assigned from an agency having the most substantial equity in the AOR, and USCINCPAC was reassessing two principal alternatives of a USCG director reporting to USCINCPAC and a DOD director. On 10 November 1994, RADM J. T. Tozzi, USCG, relieved VADM Herr and assumed the duties of Director, JIATF WEST.<sup>58</sup>

(U) USCINCPAC's review of transition requirements was based on the following mission analysis:<sup>59</sup>

- (U) The National Drug Control Strategy directed:  
(1) Support to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy drug trafficking organizations; and (2) shift the focus of operations from transit zones to counterdrug programs in national priority source and transit countries as an integral part of foreign policy. In addition, the strategy stated the heroin threat required a significantly different approach due to the far greater difficulty in collection of intelligence on and conduct of law enforcement operations against this decentralized and diversified threat.

- (U) The three tenets of USCINCPAC's role were unchanged: (1) Provide the long range, strategic focus for JIATF WEST consistent with national guidance and USCINCPAC policies and initiatives in the region; (2) Establish access with country teams and maintain liaison with host nation drug coordinators in the AOR; (3) Interface with the Joint Staff.

- (U) Under USCINCPAC oversight, JIATF WEST would: (1) Provide actionable intelligence for heroin and other illegal

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drugs originating in SE and SW Asia; (2) Support priority host nations in SE and SW Asia; (3) Support intelligence-cued LEA interdiction in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, streamlining transit zone detection and monitoring (D&M); (4) Organize to maximize operational effectiveness and minimize overhead; (5) Refocus primary efforts on supporting US CD efforts in the PACOM AOR.

(U) There were four major items that required timeline management for implementation; three could be completed prior to 30 September 1994, and one, the realignment of service billets, would require more than six months to fully implement. At the time the review was conducted, JIATF WEST was capable of assuming all mission requirements of JTF-5 within the PACOM AOR, and the only mission function that could not be assumed immediately was the conduct of operational support to SW Asia, due to the need to initiate a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between USCINCENT and USCINCPAC on support to the national priority heroin source nation of Pakistan. Negotiations had begun, however, and an MOU was expected to be completed by 1 September 1994.

(U) In June, the Joint Staff requested USCINCPAC's anticipated funding and personnel requirements for the transition be provided them not later than 30 June 1994. However, concept refinement of the refocused JTF-5 mission required more time to complete and the DCINC asked for a 30-day extension to ensure that an accurate and supportable Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) could be submitted. The new goal of 29 July proved to be overly optimistic, and USCINCPAC did not submit its final input for implementation until 19 August. In summary, the final input stated that no major issues remained unresolved and JTF-5 was capable of assuming all mission requirements of JIATF WEST.<sup>60</sup>

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US Interdiction Coordinator Designated(U)

(U) Before many of the actions described above took place, ADM J. William Kime, USCG, Commandant of the Coast Guard, was designated the US Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) for CD matters on 12 February 1994. He was appointed by the Director, ONDCP, to act on his behalf for drug interdiction efforts in support of the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. The USIC's role was to focus oversight coordination in the Western Hemisphere, up to but not including the borders of the United States. As the USIC, Admiral Kime would coordinate the efforts of departments and agencies with overseas interdiction responsibilities, ambassadors, and senior military and civilian supervisors in the field to ensure that assets committed to international interdiction were adequate, and to integrate the location and scheduling, as well as optimize the employment of US aerial and maritime D&M and interdiction assets. On 1 June 1994, Admiral Kime was relieved as Commandant and USIC by ADM Robert E. Kramek, USCG.<sup>61</sup>

JTF-5/JIATF WEST Special Operations(U)

(C) Special operations conducted by JTF-5 and JIATF WEST included several continuing operations as well as designated CD operations. There were two successful DOD-supported controlled deliveries of cocaine completed by the USCS during 1994, Operations STINGRAY and STARFISH. The former is described below.<sup>62</sup>

- (C) Operation STINGRAY: This was a highly sensitive EASTPAC maritime controlled delivery of cocaine conducted by the US Customs Service (USCS) on 14 June 1994. USS RECLAIMER (ARS 42) provided escort and over-the-horizon security support for the transfer of 3.1 tonnes of cocaine from a Colombian drug mothership to a USCS undercover vessel. RECLAIMER then met with the USCS vessel, picked up the load and proceeded to Pearl Harbor. The cocaine was off-loaded at Naval Magazine Lualualei

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on 23 June and flown to Travis AFB aboard a USAF C-141 on the 24th.\* Although the USCS intended to use the cocaine for multiple sting operations, the concern that some of the cocaine could have been distributed after the final transfer to the subjects caused a change in tactics. Therefore, STINGRAY closed out on 6 July when USCS, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DEA agents arrested four men in a sting operation in Antioch, California. The story broke in the Bay Area press on 7 July as a result of courthouse-covering journalists who gained access to the information filed when the accused were brought before a federal magistrate. Once released, USCS then allowed news services in Hawaii to break the story locally. The first concern of JTF-5 was that there had been a security leak, but that proved to be an unfounded fear.<sup>63</sup>

Monthly Operations Summaries(U)

~~(C)~~ During January, USN P-3B and P-3C ORION MPA flew 10 CD-dedicated sorties totaling 78.8 flight hours, while associate P-3s contributed an additional 49 sorties/234.1 flight hours. A single USCS P-3 flew a single 8.0-hour sortie, and a USAF E-3 SENTRY also flew one sortie of 11.3 hours. The only other aircraft contributing to the CD effort were two Navy SH-60B SEAHAWKS. The Coast Guard cutter MUNRO (WHEC 724) provided 29 steaming days on CD patrol and conducted joint operations with the E-3 AWACS in conjunction with Operation TURKEY HUNT. One boarding was conducted with negative results. JTF-5 support to LEAs included intelligence analysis support provided to: the DEA in Karachi, Seattle, Bangkok, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Blaine; the FBI in Seattle, Las Vegas, and Oakland; the USCS in Seattle,

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\* The cocaine was packed in 84 packages which weighed approximately 75 lb each. The name of the mothership was not released because of plans to conduct future transfers with the same organization.

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San Francisco, and Los Angeles; the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Sacramento; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Ottawa; the Joint Drug Intelligence Group (JDIG) in Norwalk and Los Angeles; and the Joint Heroin Analysis Team (JHAT) in Washington, DC. In addition, JTF-5 provided photographic imagery interpreter support to the US Defense Liaison Office (USDLO) in Hong Kong; a linguist to the USCG in Alameda; D&M for JTF-5, the police in Honolulu, and the DEA in Blaine and Karachi. Equipment loans were made to the DEA in Honolulu and the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) in Los Angeles. Airlift support to the Honolulu Police Department was also furnished. For all that, there were no drug seizures, no marijuana eradication, and no airborne targets of interest (TOI) detected or intercepted.<sup>64</sup>

(e) During February, CD-dedicated USN P-3Cs flew 7 sorties/70.1 flight hours, and associate P-3Cs flew another 26 sorties totalling 172.9 flight hours. Navy SH-60Bs provided a total of 23 sorties/89.4 hours, with 16 sorties/57.6 hours dedicated to CD. The Army added 12 OH-58 sorties during Operation WIPEOUT on Oahu and in the Kona area of Hawaii. At sea, MUNRO under the tactical control (TACON) of CJTF-5 dedicated 17 steaming days to CD operations, during which one surface vessel was boarded—no drugs were found. Support to LEAs and host nations coordinated by JTF-5 included intelligence analysis support to: the USCS in Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; the FBI in Seattle, Las Vegas, Oakland, and Los Angeles; the DEA in Karachi and San Diego; and EPIC in El Paso. Other support included logistics assistance to the USCS in Honolulu; an equipment loan to the USCS in San Francisco; and D&M to the DEA in Mazatlan. In Hawaii, a total of 1,238 marijuana plants were spotted and eradicated during WIPEOUT. No aerial TOIs were detected during the month.<sup>65</sup>

(e) During March, CD activities increased in tempo in several areas. Dedicated MPA flights totalled 10 sorties/93.6 flight hours, and associate P-3Cs added 21 sorties and 130.2 hours to the total. Navy SEAHAWKS flew 30 sorties for 60.3

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flight hours, and Army OH-58s put in 24.8 hours during 13 sorties in support of Operation WIPEOUT. USS JOHN A. MOORE (FFG 19) contributed 9 steaming days TACON to CJTF-5 on dedicated CD operations, but no boardings or drug seizures were made. Support to LEAs and host nations increased significantly. Intelligence analysis support included assistance to: the USCS in Seattle, San Diego, and San Francisco; the DEA in Los Angeles, Bangkok, Seattle, Hong Kong, Karachi, and Blaine; the FBI in Seattle, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas; the Joint Drug Intelligence Groups (JDIG) in Los Angeles and Norwalk; the Police Department in Sydney, Australia; the DOJ in California; and EPIC in El Paso. The D&M operation in Mazatlan was completed, with a total of 192 man hours committed. Equipment loans were made to the USCS in San Francisco and Oakland, and linguist support was provided to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) in Los Angeles and the USCS in Seattle. Military working dog (MWD) support assisted the USCS in Anchorage, and logistic support was given to the DEA in Honolulu. In Thailand, 60 man hours of field medical training for DEA and Thai nationals was completed, and the initial planning conference for US Special Forces training of the Thai counternarcotics (CN) task force was conducted. In Hawaii, a total of 61,627 marijuana plants were spotted and eradicated in Kona during Operation WIPEOUT. No aerial TOIs were detected.<sup>66</sup>

(C) CD-dedicated MPA operations during April consisted of only 5 sorties/32.6 flight hours, but associate flights totalled 28 sorties comprising 197.3 hours. The SEAHAWKS contributed 35 sorties/93.0 hours in an associate role, and Army OH-58 KIOWA helicopters flew 10 WIPEOUT sorties totalling 18.9 flight hours. Surface ship support was provided by USS WADSWORTH (FFG 9) dedicated 8 steaming days while TACON to CJTF-5, but no suspect vessels were boarded. Intelligence analysis support was provided to: the USCS in Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego; the DEA in Los Angeles, Bangkok, Seattle, Karachi, and San Diego; the FBI in Seattle, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas; the JDIG in Los Angeles and Norwalk; the DOJ in Los Angeles and California;

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the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) in Oakland; and the HIDTA in Los Angeles. Equipment loans were made to the DOJ in Los Angeles and the USCS in San Francisco, and linguist support was provided to the USCS in Seattle. MWDs supported the USCS in Anchorage, and field training was provided for the DEA in Thailand. During Operation WIPEOUT, 8,094 marijuana plants were spotted on Maui, and 7,094 were eradicated. There were no aerial TOIs detected during April.<sup>67</sup>

(C) During May, CD-dedicated P-3Cs flew 4 sorties/32.0 hours, while associate MPA flew 259.6 flight hours during 38 sorties. The UH-60 contribution was limited to 3 sorties for 10 flight hours, and S-3B VIKINGS made their first appearance in CD operations for the year with 40 sorties/105 hours. There were no WIPEOUT operations conducted during May, and a surface ship was not provided for CD operations. Intelligence analysis support was provided to: the USCS in San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles; the HIDTA in Los Angeles; the FBI in Seattle. San Diego, San Francisco, Oakland, and Bangkok; the DEA in Bangkok, Seattle, Karachi, and Mazatlan; and the US Attorney in Los Angeles. Equipment was loaned to the DOJ in Los Angeles, the USCS in San Francisco and Port Angeles, and to the DEA in Bangkok. Linguists were provided to the FBI and DEA in Honolulu and the FBI in Los Angeles, and a small amount of D&M support was allocated to the USCS in Seattle. As in past months, no aerial TOIs were detected.<sup>68</sup>

(C) DOD-assistance to the USCS in Anchorage by MWD teams resulted in three seizures of small quantities of drugs, residue, and paraphernalia. The dog teams searched 66 vehicles and 6 ships between 19 and 30 June. JTF-5 Operation STINGRAY in support of a USCS San Francisco undercover operation resulted in the seizure of three tonnes of cocaine. The cocaine was flown from Hawaii to Travis AFB and used in a controlled delivery in California which resulted in five arrests, identification of the mother ship, and significant intelligence on a major smuggling

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organization in Colombia. MPA support during June reached over 300 flight hours for the first time since January, with dedicated P-3s contributing 8 sorties/63.7 flight hours and associate MPAs flying 245.2 hours during 36 sorties. Operation WIPEOUT resumed, and Army OH-58s flew 33 sorties for 120.5 hours. Surface ship support was provided by USS RECLAIMER (ARS 42) with a USCG law enforcement detachment (LED) on board which escorted a USCS undercover vessel during a rendezvous with a Colombian mothership in EASTPAC and then transported the cocaine to Hawaii during STINGRAY. Other support to LEAs and host nations included intelligence analysis support to: the DEA in Karachi, Seattle, Bangkok, and San Francisco; the FBI in Seattle, Las Vegas, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Oakland; the USCS in San Francisco and Los Angeles; the police in Sydney; the JHAT in Washington; the JDIG in Los Angeles; and the HIDTA in Newark. The D&M support to the USCS in San Francisco was completed. Linguist support was provided to the FBI in Los Angeles, and the equipment loan to the DOJ in Los Angeles was continued. During Operation WIPEOUT in Hawaii, 31,955 marijuana plants were eradicated in Kona, Kauai, and Maui. No air TOIs were detected.<sup>69</sup>

(C) July was another busy month for JTF-5. In Anchorage, MWD teams assisting the USCS from 4 to 18 July searched 165 vehicles and 16 ships, resulting in three seizures of small quantities of drugs, residue, and paraphernalia. Operation STARFISH was completed, resulting in the controlled delivery of three tonnes of cocaine to the San Francisco Bay area. USCS, FBI, DEA, and LEA arrested four individuals, confiscated \$40,000 and several vehicles, and seized the cocaine prior to distribution to the smuggling organization. The cocaine had a street value of \$43 million. MPA support totalled 58 sorties/434.7 flight hours, of which 8 sorties/67.5 hours were dedicated to CD. Other CD-dedicated aircraft support included 2 E-2C HAWKEYE sorties totalling 6.5 flight hours, and 37 sorties by S-3Bs adding 65.0 hours to the CD effort. Surface ship support dedicated to CD operations included 7 steaming days by USS GEORGE

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PHILIP (FFG 12) and 10 steaming days by WADSWORTH, but no boardings were conducted. In addition, USCGC RUSH (WHEC 723) provided 23 associate steaming days while TACON to CJTF-5 during underway periods. Support to LEAs and host nations included analysis support to: the DEA in Karachi, Bangkok, and San Francisco; the HIDTA in Los Angeles; the USCS in San Diego; the FBI in San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, and San Francisco; and the JDIG in Norwalk and Los Angeles. Training was provided for the USCS in Blaine, and airlift support was provided the DEA in Honolulu. D&M support to the USCS in San Francisco was completed, but continued for the USCG in the Pacific area. In Thailand, Project TIGER CAGE, the construction of the Thai Counter Narcotics Task Force (CNTF) command center in Chiang Mai, got underway with completion of a site survey and distribution of a statement of work to potential Thai contractors. Operation WIPEOUT continued on Oahu and Maui during the month, but flying hours were not reported and only a small number of marijuana plants were eradicated. Again, no air TOIs were detected.<sup>70</sup>

(C) August proved to be another productive month for JTF-5. DOD support to Australian authorities for Operation NAZARETH resulted in the arrest of 22 people and seizure of a vessel with an estimated five tonnes of cannabis resin (hashish oil) on 5 August, and MWD assistance to the USCS in Alaska led to two seizures of small quantities of drugs, residue, paraphernalia, and one illegal weapon. The dog teams searched 18 vehicles, one ship and one train during the period 7 to 17 August. CD-dedicated MPA flew 9 sorties/74.0 flight hours, while associate P-3Cs flew 368.0 hours during 52 sorties. The only other CD-related air activity reported was 25 S-3B associate sorties totalling 56.7 flight hours. Army OH-58s supported Operation WIPEOUT in Hawaii, but the number of sorties/hours was not reported. Surface ship support TACON to CJTF-5 was provided on an associate basis by RUSH (18 steaming days) and USS TRUXTUN (CGN 35), which contributed five steaming days. No boardings were conducted. Other support included intelligence analysis to:

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the DEA in Karachi, Bangkok, Seattle, New Delhi, and Mexico City; the HIDTA in Los Angeles and Newark; the USCS in San Diego and San Francisco; the FBI in San Diego, Santa Monica, San Francisco, and McAllen, Texas; and the JDIG in Los Angeles. During the month, D&M support to the USCS and USCG was closed, the equipment loan to the DEA Bangkok was ended, training provided the USCS in Blaine was completed, and linguist support to the DEA in San Francisco closed. In Thailand, TIGER CAGE was upgraded from project to operation, with a work statement of work specifying renovations and floor plan submitted to contractors and acquisition of the majority of the office equipment, which was stored in a warehouse on Coast Guard Island, Alameda. Operation WIPEOUT continued in Kauai and Maui, and the total number of plants eradicated to date in calendar year 1994 reached 125,110. There were no aerial TOIs detected.<sup>71</sup>

(e) Dedicated P-3C MPA support during September consisted of 4 sorties totalling 38.6 hours, and associate MPA flights numbered 356.4 flight hours during 42 sorties. Associate VIKINGS flew 26 sorties for 57.6 hours. The KIOWAs supported WIPEOUT in Kona, Maui, and Oahu, but flight hours were not reported. Dedicated surface ship operations included: USS LEWIS B. PULLER (FFG 23) and USS SIDES (FFG 14) provided five steaming days each, and GEORGE PHILIP contributed 11 steaming days. One surface vessel was boarded with negative results. In order to clear up any possible confusion in the type of support provided by JIATF WEST, analysis cases in which the analysis was provided in-house with no analyst deployed were referred to as intelligence support beginning in September. Ongoing support to LEAs and host nations included intelligence support to: the HIDTA in Los Angeles and Newark; the JDIG in Los Angeles; the USCS in San Francisco; the DEA in Seattle, Karachi, San Francisco, Bangkok, Hong Kong, New York, and Manila; the JHAT in Washington and Bangkok; the FBI in Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Oakland, San Francisco, San Diego, McAllen, and New York; and the RCMP in Canada. Other support included weather support to the DEA in Bangkok; airlift support

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to the DEA in Guam and Bangkok; and linguist support to the FBI in Honolulu. In Alaska, the Army provided night vision goggles (NVG) and training to the Fairbanks Department of Public Safety, and in Hawaii, combat lifesaver training was provided to the DEA and the State Marijuana Eradication Task Force in Maui. In Thailand, members of the Border Patrol Police (BPP) and the Narcotics Suppression Bureau (NSB) took part in Exercise BAKER TEPID 94-1. For Operation TIGER TRAP, DOD aircraft were to support a DEA operation to extradite approximately 21 high-profile heroin traffickers from Thailand to the US immediately following capture. JTF-5/JIATF WEST coordinated use of aircraft on short notice through PACAF. The operation was placed on hold pending apprehension of the suspects by Thai authorities. Construction of the Thai CNTF command center, Operation TIGER CAGE, continued on schedule. Furniture, computers, and office equipment was stored in Alameda. WIPEOUT operations resulted in the eradication of another 9,733 marijuana plants to bring the year's total to 134,843. No air TOIs were detected. By the end of the month, JTF-5 was ready in all respects to change its name and assume duties as JIATF WEST on 1 October 1994.<sup>72</sup>

(C) During October, the first month JIATF WEST was in operation, dedicated MPA flew only 5 sorties/45.4 flight hours, but associate P-3s contributed 558.0 hours during 107 sorties, the highest numbers of flight hours and sorties to date in 1994. The only other aircraft support reported was the 24 sorties and 74.9 hours flown by Army OH-58s in support of Operation WIPEOUT. Associate surface ship operations were conducted by TRUXTUN and LEWIS B. PULLER, for 31 and 11 steaming days respectively. No boardings were conducted during the month. DOD support to LEAs and host nations included intelligence support to: the FBI in Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, San Diego, McAllen, and San Francisco; the DEA in Seattle, Karachi, San Francisco, New Delhi, Bangkok, New York, and Manila; the USCS in Los Angeles, Miami, San Diego, and San Francisco; the HIDTA in Newark; the USCG in Alameda; and the JHAT in Bangkok. Other support included

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training and airlift for the FBI in Honolulu, and D&M for the USCS in Blaine, Los Angeles, and San Diego. The Army continued training with NVGs in Fairbanks, and in Honolulu the Army provided a range safety officer and medical personnel to an FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. In Thailand, Operation TIGER TRAP was still on hold, pending apprehension of the suspects. Operation TIGER CAGE continued on schedule in Chiang Mai. Operation WIPEOUT in Maui and Kauai resulted in eradication of 4,588 marijuana plants. No air TOIs were detected during the month.<sup>73</sup>

(c) November realized the highest number of MPA sorties to date, with associate MPA flying a total of 613.2 flight hours during 71 sorties—there were no dedicated MPA sorties. Also in the associate category were 33 sorties/135.0 flight hours flown by S-3Bs. CD-dedicated flight time was provided by 4 E-2C sorties for 15.7 hours, and Army OH-58 support of Operation WIPEOUT with 24 sorties for 72.8 flight hours. At sea, TRUXTUN contributed 2 associate steaming days, and LEWIS B. PULLER put in another 11 days, also in the associate category. No boardings were conducted by the ships. The amount of intelligence support to various agencies declined slightly, with support to: the FBI in Las Vegas, Santa Monica, Oakland, San Francisco, San Diego, and McAllen; the DEA in Seattle, San Francisco, and Bangkok; the JHAT in Washington and Bangkok; and the USCS in San Diego and San Francisco. Other support included D&M to the USCS in Blaine and Los Angeles, and NVG training in Fairbanks. In Thailand, Operation TIGER TRAP commenced with 10 of the fugitives arrested on 27-29 November by the Royal Thai Police.\* For Operation TIGER CAGE, preparations for transport of command center equipment by

\* However, the RTG elected to arrest and jail the 10 arrested vice turning them over to the US. Pending approval from the Thai judiciary, the 10 defendants would be extradited to the US later.

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the USAF continued. Operation WIPEOUT continued in Hawaii on Maui and Kauai, with eradication of another 7,800 marijuana plants. Again, no air TOIs were detected.<sup>74</sup>

(C) During the last month of the year, CD-dedicated P-3C MPA flew 2 sorties for 13.6 flight hours, and associate P-3Cs flew a total of 83 sorties/652.8 hours, the largest number of sorties/hours flown by MPA during any month in 1994. Other dedicated Navy aircraft support included a single E-2C sortie of 2.9 hours, and 32 SH-60B sorties totalling 89.7 hours. Army OH-58s supported WIPEOUT operations in Hawaii with 4 sorties of 10.4 hours. Associate surface ship support was provided by: LEWIS B. PULLER, 12 steaming days, and SIDES, 9 steaming days, during northbound return transits to Southern California from Central America; and USS VALLEY FORGE (CG 50), 7 steaming days, during transit to Central America from Southern California. No surface vessel boardings were conducted during the month. CD support to LEAs and host nations included intelligence support to: the FBI in Las Vegas, Santa Monica, Oakland, and San Diego; the DEA in Seattle, Bangkok, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Riverside; the JHAT in Washington and Bangkok; the HIDTA in Newark; the USCS in San Francisco and San Diego; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in San Francisco. Other support included airlift support to the USCS in Phoenix; training for the FBI in Honolulu; D&M for the USCS in Los Angeles; and linguist support to the DEA in Honolulu. The Army in Alaska continued to provide NVGs and related training in Fairbanks on an as-needed basis. In Thailand, Operation TIGER TRAP was awaiting Thai Government legal review of the fugitives' nationality claims. Use of USAF aircraft for transportation had been coordinated through PACAF and USTRANSCOM. Construction of the Thai CNTF command center, Operation TIGER CAGE, was completed, and a tentative delivery date of 20-24 January 1995 for the furnishings was established. In Hawaii, Operation WIPEOUT resulted in the eradication of 682 more marijuana plants, with a total for the calendar year of 147,913. As with all

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previous months, no air TOIs were detected during the month, making the total for the year zero aerial TOIs.<sup>75</sup>

USCINCPAC Freedom of Navigation Operations(U)

(U) The United States had successfully conducted a Freedom of Navigation (FON) program since 1979 to protect US navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas. Purpose of the FON program was to preserve the global mobility of US forces against excessive maritime claims of other nations. United States policy on FON was governed by three important principles. The United States would:<sup>76</sup>

- (U) Respect maritime claims consistent with navigation provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention.
- (U) Exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights, on a worldwide basis, in a manner consistent with the LOS Convention.
- (U) Not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other nations designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation, overflight, and other traditional uses of the sea.

(U) Responsibilities for planning and executing FON assertions within USPACOM lay at three levels: DOS for planning and administering the diplomatic portion of the FON program; DOD for planning and administering the operational assertion portion of the program, with the Joint Staff tasked to develop an annual selective list of FON assertions for each fiscal year; and USCINCPAC for planning and ensuring execution of assertions on the JS annual list, subject to operational limitations. In turn, USCINCPAC tasked component commanders to plan and execute operations asserting US rights against excessive maritime claims.

(C) During FY 94, USCINCPAC conducted seven surface and four air FON operations against eight countries. In addition, a

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total of 49 air, surface, and subsurface transits through the Philippine archipelago were conducted, and another 31 through the Indonesian archipelago. Typical FON assertions included:<sup>77</sup>

- ~~(S/NP)~~ Maldives: On 16 November 1993, a P-3C MPA conducted flight operations in claimed territorial airspace outside 12nm from land en route Diego Garcia from Masirah, Oman. On 27 May 1994, USS THACH (FFG 43) conducted high seas activities in claimed territorial sea outside 12nm from land, and innocent passage within 12nm of land without prior permission en route the Arabian Gulf from Thailand. Closest point of approach (CPA) was 10nm to Kelai Island. No reaction was noted to either assertion.<sup>78</sup>

- ~~(S/NP)~~ Philippines: On 8 February 1994, USS OLDENDORF (DD 972) and USS HARRY W. HILL (DD 986) conducted an innocent passage transit within claimed straight baselines and within 12nm of land through the Bohol Sea without prior permission en route Singapore from Guam. The ships' actual track took them between Bohol and Medano Islands, which were separated by a distance of 28.25nm including a 4.25nm navigable international waters corridor. This was the first FON assertion which challenged prior permission for warships transiting Philippine territorial sea in innocent passage since expiration of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1991. On 1 July 1994, USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3) conducted the same type of FON assertion off the southwest coast of Mindanao en route Singapore from Guam. No reaction was noted to either passage.<sup>79</sup>

- ~~(S/NP)~~ India: On 24 February 1994, USS FLETCHER (DD 992) and OLDENDORF conducted an innocent passage with 12nm of land off the southern tip of Great Nicobar Island without prior notification en route to the North Arabian Sea from Thailand. No reaction was noted. The last FON conducted against India was 20 May 1993 by USS HORNE (CG 30). An FON against India and Sri Lanka planned for 22 November 1993 was denied by ADM Larson on 29 October 1993 due to political sensitivity.<sup>80</sup>

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- ~~(S/NF)~~ Cambodia: On 28 February 1994, a P-3C MPA conducted flight operations off Rucker Kusrovie in claimed territorial airspace outside 12nm from land while en route Kadena AB, Okinawa, from U Tapao, Thailand. Prior to this assertion, the last FON against Cambodia was conducted by USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) on 13 May 1993 with no reaction noted. On 8 May 1994, USS DUBUQUE (LPD 8) conducted high seas activities in the claimed 24nm security zone and territorial sea derived from excessive baselines, and conducted innocent passage with 12nm of land without prior permission en route Sattahip, Thailand from Okinawa. Closest point of approach (CPA) was 8.1nm to Puolo Wai. Neither assertion provoked a reaction.<sup>81</sup>

- ~~(S/NF)~~ Sri Lanka: USS ANTIETAM (CG 54) and USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG 57) conducted high seas activities and innocent passage within the claimed 24nm security zone and within 12nm of land on 10 April 1994. CPA was 6.2nm off Dondra Head. No reaction was noted. No FON had been conducted against Sri Lanka in the past three years, and a planned FON planned for November 1993 was canceled by USCINCPAC due to political sensitivities in India.<sup>82</sup>

- ~~(S/NF)~~ Bangladesh: on 21 June 1994, a P-3C aircraft conducted flight operations in the claimed 18nm security zone and claimed territorial airspace outside 12nm from land while en route Thailand from Diego Garcia. CPA was 30nm to landfall. No reaction to the assertion was noted. No FON assertions had been conducted against Bangladesh in the last three years.<sup>83</sup>

- ~~(S/NF)~~ Burma: A P-3C patrol aircraft conducted flight operations in the claimed 24nm security zone and claimed territorial airspace outside 12nm from land en route from U Tapao to Diego Garcia. CPA was 14.4nm to North Twin Island. No reaction was noted. The last FON against Burma was conducted on 3 August 1993.<sup>84</sup>

- ~~(e)~~ Through the Philippines, 15 air transits, 30 surface transits, and 4 subsurface transits were conducted. No reaction was noted to any of these transits.

