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REVIEW
OF
UNITED STATES
OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

April 1960



Prepared by:

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obligations for their defense and to possess the capability to fulfill its commitments.

The foregoing review of the elements of the national military

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NLE MR Case No. 78-3
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29 October 1959

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 78-3 #38

By bc NLE Date 3/5/75

Dear Mr. President:

At this morning's meeting, you referred to the report submitted to you in December 1957 by Frank Nash, which was concerned with U. S. Overseas Military Bases. In preparing his report, Mr. Nash consulted the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Unified Commanders. I thought you might be interested in refreshing your memory by the following pertinent excerpts from this report:

"We will have need for such a [base] system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order (a) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot calculate on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; (b) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces if being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capacities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and (c) to promote US political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies. (pages 8-9)

"Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smothered." The foregoing analysis of the

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Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as
President of the United States,
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)
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of Defense a re-examination of the United States overseas military base system and a review of the

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
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FOREWORD

This report has been prepared in compliance with a request by the President to the Secretary of Defense for a re-examination of the United States overseas military base system and a review of the findings and recommendations contained in the Report to the President in December 1957 by the late Mr. Frank C. Nash.

The report is addressed to the conclusions of the Nash Report concerning the continuing need of the overseas base system for the foreseeable future, that is, the next five to ten years. It does not consider those portions of the Nash Report that deal primarily with the political aspects of retaining the overseas base system.

Part I of the report is a general review and summary. Part II contains a detailed review and evaluation of the overseas bases by area and function for the 1960-1963 time period and a general forecast of overseas base requirements from 1963 through 1969.

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STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OVERSEAS BASES

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SUMMARY

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

The present system of U.S. military facilities abroad is essential to an effective fulfillment of our basic national strategy. It provides a basis of support and dispersal necessary for the retaliatory forces of the Strategic Air Command, the naval carrier and submarine strike forces, and other strike forces in forward areas. It permits the forward deployment of ground, sea, and air forces in Europe and the Far East, where the security interests of the United States require military strength to deter or deal swiftly with any military action against these free world areas and to fulfill collective security commitments with free world allies. It also offers, with limitations, facilities necessary to deploy mobile forces to areas of the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia in response to contingencies which might require commitment of these forces.

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Our present system of overseas bases enhances greatly our ability to defend the U.S. mainland against enemy attack. Early strategic intelligence indicating hostile action against the United States is facilitated by use of a considerable number of observation posts situated around the periphery of the USSR and China. This intelligence is transmitted over an extensive, world-wide communications system, which also serves as an essential element in ensuring adequate control and administration of modern U.S. military forces. Early tactical warning of an air or missile attack, as well as surveillance or combat operations against attacking forces, is supported to a great degree by the extensive U.S. base system around the North American continent. Lastly, our present base system serves the many and varied research, testing, and development activities associated with the newer, long-range weapons and the exploration of space.

C 2.

R + D.

Overseas bases will continue to play an essential role in national defense for the next decade. The advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile and the sea-launched intermediate range ballistic missile will not eliminate or reduce substantially the requirement for overseas bases during this period. The Strategic Air Command will continue to rely in large part on the manned bomber. While the peacetime utilization of overseas bases by the strategic retaliatory forces may be reduced to some degree in the latter part of the decade, wartime use of these bases by these forces will remain a requirement. There will be a continuing need for the forward deployment of other ground, sea and air forces in being or close to potential trouble spots to deter or deal swiftly with any military action against areas of the free world. These forces will require essentially the same base structure, with additional base development in the southern Asia areas, in order to cope adequately with likely forms of communist overt aggression.

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In the Strategic Air Command, the present overseas base system permits the dispersed deployment of medium bomber strike forces with a quick reaction time as well as effective deployment of tanker units in support of the medium and heavy bomber fleets. There will be a continuing need for these bases, at least until 1963. By the end of that year, because of political considerations, the bases in Morocco are scheduled for release. After 1963, the future tenure of other strategic bases for the peacetime disposition of medium bombers is not certain. With further phase-out of the medium bomber force, it may be expected that the remaining force would not be able to support the overseas deployment in its present scale. Therefore, peacetime stationing of medium bombers overseas may be reduced markedly in the years following 1963. In any event, these overseas bases will remain a requirement for the indefinite future to support wartime strategic operations involving emergency recovery and re-strike missions. These bases may also be required for tactical and transport aircraft and for staging purposes during emergency as well as peacetime operations. Intercontinental ballistic missiles will require no overseas base support except for training and test purposes.



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overseas bases*

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(over page)*

Overseas bases associated with the mission of defending the North American continent from air and sea attack are regarded as a continuing requirement as long as the potential enemy possesses the capability to attack the United States by these means. These bases will not only provide for early warning and effective employment of the strategic retaliatory forces, but will also serve the military and civil defense efforts in reducing the damage to our industrial base and population centers. Additionally, they will continue to assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and air communications.

In Europe, the United States will require for the next three to four years substantially the same number of bases it now utilizes in supporting approved NATO military plans. Force contributions expected of the NATO nations beyond 1963 are not firm. The introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles into NATO after 1963 could reduce the need for some of the tactical air forces supplied by the United States, with a possible minor reduction in air base needs. With the continuation of NATO during the 1963-1969 period, it is expected that the United States would require major forces deployed in Europe, with adequate base support, to continue to maintain its leadership in the alliance and to contribute to an effective NATO military strategy. The forces deployed to Europe will also be advantageously positioned for contingency operations in the Middle East.

In the Far East, the United States has reduced its Army and Air Force base holdings significantly in the last few years. This trend will continue to a minor degree for the Air Force through 1963, under present programs. The remaining bases in the Far East will continue

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to support the forward deployment of U.S. ground, sea and air forces in the areas as part of the basic strategy to deny further communist encroachment and, in case of general war, to hold territory as far forward as possible, securing Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The forward positioning of these forces in the cold war is a continuing part of the deterrent to possible communist aggression in this part of the world. The U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will expedite commitment of the appropriate force in time to defeat possible aggressive action and help prevent broadening of the war.

Secure Pacific

In the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeastern Asia areas, the U.S. overseas base system is almost non-existent. Present facilities which would be required as bases for the support of modern U.S. military forces are generally inadequate, without extensive construction, for other than small scale military action. There are only limited possibilities for increasing the base capability in peacetime, although some improvements have been made by peacetime construction of critical facilities through the Mutual Security Program. The growing communist threat to this area of the world points up the urgent need for adequate support facilities.

SE Asia
You know

Overseas facilities will continue to be required for support of a world-wide communications network, which is mandatory in order to insure adequate control of modern military forces with atomic weapons, to facilitate the transmission of intelligence to the United States, and to administer the deployed forces. Present plans call for the modernization of this system through the progressive installation of advanced equipment by 1965. While this modernization will require additional sites, it will permit re-routing or reduction to standby status of some of the existing high frequency stations. The varied activities associated with space research will probably create an ever changing requirement for many small facilities of a temporary nature, scattered throughout the world.



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From an overall view, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the communist bloc with combat forces--land, sea and air--or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. overseas base system is a primary means of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations.

Auth
Sms - Soviet
Bloc

Recent difficulties involving retention of essential overseas bases, such as in Morocco, Libya, and the West Indies Federation, have been encountered for the most part in those countries which have little or no identification with U.S. security interests. Our other base rights appear to be as strong as the alliances or bilateral collective security arrangements they support.

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The ability of U.S. forces to respond to emergency situations in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East could be improved. From a base support standpoint, continued active effort is recommended in:

a. Obtaining the necessary rights for the operations of U.S. military forces in these areas when required.

b. Pre-stocking items of military equipment and supplies to permit rapid deployment and to sustain operations until re-supply is possible.

c. Pursuing all possible peacetime measures to improve essential facilities in these areas so that they would be readily usable for U.S. military emergency operations.

