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AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION
IN THE PACIFIC THEATER:
WORLD WAR II TO 1983

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A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN L. BUCKLEY, MAJ(P), USA
S.S., University of Tampa, 1975

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Conclusions reveal that reorganization of the Army structure must be done in a joint context and must accommodate the sensitivities and complexities of both military and political requirements. The current structure, although workable, is not optimal to ensure a transition to regional, theater, or global war. Should an effective remedy not be applied before the outbreak of hostilities in the region, the price of transition will be expensive in both time and resources. That remedy should be in the form of a Northeast Asia Command. (author)

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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Finally, and most importantly, my sincere thanks to my wife Vikki and children Anne and John, who made many sacrifices as I devoted time and energy, which would otherwise have belonged to them, in completing this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS	ix
 Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Problem	1
Purpose	6
Background	6
Methodology	9
Research Question	12
Delimitations	13
Assumptions	14
Definitions	14
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL (WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT)	16
World War II	16
Post World War II	19
Korean War	20
Post Korean War	22
Vietnam Conflict	24
Vietnam Drawdown	26
Present Situation	28
III. REORGANIZATION EFFORTS: 1978 TO PRESENT	36
Project Pacific Phoenix	38
Where The Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder	40
U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia	42
Roles, Missions, and Relationships of PACOM Headquarters	43
Army Organization in PACOM	46

IV. THE MAXIMS OF REORGANIZATION	53
Unity of Command	53
Political Considerations	60
The Joint Environment	61
V. NORTHEAST ASIA IN PERSPECTIVE	67
A Northeast Asia Command	70
Service Component Commands	79
Subordinate Army Commands	85
Multirole Dilemma	85
Headquarters, U.S. Army Western Command	87
Summary	90
APPENDIX 1 - USARJ Reorganizations: 1941-1947	94
APPENDIX 2 - USARJ Reorganizations: 1950-1978	96
APPENDIX 3 - Current PACOM Organization	99
APPENDIX 4 - Command and Staff - CFC (CFC/USFK Dual-Hatting)	102
BIBLIOGRAPHY	104
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	109

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Proposed Unified Command Structure	79
2. Proposed Reorganization of Pacific Theater	86

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACC - Air Component Command

AFPAC - U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

AMOPS - Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System

ARSTAF - Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff

CFC - ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command

CINCAL - Commander-In-Chief, Alaska Command

CINCFE - Commander-In-Chief, Far East Command

CINCPAC - Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Command

CINCUNC - Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command

DA - Department of the Army

DCSOPS - Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

EUSA - Eighth U.S. Army

FEC - Far East Command

FOA - Field Operating Agency

FORSCOM - U.S. Army Forces Command

GAO - Government Accounting Office

GCC - Ground Component Command

HQ - Headquarters

HQDA - Headquarters, Department of the Army

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JGSDF - Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

JOPS - Joint Operations Planning System

MAJCOM - Major Army Command

MACV - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
NCA - National Command Authority
NCC - Naval Component Command
NEACOM - Northeast Asia Command
NORAD - North American Air Defense Command
ODCSOPS - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans
OPCOM - Operational Command
OPCON - Operational Control
P3 - Project Pacific Phoenix
PACOM - Pacific Area Command
PALEX - Pacific Armies Liaison and Exchange Program
ROK - Republic of Korea
SRI - Strategic Research Institute
SSI - Strategic Studies Institute
SWPA - Southwest Pacific Area
TPFDL - Time-Phased Force Deployment List
UNC - United Nations Command
U.S. - United States
USAFFE - United States Army Forces in the Far East
USARJ - United States Army, Japan
USARPAC - United States Army, Pacific
USARV - United States Army, Vietnam
USFJ - United States Forces, Japan
USFK - United States Forces, Korea
WESTCOM - United States Army, Western Command

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this

General George C. Marshall¹

THE PROBLEM

Throughout the history of United States military involvement in the Pacific theater, the command and control structure has been a focal point of constant concern, criticism, and proposals for reorganization. The military community has generally based its consideration of various reorganization alternatives on strategy, military doctrine, and the imposition of clear lines of command authority. However, the implementation of complex and broadly-based reorganizations to accomplish military objectives has been fraught with difficulty: solutions to the problem either conflict with political realities or infringe on parochial service interests.

Political considerations are paramount, and therefore the civilians responsible for meeting United States' political objectives retain ultimate authority. Any reorganization of the military command and control structure

without regard to political considerations is neither propitious nor feasible. A case in point was an intended reorganization of the Army structure in the Pacific in 1978. The plan, called Project Pacific Phoenix, had been approved for implementation after exhaustive study. The reorganization methodology involved a three-phased operation eventually leading to the reestablishment of a major Army command (MACOM). This command received the designation of Headquarters, U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), and its purpose was to operate as the Army component command to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The establishment of WESTCOM was only Phase I in what appeared to be a straightforward change in Army command and control procedures in the theater. Phases II and III involved the eventual subordination of two other MACOMs (Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan and Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army) to U.S. Army Western Command. Although WESTCOM was established as scheduled during Phase I, strong political objections came at the eleventh hour to defer for an indefinite period the subordination of the other major Army commands. The political rationale for deferment stemmed from the possible adverse impact on the governments of Japan and South Korea should they perceive the reorganization to imply a diminished U.S. resolve to fulfill regional security obligations. This very reorganization effort has been the focus of several major studies, at a rate of almost one per

year, since the time of original deferral. This reorganization effort will serve as the central topic of this thesis.

The military structure in the Pacific region bears the fundamental responsibility to ensure a viable command and control capability to meet peacetime requirements and simultaneously to manage the effective transition to war. The principal task is to develop an organizational structure which meets the needs of the military and also accommodates valid political considerations.

Military requirements are basic. The organization must provide a single commander of a specified force in a designated geographical region. Additionally, that commander must possess sufficient authority and resources to ensure accomplishment of the mission. Simply stated, that means unity of command and clearly defined lines of command and control.

Political considerations, however, are more complex: they can both illuminate and obscure other fundamental issues. Because political realities are paramount, a not uncommon tactic for a military service (Army, Navy, or Air Force), or commands within a service, is to disguise a vested parochial interest as a major political concern. In fact, it is often impossible to discern the difference. For example, during World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz and

General Douglas MacArthur openly disagreed over the appropriate military strategy for the Pacific theater. As both commanders independently pursued separate courses of action, they also competed for the same scarce resources. In some instances, presidential decision was required to break the deadlock over resource allocation. The schism between MacArthur and Nimitz effectively blocked unification of the Pacific theater throughout World War II. How much of the rift was valid political consideration, and how much was the result of parochial interest and Army-Navy service rivalry, will probably never be accurately assessed.

Parochial interests in the Pacific continue to dominate the scene even today. The three major Army commands in the Pacific region are often embroiled in argument over lines of authority and optimum reorganizational alternatives. Each command justifies its position with reference to "the needs of the Army" and to the political climate. Again, it is often difficult to ascertain the difference between vested interests and valid political constraints.

In the final analysis, political considerations associated with the Pacific command and control structure must ensure that all commitments of the United States are fulfilled both in terms of perception and actuality. At the same time, to overfulfill the commitment may have an adverse impact on regional stability. The fine line between meeting

security obligations and interfering with the political status quo must accommodate the national interests of the United States while simultaneously conforming to the needs and perceptions of U.S. allies. In this regard the Pacific nations are particularly sensitive. A revised command and control structure which appreciably alters the current organization may result in a perception of reduced U.S. defense commitment to some allies and an elevation in priority of others. The "bottom line" is that any change in the Pacific command and control structure must meet not only military requirements, but must also avoid upsetting the political status quo.