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• (C) Through Indonesia, 21 surface transits, 9 sub-surface, and a single air transit were conducted. No reaction was noted to any transit.

Port Visits(U)

(U) USCINCPAC established policy for the control of port visits by ships in USPACOM. Such port visits were subject to approval of the host government, except in cases of emergency, stress of weather, or where agreements existed providing for free access upon advance notification to local authorities. The Navy component commander, CINCPACFLT, was delegated responsibility and authority for the administration of port visits, and at his discretion could further delegate that responsibility. When factors such as timing or politico-military implications indicated that specific USCINCPAC approval was required for port visits to certain areas, USCINCPAC would notify CINCPACFLT. During FY 94, a total of 584 port visits were conducted in 15 different countries in the USPACOM AOR. The top five countries visited were: Singapore-133; Japan-133; Hong Kong-94; and Korea-87, and Thailand-49.<sup>85</sup>

Ship Visits to China(U)

(S) During SECDEF Perry's visit to China in October 1994, he suggested to the Chinese that reciprocal ship visits be resumed, beginning with a visit by a US ship to China early in 1995. Responding to that suggestion, in December 1994 ADM Macke forwarded a concept for a ship visit to CJCS. The visit concept was for a single ship, with a PACFLT flag officer of three-star rank or below embarked, to visit Shanghai for several days of meetings with Chinese military officials, tours, and appropriate public relations activities. To meet both the expressed preference of the Chinese and operational considerations, USCINCPAC's first choice of dates was 21-24 February 1995 for USS BUNKER HILL (CG 52), an AEGIS cruiser. Alternate dates proposed for the

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visit were 20-24 March for USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19), the SEVENTH Fleet command ship.<sup>86</sup>

(C) The CINC was eager to move forward with the military-to-military program, but understood the need for the military relationship to keep in step with the political relationship. He noted that ASD Edward L. Warner III planned to visit China in December, and asked for the Chairman's support in obtaining interagency approval for one the two proposed dates following the trip. Political sensitivities surrounding any contact with China would require thorough interagency coordination, but CJCS informed the CINC that he supported the ship visit as a cornerstone of the military contact plan. He promised to keep ADM Macke advised.<sup>87</sup>

#### Humanitarian Demining Programs(U)

##### DOD Demining Operations(U)

(U) The President and Congress established the global problem of landmines as a priority issue. The stated policy was to provide humanitarian assistance demining training to nations with severe landmine problems, and Congress earmarked \$10 million of FY 94 O&M funds to conduct or support humanitarian demining activities, not to include actual mine clearing operations. Pursuant to the FY 94 DOD authorization and appropriations acts, DOD was able to conduct demining training programs to build sustainable host-nation (HN) demining infrastructures capable of conducting mine awareness and mine clearance programs. The earmarked funds were transferred to USSOCOM, the designated executive agent for the program, for execution. Within USPACOM, Cambodia was identified as the primary country, with both Laos and Vietnam listed for consideration.<sup>88</sup>

(U) On 28 March 1994, CJCS informed the CINCs that the funds earmarked by Congress had to be spent or obligated during

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FY 94, and asked them to coordinate with the appropriate country teams to determine priorities and assess their ability to implement demining programs within their AORs. At the same time, USCINCSOC was tasked to assess augmentation requirements and capability to support the theater CINCs in implementation of demining training programs.

Cambodia Demining Program(U)

(C) Meanwhile, USCINCPAC had requested the deployment of a seven-person USCINCSOC PSYOP Mine Awareness Information Team to Cambodia, beginning on or about 7 July 1994 with a completion date not later than 15 September 1994. This request was the follow-on to the FY 93 visit to Cambodia of a US Army PSYOP team and the subsequent visit of a single PSYOP officer to evaluate the results of the earlier visit and determine requirements for a FY 94 deployment, both funded by CINCs Initiative Funds (CIF). The purpose of the FY 94 mission was to assist the Cambodian Mine Awareness Committee (CMAC) in the further development of their mine awareness program. The intent was to create a program that Cambodian personnel could implement without US assistance.<sup>89</sup>

(C) USCINCPAC's request was followed on 22 April 1994 by a CJCS deployment order to USCINCSOC to deploy 12 PSYOP personnel to Cambodia to support the CMAC, for the period requested. The team was to build on products developed during the FY 93 deployment, develop additional materials as necessary while in country, organize the printing of the products in Phnom Penh, organize and facilitate a nationwide distribution network for the products, and train Cambodian personnel to perform those functions. Their objective was to develop a self-sustaining HN program. USCINCPAC promptly appointed the Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (COMSOPAC) to act as executive agent for USCINCPAC's Cambodian Demining Training Assistance Program, which was conducted by the Executive Demining Working Group, led by the J3 with standing members from FPA, J2, J4, J5, J05, and SOCPAC.

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Purpose of the group was to plan, coordinate, and execute all demining assistance missions. The focus of the five-phased program was to provide humanitarian, non-lethal mine clearing, mine awareness, and demining support training. The desired end state was Cambodia self-sufficient with an established training cadre and demining support systems. At the same time, USCINCPAC tasked COMSOPAC to conduct an assessment of Cambodian demining program requirements with a survey team during the period 29 May to 7 June 1994.<sup>90</sup>

(U) In May 1994, COMSOPAC visited Ambassador Twining to determine the level and type of additional demining assistance required, and the SOCPAC survey team tasked by USCINCPAC deployed to Cambodia during the period 1-10 June to further determine requirements. The team was composed of representatives from US Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs (CA), PSYOP, engineer, logistics, and EOD subject matter experts (SME), and augees from SECDEF and SECSTATE. Following the assessment, the ambassador and the Executive Demining Working Group approved COMSOPAC's mission concept for Phase I of the program, the initial training mission, which emphasized developing the demining capability of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and providing additional assistance to the CMAC to begin development of a self-sustaining training cadre.<sup>91</sup>

(U) On 21 June, COMSOPAC requested deployment of a 30-man training team composed of Special Forces, PSYOP, Combat Engineer, EOD, and contracting personnel to Phnom Penh, and the advance elements of the team began deploying on 7 July. The main body, consisting of a 17-man demining training team and an 11-man mine awareness training team, arrived in Phnom Penh on 14 July 1994 via C-130 aircraft—Phase I training actually began 18 July. During this phase, an RCAF engineer platoon was trained in both mine clearing and mine awareness, and training support was provided to CMAC. In addition to the trainers, SOCPAC provided a senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) to the American Embassy to

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act as Demining Coordinator. COMSOPAC conducted a favorable mid-point assessment 21-23 August, and determined that the success of RCAF training and completion of support to CMAC warranted continuation of humanitarian demining assistance in FY 95, or Phase II of the program.<sup>92</sup>

(U) Phase II, originally scheduled to begin 3 October 1994, was delayed pending receipt of FY 95 funds and the JCS deployment order. The CJCS deployment order was issued by message on 7 October, and covered the execution of Phases II through V of the program. Deployed personnel were to be rotated so none exceeded 179 days of temporary duty (TDY), and all forces had to be redeployed not later than the end of the fiscal year (30 September). Deployment of the 28-man replacement demining training team (DTT) began on 10 October, and redeployment was completed on 21 December 1994. The DTT consisted of a 14-man element which conducted train-the-trainer mine clearance training and related medical training, and a 12-man element that developed a mine awareness program. Phase III was scheduled to begin on or about 6 January 1995 with deployment of a similar 28-person team to Cambodia. By the end of FY 94, Cambodia was expected to have a self-sustaining capability consisting of a demining company, a demining school, a mine awareness company, and a mine awareness school.<sup>93</sup>

Laos Demining Program(U)

(C) Following the deaths of three young children in northern Laos on 11 December from the detonation of a probable US origin cluster bomb near a JTF-FA 95-2L POW/MIA operations team, Mr. Done Somvorachit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Ambassador Tomseth that the Lao government was ready to move ahead with the development of a US-assisted demining/unexploded ordnance (UXO) project. The subject had been discussed by Admiral Macke during his October visit to Laos, with an emphasis

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on training trainers who could improve the Lao capacity to manage ordnance removal and destruction.<sup>94</sup>

~~(C)~~ The ambassador strongly supported moving ahead on the development of a demining/UXO program for Laos which would allow a project to be funded from the FY 95 funds appropriated for DOD O&M humanitarian ordnance clearance activities. Laos met all the criteria for assistance, and such a project would lend support to work effectively and cooperatively with the Lao on other key issues in the relationship: POW/MIA operations, counternarcotics projects and enforcement, and refugee repatriation.

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SECTION III—EXERCISES(U)

USPACOM Exercises(U)

Significant Exercises(U)

(U) The USPACOM Exercise Schedule published in August 1993 listed 12 significant Part I exercises for fiscal year 1994. Exercises were considered significant if they met one or more of the criteria listed in the Joint Training Manual. For example, if planned for politically sensitive geographic areas as determined by DOS, or if they had particular political implications as determined by the CJCS or the scheduling CINC. All Part I exercises required submission of a Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) by the sponsoring CINC for possible approval by the National Security Council (NSC). Part I exercises included field training exercises (FTX) such COBRA GOLD, and command post exercises (CPX) such as ELIGIBLE RECEIVER.<sup>95</sup>

Exercise COBRA GOLD(U)

(C) Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) was a joint and combined FTX designed to maintain US access and influence in both Thailand and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states in general through the development of strong military-to-military relationships with the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). Conducted in Thailand, CG was scheduled and conducted by USCINCPAC annually. It supported the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), and was number 4 on the command priority listing. A total of 24 supporting and enabling tasks under five Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) were listed for accomplishment in CG 94.<sup>96</sup>

(U) Employment dates for CG 94 were 2 to 26 May, with inclusive dates of 1 April to 5 July 1994. Approximately 8,600 US and 10,000 Thai participants took part in what was an air,

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land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations exercise. III MEF provided the US JTF commander, MajGen Donald R. Gardner, USMC, and the staff nucleus, and units were drawn from SOCPAC, III MEF, SEVENTH Fleet, 13 AF, 6th ID(L), and the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). CG 94 was the 13th exercise of the COBRA GOLD series, and provided many CG firsts:<sup>97</sup>

- (U) A US flag officer, BG Greg Gile, USA, of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) (10th Mtn Div (L)), a FORSCOM unit stationed at Fort Drum, New York, headed the Combined Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) in Sattahip, Thailand. The value of general officer participation in the CJECG was significant as it provided a strong testament to the Thais of our commitment to training excellence.

- (U) The CJECG operated from a remote location at Sattahip. The 60-mile separation from the Combined JTF headquarters at Chon Buri provided an exercise control transparency which contributed to more realistic training opportunities for both US and Thai forces.

- (U) During the entire eleven months of deliberate planning, including three planning conferences and a month of exercise execution, an officer from the Singapore Armed Forces observed CG 94.

- (C) The exercise featured a ten-fold increase over the modest SIGINT play of CG 93 and specifically addressed issues experienced during staff workup for the real world operation, SAFE EXIT, planned in 1993 for Cambodia.

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- (C) Four tactical sensitive compartmented information facilities (TSCIF) were established by the CJTF in Thailand for the first time.

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- (U) Joint Deployable Information Support Systems (JDISS) were employed at the JTF and component headquarters, the JECG, and at JICPAC in Hawaii. The deployed JDISS at the JECG was a first for CG, and allowed exercise controllers to quickly insert scenario information at either the theater, JTF, or component levels.

- (U) A separate SCI JDISS operated in a US exclusion in the CJTF TSCIF provided real-world SCI information from JICPAC to the senior US commander throughout the exercise.

- (U) Six Air National Guard F-16s from Springfield, Illinois, and six A-10s from Battlecreek, Michigan, took part.

- (U) During the exercise, the Joint Warfighting Center provided numerous demonstrations of the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). Thai interest was high, and the demonstrations provided them with a first look in expanding the utilization of simulation to enhance CG exercise play.

#### Exercise TEMPO BRAVE(U)

(U) Exercise TEMPO BRAVE (TB) was a Part II computer aided exercise (CAX) conducted twice in even fiscal years and once in odd fiscal years. It was scheduled and sponsored by USCINCPAC, and was designed to introduce and evaluate JTF contingency crisis planning and preparation at both the theater and JTF levels using simulations as the exercise driver. Its purpose was to exercise the primary USCINCPAC JTFs and the CINC's theater staff in crisis assessment, reaction, and execution planning, and supported the two-tier, joint command and control structure in USPACOM. The USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC), a trained team tailored to the needs of each JTF normally comprised of about 35 augmentees who worked, upon reporting,

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solely for the CJTF, was actually deployed during each TB exercise. During the exercises, simulation results were distributed via real world command and control systems, which linked players in Hawaii, Fort Lewis, Guam, San Diego, Scott AFB in Illinois, and role players at USCINCPAC and Carlisle Barracks. TEMPO BRAVE 94-1 was conducted from 6 to 20 April 1994, and TB 94-2 from 13 to 23 September.<sup>98</sup>

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## SECTION IV—POW/MIA RESOLUTION EFFORTS(U)

(U) US efforts to resolve the issue of unaccounted for prisoner of war and missing-in-action (POW/MIA) cases continued through 1993 and 1994. At mid-June 1993, a total of 2,255 Americans were unaccounted for from the Southeast Asia war, for whom the US had pledged to achieve the fullest possible accounting. By the end of 1993, the total was down to 2,248 as the result of identifications made by the US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI). By country, the breakout was:<sup>99</sup>

Vietnam	1,648*
Laos	514
Cambodia	78
China	<u>8</u>
Total	2,248

\* 422 over water losses included.

### National POW/MIA Operations Reorganized(U)

(U) On 6 August, DOD announced the reorganization and consolidation of four previously separate offices into the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO). The four offices involved were the Deputy Assistant SECDEF for POW/MIA Affairs; the Central Documentation Office; the Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for POW/MIA; and the US Army's Task Force RUSSIA. DPMO was a DOD field activity under the authority of the Assistant SECDEF for Regional Security Affairs (ASD(RSA)), and the Director, DPMO, served concurrently as the Deputy Assistant SECDEF for POW/MIA Affairs. It consisted of a headquarters and five separate divisions: Administrative Support, Plans and Policy Support, Research and Analysis, External Affairs, and Reference and Documents.<sup>100</sup>

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### Joint Task Force-Full Accounting(U)

(U) Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) was activated 23 January 1992, with 57 military and 10 civilian personnel on board, with BG Thomas H. Needham, USA, in command. The task force moved from Barbers Point Naval Air Station (NAS) to Camp H. M. Smith on 16 March 1992. Personnel strength at the end of 1993 was 154 military out of 159 authorized, and 18 civilians of 23 authorized, with five excess and two attached personnel.<sup>101</sup>

(U) Forward detachments of JTF-FA were established as follows: Det One in Bangkok, Thailand; Det Two in Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV); Det Three in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); and Det Four in Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia (KOC). Activities of JTF-FA headquarters and the four detachments were covered in detail in weekly situation reports (SITREP). To preclude repeated reference to the SITREPs, the 1993 and 1994 SITREPs are listed in the final footnote to this section.

### Destruction of Documents(U)

(U) Early in 1993, allegations were made and widely reported in the media that JTF-FA had destroyed important documents associated with the POW/MIA effort formerly held by Det One in Bangkok. What actually happened was that the Commander, JTF-FA (CJTF-FA) directed a review of the files in Bangkok as part of an effort to ensure compliance with policy directives to declassify POW/MIA documents and consolidate holdings. As the mission of Det One had evolved, the detachment no longer interviewed refugees for POW/MIA information, which was the principal function of the former Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) liaison office in Bangkok for many years, and that was reflected in the content of the files.<sup>102</sup>

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(U) A detailed, systematic files review personally supervised by the JTF-FA Director for Intelligence was conducted, with steps taken to ensure all POW/MIA related reports were held at JTF-FA headquarters before any reports were purged from Det One's files—only duplicate files were destroyed and no files were indiscriminately marked for destruction. Some 192 reports were set aside for return to JTF-FA to ensure a copy was on file. The document review and destruction took place on 24-26 March 1993, and was the culmination of a year-long review process begun in May 1992 and continued until the documents were destroyed. A total of 7,962 refugee reports were held by Det One prior to the review and destruction, and Mr. Garrett E. Bell, Special Assistant to CJTF-FA, screened and retained for the files 1,384 of that total. Because of the allegation, USCINCPAC directed the command's inspector general (IG) to conduct an impartial, thorough, and complete investigation, capable of withstanding the closest scrutiny, to determine if documents were improperly destroyed. As a physical audit of over 8,000 refugee files was required, the investigation was a long and tedious task.<sup>103</sup>

(U) The IG began his investigation on 5 April 1993, and concluded his investigation of the alleged improper destruction of documents on 17 May 1993. The investigating team took testimony from 26 witnesses and reviewed more than 9,500 documents, and the preponderance of physical and testimonial evidence and the detailed inventory of JTF-FA files showed that the destroyed documents were duplicates of refugee reports and other documents on file at JTF-FA headquarters. In addition, the investigators concluded that the minimal amount of marginal information which may have been destroyed was of no significant analytical value. The findings of the investigation were that no information was lost which would prevent the fullest possible accounting of our missing in Indochina, and that JTF-FA document review and destruction procedures were working properly.<sup>104</sup>

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## Orders Issued(U)

(U) USCINCPAC issued his warning order for FY 94 POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia on 17 August 1993. The warning order updated OPORDER 91-1, Expanded POW/MIA Operations in Southeast Asia - Operation Full Accounting, issued on 11 January 1992 which covered FY 93 operations. USCINCPAC OPORDER 5080-93, Expanded POW/MIA Operations in SE Asia - Operation Full Accounting, was issued by message on 5 January 1994, and was basically identical to the warning order.<sup>105</sup>

(U) The new order provided for expanded and accelerated POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia resulting from increased bilateral and trilateral contact with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Planning factors for each country were:

- (U) SRV - Six JFAs conducted approximately every other month, consisting of up to eight elements (four investigation, four recovery), with a maximum of 75 personnel.

- (U) Laos - Six JFAs conducted approximately every other month, with up to three investigative/recovery elements and a maximum of 40 personnel.

- (U) Cambodia - A minimum of four JFAs with up to three investigative/recovery elements with a maximum of 75 personnel, including helicopter support personnel. JFAs were proposed for October 1993, January 1994, and March 1994.

- (U) Trilateral Mission - One JFA proposed for December 1993, with two investigation/recovery elements, one each in Laos and Vietnam, comprised of a total of 24 personnel.

(U) USCINCPAC tasked his component commands to provide the various kinds of support required by the mission operations orders published for each joint field activity:

- (U) PACAF was tasked to provide special assignment airlift mission (SAAM) aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal

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(EOD) technicians and support equipment, physicians, individual duty technicians (IDTs), and life support technicians, as required. For JFAs in Laos and Cambodia, PACAF was also tasked to provide SAAM C-130 aircraft and life support technicians as required, and weather support as required for Cambodia operations.

- (U) PACFLT was tasked to provide EOD technicians and support equipment, physicians, and IDTs as required. For JFAs in Cambodia, they were also tasked to provide weather support as required.

- (U) USARPAC was tasked to provide EOD technicians and support equipment, physicians, and IDTs as required. For two of the four JFAs projected for Cambodia, USARPAC was also tasked to provide a helicopter support package. They were also tasked to provide similar support for JFAs in Laos if the government changed its position on deployment of US military helicopters.

- (U) MARFORPAC was tasked to provide a helicopter support package for two of the four JFAs projected for Cambodia. They were also tasked to provide similar support for JFAs in Laos if the government changed its position on allowing use of US military helicopters.

- (U) CILHI was tasked to provide up to four recovery teams, search and recovery specialists for investigations, and supporting equipment as required.

(U) Specific airlift support requirements for FY 94 POW/MIA operations included forward deployed C-130 channel aircraft and crews, temporary duty (TDY) airlift control element (ALCE) support, and C-12 airlift and SAAM missions as directed. In addition, passenger, cargo, and ground handling support were required at U'Taphao. A total of 750 C-12 flight hours were projected for the year.

(U) The warning order for fiscal 1995 POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia was issued on 3 September 1994 as an update to the previous operations order issued in January 1994. The order

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noted that increased bilateral and trilateral contact with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had created opportunities to expand and accelerate POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia. Planning factors for each country were:<sup>106</sup>

- (U) SRV - Six JFAs conducted approximately every other month, consisting of up to eight investigative and recovery elements, with a maximum of 85 personnel.

- (U) Laos - Six JFAs conducted approximately every other month, with up to four investigative/recovery elements and a maximum of 40 personnel.

(U) No field operations were scheduled in Cambodia, as all Cambodian cases, and all Vietnam cases with leads in Cambodia, had been investigated at least once and all but three cases were in a pending status. JTF-FA continued to assess the status of cases in Cambodia to determine whether or not future JFAs were warranted. A trilateral JFA was not and would not be scheduled until such time as operations in Laos brought field operations to the southern provinces.

(U) Taskings of component commands to support operations in Vietnam and Cambodia were generally unchanged from the previous order. CILHI's tasking for Vietnam was increased from up to four recovery teams to as many as six, plus mortuary affairs specialists for investigative teams and supporting equipment as required. Although Laos had rejected the use of US military helicopters for POW/MIA operations, USACOM was tasked to provide a three-helicopter support package for each JFA should their position change. Each helicopter had to be capable of loading 10 passengers and self-deploying from the nearest C-5 capable airfield to Vientiane. A similar tasking for a four-helicopter support package should operations in Cambodia be resumed was levied on USACOM should their support be required, with the helicopters capable of self-deploying from Bangkok to Phnom Penh.

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(U) PACAF was tasked to lead an effort to establish a comprehensive airlift management plan for FY 95, to include consideration of a wide range of options. These included establishing multiple airlift channel flights, establishing a C-12 detachment, forward deploying aircraft and rotating crews, and other methods of providing relief to SAAM and C-12 aircraft. A total of 288 C-12 flight hours were projected for the year.

People's Republic of China(U)

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Chinese Visit to Hawaii(U)

(U) On 2 March 1993, China accepted the US invitation proffered in January to send a five-person team to visit JTF-FA and CILHI for a briefing on crash site surveys and recovery and identification of remains. Led by Mr. Yang Jiechi, Deputy Director, Department of North American and Oceanic Affairs, MFA, the team arrived at Honolulu IAP on 28 March, and was billeted in the Hilton Hawaiian Village. They visited USCINCPAC, JTF-FA, and CILHI for briefings, demonstrations, and discussions, with some

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time available for sight-seeing on Oahu. US representatives present included Deputy Assistant SECSTATE Kenneth Quinn and Acting DASD for POW/MIA Affairs Edward Ross.<sup>108</sup>

(U) The team received substantive presentations on the mornings of 29 and 30 March, and proposed US investigation and survey efforts in China were discussed on the morning of the 31st. During the morning discussions on the final day of their visit, Mr. Yang stated that China had a clearer view of the process and approached the issue in a spirit of cooperation and friendship to the American people, and that China saw good Sino-American relations as important to the development of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He provided information about specific cases which were the subject of US inquiry:

- (U) USN P4M-1Q MERCATOR of VQ-1 shot down over the Shengai Islands on 22 August 1956. The PRC recovered the bodies of two crew members and returned their remains to the US through United Kingdom (UK) representatives in Shanghai on 12 September 1956. They had no other information regarding the other 12 crew members:

- (U) USN P2V NEPTUNE of VP-22 shot down over the Shantou Region on 18 January 1953 while patrolling the Formosa Strait, crashed into the sea east of Jinghai. The PRC had no information about the six missing crew members.

- (U) USN F-4B of VF-9 shot down near Hainan Island on 9 April 1965 during an engagement with Chinese MiG-17s, which crashed into the sea west of Hainan. The PRC had no information about the crew.

- (U) USN A-3B shot down over Leizho Peninsula and crashed at sea. The remains of one crew member were returned to the US on 15 December 1975, while the bodies of two others were buried—one washed out to sea and the other could not be located because terrain features had changed over time from erosion. They did not know the fate of a fourth crew member, but surmised he died, judging from the circumstances of the crash.

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• (U) USN A-1H, one of two aircraft fired on in Chinese airspace on 14 February 1968, which crashed in the sea east of Wanning County, Hainan Island. The second aircraft was tracked by PRC Air Defense heading toward Danang, SRV. Neither wreckage nor remains were located, and the Chinese assumed the pilot died in the crash. That information had been passed to the pilot's wife in 1979 and son in 1992.

• (U) A-6A aircraft shot down over Guangxi Province on 21 August 1967. One crashed near Jiang Kou, and one crewman was captured and later released. The body of the other was buried and then returned to the US in December 1975. The other aircraft crashed near Baqi, Ning Ming County, and the bodies of both crewmen were located and buried. Unfortunately, floods during the following rainy season washed away both shallow graves. Mr. Yang presented Mr. Quinn an album which contained full facial photographs of the bodies of the two flyers and their military identification cards, first positive evidence received to substantiate previous reports from China that the two aviators had perished.

(U) The excellent reception afforded and the favorable impression of US efforts received by the Chinese delegation led the PRC to seriously consider the US request for site surveys of the four Vietnam-era crash sites. In November, they agreed to allow US teams to visit China to identify and transfer the remains of three Americans from a World War II crash site in Tibet and to conduct a survey of a Vietnam War crash site in Guangxi. They were also prepared for a US team to conduct a site survey of the crash site in Tibet, but weather conditions limited access to the site to the months of July and August.<sup>109</sup>

### Repatriation of Remains from China(U)

(U) With approval granted in November, a three-person team from CILHI arrived in China on 5 December 1993 and on the 7th accompanied Chinese and American Embassy officials members to

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Lhasa, Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), to recover the remains of three American service-men lost in an aircraft crash during World War II. The remains were examined on 7 December, and preliminary evaluation indicated the aircraft was a C-87 operating over the aerial supply route known as the Hump, and was probably lost after November 1943. The crash occurred on or near a glacier at an altitude of 14,000 feet. Thirteen C-87s and crews were still carried as missing on Missing Aircrew Reports (MACRs) out of approximately 40 lost during Hump flights.<sup>110</sup>

(U) The remains were repatriated in a brief, dignified ceremony in Beijing on 11 December 1993, with Brig Gen Ervin C. Sharpe, USAF, USCINCPAC/J30, representing USCINCPAC. During a short stopover at Andersen AFB, Guam, Thirteenth Air Force personnel and local veteran's organizations conducted a ceremony. Upon arrival at Hickam AFB, an appropriate arrival ceremony was held by USCINCPAC, following which the remains were delivered to CILHI. Subsequent analysis by CILHI indicated that the remains repatriated accounted for three of the five crew members aboard the missing C-87.<sup>111</sup>

### Recovery Operations in China(U)

(U) A joint US-PRC team, including six Americans, investigated the case involving two unaccounted for personnel in Guangxi mentioned above from 13 to 16 December 1993. The team interviewed seven individuals and confirmed that both crew members' bodies were found after the crash in widely separated locations. One was buried by villagers the day after the crash, while the other was simply covered with grass two or three weeks later. In April 1973, after unsuccessfully attempting to locate both remains, the Chinese concluded they had washed away. The joint team searched the location where each body had been found and excavated the reported burial site, all with negative results. Their findings supported the Chinese conclusion reported earlier that the remains were not recoverable.<sup>112</sup>

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(U) On 27 December 1993, the Chinese presented the bills for costs incurred by Chinese central and local governments in connection with the activities in Guangxi and Tibet—costs in addition to payments already made by the US teams. At the same time, they informed the Beijing embassy officers that they were prepared to accept the remaining site surveys, and invited them to propose dates.<sup>113</sup>

(U) For the activities in Guangxi Province, the Chinese requested payment of 157,870 Yuan (\$27,696). The bill included:

- (U) Claims for travel, transportation, and related costs for investigation activities in March 1993 that resulted in the information provided to the US on 31 March in Hawaii.
- (U) Payment for mine clearing activities in preparation for the December 1993 visit of the US team.
- (U) Payment for costs incurred in preparation for and during the December visit to Guangxi.

(U) For Tibet, the Chinese asked for a lump sum payment of \$100,000, which they said included:

- (U) Costs of their efforts to recover the remains of US personnel from the site, transport them to Lhasa, and storage costs in Lhasa.
- (U) Costs of photography for the pictures and videos presented to SECSTATE in Washington in November 1993, as well as other costs.

(U) The Chinese were thanked for their assistance, and informed that many of the services for which they were requesting payment had been undertaken without the knowledge or approval of the US Government, and that it was important to avoid surprises in the future. The Chinese agreed that, prior to incurring any future POW/MIA related costs, they would notify the US and determine whether we were prepared to assume such costs.