If reductions in military forces should occur during the next decade, through arms control agreements or other political or economic considerations, the overseas base holdings supporting U.S. forces should be carefully evaluated before being relinquished. It should be recognized that these bases would represent the best possible means for reacting to emergencies in areas uncovered by a withdrawal of U.S. forces. A lack of adequate in-transit bases, staging areas, and terminal facilities for contingency operations could reduce reaction capability to such a degree that U.S. military intervention would be too late to safeguard our security interests. If actual relinquishment of an essential base becomes necessary, possible future use should be safeguarded by a right of re-entry.

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INTRODUCTION

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In December 1957, a report to the President by Mr. Frank C. Nash on U.S. Overseas Military Bases expressed the following central theme regarding the need for an overseas base system in the ensuing decade:

"We will have need for such a [base] system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order (a) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot calculate on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; (b) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces in being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capabilities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and (c) to promote U.S. political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies. (Pages 8-9)

"Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smothered. The foregoing analysis of the political and military aspects of probable U.S. requirements over the next ten years leads to the conclusion that their general scope and pattern are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period. It is certain, however, that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas areas." (Pages 12-13)

During the two-year period since the completion of the Nash Report, continuing and recurrent problems have been experienced in maintaining certain important elements in the U.S. overseas base system. In October 1959, the President requested of the Secretary

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(a) Strategic + dispersal

(b) tactical

(c) political

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of Defense a re-examination of the United States overseas military base system and a review of the findings and recommendations of the Mash Report. On 16 December 1959, the National Security Council, in referring to the study then in progress in the Department of Defense, requested that this study provide a basis for Council discussion of U.S. overseas bases, with special emphasis on the implications of developments in the missiles field.

DDP Study
to
Halt?



In the review of the probable U.S. requirements over the next decade, the following study has been addressed mainly to the conclusion of Mr. Mash that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of tactical forces, and the political and military vulnerability of particular overseas areas. It is noted that certain adjustments to the overseas base system have indeed occurred since publication of the Mash Report, but not necessarily for the reasons cited by Mr. Mash. These chiefly have been the reduction of Army forces in Japan, the withdrawal of Army forces in Iceland, and the redeployment to Britain and Germany of tactical Air Force squadrons from France. Also, inactive base holdings of over 300,000 acres, involving facilities developed during World War II in the Philippines and in the Caribbean area, are expected to be relinquished shortly. New bases acquired include those in Canada for use of the Strategic Air Command and for further extension of the air and missile early warning systems. In addition, arrangements have been reached for the deployment of IREB's, to be manned by host state personnel, in the U.K., Italy and eventually in Turkey. Substantial progress has also been made in the implementation of the NATO atomic stockpile concept under which nuclear weapons, maintained in U.S. custody, will be readily available to the forces of the alliance in time of need.

Army in J.

Philippines

In order to assess the future need for an overseas base system, a portrayal of our present system in relation to its capability to fulfill the requirements of national policy and military strategic concepts is a prerequisite. The following report briefly summarizes the applicable elements of national military policy, portrays the present overseas base system, and assesses probable trends in this base system, both for the short- and long-term future.

The Mash Report considered future requirements for the base system projected over a period of from five to ten years from 1957. This period was selected as being in general accord with the accepted time for long-range military planning. The present report also accepts a ten-year period, projected from 1960, as a limit for trend predictions, but recognizes that events can be forecast with a much greater degree of certainty in the immediate and near-term future, say for three years hence, than can later trends and events. Pertinent U.S. and allied

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military planning documents, such as the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, FY 1963-64, and NATO MC-70, furnish guidance as to military base needs and objectives in the 1963 period. More immediate base requirements can be forecast from considerations of current capabilities plans employing weapons systems now in production or in use. Beyond 1964, the phase-in of newer weapons systems by the Services, force levels, and the effects of such factors as allied plans and commitments, enemy capabilities, and the general international political atmosphere become more indefinite. For these reasons, the present report divides the next ten years into two basic time periods: from the present to 1963, and from 1963 through 1969.

The report identifies those areas where significant requirements for the development of facilities exist for certain emergency conditions, but where no base holdings are maintained in peacetime, for political or other reasons. It also suggests certain possible measures which could be taken in peacetime to better assure the prompt availability of adequate facilities in these areas when needed for military operations.

need for new bases.



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BASIC NATIONAL STRATEGY RELATED TO THE NEED
AND DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. BASES OVERSEAS

(The contents of this section are classified TOP SECRET unless otherwise indicated)

A system of U.S. military bases overseas serves to support the national strategy which guides the employment of U.S. military forces in peace and war. Therefore, a study of our present and future overseas base system should include, initially, an examination of the present and foreseeable national military strategy as it relates to any general requirement for overseas bases. (Confidential)

The United States national military strategy is derived from policy guidance formulated by the National Security Council and is implemented through military strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These joint plans are designed to furnish strategic guidance for employment of military forces in being, and for the desired composition and strategic employment of forces in the near-term future (four to seven years hence). In addition, a strategic estimate is prepared for general long-range military developmental requirements (eight to twelve years in the future). From the overall military strategic plans, the Unified and Specified Commanders and the Military Services determine the overseas military bases required for the many operational plans or supporting activities. These requirements are reviewed annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consolidated, and set forth in a comprehensive report called "U.S. Base Requirements Overseas" (USERO). This document is a detailed inventory of present base holdings as well as future base requirements to support any of the many emergency situations which might arise in both limited and general war. (Confidential)



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JCS.

JCS.
US Base Req
Overseas

The U.S. national and military strategy for the last ten years has recognized as the basic threat to U.S. security the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward achieving world domination. A chief element of this threat lies in the Soviet possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces. Accordingly, a central aim of U.S. policy has been to deter the communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced on the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, the danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further communist aggression. National strategy is designed to achieve

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the basic U.S. objective by deterring or being prepared successfully to wage general or limited war, and by effectively conducting the cold war with the Sino-Soviet bloc for whatever period of time the basic threat to U.S. security may continue.

Under the current national military policy, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop. Moreover, the policy emphasizes that the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression. The strategic military concept stresses the principle of mutual security and envisions that the United States will require the support and cooperation of the appropriate major allies and certain other free world nations in providing and using their share of military forces in common defense and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power. In this connection, the strategy requires forward deployed forces and a world-wide system of bases in order to remain sufficiently flexible in meeting the requirements for cold, limited and general war.

In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the national policy states that the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military force its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military programs for continental defense.

Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression is based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces, national policy requires inclusion of ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate to (a) present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression and (b) defeat such aggression or hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldistribution from the viewpoint of general war must be expected.

According to national policy, the United States should, as practicable, strengthen the collective defense system and induce Western Europe and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense. The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution in participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to carry out its

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
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obligations for their defense and to possess the capability to fulfill its commitments.


The foregoing review of the elements of the national military strategy indicates in a general way the relation of overseas military bases to the prosecution of essential war tasks, the necessity for prompt response to communist overt aggression in any form, and the necessity for maintenance of free world strength in peacetime. In the subsequent sections of this report, the present and projected overseas base complex will be reviewed on a functional and area basis as it relates to the national military strategy. (Confidential)



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SAC OVERSEAS BASES

- ★ BASE FOR MEDIUM BOMBERS
- ★ BASE FOR TANKERS
- ★ BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND JET TANKERS

Note:
Including bases in Alaska, Guam,
and Puerto Rico.


STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND OVERSEAS BASES

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The Strategic Air Command supports the national policy of deterring general war with its strike force of bombers and missiles. It is essential that these forces be so deployed that an enemy cannot count on their neutralization by a single attack, even by surprise. The overseas base complex plays an important role in supporting these strategic deterrent forces. While the bulk of the strike forces of the Strategic Air Command are deployed in the United States, portions of these forces utilize overseas bases to provide dispersal and quick reaction capability, thus complicating the problem of enemy planners. The strike forces also rely on overseas bases to afford important refueling capabilities, post-strike, and emergency recovery bases.

In 1960 the Strategic Air Command is programmed for 210 squadrons which are being reduced to 198 squadrons by 1963. The numbers of squadrons and changes in composition are reflected as follows.

	1960	1963
Heavy Bombers (B-52)	36	42
Medium Bombers (B-47/B-58)	104	64
Jet Tankers (KC-135)	26	40
Conventional Tankers (KC-97)	31	14
Medium Recon (RB-47)	3	3
Light Recon (RB-57)	3	3
Missiles (ICBM)	7	32
	<u>210</u>	<u>198</u>



Although the overall reduction is small, there is a substantial change in the composition of the forces during this time period. The most significant changes occur in the medium bomber inventory, which is reduced by 40 squadrons, and the missile force, which shows an increase of 25 squadrons. With these changes in force structure, it is possible to assess fairly accurately the effects on overseas base requirements through 1963.

*8K
8 bombers
7 missiles*

The heavy bombers are capable of striking Russian targets from the United States. However, jet tankers provide necessary support of these bombers in giving added range and flexibility in striking more distant targets. In addition, tankers are needed in support of the medium bombers which require at least one and sometimes two refuelings before striking deep into enemy territory. Deployment of part of the medium bomber force to overseas bases serves to reduce this requirement, since the bombers thus deployed have a capability of striking assigned targets without refueling.

bases vs tankers

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B-47 medium bombers are deployed at ten overseas bases as well as two bases in Alaska and one at Guam. These bases, reflected by symbol on the accompanying chart, are distributed on foreign territory as follows: four in the United Kingdom, three in Spain and three in Morocco. Currently, SAC deploys the medium bombers in sufficient numbers to maintain six aircraft on alert at each forward base except Oms where the effort is substantially larger. SAC provides for 12 aircraft on alert. The alert posture envisioned at these bases, known as Operation Reflex, enables the bombers to be extremely flexible in those states after warning has first been received and contributes greatly to the dispersal of strike forces and to quick reaction capability.

The Strategic Air Command also maintains a B-52 wing, with supporting tankers, in Puerto Rico. This base represents the only facility outside the mainland in use, or programmed for use, by the heavy bomber strike force.

The Strategic Air Command utilizes, or is programmed to use, nine forward tanker refueling facilities outside of the United States as well as two in Alaska and one in Guam. Six of these bases are located in Canada, and two each in Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores. These bases, shown by symbol on the attached chart, support either the heavy or medium bomber strike forces. As is the case in the deployment of the B-47 bomber overseas, calls at the tanker squadrons at these bases are restricted to an "Operation Reflex" alert posture with the exception of the tanker force on Oms. The tanker refueling facilities in Canada and Greenland could also play an important role in the ability of the Strategic Air Command to maintain a sustained airborne alert.

In addition to their role for the tactical deployment of bomber strike and tanker forces, the forward bases are required for recovery or post-flight operations. The Strategic Air Command also has a similar requirement for eight tanker overseas bases, three in the United Kingdom, two in Japan and one each in Turkey and Okinawa. All of these facilities are currently in use by other elements of the Air Force and will be included in other appropriate sections of this report.

Since the Bush Report, adjustments have been made to the overseas base structure of the Strategic Air Command. Four new tanker bases in Northern Canada are nearing completion and will become operational shortly. Seven IBM squadrons are deployed, or programmed to be deployed overseas, four in the United Kingdom, two in Italy and one in Turkey. Calls at the time of the Bush Report, it was contemplated that these squadrons might be serviced by United States personnel, arrangements governing their deployment call for this responsibility to be fulfilled by the host country. In the case of Turkey, however, U.S. personnel will be utilized until Turkish forces are fully trained.

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The bulk of U.S. ground combat forces committed to NATO are shown in the following chart.



1 Guam
6 RT
10-6-47-1
Operation
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10-6-47-1
652-6-1100
10-6-47-1
EXCERPT IN
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by 6/11/47
in Guam
Tulio
K. W. Wain
W. J.
New Liberty
Port
Guantanamo

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There have also been reductions in the overseas bases used in peacetime by the Strategic Air Command. In the United Kingdom, four bases were released for use by tactical air units withdrawn from France upon the latter's refusal to permit the storage of atomic weapons in its territory. Seven other bases were relinquished to the British Government since they were no longer adequate for use by planes in the present inventory of the Strategic Air Command; were no longer required for such missions as fighter escort; or were so close to other bases used by the Strategic Air Command that they did not provide effective dispersal. Adverse operating conditions at Thule, Greenland, also limited its peacetime utilization. By the end of 1963, U.S. forces are committed to withdraw from the three Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco.

The relatively limited number of overseas bases available to the Strategic Air Command highlights their continuing importance. As noted earlier, the Strategic Air Command will continue to rely heavily during the period 1960-1963 on its heavy and medium bomber fleets, both of which are supported by overseas bases. This period will see the advent of missiles in significant quantities, both in the United States and the USSR. Aside from the need for the protection of our strategic strike forces based in the United States, the increased enemy capability in long-range missiles dictates the maximum degree of dispersal and quick reaction possible on the part of our strategic striking forces. This can be accomplished in large measure by the "reflex" bases and tanker refueling facilities available to the Strategic Air Command abroad.



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AIR AND SEA DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

In carrying out the national policy of developing and maintaining adequate military programs for continental defense, the United States has established a base system (depicted on the accompanying map) which is intended to support both active and passive defensive measures in the air and sea approaches to the North American continent. Defense of outlying United States-controlled territory is also enhanced by the strategic positioning of forces in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone.

As part of the passive defense against possible attack by air and sea against North America, the United States, in cooperation principally with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, has in recent years built an extensive system of warning, control and communications installations. Essential parts of this system are still under construction.

The aircraft control and warning system consists essentially of three systems or lines, disposed in depth across the North American continent and its maritime approaches. The first of these is that an enemy aircraft would encounter is the Hibernia Early Warning (HEW) system.

The HEW system is essentially complete and has been in full scale operation for some time. It extends from Midway Island to the Aleutians, thence to Alaska, where it joins the HEW Line at Cape Lisburne. The HEW Line, named jointly by the United States and Canada, is located along the Northern Frontier of Alaska and Canada and terminates in the East at Cape Dyer on Barfin Island. From Cape Dyer the warning system is projected down the Labrador Coast to Argentia, Newfoundland, where it joins the Atlantic Barrier, which provides a second extension of the system to the Azores. The Navy maintains the regular radar coverage at sea through the assignment of Air Early Warning aircraft for both the Pacific and Atlantic Barriers. A combination of high-powered radars and gap fillers are employed in the land based parts of the system. Programs scheduled for completion in mid-1961 and now under implementation will extend the HEW Line eastward from Cape Dyer across the Greenland Ice Cap to juncture with a planned second extension from the east coast of Greenland across to Iceland, the Faeroes and to the United Kingdom.