This discussion serves to underscore the diversity and complexity of some of the key factors which must be considered in the process of reorganizing the military command and control structure in the Pacific arena. The development of an optimal command and control structure to meet the needs of the future is clearly a formidable task by any measure. One must be able to differentiate political and parochial considerations, and to assign a proper weight to those considerations, all the while keeping the threat in perspective.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to review the organization arrangements in the Pacific theater from World War II to present, to analyze the findings and conclusions of major studies pertaining to pending reorganizational alternatives for the Army in the Pacific, and to postulate in adequate detail the optimum organizational structure for the U.S. Army in the Pacific theater. The postulated command and control structure will fully correspond with unified command considerations and be sensitive to regional political implications.

BACKGROUND

Although Chapter II of this document provides a detailed history of command and control in the Pacific theater, a brief summary of the major reorganizational efforts in that arena is appropriate at this point. The purpose of providing this information is to give the reader an appreciation of the magnitude of past reorganizations and the difficulty associated with implementing lasting changes in the command and control structure.

Interservice rivalry and parochialism have historically characterized the Pacific military structure; however, those problems were particularly prominent immediately prior to, and during, World War II. The organizational problems of the Pacific theater had long been

recognized as a serious deficiency, but unification of the Pacific command and control structure was not seriously addressed until after the outbreak of World War II.² The rift between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur over military strategy and resources only served to exacerbate existing problems and delay corrective measures. Enactment of the 1947 National Security Act was the first tangible step toward unifying the theater under a single commander.³

As a result of the 1947 Act and the transition from world war to a military occupation mission, the unified and component commands initiated major reorganizations. The magnitude of reorganization from 1941 to 1947 can best be appreciated by reviewing some of the changes in various Army headquarters during that period (see chronology at Appendix 1).⁴ It must, however, be recognized that the U.S. Army did not have a monopoly on reorganization and the impact of structural change was amplified in direct proportion to the vast number of military headquarters in the Pacific region at that time.

Unfortunately, the years following 1947 saw no appreciable reduction in command and control reorganization efforts. The "cold war" over democracy versus communism continued to heat up for the next three years. In June 1950, that ideological schism erupted into open warfare on the Korean peninsula.⁵ Reorganization was again necessary to meet the tactical and logistical needs in the region and to

continue concurrently the occupation and reconstruction in Japan. Although the 1953 United Nations' armistice agreement ended the large scale open conflict on the Korean peninsula, the uneasy peace in that area, coupled with U.S. regional interests and defense commitments, necessitated the retention of a forward deployed U.S. military force in South Korea.

By 1956, the Secretary of Defense had directed major changes in the Pacific unified command structure and reorganization was once again in progress.⁶ By early 1960, the United States was involved in conflict in Vietnam and the command and control structure in the Pacific was again reorganized to meet regional security and support requirements. The large buildup of military forces necessary to conduct operations in Vietnam and to support those operations from outside Vietnam also entailed extensive manpower increases in Army headquarters throughout the Pacific theater. The unwieldy "tooth-to-tail" ratios which had been allowed to develop during the 1960s had to be reduced to meet the fiscal and manning constraints which accompanied the conclusion of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1970s. The Pacific command and control structure was once again in the throes of major reorganization. To appreciate fully the magnitude and frequency of organizational change from 1950 to the present, the reader

should review the chronology at Appendix 2.⁷ This appendix is a continuation of the summary of organizational changes experienced by some of the U.S. Army headquarters in the theater during that period.

Although the summaries of Army reorganization efforts (Appendices 1 and 2) are directed primarily at the Army in Japan, extensive reorganization was also ongoing in Korea, Vietnam, and Hawaii. It is also important to remember that the other service components and joint/combined commands were simultaneously involved in the implementation of major reorganization plans. These surveys reveal that the Army in the Pacific has been in a constant state of organizational turmoil as command and control relationships have been altered to meet each crisis. One might question how the Army in the Pacific finds time to accomplish its primary missions in the wake of such turmoil and associated confusion.

METHODOLOGY

The period under consideration will run from World War II to the present. This time span is important because it includes the years during which the Pacific Ocean area retained special strategic interest for the United States. The activation, maintenance, and continued assessment of major military headquarters in the region, the political and economic emergence of America's Pacific allies, the

frequency of conflict in the region, and increased Soviet activities are all major trends which have developed since World War II. Each of these factors plays a significant part in determining the future role of U.S. forces in the Pacific theater.

The nature of the problem and available sources have determined the underlying research methodology and manner of presentation. As the study unfolded, a basic four-step approach emerged to govern research and explanation. That approach was: 1) to define the problem in all of its ramifications; 2) to explain what resolutions to the problem various actors and agencies have sought more remotely since World War II and more proximately since 1978; 3) to distill from the various attempts at resolution fundamental principles which would seem appropriate to any attempt at reorganization in the Pacific; and 4) to apply those principles, or maxims, in a suggested plan for a workable reorganization that would address the problem as it has evolved since World War II.

This approach is built on an analysis that is part historical in nature. Related primary and secondary research materials form the foundation which supports an identification of the problem and the various attempts to resolve it. Of special interest is a series of major reorganizational studies undertaken by various institutions since 1978. Each of these studies has assessed the

difficulties of current command relationships in detail, yet each has recommended a different course of action. A significant part of the research in this thesis has been devoted to ascertaining which parts of these studies retain validity and which parts reflect false assumptions and interests. It is on the basis of this analysis that the author suggests a solution that would seem to meet the major criteria for reorganization while avoiding the worst shortcomings of past efforts and plans. This general approach has governed thesis organization.

Chapter I outlines problems with the current Pacific command and control structure and provides a brief background on the reorganization turmoil experienced in the theater since World War II. The purpose of providing this information is twofold: first, the reader must understand the problem. That problem, simply stated, is that the present command and control structure neither delineates clear lines of authority/responsibility, promotes coordination/cooperation, nor does it facilitate an effective transition to war in the joint service environment. Second, the background information affords an introduction to some of the exogenous factors which both contribute to the existing problem and serve to complicate resolution of key issues. Some of the factors addressed are political considerations, interservice rivalries, the

parochialism of protagonists, and finally the magnitude of reorganization plans implemented since World War II. Chapter I is both an introduction for readers unfamiliar with the issues and a refresher for those who have some knowledge of PACOM command and control problems.

After this introduction, Chapter II provides an explanation of how and why the situation evolved to its present form. Chapter II also makes clear the need for "unity of command" in the Pacific and assists the reader in differentiating between the principle of "unity" and the concept of "centralization." Contrary to popular belief, the terms are not synonymous. Chapter III analyzes the five most recent studies dealing with command and control in PACOM in light of contemporary issues. It also explains how each study failed to consider either principles or key issues essential to successful implementation of a reorganization. On the basis of the first three chapters, Chapter IV presents a synthesis in the form of maxims, or rules, which have proven to be central to resolution of the problem. Chapter V then applies these maxims to develop a workable conclusion to the research question.

RESEARCH QUESTION

What is the optimum organizational structure for the U.S. Army in the Pacific theater to ensure an effective transition to the most probable wartime footing?

DELIMITATIONS

Although much of the scope of this thesis has been alluded to in preceding pages, it is worthwhile to state explicitly the precise limitations of the study. The period examined from a historical perspective runs from World War II to the present. The search of relevant material on the subject is confined to the major reorganization studies which have been published since the last substantial reorganization effort begun by the U.S. Army in 1978.

Although it is necessary to discuss the organizational structures of the unified command headquarters in PACOM, and its Air Force and naval components, these discussions are tangential in nature and only to the degree required to develop a point pertaining to the impact of a change in the U.S. Army structure.

While cost is a major consideration associated with any reorganization effort, a comparative cost analysis of various options is beyond the intended scope of this study. The impact of cost in terms of manpower or dollars will not be addressed.