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(U) A second joint field activity (94-2C) was conducted in two provinces of China from 6 to 21 April 1994. The IE included eight US personnel (four from JTF-FA, two from CILHI, one from AMEMB Beijing defense attaché office, and one from the US Consulate in Guangzhou) organized as an investigative element. Three cases were investigated and all were recommended for the pending category as there was nothing to be gained from further field investigation. No remains were recovered. Cooperation from the central PRC government was deemed outstanding, while cooperation from local government authorities ranged from fair to excellent in the provinces. The three cases investigated were:<sup>114</sup>

- (U) Loss of an F-4B off the western coast of Hainan Island on 9 April 1965.
- (U) Loss of a KA-3B off the southern tip of the Leizhou Peninsula, Guangdong Province, on 12 April 1966.
- (U) Loss of an A-1 off the eastern coast of Hainan Island on 14 February 1968.

(U) Later in 1994, a follow-up to the December 1993 repatriation of remains from Tibet took place. From 8 to 25 September 1994, a combined civil-military team comprised of four US military personnel from CILHI recovered the remains of the remaining two crewmembers from the wreckage of the C-87 transport from a glacier at about 12,500 feet above sea level in Bomi County, northeastern Tibet. The team was accompanied by two Chinese-speaking members from the American Embassy in Beijing and officials from the PRC and TAR, plus an infantry platoon of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) accompanied by a colonel and a party of approximately 25 guides and porters. A pack string of 16 horses was also dedicated to the operation.<sup>115</sup>

(U) The village of Yigong was used as a staging area for the expedition, a two-day ride on a narrow, rutted road from Lhasa. The crash site was located 20 kilometers (km) straight

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line distance from the drop-off point some five miles north of Yigong, but the actual route to the site was approximately 37.1 km. The route of approach passed through 11,800 feet as it neared the glacier. At noon on 14 September, the main party began traveling by foot after driving to the end of the trail from Yigong, and set up an early camp at 1700 hours. During the next two days, the party traveled from dawn to last light through a natural valley with mountains ranging to 21,000 on all sides. Nearly 80 stream/river crossings over newly constructed bamboo and timber bridges were made. The final campsite was established on the evening of 17 September on a sand bar next to a swift river approximately nine kilometers from the glacier and crash site.

(U) The main party split into three teams for the final march to the crash site, each team traveling a different route in case difficult march conditions were encountered. The first team reached the crash site three hours and twenty minutes after leaving base camp, and was soon joined by the other two teams. Aircraft debris and material evidence was scattered along a discernible path down the glacier in a swath approximately 200 meters wide by 1,000 meters long. The largest recognizable piece of wreckage was a Pratt & Whitney R-1830 engine with the propeller blades bent back toward the cowling, indicating a cataclysmic crash. There were seven major areas within the crash site which yielded most of the material evidence and remains.

(U) The team searched the area for six hours, and recovered approximately 160 pounds of material evidence and the remains of what was believed to be two persons in a high state of preservation. The remains and some of the other evidence was placed in two military duffle bags, each weighing about 80 pounds. Because of religious reasons, the porters refused to handle the remains, and the two CILHI sergeants packed them back to the camp site that evening and 14.5 km further the next day to where the horses were picketed.

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(U) The remains were repatriated on 29 September 1994 at Baboshan National Cemetery, Beijing, in an appropriate ceremony, and the identification process was undertaken upon arrival at CILHI. Excellent support was received from all involved in the recovery and repatriation effort.

### Socialist Republic of Vietnam(U)

(U) The U.S.-Vietnam joint field investigation effort begun in 1988 continued for its sixth and seventh years through 1993 and 1994. The period was marked by significant advances toward resolution of the POW/MIA issue. An overview of 1993 activities in the SRV was included in the 1993 USCINCPAC Command History.

### Assessment of Cooperation(U)

(U) In February 1993, Admiral Larson submitted the final monthly USCINCPAC subjective assessment of Vietnamese cooperation on the agreement concluded in March 1992 which delineated the activities which defined cooperation on POW/MIA accounting. They fell into five areas, and progress in those areas meant improved cooperation. Referred to as the Five Agreements, they were:<sup>116</sup>

- (U) Agreement 1: Increased access to records, archives, and museums.
- (U) Agreement 2: Implement credible live sighting mechanism.
- (U) Agreement 3: Implement plan of expanded joint operations over the next two years, to include five investigations in the next ten months.
- (U) Agreement 4: Continue trilateral efforts to resolve border cases.
- (U) Agreement 5: Renew unilateral efforts to recover and return remains of unaccounted for in Vietnam.

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(U) After 10 months of combined US/SRV effort, the CINC reported the following accomplishments:

- (U) Accomplishment of the specific goal of completing five joint field activities (JFA) and initial investigations of all 135 last known alive (LKA) cases within the past 10 months.

- (U) Investigation of all outstanding live sighting reports, except for three cases which still required some minor work before they could be completed.

- (U) Establishment of three archival research teams, aided by numerous Vietnamese support personnel, within SRV military museums.

- (U) Expansion of the Vietnamese effort to recover remains.

- (U) Discovery of information from Vietnam relating to incidents in Laos.

- (U) Coordination between the State of Cambodia (SOC) and SRV regarding field investigations near the Vietnam border.

(U) On a continuum of greater to less success, he ranked the areas of cooperation as follows: field activities, archives, live sighting investigations, returns of remains, and tripartite cooperative action. The CINC noted that since March 1992 there had been significant cooperative steps in all categories, and overall Vietnamese cooperation had increased dramatically. He felt that the report had served the purpose for which it was intended, and only special reports on significant developments would be submitted as appropriate. The five agreements evolved into the four key areas in 1993:

- (U) Remains repatriation
- (U) Resolution of discrepancy cases
- (U) Trilateral cooperation
- (U) Provision of POW/MIA documents

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Presidential Emissary Visit to Vietnam(U)

(U) GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., (USA, Ret), Presidential Emissary for POW/MIA, visited Vietnam 18 to 20 April 1993 to discuss progress of the MIA accounting effort. He met with a number of senior SRV officials, including President Le Duc Anh, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, and Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai.<sup>117</sup>

Presidential Delegation Visits to Vietnam(U)

(U) In July 1993, a Presidential Delegation led by the Honorable Hershel Gober, Deputy Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA); the Honorable Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary (A/S) of State (EAP); and Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF, Assistant to CJCS, visited Vietnam. Their mission was to make clear to the Vietnamese that any further steps in relations between the two nations depended on tangible progress on outstanding POW/MIA issues. The delegation totaled 23 in number, and included representatives of the four largest US veterans organizations—the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), Disabled American Veterans (DAV), and AMVETS. Enroute to Vietnam, the delegation stopped in Hawaii and were briefed by USCINCPAC, JTF-FA, and CILHI.<sup>118</sup>

(B)(1)(1.4a)

(B)(1)(1.4b)

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December Delegation Visit(U)

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(U) Prior to A/S Lord's visit to Vietnam in December 1993, Admiral Larson presented his views on where we stood regarding Vietnamese cooperation with the POW/MIA resolution efforts.<sup>121</sup>

(B)(1) (1.4a)

(B)(1) (1.4b)

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Economic and Trade Embargo Lifted(U)

(U) On 3 February 1994, President Clinton announced the United States was lifting the trade embargo against Vietnam. Saying he was absolutely convinced it offered the best way to resolve the fate of those who remained missing and about whom we were not sure. He noted that progress on unresolved questions was encouraging, but it could not end there, and he remained personally committed to continue the search for the answers and the peace of mind that the families of the missing deserved. President Clinton added that he had consulted with his national security and veterans' affairs advisers and with several outside experts, and it was their view that the key to continued progress lay in expanding contacts with Vietnam, a view shared by many distinguished Vietnam veterans.<sup>122</sup>


(U) At the same time, the president announced a proposal to establish reciprocal liaison offices with Vietnam to provide services for Americans there and help pursue a human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government. He made clear, however,

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that those actions did not constitute a normalization of relationships with Vietnam, and before that could happen more progress, more cooperation, and more answers were needed. He also said another high-level delegation would be sent to Vietnam in the spring of 1994 to continue the search for remains and documents.

(B)(1)(1.4a)




1994 Presidential Delegation Visit(U)

(U) In July 1994, a Presidential Delegation led by the Honorable Hershel Gober, Deputy Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA); the Honorable Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary (A/S) of State (EAP); Mr. Wold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs; MajGen John Admire, USMC, Joint Staff J5; and representatives from the American Legion, AMVETS, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, Disabled American Veterans, and National League of Families, visited Vietnam. In Hanoi, they met with General Secretary Do Muoi;

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(B)(1) (1.4a)




(U) The delegation visited Da Nang on 3 July, where they were briefed on team operations, then split into two groups and visited excavation sites. On the following day, they traveled to HCMC and Vientiane, Laos. (The visit to Vientiane is covered in more detail below.)

(B)(1) (1.4a)

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### Long Range Plan for POW/MIA Operations in Vietnam(U)

(U) At the bi-monthly technical talks held in Hanoi in March 1994 (see below), Vietnamese officials conveyed Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai's request for a high-level policy meeting to assess POW/MIA progress and discuss a two-year work plan for the future. USCINCPAC believed such a meeting was desirable to reaffirm with Vietnam our continued high interest in attaining the fullest possible accounting. In anticipation that a senior American official would meet with the Vietnamese, a long-range plan and proposed talking points were forwarded to the Joint Staff in May. Although Vietnamese requested a two-year plan, USCINCPAC presented a one-year plan of activities as it was not then feasible to project activities beyond the end of 1995.<sup>126</sup>

(U) The plan consisted of a continuation of five specific research and investigative initiatives and a program of joint field activities. USCINCPAC believed that the process which had been instituted would, if continued, result in the fullest possible accounting, and the key goal was to maintain progress at the current pace and scope. Three areas which should receive special emphasis for Vietnamese improvement were:

- (U) Efforts to locate and provide documents and other material related to US POWs, particularly original source materials used to compile documents already provided, and to search for archival material and memoirs held by private citizens.

- (U) Access to areas previously or currently denied, such as the Cam Ranh Bay Naval Facility.

- (U) Efforts by the Vietnamese unilaterally to locate and return remains.

(U) Specific proposals in the plan included joint field activities through the 36th JFA scheduled for June-July 1995, and a trilateral operation with the US, Vietnam, and Laos. However,

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because of the north-to-south work schedule in Laos, dates for the next trilateral field activity could not be scheduled.

(U) Planned activities of the five on-going special research and investigative initiatives were individually addressed:

- (U) The STONY BEACH live sighting investigation (LSI) program remained first priority. They were conducted, usually by a two-member team of US specialists stationed in Bangkok, whenever new information suggested the possibility of live unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam. The program was anticipated to run through 1995.

- (U) The Priority Case Investigation Team (PCIT), a four-member investigation team composed of two US linguist/analysts and two VNOSMP specialists, researched specific cases remaining from the list of 135 individuals listed as last known alive. PCIT work was extended beyond the original 31 March 1994 estimated completion date, and was scheduled to run through the end of 1994. If new leads surfaced, JTF-FA might again request extending the effort at that point.

- (U) The Special Remains Team (SRT), a six-member team composed of a US team leader, linguist/analyst, and graves registration specialist, and three VNOSMP specialists, researched the list of 84 cases, representing 98 individuals, for whom the US believed Vietnam could locate remains. JTF-FA expected all cases to be investigated at least once by February 1995.

- (U) The Archival Research Team (ART), a four-member team which researched museum holdings, documents, and films at the Joint Document Center in Hanoi and throughout Vietnam seeking information on unaccounted Americans. JTF-FA expected this team to continue operations through 1995, with at least one team operating from the US office in Hanoi.

- (U) The Oral History Program (OHP), two US researchers assisted by VNOSMP specialists, conducted interviews regarding Vietnamese policies and procedures for handling US

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POWs, and specific information relating directly to cases of unaccounted for Americans. Again, JTF-FA expected this program to run through the end of 1995.

### Joint Research Activities, 1993(U)

(U) In October and November 1992, memoranda of understanding (MOU) were developed and details clarified on the conduct of joint research activities conducted in the SRV. Archival Research Team Number One (ART 1) began research at the Hanoi Army Museum on 2 November 1992, and ART 2 started work at the Da Nang Military Region (MR) 5 Museum on 5 November.\*

(U) ARTs 1 and 2 stopped work and returned to JTF-FA headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii, during Tet, the Vietnamese lunar new year observance, 16-31 January 1993. They returned to Vietnam and resumed work in Hanoi and Da Nang respectively on 1 February 1993, and that same day ART 3 arrived in Ho Chi Minh City and began work at the MR7 Museum the next day.<sup>127</sup>

(U) ART 3 worked only five days before the museum staff informed them that the supply of research material was exhausted and there was nothing more for them to examine in the vicinity of Ho Chi Minh City. The team was limited to only 39 full days of work during their four-month deployment, and the team was not replaced after their rotation date in early June 1993. During its brief productive life, ART 3 reviewed and photographed nine photographs and 175 artifacts. In May, however, Vietnam agreed to allow resumption of research in the surrounding provinces after the team's departure in June. To take advantage of the opportunity, a mobile research task team (RTT) was formed, headed

\* The genesis of the archival research program in Vietnam is discussed in the 1992 USCINCPAC Command History, pp. 186-189.

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by the former ART 3 team leader. The RTT began visits to provincial military museums on 28 June 1993.<sup>128</sup>

(U) Meanwhile, ART 1 ran out of work at the Army Museum on 9 February and temporarily halted research work, but on 26 February resumed research at the Capital Military District Headquarters. On 7 June 1993, the Joint Documents Center (JDC) in Hanoi was officially opened by ART 1. Located in the Central Army Museum, the JDC was manned by JTF-FA Det 2 and Vietnamese personnel and operated five days per week. In addition to the review of documents, ART 1 began reviewing war-era Vietnamese films. By the end of the year, a total of 319 (328 including nine duplicate films) out of 341 available historical films had been reviewed.<sup>129</sup>

(U) A significant number of documents were turned over to the JDC on 30 August and 1 September by the Vietnamese, and most of the team's attention for the rest of the year was devoted to reviewing them. The documents included a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) Group 559 shutdown record and biographic questionnaires completed by all US POW's while in captivity. In October, Senior Colonel Tran Bien, Deputy Director, VNOSMP, arranged for the team's research historian to receive a library card that permitted him to conduct independent research at the Ministry of Defense (MND) library, a significant expression of the growing trust and cooperation and openness developed between the Vietnamese and JTF specialists. By 26 December 1993, ART 1 had reviewed and photographed 1,915 photographs and 4,412 artifacts and assessed 793 documents.<sup>130s</sup>

(U) ART 2 enjoyed a steady supply of material for examination from the MR5 museum, and when that supply was exhausted moved to the MR4 museum in Vinh and continued work. They then moved back to Da Nang until 17 September, when they returned to Hanoi to assist ART 1 with the historical film review project. The team made a brief deployment to MR9, returned to Hanoi on

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15 November, completed reviewing available films on the 23rd, and departed Hanoi on 1 December. Its mission completed, ART 2 was not replaced. During the year, it reviewed and photographed 469 photographs and 7,231 artifacts.<sup>131</sup>

### Joint Research Activities, 1994(U)

(U) During 1994, the ART continued its daily activities at the Joint Document Center in Hanoi. Their efforts failed to yield significant quantities of new information on unresolved cases, but some new information was located as well as additional correlating information on several cases. From inception on 2 November 1992 through 30 December 1994, the Vietnam ART had reviewed or photographed a total of 27,789 items. The bulk of those items fell into three categories: artifacts (16,595); newspapers (2,685); and museum accession records (3,791). A total of 1,945 correlations were noted, of which 742 related to unresolved cases.<sup>132</sup>

### Bi-Monthly Technical Talks, 1993(U)

(U) The regularly scheduled bimonthly technical meeting took place in Hanoi, 3-5 February 1993. The Vietnamese again requested a high-level US Government official come to Vietnam to present the 1993 work plan. Negotiations concerning the size of the 22nd JFA resulted in a compromise, as they agreed to support four IE and three RE teams totalling 72 people, which meant reducing by two the number of provinces covered. Extensive discussions were held concerning financial arrangements for archival research facilities, museum staff support and access to archives, organizational costs associated with JFAs, and expenses incurred in remains recovery. The Vietnamese also presented a paper on their assessment of the 135 priority discrepancy cases, and tentatively agreed to holding the next round of technical talks 5-6 April 1993.<sup>133</sup>

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(U) The second technical meeting of the year took place in Hanoi 5-6 April 1993. Vietnam agreed to the US proposal for a 23rd JFA, and again asked for a high-level US official to come to Hanoi to review all agreements and present the future JTF-FA work plan. They also agreed to host a trilateral meeting in Hanoi on 6-8 May 1993, but requested the US extend the invitation to Laos. The Vietnamese said they would continue to work to improve the archival research program and offered access to their motion picture libraries and mainstream newspapers. Following the technical talks, MG Needham, CJTF-FA, and LTC Cray, Det 2, met with Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet on 6 April. MG Needham stated that JTF-FA had received the best-ever cooperation, but asked for more assistance with the archival research project and the remains recovery issue.<sup>134</sup>

(U) On 3-4 June 1993, the third technical talks were held in Hanoi. The US side outlined the approach of the newly instituted primary case investigation team (PCIT), discussed the progress of archival research activities, and covered proposed dates for future JFAs. The Vietnamese agreed to plans for the 24th JFA, and stated they would try to bring the Joint Document Center up to full operation. They stated they would attend the trilateral meeting in September and agreed to bilateral technical talks in July 1993.<sup>135</sup>

(U) The July 1993 bimonthly technical talks were held in Hanoi on 28 July. The US side discussed the progress of archival research activities and the PCIT, highlighted the results of the 18th forensic review following the last JFA, and presented the operational plan for the 25th JFA. The Vietnamese spokesman noted his government's commitment to the MIA accounting effort, and noted that although the task was more difficult because only the difficult cases remained, the working climate between the two countries had improved, making the search more effective and efficient despite the difficulties. He also noted that the US side had to realize that complete, systematic documents were not

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available, particularly in the south, a point acknowledged by MG Needham. The Vietnamese stated that recent high level meetings such as a recent meeting in Singapore between Secretary Christopher and Vietnam's foreign minister had helped build a spirit of cooperation. The date of the next technical talks was set for 27 September 1993.<sup>136</sup>

(U) The fifth round of technical talks during 1993 was held in Hanoi as scheduled on 27 September. In his first meeting with a new VNOSMP director, CJTF-FA discussed measures of progress and ongoing research programs. He also summarized the results of the 25th JFA, provided operational plans for the 26th and Trilateral JFAs, and general plans for the 27th JFA. MG Needham also discussed in detail plans to use USMC helicopters in an area of Cambodia near the Vietnam border, and agreed to advise the SRV in writing of any change in the operational schedule. The Vietnamese again expressed support for the joint effort and agreed to most US proposals during the meeting.<sup>137</sup>

(U) Final technical talks of the year were held in Hanoi on 6 December 1993. CJTF-FA began his remarks by repeating President Clinton's four measures of progress on the POW/MIA issue, and discussed the status of archival research, documentary film review, PCIT, special remains team (SRT), and the oral history program (OHP). He summarized the results of the last JFA and reviewed preparations for the 27th JFA. The Vietnamese proposed switching some assigned provinces, but agreed to the US proposal. They also emphasized the importance of assuring the safety of Americans operating in the border area, while CJTF-FA pressed the importance of ensuring US teams had access to recovery sites near the Cambodian border. MG Needham pointed out that American teams escorted by Cambodian soldiers were working in border provinces, and then pointed to the paradox perceived by some that, in the face of a questionable Khmer Rouge threat, the poorly equipped Cambodians could escort JTF-FA teams to the border, whereas the far superior PAVN could not perform the same

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service just across the border. The Vietnamese response was that the threat was real, as the KR had just kidnapped and held for ransom 14 villagers. They noted CJTF-FA's laudatory comments about the prowess of the PAVN, adding that it was precisely because the PAVN understood guerrilla warfare tactics that they could not guarantee the safety of US personnel on the Cambodian border.<sup>138</sup>

### Bi-Monthly Technical Talks, 1994(U)

(U) First of the bi-monthly technical talks to be held in 1994 was conducted at the Government Guest House in Hanoi on 3 February. CJTF-FA led the US side, and Mr. Vu Chi Cong, VNOSMP Director, head the Vietnamese side. MG Needham began by discussing progress on the President's four measures (remains, priority cases, trilateral activity with Laos, and archival research), summarized the results of the last JFA, and outlined US plans for the next two JFAs. He noted that the JFA teams would consist of three investigation and five recovery elements instead of four and four for the 28th and 29th JFAs to help work off the backlog of excavations. The Vietnamese concurred with the rationale that as the number of cases per province decreased, the number of provinces each IE must visit increased, agreed with the proposal to have three IEs and five REs per team, and approved execution of the 28th JFA as briefed. They also agreed with the concept for a trilateral operation with the Lao, but would await results of the next US-Lao consultative meeting before making a decision.<sup>139</sup>

(U) The next technical talks were conducted 31 March 1994 in Hanoi. MG Needham again provided his assessment on President Clinton's four measures of progress, summarized the 28th JFA, previewed the next two JFAs, provided the US response to Vietnamese requests for payment of overflight charges for military aircraft, and the location of herbicide spraying in Kon Tum Province during the war. CJTF-FA informed the Vietnamese

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that a change in concept of operations in Laos precluded trilateral field activities for at least six months, and that another trilateral operation would be proposed when work in southern Laos was planned. The Vietnamese accepted the general proposal for the 29th JFA, but stated a need to continue working with the US to resolve the overflight payment issue. They also pointed out that the two countries had just completed a two-year plan and emphasized the need for a senior policy level meeting to assess POW/MIA accomplishments and to determine the work plan for the next two years. Following this meeting, USCINCPAC prepared a long-range plan for POW/MIA operations in Vietnam that extended through the end of 1995.<sup>140</sup>

(U) Held in Hanoi on 31 May 1994, the third technical talks of the year followed the same format as previous sessions. It was the last technical meeting in which the US side was led by MG Needham. After assessing progress on the four measures, summarizing the last JFA, and outlining the next two field activities, MG Needham proposed placing notices in veteran's magazines asking for information about missing Americans. He also discussed payment of overflight charges for military aircraft, and informed the Vietnamese side the US government was attempting to resolve the issue and would work through Ambassador Le Bang in New York. The Vietnamese agreed with the proposed plan for the 30th JFA, but said they preferred to await the outcome of an upcoming visit by the US Presidential Delegation, the future of JTF-FA, and receipt of a long-range plan before committing to dates for the next two JFAs.<sup>141</sup>

(U) The next round of regularly scheduled technical talks were held in Hanoi on 27 July 1994. BG Viale led the US side for the first time. He assessed progress on the four measures of MIA accounting, requested renewed Vietnamese support for the oral history program, summarized the results of the 30th JFA and presented the plans for the 31st. CJTF-FA also underscored the desirability of the VNOSMP periodically reporting on the status

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of their unilateral activities, especially regarding archival research, and raised again the proposal to get the Veterans Association of Vietnam to help seek information about unaccounted for Americans. The Vietnamese accepted the proposals for dates and locations for the 31st JFA, and voiced their long-standing concern about repetitious interviews of witnesses. They viewed repeat interviews which failed to add new information as an inefficient, misdirected effort which at times placed the VNOSMP in an awkward position with local people or other branches of government. They also sought US understanding for the difficulty of interviewing busy flag officers and other high ranking individuals in sensitive positions who possessed little direct knowledge about US casualties. A related theme developed during this conference was how to balance our desire for more evidence of Vietnamese unilateral efforts with our need for independent confirmation of Vietnamese assertions about their efforts. In order to make significant progress in full accounting, the US government had to consider adopting a consistent policy about accepting results of unilateral activity provided by the Vietnamese, especially considering that the Presidential delegation had urged them to press forward with unilateral activity. For that to succeed, the US would have to accept in good faith Vietnamese assessments regarding documents, remains, witnesses, and live sighting reports.<sup>142</sup>

(U) The fifth technical meeting was held in Hanoi on 28 September 1994, and followed the usual format. After reviewing status of the four key measures of progress, summarizing the results of the 31st JFA, and presenting his proposal for the next field activity, CJTF-FA discussed other technical level issues, including issues related to the planned under-water recovery of two cases off the coast of Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province. He also repeated the Lao proposal to hold a policy-level meeting to discuss using Vietnamese witnesses during investigations in Laos, and proposed a tentative date of 1 December for the meeting. The Vietnamese expressed concern for

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the number of cases assigned to each investigative element, and recommended that no more than 10 provinces per IE.<sup>143</sup>

(U) The final technical talks of the year were held in Hanoi on 30 November 1994. CJTF-FA reviewed the status of the four key measures of progress, summarized the 32nd JFA, and presented proposals for the next field activity. He also discussed a proposal for an at-sea evaluation of sites associated with two cases off the coast near Vung Tau, and a plan for Vietnamese witnesses to help investigate a case in Cambodia. BG Viale again expressed the US government's strong desire to use satellite communications, reiterated the offer to present a practical demonstration upon request, and asked if there was anything else that could be done or provided to facilitate their decision. The other side reported that a new unilateral research team had been established within the Defense Ministry comprised of the SRV's most experienced researchers, but did not comment on most other issues.<sup>144</sup>

### Joint Field Activities, 1993 (U)

(U) The 21st Joint Field Activity (JFA) in the SRV was conducted 2-18 January 1993, with a total of 65 US personnel deployed. The Investigation and Recovery Team (IRT) included six investigation elements and one recovery element, and worked with their Vietnamese counterparts. The IRT arrived at Noi Bai and Da Nang airports via two C-130 sorties, and the elements traveled directly to their areas of operation (AO). During the JFA, the initial investigations of the 135 priority focus cases were completed—the investigation elements (IEs) conducted investigations of 42 cases—and the recovery element (RE) excavated and closed one site. STONY BEACH live sighting investigators (LSI) conducted eight live sighting investigations during the JFA, and one walk-in interview was conducted by Det 2 in Hanoi.<sup>145</sup>

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- (U) Investigation Element One (IE1) conducted joint investigations in Nihn Linh, Gio Linh, Trieu Phong, and Cam Lo Districts, Quang Tri Province. They investigated five priority focus cases and four geographic proximity cases, recovered remains associated with two of the later, and received from local citizens another four remains.

- (U) IE2 conducted joint investigations in Huong Boa District, Quang Tri Province, including three priority focus cases and five geographic proximity cases. They also surveyed the area formerly occupied by the Lao Bao prison facility and visited the Quang Tri Province Museum in Dong Ha. No remains were recovered.

- (U) Joint investigations in five districts in two provinces, Quang Nam-Da Nang and Thua Thien-Hue, were conducted by IE3. Four priority cases and four geographic proximity cases were investigated, and the element recovered identification media associated with three unaccounted for individuals and possibly seven sets of remains.

- (U) IE4 was assigned to work in two districts and one township in Kontum Province, and investigated three priority focus and four geographic proximity cases. Neither remains nor ID media were recovered.

- (U) Gai Lai Province in south-central Vietnam was the AO for IE5, which investigated five priority focus and two geographic proximity cases. The element received three sets of remains and ID media associated with two of them.

- (U) The Det 2 IE investigated one priority focus case in Tay Ninh Province, but failed to recover remains.

- (U) RE1 conducted a recovery operation in Son La Province, northern Vietnam. They completed the excavation of one case site and attempted to conduct a site survey of another site in Van Chan District, Yen Bar Province. Inclement weather and lack of viable ground transportation precluded their reaching the site. The element did not recover or receive any remains.

- (U) A USCINCPAC malaria survey team traveled with members of the Ministry of Public Health throughout Vietnam

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gathering information and data relative to the malaria problem in the country.

(U) Conducted in the SRV from 25 February to 23 March 1993, the 22nd JFA was composed of 71 US personnel organized into an IRT with four IEs and three REs. The IRT arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airport on 25 February and Da Nang Airport on the 26th via three C-130 sorties from Bangkok, and the team's elements traveled directly to their respective AOs. The investigation elements conducted investigations of 50 cases—11 priority focus and 45 geographic proximity cases, while the REs excavated and closed six sites and a seventh site was excavated and closed by CILHI representatives during the JFA. Two walk-in interviews were conducted at Det 2; CJTF-FA's special assistant conducted oral history interviews of selected Vietnamese citizens in the HCMC area; and a Det 2 representative accompanied a VNOSMP staff member to HCMC to follow-up on reports of remains allegedly in the custody of private citizens.<sup>146</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted joint investigations in three districts of Kontum Province. They investigated 11 secondary and three geographic proximity cases, surveyed six crash sites and two burial sites, and one last-known location, and conducted a six-day excavation of a burial site connected with one case. One small bone fragment was recovered, and another piece of bone was handed over by local hunters.

- (U) Operating in Dac Lac and Gia Lai Provinces, IE2 investigated five priority cases and ten geographic proximity cases. No remains or ID media were recovered. Two proximity cases could not be investigated because of their propinquity to the Cambodian border, and a third due to the complete lack of witnesses and site information.

- (U) In six districts in Song Be Province and one within Dong Nai, IE3 investigated five priority and seven proximity cases, but recovered no remains during the JFA.