A second line of communications and radar installations reaches across the middle of Canada. Established and named by Canada, this mid-Canada line provides an additional warning capability and permits correlation of information with the HEW system and the

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BASES IN THE FAR EAST

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3 systems
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Admiral

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contiguous radar system. A third tier of aircraft control and warning installations, the "Pine Tree Line," is situated generally along the Canadian-United States border and constitutes the northern sector of the contiguous radar system where any major air defense battle would be fought. This is an integrated air defense operation between Canada and the United States. Contiguous barriers also extend the warning and control areas to seaward about 300 miles off the east and west coasts of the U.S. employing 16 Navy radar picket ships and 36 Air Force Sentinel aircraft off each coast plus 4 lighter-than-air ships in the Atlantic. The Air Force currently maintains four Fighter Interceptor squadrons in this North Atlantic region. The foreign bases which support these squadrons are located in Labrador, Newfoundland, Iceland and Greenland.

Pine Tree Line



In addition to these facilities, which are designed for use against the long-range bomber and air-breathing missile threat, three other installations will be used for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS): at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and at Flyingdale Moor, United Kingdom. At each of these stations, a high-powered, long-range radar is expected to be able to detect enemy long-range missiles shortly after launch. This radar watch could afford up to fifteen minutes tactical warning to U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. The positioning of these radar stations is designed to provide coverage of the polar region, where the enemy missile trajectories against the United States are likely to be concentrated. The BMEWS sites in Alaska and Greenland are now under construction; negotiations have been completed for the establishment of the third site in the United Kingdom.

BMEWS
polar

Six foreign bases in the North Atlantic support a number of vital or important wartime and peacetime missions of the U.S. Naval Forces under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic. These bases are Argentina, Newfoundland, Keflavik, Iceland, Bermuda, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Azores, and Chaguaramas, Trinidad. The naval and air facilities at Argentina support air early warning operations in continental air defense, anti-submarine operations, sea-air rescue and fleet operations protecting the North Atlantic lines of communications. The NATO fuel storage facility at Rvolfjordur, Iceland, when constructed, will provide further logistic support to fleet wartime operations, while naval facilities under construction at the Keflavik Air Base will be an essential link in the planned peacetime air early warning barrier chain from Greenland to the United Kingdom. Facilities in Bermuda are utilized by naval air forces to support anti-submarine operations, fleet reconnaissance, and aircraft staging. In addition to the air facilities, there are fuel and ammunition storage areas

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The naval installation in the Guantanamo Bay area has provided excellent year around training facilities to U.S. naval forces based in the United States. This installation also provides an important support base for wartime naval operations in the Caribbean area. An additional important naval base for wartime training, escort operations, and support of fleet units is maintained at Chaguaramas, Trinidad, on a stand-by status.



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NLE Date 7/12/79

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U.S. base installations in the Azores play a major role in the defense of North America. In addition to the support of strategic air operations, the air installations are utilized for air early warning operations and as a link in the air transport route in support of the European Command and the U.S. installations in North Africa. The existing and planned naval facilities will be capable of supporting anti-submarine warfare operations, escort vessels and radar barrier units.



In Alaska, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal Zone, U.S. forces maintain a number of military bases which support the defense of these United States-controlled territories as well as more far-ranging operations. A reinforced Army battle group utilizes six bases in the Canal Zone for protection of the Panama Canal; two reinforced Army battle groups and Army air defense elements, operating from base complexes North and South of the Alaska Range, assist in the ground and air defense of Alaska. On the island of Oahu, the 25th Infantry Division (minus one battle group), stationed at Schofield Barracks, serves as the Pacific Command reserve, together with the First Marine Brigade and Marine Air Group. The Navy maintains a sizeable establishment in the Hawaiian Islands including Barbers Point Air Station, a Marine Airfield at Kaneohe, and a Naval Shipyard. The Navy also maintains facilities, in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and Alaska. Naval and air bases in these territories support both strategic and continental defense missions. The Air Force operates two Fighter Interceptor squadrons from bases in Alaska and two transport squadrons from Hickam Air Base in Hawaii.

Some 17 inactive areas (totalling 31,383 acres) in the Caribbean, obtained from England in 1941 under the ninety-nine year Leased Bases Agreement, have recently been determined excess to military requirements and the Departments of State and Defense are prepared to release them when politically appropriate. Additional inactive areas in the Caribbean are currently being considered for possible release.

The remaining foreign bases in this hemisphere are being utilized for high priority research and development missions: arctic research and test at Fort Churchill, Canada, and Thule, Greenland, and missile tests at the Atlantic Missile Range. Ten of the 13 U.S. missile test sites in the Caribbean and South Atlantic area are located on foreign soil. These stations, which operate under the cognizance of the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, monitor the launching trajectory and impact of the intermediate range and inter-continental ballistic missiles over the 5,000 mile South Atlantic course (across the Bahamas and Windward Islands to Ascension Island). With the possible inactivation of some of the closer-spaced tracking stations and a likely extension of the range, it is anticipated that the Atlantic Missile Range will be required for the foreseeable future. The Pacific Missile Range is being similarly utilized on the West Coast. This range, under the cognizance of the Navy, provides range support

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for the Department of Defense and other designated government agencies for launching, tracking and collecting data on guided missile, satellite and space vehicle research and provides support for training of operational guided missile units. Overseas bases supporting this activity are mainly planned for location on United States-controlled territory, although certain sites, such as Australia, may also be included in future programs for the Pacific Missile Range.



The 1960-1963 period will pose challenging problems in the task of defending the U.S. based nuclear strike forces and U.S. population centers. Both are relatively soft targets, and the growing enemy ICBM force makes these targets dangerously vulnerable. A Soviet ICBM attack, accompanied by a medium-range missile attack from submarines, and followed by a manned-bomber attack probably represents the optimum means which the enemy could employ against the continental United States. It is not the purpose of this report to detail all the possible measures which the United States could adopt to counter this enemy threat. It is intended, however, to portray the vital role of the overseas base system as a part of the defense of the continental United States.

In exhausting every possibility to obtain early strategic warning of the enemy's plans, increased effort must be placed on timely intelligence. This will require intensified intelligence activities from posts situated around the communist bloc; more efficient visual, photographic or electronic observation of the enemy homeland; and an extensive, rapid, and reliable network of communications world wide.

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The operational availability of the three BMEWS stations will contribute to our ability to secure tactical warning of an ICBM attack. This warning will afford some protection for the U.S. based strategic deterrent force. The dispersal inherent in the overseas reflex bases has also been mentioned as a means of protection against a total knockout blow. It is recognized that these bases are vulnerable to intermediate range weapons, but an attack against these bases must be perfectly synchronized with an attack against the United States in order to prevent some degree of warning to elements of the strategic strike force located on bases in this country.

Defensive measures against the air-breathing threat are also strengthened by use of foreign bases. Further integration of the United States-Canadian air defense effort under NORAD appears desirable; this would include the establishment of the necessary air defense control centers in Canada and the consummation of agreements to employ nuclear weapons for air defense purposes. It should also be feasible to turn over to the Canadians a major portion of the air warning installations in Canada.

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The extension of the DEW Line from Canada across Greenland will also increase the effectiveness of the air early warning system. Keflavik Air Base and other installations in Iceland will play an important role in the projected seaward extension of this line from Greenland to the United Kingdom. In addition, the Iceland bases will offer possibilities for additional air and sea surveillance of enemy submarines and increase the effectiveness of submarine detection systems now in use or expected to be employed in this period. The establishment of the Greenland, Iceland, U.K. barrier should replace and permit the disestablishment of the air-sea barrier between Argentina and the Azores. Also the proposed utilization of port facilities in northern United Kingdom from which to operate hunter-killer submarines in times of emergencies should provide timely intelligence on the movement of enemy submarines.

Other overseas bases in the North Atlantic--in Bermuda, Cuba, the Azores, and Puerto Rico--will provide important support for naval forces carrying out anti-submarine missions. Similarly, effective air warning and anti-submarine operations in the near Pacific are dependent on naval bases in Hawaii, Midway, and Alaska, as well as on the West Coast of the United States.