The future roles and missions of Headquarters, IX Corps, in Japan, have been the subject of constant study and debate over the past decade; however, the thrust of this paper is at the level of major Army command and above. Any mention of Headquarters, IX Corps is intended to clarify command relationships which currently exist, and should not

be interpreted as a recommended solution to the IX Corps issue. The scope of the IX Corps issue transcends the nature of this thesis, and should be regarded as a separate, although related, matter which merits further analysis.

The primary constraint is security classification. Although much of the literature review involves classified documents, only those aspects which can be published in an unclassified format have been used. It is not expected that this caveat has detracted from the findings, or diminished the validity of the conclusions.

ASSUMPTIONS

The primary assumption is that the U.S. Army cannot, and will not, participate in future conflicts on a unilateral, single service basis. The wars of the future, as described in the Unified Command Plan and current combined arms doctrine, will be prosecuted by the service components of the unified and subordinate unified commands in a joint context only.

DEFINITIONS

The majority of terms used in this study are standard U.S. Army terms found in Army Regulation 310-25 or JCS Pub 1. In an attempt to circumvent misinterpretation, and to facilitate reading, pertinent definitions are provided in the body of the text, as appropriate.

CHAPTER I

NOTES

¹ James D. Delk, COL, USA, and James E. Dewire, LTC, USA, Army Organization In PACOM(U) (External draft) (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1982), SECRET, p. 6. ✂

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan. USARJ Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions Manual. Camp Zama, Japan, 1978, p. 2-1 - 2-2. ✂

⁵ Pictorial Encyclopedia of American History, 25 volumes, (Davco Publishing Co., 1962-1968), vol. 15: 1946 to 1956, p. 1162.

⁶ David W. Gray, Brigadier General, USA, letter to Commandant, U.S. Army War College, "Request for Background Information." Washington, D.C.: (DCSOPS, 24 August 1956. ✂

⁷ USARJ Regulation 10-1, pp. 2-2 - 2-6.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL (WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT)

WORLD WAR II

The history of United States military involvement in the Pacific theater has been marked by considerable consternation and debate regarding the optimum command and control organization required to perform peacetime functions and to manage effectively and efficiently the transition to war. Immediately prior to World War II, service parochialism ruled supreme: management assumed the form of cooperation rather than command and control authority. While the major service component headquarters in the Pacific area enjoyed the benefits of autonomy and associated advantages, serious deficiencies stemmed from decentralized effort and lack of unification within the theater. It was not until after the outbreak of World War II that any significant attempt was made to unify the commands in the Pacific. In a meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff on Christmas Day 1941, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General

George C. Marshall, made his position on unity of command very clear:¹

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater - - air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this²

Up to this time the Pacific theater had been divided into several different geographic areas with correspondingly different unified commands. General Marshall stressed unification of the entire Pacific theater under a single commander. The intent was to provide a focal point for command and control of all U.S. forces and assets in the theater. Although unification of the theater, as envisioned by General Marshall, was clearly an important issue, the genesis of the command and control problem lay in another set of issues. Much of the command problem during World War II stemmed from service rivalry and parochialism within the various service components of the unified commands.

By April 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had promulgated JCS Directive 263/2/D which specified unified command procedures for U.S. Joint Operations.³ The JCS directive was intended to provide a basis for centralized command and control by the unified commanders. The degree

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to which the directive was observed, however, varied widely among the unified commands. In a letter to the War Department describing the command philosophy espoused by the unified commander of the South Pacific Force, the Army component commander (Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon) wrote:

From the moment of his assumption of command, Admiral Halsey stressed the principle of a single force. He emphasized to all services and to all senior commanders that the mission of the South Pacific Force was to defeat the Japanese forces, that no single arm or service had a preponderance of interest in this mission, and that all arms and services must be welded into and fought as a single force

The thrust of Admiral Halsey's comments were clear; however, the execution of that philosophy was a distinctly different matter. In the same letter to the War Department, Lieutenant General Harmon stated:

No real air organization existed and it was necessary for me to augment General Twining's staff by transfer from my own headquarters and from units within the area. There was no Air Force Service Command As a consequence, it was necessary for my headquarters to carry much of the administrative and supply burden for the Thirteenth Air Force over a considerable period of time

The dichotomy between philosophy and execution is obvious, and history is replete with examples of a similar nature.

POST WORLD WAR II

The problem in 1944 was twofold: first, the necessity to unify the Pacific theater under one commander; and second, the need to clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and command relationships among the components of the unified commands. The first problem was initially addressed only after Japan's surrender in 1945. As a consequence of recommendations developed during the war, "the National Security Act of 1947 unified the armed forces under a single Department of Defense."⁶ In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun reorganizing the unified commands in the Pacific through the promulgation of JCS Directive 1259/27. The directive became formally effective on 1 January 1947, and established three regionally oriented unified commands in the Pacific: Commander-In-Chief Far East (CINCFE) - General MacArthur; Commander-In-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) - Admiral John Towers; and Commander-In-Chief Alaska (CINCAL) - Lieutenant General Ruegg. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was designated the executive agent for the Far East and Alaska Commands, and the Chief of Naval Operations as the executive agent for the Pacific Command.⁷ The second problem, that of clarifying authority, responsibility, and relationships of the component commands, awaited satisfactory resolution.

As the war effort wound down, international attention focused on economic recovery, reconstruction, and the occupation and administration of the defeated nations. In the Pacific, the orientation was primarily on Japan, and to a lesser degree, Korea. Along with the new peacetime mission came new command relationships and organizations to accommodate the requirements of administration and occupation.⁸ Although the unified commands remained stable, reorganization within the unified commands was dramatic, particularly in the Far East Command where General MacArthur had been charged with establishing a democratic government in Japan.

KOREAN WAR

Although World War II had been brought to a successful conclusion, conflicting ideological commitments to communism and democracy found expression in the form of a "cold war." The cold war heated up in June 1950 when Communist North Korea attacked south of the 38th parallel and the United Nations, under its new charter, came to the aid of the Republic of Korea.⁹ By 7 July, a United Nations Command under General Douglas MacArthur had been formed as a separate unified command of United Nations forces under the direction of the United States.¹⁰ While the unified and component command structures in the Pacific were destined to change in the future, the establishment of the United

Nations Command introduced a new factor into the command relationships equation which would further confuse the issue. By mid July 1951, Korean President Syngman Rhee asked General MacArthur to assume control of South Korean forces in addition to the United Nations forces already commanded by MacArthur. Control of South Korean ground forces was subsequently passed from General MacArthur to Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Commander, Eighth U.S. Army. In essence, a Combined Forces Command, although not formally designated as such, had in fact been established. In June 1951, a Soviet delegation speaking on behalf of Communist China and North Korea, proposed to the United Nations that a cease-fire be ordered and that armistice negotiations be initiated. After almost two years of negotiation, debate, and cease-fire violations, the armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. Simultaneously, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) was given responsibility for the observance and enforcement of the agreement. From a U.S. perspective, a more significant development saw CINCUNC charged with responsibility for the external defense of the Republic of Korea. That responsibility was made non-transferable from U.S. hands as long as the agreement remained in effect.¹¹ The die had now been cast: any future reorganization of the command structure in the Pacific would be tied to the United Nations' armistice

bullshit

agreement. The U.S. military community had lost its authority to initiate unilateral reorganization efforts which would alter the United Nations role of the senior U.S. Army commander in the Republic of Korea.