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- (U) IE4 conducted joint investigations in nine districts with four provinces: Tra Vinh, Tien Giang, Dong Thap, and Vinh Long. They were responsible for one priority focus case and 13 geographic proximity cases, but recovered no ID media or remains.

- (U) RE1 excavated one priority focus site in A Luoi District, Thua Thien-Hue Province, and recovered a portion of mandibular denture with five teeth and one piece of associated ID medium. An attempt to conduct a site survey of another case was foiled by inclement weather. The element also received one almost complete and one partial set of remains and one partial set.

- (U) RE2 conducted recovery operations at two sites in Phu Yen Province in southern Vietnam, and performed an aerial survey of a third site in Dac Lac Province. Considerable human remains, material evidence, and associated aircraft wreckage was recovered from both excavated sites.

- (U) Song Be Province in southern Vietnam was the AO for RE 3. Two case sites were excavated, one yielding a single piece of human bone and a few small pieces of boot and military clothing. From the second, however, human remains, personal effects, and material evidence was recovered. The element was accompanied at the second dig by the son of one of the aircraft crew members. RE3 also conducted forensic examinations of two sets of remains from burial plots, both determined to be Southeast Asian by the team anthropologist.

(U) The 23rd JFA was conducted in the SRV from 22 April to 24 May 1993. The IRT included 69 US personnel organized into four IEs and three REs, and worked with Vietnamese counterparts. Arrival at Da Nang Airport via three C-130 sorties from Bangkok took place on 22 and 23 April. As usual, the elements deployed directly to their operational areas. The investigation elements conducted investigations of 102 cases during the JFA: 5 priority and 92 geographic proximity cases, plus 5 resolved cases. The REs excavated and closed five sites, and a portion of a sixth was excavated and closed. In addition, two walk-in interviews were

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conducted. SRV preparation for and cooperation during the JFA were encouraging.<sup>147</sup>

- (U) Investigation Element One conducted joint investigations in five districts in Quang Binh Province, investigating one priority focus case, 24 geographic proximity cases, and the five resolved cases. They also visited 13 crash/burial sites, and received ID media for one unaccounted for individual. No human remains were recovered, but a profusion of corroborative testimony from witnesses in three of the five districts indicated that a government-directed exhumation of US remains took place during the late 1970s.

- (U) Working in five districts of Thua Thien-Hue Province, IE2 investigated 34 geographic proximity cases, during which they interviewed 51 witnesses. Site surveys were conducted at all sites, and personal effects and partial remains believed to be from an aircraft crash site in Hue City were collected.

- (U) IE3 conducted joint investigations in nine districts within Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, including three priority and 15 geographic proximity cases. The element received identification media associated with eight unaccounted for individuals and remains possibly associated with three other cases.

- (U) In Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces, IE4 investigated one priority case and 19 geographic proximity cases. They surveyed seven crash sites, six burial sites, and five last-known locations. Two burial sites were excavated, and a set of remains was recovered from one. The team, along with the CILHI anthropologist, also examined 16 sets of remains turned in to province officials, and selected two for joint forensic review.

- (U) RE1 conducted a joint recovery operation in Le Thuy District, Quang Binh Province, in central Vietnam. One site was excavated and two others were visited. The excavation site yielded nine unidentified small bone fragments and crash debris, and local witnesses turned in six bone fragments possibly correlated to the case.

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- (U) RE2 worked in Quang Tri Province, excavating three case sites. A possible human bone fragment was recovered from the first dig, the location of the former Lang Vei Special Forces camp. Human remains including six teeth, three ID tags associated with two unaccounted for individuals, material evidence, and aircraft wreckage were recovered from the second site. A small piece of unidentifiable human bone and an abundance of flight suit and life support equipment were recovered from the third excavation site.

(U) JTF-FA elements conducted the 24th JFA in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien-Hue, and Quang Nam-Da Nang Provinces, Vietnam, from 24 June to 20 July 1993. The IRT included 72 personnel organized into four IEs and three REs, and arrived at Da Nang and Noi Boi airports on 24 and 25 June on 3 C-130 sorties. During the JFA, a total of 117 cases were investigated, five were excavated, one partially excavated, and five surveyed. Joint efforts led to recovery of remains at sites associated with five cases, and remains were received which may be associated with another nine cases.<sup>148</sup>

- (U) IE1 operated in Nghe An Province, investigating one priority case and 28 other cases. They received remains possibly associated with four cases from witnesses, but none were recovered from crash or burial sites by the team. Test pits were dug during investigation of two cases, but no remains were found and the pits were closed. IE1 recommended three cases be reinvestigated and another four be excavated.

- (U) In Ha Tinh Province, IE2 investigated 19 cases and received information and material evidence on an uncorrelated crash site. They recommended three cases for reinvestigation and two for excavation. From a witness, the team received remains associated with one case, and, from another witness, ID media correlating to an unaccounted for individual in another case.

- (U) IE3 conducted investigations of seven priority cases and 32 other cases in Quang Tri Province, and recommended

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six for reinvestigation and one for excavation. Partial remains were collected for two cases, and ID media associated with a case was turned over to the team by a witness.

- (U) The fourth investigation element, IE4, worked in both Thua Thien-Hue and Quang Ham-Da Nang Provinces. They investigated three priority and 27 other cases, recommending seven for reinvestigation and three for excavation. One site was excavated and closed with no remains or personal effects found. The team received from witnesses ID media associated with two cases and remains possibly associated with three others.

- (U) RE1 conducted one excavation and two surveys in Ha Tinh Province, and assisted IE1 in Nghe An at one crash site. The team recovered remains, material evidence, and aircraft wreckage from a crash crater associated with the loss of an A-4E. One of the surveyed sites was recommended for excavation during the dry season.

- (U) In Quang Binh Province, RE2 conducted two excavations and one survey. Excavation of an F-4C crash site associated with a priority case yielded aircraft wreckage and life support equipment, which indicated at least one crew member was aboard the aircraft when it crashed, but no human remains were found. At the second excavation, also an F-4C crash site, a human tooth, life support equipment, and aircraft wreckage was recovered. Discrepancies between RE2's observations and the survey conducted during the 18th JFA and absence of witnesses precluded excavation of the third site.

- (U) Also in Quang Binh, RE3 conducted two excavations, one partial recovery, and two surveys. Items recovered from the first excavation included an apparent dental backing without teeth, material evidence, and wreckage. The second excavation site was at the base of a sheer rock face (karsk) where the aircraft had impacted about 150 meters up the face. No remains were found, but material evidence indicating at least one crew-member was aboard at time of impact was recovered, along with aircraft wreckage. The partial recovery resulted in finding

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personal flying equipment but no remains. The two surveys resulted in recommendations for reinvestigation and excavation.

(U) The fifth JFA of the year, the 25th, was conducted from 19 August to 20 September 1993. The IRT consisted of 71 US personnel comprising four IEs and three REs, arrived at Da Nang airport on 19 and 20 August via three C-130 sorties. This ambitious IRT conducted a total of 176 investigations, eight excavations, and three site surveys. Of the cases investigated, 26 were recommended for reinvestigation and 13 for excavation. One member of an RE was bit by a poisonous snake and was transported by ground, helicopter, and fixed wing aircraft from a field excavation site to Bangkok in 8.5 hours. Cooperation, flexibility, and case preparation continued to improve and enhance the success of this JFA, and the large number of cases investigated were the result.<sup>149</sup>

- (U) IE1 investigated 41 cases in Quang Binh Province, and of those six were recommended for reinvestigation and five for excavation. One bone fragment and portions of personal equipment were recovered from a crash site of an O-2, remains possibly associated with four other cases and ID media associated with two cases were received from witnesses.

- (U) In Quang Tri Province, IE2 investigated 54 cases and excavated one burial site. Five of those were recommended for reinvestigation and two for excavation. Remains associated with the ground loss of two individuals defending an artillery fire support base were recovered, and remains possibly associated with two other cases were received from witnesses. ID media associated with another case was also received by IE2.

- (U) A total of 50 cases were investigated by IE3 in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province during the JFA, and the team recommended seven for reinvestigation and another six for excavation. One burial site associated with the loss of a Marine lost in the crash of an H-34 was excavated and remains were

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recovered. The team also received remains possibly associated with three unknown cases.

- (U) IE4 investigated 31 cases in Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau Provinces, and recommended eight for reinvestigation. No remains were recovered by the team, but remains possibly associated with three cases were received from witnesses, as well as ID media associated with four more cases. They also received seven sets of remains allegedly associated with unaccounted for Americans from a suspected remains trader in Khanh Hoa Province.

- (U) RE1 conducted three excavations, including one priority case, and three surveys within Quang Binh Province. Excavation of the priority case yielded remains, material evidence, and aircraft wreckage. Two small portions of human tibia were recovered from one of the other excavations, and material evidence, life support equipment, and aircraft wreckage was recovered from both. One survey was interrupted by violent threats and a subsequent attack by a local villager—work was resumed after assurances by the VNOSMP that no further acts of violence would occur.

- (U) RE2 excavated two impact sites associated with the loss of an AC-130A in Thua Thien-Hue Province. Human remains, material evidence, and ID media was recovered from both sites and observed in the nearby village.

- (U) In Quang Ngai Province, RE3 conducted four excavations, including two priority cases. No remains or material evidence were recovered from either priority case site, but human remains, personal effects, life support equipment, and aircraft wreckage was recovered from one of the other two excavations.

(U) The 26th JFA, sixth and final JFA of the year, was conducted from 21 October to 16 November 1993. The IRT included 73 personnel organized into four IEs and three REs. Following normal practice, the team arrived at Noi Boi and Tan Son Nhut airports via three C-130 sorties on 20 and 21 October, and

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elements traveled directly to their areas of operation. A total of three priority cases and 112 other cases were investigated, five excavations were conducted, and one site survey was completed. Of the 115 cases investigated, 20 were recommended for reinvestigation and 12 for excavation. As with the previous JFAs, SRV cooperation was excellent.<sup>150</sup>

- (U) RE1 conducted investigations in 22 districts in five different provinces, and investigated one priority case and 27 cases. The team recommended four for reinvestigation, three for excavation. Remains possibly associated with the loss of an A-6A in Hai Phong Province were received from a village chairman.

- (U) Operating in 15 districts in Thanh Hoa, Son La, and Vinh Phu Provinces, IE2 investigated 32 cases and recommended seven for reinvestigation and four for excavation. The team also conducted an excavation of a burial site and recovered remains possibly associated with the loss of an F-4B. Remains possibly associated with another case were received from witnesses.

- (U) IE3 investigated two priority cases and 23 cases in Dong Nai, Song Be, and Tay Ninh Provinces, and excavated two burial sites. Three cases were recommended for reinvestigation, four for excavation. ID media associated with one unaccounted for individual lost in the crash of a UH-1H in a river was received, along with possibly associated remains and an aircraft data plate.

- (U) During the JFA, IE4 conducted investigations in the Ho Chi Minh City area and adjacent provinces. A total of 30 cases were investigated, with six recommended for reinvestigation and one for excavation. IE4 received remains from a public security official in Long An Province possibly associated with the loss of an A-1E.

- (U) RE1 excavated one aircraft crash site in Lai Chau Province which involved the loss of a C-130E with 11 crew members. The site was in an isolated and mountainous area at an elevation of 1,457 meters, a 2½-hour-trek from the closest helicopter landing zone. The team established a base camp an

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hour's hike from the crash site, which as a 40-45° rocky slope with steeper rock faces above and below the impact site. A total of 17 separate excavation sites were defined, and no attempt was made to establish a site grid. The excavation resulted in the recovery of human remains, personal effects, and associated pieces of wreckage, including 187 pieces of human bone and 16 teeth. Considerable life support equipment was recovered, including elements from at least seven personal parachutes. The excavation took 17 days, from 24 October to 8 November 1993.

- (U) In Vinh Phu and Tuyen Quang Provinces, RE2 excavated one priority case and two cases, but no remains or material evidence was recovered. Local villagers from Van Luong turned over wreckage from an F-4E, life support equipment, and skeletal fragments allegedly from the crash site to the team.

- (U) RE3 conducted one excavation in Song Be Province and a survey in Tay Ninh Province. No remains or other material was recovered.

(U) A seventh JFA was conducted in the SRV and Laos, under the designation Trilateral JFA in Vietnam and JFA 94-2L in Laos. It ran from 8 to 20 December, and the Vietnamese portion was held in Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue Provinces. IE1 consisted of 10 Americans who arrived at Da Nang Airport on 3 December via C-130 and deployed directly to their operational area by a Service Flight Corporation of Vietnam Mi-8 helicopter. The SRV portion of the JFA encompassed 12 cases and one Lao priority case, and of those five were recommended for reinvestigation and two for excavation. Severe weather hampered operations, and prevented investigation of some cases. Remains possibly associated with one case were received by the team. As a result of the trilateral effort, two cases listed under Laos were discovered to be in Vietnam, and another three which the Lao thought were in Vietnam were confirmed to be in Laos.<sup>151</sup>

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### Joint Field Activities, 1994(U)

(U) First JFA of the year, the 27th in the series, was conducted from 6 to 28 January 1994. The IRT included 84 US personnel organized into four IEs and four REs. The fourth recovery element increased the number of teams to eight, the largest number of teams and personnel ever deployed to the SRV. They arrived at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut airports on 6 and 8 January via three C-130 sorties, and traveled directly to their areas of operation via helicopter or ground transportation. The JFA encompassed a total of 100 cases, including two priority investigations, 83 investigation, one investigation of a Lao case, 12 excavations, and two site surveys. Of the 86 investigations, 23 were recommended for reinvestigation and three for excavation. Remains were recovered at sites associated with five cases, and additional remains which may be associated with another four cases were received. Uncorrelated remains were received on six occasions, some of which were determined by team anthropologists to be Mongoloid. The team received excellent cooperation from the Vietnamese, and noted their detailed preparation and ability to anticipate was at a new, higher level. Three Mi-8 helicopters were needed to support the eight teams over the vast distances involved. Two cases of chicken-pox were contacted by IRT members, who were evacuated to Bangkok.<sup>152</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted operations in 14 districts within Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Quang Tri Provinces, investigating 24 cases plus the single Lao case. They recommend 11 for reinvestigation and one for excavation. The team also excavated and recovered remains from a burial site associated with the loss of 6 individuals aboard a UH-1H helicopter, and received additional possibly associated remains.

- (U) Working in four districts in Thua Thien-Hue Province and nine in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, IE2 investigated one priority case and 22 cases. The team recommended nine cases for reinvestigation. During the investigations of the priority

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case and one other case, isolated burial sites were located and excavated with no results, and remains possibly associated with one case were received.

- (U) IE3 conducted joint field investigations of 20 cases in four districts and one township in Kontum Province, and recommended two cases for reinvestigation. Remains and ID Media possibly associated with a Cambodia case were received.

- (U) In eight districts in Gia Lai, Dac Lac, and Lam Dong Provinces, IE4 investigated one priority case and 17 cases. Of those, one case was recommended for reinvestigation and two for excavation. The team conducted an excavation of a burial site associated with the loss of a B-57B shot down by ground fire in March 1965, and recovered 21 teeth, two arm bones, a parachute harness, a flight helmet, and two boot soles. Remains and ID media possibly associated with another case were received.

- (U) RE1 excavated one priority case and surveyed two other cases in Quang Nhai Province, both of which were recommended for excavation. The excavated priority case involved the loss of three people on a long-range reconnaissance patrol in May 1967. Portions of all major long bones for each of three individuals were recovered, along with portions of crania, humerii, foot bone fragments, and other pieces, including 86 teeth.

- (U) RE2 conducted three excavations of cases in Gia Lai Province and Da Nang City, but failed to recover any remains.

- (U) In Binh Dinh, Quang Nam-Da Nang, and Dac Lac Provinces, RE3 excavated two priority cases and two cases without recovering any material evidence or human remains.

- (U) RE4 conducted four excavations in Tay Nihn and Dong Nai Provinces and Ho Chi Minh Municipality, including one priority case and three cases. At all four sites, no human remains, personal effects, or personal equipment were found, and no evidence associated with the death of any unaccounted for Americans was recovered.

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(U) The 28th Joint Field Activity was conducted in the SRV from 26 February to 22 March 1994. The IRT included 84 US personnel organized into three investigative and five recovery elements. The addition of the fifth RE represented the largest excavation effort in Vietnam to date. The team arrived at Noi Boi and Tan Son Nhut airports on 26 February via four C-130 sorties. This JFA encompassed a total of 80 cases, including 64 investigations, 15 excavations, and one site survey. Of those cases investigated, 14 were recommended for reinvestigation and four for excavation. The REs excavated all 15 sites, including one priority case and one Lao priority case, and IE1 also conducted an excavation. Remains were recovered at sites associated with six cases and the Lao priority case, and remains were received possibly associated with another seven cases. In addition, uncorrelated remains were received on eight occasions. Helicopter support provided by the Vietnamese included three, and for a short time, four, Mi-8s.<sup>153</sup>

- (U) IE1 investigated 23 cases in 19 districts in Lai Chau, Son La, Tuyen Quang, Bac Thai, Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Hai Hung, and Cao Bang Provinces. Two cases were recommended for reinvestigation. The team received remains possibly associated with two cases—the loss of an F-105D in Dien Bien Phu in March 1966 and the radar scope loss of an A-6A in Hai Hung in September 1972—and media data for a third case.

- (U) A total of 18 cases were investigated by IE2 in ten districts in Khanh Hoa, Song Be, Ninh Thuan, Tay Ninh, Dong Nai, Binh Thuan, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau Provinces. Seven cases were recommended for reinvestigation and two for excavation. The team also conducted the excavation of a burial site associated with the April 1969 loss of an O-1G in Ninh Thuan Province with negative results. Remains possibly associated with four cases were received.

- (U) In An Giang, Can Tho, Kien Giang, Long An, Minh Hai, and Soc Trang Provinces and the municipality of Ho Chi Minh City, IE3 investigated 23 cases in 18 districts, recommending

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five for reinvestigation and two for excavation. The team received remains possibly associated with the March 1969 loss of an F-4D in Quang Tri, and uncorrelated remains from three separate individuals in HCMC.

- (U) RE1 conducted four excavations, one each in Son La, Bac Thai, Nam Ha, and Yen Bai Provinces. Excavation of the site in Son La proved fruitless, but the Bac Thai site yielded material evidence that indicated the site correlated to an F-105 crash and that the pilot was in the aircraft at impact, but no human remains were found. Numerous human bones, 16 teeth, and bone fragments and material evidence was recovered from the Nam Ha site of the loss of an SH-3A. The fourth excavation, in Yen Bai Province, failed to reveal any human remains or material evidence, but material evidence found during surface search correlated to an F-4 aircraft.

- (U) In Thanh Hoa Province, RE2 conducted four excavations, including a Lao priority case. Human remains were recovered from two sites

- (U) RE3 conducted two excavations in Nghe An Province, and recovered remains from both. The two cases involved the September 1965 loss of an F-4C and the February 1966 loss of an A-4C.

- (U) In Song Be, RE4 excavated one priority case and one case. Inconclusive material evidence (four pieces of a poncho) was recovered from the priority case site. Two small portions of human remains were recovered from the crash site of an RF-4C lost in June 1970, but work on the site had to be discontinued when the VNOSMP disapproved a request for extension beyond the dates of the JFA.

- (U) RE5 conducted three excavations and one survey in Minh Hai, Kien Giang, and Song Be Provinces. No human remains or material evidence was recovered from the three excavation sites, but the survey of the crash site of an F-4C lost in August 1966 in Song Be turned up aircraft wreckage and life support equipment. The site was recommended for excavation.

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(U) JTF-FA elements conducted the 29th JFA from 21 April to 24 May 1994. The IRT included 92 US personnel organized into three investigative and five recovery elements, and arrived at Noi Bai and Tan Son Nhut airports on three C-130 sorties on 21 and 22 April. The JFA encompassed a total of 81 cases, which included 14 excavations and a single site survey. Two excavations could not be completed and were rescheduled for a later date, and in addition to the scheduled excavations, a total of five burial sites were excavated by IEs. Of the 66 cases investigated, 16 were recommended for reinvestigation and 8 for excavation. Three of the investigations were B-52 cases in the greater Hanoi area which were conducted concurrently by Det 2. Remains were recovered from sites associated with 19 cases, remains were received possibly associated with 3 cases, and uncorrelated remains were received on three occasions. Helicopter support was provided by three Mi-8s, which flew 53 missions during the JFA. Two team members were medically evacuated to Bangkok, a snake bite victim and one suspected malaria case. Two breaches of discipline were reported during the JFA. One was the loss of personal funds on 23 May by one individual in Nghe An Province, while the other involved two individuals who violated the standards of conduct policy on 1 May in Quang Tri. One incident involving the collapse of a bridge occurred on 4 May in Quang Nam-Danang Province. A large number of Vietnamese observing the helicopter departure from a village fell into a river when the bridge gave way, injuring 49 people.<sup>154</sup>

• (U) IE1 investigated one priority case and 20 cases in 10 provinces. Nine cases were recommended for reinvestigation, and two for excavation. Cases related to the loss of three B-52s on 19, 20, and 22 December 1972 in the greater Hanoi area were investigated over a four-month period by Det 2, and were reported under the JFA for administrative purposes. IE1 excavated three burial sites, and recovered remains possibly

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associated with cases from all three, and received remains possibly associated with one of the cases from witnesses.

- (U) Working in Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien-Hue Provinces, IE2 investigated 26 cases and three Lao cases. They recommended six cases for reinvestigation and three for excavation. During one case investigation, the team discovered an isolated burial site which was excavated by RE3. IE2 did not recover or receive remains during the JFA.

- (U) In Quang Nam-Danang and Kontum Provinces, IE3 investigated 15 cases and one Cambodian case, and recommended one for reinvestigation and three for excavation. Two burial sites were excavated, and recovered remains possibly associated with the October 1963 loss of a T-28B in Danang City. They recovered remains possibly associated with three other cases, received remains that might be associated with one case, and were given three sets of uncorrelated remains and ID media.

- (U) RE1 excavated two crash sites, one each in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. In Ha Tinh, the site of the loss of an A-1H in March 1966 yielded fragmented human bones, ID media, and numerous pieces of material evidence and aircraft wreckage. The Quang Binh case involved the March 1967 loss of an F-105D, consisted of two project areas, one at the base and the second at the topside of a karst. Wreckage recovered from both areas correlated to an F-4 aircraft, and material evidence recovered suggested that two individuals were on board the aircraft at time of impact. Excavation of the topside area was not attempted during the JFA.

- (U) In Quang Binh Province, RE2 excavated two crash sites and conducted one survey. Four teeth and small amounts of personal effects were recovered from the crash site of an F-4C lost in October 1966. Excavation of the second site involving the September 1968 loss of an F-4B yielded five human bone fragments and small amounts of personal effects and material evidence, but the excavation was not completed and the site left open for further excavation. A detailed survey was conducted of

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the crash site of an O-2A in June 1968, but only small amounts of aircraft wreckage was located.

- (U) RE3 conducted three excavations during the JFA, all in Quang Tri. Approximately 69 bone fragments, life support equipment, and aircraft wreckage was recovered from the crash site of an F-4J in April 1972. Excavation of a burial site associated with the January 1968 loss of an O-1D resulted in recovery of over 25 bone fragments, one tooth, and two military style buttons, while a witness turned over 70 human bone fragments and five teeth to the team. The third excavation involved the April 1972 loss of an HH-53C lost with six crewmen. A total of approximately 255 human skeletal fragments and four teeth were recovered.

- (U) RE4 completed three excavations in Quang Tri and a fourth uncorrelated A-4 case in Hai Hung Province, and recovered remains from two. One concerned the loss of five US soldiers unaccounted for after the battle for the Lang Vei Special Forces camp in February 1968, and involved the excavation of 5,000 square meters to culturally sterile soil. Only one portion of human cranium was located during a ground search, while the excavation yielded nothing. The second was the loss of a C-123K in March 1968, and numerous skeletal remains, personal effects, and five teeth were recovered but material evidence recovered was insufficient to determine the type of aircraft.

- (U) Three excavations were conducted by RE5 in Thua Thien-Hue Province. Remains and material evidence was recovered from two crash sites, one of a CH-46A in August 1967, the second of an OH-6A in February 1971.

(U) With the 30th JFA, conducted from 23 June to 19 July 1994, JTF-FA changed their reporting procedures and eliminated much of the detail from their summary reports. The 30th JFA investigative and recovery team included 102 personnel, the largest to date, organized into three IEs and five REs. They arrived in Vietnam via two C-130 sorties and one civilian airline flight, and subsequently deployed to 25 provinces. They

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investigated 45 of 46 scheduled cases, and recommended 20 for reinvestigation and one for excavation. One case could not be investigated because of weather and landing zone difficulties. Only 12 of 23 scheduled excavations were completed by the REs, and one required further work. A total of 6,378 human remains were recovered, including 182 unilaterally turned over to the elements.<sup>155</sup>

(U) (U) The 31st JFA was conducted from 18 August to 20 September 1994. The IRT consisted of 84 US personnel organized into three IEs and five REs. On 18 August, five teams deployed to Danang on two C-130 sorties and one team flew into Tan Son Nhut via civilian airliner, and on the following day two teams deployed to Hanoi on one C-130. After arrival, the teams deployed to a total of 20 provinces. A total of 17 investigations and 28 excavations were scheduled, while 19 and 13 were conducted, respectively. Of those cases investigated, seven were recommended for reinvestigation and four for excavation, and one excavation required further work. The teams recovered 397 human remains, and another 284 remains were unilaterally turned over to them. Operations were hampered by two typhoons which hit central and northern Vietnam during the JFA, as adverse weather slowed many of the excavations and precluded or delayed many scheduled helicopter flights to various sites. Daily showers and thunderstorms were a daily occurrence at many locations. Noteworthy during this JFA was the recovery of remains believed to be associated with a missing serviceman who died during captivity. A former POW and returnee had identified the burial site of one of his fellow POWs in January 1994, and excavation of the site yielded an almost complete skeleton, including ten teeth with restorations.<sup>156</sup>

(U) The sixth and final JFA of the year was the 32nd, conducted from 15 October through 15 November 1994. The IRT consisted of 86 US personnel organized into two investigative and six recovery elements, the largest number of recovery elements on

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a single JFA to date. Team deployment to Vietnam was on 15 October, with four teams deployed to HCMC via two C-130 sorties; three teams to Hanoi on one C-130 sortie; and a single team to Danang on one C-130. After arrival, the teams deployed to a total of 23 provinces. Of 45 investigations scheduled, IE1 conducted 19, including one priority case and one other country case, while IE2 conducted 12, including 4 priority cases. The IEs also conducted three excavations. Of those cases investigated, 14 were recommended for reinvestigation and one for excavation. The recovery elements conducted 12 excavations of 20 scheduled, recovered 1,308 human remains, and received one from a unilateral turn-over. Investigations continued to be more and more difficult, and several took several days to complete. Recoveries likewise were more difficult and time consuming, and several REs closed their sites with not enough time to begin a long excavation and too much time to be unoccupied. During the JFA, deteriorating weather caused a helicopter to shut down at a recovery site landing zone (LZ) to await a break in the weather the next morning, and did not return to its expected airfield until almost 20 hours after its expected time of return. There was no radio communication with either the helicopter or the US personnel at the site, which caused grave concern at all levels. For the second consecutive JFA, a significant number of remains of a graves registry special remains case were recovered.<sup>157</sup>

### Repatriation of Remains from Hanoi, 1993-1994(U)

(U) The VNOSMP released remains to Det 2 in Hanoi on six occasions during 1993. In all cases, the remains were turned over to a joint JTF-FA/CILHI detachment at Noi Bai Airport, Hanoi, and flown to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, aboard a C-141 aircraft with an overnight stay enroute at Andersen AFB, Guam. Upon arrival in Hawaii, appropriate ceremonies were conducted following which the remains were transported to CILHI for further processing. Remains were turned over in Vietnam on 8 February, 7 April, 8 June, 4 August, 5 October, and 13 December 1993, and

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arrived in Hawaii one day later. The April return included remains recovered from three sites in Laos.<sup>158</sup>

(U) The VNOSMP released remains possibly those of Americans killed in the Vietnam War to Det 2 in Hanoi on six occasions during 1994. Dates of turnover of remains in Vietnam were 7 February, 12 April, 7 June, 2 August, 5 October, and 29 November 1994. Arrival dates at Hickam AFB in each instance were one day later.<sup>159</sup>

### Identification of Remains, 1993-1994(U)

(U) Remains repatriated from SEA were received by CILHI at Hickam AFB, where they were thoroughly examined. During 1993, USCINCPAC announced the identification of 25 individuals, as follows:<sup>160</sup>

- (U) 27 January: LT Ralph E. Foulks, Jr., USN, lost on 5 January 1968 when his A-4E was downed over North Vietnam, and 1st Lt Douglas C. Condit, USAF, pilot of an F-4C lost over North Vietnam on 26 November 1967. A third identification of a US civilian was also announced in January, that of newsman Welles Hangen, lost in Cambodia on 31 May 1970.