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
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
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BASES IN EUROPE IN SUPPORT

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BASES IN EUROPE IN SUPPORT OF NATO

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)



As a vital part of its military participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States has committed substantial ground, sea, and air forces to the defense of Western Europe. This deployment arose as a result of awareness that the loss of populations and large areas of Western Europe to Soviet control would seriously endanger U.S. security. Soviet ground and air forces deployed in East Germany, numbering some 20 divisions and 20 air regiments, plus forces available in the USSR, pose a serious threat to free European territory. The military capability of these Soviet forces has been steadily and materially improved in the past several years. Continuing modernization and improvement of the Soviet forces will increase significantly their capabilities.

The NATO military plan to deter aggression against NATO European territory or to defeat such aggression if it should occur has been termed the "sword and shield" strategy. That is, sufficient allied ground, sea, and air forces would be deployed as a "shield" to fend off any incursions or limited attacks against NATO, thereby forcing the enemy to pause and consider whether to break off the action or deliberately expand it. The shield forces would also blunt or hold a massive offensive into Western Europe and surrounding maritime areas. In the event of a massive Soviet attack, a combined air, missile, and naval air counteroffensive would be launched against the USSR. The principal edge of the "sword" is the U.S. Strategic Air Command, supplemented by U.S. naval air forces and other strike forces, as well as tactical air units and medium-range missiles under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Agreed NATO military plans for "shield" forces are predicated on a force of 29 1/3 divisions in Central Europe together with 181 tactical air squadrons positioned in that general area.

U.S. forces today constitute a primary part of the "shield" force in Central Europe. These U.S. "shield" forces are also advantageously deployed for rapid reaction to contingency situations in the Middle East. In addition, U.S. forces situated in Europe play an important role in supporting U.S. responsibilities and policies toward Berlin (where 4,000 Army troops, not committed to NATO, are garrisoned). They utilize an extensive system of bases as shown on the attached map. In addition to the bases shown, U.S. forces use commercial facilities and other allied military bases in the area, in conjunction with other NATO nations, for training, occasional operational maneuvers, or convenience in logistic support arrangements. Use of these additional facilities is recognized in NATO military planning.

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The bulk of U.S. ground combat forces committed to NATO are deployed in West Germany. These forces, which consist of five divisions (two being armored), one armor group, three armored cavalry regiments and combat support units, are dispersed throughout 15 base areas containing troop billets, training areas and forward supply depots at 121 locations. For the logistic support of these forces and partial support of other U.S. and NATO forces in peace and in war, logistic complexes and a line of communications have been established in France utilizing 39 installations of varying size including depots, hospitals, port facilities, troop billets, and a pipeline extending from the coast of France into Germany. U.S. Army forces in Europe also include the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), a missile command which is also NATO-committed, stationed in northern Italy. Its combat elements occupy two main areas, and its logistic support area is located in northwest Italy. Including the two separate, non-NATO battle groups in Berlin, the U.S. Army, Europe, totals approximately 227,000 military personnel and employs 6,000 U.S. civilians and 90,000 foreign nationals.

Air Force units committed to NATO include 21 fighter bomber squadrons, 18 other tactical squadrons, 7 transport squadrons and 3 squadrons of surface-to-surface missiles. These units use six bases in Germany, nine in the United Kingdom, one in the Netherlands, one in Italy, two, in Turkey, and four in France. Bases in Iceland and the Azores provide air transit facilities between the United States and its forces in Europe. Outside the NATO area, Wheelus Air Base in Libya affords our Air Force units in Europe with the only gunnery and bombing training facilities available on a year around basis. In addition, Wheelus Air Base is of importance as a possible staging area in the event of limited war in the Middle East. In all, U.S. Air Forces in Europe operate some 150 separate installations of sizes varying from large air bases to individual aircraft control and warning sites. Air Force personnel supporting NATO include approximately 108,000 military personnel, 4,000 U.S. civilian employees, and 26,000 foreign nationals.

The U.S. Navy's 6th Fleet which operates in the Mediterranean Sea is composed of 56 ships, 2 carrier air groups, 2 anti-submarine warfare aircraft squadrons, and a Marine battalion landing team with air support. This fleet is supported at sea by an underway replenishment group which in turn receives its support from the United States, except for fuel, lubricants, and some spare parts, which are supplied through either Naples, Italy, or Rota, Spain. Primary communication support is presently provided by facilities located near the base at Fort Lyautey, Morocco. The air anti-submarine warfare squadrons are normally based at Rota, Spain and Sigonella, Sicily. These two squadrons are rotated at unscheduled intervals through 8 NATO maritime air bases in the Mediterranean. In addition to the 6th Fleet and the 4 locations noted above, the Navy maintains ammunition storage at Cartagena, Spain, and is planning to expand its

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operations from Iceland. These six installations are manned by approximately 8,300 personnel including about 5,400 military, 400 U.S. civilian employees, and 2,500 foreign nationals. For emergencies and wartime operations, the Navy has pre-stocked, or plans to pre-stock, 24 other locations with such supplies as fuel, lubricants, spare parts and ammunition. These sites are located at commercial or allied military installations on Mediterranean Islands, in countries bordering the Mediterranean and the Northeast Atlantic Ocean area.



Included in the European area are 21 Loran stations which are manned by the Coast Guard.

Except for the release of four air bases in England, due primarily to force reductions, and the transfer of use of eight air bases in Germany to the German Air Force, the major base complex in support of our forces committed to NATO in Europe have remained substantially unchanged over the past several years:

Difficulties in securing agreement on the storage of atomic weapons in France necessitated the repositioning within the last year of tactical air squadrons from five bases in France into Germany and the United Kingdom. Three of these bases in France are now retained in a Dispersed Operating Base status. By way of new facilities, Loran C stations, essential to the POLARIS mission, are being established in Italy, Turkey and Libya and in Iceland, Norway and the Faeroes. During this period, other new facilities have been required for positioning of NIKE and MACE units in Germany. While technically not requiring the establishment of U.S. bases, the implementation of the IREB program and the NATO atomic stockpile concept will require additional U.S. personnel. Under arrangements reached for the stationing of IREB's in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey, the host state will be responsible for manning the missile systems. However, U.S. personnel will be required to train the host state forces and at least in one case, Turkey, to man the sites for a period of years until host state personnel are fully trained. Under the NATO atomic stockpile plan, a large number of sites are being constructed or will be established, mainly through infrastructure (NATO's common financing arrangement for base construction), for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons to be readily available to the forces of the alliance in time of need. Under present U.S. legislation, these weapons must remain in U.S. custody, and, accordingly, a U.S. custodial detachment must be stationed at each stockpile site.

The current deployment of U.S. ground, naval, and air forces in Europe is in fulfillment of U.S. commitments to meet approved NATO force requirements as contained in the basic NATO military planning document, MC-70. This NATO force schedule, prepared in early 1958

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as a result of the decision to incorporate atomic weapons into the NATO arsenal, calls for U.S. contributions essentially as they are today through 1963 except for a reduction of tactical air squadrons from 49 to 43. Base needs to support these contributions have largely been satisfied except for facilities for newer air defense weapons, tactical missiles, communications, and certain naval support facilities. Those projects which qualify as NATO infrastructure are planned for construction through this procedure. The programmed reduction of U.S. tactical air squadrons, as contained in MC-70, would probably be accompanied by some adjustments to the air base structure in England and France.