POST KOREAN WAR

Within the Far East Command, the organizations, missions, roles, and command relationships of the component and subordinate commands remained in a constant state of change. Changes were initially necessary to support the war effort in Korea, and later, to oversee the armistice agreement and uneasy peace in that country. Change also facilitated the continued reconstruction of Japan and the administration of its government. By 1956 the reorganization movement gathered momentum, but the focus was now at the unified command level. The U.S. Secretary of Defense had directed the disestablishment of the Far East Command and ordered that the unified command responsibilities assigned to Far East Command be transferred to the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).¹² The disestablishment of CINCFE was intended to settle several issues in the Far East - Pacific areas:

- resolve the problems of divided responsibilities for U.S. missions which were not readily divisible by geographic areas.¹³

- provide command and control of limited U.S. forces responsible for contingencies in a widespread area.¹⁴

- clarify command and control of bases and logistical facilities within the Pacific theater.¹⁵

As the 1956 reorganization study developed, the U.S. military community began to grapple with the problems of unraveling the complicated command structure which had been established to meet U.S. obligations in Korea. Brigadier General David W. Gray, Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, was able to forecast in a letter to the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College that CINCUNC would be retained as a separate major command, headed by the senior U.S. Army commander in Korea. He also stated that "Due to the peculiarity of the United Nations Command, which has no parallel arrangement under the military establishment, the Executive Agency to whom CINCUNC will be responsible has not been determined."¹⁶

By 1957 the unified command and control structure in the Pacific theater had begun to stabilize. The Commander-In-Chief, Alaska, also designated Commander, Alaskan NORAD Region, began to orchestrate the efforts of subordinate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine headquarters in Alaska. As CINCAL he was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the "security of Alaska, and for the support of forces of other unified and specified commands operating through, or within Alaska."¹⁷ As the Commander, Alaskan NORAD

Region, he was also assigned responsibility "for early warning of air attacks against the North American continent and for the air defense of Alaska."¹⁸

With Alaskan Command focused on the Continental United States and the Far East Command abolished, the Pacific area was finally taking shape as a unified organization under a single commander.

Within the Pacific Command, component services continued reorganization in an effort to conform to the new unified command structure. On 1 July 1957, the U.S. Army established Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) in Hawaii as the Army component commander to CINCPAC. USARPAC exercised command and control over all U.S. Army forces in the Pacific theater. The subordinate elements at that time included the U.S. Army, Hawaii; Eighth U.S. Army, Korea; U.S. Army, Japan; and the U.S. Army Ryuku Islands/IX Corps in Okinawa.¹⁹

VIETNAM CONFLICT

By 1950 the United States had become involved in a small military assistance mission in South Vietnam. By 1962, U.S. involvement had increased substantially. Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established in Saigon in February 1962 and was designated a separate subordinate unified command reporting through CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁰ In 1965,

1969

U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) "was placed directly under USARPAC for command, while remaining under the operational command of MACV for the duration of the conflict."²¹ At this time, General William C. Westmoreland commanded both MACV at the subunified command level and USARV at the Army component command level. As the Commander, MACV he also exercised operational control of Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces through their senior commanders. The variety and complexity of MACV missions required the incremental establishment of an intricate command and control structure. Although the structure was confusing, it apparently worked well for General Westmoreland. In an after-action report he stated:

although the lines of authority ran to me in several different ways, I was able to provide unity of command for the entire American military effort in South Vietnam, and also to give my personal attention to the entire range of advisory, combat, and support activities embraced by our commitment to South Vietnam.²²

Air Force and naval operations were particularly complex with CINCPAC controlling missions north of the Demilitarized Zone and MACV controlling operations on the south side. On the surface such an arrangement appears to be unworkable when dealing with limited assets; however, the flexibility exercised by CINCPAC made these arrangements far less rigid

than they would appear on a command and control diagram.

General Westmoreland went on to say:

In an emergency and upon my request, CINCPAC would divert all necessary air and naval capabilities to priority targets selected by me. When the enemy mounted a major offensive in the area of the DMZ, Admiral Sharp (CINCPAC) passed to my control all air operations in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam, because this area was in fact part of the extended battlefield. . . . On other occasions air operations in South Vietnam were curtailed for short periods in order to add to the weight of the effort against high priority targets in the north. This arrangement permitted full and effective use of our air and naval capabilities.³

General Creighton W. Abrams replaced General Westmoreland in 1968 and found the command and control arrangements to be less responsive.

VIETNAM DRAWDOWN

After the military withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. Army began to assess the layering of large headquarters which had been allowed to take place during the Vietnam era when manpower was not a critical issue. Along with retrenchment came the realization that the large command and control structure and the Vietnam-oriented logistical support bases in the Pacific were costly in dollars and manpower. Emphasis shifted to the reduction of manpower spaces and ways to improve the "tooth-to-tail" ratios which detracted from the availability of manpower in combat units.

General Abrams, who had commanded U.S. forces in South Vietnam for much of the conflict period, had witnessed

firsthand the problems associated with reporting through and relying on a higher headquarters geographically removed from the scene of conflict. He was appointed the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1972 and found himself in a position to influence the U.S. Army command and control structure with which he had dealt for several years. A recent study conducted by the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), comments that:

USARPAC was disestablished on 31 December 1974, with the Eighth US Army (EUSA) in Korea and US Army, Japan (USARJ), concurrently established as MACOM's, USARPAC's disestablishment. . . . with the ostensive purpose of saving manpower spaces. In fact, a savings of over 1300 spaces resulted from changes associated with the reorganization. Nonetheless, interviews have convinced the study team that the decision resulted at least partially from a conviction that headquarters in Hawaii would perform a supporting rather than a directive role in future wars. It was envisioned as the beginning of a move toward future establishment of a more responsive operational headquarters in NEA and SEA

Headquarters, USARPAC was replaced by two smaller headquarters located in Hawaii; U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group and U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. CINCPAC Support Group was designated a Department of the Army Field Operating Agency with the mission of providing liaison, advice, and assistance to the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific. U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, a FORSCOM unit, was designated the senior Army headquarters in Hawaii and was responsible for the command and support of assigned and attached FORSCOM elements in PACOM.²⁵ U.S. Army, Japan and

Eighth U.S. Army in Korea were separate MACOMs and did not fall under the purview of U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

Shortly after this reorganization, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group began to express concern that the Army in the Pacific did not have an equal voice in joint matters because there was no real U.S. Army component command to CINCPAC. Additionally, there was considerable staff friction between U.S. Army Support Command and U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. Projects as simple as coordinating an itinerary for a VIP (Very Important Person) to visit the 25th Infantry Division became major staff feats in view of the prevailing friction.

Again, the Army studied the command relations in PACOM, and reorganization was in full swing by 1979. On 23 March 1979, Headquarters, U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM) was activated to fill the void that CINCPAC Support Group said had been created by the disestablishment of USARPAC in 1974. WESTCOM was formed by combining CINCPAC Support Group with elements from U.S. Army Support Command, and was initially commanded by a Major General. During this phase of the reorganization the WESTCOM commander still lacked rank parity with the other service component commanders of CINCPAC; in fact, he was also outranked by the other two MACOM commanders in Japan and Korea.²⁶ In terms

of an equal voice in the joint arena, little had really been accomplished.

The resurrection of USARPAC, in the form of WESTCOM, was only the first step in a three-step process which would eventually subordinate USARJ and EUSA to the new Army component in PACOM. At the end of the reorganization process, scheduled to take place over several years, WESTCOM would have the full command and control authority of an Army component to a unified command. The status of WESTCOM as the Army component for the Pacific theater was clearly contingent on the execution of all three phases of the reorganization plan. As mentioned earlier, the reorganization did not proceed as planned due to last minute political intervention. The CINCPAC Terms of Reference, which define the responsibilities of component and subordinate unified commands, defined WESTCOM as "the US Army Component Commander to CINCPAC (less the geographical areas of Japan and Korea)." This geographical caveat is not included in the responsibility statements which address the air and naval components of CINCPAC. It is this truncated authority which has become the focal point of Army interest in PACOM since 1979. Occasional excursions by WESTCOM to circumvent this caveat have been met with strong resistance by the Army commanders and staffs in Korea and Japan.