- (U) 17 February: Capt John R. Burns, USAF, pilot of an A-1E shot down over Houaphan Province, Laos, on 4 August 1966. His name was withheld from the announcement at the request of his family.

- (U) 20 May: PFC Raphael L. Collazo, lost in ground incident on 17 March 1968, in Tian Giang Province, Vietnam.

- (U) 7 June: The remains of four Marines lost on 30 July 1967 in Quang Tri Province when their CH-46 aircraft crashed during an approach to a landing zone. Their names were: Capt David A. Frederick, USMC; 1stLt Craig H. Waterman, USMC; LCpl Earnest R. Byars, USMC; and LCpl Robert L. Biscailuz, USMC. Their remains were repatriated in July 1992.

- (U) 15 June: Lt Col James A. Branch, USAF, and WO Gregory S. Crandall, USA. Lt Col Branch was the pilot of an F-4C

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aircraft lost over North Vietnam on 4 September 1965 hit by ground fire and exploded upon impact. His remains were repatriated in March 1992. Crandall was the pilot of an OH-6A aircraft hit by ground fire over Laos during a visual reconnaissance mission on 18 February 1971. His remains were repatriated in February 1991.

- (U) 13 July: Maj Wayne E. Pearson, USAF, lost on 22 February 1969, over Laos. Pearson was the pilot of an F-4D which caught fire during a pass over the target area. Although two parachutes were observed and the back-seater was rescued, contact with Maj Pearson was never established. His remains were repatriated in January 1992.

- (U) 12 August: The remains of four American servicemen were returned to their families from Hickam AFB. The names of three were withheld at the request of their families. The fourth individual was identified as Col Carl F. Karst, USAF, whose O-1F aircraft was lost in November 1968 over South Vietnam during a visual reconnaissance mission. His remains were repatriated in June 1989.

- (U) 17 December: The remains of nine US Navy personnel lost in Savannakhet Province, Laos, on 17 February 1968 when their OP-2E aircraft was struck by small arms fire, burst into flames, and crashed into the side of a hill. Their remains were repatriated in April 1993 as a result of joint US-Lao search efforts during JFAs 92-5L, 93-1L, and 93-2L. Names of eight crewmen were released, but the ninth was withheld in deference to family wishes: LT James S. Kravitz; LT Curtis F. Thurman; ENS James C. Wonn; PO3 Frank A. Dawson; PO2 Clayborn W. Ashby, Jr.; PO2 Chester L. Coons; PO2 James E. Martin; and PO1 Paul N. Donato.

(U) During 1994, USCINCPAC announced the identification of 28 remains, as follows:<sup>161</sup>

- (U) 6 January: LT(JG) Barry E. Karger, USNR, who was lost when the A-4F aircraft he was piloting on a strike

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mission over North Vietnam crashed in Quang Binh Province on 14 May 1968. His remains were repatriated in June 1993.

- (U) 15 February: 1LT Byron K. Kulland, USAR, and SP5 Ronald P. Paschall, USA, and WO1 John W. Frink, USA (whose name was withheld at the request of his family), lost in Quang Tri Province when their UH-1H was hit by enemy ground fire and forced down. The remains were repatriated in February 1993. In addition, the remains of a civilian repatriated in August 1993 whose name was withheld in deference to the wishes of his family were returned.

- (U) 5 May: Cpl Terry A. Hoffman, USMC; lost on 19 August 1968, in Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. Hoffman was crew chief aboard a USMC CH-46D helicopter struck by artillery fire during a troop extraction mission. His remains were repatriated in August 1993.

- (U) 24 May: Capt William K. Cogdell, USAF; lost on 7 November 1967, in Laos. Cogdell was the pilot of a T-28 aircraft escorting a defoliation mission hit by anti-aircraft fire after being diverted to participate in a search-and-rescue mission. His remains were repatriated in February 1994.

- (U) 22 August: Capt Glenn H. N. Lee, USAF; lost on 27 May 1970 in Cambodia. Lee was back-seater in an F-4D shot down by ground fire over Mondolkiri Province while on a combat strike mission. His remains were recovered in 1993. In addition, the pilot of the aircraft was identified as Capt George R. Keller, USAF, but his name was not released in deference to family wishes.

- (U) 22 August: Maj John C. Egger, USAF; lost on 3 November 1967 in North Vietnam. Egger was the pilot of an O-2A aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire while marking a coastal target over Quang Tri Province. The aircraft crashed 500 meters offshore in the Gulf of Tonkin. His remains were returned to a JTF-FA team and repatriated in February 1994.

- (U) 22 August: CAPT Hubert B. Loheed, USN; lost on 1 February 1966 in North Vietnam. Loheed was the pilot of the lead A-4C on an armed reconnaissance mission over Nghe An

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Province shot down by ground fire while attacking barges. The remains that led to his identification were repatriated as the result of a unilateral return in 1986 and recovery operations in 1993 and 1994.

- (U) 30 September: Lt Col Richard D. Smith, USAF; lost near Pleiku on 11 March 1965. Smith was the navigator of a B-57B aircraft lost during a low-level interdiction mission near Pleiku. His remains were repatriated in 1994. In addition, the remains of CAPT Harley H. Hall, USN, lost in Vietnam on 27 January 1973, were identified and returned to his family at the same time. CAPT Hall's family requested his name not be released to the public.

- (U) 21 October: CDR Robert C. Hessom, USN; lost 5 March 1966 in North Vietnam. Hessom was the pilot of an A-1H aircraft shot down by ground fire over Ha Tinh Province while on a strike mission. His remains were repatriated in 1994.

- (U) 21 October: The remains of 12 USAF servicemen who were part of the crew of an AC-130A lost over the A Shau Valley on 18 June 1972 while on an armed reconnaissance mission. The aircraft was hit by a surface-to-air missile. Three crew members were blown clear of the aircraft by an explosion and rescued the following day, but the rest of crew was killed on impact. Their remains were repatriated in 1993. Three remains were identified individually (Maj Gerald F. Ayres; Capt Mark G. Danielson; and SMSgt Jacob E. Mercer), and the rest by group remains.

- (U) 18 November: Capt Eugene T. Meadows, USAF; lost on 13 October 1966 in North Vietnam. Meadows was the pilot of an F-4C aircraft shot down by ground fire while on an armed reconnaissance mission over Quang Binh Province. His remains were repatriated in 1994.

- (U) 12 December: CDR Edward F. Gold, USN; lost on 22 December 1965 in North Vietnam. Gold was the bombardier-navigator of an A-6A aircraft lost during an attack on the Haiphong Harbor bridge, possibly struck by a SAM. His remains


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
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were repatriated in 1994. The remains of CAPT Billy Jack Cartwright, USN, the pilot of the A-6A, were also identified but his name was not released at his family's request.

Lao People's Democratic Republic(U)



Lao Cooperation Assessed(U)



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
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
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
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


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
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Lao Cooperation Strategy(U)

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Archival Research Team Activities(U)

(U) On 6 January 1994, JTF-FA established a new ART in Vientiane. It began work at the Laos Film Archive Center, and in February gained access to the Revolutionary Museum, also in Vientiane. In November, the Lao ART conducted its first research of provincial archives in Louangphrabang Province but found no information on unaccounted for Americans. By 30 December 1994, the ART had reviewed or photographed a total of 2,004 items, of

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which 1,959 were archival films. A total of 18 correlations were noted, half pertaining to unresolved cases.<sup>165</sup>

### Consultative Meetings, 1993(U)

(U) The annual US-Lao consultative meeting for 1993 was held in Vientiane, 16 and 17 September 1993, to discuss progress on joint efforts to account for missing Americans in Laos during FY 1993, and to discuss plans for FY 1994 field activities. The US delegation was led by MG Needham, CJTF-FA, and opening remarks were made by Chargé A. I. Wilkinson. The Lao delegation was led by Mr. Done Somvorachit, MFA.<sup>166</sup>

(U) During his remarks, Mr. Done failed to mention the FY 94 work schedule. MG Needham expressed his disappointment that he had traveled from Hawaii to discuss the work schedule, and added that JTF-FA had been working for four months to coordinate the FY 94 schedule and it appeared that two weeks from the beginning of the new fiscal year, the subject was not discussed. CJTF-FA also expressed concern that since key Lao MFA leaders would depart for New York in a few days, the indication was that a response would not be forthcoming. After stressing American concern over the impact on the POW/MIA mission of building schools and the delay of two JFAs which resulted in cancellation of JFA 93-7L, he stated in direct terms that it appeared the Lao were posturing to delay JFA 94-1L.

(U) The Lao response was to deny any posturing to delay JFA 94-1L, but that the US work plan did not appear to support US policy expressed by President Clinton's request to the Vietnamese to put pressure on the Lao to solve cases along the border as a condition for better US-Vietnamese relations. Done stated the Lao were ready to investigate border cases and did not want to wait for Vietnamese pressure to force the issue. Since it was a matter of US policy that border cases were the most important, he proposed the joint team deploy to areas within 50 kilometers of

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the border and stay there until all the cases were resolved. He also suggested that the joint team go to a province and work all the cases in that province before proceeding to a new province.

(U) MG Needham countered that the US was prepared to operate anywhere the Lao government would permit, but the recent difficulty was receiving permission to go anywhere. Needham emphasized that the most successful operations in Vietnam and Cambodia were proposed by those governments since they knew their country the best, but asked for two exceptions: that sites recommended for excavation be recovered immediately to preclude being disturbed before the joint team returned, as happened with 50 percent of the cases recommended for excavation; and that operations be expanded in any way the Lao desired so the joint team could immediately excavate sites.

(U) On the second day of the meeting, the Lao agreed on several US proposals, including:

- (U) Begin JFA 94-1L in October 1993, beginning on 25 rather than 15 October.
- (U) Conduct field operations for a 30-day period.
- (U) Keep the number of US team members at 30 and the Lao team at eight.
- (U) Limit the number of cases to 20 rather than the 37 proposed.
- (U) Perform three excavations during JFA 94-1L.
- (U) Conduct the trilateral activity as agreed upon during the trilateral meetings in Hawaii.

(U) A number of items were discussed without resolution, but a compromise was reached on the start date for JFA 94-1L, which was changed to 19 October. Overall results were less than hoped for. On the one hand, the stated Lao position was to move forward with cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, but they did not agree to an expansion of the number of teams or total US team members. A narrow interpretation of the August trilateral talks

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in Hawaii and limitation of operations during JFA 94-2L to only trilateral operations along the border seemed to indicate the Lao concept of expanded cooperation was not in line with US expectations. The delay of the start of JFA 94-1L, the third consecutive JFA to be delayed, appeared to be motivated by a desire to complete construction of a school under Exercise BAKER LEADER before beginning the JFA. One helpful event came out of the talks, however, and that was the approval for MG Needham to meet with an appropriate level official in the Ministry of Defense, the first time since the stand-up of JTF-FA that he had been given an opportunity to meet with a Lao general officer.

. . . and 1994(U)

(U) Lao-US Consultative Talks were held in Vientiane 18-19 and 23 February 1994. In the summary report of the meeting, its atmosphere was characterized by the very direct exchange of views. Ambassador Tomseth opened the meeting for the US side, and Mr. Done for the Lao side. Tomseth noted that President Clinton recently expressed appreciation for the cooperation of the Lao government and people, and that over the last six months, joint US-Lao operations had been very successful. He listed several proposals from the US perspective, including the need to develop a live sighting investigation (LSI) program, increase the size of the field teams to 40 members and eliminate the restrictions on the number of Lao-American linguists who participated in the JFAs, and approval of the remainder of the fiscal 1994 JFA schedule (three JFAs).<sup>167</sup>

(U) At that point, difficulties were encountered. The Lao responded that they preferred to conduct field activities province by province, as previously indicated, but in order from the southern portion of the country, starting in Attapu Province, to the northern portion instead of conducting operations in northern Laos on the next field activity as part of a US-proposed plan to operate from north to south. The next scheduled JFA was

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94-4L, planned for Houaphan and Xiangkhoang Provinces, which included the special investigation of a high-interest case which the US side desired to conduct immediately based on a family member request to the Department of the Air Force. The Lao did not respond to repeated requests from the US side for permission to conduct the special investigation of the case, and after lengthy discussion and expression of extreme US disappointment with the last minute change in plans for JFA 94-4L, both sides agreed to defer the matter pending guidance from their respective superiors and reconvene on 23 February.

(U) The Lao did agreed to conduct three LSIs in northern Laos, to continue and consider an expansion of the archival research program, and to conduct JFA 94-5L in Savannakhet and Khammouan Provinces under a trilateral concept. They also requested better communications capability to support future JFAs, asked that the MEDCAP program be increased although they did not accept an offer for a second field MEDCAP team, and accepted US offers to build two additional schools and provide 17 on-off road motorcycles to support joint activities. They took issue with two recent news articles broadcast over the Voice of America (VOA) and the reliability of US-provided Mitsubishi PAJERO 4x4 vehicles, and stated their preference to keep the team size at 30 members.

(U) MG Needham provided the US response to the Lao comments, noting that the US Government did not control VOA, and suggested the Lao invite the press to come see for themselves the cooperation between the joint teams. Poor vehicle reliability was due to improper driver maintenance and failure to rotate the vehicles from the provinces to Vientiane for scheduled maintenance. The bulk of the second day's discussion concerned the location of JFA 94-4L, and the lack of agreement was extremely disruptive to fundamental bilateral cooperation.

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~~(c)~~ The talks reconvened on 23 February, hosted by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Soubanh Srithirath. MG Needham expressed support for the Lao proposal to proceed on a province-by-province basis, but stressed that his number one concern was Houaphan Province and the importance of two cases there. He also pointed out the problems of preparing for an operation in the south at such a late date, and stressed the need for extensive preparations that had already been made for JFA 94-4L in Houaphan. Soubanh responded that his government had some problems with the choice of area for 94-4L, as from their viewpoint JTF operations had been moving around the country in a disorderly fashion. A regular, planned progression from south to north, or north to south, would create a more favorable methodology for the Lao government and population. He stated that it would be useful for the Lao if the US could agree to start in the south and then move province-by-province towards the north, and continued that he recognized our concerns and to reach a mutually acceptable agreement he proposed holding JFA 94-4L in Houaphan, as previously planned, and then moving on a province-by-province basis to the south.<sup>168</sup>

~~(c)~~ MG Needham readily agreed with the proposal, including the stipulation that the team could only operate in the province in which based, and would have to move their base camp from Houaphan to Xiangkhoang as time permitted to begin operations there. Needham then asked about the planned trilateral JFA 94-5L operations with the Vietnamese. Soubanh replied that going ahead with the operations would be a problem if the US were agreeing to proceed from north to south, and it would be better to put off the trilaterals until the following year. CJTF-FA readily agreed to that proposal. Mr. Soubanh finished by asking that a Lao request for water pumps and generators be give special consideration as they were urgently needed in the provinces, to which both Needham and the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) promised prompt consideration.

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(U) The second technical level meeting held during the year was conducted in Vientiane 19-20 August 1994. Ambassador Tomseth opened the meeting and reiterated the four main points made by the recent Presidential delegation, which were:<sup>169</sup>

- (U) Continue to investigate live sightings quickly and independently of JFAs.

- (U) Expand the size of the field team to four elements and 40 people.

- (U) Permit greater flexibility in the field, to include a mechanism to permit Vietnamese witnesses to cross the border to assist investigators.

- (U) Expand the archival research program.

(U) Tomseth told the Lao that the more lead time they gave the US when it raised specific humanitarian concerns, the better the prospects for a positive response. As the worldwide demands for humanitarian assistance far exceeded the ability of the US to provide, the Embassy had to justify what a particular project in Laos should have higher priority than humanitarian efforts in Africa or Afghanistan or nearby Cambodia and Vietnam. He also pointed out two recent instances when the Lao had turned down offers; one for two schools the US offered to build during fiscal year 1994 with Title X funds, the other an offer to send a team of technical experts to Laos to assess the nature and extent of the unexploded ordnance problem in the country. The Ambassador noted that Laos competed with every other country in PACOM for Title X funds, and when it turned down a project, there were plenty of other countries which would gladly take whatever was offered, and that should Laos decided it wanted the US to carry out a project next year that could be funded under Title X, then there would be a greater challenge competing for the funds simply because Laos did not accept the schools offered in 1994.

(U) The Lao agreed to increase the size of the field team during JFAs to four elements and 40 people, with one Lao-American linguist per element. They also agreed to conduct live sighting

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investigations of new leads about possible living Americans independent of JFAs, to conduct opportune investigations and excavations within the context of the agreed upon work plan, and to immediately evacuate any injured team member from the work site. The US proposal to use Vietnamese witnesses to aid investigations in Laos they felt was a matter that required a policy-level trilateral meeting in Vietnam. The Lao then requested several items from the United States including: flood relief efforts; medical supplies, equipment, and training; insurance for individuals working the POW/MIA issue; maintenance of the vehicle allocation at 17 vehicles; and office equipment to support their POW/MIA work. Mr. Done, MFA, also noted that of the eight schools constructed by the US so far, the last three built were of very good quality, but the first five were not too good. He explained that one of the schools was no longer in use for fear of the roof falling in, another was too dark inside because of a lack of enough windows, and a third flooded because the level of the floor was too low.

### Visit by Presidential Delegation(U)

(U) The Presidential Delegation led by Mr. Gober which visited Vietnam 1-4 July 1994 (see above) also visited Vientiane on 4 July. They met President Nouhak Phommavanh, Defense Minister LTG Choumali Saignasone, Interior Minister MG Asang Laoly, and Acting Foreign Minister Soubanh Srithirath. The delegation asked the Lao to support four initiatives (mentioned above), and the Lao leaders pledged continued support on the POW/MIA issue but did not respond to specific delegation requests. Mr. Soubanh stated the specific US requests would be discussed at the next scheduled technical talks, and they were in fact covered at the consultative talks held in August 1994.<sup>170</sup>

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Visit by League of Families Delegation(U)

(U) From March 24 to 28 1994, a delegation from the League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia visited Laos. The delegation consisted of Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths, Chairman of the Board Sue Scott, and board member Colleen Shine. They received briefings from the Embassy and Det 3, paid courtesy calls on Deputy Prime Minister Khamphoui Keoboualapha, Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, and Deputy Foreign Minister Soubanh Srithirath. Delegation members raised a number of specific issues with the Lao, including bureaucratic roadblocks, UXO, and the conduct of field investigations. The ambassador felt the League's visit made a significant contribution to advancing the overall US POW/MIA agenda in Laos.<sup>171</sup>

Visit by USCINCPAC(U)

(e) Admiral Macke visited Laos from 26 to 28 October 1994 during a round of visits to Southeast Asia countries. His visit represented a new stage in the developing relationship with Laos. During his visit, he met with Foreign Minister Somsavat, Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh, and Vice Minister of Defense LTG Ai Souliyaseng, and visited two ongoing excavations in Louang Prabang and Xieng Khouang Provinces in northern Laos being conducted by JFA 95-1L.<sup>172</sup>

(e) First reaction of the Lao to the CINC's visit was to treat it as something that largely did not concern the Lao government, a trip conducted only for the purpose of visiting JTF-FA's activities in the field. Only after the ambassador pointed out that USCINCPAC's responsibilities encompassed the entire range of security issues affecting the Pacific region, and that his initial visits to countries in his area of command were for the purpose of meeting and beginning a dialogue with senior officials of regional governments responsible for those same kinds of issues, did the Lao begin to appreciate that some kind

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of bilateral interaction was expected. At first scheduled to meet with the vice ministers of foreign affairs and defense, a meeting with FM Somsavat was hastily arranged only when it was pointed out to Soubanh after a dinner hosted by the ambassador that Macke's reception in Laos fell far short of the level he was being received at during the other three stops on his itinerary. Despite the slow start and hesitant Lao handling of arrangements for the visit, USCINCPAC's trip to Laos proved a substantial success. In particular, it helped condition the Lao to accept the proposition that in the post-Cold War era bilateral intercourse involving the US area military command was both natural and to be welcomed.

Visit to USCINCPAC(U)

(U) USCINCPAC hosted the 2-4 October 1993 orientation visit to Hawaii of Lao Foreign Minister Somsavath Lengsavad and his party. His party included the Americas Department Director, Mr. Done Somvorachit, and his First Secretary, Linthong Phetsavanh. The Minister had a 30-minute office call on Admiral Larson, and USCINCPAC/J3 hosted a luncheon for the Lao party. During their visit, they received the USCINCPAC POW/MIA Perspective and JTF-FA's operational and display briefings, and toured CILHI.<sup>173</sup>

Joint Field Activities, 1993(U)

(U) The first of six JFAs conducted in Laos during 1993 was JFA 93-3L, which ran from 14 January to 8 February. The IRT included 31 American personnel, and they conducted 10 investigations, 13 surveys, and one recovery of a crash site in Xekong, Attapu, and Khammouan Provinces. The main body arrived at Pakse Airport via C-130, and shuttled to their base camp via 11 helicopter sorties using a Lao military MIL Mi-8 HIP and a Lao Westcoast SQUIRREL (Aerospatiale AS 350 ECUREUIL). Of the 24 total cases, two were recommended for investigation, one for survey, and nine for excavation. The small SQUIRREL, with a main

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rotor diameter of only 35 feet, proved invaluable to the mission in Laos, reaching crash sites and villages where the larger Mi-8 (70-foot main rotor) could not land. The JFA 93-3L team redeployed to U'Taphao on 8 February 1993, and to Hawaii the following day.<sup>174</sup>

- (U) The RE excavated a crash site in Xekong Province from 16 January to 1 February. Tens of thousands of pieces of wreckage were recovered, as well as approximately 20 pieces of bone fragments and one tooth. Also found at the site were personal effects, including ID media, portions of flight suit material, coins, and watch backings.

- (U) In Xekong Province, nine sites were investigated or surveyed, including three of the six priority cases in the province. Three cases, all priority, were not investigated or surveyed because provincial officials discovered they were located in Vietnam or another province.

- (U) A total of 13 sites in Attapu Province were investigated or surveyed, including three of the four priority cases in the province. Nine other sites located along the Vietnamese and Cambodian borders were not investigated or surveyed due to provincial concerns of security problems with timber poachers along the Lao-Vietnamese border, and the presence of Khmer Rouge forces along the Lao-Cambodian border.

- (U) In Khammouan, an unidentified crash site was surveyed, and suspected pilot-related equipment and aircraft components were photographed. The aircraft, probably a Dornier, was not positively identified as a US loss. No remains were recovered.

(U) JFA 93-4L was conducted in Savannakhet Province during the period 4 to 27 March. The team deployed to Savannakhet on 4 March, then to their base camp on the 5th. The IRT consisted of 32 American personnel, and they conducted 12 investigations, 13 surveys, two crash site recoveries, and one recovery of a grave site. Of the total 28 cases, five were recommended for

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investigation and 12 for excavation. Four cases, including two priority cases, were not investigated because provincial officials discovered they were actually located in Vietnam or a neighboring province. The three excavations were all successful: Human remains were recovered from the isolated grave site; at one crash site, thousands of pieces of aircraft wreckage, approximately 136 pieces of human bone fragments and a dental bridge, plus personal effects were recovered; and the third site, the fourth iteration of continuing excavation at this location, yielded both human remains and personal effects as well as aircraft wreckage. Cooperation from the Lao was good to excellent, although a need for more flexibility was noted. One member of RE2 suffered an arm injury caused by falling rock and was evacuated to Thailand for treatment—the injury was later diagnosed as a severely bruised tendon.<sup>175</sup>

(U) The third JFA in Laos, 93-5L, was conducted from 8 to 28 May in Khammouan and Savannakhet Provinces. The IRT, which deployed to Savannakhet on 8 May, consisted of 34 Americans organized into two REs and one IE. In Khammouan Province, ordnance hazards were the greatest yet encountered by any US team operating in Laos, with live anti-personnel ordnance and heavier ordnance widely scattered along all segments of the former Ho Chi Minh Trail. The US team had to terminate field operations one day earlier than planned to accommodate C-130 scheduling. A planned LSI of Gnommalath Prison was canceled by Lao officials because of coordination problems between the Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministries.<sup>176</sup>

- (U) The IE investigated nine priority cases and five geographic proximity cases, including all priority cases in Khammouan Province. Two were recommended for further investigation, two for survey, and two for excavation.

- (U) RE1 excavated two sites, one crash site and one grave site. The crash site yielded thousands of pieces of aircraft wreckage as well as life support equipment and ID media.

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The burial site had been excavated by a recovery element in 1991, at which time no remains were found, but this excavation resulted in the recovery of two possible human skeletal fragments and a fragment of a human tarsal, plus a zipper slide fastener.

- (U) RE2 also excavated one crash site and one grave site. No remains or personal effects were recovered from the burial site, but several pieces of aircraft wreckage and crew related equipment were recovered from the crash site.

(U) JFA 93-6L, held from 16 July to 16 August 1993, was held in Xiang Khouang Province. The IRT consisted of 33 Americans organized into two IEs and one RE, and arrived at Vientiane on one C-130 aircraft on 16 July—the move to Xiang Khouang Province took place on the 20th. In conjunction with the JFA, an LSI was conducted in Nong Het District by DIA/STONY BEACH. A total of 34 cases was encompassed by the JFA, including 10 priority cases, 22 cases, and two excavations. Five cases were not investigated for a variety of reasons, such as coordination problems, weather, and geography. Of the 27 cases investigated, six were recommended for reinvestigation and seven for excavation. The four-day delay in Vientiane was caused by late approval by the Lao government. Additional problems were caused by the absence of four of the seven Lao team members who attended meetings in Vientiane and the trilateral meetings in Hawaii. The team deployed to Bangkok on 16 August, and departed for Hawaii on the 18th.<sup>177</sup>

- (U) IE1 investigated 13 cases, including four priority cases, and received unilaterally remains allegedly associated with one case. Although most of the sites investigated contained aircraft wreckage, no personal effects or biological remains were recovered.

- (U) IE2 investigated a total of 14 cases, including five priority cases. Remains associated with one case were recovered during a search of the crash site.

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- (U) RE1 conducted two planned excavations and one additional excavation as a result of information obtained during investigation of a priority case in Pek District by IE2. Remains were recovered from one excavation, along with life support equipment and cockpit related items.

(U) JFA 94-1L was conducted in the LPDR from 19 October to 12 November 1993. The IRT included 31 American personnel organized into one IE and two REs. The team arrived at Pakxe Airport, Champasak Province, on 19 October on two C-130 sorties, then shuttled to their base camp in Xekong Province over the next four days using a total of 19 helicopter sorties. During the JFA, a live sighting investigation (LSI) was conducted by DIA/STONY BEACH. The JFA investigated seven priority cases and 17 other cases, and conducted two excavations. One case was recommended for reinvestigation and four for excavation. The team completed their redeployment to Thailand on 11 November.<sup>178</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted investigations in three districts in Xekong Province, and two in Salavan Province. Remains possibly associated with the loss of an A-1E in Salavan Province were recovered.

- (U) In Xekong Province, RE1 excavated the crash site of a C-130A. In addition to a great quantity of aircraft wreckage, some 649 bone fragments, 5 teeth, 13 tooth fragments, and numerous pieces of personal effects and life support equipment were recovered from the site.

- (U) A second C-130A crash site in Xekong Province was excavated by RE2. Thousands of pieces of aircraft wreckage, a total of 1,550 bone fragments, 5 teeth, and a large quantity of personal effects were recovered, as well as numerous pieces of life support equipment and cockpit related items.

(U) The final JFA in Laos during 1993 was 94-2L, which began with deployment of the IRT to Laos on 4 December and ran through 20 December 1993. This JFA was the Laos element of the

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first trilateral JFA conducted by JTF-FA. The Vietnam element was the seventh JFA to be conducted in that country, and is described above. The IRT for 94-2L consisted of 31 American personnel organized into two IEs and one RE, and addressed a total of 27 cases (9 priority and 13 other Laos cases, and 1 priority and 2 other Vietnam cases) and 2 excavations. The team arrived at Savannakhet Airport on 4 December on one C-130 sortie and shuttled to base camps in Savannakhet and Salavan Provinces using four Mi-8 and nine SQUIRREL sorties. Of the cases investigated, ten were recommended for reinvestigation and four for excavation. Poor Lao preparation resulted in lost time at the beginning of this JFA. Border processing of the Lao/US team took over one hour because the Lao did not coordinate ahead of time, as suggested, and deployment of IE2 to Salavan Province was delayed one day until 5 December because the Lao team was unable to obtain billeting. In addition, the Lao were unable to locate any witnesses with information on cases located in Vietnam.<sup>179</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted investigations in four districts, and although operations started slowly because of poor Lao preparation, Lao officials permitted great flexibility in investigating among several cases, even across district boundaries.

- (U) Working in two districts in Xekong Province, IE2 investigated nine Laos cases and the three Vietnamese cases. Adverse weather severely limited IE2 operations.

- (U) RE1 conducted two recovery operations in Savannakhet Province—the crash site of an HH-53H helicopter with five persons on board, and an OH-58A. From the first site, 132 bone fragments, a dental prosthesis, one ID tag, and a number of personal effects and life-support equipment items were recovered, plus numerous pieces of aircraft wreckage. The second site failed to yield any remains or personal effects.