It is recognized that the United States has under continual review its force contributions to NATO and in the NATO Annual Reviews has made allowance for adjustments to its force requirements as contained in MC-70. Any revision to MC-70, calling for major changes in U.S. force contributions from those presently programmed, would affect in turn U.S. base holdings. Minor reduction in Army and Air Force forces would probably result largely in reduced saturation and changed missions of facilities rather than substantial reduction in numbers of facilities. No evidence is presently available of NATO military plans or anticipated increased contributions from other NATO allies which would justify major reductions of U.S. forces in Europe through 1963.

To be in keeping with the U.S. effort to promote greater participation by the other members of the alliance, it appears appropriate for the United States to seek to satisfy whatever future base needs may develop through infrastructure wherever possible. Further, during the current deliberations on future infrastructure programs through 1963, it appears desirable to press for a greater financial contribution from the other prosperous NATO countries than has been their share up to now.

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BASES IN THE FAR EAST

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

U.S. military forces deployed to the Far East are situated in an area of uneasy truce and standoff between Western military power, together with Far Eastern Allies, and the growing military power of Communist China, supported by the USSR. Inconclusive conflict in Korea has left that country divided open to renewed communist aggression. This has required the continued stationing of two Army divisions in Korea and positioning of tactical air forces, naval, and marine forces nearby--in Japan and Okinawa. Japan and the Philippines are not fully able to defend themselves; the Republic of China requires assistance of U.S. military forces to maintain its territorial integrity; and the nation states of Southeast Asia, with their limited military forces, are highly vulnerable to communist aggression.

*uneasy truce
Korea - J
Army*

U.S. forces under the Commander in Chief, Pacific, operate from a number of bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, in addition to bases in U.S. administered territory such as in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Guam, and Wake. In addition to CIBCPAC headquarters, there are extensive military facilities and substantial forces in Hawaii. These forces are positioned to provide defensive and offensive capabilities in support of national objectives and defense commitments in this area.

The U.S. Army Pacific currently contributes to the defense of Korea with two divisions and a missile command supported by command, tactical, and logistical bases in four general areas in that country. These four areas in turn contain 22 different installations. The Army also utilizes storage, maintenance, communication, and logistical facilities at 15 additional installations (5 in Okinawa and 10 in Japan). These installations maintain a reserve of combat essential items for U.S., ROK, and other UN forces in Korea, and provide support for possible contingency operations in other areas of the Far East, and Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army base complex in the Far East is manned by approximately 116,000 personnel including 54,000 military, 4,000 U.S. civilian employees and 58,000 foreign nationals. Since January 1958, the withdrawal of Army combat and related support forces from Japan has resulted in the release to the Japanese Government of some 82 separate facilities and the transfer to the Navy and Air Force of 28 other facilities. This withdrawal has now been completed. The Army is at present deploying an airborne battle group, with mobile logistical support, to Okinawa, as the fifth battle group of the 25th Infantry Division, located in Hawaii. This force would utilize existing facilities on Okinawa, expanded as necessary.

*Army -
ROF.
Okinawa.*

Naval and Marine forces in the Far East consist of approximately 143 ships (ranging from attack carriers to mine sweepers), four carrier

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air groups, 15 aircraft squadrons including two Marine Air Groups, and two-thirds of a Marine Division. These forces are supported by 17 installations, 5 of which are in Japan, 2 in the Philippines, 9 in Okinawa, and 1 in Guam. The entire Navy and Marine Corps Far East overseas base complex is manned by approximately 56,000 personnel including 30,000 military, 1,000 U.S. civilian employees and 25,000 foreign nationals. The 7th Fleet depends upon bases in Japan for its major support. For example, it has been estimated that 80 mobile tankers would be required to replace the naval fuel storage in Japan. The bases discussed above, coupled with the underway replenishment groups, provide the necessary support for the 7th Fleet to operate in Far Eastern and Southeast Asian waters.

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the center
the base

The Air Force currently maintains 41 tactical or tactical support squadrons in the Far East. These squadrons operate from 6 bases in Japan, 2 in Korea, 2 in Okinawa and 1 in the Philippines. A MATADOR squadron is stationed in Taiwan and two Chinese Air Force facilities are used by various U.S. tactical aircraft for rotational purposes. There are 46 additional Air Force installations which include 22 radar sites located in this area. These 57 installations are operated and maintained by approximately 93,000 personnel including 53,500 military, 2,500 U.S. civilian employees and 37,000 foreign nationals.

int. range
= missile with
nuclear
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Island bases in Wake, Guam, Eniwetok, Midway, Johnston, Krajalein and Iwo Jima provide essential air transit facilities to the tactical air forces during peacetime. In addition, four existing air bases in Korea and Taiwan, manned by host state forces, will be required for wartime operations by the U.S. Air Force.

Island bases
transit

Since the Kase Report, the Air Force has established 14 facilities in Japan (including 12 taken over from the Army) and has released one major air base and 51 other facilities to the host country. The Air Forces in the Far East are being reduced by 12 squadrons during the 1960-1963 time period and 2 major bases in Japan are to be inactivated. The remaining 9 air bases will continue to be required for the foreseeable future in order to afford some degree of protection from the saturation problem which is recognized to exist in this area.

In addition to the changes to the base holdings noted above, agreement in principle has been reached with the Philippine Government to release inactive base areas in that country representing 283,656 acres and to acquire, for use on a combined basis with the Philippine armed forces, some 3,400 acres for base support.

Philippines

The bases in the Far East will continue to support the U.S. and allied forces in the area as part of the basic strategy to deny further communist encroachment and, in the case of general war, to hold territory as far forward as possible, securing Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The forward positioning of forces in

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cold war is visualized as a continuing part of the deterrent to possible communist aggression. In case of limited war, the U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will permit the early commitment of appropriate forces to help defeat this aggression and prevent broadening of the conflict. Also, because of the remoteness of this area, the base structure in the Far East will continue to represent a major capability to absorb the initial logistic drain which invariably accompanies contingency or emergency operations.

The expected growth of Communist-Chinese military strength during the coming years, coupled with their expansionist aims, renders unlikely any settlement consistent with U.S. security interests of such questions as the divided Korea and Vietnam. Continued military presence in the Far East is, therefore, deemed essential for the 1960-1963 period. The deployment of these forces is not only necessary for the Far East region but is also required for rapid reaction to contingencies which are likely to arise in Southeast Asia and possibly South Asia. Base limitations in this region will be discussed in the following section of this report.

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BASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

In the wide arc of the southern periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, some 80 degrees of longitude between Turkey and the Philippines, the United States maintains little or no base holdings. Aside from relatively few but strategically located special intelligence and communications facilities, the only sizeable U.S. installation in this area is the air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Other U.S. installations are of minor size and are designed principally to serve military and economic aid missions.

The scarcity of facilities in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean-South Asia area, and in Southeast Asia in support of U.S. forces is chiefly due to political difficulties in making the necessary arrangements and to the lack of available U.S. forces and resources to develop or utilize such facilities in peacetime. Yet the United States is committed, by the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty and by announced policy in the Middle East, to assist regional countries in combating communist aggression against their territory. Moreover, in all of these areas South of the Soviet and Communist Chinese borders, there are political and economic tensions which could create emergency situations requiring U.S. military intervention in some form.

The Unified Commanders and the Military Services have recognized the need for adequate base support in the Middle East and Southeast Asia; specific requirements for pre-stockage purposes and for rights to use existing host state facilities in wartime have been reflected in appropriate military planning documents covering some of the contingencies which might arise in these areas. However, the ability of U.S. forces to respond quickly and decisively in emergencies is hampered among other things by the remoteness of this region of the world and by the relatively limited number of suitable facilities in the area which could support U.S. operations. Aside from the problem of obtaining the necessary emergency rights, U.S. forces with their initial equipment must be brought in either from contiguous areas of deployment (such as the Far East or Europe) or from the United States and thereafter supported from logistic base complexes developed after the outbreak of hostilities. U.S. military operations will also be hindered by the primitive and difficult nature of the terrain, which is largely unsuited to present models of high performance aircraft and land vehicles of low cross-country mobility. A successful U.S. military venture in this area is therefore largely dependent on attaining a sustained logistic capability and on the cooperation and capability of indigenous forces.