It should be noted at this point, however, that the responsibility for WESTCOM's attempts to dabble in the affairs of the other Pacific MACOMs must be shared with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). Although it is not within the purview of HQDA to promulgate "Organization and Functions Manuals" for MACOMs outside of the continental United States, it is clearly incumbent upon Department of the Army to delineate, in writing, specific missions, responsibilities, and lines of authority/coordination for its subordinate MACOMs. Certain actions, or in some cases inactions, by HQDA in the past have only served to aggravate the already tense relationships between the Pacific MACOMs. Specifically, Department of the Army has:

- published Army Regulation 10-1 which outlines the organization and functions of Headquarters, WESTCOM. No such DA promulgated regulation exists for USARP or EUSA; as such, there is no clear tie between the responsibilities of the three Pacific MACOMs.

- allowed Department of the Army Operating Instructions for the Pacific (DAOI-PAC) to expire. Although this document was designed specifically to delineate the army-to-army relationships in PACOM, it expired shortly before the activation of WESTCOM, and there have been no attempts by HQDA since then to update those instructions.

- given tacit approval of several WESTCOM actions which infringe on the responsibilities and initiatives of

the other Pacific MACOMs. Specific examples are the USARJ initiated bilateral exchange activities which are routinely briefed to visitors by WESTCOM as a part of WESTCOM's Pacific Armies Liaison and Exchange (PALEX) Program; and USARJ initiated bilateral exercises which are similarly briefed by WESTCOM as a subordinate part of their training/exercise program. A visitor who ventures no further into the Pacific than Hawaii (the location of WESTCOM headquarters) is likely to depart with the impression that WESTCOM is, in fact, USARPAC by another name, and is fully responsible for orchestrating the activities of the other Pacific MACOMs, regardless of geographical caveats.

While Project Pacific Phoenix was preparing to revamp the Army command structure in the Pacific, another reorganization was in progress in Korea, the activation of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Although there is some disagreement over the number of "hats" the CINC in Korea really wore, for the purpose of this paper, he wore four: CINC United Nations Command, CINC Combined Forces Command, Commander U.S. Forces Korea, and Commander Eighth U.S. Army. The most significant aspect associated with the activation of Combined Forces Command (CFC) is that the authority of JINCCFC exceeds the authority of the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea. This creates a "situation where a U.S. general

officer has operational control over another nation's forces."²⁷

CINCCFC receives operational guidance and strategic direction from the ROK-US Military Committee established by the CFC 'Strategic Directive 1'. CINCCFC (as the senior US military officer assigned to Korea) communicates directly with the JS National Command and Military Authority (JCS plus the NCA) of the United States on binational matters. The existence of these direct communications channels and a broad continuing mission requiring execution by significant forces of two or more services and necessitating single strategic direction have²⁸ resulted in a de facto unified command in Korea.

The establishment of a direct link from the commander on the ground to the National Command Authority has created much uncertainty regarding the role of CINCPAC during conflict. It would appear that CINCPAC will become a supporting commander to CINCCFC. An article in Defense/81 magazine points out this uncertainty with the following narrative:

While the JCS Pub 2 has remained basically unaltered since 1958, there have been continual changes in operating procedures, resulting from experience in the Vietnam War and from a number of crises. Among these crises were US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973, capture of the Pueblo in 1968, and evacuation of American personnel from Saigon in 1975, seizure of the Mayaguez the same year,²⁹ and the Korea tree cutting incident of 1976.

The activation of Combined Forces Command further confused the already complicated command structure in Korea, and additionally reduced the latitude of the U.S. military authorities to alter command arrangements in PACOM.

The command and control structure in PACOM now consists of CINCPAC with three component commands (although the authority of the Army component has geographic limitations) and two subordinate unified commands; one in Korea (U.S. Forces, Korea) and one in Japan (U.S. Forces, Japan). Reporting to each of these subordinate unified commands are a series of service component commands, most of which oversee the operation of several smaller headquarters of their respective services. Appendix 3 provides a detailed explanation of current command arrangements in the Pacific theater. A thorough comprehension of these arrangements is essential to understanding both the reorganization alternatives discussed in the next chapter and the conclusions provided in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II

NOTES

¹James D. Delk, COL, USA, and James E. DeWire, LTC, USA. Army Organization In PACOM(U)(External Draft) (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1982), SECRET, p. 6.

²Ibid.

³Millard F. Harmon, LTG, USA. Letter to MG Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Div., War Department. Summary of operational problems and accomplishments of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific. 6 June 1944, Annex A.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 15.

⁶Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 6.

⁷JCS, WARX #87793. Discusses the Unified Command Plan which was approved by the President on 14 December 1946. The message is for action to the unified commanders in the Pacific area. Washington, D.C., 16 December 1946.

⁸Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan, USARJ Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions Manual, Camp Zama, Japan, 1978, p. 2-2.

⁹Pictorial Encyclopedia of American History, 25 volumes, (Davco Publishing Co., 1962-1968), vol. 15: 1946 to 1956, p. 1162.

¹⁰Encyclopedia International, 20 volumes, (Lexicon Publications, Inc., 1980), vol. 10: Korean War, p. 256.

¹¹William M. Carpenter, et al. U.S. Strategy In Northeast Asia. Annex. Considerations Regarding The Residual U.S. Forces In Korea and Japan(U)(Arlington, Virginia: SRI International, Strategic Studies Center, 1978), Report Number SSC-TN-6789-2, SRI-W-78-17406, CONFIDENTIAL, p. 21.

¹²David W. Gray, Brigadier General, USA. Letter to Commandant, U.S. Army War College. "Request for Background Information." Washington, D.C.: ODCSOPS, 24 August 1956.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Alaskan Command, "Alaskan Command Briefing," undated. Based on text of briefing script, approximate date of publication is estimated to be 1957, p. 7.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 10-11.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

²¹ Ibid.

²² U.S. Pacific Command, Report on the War in Vietnam, as of 30 June 1968, Section II by W. C. Westmoreland, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 101.

²³ Ibid., p. 103.

²⁴ Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 10-11.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁶ The commanders of PACFLEET, EUSA, and PACOM were all four-star equivalents. The commanders of PACAF and USARJ were lieutenant generals. It was not until 1 October 1981, that the Commander, WESTCOM was upgraded to lieutenant general.

²⁷ Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 32.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 32-33.

²⁹ John L. Frisbee, "Command Lines For Combat Forces," Defense/81 (August 1981): 12.

CHAPTER III

REORGANIZATION STUDIES: 1978 TO PRESENT

The previous two chapters have outlined the frequency of reorganization efforts in the Pacific (primarily U.S. Army oriented), and to a lesser degree have emphasized some of the military and political considerations which have precipitated the constant alteration of command relationships in the theater. This chapter focuses on the current problem and solutions to that problem offered by various study recommendations since 1978.

When one considers the administrative effort, manhours, and cost associated with the conduct of a major reorganization study project, the resources allocated to study Pacific command relationships since 1978 have been staggering. Most of the studies have involved travel from the United States to several Pacific countries by two or more study team members. Those study projects which were mandated or contracted by government officials/agencies were also preceded by a requirement for the headquarters involved to provide support and assistance. More significantly, each of the final studies has been reviewed by the headquarters involved, and extensive comments (often on the scale of "counter-studies") have been staffed, prepared, and

forwarded for consideration or, as is generally the case, in rebuttal.