- (U) Tri-lateral meetings were held during the JFA at Lao Bao, Vietnam, near the Lao-Vietnamese border to exchange information and interview witnesses who might have information

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pertinent to cross-border operations. Meetings were held on 5, 10, and 15 December 1993, and significant progress was made.

### Joint Field Activities, 1994(U)

(U) The year began with JFA 94-3L, conducted from 12 January to 8 February 1994 in Savannakhet Province. The IRT consisted of 31 US personnel organized into one IE and two REs. Deployment to Savannakhet Airport took place on 12 January via one C-130 sortie, and the team shuttled to their base camp using two Mi-8 and nine SQUIRREL sorties in one day. Recovery equipment and water was transported to the base camp by truck which reduced deployment time and allowed the team to start operations on their first full day in country. A total of 28 cases were investigated, including six priority cases and one Vietnam case, and eight were recommended for reinvestigation and six for excavation. The REs excavated four crash sites and two burial sites, including those associated with four priority cases. Remains were recovered from five sites. The JFA was supported by a single Mi-8 and three SQUIRRELS, which flew approximately 51 and 225 hours respectively. One case could not be investigated because it was located in the newly created Atsaphong District, and operations had not been requested for that district. One team member redeployed early because of a family emergency.<sup>180</sup>

- (U) IE1 investigated six priority cases, 21 cases, and one Vietnam case in four districts in Savannakhet Province. Remains were recovered at two excavations, one the loss of an A-26A in Laos in April 1968, the second the Vietnam case which involved the loss of two individuals in the crash of an O-1G in May 1969—the crash site was located in Nong District.

- (U) RE1 conducted three recovery operations in Vilibouli District, and completed two excavations. The third site could not be completed prior to redeployment, and was left open. Remains were recovered from the January 1967 crash site of

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a T-28D, and life support and pilot related equipment was recovered from the second site which involved the December 1967 loss of another T-28D.

- (U) In Xepon and Vilibouri Districts, RE2 also conducted three excavations, and recovered remains and pilot related equipment from two crash sites—the March 1966 loss of an O-1E and the January 1969 loss of an A-1H.

(U) JFA 94-4L was conducted in Houaphan and Xiang Khouang Provinces of the LPDR from 9 March to 4 April 1994. The IRT was again composed of 31 US personnel organized into two IEs and one RE. They arrived at Wattai Airport via a single C-130 sortie on 9 March, and shuttled to Xam Nua in Houaphan using eight SQUIRREL sorties on the 9th and three Mi-8 sorties over three days. Recovery equipment, water, and aviation fuel were prepositioned by three trucks and two Mi-8 sorties before team arrival, which significantly reduced deployment time. Helicopter support was provided by one Mi-8 and four SQUIRRELS, which flew approximately 36 and 230 hours, respectively. The JFA addressed a total of 29 cases, including investigation of 9 priority cases, 13 cases, and 1 Vietnam case. Of cases investigated, three were recommended for reinvestigation and six for excavation. The RE conducted three crash site excavations and three site surveys, and also excavated one additional priority case site. Remains were recovered from two sites, and a small bone fragment of unknown origin was recovered from a third. Unseasonable weather impacted operations on 13 of the 25 days the team was deployed. An incident involving misconduct on the part of a US team member occurred on 24 March involving a US team member who had violated the two-person guideline and was accused of insulting a province official while intoxicated. The individual was identified by Lao witnesses on the 26th and departed for Bangkok the following day. Despite the alleged incident, the JFA was considered the most successful and smoothest of any in Laos to date.<sup>181</sup>

- (U) IE1 worked in both provinces and investigated five priority cases, six cases, and one Vietnam case. Two cases

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were recommended for reinvestigation and three for excavation. Remains and data plates were received from witnesses possibly associated with the December 1968 crash of an F-105 in Xam Nua District, Houaphan.

- (U) In seven districts in both provinces, IE2 investigated four priority cases and seven cases. One case was recommended for reinvestigation, three for excavation. No remains were recovered or turned over to the team.

- (U) RE1 conducted three excavations and three surveys of excavation sites, all but one excavation in Xiang Khouang. Remains, life support equipment, and personal items were recovered from the August 1969 crash site of an O-1A.

(U) JFA 94-5L was conducted from 4 May to 1 June 1994, and returned to Houaphan and Xiang Khouang in accordance with an agreed plan to work from north to south. The IRT consisted of 32 US personnel organized into one investigative and two recovery elements. They arrived at Wattai Airport, Vientiane, on 4 May via one C-130, from where the two REs shuttled to Xam Nua using six SQUIRREL sorties and two Mi-8 sorties. Because of adverse weather, deployment of the IE to Xiang Khouang Province was delayed until 7-8 May, with all elements in place by the 9th. As before, equipment, water, and aircraft fuel were transported by truck to expedite deployment, and also saved about 16-20 hours of Mi-8 flying time, a cost reduction of about 90%. Helicopter support was provided by one Mi-8 and three SQUIRRELS, which flew 27 and 106 hours, respectively. The JFA addressed a total of eleven cases, including one investigation of a priority case, investigation of one case, six crash site excavations, and three excavation site surveys. Remains associated with six cases, including the priority case, were recovered by the JFA. Adverse weather affected operations on 12 of the 26 days the team was deployed.<sup>182</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted the two investigations, and recommended one case for reinvestigation. Augmented by RE2, they also

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excavated the site associated with the loss of an A-1J in April 1969, and recovered one bone fragment and numerous pieces of pilot related equipment, including two dog tags and a dime. They also excavated the February 1970 crash site of an A-1E and recovered a bone fragment and more than 40 pieces of pilot-related equipment and personal effects, including a 1961 nickel.

- (U) RE1 conducted one excavation in Xam Nua District, Houaphan, involving the loss of an F-105D in December 1968, and one in Phaxay District, Xiang Khouang, involving the September 1972 loss of an F-4D. Human remains, personal effects, and personal equipment items were recovered from both sites.

- (U) In addition to assisting IE1 with two excavations, one excavation of a priority case was conducted by RE2 in Xam Nua of the crash site of an F-105D in December 1967 investigated in March 1994. Remains and various items of personal equipment were recovered. In Pek District, Xiang Khouang, a crash site investigated in July 1993 and resurveyed in March 1994 was excavated. Aircraft wreckage, life support equipment, remains, and personal effects were recovered. The case involved the December 1971 loss of an F-4D.

(U) JFA 94-6L was conducted from 3 to 30 August 1994, beginning with deployment to Laos on one C-130 sortie. The IRT consisted of 30 US personnel organized into the usual single IE and two REs, and subsequent to arrival in Laos they deployed to six provinces. They redeployed to Bangkok on a single C-130 sortie on 30 August. They scheduled a total of 23 investigations but accomplished only 11, of which one was recommend for excavation and one for reinvestigation, while two of five scheduled excavations were conducted. The absence of the chief of the Lao team for the first 20 days of the JFA and the resultant poor coordination combined with poor weather conditions affected activities of IE1. Remains possibly associated with two cases were recovered. Mud slides prevented completion of an excavation, and daily delays due to low cloud cover were encountered.<sup>183</sup>

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(U) The first JFA of the fiscal year conducted in Laos was 95-1L, 7 October to 7 November 1994. The IRT was the largest of the series, with 40 US personnel organized into two investigative elements and two recovery elements, and was augmented by the Det 3 commander as assistant team chief of IE1, and Det 3 archival research personnel. Deployment to Vientiane and Savannakhet took place on 7 October on one C-130 sortie, and the teams subsequently deployed to sites in five provinces. Lao support to the deployment consisted of three Mi-8 helicopters and a single An-26. This JFA was the most complex and challenging to date. An ambitious workload was scheduled, including 53 investigations and 6 excavations. A total of 4 priority cases, 32 cases, and 2 Vietnam cases were actually investigated, of which 5 were recommended for reinvestigation and 9 for excavation. The two REs began excavation of three cases, completed two, and left one site open. Remains possibly associated with seven cases were recovered, and a possible bone fragment associated with one of those cases was received from witnesses. Lao cooperation was excellent demonstrated their desire to successfully complete each case. Difficulty was encountered on only twice, once with a district official who denied access to the Lao-Thai border for safety concerns, and another who denied requests to continue an investigation in two areas of his district. One team member contracted malaria and was evacuated to Bangkok for treatment.<sup>184</sup>

(U) JFA 95-2L was the last to be conducted in 1994, and ran from 4 to 20 December. Like the previous JFA, 95-2L's IRT consisted of 40 US personnel with two IEs and two REs, augmented by the Det 3 commander as assistant team chief of IE1. The IRT deployed to Vientiane and Savannakhet using one C-130 sortie on 4 December, and deployed to base camp locations the same day. RE1 excavated a site in Xam Nua with the aid of a Vietnamese witness, an event approved by the Lao government on 7 December after interviewing him. The team remained in Laos after the rest of the IRT redeployed to Bangkok on 20 December. A total of 30 cases were scheduled for investigation, and of the 23 actually

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done 7 were recommended for reinvestigation and 4 for excavation. Two excavations were scheduled, but neither was completed by the end of the JFA—RE1 remained in Laos, RE2 left their site open for completion at a future date. Remains possibly associated with two cases were recovered. The four element leaders reported that Lao cooperation was the best to date. There were no safety incidents or accidents involving members of the IRT, but in Xam Nua on 11 December, five village children exploded a small bomblet they had found in a stream by striking it with a rock. The explosion was about 200 meters from the members of RE1. One of the children died immediately, the other four were seriously wounded. Team members, including the independent duty technician (IDT) medical aid man, assisted at the scene. No information was available on helicopter support provided by the Lao.<sup>185</sup>

### Cambodia (U)

#### Joint Field Activities, 1993 (U)

(U) Joint Field Activity 93-3C was conducted in Cambodia from 21 January to 23 February 1993. The IRT and supporting aviation detachment from the 25th ID(L) arrived at U'Taphao from Hawaii via C-5 aircraft on 18 January and deployed to Cambodia via C-130 aircraft on the 21st, while the two UH-60A BLACKHAWK helicopters self-deployed. The IRT was comprised of 54 Americans, who performed 13 investigations, six surveys, and two recovery operations in Kracheh, Mondolkiri, Kampong Cham, and Kampong Soam Provinces, and of those recommended ten for reinvestigation and one for excavation. Remains were recovered from the excavation of an OH-58A crash site in Kracheh Province. Nine cases could not be investigated either because of possible National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) activity in the area or inability of the security forces to travel to proposed work locations. Three investigations and one underwater survey were conducted on Tang Island (Kho Tang), Kampong Saom Province, by an IE with a US Navy diving team attached. During the JFA, a UN

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patrol on the Mekong River was told by a Khmer Rouge representative on 16 February that the two black helicopters flying near the village of Boeng Char would be shot down if they did not belong to UNTAC. The incident and remark were attributed to poor communications within the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). Personnel redeployed to Thailand on 22 and 23 February, then to Guam on the 26th by C-5 enroute to Hawaii.<sup>186</sup>

(U) During the period 23 March to 7 April, JFA 93-4C was conducted by a joint team including 67 Americans in Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and Kratie Provinces. The IRT and supporting USMC aviation detachment departed MCAS Kaneohe via two C-5s on 17 March, arrived at U'Taphao on the 19th, and deployed to Stung Treng on from 24 to 26 March. Logistic support was provided by a USMC aviation detachment from HMM 165/MAG 24 with four CH-46 helicopters—use of a third helicopter in this JFA was approved during JFA 93-3C, and before the JFA began approval for a fourth was granted. The team conducted four investigations, two surveys of crash sites, and one excavation. Of seven total cases, two were recommended for investigation, one for excavation, and one for continuation of excavation. During excavation of an F-4E crash site in Kratie Province, numerous pieces of wreckage, life support equipment, and personal effects were excavated, but no human remains were found prior to termination of the excavation—the case was not closed. At about 2000 hours, 3 April, there were two explosions near the forward support base at Stung Treng. The JTF-FA team commander assessed them as incoming mortar rounds, and judged one to impact 100 meters from the base. He directed an evacuation to Phnom Penh using a pre-arranged and rehearsed plan, and the three CH-46 helicopters transported all 48 Americans at Stung Treng to Phnom Penh by 2225 hours. During the flight to Phnom Penh, the helicopters received small arms fire and one aircraft was hit but remained fully operational and no personnel were injured. USCINCPAC directed that the JFA be terminated and after returning to Stung Treng to recover equipment, the IRT redeployed to U'Tapao, Thailand, on

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6 and 7 April, and on to the US on 8 and 11 April 1993. A later report issued by UNTAC speculated that the weapons used in the shelling were 107mm rockets.<sup>187</sup>

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(U) The next JFA in Cambodia took place from 29 September to 3 November 1993. The IRT consisted of 67 Americans organized into one IE, one RE, and a USMC 44-member aviation detachment with three CH-53 helicopters from MAG 24 based at MCAS Kaneohe. They arrived at U'Taphao from Hawaii on 27 September via two C-5s, and flew into Pochentong Airport on the 29th and 30th on four C-130s and the three CH-53s, and were billeted in Phnom Penh for

\* The aircraft were probably Xian Y-7s built in China under license from the USSR/Russia. Production of the An-24 ceased in 1978.

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the duration of the JFA. A total of 12 cases were encompassed, including six priority investigations, two investigations, two excavations, one investigation with excavation of a priority case, and one investigation with partial excavation. Of the ten cases investigated, four were recommended for reinvestigation and two for excavation. Remains were recovered from one excavation, which remained open for further work during the next JFA, and three uncorrelated remains were received. Redeployment to U'Taphao took place on 2 and 3 November via four C-130 sorties.<sup>189</sup>

- (U) IE1 worked in four provinces and Phnom Penh City, and investigated seven priority cases and three other cases. Two cases could not be investigated because of the presence of Khmer Rouge and current operations being conducted by Cambodian military forces, and the CH-53s proved to be too large for several landing zones. IE1's investigation of the crash site of an F-4D in Kratie Province resulted in location of numerous pieces of aircraft wreckage and items of life support equipment. RE1 began an excavation and recovered fragmented human remains and ID media, but termination of the JFA halted the excavation.

- (U) RE1 conducted three excavations, including one priority case in Phnom Penh City, one in Ratanakiri Province, and one in Kratie Province that was a continuation of the excavation begun in the last JFA, and the partial excavation described above. No additional human remains were recovered.

(U) The fourth and final JFA in Cambodia during 1993 followed closely on the third, as JFA 94-2C was conducted from 9 November to 17 December. The IRT consisted of 75 American personnel organized into one IE, two REs, and a US Army aviation detachment with four UH-60 helicopters. Four C-130 and four UH-60 sorties delivered the IRT to Pochentong Airport on 9 and 10 November, and the forward element deployed to Kratie Base Camp. The JFA encompassed a total of 14 cases, including two priority case investigations, one priority case investigation and

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recovery, investigations of four other cases and four Vietnam priority cases, two excavations, and one incomplete excavation. Remains were recovered at three sites. During this JFA, security forces were transported to and from work sites aboard US helicopters. With the full cooperation of Cambodian officials at all levels, the field teams gained access to areas never before available for investigation and recovery efforts. One UH-60 suffered a blade strike and all four main rotor blades had to be replaced. One aircraft was hit by small arms fire on 29 November which damaged an external fuel tank, and on two other occasions flight crews reported being engaged by small arms fire but there were no injuries to personnel or damage to aircraft. Two typhoons crossed Cambodia during the JFA, and each caused the loss of approximately 36 hours of work time.<sup>190</sup>

- (U) IE1 conducted investigations in two provinces, including three priority cases, four other cases, and the four Vietnam priority cases. The investigation and recovery of an F-4D crash site failed to yield human remains, but large portions of aircraft wreckage and items of life support equipment were recovered. Investigation operations were severely hampered by the rugged terrain, dense triple canopy jungle, and lack of habitation.

- (U) RE1 excavated two sites, and possible human bone fragments were recovered from both, with the second site also yielding crew related items and wreckage.

- (U) RE2 continued the excavation of the F-4D crash site in Kratie Province worked on during JFA 94-1C, and both dental and skeletal remains were recovered. At JFA termination, the site required further excavation to be conducted during a future JFA.

### Joint Field Activities, 1994(U)

(U) Only one JFA was conducted in Cambodia during the year, and that was 94-3C, 7 February to 17 March 1994. The IRT totaled

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49 US personnel organized into a single IE with CILHI augmentation and a US Army aviation detachment of three UH-60 BLACKHAWK helicopters. Deployment to Pochentong Airport took place on 7 and 8 February, using three C-130 and three UH-60 sorties. The JFA encompassed a total of nine case investigations: six cases, one Vietnam priority case, and two Vietnam cases. Two cases were investigated for a second time, and one case was reinvestigated based on new information received during the JFA. Three cases were excavated after investigation and closed. Remains associated with the December 1971 loss of an OH-6A were recovered, and remains believed to be associated with another case were received from a witness. For the first time in Cambodia, every scheduled case was investigated, and cooperation was excellent at all levels. The aviation detachment flew a total of 143 hours with an overall readiness rate of 97 percent. One aircraft enroute from Kompong Thom to Phnom Penh was engaged by small arms fire while flying at 3,800 feet and was not hit.<sup>191</sup>

### Archival Research Team Activities, 1994(U)

(U) A two-man Cambodia ART deployed from Hawaii on 8 May 1994, arriving in Phnom Penh on the 11th. Their mission was to research archival materials at several facilities in Phnom Penh and interview selected Cambodian individuals for POW/MIA related information. When the extent of holdings of written material was realized, in both Cambodian and Vietnamese, the team was augmented by two linguists, one each Cambodian and Vietnamese. They received access to the Military Museum, the Tuol Sleng Prison Museum, the National Library, and the Council of Ministers Archives. ART activities were suspended in September 1994 pending the discovery of new sources of POW/MIA-relevant information and the ART redeployed on 7 September 1994. One linguist remained in Phnom Penh until the 17th to continue oral history interviews.<sup>192</sup>

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Trilateral Coordination Talks(U)

(U) More than three fourths of the approximately 500 unresolved American losses in Laos occurred along the former Ho Chi Minh Trail and in other areas where Vietnamese forces operated during the war. There were some 50 cases which could not be resolved because of uncertainty as to the exact delineation of the border. The United States had pushed strongly for trilateral cooperation on this issue since 1988, and such cooperation was one of the five measures of cooperation in the March 1992 agreement.<sup>193</sup>

(U) In January 1993, the Lao government expressed high-level interest in holding trilateral US-Lao-Vietnamese talks on POW/MIA cooperation, and the Vietnamese agreed in principle during technical talks held in Hanoi in April. The talks were held on 6 and 7 May 1993 in Hanoi, during which MG Needham outlined a plan for a trilateral field activity in December. Major US concerns were to determine the specific delineation of the border between Vietnam and Laos and for all sides determine, case by case, in which country each incident lay. Recommended date for the proposed trilateral operation was 1-20 December 1993, a period when favorable weather coincided with a JFA already scheduled in Laos and an unscheduled period in Vietnam. The suggested operational area was roughly defined by, the northern border of Quang Tri and the southern border of Thua Thien-Hue Provinces in Vietnam, and contiguous areas of Savvana-khet and Xekong Provinces in Laos.<sup>194</sup>

(U) The next trilateral meeting on POW/MIA cooperation was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 9 and 10 August 1993, with policy level discussions on the 9th, followed by technical meetings on the 10th. Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh Srithirath led the Lao delegation, and Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai led the Vietnamese delegation. The US delegation was headed by Mr. Kent Wiedemann, Special Assistant to the President and a member of the National

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Security Council staff, with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Quinn and Acting DASD for POW/MIA Affairs Edward Ross representing their respective departments. The three parties agreed to cooperate in investigating cases of missing Americans in the border area, including simultaneous operations by joint US-Lao and US-Vietnamese teams. A detailed report of proceedings was issued by the State Department.<sup>195</sup>

(U) Following a farewell dinner on the evening of 10 August, Mr. Le Minh Tran, for whom the Vietnamese government had provided the job title "Assistant to the Minister of the Interior," returned to his room at the Hilton Hawaiian Village to discover his room had been completely cleaned ready for a new occupant and his belongings removed. Mr. Tran thought he had been robbed, but investigation revealed that the hotel staff had mistakenly thought he had checked out, leaving behind his belongings which had been inventoried and removed to the hotel security room. They were later returned to Tran, who was very upset and unreceptive to explanations and apologies from the hotel's security staff. However, following profuse apologies from all concerned, the entire Vietnamese delegation seemed to understand and accept the incident as nothing more than an embarrassing mistake on the part of the hotel.<sup>196</sup>

(U) Events did not stop with Mr. Tran, however. On the morning of 11 August, as Vice Minister Le Mai was returning to his room after breakfast, he found the hotel maid in the process of taking his briefcase to the security room. Again, the hotel staff thought he had checked out and left his briefcase behind by mistake. The hotel general manager formally bid farewell to the delegation with apologies and gifts, and provided them with a copy of the hotel's report on their investigation of the incident involving Mr. Tran's room. The delegation seemed calmer about the incident by the time they arrived at the airport.<sup>197</sup>

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(U) To coordinate operational details, representatives of the three countries—the United States, Vietnam, and Laos—met in Hanoi on 22 November in the Tay Ho Hotel. MG Needham headed the US delegation, which included the Det 2 and Det 3 commanders. Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, Acting Director, Americas Department, MFA, headed the Vietnamese delegation, which included Mr. Vu Chi Cong, Director, VNOSMP. The Lao delegation was headed by Mr. Amonquaykoone Sudachan, Americas Desk Officer, MFA, and Major Sikahi Keovixay, the POW/MIA team chief, MND. Agreement was reached in six areas:<sup>198</sup>

- (U) Trilateral meetings to be held on the Vietnamese side of Lao Bao bridge to pass information and coordinate operations. Meeting dates were 5, 10, and 15 December 1993.
- (U) Procedures for potential witnesses to cross the border to assist in investigations.
- (U) Transfer of cases between the Vietnamese and Lao workplans depending on the actual location of the border.
- (U) Cross-border daily HF radio communications on frequency 9.315 (channel 5).
- (U) Helicopter operations near the border. Helicopters would cross the border only in an actual emergency.
- (U) Flexibility to follow investigation leads.

(U) On 1 December 1994, delegations representing Laos, Vietnam, and the United States met in Hanoi to discuss trilateral procedures for utilizing Vietnamese witnesses to search for unaccounted for Americans in Laos. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs James Wold represented the US, and other primary members of the US delegation were Ambassador to Laos Victor Tomseth and BG Charles R. Viale, CJTF-FA. The other two country delegations were led by their vice ministers of foreign affairs, Mr. Soubanh Srithirath for Laos and Mr. Nguyen Dinh Bin for Vietnam.<sup>199</sup>

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(U) The US delegation proposed a mechanism for trilateral operations, and all agreed that the detailed mechanism offered a clear explanation for necessary procedures and provided a good starting point for discussions. Mr. Soubanh, however, suggested that the proposed mechanism might needlessly restrict and complicate future trilateral operations, and further suggested that in lieu of the proposed detailed mechanism the Lao government would be willing to cooperate in future humanitarian trilateral operations on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the agreements reached during the August 1993 trilateral meeting in Hawaii. The Vietnamese shared the Lao view that there was no need for a formal mechanism, the important thing being to find the best procedure to bring the witnesses across the border in the spirit of the August 1993 agreement.

(U) Soubanh's suggestion was agreed to by all three delegations, and an agreement was drawn up using the August 1993 trilateral meeting as a basis for actions regarding future trilateral operations. Soubanh agreed to a proposal from Bin that the Lao interview of Vietnamese witnesses take place in Hanoi rather than on the border, and also that a VNOSMP official accompany the relevant witnesses to incident sites in Laos. Result of the meeting was the achievement of both Lao and US objectives—Ambassador Tomseth opined that the Vietnamese side seemed ready to agree to anything the Lao and US sides could work out.

(U) Specific details for using Vietnamese witnesses were worked out in technical level meetings held in the afternoon of 1 December, and several agreements were reached. In particular, the specific procedures to be followed during JFA 95-2L were agreed to by all parties.

United Nations MIA/Remains Discussions, 1993(U)

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(U) After marathon talks on a remains MOU on 28 June, the KPA and UNC MAC Secretaries agreed in principle to modifications to the proposed text of the MOU with the caveat that each would present the modified text to their next higher headquarters for final review and approval. Based on this agreement, the KPA revealed they were prepared to repatriate 17 UNC war remains on 9 July 1993. After some political maneuvering and the insistence, later withdrawn, that the repatriation be held in conjunction with the signing of the MOU, the KPA repatriated the remains of 17 UN servicemen reported as killed in action/body not recovered during the Korean War on 12 July. The repatriation, the fifth since Operation GLORY in 1954, took place at Panmunjom, following the same procedures established in 1992.<sup>203</sup>

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Remains Discussions, 1994(U)

(U) A two-day technical meeting was held at Panmunjom on 26-27 January 1994 under the auspices of the UNC-KPA Remains Agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to provide forum for technical experts from both sides to exchange views concerning remains recovery and identification procedures. The UNC group was composed of UNC staff officers and a three-man CILHI delegation, and the KPA group of KPA regulars augmented by scientists from the Pyongyang Archaeological Institute who had participated in KPA exhumation operations, and an archival researcher.<sup>207</sup>

(U) Both sides presented briefings on recovery and identification and classification processes. The CILHI team emphasized US legal requirements for identification and made a case for the desirability of implementing joint recovery operations. The KPA indicated they understood the potential value of joint recovery teams, but continuing problems in bilateral US/DPRK relations made the formation of such teams impossible at the present time. They implied that joint operations might be possible when and if those bilateral relations improved. The overall atmosphere of the meetings was positive, and scientists on both sides indicated they believed a solid framework had been established for improved future cooperation on the remains issue.

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• (U) Condition of remains: the KPA was not using accepted techniques. The December 1993 remains indicated significant commingling, storage, and less than satisfactory recovery techniques.

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
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• (U) KPA expectations for payment: actions taken at this point had to shape their future actions and expectations. To meet what all agreed were unrealistic expectations would only complicate future remains related compensation.


• (U) Possible implications that the US would pay for remains by applying a fixed amount per remains: the US position neither involved nor implied payment for remains, and was consistent with the only available precedent for reimbursing unilateral returns of remains. Prior to the 1992 payment, there was no compensation for such returns.

• (U) Recovery and expense data already supplied: there was significant reason to doubt its reliability since almost half the remains indicated storage for periods in excess of one year, yet the data implied all remains were recently recovered, and CILHI could only verify recovery and expense data for those remains that could be identified.

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(U) Final action of the year was approval to issue a formal invitation to the KPA for five representatives to visit CILHI for a two-to-three day orientation visit. UNC would issue

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the invitation and coordinate the visit date and itinerary with CILHI, the Joint Staff J5, and OSD/DPMO. CILHI was requested to identify to UNCMAC two dates per month each for January, February, March, and April 1995. CILHI presented unit mission and capabilities briefings and workshops with the UNCMAC Secretariat staff, UNCMAC Advisory Group, and UNC staff officers 6 through 9 December 1994, hosted by the UNCMAC Secretariat. Further progress on this proposal was not known at year end.<sup>213</sup>

### Return of Remains from North Korea, 1993-1994(U)

(U) In addition to the repatriation of 17 remains in July 1993 mentioned above, the KPA returned remains on four other occasions during the year. At the completion of the repatriation ceremonies at Panmunjom on 21 December, the KPA informed UNC that all exhumation operations were suspended for the winter, but that they intended to resume operations in the spring. They also submitted a 21-page document which outlined the manpower and equipment resources they claimed to have used in exhuming and processing the 131 remains returned, and requested monetary reimbursement. Remains were returned on the following dates:

- (U) The repatriation of 33 sets of remains of UN servicemen reported as killed in action/body not recovered during the Korean War was conducted on 30 November 1993 at Panmunjom. The remains were transferred to CILHI for subsequent evaluation and attempted identification.<sup>214</sup>

- (U) On 7 December 1993, 31 remains were repatriated by the KPA at Panmunjom. The remains were transferred to CILHI for subsequent processing for identification. On 25 October 1994, three of these remains were identified.