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It would be most advantageous, in making a timely response to a limited type of action, to have adequate ground troops stationed where they can be deployed rapidly and supplies pre-stocked as near the scene of action as possible. This requirement for Southeast and South Asia is satisfied in some degree by the two-thirds Marine division force on Okinawa and the airborne battle group being deployed there. The Marine battalion landing team with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and battle groups from the Army forces in Germany can initially be dispatched to areas of the Middle East. Additional forces would be deployed from Hawaii or the continental United States. Logistic support for Middle East operations can also be effected from resources based in Europe. A move from the United States to South Asia, Southeast Asia or the farther reaches of the Middle East would place severe demands on available air and surface transportation. Such a transportation load could be alleviated considerably by further strategic positioning of U.S. ground forces overseas and by pre-stocking of supplies and equipment at forward locations. The Army is at present positioning an airborne battle group, with mobile logistical support, on Okinawa. The Army is also developing interim forward depot facilities in Italy for support of Middle East contingencies. Planning has been initiated for more permanent Army forward depot and staging facilities in Turkey. U.S. military forces have little capability for conducting sustained operations in the Indian Ocean area. To alleviate this situation, plans are being pursued to secure peacetime use of Mombasa, Kenya, Karachi, Pakistan and Diego Garcia Island for pre-stockage of fuel and for staging. The Air Force would have to utilize existing U.S. or NATO bases in Turkey and U.S. bases in the Far East plus the few facilities available in the objective area.

Okunwa's SEA

Continued of Cuban policy

incredibly modern sounding



1970

In Southeast Asia, several projects are being accomplished under the Mutual Security program which have significant military advantages. For example, the present airfield at Vientiane, Laos, is being repaired; also, a new runway will be built and will be capable of supporting heavy cargo aircraft. However, more airfield and road improvement is urgently needed in Laos, not only to assure better communications, trade development and government control of the interior, but to facilitate military operations in this difficult terrain. An all-weather road from Pakse, Laos, to Kontum, South Vietnam, has been cited by CINCPAC as an urgent military necessity. Additionally, in Vietnam, port improvements, adequate airfields, and lines of communication are required at and between the following key areas: Tourane, Nha Trang, and Saigon. Airport improvement is also desirable at Pochentong, Cambodia, and Djakarta, Indonesia.

← NB!

In Thailand, port and railway improvements leading from Bangkok are required. Three new, relatively modern airfields are being constructed, at Khorat, Udorn, and Udon. The completion of these airfields will add substantially to the base posture in Southeast Asia.

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Date Increase in
Decision Personnel Increase in 12 Months

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However, aircraft parking areas and access roads will be sorely needed at these airfields to make them fully effective in limited war operations.

The base situation in the Middle East is not considered as critical as in Southeast Asia, although improvements to our logistic support capabilities are desirable. It has been mentioned that forward pre-stockage of Army supplies in Turkey is contemplated. This pre-stockage and troop staging would be carried out at existing bases already earmarked for U.S. use, with the temporary use of one or two NATO infrastructure bases. Naval and Marine forces would also utilize temporarily NATO bases in the Eastern Mediterranean.


There are a few facilities in Southern Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon and India) capable of supporting limited war or contingency operations. However, in event of hostilities in this area, it is considered that the number of existing facilities now available in these South Asian countries would be inadequate. National policy states that the United States should, where feasible, obtain the use of or the right to use military and strategic facilities in South Asia, including the right to operate forces in the area upon the threat of or during hostilities in which the United States is involved. It appears that the same policy should obtain for U.S. requirements in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

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
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BASES FOR COMMUNICATIONS



(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

The world-wide deployment of U.S. military forces has necessitated the development of a world-wide communications network. Such a network is mandatory in order to insure adequate control of modern military forces with atomic weapons, to facilitate the transmission of intelligence to the United States, and to administer the deployed forces.

The number and types of installations are dependent on distances involved, progress in communications technology, and strategic requirements overseas. The present network of long-haul communications stations support principally high frequency or cable transmission. To insure adequacy and diversity of communications support, more reliable and secure methods of electromagnetic communications with high capacity, such as tropospheric scatter, are being installed progressively and will be employed in conjunction with existing or planned high frequency and cable relays. Initial planning for the future communications network indicates the use of some 120 fixed installations for communications purposes overseas. This count does not include all those installations connected with such operations as DEW Line, Mid-Canada, and other systems interlacing Canada and Alaska. Space and detail permitting, the majority of the 120 sites have been identified on the attached chart. It will be noted that several areas in the chart, i.e. Spain, Germany, Turkey and Japan, have a seemingly disproportionate share of terminal and relay stations. These are necessary to provide diversity in routing; diversity in method of communication; and to accommodate increased Service requirements generated by the more advanced weapons systems.

These locations are designed to meet existing and planned requirements and are susceptible to integration into a world-wide joint communications network now being developed which will be capable of meeting military long-haul, point-to-point requirements. This network will not include: (a) tactical communications systems, self-contained within tactical organizations; (b) self-contained information gathering, transmitting and processing systems normally local in operation and uses; and (c) land, ship or airborne terminal facilities of broadcast systems, ship-to-shore, ship-to-ship, air-ground-air systems.

In order to insure the degree of reliability necessary to meet requirements for the transmission of vital commands, critical intelligence, weapons control information, and essential support data, these sites are so utilized and dispersed as to preclude major damage to a world-wide joint communications network, should appreciable damage be sustained in any one large geographical area. To accomplish

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this reliability, major communications axes emanating from the continental United States are designed to provide two or more distinct paths to overseas locations. (These major axes are indicated on the attached chart.) In the case of Europe, for example, two major routes are utilized, one to a northern gateway complex in England and one to a southern gateway in Spain. These routes, in turn, connect with a trans-Mediterranean axis. In the Pacific, interconnecting paths follow routes through the central Pacific to Southeast Asia and to Japan and through Alaska to the Far East.

It is anticipated that current plans for the long-haul communication network will be essentially fulfilled by 1965. Installation of the tropospheric scatter systems is proceeding in all geographical areas. These new systems will permit re-routing or reduction to standby status of some of the existing high frequency stations. Additionally, they will provide increased capacity with greater reliability and security.

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OVERSEAS BASES FROM 1963 THROUGH 1969

(The contents of this section are classified SECRET)

As previously mentioned, a forecast of the need for a U.S. overseas base system for the years following 1963 must be founded on more indefinite factors and trends than are available for the immediate future. The effect on base needs of actual production and deployment programs is largely speculative. Nevertheless, with the assumption that world tensions and the struggle with world communists will continue basically as they are today, and with the assumption that the present national policy to counter the communist threat to U.S. and free world security will remain valid for the future, it is possible to set forth certain factors which will influence the need for maintenance of an overseas base system. The impact of developments in weapons technology, particularly those of breakthrough character--such as space vehicles--is even more difficult to assess.

For the period after 1963, it is assumed that the U.S. policy will remain that of deterring the communists from resorting to overt aggression and that the United States and its allies should be prepared to meet such aggression in any form if it should occur. It is also likely that unless there is a real solution to the disarmament problem, the Sino-Soviet bloc will continue to maintain impressive military power. Whether or not a settlement is reached over Germany and Central Europe, it is reasonable to suppose that the collective security concept embodied in NATO will continue. The United States would be committed militarily to such an alliance and to alliances with other free world nations, with possible adjustments in force contributions from that now prevailing or programmed.