While it is axiomatic that the elements of power in the Pacific region are dynamic, there is some doubt that the degree of change has been sufficient to warrant reassessment on the scale witnessed since World War II, or even since 1978. That is not to say that military and political leaders should adopt a policy of "neglect" or "stagnation" in the Pacific region; however, it is to say that a decision "not to decide" or to "piecemeal the solution" only unnecessarily exacerbates the friction, uncertainty, and turmoil which already exist in Pacific command and control relationships.

In general, each of the major studies conducted since 1978 has presented valid facts and detailed assessments of current problems and considerations. In general, the same facts, problems, and considerations are duplicated in each of the studies. The situation has been reviewed so many times in what appears to be a never-ending study process, that the military headquarters in the Pacific and other agencies would be hard pressed to uncover new data which would suddenly lead to a panacea.

Although the plethora of studies conducted since 1978 generally agree in substance, conclusions and recommendations differ widely. Following is a review of key points made by each of the five major studies since 1978:

STUDY 1 - PROJECT PACIFIC PHOENIX (P3):

This study was sponsored by the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and was published by U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group in March 1978.¹ While the study made many recommendations regarding the transfer of functions and facilities in PACOM, the principal thrust of the study was to reestablish USARPAC and to return to the command and control structure which had existed prior to the disestablishment of USARPAC in 1974. At least that was the thrust in the joint context; in the Army-only environment, the recommended changes were far more substantive.

Although the proposed structure would have been functional, it could only be expected to operate as marginally as it did prior to 1974. From an objective viewpoint, the major reason the proposal failed was "bad timing." Beginning in 1974, the United States military began a massive long-term incremental troop reduction in the Pacific theater. In 1977, U.S. troop reductions in Korea were initiated and, by the time the P3 study appeared in 1978, America's major Pacific allies were acutely attuned to the potential impact that U.S. withdrawals would have on regional security. The establishment of an Army component command in Hawaii, almost 3,500 miles from Northeast Asia, to replace a major Army command headquarters being withdrawn

For Navy
CICAF
Maven
study of
reorg
etc

from Korea did little to demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to any Pacific nation, particularly Korea and Japan.

When the political and military atmosphere of 1978 is compared with the environment in the Pacific today, one finds that there are several factors which have changed appreciably over the past five years. When the U.S. fully intended to withdraw troops from the Republic of Korea, the concept of combining Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army with the new Army component command in Hawaii may have indeed had merit. With no ground forces in Korea, an Army headquarters on the Korean peninsula would be difficult to justify, particularly in view of congressional pressure to reduce the layering of unnecessary headquarters in the theater. The obvious solution, given that ground combat forces would leave the peninsula, was to move Headquarters, EUSA to Hawaii. This would permit personnel space savings by merging Headquarters, EUSA with the new Army component, and would also demonstrate to the Republic of Korea that EUSA had not really abandoned the Pacific altogether. Another consideration in the 1978 time frame was that U.S.-Japan bilateral military activities were of little import. Until 1978, little overt progress had been made in bilateral training and contingency planning; however, the embers had been stoked and the kettle was sufficiently warm to interest both U.S. and Japanese statesmen; ergo, the eventual

political intervention which stopped Project Pacific Phoenix.

Since 1978, both of these factors, which were major considerations in Project Pacific Phoenix, have changed. The plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea was abandoned and U.S.-Japan bilateral military cooperation has expanded significantly. One can logically conclude that the initial rationale for implementing Project Pacific Phoenix, excluding parochial interests, has been overcome by events.

STUDY 2 - WHERE THE DAWN COMES UP LIKE THUNDER: A Look at the Army's Future Role in the Pacific:

This study was done by Colonel Ward M. Lehardy and published in June 1978. This was an individual study project written as an article for publication and it to some extent reviewed the economic, political, and military interests of the United States in the Pacific theater. The author clearly outlined the sensitivities of our allies regarding the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea and Asian perceptions of our European interests at the expense of Asian regional security. Colonel Lehardy made five specific recommendations:²

- 1 - Reestablish USARPAC.
- 2 - Designate three divisions as "Pacific-oriented" forces.

3 - Establish a clear mission in the Pacific for IX Corps.

4 - Exercise Pacific contingency plans on a frequent basis.

5 - Increase the use of small, elite training teams where indigenous forces want them.

Although Colonel Lehardy devoted a major portion of his study to political sensitivities and the significance of a U.S. ground force presence in the Pacific,³ his recommended command and control structure essentially paralleled the P3 study. That is, he advocated reestablishing USARPAC. As was the case with Project Pacific Phoenix, the establishment of USARPAC, troop strength reduction in Korea, and the associated subordination of the U.S. Army headquarters in Japan and Korea would only serve to diminish the military significance of Northeast Asia.

The recommendation to resurrect USARPAC presents a unique dichotomy when compared with the other recommendations of the Lehardy study. The scope of country and regional contingency planning conducted in the theater is limited almost exclusively to Japan and Korea; therefore, Lehardy's recommendations relative to contingency planning focus on Northeast Asia by default. The need to designate "Pacific-oriented" forces, to establish a clear mission for IX Corps (located in Japan), and to exercise contingency

plans frequently all give the illusion of increasing the importance of Japan and Korea. If the reestablishment of USARPAC contravenes a demonstration of U.S. resolve in Northeast Asia, one might conclude that Colonel Lehardy was suggesting that the U.S. attempt to appease Northeast Asian concerns with some sort of trade off: specifically, although the strength of U.S. ground forces in the region would be reduced, the U.S. could replace it with a "perception" of renewed interest. The hard facts are that the illusion of renewed interest is a poor substitute for in-place ground combat forces which serve as a "trip wire" for regional defense.

STUDY 3 - U.S. STRATEGY IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

Like Project Pacific Phoenix, this was also a DA DCSOPS sponsored study. The study was conducted by Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in Palo Alto, California and was published in June 1978. The final report consists of a basic unclassified study with an Annex which is classified SECRET. The basic study provides an excellent assessment of the confluence of power in Northeast Asia and of the national interests and objectives of the involved nations. The substantive recommendations of the study are contained in the classified Annex.

Although the classified data will not be incorporated in this document, the SRI study is significant

not only because it presents the first formal opposition to resurrecting USARPAC but also because it focuses on the strategic significance of Northeast Asia. Additionally, the study does not reflect self-serving interests and biased opinions.

The command and control recommendations of the SRI study vary greatly from the recommendations presented in Project Pacific Phoenix and in Colonel Lehardy's study. The SRI study team carefully and methodically analyzed contemporary issues and other factors which have altered the elements of power in Northeast Asia over the past decade. Based on that analysis, the study concludes that "centralization" by the U.S. Army in Hawaii would be detrimental to U.S. and ally interests in the region. The study provides a clear focus on the emerging significance of Northeast Asia and the importance for the U.S. to maintain a balance of power in the Northeast Asian region which complements U.S. security objectives in the Pacific basin.

STUDY 4 - THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND RELATIONSHIPS OF PACIFIC COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:

Based on a July 1979 request by Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) also studied command

relationships in the Pacific. The study was published in 1980. Its justification was that the Subcommittee had

been informed that with new communications, Washington officials make many types of decisions, which previously would have been made in Hawaii or further out in the Pacific. Yet in an emergency or contingency operational control is transferred to a local commander in the Far East. It would thus appear that the role of the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific, is questionable and, possibly, a peacetime luxury.

Although Congressman Addabbo had specifically emphasized the possibility of saving personnel spaces and reducing overlapping functions, the potential ramifications of his question addressed a much broader issue: the very existence of the unified command structure in the Pacific theater. The detailed analysis required to satisfy the Congressman's doubts necessarily extended the scope of the study to include the subordinate unified and component commands of CINCPAC. Because GAO had reviewed the Navy and Air Force components only a short time prior to the Subcommittee query (Pacific Fleet Headquarters in February 1977 and Pacific Air Force Headquarters in February 1979) the present GAO study focused primarily on PACOM Headquarters, the subordinate unified commands, and on the Army in the Pacific. In addressing each of these headquarters the GAO made three key observations:

1 - The role of CINCPAC had gradually decreased since 1947;

2 - The role of the subordinate unified commands had incrementally increased;

3 - The merits of resurrecting USARPAC are questionable.