- (U) On 14 December 1993, 33 sets of remains of UN servicemen were repatriated by the KPA at Panmunjom. The remains were transferred to CILHI for subsequent evaluation and attempted identification.<sup>215</sup>

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- (U) In the final repatriation of remains for 1993, the KPA returned 34 sets of remains at Panmunjom on 21 December. The remains were transferred to CILHI for subsequent evaluation and attempted identification.<sup>216</sup>

- (U) On 13 September 1994, the KPA repatriated the remains of 14 United Nations servicemen reported as killed in action/body not recovered during the Korean War. The repatriation took place at Panmunjom. The remains arrived at Hickam AFB on 14 September, and were transferred to CILHI for subsequent evaluation and attempted identification.<sup>217</sup>

### Identification of Remains from Korean War(U)

(U) During 1994, USCINCPAC announced the identification of four American servicemen previously listed as unaccounted for from the Korean War. The first was SGT Frank M. Morales, USA, who was lost in November 1950 while assigned to Company L, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, in the area of Unsan, North Korea. His remains were repatriated on 30 November 1993. The other three were crewmembers of a USAF B-29 aircraft shot down on 12 April 1951 over Sinuiju, North Korea. Names of those identified were Capt George Aaron; 1st Lt Elmer W. Bullock; and MSgt Robert W. Jones. The remains of all three were repatriated on 7 December 1993 from the DPRK, and departed Hickam AFB for return to their families on 13 December 1994.<sup>218</sup>

### Cold War Remains Returned(U)

(U) The remains believed to be of an American serviceman shot down in the vicinity of Hokkaido, Japan, near the Kuril Islands during the Cold War were flown from Moscow to Hickam AFB on 16 September 1994, from where they were transferred to CILHI. These were the first remains received from Russia since the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA was established in 1992, and were exhumed on Yuri Island by a trilateral team of American and Russian investigators on 2 September—the US members of the team

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were assigned to Task Force RUSSIA (TFR) and CILHI. An earlier expedition to Yuri in May 1994 was unproductive, prompting the team's return in August. Available evidence indicated that the remains were of Capt John R. Dunham, the navigator of an RB-29 shot down by Soviet LA-11 fighters on 7 October 1952, the only member of the eight-man crew of the RB-29 to be accounted for.<sup>219</sup>

### JTF-FA Situation Reports, 1993 and 1994(U)

(U) A complete record of JTF-FA activities was reported by USCINCPAC in the form of unclassified weekly situation reports. To avoid the repeated reference to individual SITREPs throughout this section, all 52 SITREPs issued each year were used as supporting documents. The SITREPs for each year are bound in two single volumes numbered as supporting documents: 1993 SITREPs comprise supporting document SD 3-310, 1994 SITREPs, SD 3-311.

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2 SSS (S/DECL OADR), J3 to J00, "First Quarter Readiness Summary CY 1994 (U), 11 Apr 94, w/encl "First Quarter CY 1994 Readiness Summary," (SD 3-2).

3 Ibid.

4 SSS (S/DECL OADR), J3 to J00, "Second Quarter Readiness Summary CY 1994 (U), 11 Apr 94, w/encl "Second Quarter CY 1994 Readiness Summary," (SD 3-3).

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Memo (U), JS, "The Chairman's Readiness System," 22 Nov 94. (SD 3-4).

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9 Msg (U), JS to USCINCPAC, "Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) 1-95," 231928Z Dec 94.

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
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
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52 Msg (S/DECL OADR), COMUSKOREA to USCINCPAC, "CDR, USFK FY 95 Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (U)," 282013Z Nov 94 (SD 3-120).

53 Information Paper (C/DECL OADR), J33, "Counterdrug Operations Update," 1 Jul 94 (SD 3-121).

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54 Msg (U), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug Policy Organization Issues," 070215Z Jan 94 (SD 3-122); Ltr (U), A/S for International Narcotics Matters to Dir, ONDCP, [JTF-5], undated [c. Mar 94] (SD 3-123); Ltr (U), ASD for Spec Ops/LIC, [JTF-5], 22 Mar 94 (SD 3-124).

55 JS Memo (U), "National Interdiction Counterdrug Command and Control Plan," 1 Mar 94, w/attach (SD 3-125).

56 Information Paper (C/DECL OADR), J33, "Counterdrug Operations Update," 1 Jul 94 (SD 3-126); Plan (U), ONDCP, "National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 7 Apr 94 (SD 3-127); Talking Paper (U), J331, "ONDCP National Interdiction Counterdrug Command and Control Plan," 3 Mar 94 (SD 3-128).

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59 Msg (U), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Implementation of National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 231900Z May 94.

60 Msg (U), Joint Staff to USCINCPAC, "Joint Staff Guidance on Implementation of National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 171603Z Jun 94 (SD 3-135); Msg (U), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "USCINCPAC Implementation of National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 242100Z Jun 94 (SD 3-136); Msg (U), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Final Input for Implementation of National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 190405Z Aug 94 (SD 3-137).

61 Msg (U), USIC to SECDEF, "United States Interdiction Coordinator," 272046Z May 94 (SD 3-138).

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64 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug (CD) Ops Rpt for Jan 94 (U)," 252019Z Feb 94 (SD 3-142).


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- 70 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug (CD) Ops Rpt for Jul 94 (U), 262300Z Aug 95 (SD 3-148).
- 71 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug (CD) Ops Rpt for Aug 94 (U), 282200Z Sep 95 (SD 3-149).
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- 73 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug (CD) Ops Rpt for Oct 94 (U), 282300Z Nov 95 (SD 3-151).
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- 75 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Counterdrug (CD) Ops Rpt for Dec 94 (U), 262345Z Dec 95 (SD 3-153).
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- 77 Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program Semi-Annual Report (U)," 150505Z Apr 94 (SD 3-154); Msg (C/DECL OADR), USCINCPAC to Joint Staff, "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program Semi-Annual Report (U), 070335Z Oct 94 (SD 3-155).
- 78 See note above; Msg (S/NF/DECL OADR), COMSEVENTHFLT to CTF SEVEN FIVE, "[order (U)]," 300142Z Apr 94.
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## CHAPTER IV(U) LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE(U) SECTION I—INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS(U)

### Unified Commanders' Conduct of Cooperative Programs With Friendly Nations(U)

(U) The "Unified Commanders' Conduct of Cooperative Programs with Friendly Nations" (more often referred to as "Title 10") was an important element in the USPACOM "Cooperative Engagement" strategy. It consisted of three separate Title 10 programs: Section 401, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (H/CA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations; Section 1051, Participation of Defense Personnel of Developing Countries in Bilateral or Regional Conferences, Seminars or Similar Meetings (or Personnel Expenses Authority for Developing Countries); and Section 2010, Participation of Developing Countries in Bilateral or Multilateral Military Exercises (or Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP)). HQ USCINCPAC achieved 100 percent obligation of the FY 94 Title 10 allocated budget.

#### Title 10 Humanitarian/Civic Assistance(U)

(U) In addition to providing military training, H/CA projects assisted local populations and improved US relations with foreign nations. Engineering and construction exercises as well as medical, dental, and veterinary readiness exercises were conducted in 13 countries throughout the USPACOM area of responsibility. Total FY 94 H/CA obligations were \$1,356,024, a decrease of about seven percent from FY 93.<sup>1</sup> (See Table IV-1.)

#### DOD H/CA Program Directive(U)

(U) A critical GAO report resulted in the OSD: Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs and Special Operations/ Low

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TABLE IV-1(C)

UNIFIED COMMANDERS' CONDUCT OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS  
SUMMARY OF USCINCPAC FY 94 TITLE 10 EXPENDITURES (U)



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(B)(1) (1.4b)  
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Source: See Supporting Documents 4-1 (U), 4-5 (U), 4-6(C), and 4-7(C).

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Intensity Conflict Office (HRA/SOLIC) completing a draft DOD directive for Humanitarian/Civic Assistance projects authorized under Title 10, US Code (U.S.C.), Section 401. The main purpose of the directive was to outline the areas of responsibility for all concerned organizations, i.e., CINC's, Joint Staff, and OSD. USCINCPAC responsibilities remained largely the same. Two major changes were the addition of a mid-year status report for H/CA projects and the requirement to process all H/CA correspondence from USCINCPAC through the Joint Staff. Although there was concern that the inclusion of the Joint Staff in the process would add another level of management, their organization and advocacy would help support the CINC's H/CA program. OSD was to publish this directive by 30 September 1994 in order to avoid the Congressionally threatened cancellation of the programs.<sup>2</sup> DOD Directive 2205.2, "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations," was published on 6 October 1994.<sup>3</sup> A subsequent directive entitled "Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program," was published on 27 January 1995.<sup>4</sup>

### Title 10 Personnel Expenses Authority for Developing Countries(U)


(U) Title 10 U.S.C., Section 1051, Personnel Expenses Authority for Developing countries, provided all unified command CINCs with authority to pay expenses of defense personnel from developing countries attending bilateral or regional conferences, seminars, or similar meetings if SECDEF determined it was in the national security interest of the US. Travel, subsistence, and similar personal expenses were covered. FY 94 obligations in this Title 10 category were \$910,320, a decrease of slightly over seven percent from FY 93.<sup>5</sup> (See Table IV-1.)

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Title 10 Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program(U)




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TABLE IV-2 (e)

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COMBINED EXERCISE PROGRAM  
SUMMARY OF FY 94 TITLE 10 EXPENDITURES (U)



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(B)(1) (1.4d)

SOURCE: USCINCPAC J34. See Supporting Document 4-7 (C)

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Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property(U)

(U) The Humanitarian Assistance Program for Excess Property (HAP-EP) distributed excess, non-lethal DOD property through the State Department to developing countries in support of US peacetime objectives. Authority to donate this excess property was provided through U.S.C., Title 10, Section 2547, which authorized SECDEF to make excess property available to SECSTATE for donation to developing countries for humanitarian or nation building purposes. Approval of a recipient nation and subsequent donation was a joint SECDEF and SECSTATE decision. Worldwide program management was under the direction of the Office of Humanitarian Assistance (OHA)/International Security Affairs (ISA)/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and included the administration of transportation and repair funding. During FY 94, the value of USCINCPAC donated HAP-EP items totaled \$6,489.476.<sup>7</sup> (See Table IV-3.)

Cambodia Assistance(U)

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TABLE IV-3 (U)

HAP-EP DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION PER COUNTRY FY 91-FY 94 (U)


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
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ROK-US Logistics Cooperation Committee(U)

(U) The Logistics Cooperation Committee (LCC) was one of four committees in the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) process and met to discuss a wide range of logistics cooperation issues prior to the annual SECDEF-Ministry of National Defense (MND) meetings. USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance was a delegate to the LCC and was the host for 1994's meeting. The Korean delegation was in Hawaii during the period 7-12 August. The actual bilateral discussions took place on 9 August. The following topics were discussed: Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS), Enhancing the effectiveness of logistics support agreements, equipment transfer, US aircraft maintenance in Korea, JP-8 conversion, ROK-US Logistics Study, long-term POL

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support for USFK, explosive storage safety, and containerization.<sup>12</sup>

### US-Australian Logistics Review Talks(U)

(U) The USCINCPAC International Logistics Division (J41) attended the US-Australian Logistics Review Talks (LRT) at Melbourne and Canberra, Australia, 14-16 February 1994. Representatives from OSD (USDA DUTP&IP/CSP), Joint Staff J4, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) attended the meeting. The meeting highlighted the successful logistic relationships the two countries have. Discussions included ways to more effectively use the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), the growth of the Pilot Repair Program (PRP) to include surface as well as aircraft components, the future US use of Australian aircraft ranges, and Australia's continued involvement and support of the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS). The next LRT was scheduled for 1996.<sup>13</sup>

### Australia-US Logistics Working Party(U)

(U) The 1994 Australia-US Logistics Working Party (LWP) meeting was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii, 9-11 May 1994, and included logistics discussions with all four USCINCPAC components. The three major topics of discussion included: developing component standing Implementing Arrangements (IAs) for the Australia-US ACSA; Australia and US use of each other's training ranges; and increasing logistics play in combined Australia-US exercise programs. Australia remains one of the most frequent ACSA users and, as such, standing IA concepts have been pioneered with them. With a standing IA in place, a simple letter containing financial details was all that was necessary to obtain support under the ACSA. PACAF had already signed a standing IA with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and other USCINCPAC components were working on similar IAs. The

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
discussions on use of Australia-US training ranges included negotiations to reduce the cost of using the ranges and a PACAF suggestion that Australia consider using the Alaskan range instead of the Nellis range. Specific logistics objectives were developed and appropriate combined exercises were identified for injecting logistics play. The LWP also suggested Australians participate in Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) activities during Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS and Crisis Action Team (CAT) activities during Exercise TEMPO BRAVE. This would help the Australians improve their understanding and interoperability with US crisis action procedures and the USCINCPAC two-tier command and control concept.<sup>14</sup>

### Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar(U)

(U) A special Project Development Committee (PDC) meeting was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, 21-23 September 1993 to develop the structure for the Pacific Area Cooperative Acquisition and Logistics System (PACALS). The September PDC also recommended that Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) XXIII be held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 19-24 September 1994 and the theme be "Logistics Cooperation - An Integrated Approach." Two other PDC actions also received unanimous approval of the Logistics Steering Group (LSG), the PASOLS governing body. The first of these was that Mongolia and Brunei were approved for PASOLS membership as the 17th and 18th members. The second was approval of the PACALS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This SOP defined PACALS mission and objectives and provided participants with a common, easy to use format for the exchange of information concerning areas of cooperative acquisition and logistics support.<sup>15</sup>

(U) The mid-term PDC met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20-22 April 1994. Fifteen of eighteen member nations were represented by 29 delegates with only Papua New Guinea,

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Philippines, and Singapore unable to attend. Brunei and Mongolia attended this PDC in anticipation of being officially inducted as PASOLS members in September. The main focus of the PDC was to prepare for PASOLS XXIII. The PDC reviewed PASOLS XXIII planning and selected the following as panel topics for the seminar.

- (U) Malaysian Case Studies: To provide possible solutions to logistics problems identified by the host country. PASOLS started the tradition of the host country providing logistics case studies. Malaysia was to prepare the discussion guides and chair the panel discussions for three (Army, Navy, and Air Force) case studies.

- (U) PACALS: Getting Started: The goal was to transform the PACALS concept into reality by selecting a few initiatives which would produce beneficial results. The PDC selected two initiatives—Excess Availability and Marketing System (EAMS) and Pacific Area Cataloging System (PACS)—to pursue towards implementation as part of PACALS.

- (U) UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Support: This topic would discuss the New Zealand-developed UN Logistics Support Handbook. Additionally, the discussion would try to recommend improvements to the UN on reimbursement procedures and identify ways to provide UN PKO training to Pacific nation officers.

(U) The April PDC also suggested the addition of China and Cambodia as observer nations at PASOLS XXIII. Pending a positive vote of all member nations, China and Cambodia would be invited to attend PASOLS XXIII. Subsequently, in May, the PASOLS member nations voted unanimously to invite these two countries as observer nations.<sup>16</sup>

(U) PASOLS XXIII was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 19-24 September 1994. Representatives from fifteen of the sixteen member nations attended, with only Tonga absent due to

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their inaugural PKO effort in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. Attendees included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Fiji, Kiribati, Korea, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the US; Brunei and Mongolia were inducted as PASOLS' 17th and 18th members. Nations with observers in attendance were Comoros, India, Indonesia, Japan, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Seychelles, Nepal, and Vanuatu. the People's Republic of China and Cambodia were first-time observers. The 112 delegates representing 29 countries and the UN included over 30 flag rank or civilian equivalents.

(U) As a result of presentations and panel discussions, ten PASOLS XXIII initiatives were adopted. Most of the initiatives were related to UN PKOs. It was agreed that South Korea would host PASOLS XXIV in Seoul, 18-23 September 1995, and that the Spring PDC meeting would be held in Seoul 25-28 April 1995.<sup>17</sup>

### Combined US-Thai Logistics Exercise 37(U)

(U) Representatives from the Joint Staff, USCINCPAC, COMPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and CGUSARPAC participated in the combined US-Thai Logistics Exercise 37 (LOGEX 37) during the period 21-29 July 1994 at Utapao Naval Base, Thailand. LOGEX is a Thai national mobilization and logistics exercise held every year—every other year as a combined US-Thai exercise. At LOGEX 37, there were several first-ever events, to include exercising the ACSA, the simulated delivery of equipment off the Equipment Afloat Ships (EAS) (which were conducting a ship visit in Thailand during LOGEX 37), and the attendance of two Australian officers as observers. The LOGEX successfully exercised the procedures for our support of our treaty partner, Thailand, during a nation threatening contingency. The release of War Reserve Stockpile-Thailand (WRS-Thai or WRS-T) was also exercised.<sup>18</sup>

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## Army Equipment Afloat Ships(U)

(U) On 24 February 1994, USCINCPAC, AMEMBASSY Bangkok, Military Sealift Command (MSC)-Far East, and JUSMAGTHAI formally introduced the Army Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS)(or Equipment Afloat Ships (EAS)) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives. The MOU would allow for up to 15 EAS (later 11) to be sited in Thailand. The Thais seemed receptive to the concept, although they suggested a formal MOU wasn't needed. They suggested a military-to-military agreement was a feasible option. USCINCPAC favored a written military-to-military agreement plus a diplomatic note providing Administrative and Technical (A&T) status for the six to fifteen MSC personnel on shore. OSD and DOS concurred with the USCINCPAC recommendation to make the EAS agreement a less formal military to military written agreement in the form of an annex to the existing Logistics MOU. While negotiations continued, the eight activated Army EAS were temporarily sited at Saipan and Diego Garcia.

(U) Negotiations continued into October regarding the siting of the EAS off the coast of Thailand. On 6 October 1994, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai met with President Clinton in Washington, DC, where the EAS issue was discussed. The Prime Minister noted the issue involved both international and domestic political considerations that required careful study, but no definitive answer was given.

(U) On 31 October, during a USCINCPAC visit to Thailand, Prime Minister Chuan informed Admiral Richard C. Macke that Thailand would not conclude an EAS agreement with the US. Chuan relayed the decision in response to ADM Macke's review of the EAS question during a courtesy call. A reevaluation then commenced which resulted in an internal review of potential follow-on sites which determined that Australia, Singapore, Malaysia,

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Philippines, and Brunei, either individually or in combination, were the best possibilities. At the end of 1994, due to "basing" concerns publicly expressed by various ASEAN countries, USCINCPAC was reviewing all possible siting options and related political implications prior to proceeding with any siting initiative.<sup>19</sup>

### Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements(U)

(U) One of USCINCPAC's goals was to gain reciprocal support arrangements to accomplish combined exercise goals and to enhance interoperability within the theater. A major component of this strategy was the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) which allowed for preapproved logistics cooperation with the minimum of red tape. An ACSA between the US and Malaysia was signed on 18 March 1994. The signing culminated a year-long negotiation process. An ACSA represented an advanced level of cooperation and was a significant milestone in US-Malaysian relations. At the time, only three other nations in Asia had ACSA agreements with the US: Australia, Republic of Korea, and Thailand. Discussions were continuing with other USPACOM countries, including Japan, Indonesia, Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, and Fiji. In July 1994, OSD and Joint Staff authorized USCINCPAC to sign the proposed ACSA with the Republic of Fiji. In September a request was forwarded to Joint Staff to add Bangladesh, Brunei, and India to the ACSA-eligible country list. Adding these countries to the ACSA-eligible list required Congressional notification. If Congress takes no action to withdraw the country from the list within 30 days of submission to Congress, the countries are automatically included on the list.<sup>20</sup>

(U) In October of 1993, discussions with the Republic of the Philippines on obtaining an ACSA were reopened. Negotiations were concluded in October 1994, and formal signing of the ACSA was scheduled for the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) Meeting in

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December 1994. Unfortunately, the Philippine Secretary of National Defense (SND), responding to local political pressure, canceled the ACSA signing. These political concerns were a result of inaccurate press reports linking the ACSA to a bases agreement, including the siting of EAS. The SND was to provide a re-draft of the ACSA at a later date.<sup>21</sup>

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## SECTION II—LOGISTICS RESOURCES(U)

### Munitions Storage Review(U)

(U) Late in 1993, the USCINCPAC Deputy Commander (DCINC) tasked the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance to produce a review of the munitions storage sites in the Pacific to assure the adequacy of storage facilities supporting OPLAN 5027. The review included storage requirements, storage capabilities, retrograde, and demilitarization (demil). Meetings were held with each of the Service components which produced a "snap shot" of all the munitions storage sites which supported 5027. The sites included Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii. The result was a broad picture of the status of storage capabilities in the theater. The results indicated that available storage capacity in the Pacific was sufficient to meet current and projected OPLAN requirements. Recommendations as a result of the review included a joint initiative to identify two joint demil sites in the AOR. In conjunction with this a CINC's Initiative Fund (CIF) project was being worked to provide a pool of money to be used by all components for Navy Opportune Lift. This fund would be used for both demil and retrograde, concentrating on the excess stockpiles that would most benefit USCINCPAC's Preferred Munitions Forward Program (PMFP). The report was published on 15 December 1993 and distributed in early 1994.<sup>22</sup>

(U) On 1 May 1994, the War Reserve Stocks - Thailand (WRS-Thai or WRS-T) program was finally completed. The 163 containers which comprised the fourth and fifth year deliveries of war reserve stocks were delivered to the port of Chuk Samet by two vessels, MV STRONG TEXAN and USNS REGULUS. The containers were then trucked in five successive convoys to the Korat Munitions Storage Area. On the second day of operations, Ambassador Lambertson flew to Korat with the Chief of JUSMAGTHAI,

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accompanied by a number of Thai general and flag officers. The Ambassador toured the magazine areas and then attended a luncheon hosted by the Thais. The Ambassador gave a speech complimenting the Thai military and JUSMAG and expressed desires for a continuation of the program for another five years. As of the end of 1994, efforts were under way to extend the agreement for five more years.<sup>23</sup>

### Makua Valley Open Burning/Open Detonation(U)

(U) In late FY 94, it was decided to eliminate open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) for routine munitions destruction purposes at Makua Valley Range on Oahu, Hawaii. The range was used primarily for company-level maneuver and live fire training by the 25th Infantry Division (Light) (25ID(L)). They also performed, although on a very small scale, OB/OD at a specific site on the range. The OB/OD operation came under scrutiny earlier this year due to the requirement for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-licensing of the "burn-pit" area. The cost of the EPA permit, the time involved, and the political realities of land use issues in Hawaii did not favorably balance with the range's very limited utility (300-lb explosive limit). Emergency destruction of munitions could continue at the facility, but routine destruction would have to be done elsewhere.<sup>24</sup>

### Kobe Earthquake Relief Support(U)

(U) Coordinated efforts by the DOS, Joint Staff J4 Logistics Response Cell (LRC), USCINCPAC J3 and J4, and USFJ were very successful in providing requested humanitarian assistance in the form of materiel taken from US military stocks in Japan. Materiel was provided from stocks at the US Army Sagami Depot and III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stocks at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni and Okinawa. Sagami Depot provided 42,299

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blankets, 7,430 water cans, 20 general purpose large tents, and 177 rolls of plastic sheeting. III MEF provided 15,161 blankets.

(U) Additionally, support was provided to the US Consulate in Kobe at the request of the US Embassy in Tokyo. They were provided with two 400 gallon water buffaloes, one 900 gallon rigid side truck, one radio HMMWV, one Water Distribution and Hose System. Twelve Marines were sent from MCAS Iwakuni to set up a water distribution system at the housing complex at the Consulate. One 900 gallon system was charging the heating system, while two 400 gallon systems were used for drinking water.

(U) Significant airlift support was also provided for the Kobe relief effort. The following airlift support was provided: 17 USMC MC-130 sorties, 41 USAF C-130 sorties, and 1 Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) B747.<sup>25</sup>

### Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS(U)

(U) USCINCPAC's Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) was activated for Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 94 (UFL 94) which provided training for 19 reservists and 8 active duty personnel. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was represented in the LRC by civilians from the DLA-Pacific Office who provided assistance in monitoring the notional flow of DLA-managed materiel into the theater. Also on hand to provide in-transit and total asset visibility of Service-managed materiel was a Rapid Area Distribution Support Team from HQ Air Force Materiel Command. An intensive three-day training package was put together for the exercise participants that included a review of crisis action planning and execution in USPACOM; instruction on crisis action organization and procedures; and familiarization with exercise operations, intelligence, and the current theater logistics posture. Exercise participants also received LAN training and

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LRC computer and communications training. The upgraded computer and communications in the newly renovated LRC facility provided an outstanding training environment. The exercise training objectives were met and valuable lessons were learned that would improve performance.<sup>26</sup>

### Offshore Petroleum Discharge System Operations During Exercise FREEDOM BANNER 94(U)

(U) Exercise FREEDOM BANNER 94 (FB 94) was an annual power projection exercise that included deploying a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to link up with a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS). FB 94 integrated Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) training into the USCINCPAC exercise program by including the first tactical employment of the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). There were three general training objectives: demonstrate OPDS in the USCINCPAC AOR, train OPDS operators, and activate a ready reserve fleet OPDS tanker. The primary reason for integrating the OPDS in FB 94 was to train CINCPACFLT units in the operation of the system. Prior to this exercise, the units were untrained and had limited exposure to the complex system. The OPDS had a checkered past. Previous attempts to use the system were considered either failures or no more than qualified successes.

(U) FREEDOM BANNER was conducted during the entire month of July 1994. Approximately 210,000 gallons of fuel were pumped ashore in two separate pumping operations. The ship's crew, Amphibious Construction Battalion 1, together with the Bulk Fuel Company, 9th Engineer Support Battalion, executed their missions flawlessly. Rigid environmental guidelines that were developed prior to the exercise were strictly adhered to throughout the operation. There were no incidents of fuel spills or leaks in either the ocean or on shore.<sup>27</sup>

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### Exercise COBRA GOLD 1994(U)

(U) Exercise COBRA GOLD 94 concluded in Thailand with the airlift of 5,374 passengers and 1,339 short tons of cargo from CONUS, Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii. The Exercise cost \$16,000,000 and used 31 C-5, 41 C-141, 22 C-130, and 11 wide-body aircraft to deploy and redeploy the loads. Additionally, the Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) REGULUS carried approximately 102,000 square feet of cargo into Thailand. This was the first time a FSS was used in a USPACOM exercise. The successful test offered users more lift capability than required and allowed USPACOM ports to test load procedures of this large ship. COBRA GOLD also had 996 people moved under an individual commercial ticket program which was funded by the Joint Staff. Under this program HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC) was provided a fund cite by the Joint Staff to pay for individuals to travel to an overseas port. This program offered AMC flexibility when it was not cost effective to assign an entire aircraft to a small group of passengers.<sup>28</sup>

### Containerized Munitions Project for the Pacific and Exercise TURBO CADS 94(U)

(U) Due to the fact that containerization of munitions is considerably less expensive and much more expedient than shipping break-bulk, USCINCPAC's objective was to make the Pacific AOR fully container capable. A USPACOM Munitions Containerization Working Group was established in the Logistics Directorate to facilitate the achievement of that goal. The working group first met on 7 January 1994. This was to be a joint effort and included the components on the working group. A plan of action and milestones document was developed by this group.<sup>29</sup>

(U) A CIF project to reposition preferred munitions forward in the theater using Navy opportune lift was disapproved by the Joint Staff. As a fallback position, USCINCPAC began working with USTRANSCOM and the Components to put together a

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containerized munitions exercise in the Pacific. The Joint Staff gave their full support to the exercise and, following a briefing of the concept to USTRANSCOM personnel and Service representatives by the USCINCPAC Munitions Branch, USCINCPAC was able to secure \$6,600,000 for the exercise. The exercise was intended to move needed munitions forward, retrograde nonessential munitions, and allow an evaluation of the ability to handle containers in the theater. The exercise would also provide an opportunity to evaluate In-Transit Visibility (ITV) concepts along with any other new ideas in the container movement business. (Most of all, however, it would move preferred munitions forward, thus freeing-up valuable lift assets should a contingency arise. This exercise was to be known as TURBO CADS ("CADS" for Containerized Ammunition Distribution System). The concept for the exercise was to move munitions via containers throughout the theater and involve a number of transportation nodes, including Korea, Okinawa, Guam, Alaska, and Hiro, Japan. The munitions moved would be items that had been awaiting movement funding for some time.<sup>30</sup>

(U) TURBO CADS permitted USPACOM components to validate assumptions regarding when and what to program regarding required equipment and training to ensure timely acquisition of a badly needed comprehensive CADS capability in the Pacific. Additionally, the exercise assisted in stockpile modernization efforts by moving munitions that might otherwise not get transportation funding for many years. Loading of the ships began in late August 1994 and all actions were complete as of the end of November. Two Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships were used for the exercise: a Ready Reserve Fleet ship, GREEN WAVE, and another ship under contract to MSC, GEM STATE. The loadings took place at two Pacific coast ports: Indian Island, Washington, and Concord Naval Weapons Station, California. In the largest movement of munitions in the USCINCPAC AOR since Operation DESERT STORM, these ships moved approximately 8,700

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short tons in 846 containers into the theater, 12,000 short tons in 487 containers plus break bulk retrograde out of the theater. About 1,800 short tons were moved within the theater. The entire exercise cost was approximately \$16,000,000. Exercise TURBO CADS was considered highly successful and work began on an additional, albeit smaller in scale, TURBO CADS for 1995.<sup>31</sup>

### Joint Mortuary Affairs Office-Pacific Annual Training Conference(U)

(U) The Joint Mortuary Affairs Office-Pacific (JMAO-PAC), assigned to the USCINCPAC J4 and staffed solely by reservists, met annually to conduct its annual training. JMAO-PAC conference was held 28 February through 11 March 1994. The conference agenda included doctrinal updates, tours of local Mortuary Affairs operations and facilities, a video-teleconference with the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Office at Fort Lee, Virginia, and the development of a JMAO command post exercise (CPX) to be conducted in conjunction with Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 95. During contingency operations the JMAO-PAC was activated to provide oversight of mortuary affairs support to the JTF or supported commander.<sup>32</sup>

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## SECTION III—MOBILITY OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS PLANS (U)

### 1994 USCINCPAC J4 Logistics Conference (U)

(U) The first ever in-depth USCINCPAC J4 Logistics Conference was held on Oahu 18-19 October 1994 in the HQ USCINCPAC Gaming and Simulation Facility. The conference was geared to the O-6 and below action officers (or civilian equivalents) with the objective to discuss Pacific Theater issues and other topics of general interest. The conference was co-chaired by the USCINCPAC Deputy J4, and the Chief, Mobility Operations and Logistics Plans Division. Approximately 60-70 people from various commands and agencies participated.<sup>33</sup>

### Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Seminar and Exercise (U)

(U) A Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSO&I) Seminar and exercise was attended in Seoul, Korea, 12-20 April 1994. The purpose was to exercise USFK/CFC staff, selected subordinate commands, components, and selected ROK and US logistics agencies on RSO&I of OPLAN 5027 Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). The RSO&I exercise was exclusively focused on internal issues requiring attention by the USFK/CFC staffs. Moreover, it seemed that the exercise was designed for success by not stressing critical elements of the RSO&I system. The primary reason the system could not be realistically stressed was that Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) was the system chosen to exercise RSO&I. CBS was a tactical simulation not designed to exercise RSO&I and, therefore, did not fulfill the expectations of logisticians responsible to execute the RSO&I mission.