In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war during 1963-1969, it is also assumed that national policy will continue to require as part of its military force an effective nuclear retaliatory power, a power which will be kept secure from neutralization, even from a surprise attack. The role of overseas bases in promoting the effectiveness of the present retaliatory force and in enhancing the security of that force has already been cited. The role of overseas bases in supporting a U.S. nuclear retaliatory force after 1963 will depend primarily on weapons yet to be fully developed and on decisions yet to be made regarding the composition of such a force. From certain evident or likely trends in weapons characteristics and force composition, it appears that, after 1963, overseas bases may play a diminishing part in support of the nuclear retaliatory force.

The present trend in composition of the manned bomber force will result in a continued reduction in the B-47 and KC-97 tanker inventory.

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Concurrently, the B-52 force will reach a total of 42 squadrons by 1963; from there, it will probably remain at the same level for a number of years, depending on the useful life of the aircraft. The jet tanker force of KC-135's will total 40 squadrons by 1963; also, a modest number of B-58 bombers will be in the inventory by 1963. Thus the trend in the manned bomber force in the Strategic Air Command after 1963 would be to reduce reliance, as far as initial strike operations are concerned, on foreign overseas bases during the 1963 to 1969 period. Strategic operations conducted from foreign bases would then be primarily to provide greater efficiency and flexibility (such as tanker refueling for increased range) and to facilitate post-strike recovery and staging operations in wartime. In addition, these bases could provide greater efficiency and flexibility of operations for the tactical and tactical support forces. Dispersion of the heavy bomber force would be carried out on bases located on United States-controlled territory.

The increased development, production, and deployment of long-range and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles can be expected to contribute significantly to an effective nuclear retaliatory power. The missiles to be deployed after 1963 will likely have more reliability and accuracy than present models in production. Present plans for safeguarding the ICBM force contemplate dispersal and hardening of sites in the continental United States; plans for future models of ICBM's also visualize security through mobility, such as use of railway launching platforms. Additional possibilities which warrant investigation are barges or ships on inland lakes or waterways and in relatively secure, contiguous maritime waters. Such launching platforms should be located away from populous centers in the United States. Development of a medium to long-range air-to-surface missile would also add to the desired variety of nuclear attack weapons.

The use of medium-range submarine launched missiles, such as the Polaris weapons system, will contribute greatly to the desired dispersion and mobility of the nuclear retaliatory force. The deployment of this force will require minor overseas base support initially.

With the aid of dispersal mobility, and other protective measures, it should be possible for the United States to prevent destruction of its strategic retaliatory force from enemy attack, including a surprise attack. The same protective capability will probably apply to long-range strike forces of the USSR. Therefore, it appears that during the latter half of the 1963-1969 period, both the United States and the USSR would be capable of devastating each other's homeland with nuclear weapons, but not without being susceptible to a destructive attack in reprisal.

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The communist bloc can be expected to continue to test free world resolution and resistance wherever feasible to further their expansionist aims. Any resort to overt aggression on their part would probably be in the form of probing actions in areas where the United States would be confronted with the greatest military, geographic, and political difficulties. Such actions, if unopposed, could result in an erosion of free world strength; if successful, the communists would be encouraged to undertake bolder ventures, thus increasing the chances that military conflicts would spread into general war. It would be incumbent upon the United States, therefore, to have the capability to counter swiftly and successfully these aggressions in a manner best designed to avoid general war. Sufficient military strength in being, on the part of the United States and its allies, suitably deployed, and adaptable to the need for flexible application of military power, would be an essential means to realize this capability. Our overseas base system will continue to be the necessary element in making possible the forward deployment of these forces to strategic areas of the world.

Overseas bases will remain essential as an element in cold war actions designed to improve and retain U.S. leadership among non-communist nations and to promote free world solidarity. Many of our present bases are associated with force deployments to fulfill national commitments to alliances, such as NATO. For the NATO or any other collective security strategy to be effective, continued U.S. support with significant forces appears necessary.

In NATO, continued improvement in defensive capability of allied forces, notably Germany, should be possible. This will increase the ability of the alliance to retard or arrest a major aggression against the strategic area of Western Europe. Also, it can be expected that some of the NATO nations will develop an offensive capability which may allow some adjustments to U.S. strike forces assigned to NATO. For example, it is planned that from 1963 to 1965, some 300 medium-range ballistic missiles would be deployed in Europe and would replace tactical aircraft on about a one for one basis. To the extent that these missiles are manned by other NATO nations, no U.S. base requirements would be generated other than facilities to accommodate U.S. special ammunition custodial detachments. Even these would probably be provided through NATO common infrastructure procedures. The reduction in manned aircraft requirements could be expected to result in some minor reduction in the number of air bases now assigned for U.S. use.

In contrast to the expected improvement in allied military capability in NATO, military forces of allies and associated free world nations in the Far East and in Southern and Southeastern Asia and the Middle East can be expected to attain at best a limited

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capability for defense. Therefore, U.S. forces would be required to supplement and complement these indigenous military forces in opposing large-scale communist aggressions. As has been previously indicated, an improvement in the potential base structure in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, and the Middle East is an immediate requirement if the rapid and efficient deployment of U.S. forces to these areas is to be realized in time of need. In view of the expected continued increase in military power and aggressive attitude on the part of Communist China, this need would become even more critical in Southern Asia and Southeast Asia after 1963.

Overseas bases associated with the mission of defending the North American continent from air and sea attack are regarded as a continuing requirement as long as the potential enemy possesses the capability to attack the United States by these means. These bases will not only provide for early warning and effective employment of the strategic retaliatory forces, but will also serve the military defense efforts in reducing the damage to our industrial base and population centers. Additionally, they will continue to assist in maintaining control of vital land and sea areas and air communications.



Other changes to the overseas base system are expected to be minor. The varied activities associated with space research will probably create an ever changing requirement for many small facilities of a temporary nature, scattered throughout the world. Also, as previously noted, plans for long-haul communications envision the establishment by 1965 of additional installations to accommodate newer communications systems, with a reduction in some of the existing facilities not employed.

During the 1963-1969 period there is a possibility of attaining some form of international arms control agreement with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Because of the many and varied types of agreements which might be reached, many possible consequences affecting overseas base holdings may result. It is important to note, however, that adjustments in U.S. force levels brought about by such disarmament agreements, if coupled with a relinquishment of overseas bases, will doubly curtail the ability of the United States to deploy its remaining military power to critical areas of the free world.

From an overall view, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the Communist Bloc with combat forces—land, sea, and air—or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. overseas base system is an essential means of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations.

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chance to prevail.

Lang et al 1960 Review

Bases - 3 fold purpose

- f.1. {
- (a) to maintain strat. deterrent - SAK
 - (b) to maintain tac forces
 - (c) to promote US political objectives

• NB how easy US got SAC bases. URS never - this no doubt why URS concentrated on ICBMs.

- f.8. (d) to defend US mainland against attack
- by early warning - int facs + com facs.

• NB how overseas bases are essential for all these,
incl a ww comms syst to control nuclear forces,
to transmit intelligence + to administer deployed forces,
- this the ^{govt} US just doesn't have.

- f.10. one of the prime strat advants of US - possib
of surrendering the Com. bloc.

• NB function (d) defend US mainland now v.
restricted - ALS, CAN.

f.42- comms are mandatory.

every word of this report suggests URS has no
capab for global war or ww intervention.

Reasons for FMP

①	strategic offensive.
②	tactical / interventionary. ?
③	promotion of political objectives.
④	^{Forward} intelligent defence of the homeland
⑤	intelligence