The GAO study team found that the role of CINCPAC had changed appreciably as a result of the introduction of technology, the transition from grant aid security programs to foreign military sales, and a gradual increase in the responsibilities/scope of operational involvement of the subordinate unified commands. In sum, the peacetime role of CINCPAC had been gradually reduced and the wartime role had become "somewhat vague."⁵ The GAO study concluded that the "changing world conditions and ongoing reevaluations of national strategy raise questions as to whether the current Pacific command structure is the most effective one to meet emerging problems (i.e., contingencies, war, etc.)."⁶ Specifically, the role of CINCPAC had changed from "prosecuting the war" to "support and coordination."

Regarding the U.S. Army structure in the Pacific, the GAO report was equally explicit. Although the details of the GAO analysis, conclusions, and recommendations on the Army structure remain classified, the study team strongly recommended that the Secretary of Defense "fully examine the pros and cons of the need for a Pacific-wide component headquarters for the Army in Hawaii."⁷ The GAO study strongly warned that the reestablishment of Headquarters

USARPAC, or any form of Army centralization in Hawaii, brought with it "potentially adverse political ramifications."⁸

STUDY 5 - ARMY ORGANIZATION IN PACOM:

This was a ~~draft report~~ prepared by a team from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, based on a study directive by the DA DCSOPS. The report was published in 1982, bringing the DCSOPS-directed studies on Army command and control in the Pacific to a total of three since 1978. This report carried with it a clear caveat:

This is a draft report . . . , and as such it does not reflect the official position of the Army War College or approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, or Department of the Army. The findings of this report are not to be construed⁹ as an official Department of the Army position.

Although the SSI study in its draft format does not represent the official position of the Army War College or Department of the Army, the depth of the review is exceeded only by the GAO report and the content probably surpasses that of the SRI study in terms of command and control analysis. While some protagonists fail to recognize the political significance associated with the reorganization of something as seemingly insignificant as the theater Army command and control structure, the SSI study portrays the vivid realities which must be considered.

The Army organization in PACOM must, at the same time, be supportive of US diplomatic efforts in the area. The impact of the stationing of Army forces, conducting exercises in the region, and location and authority of Army headquarters on the perceptions of friends and potential adversaries must be recognized.

The Army's principle challenge, then, is to provide an organization in PACOM which is able to fulfill requirements across the spectrum of conflict while supporting US diplomatic efforts both now and in the future.¹⁰

The significance of this study is twofold: first, it addresses the strategic importance of Northeast Asia vis-à-vis the rest of the Pacific theater, and second, it recognizes the expanding operational role of the subordinate unified commands in PACOM, particularly in Korea.

Regarding Northeast Asia, the SSI study team stated

Traumatic though it may be, it must be accepted that significant interests and military power rightfully reside in Northeast Asia. Power and influence, at least as concerns the Army, must be shared between command and control axes centered on both Hawaii and Northeast Asia.¹¹

This statement is significant for at least two reasons: the stage is being set to consider the possibility of a formal unified command in Northeast Asia; and the term "power" has been introduced in the context of command and control arrangements. It is this very concept of "power" that has historically nurtured the seeds of parochialism throughout PACOM. Unfortunately, these seeds have often grown into major obstacles which impede progress.

The SSI conclusions, relative to the expanding role of the subordinate unified commands in PACOM, parallel the findings of the 1980 GAO report; however, the significance of this trend is explained by the SSI team in far greater detail. The study concluded that:

The crux of the issue is how warfare in the Pacific is to be directed. If the command and control structure will be as publicized (through PACOM), Army organization in the Pacific should be centralized, and centralized now. . . . But the same holds true with the lines of command and control assumed by the study team. Since the Pacific will have dual channels of operational guidance and strategic direction flowing from Washington, the Army headquarters in Korea should not be subordinated to the Army headquarters in Hawaii.¹²

To emphasize this point, the study team also stated that "centralization fails to recognize the reality of a de facto unified command in Korea. This recognition is important for proper transitioning and the conduct of war."¹³

In the end, the SSI study provided four reorganization alternatives and detailed the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. The four "MACOM alternatives" were:¹⁴

1- Decentralized (essentially maintaining the status quo);

2 - Subordinate USARJ to WESTCOM (the status of EUSA would not change);

3 - Redesignate USARJ as EUSA (Rear), and subordinate EUSA (Rear) to EUSA in Korea;

4 - Centralized (this entails the resurrection of USARPAC in the form of WESTCOM as originally proposed by Project Pacific Phoenix).

Alternative 3 focuses on command and control relationships between USARJ and EUSA and is therefore the only alternative which recognizes the emerging importance of Northeast Asia; unfortunately, it too falls short of addressing the real problem. Assuming that the U.S. Army could be an independent variable in the defense equation, alternative 3 is the logical stopgap to the compounding command and control problems of the Army in the Pacific. Unfortunately, this is a false assumption, the U.S. Army is not an autonomous body in matters of national defense. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Unified Command Plan, and a variety of other documents at the national level, the U.S. Army, and every other service component, is intended to operate as an integral part of the joint military structure.

Although the facts presented in the SSI study support the essentiality of integrated operations in the joint environment, the reorganization alternatives outlined by the study team conspicuously avoided confronting the joint issue. The only apparent rationale for this approach

is that any reorganization which would alter the joint structure in PACOM would also transcend the "scope" and "limitations" of the DA DCSOPS study directive. The Department of the Army study directive specifically stated that "recommendations must be feasible and suitable for implementation beginning in 1982."¹⁵ Any recommendation (or alternative leading to a recommendation) directed at modifying current unified command procedures would require extensive analysis by the entire civilian and military leadership community and would ultimately manifest itself in the form of Congressional mandate. Therefore, it was clearly an effort which would not have been feasible for implementation in the DA DCSOPS specified time span.

The following table summarizes key aspects of each of the five studies reviewed:

STUDY	YEAR PUBLISHED	SPONSOR	CENTRALIZATION
P3	1978	DA DCSOPS	YES
Lehardy	1978	Individual	YES
SR ^r	1978	DA DCSOPS	NO
GAO	1980	Congressional	NO
SSI	1982 (draft)	DA DCSOPS	NO

In considering that DA DCSOPS sponsored two studies which were both published in the same year (1978), one might

conclude that even the Department of the Army was beginning to doubt the wisdom of centralization in Hawaii. If centralization had become doubtful in 1978, and if political concerns had stopped centralization in 1979, then by mid 1982 (in the wake of the GAO and SSI study recommendations) observers should have concluded that centralization was a dated concept.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

¹Delk, Army In PACOM, p. B-1.

²Ward M. Lehardy, Where The Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder: A Look At The Army's Future Role In The Pacific (U) (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1978), SECRET, p. 1A.

³Ibid., p. 13.

⁴General Accounting Office, The Roles, Missions, And Relationships Of Pacific Command Headquarters (U) (Washington, D.C.: 1980), Report Number GAO/C-LCD-80-6, SECRET, p. 71.

⁵Ibid., p. 67.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Delk, Army In PACOM, p. B-4.

⁸General Accounting Office, Roles and Missions, p. 68.

⁹Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 1.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹Ibid., p. 57.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 49-51.