(U) RSO&I was a good first step in solving a very complex set of logistical problems that required intense synchronization. The value was not in the exercise play, but in the opportunity for all involved to coordinate and research issues that had never

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been explored previously. With yearly RSO&I exercises that continue to build upon this important first step, this critical mission will ultimately become institutionalized and better understood by all concerned.<sup>34</sup>

### Reduced Availability of C-141 Assets(U)

(U) HQ AMC announced that all 61 of the C-141s returned for rework in October-December 1993 were grounded due to fuel contamination problems causing engine roll-back to idle while operating at low rpms. This restriction was later expanded to include all C-141s as others also had fuel contamination problems from an unknown source. The reworked aircraft were subsequently found contaminated with dust from the boron material used to repair wing weep hole cracks.

(U) The end result was that USPACOM had only one rather than the usual four to eight C-141s in theater. The shortfall was compensated for by increased use of theater C-130s and chartered commercial aircraft. PACAF surged three of the C-130s stationed at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, to assist the 16 stationed at Yokota. No channel flights or Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs) were canceled due to lack of lift.

(U) Another impact in the USCINCPAC AOR was increased costs for several of the theater exercises which used partially loaded C-5s to move military cargo, and increased O&M expenditures by other units forced to rely on the commercial ticket program to move their personnel to and from exercises.<sup>35</sup>

### Army Afloat Pre-Positioned Zero-Based Study(U)

(U) Joint Staff J4 tasked HQ USCINCPAC to review and provide comments to the Army Afloat Pre-positioned Zero-based Study prepared by USTRANSCOM. The study recommended both interim

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and final siting plans for the Afloat Pre-positioned Force, including the Army's proposed Afloat Pre-positioned Brigade. HQ USCINCPAC J4 recommended that USCINCPAC nonconcur with the study because it proposed to site the Army Afloat Brigade at Diego Garcia rather than Thailand as recommended in earlier preliminary studies. This siting recommendation was unacceptable to USCINCPAC as it delayed closure of heavy combat equipment to Korea by 4.5 days, although with little or no delays to Southwest Asia. The study also recommended that petroleum tankers be sited in Thailand. Again, this recommendation was unacceptable to USCINCPAC as on-going negotiations with Thailand did not include tankers as part of the flotilla anchored in Thailand.

(U) HQ USCINCPAC J4 received support from both the USCINCPAC and USFK staffs and, with the approval of the DCINC, nonconcurrent to Joint Staff J4. USCINCPAC received additional support from Joint Staff J3, which agreed that the siting of the Army Afloat Brigade at Thailand best met the response requirements of major regional conflicts (MRCs) east and west. USCINCPAC was the only CINC to nonconcur with the interim siting plan. USTRANSCOM was to relook the plan and the Joint Staff would forward the study with comments to CJCS for a decision.<sup>36</sup>

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## SECTION IV—FACILITIES ENGINEERING(U)

### Return of Kaho'olawe Island to the State of Hawaii(U)

(U) Although bombing practice may have begun on Kaho'olawe Island as early as 1935, the US Army first subleased the island for military training for one dollar per year from the Kaho'olawe Ranch on 10 May 1941. The sublease was renewable annually through the end of June 1954 when the Kaho'olawe Ranch lease with the Territory of Hawaii expired; there was no requirement in the sublease for the Army to restore the island to its previous condition, and ranch operations were allowed to continue. Following the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, martial law was declared, all ranching ceased, and the island began to be used exclusively for military training of all types. Following World War II, use of Kaho'olawe for military training continued.<sup>37</sup>

(U) On 20 February 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10436 placing Kaho'olawe Island under the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary of the Navy. The executive order states that when the island was no longer needed "for naval purposes," the Navy was to notify the Territory of Hawaii and "upon seasonable request of the Territory, render such area, or such portion thereof, reasonably safe for human habitation, without cost to the Territory." Through the years the island remained a highly valuable area for all types of joint/combined arms training such as aerial bombing, naval bombardment, amphibious assault, unit training, etc. Kaho'olawe remained under US ownership and Navy jurisdiction until 1994.<sup>38</sup>

(U) Lack of access to and bombing of Kaho'olawe became a catalyst for the nascent Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Kaho'olawe became a highly visible political issue in 1971 when Maui Mayor Elmer Cravalho (Kaho'olawe was part of the County of

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Maui) and the organization "Life of the Land" sued to stop Navy bombing. The suit was dismissed, but the Navy was ordered to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). Agitation continued throughout the next two decades. In 1976, nine Hawaiians and sympathizers landed on Kaho'olawe to protest the Navy bombing. This was the first of many protest landings which occurred through 1979.

(U) In 1978, a MOU was signed between the State of Hawaii and the US Navy wherein they agreed to cooperate in efforts to restore the island.<sup>39</sup> Prior to the MOU signing, a lawsuit was filed in 1976 by the "Protect Kaho'olawe Ohana" and Dr. Noa Emmett Aluli. This suit resulted in a 1980 federal court consent decree and order requiring the Navy to prepare another EIS, conduct an archaeological survey, protect cultural sites, and provide access for the Protect Kaho'olawe Ohana to the island for religious, cultural, and educational purposes. Further, the Protect Kaho'olawe Ohana's desire to act as "stewards" for the island was recognized. The Navy agreed to survey the island, clear surface ordnance from some of it, and limit ordnance impact training to the central third.<sup>40</sup> In 1981, Kaho'olawe was placed on the National Register of Historic Places.

(U) The end of the bombing on Kaho'olawe was signaled with introduction of US Senate Bill 3088 (S.3088) in September 1990. S.3088 was introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka on behalf of himself and Senator Daniel Inouye on 10 September 1990 during the second session of the 101st Congress. The four major objectives proposed in this bill were (1) establishment of the Kaho'olawe Island Conveyance Commission (KICC) to "study and recommend terms and conditions for returning Kaho'olawe Island, Hawaii, from the United States to the State of Hawaii," (2) prohibiting use of the land as a bombing range, (3) providing for a study of a potential marine sanctuary in the vicinity of the island, and (4) limiting improvements to the land during the period of the study.

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(U) While S.3088 did not pass, parts of the bill's provisions became enacted via the FY 91 DOD Appropriations Act, PL 101-511, signed into law on 5 November 1990; Section 8118 provided funding for a "Kaho'olawe Island Commission," and Section 8119 barred the use of any funds appropriated for conducting "bombing training, gunnery training, or similar munitions delivery training" on Kaho'olawe. PL 101-511 appropriated \$1,500,000 for the Department of the Navy to support KICC operations through September 1992.<sup>41</sup> A whale sanctuary study proposed in S.3088 was funded by a separate Department of Commerce appropriation.

(U) President George Bush issued a memorandum on 22 October 1990 which halted all bombing and munitions training on Kaho'olawe.<sup>42</sup> While the reasons for issuing the memorandum had very much to do with election year politics, the effect was the same: all use of Kaho'olawe as a weapons range stopped. It was, however, still used for training (amphibious assault, etc.), albeit there was no live-fire associated with that training.<sup>43</sup>

(U) President Bush's memorandum of 22 October further directed the SECDEF to "establish a joint Department of Defense-State of Hawaii commission to examine the future status of Kaho'olawe and related issues." That memorandum together with the provisions of the 1991 DOD Appropriations Act previously mentioned resulted in the establishment of the Kaho'olawe Island Conveyance Commission. The KICC was composed of five members: two appointed by SECNAV, two appointed by the Governor of the State of Hawaii, and one appointed by the Administrator of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). Former Maui Mayor Hannibal Tavares was appointed Chairman of the KICC. Members of the commission served without compensation except for travel expenses and per diem. The first KICC interim report was due 31 July 1991 and the final report was due two years after the date of the

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first commission meeting. The KICC expired 30 days after the final report was submitted to Congress.

(U) In July 1992, Admiral Larson requested that the components in Hawaii identify options for the future training use of Kaho'olawe. Each option was to fully consider and analyze accompanying responsibilities in complying with executive orders, EISS, laws, regulations, and the existing Consent Decree. Following the final response in August 1993, all involved, from the components to the CNO and Senator Inouye, concurred that without the ability to conduct live-fire exercises, Kaho'olawe had no utility to the military. On 4 September 1993, Admiral Larson informed SECDEF and CJCS that he had met with Senator Inouye and informed him that without the capability to conduct live firing, the Navy intended to relinquish control of Kaho'olawe.

(U) It should be kept in mind, however, that it was never determined that Kaho'olawe was no longer needed for naval or other military purposes. In fact, there was still a clear need to use the island for training. In an end-of-tour (EOT) interview conducted on 19 April 1994, ADM Charles R. Larson, USCINCPAC, when asked how the loss of Kaho'olawe had affected military training in Hawaii, responded:

(U) The loss of Kaho'olawe has really affected our ability to do joint/combined arms training. It's the only place in Hawaii where I can bring together all facets of amphibious, artillery, mortars, close air support, Naval gun fire, all together in one place, which you can't do on the Big Island at Pohakuloa or anywhere else.

Admiral Larson went on to say in the interview that the only place that this kind of training could be conducted in the AOR now was on the West Coast of the United States and this made

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training for the ships home-ported at Pearl Harbor much more expensive.<sup>44</sup>

(U) Congress approved the recommendation to return the island to the state and authorized \$400,000,000 over ten years for ordnance clearing and restoration. The law requiring conveyance and cleanup of Kaho'olawe was signed by President Clinton on 11 November 1993 as part of the FY 94 Defense Appropriations Act (Title X). SECNAV was to control access to the island until cleanup was complete or for ten years, whichever came first, and an MOU was to be concluded with the State of Hawaii. The Commander, Naval Base (COMNAVBASE) Pearl Harbor was designated as the DOD point of contact for restoration and return of Kaho'olawe to the state and was delegated the authority to conduct negotiations with regard to the MOU and related agreements. Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command would assist COMNAVBASE in clearing the island and preserving archaeological sites.<sup>45</sup>

(U) The Kaho'olawe Island Reserve legislation passed by the Hawaii State Legislature designated Kaho'olawe a Hawaiian cultural reserve and provided for a commission to manage the island for "rehabilitation, cultural restoration and preservation, education, culture access and practices." The Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission (KIRC) was subsequently established with Dr. Aluli appointed as Chairman. The law stated that the Office of State Planning and the Attorney General, in consultation with the KIRC, "will pursue conveyance of Kaho'olawe to the state, provided that the state shall transfer management and control of the island and its waters to a future Hawaiian nation."<sup>46</sup>

(U) An MOU between the Navy and the State of Hawaii regarding the cleanup of Kaho'olawe was signed and recorded with the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances on Friday, 6 May 1994.

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The MOU was signed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Conversion and Redevelopment) (DASN(C&R)) William J. Cassidy, Jr., and RADM William A. Retz, USN, COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor on behalf of Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), John H. Dalton. It was signed by Governor John Waihee and Noa Emmett Aluli, M.D., Chair KIRC on behalf of the State of Hawaii.<sup>47</sup> In ceremonies held Saturday, 7 May, Kaho'olawe was conveyed to the State of Hawaii in a ceremonial signing of the documents of conveyance by DASN(C&R) Cassidy. The ceremonial transfer from federal to state ownership occurred at Palauea Beach, Maui, between Wailea and Makena, in view of Kaho'olawe because the logistical problems were too great to do the ceremony on Kaho'olawe. On 9 May, the transfer of the title (Quitclaim Deed) was recorded with the State Bureau of Conveyances in both English and Hawaiian.<sup>48</sup> Although the state now owned Kaho'olawe, under the terms of the MOU, the Navy would continue to control access for the next ten years or until the cleanup was complete, whichever came first.

(U) The only outstanding matters remaining with regard to Kaho'olawe were completion of the cleanup and creation of the "future Hawaiian nation" referred to in the state legislation which will take over the island from the state. The latter was a responsibility of the Hawaiians and the State of Hawaii. The cleanup was planned to begin in 1995.<sup>49</sup>

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## SECTION V—SECURITY ASSISTANCE(U)

(U) Total budgeted administrative costs for the Security Assistance (SA) program in the USCINCPAC AOR in FY 94 (i.e., as of 1 October 1993) was \$9,444,900. This was an increase of over \$1,502,300 or almost 20 percent over FY 93.<sup>50</sup> Due to cutbacks in SA funding, however, the FY 95 administrative funding (i.e., as of 1 October 1994) dropped to \$8,049,100, a decrease of almost 15 percent.<sup>51</sup> Budget cuts also resulted in cutbacks of Security Assistance billets mandated by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).<sup>52</sup> The three areas of SA utilized in the USCINCPAC AOR were International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

### International Military Education and Training(U)

(U) During FY 94, IMET funding for 16 of 22 eligible nations within the USPACOM AOR was \$2,935,000 with which 338 students were trained. This was a decrease from FY 93 of approximately 61 percent. As a percentage of the worldwide total of \$22,250,000, however, funding distribution remained relatively constant from FY 93 to FY 94 (dropping only from 13.8 percent in FY 93 to approximately 13.2 percent in FY 94). Malaysia, which was previously suspended, began receiving IMET funding, and Cambodia received IMET funding for the first time in FY 94. IMET funding for Burma (Myanmar), Fiji, and Indonesia remained suspended throughout FY 94. The lower funding levels<sup>53</sup> and restriction on some countries<sup>54</sup> were a serious setback to the USPACOM SA program and the Cooperative Engagement strategy.<sup>55</sup>

### Foreign Military Financing(U)

(U) FMF provided financing through grants and loans for the purchase of US defense articles and services. Generally, FMF

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provided financing for FMS, although selected countries were authorized to procure defense articles and services through direct commercial contracts with US firms outside the FMS channels. Although no specific country in the USPACOM AOR is listed as receiving FMF grants or loans in FY 94, Cambodia seems to have received a specified amount funding, which may have been for demining assistance.<sup>56</sup>

TABLE IV-4(U)<sup>57</sup>

## USCINCPAC FY 94 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES(U)

COUNTRY	DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES	CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN
Australia	\$261,354,000	
Indonesia	10,785,000	
Japan	729,275,000	
Korea (South)	433,160,000	
Madagascar	100,000	
Malaysia	738,612,000	
Mauritius	650,000	
New Zealand	15,830,000	
Philippines	21,238,000	
Seychelles	1,000	\$39,000
Singapore	456,340,000	
Sri Lanka	204,000	
Taiwan	360,891,000	
Thailand	218,564,000	
Tonga	15,000	
TOTALS	\$3,247,019,000	\$39,000

### Foreign Military Sales(U)

(U) FMS was a system through which government-to-government sales of military goods and services occurred. Through FMS, the US offered to sell defense articles and service (including training and construction and design) to friendly countries and allies. Fifteen countries signed FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) during FY 94. The amount of the articles and services is recorded when the LOA is signed regardless of when the articles and services were or will be delivered. Table IV-4 shows the total dollar value by country in the USCINCPAC AOR of

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FMS LOAs signed in FY 94. Only one country in USPACOM signed an FMS LOA for Construction and Design and that was Seychelles. All other FMS LOAs were signed for Defense Articles and Services.<sup>58</sup>

### FY 95-96 USPACOM Security Assistance Training Management Review(U)

(U) The 20th annual Security Assistance Training Program Management Review (SATPMR) was held 16-25 March 1994 and attended by 87 SA community conferees including representatives from DSAA, DOS, the military departments (MILDEPS), and 22 USPACOM AOR Security Assistance Organization (SAO) training managers. Country two-year training plans were coordinated, budget year training programs were finalized, and training policy, program, and planning issues were reconciled. Of particular note were the effects of the 50 percent FY 94 IMET reduction and USCINCPAC efforts to minimize the impact of the reductions on the Cooperative Engagement Strategy. Cost-sharing agreements, alternative training opportunities, and a renewed emphasis towards PME and the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses were stressed as methods to lessen the impact of the reduction and maximize each IMET dollar. An important feature of the SATPMR was the effort to automate the process and achieve a paperless review. Initial results indicated that the prototype program provided a significant advances in accuracy and efficiency of the process. As a result, SAO training managers departed the workshop with an accurate listing of their program, including a bottom-line cost figure.<sup>59</sup>

### US-ROK Security Cooperation Committee(U)

(U) During the period 9-10 August 1994, the USCINCPAC directors for Strategic Planning and Policy and Logistics and Security Assistance, together with the ROK Minister of National Defense (MND) co-hosted the US-ROK Security Cooperation Committee (SCC). Mr. H. Diehl McKalip, Deputy Director, DSAA and Second

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Assistant Minister Ahn Byong Kil, MND co-chaired the meeting. Major discussions focused on the K-1 tank upgun program and the Korean request for a FMS case for the Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ). With regard to the K-1 tank upgun program, the US representatives expressed concerns about sensitive technology control, safety issues, and interoperability problems should the ROK purchase from a non-US source. Relative to the FMS case for the ASPJ, it was not part of the US military inventory and thus not available through the FMS system, although it was available through commercial sources. Mr. McKalip encouraged the ROK representatives to pursue alternatives to the ASPJ to satisfy the Korea Fighter Program requirement.<sup>60</sup>

### US-ROK Defense Technological and Industrial Cooperation Committee(U)

(U) USCINCPAC hosted the US-ROK Defense Technological and Industrial Cooperation Committee (DTICC) meeting on 10 August 1994. The meeting was co-chaired by the USCINCPAC Director for Logistics and Security Assistance, Brig Gen Keith Tedrow (representing Mr. Al Volkman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cooperative Programs), and Major General Choi Soo Woong, Director, Acquisition Policy Bureau, ROK MND. During the meeting the ROK delegates asked the US representatives to provide a response to a Technology Transfer Desired List presented to Mr. Volkman's office. They also requested US assistance in applying offset policies for FMS cases and, in this transaction, Korea receive the same treatment as NATO. US representatives reassured the ROK delegates that technology transfer control is applied equally to Korea as it was to NATO allies. The two sides also discussed the concept of a Research and Development (R&D) Umbrella MOU to facilitate specific co-R&D efforts. This issue would be reviewed for future discussion.<sup>61</sup>

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### Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference(U)

(U) The 26th Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference (PACSAC 94) was held 7-9 December 1994 at the Ilikai Hotel in Honolulu, Hawaii. LTG David A. Bramlett, Deputy Commander in Chief, USCINCPAC, presented the opening address to a group of over 100 SA professionals. The theme for the conference was "Security Assistance—A Cooperative Approach." Issues included the future of SA programs and the role of the SAO in promoting USCINCPAC's Cooperative Engagement Strategy. The Military-to-Military (Mil-Mil) Contact Program and quality of life issues were the focus of much attention and were to be addressed in after action reports.<sup>62</sup>

(U) During PACSAC 94, DSAA personnel provided HQ USCINCPAC with guidelines for the allocation of funds for the new Mil-Mil Contact Program (MMCP). Although MMCP was originally designed with a European perspective, the 1994 Congress earmarked \$2,000,000 for use in the Pacific. Based on DSAA's guidance it appeared two countries in the Pacific theater best fit the intent and purpose of the MMCP funding authority: Cambodia and Mongolia. Specific projects for these two countries were being reviewed for applicability to MMCP as of the end of 1995. Since oversight of MMCP resides with DSAA, management of the program in USPACOM was in the Logistics and Security Assistance Directorate, Security Assistance Division (J45).<sup>63</sup>

### Japanese Technology Transfer(U)

(U) The US is the only nation to which Japan may transfer military technology information. While Japan is considered a significant potential contributor to US defense technology, concern persists of unequal "technical flowback" despite some improvements. Military technology transfers were accomplished via cooperative R&D programs, data exchange agreements, co-

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production MOUs, and the Joint Military Technology Commission (JMTC). The Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO), Japan, as the US focal point for Japanese technology transfer, characterized the technology exchange relationship as improving, but not yet equitable. The structures for transfer of Japanese technology to the US were established and functioning. Progress had been made with co-production Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) flowback, and increased cooperative R&D also promised to enhance technology transfer.<sup>64</sup>

### Performance Evaluation Group Reports(U)

(FOUO) The USCINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) was composed of personnel from the SA Division (J45) with augmentation from other directorates and agencies as required. The PEG operated in coordination with the USCINCPAC Inspector General to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of each SAO in PACOM. It also provided information and recommendations to improve the SA programs. During FY 94 three PEG reports were completed: India Defense Supply Advisor (DSA), 24-26 January 1994; Nepal Defense Attaché, 27-28 January 1994; and Singapore Defense Attaché, 4-6 May 1994.<sup>65</sup>

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## CHAPTER V STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY SECTION I—STRATEGY AND REQUIREMENTS

### Pacific Command Strategy (U)

#### Objectives (U)

(U) The Pacific Command Strategy (PCS) promulgated on 3 August 1992 by Admiral Larson remained the USCINCPAC strategy during 1994. It supported the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the National Security Strategy, and the President's policy of Peacetime Engagement. Formally called Cooperative Engagement, the PCS sought to employ limited forces throughout the theater as a means of achieving our strategic objectives.<sup>1</sup>

(U) As strategy was the art of employing the elements of national power to achieve national interests and objectives, so the Pacific Command Strategy was the art of employing USPACOM military resources and other national instruments of power to achieve U.S. security objectives in the Pacific Region. It spanned the continuum of relations among nations in the region from conditions of forward presence operations to conflicts of a local, regional, or even global nature. Objectives for those conditions were:

- (U) In peacetime, to gain access and influence with nations of the region in order to further U.S. interests and maintain stability.
- (U) In conflict, to react swiftly and decisively to protect American interests, to bolster deterrence and reduce the risk of conflict. Should that fail, to achieve rapid and decisive victory.

(U) To meet those broad objectives, the PCS had two basic and interrelated components—one that specified how forces and

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resources were to be used in peacetime, the other how forces would be used in wartime. The core strategic concept remained deterrence, created through a combination of means that ranged from forward presence and deployments to exercises.

(U) Forward deployed forces were the most important means to provide presence, and indicated a clear commitment to deterrence. U.S. commitment became more evident and deterrence enhanced when forward deployed forces conducted exercises or other combined operations with friendly and allied nations, and, given the significant time and distance factors in the Pacific, forward deployed forces often provided the fastest and only practical military response option. Reinforcements to add fighting capability and logistical support to sustain forward deployed forces were needed, and adequate sea and airlift were key to crisis response, reinforcement, and sustainment.

(U) Pacific security and stability was enhanced by alliances and friendships with nations with shared interests, and led to shared responsibilities for deterring mutually perceived threats. The tremendous diversity among Pacific nations and the resultant need to tailor the approach to meet the often unique needs and concerns of each were recognized by the PCS, which focused on improving the network of bilateral security relationships with friends and allies

### Components (U)

#### Peacetime Component (U)

(U) The overall objective of the Peacetime Component of the PCS was to gain and maintain access and influence with the nations of the region and to encourage them to adopt complementary roles and missions. Actions during peacetime were aimed at ensuring that if deterrence failed, USPACOM would have the resources required to respond and the access to facilities,

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infrastructure, and airspace needed to facilitate deterrence operations and execute conflict contingencies.

(B)(1)(1.4a)

(B)(1)(1.4b)

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(U) Implementation of the Peacetime Component was often complex because of the wide scope of activities and the requirement for coordinating and integrating them with other Federal agencies and the respective country teams. In each case, military and security activities were tailored to the needs of individual nations and complemented the efforts of the Ambassadors' country team to achieve the broad objectives of the strategy. Military activities included exercises, peacetime search and rescue, civil military operations, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and peacetime surveillance. Security activities included security assistance, international military information, USPACOM supported U.S. Information Agency (USIA) Cooperative Programs, logistics improvements, ship visits, the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Expanded Relations Program, and Title 10 expenditures.

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## Conflict Component (U)

(U) The Conflict Component of the PCS covered conflicts ranging from localized contingencies such as semi- or non-permissive non-combatant evacuation or insurgency/counterinsurgency, to regional conflict and global war. Objectives of this component were to respond swiftly and decisively with appropriate force to deter conflict and protect American lives and interests. If deterrence failed, to employ overwhelming military force to achieve swift victory on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies.

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
(U) Uncertainty and instability were the watchwords for difficult to predict lesser regional contingencies, and specific objectives had to be developed for each conflict that arose. The overarching political objective in such a contingency was to resolve the situation short of actual conflict, and if that failed to deter escalation of the conflict to higher levels of intensity. Military objectives would be formulated from the political objectives for each situation, and would specify the desired end-state. If deterrence failed, the objective would be to apply sufficient force to achieve decisive results quickly. Flexibility was the overriding concept, as it was easier to

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
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predict what types of operations might be required than to specify where. The strategy was based primarily on type except where there were existing geographic responsibilities, as in Korea, Japan, Alaska, and Guam.


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
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
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Commander's Intent (U)

(U) The future challenge was to maintain a credible force posture that was flexible, responsive to the National Command Authority (NCA), and supportive of U.S. strategic goals and objectives in the region. USCINCPAC was not immune to budget and policy deliberations and the expected reductions, but would continue to protect and further U.S. national interests with available assets and resources.


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
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Regional Policies (U)

Northeast Asia (U)

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Southeast Asia (U)

(U) A region experiencing considerable change and political uncertainty, Southeast Asia was the gateway between the Pacific

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and Indian Oceans. U.S. interests in SEA continued to focus on individual bilateral relationships with the six member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The collective strength of the relationships provided the basis for U.S. involvement and presence in the region, which contributed to regional stability, enhanced deterrence, reduced response time by U.S. forces in crises, promoted regional prosperity, and fostered the ability of ASEAN nations not only to operate not only with us but with each other. For the Philippines, the U.S. goal was to maintain historic friendly relations with the government and the strong bonds between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the U.S. military. The preservation and development of forward training capabilities was a primary USCINCPAC concern.

### South Pacific (U)

(U) USCINCPAC's South Pacific policy was to continue to develop and maintain goodwill with the island nations to foster support for U.S. regional and international policies. Upcoming 50th anniversary of World War II events would provide excellent opportunities to renew abundant goodwill engendered during the war. Australia continued to lead in providing aid and technical assistance to South Pacific island nations. U.S. policy was to support Australian initiatives, where possible, and U.S. interests would be best served by an even closer and stronger relationship with the Australians in the future.

### Indian Ocean (U)

(U) Dominated in economic, political, and military terms by India, the changing balance of power in the Indian Ocean impacted on U.S. security interests. Rapid population growth coupled with problems from lagging economies, political instability, ethnic violence, and competition for strategic natural resources fostered regional views that emphasized self determination and nationalism. The region had significant mineral and other

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natural resources, important sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and economic markets of long-term strategic importance to the United States. U.S. budget constraints would require greater creativity and flexibility in foreign policy and military strategy to maintain regional stability and security, and to guarantee U.S. access and influence. U.S. Indian Ocean policy required closer coordination with allies and improved bilateral relations with key countries. There was mutual benefit in more extensive and improved military-to-military relations between the United States and India, but an improved relationship could not be at the expense of other friends in the region.

### Bilateral Relationships and Other Activities (U)

(U) USPACOM Foreign Military Relations and World War II Commemorative Activities for 1993, 1994, and 1995 will be covered in Sections III and IV, respectively, in the 1995 USCINCPAC Command History. Status and development of operations plans for 1994 and 1995 will be covered in the 1995 Command History.

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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> USCINCPACINST S3050.6A (S/NF), 3 Aug 92, Subj: Pacific Command Strategy (U), w/CH-1, S10 (S/NF), 11 May 93.

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