¹⁵Ibid., p. A-2.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAXIMS OF REORGANIZATION

Regardless of the initiatives eventually adopted to improve the command and control structure in PACOM, there are several fundamental considerations, or maxims, which will ultimately determine the success or failure of any given course of action. The first maxim is:

- UNITY OF COMMAND IS ESSENTIAL. The significance of this "principle of war" was as clearly understood by Clausewitz¹ in the 19th century as it was by General George C. Marshall in 1941 when he expressed to the British Chiefs of Staff the need for a single commander in the Pacific theater. Unfortunately, the importance of that principle, as it applies to command relationships in PACOM, has at times been obscured by the fog of parochialism and self interest. "Centralization," as suggested by the P3 study, should be more appropriately considered a single method of achieving "unity of command." It is clearly not the only method, probably not the best method, and does not embody in a single word the salient aspects of "unity of command."²

A review of the major studies outlined in Chapter III shows that the last three conducted (SRI, GAO, and SSI) all disagree with the concept of a centralized Army

component headquarters in Hawaii. Although the study published by Colonel Lehardy does indeed recommend centralization, the facts presented in his study more accurately support a "decentralized" Army command and control structure in PACOM. That then leaves the recommendations of Project Pacific Phoenix to stand on their own merit; and it is the very merit of that study which is questionable!

As mentioned earlier, the recommendations of Project Pacific Phoenix were implemented in part, in 1978. That action led to the establishment of WESTCOM in March 1979. Although P3 was a DA DCSOPS sponsored study, it was in fact published by U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. CINCPAC Support Group was also the headquarters which had earlier expressed concern that the Army in the Pacific did not have an equal voice in joint matters because there was no "real" U.S. Army component to CINCPAC. When CINCPAC Support Group forwarded its proposal to increase the authority and expand the responsibilities of its own headquarters as the Army component to the unified command, the initiative had little to lose, but a great deal to gain. Since the disestablishment of USARPAC in 1974, CINCPAC Support Group had the mission of providing "liaison, advice and assistance to CINCPAC, his staff and the PACOM Service component commanders regarding US Army matters of concern within PACOM."³ In addition to these

responsibilities, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group was also assigned to assist CINCPAC "in the preparation of CINCPAC Plans and prepare the US Army plans to support CINCPAC contingencies for areas not within the geographical area of a Pacific MACOM or which transcend MACOM areas."⁴

With that as a mission, no one questioned the need for CINCPAC Support Group to exist, and its future (in terms of the status quo) was never at stake. The question then arose over what would be gained by elevating CINCPAC Support Group to component command status? The answer given by CINCPAC Support Group was that the new arrangement would put the Army on an equal footing with the other two service components in the Pacific and would provide centralized unity of command; stripped of its military vernacular, the phrase actually means "prestige" and "power." As a component to the unified command, CINCPAC Support Group could logically expect to be endowed with the same degree of influence and authority held by Headquarters, USARPAC when it was the Army component to CINCPAC. In this regard, CINCPAC Support Group would be elevated from a Department of the Army Field Operating Agency (FOA) to a full major Army command (MACOM). As the new component to CINCPAC, and as a MACOM headquarters, CINCPAC Support Group could expect the other two MACOMs in Japan (USARJ) and Korea (EUSA) to become subordinate. With the expanded area of influence and

CINCPAC could be expected to support them too.

increase in command and control responsibilities, the next logical step in the process would be to upgrade the rank of the commander, incrementally, to four-star General: that would also ensure parity with the air and naval components to CINCPAC. Surely the commander of U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group must have considered these possibilities when he initiated his reorganization proposal.

Parochial interests in this case are clear: CINCPAC Support Group stood to gain in all areas. But what about Eighth U.S. Army in Korea and U.S. Army Japan? CINCPAC Support Group had no monopoly on parochialism; EUSA and USARJ stood to lose their MACOM status as they became subordinate to the new Army component to CINCPAC. From a self interest perspective, USARJ and EUSA were faced with possible staff reductions (both in numbers and rank structure) and a downgrading in the rank of the EUSA and USARJ commanders. More importantly, loss of MACOM status, along with the transfer of MACOM responsibilities, would preclude direct dialogue between EUSA, USARJ and other MACOMs, not to mention Department of the Army.

The decision to impose an additional reporting layer (WESTCOM) between the other two Pacific MACOMs and the "rest of the Army" carried with it several negative aspects. From an operational perspective, any additional layer in the command channel would encumber and dilute communications essential for staff coordination and rapid decisions. This

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consideration was particularly vital in view of the resurgence of bilateral contingency planning which was beginning to take place in both Korea and Japan. Representatives from the United States and Japan had just signed the 1978 Defense Guidelines, and for the first time ever, military-to-military bilateral planning received authorization. The next few years would prove that the ability of the USARJ staff to coordinate directly with Department of the Army and other MACOM staff representatives markedly enhanced responsiveness of the U.S. Army in Japan. A similar sense of urgency began to emerge in Korea at about the same time. The Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) had evolved from the use of "notional" forces to actual units which would be available to support specific contingency operations. As the Army staff in Korea began to restructure the Time-Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDL) which supported anticipated contingencies, direct coordination and responsive decisions by a variety of Army agencies outside Korea was essential. The speed of coordination between EUSA and representatives from FORSCOM, DA, and other involved MACOMs allowed an expeditious and efficient transition. This same coordination would become even more critical during an actual crisis.

Operational consideration is only one major facet which militates against "layering" the Army command and

control structure in PACOM. A second, and equally as important consideration, is the impact on U.S. allies. The Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) Headquarters, located in Tokyo, is the equivalent of Headquarters, Department of the Army in Washington, D.C.; each is the army headquarters in their respective countries. Although the JGSDF is equivalent to DA, its direct counterpart for bilateral planning and training activities with U.S. forces is Headquarters, USARJ. As a MACOM commander, the Commanding General of USARJ has been vested with the authority to represent the U.S. Army in Japan, and to make key decisions on behalf of DA which support U.S. Army objectives in that country. For decisions beyond his purview, the USARJ Commander serves as a direct communications link between the JGSDF and the U.S. Army infrastructure. Although this system has proven exceptionally effective for speed and accuracy of information exchanged, the real merit of the system is that it recognizes and accommodates the position of the JGSDF as a co-equal partner in defense matters with the U.S. Army. This is extremely important to the progress of military-to-military relationships between the United States and Japan. eh ?

While these are all valid considerations, their degree of importance remains theoretical until proven otherwise; therefore, the impact of violating these considerations is difficult to measure, and even more

difficult to "sell." As a result, parochial interests tend to become the first line of a rather elusive defense.

While parochial issues in Hawaii centered around "prestige" and "power" (in a variety of forms), parochialism in Japan and Korea issued from "command survivability." EUSA and USARJ countered primarily with political considerations (some valid and some not), while CINCPAC Support Group espoused the merits of "unity of command." The arguments on both sides were strong; however, as mentioned earlier, it was difficult to determine the validity of opposing viewpoints because much of the potential impact was theoretical.

History is replete with evidence and philosophies supporting "unity of command"; however, the impact of political considerations at any given point along the time spectrum is an intangible factor. The situation favored CINCPAC Support Group's proposal to centralize. An additional handicap to EUSA and USARJ was the death of General Creighton Abrams, who was largely responsible for the disestablishment of the centralized Army headquarters (USARPAC) in 1974. As a result, the military opponents of centralization counted one less asset. When all contenders emerged from the dispute, the reorganization proposal of CINCPAC Support Group had won! Or had it? Clearly the victors had failed to differentiate centralization from

unity of command, but what about the political considerations? This leads to the second maxim:

- POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PARAMOUNT. The impact of political considerations on Project Pacific Phoenix makes it almost axiomatic that changes in command relationships must be informed by political objectives. More significantly, any such proposals, particularly by a single service, must be carefully coordinated within the joint arena (from JCS through the subordinate unified commands), and must receive the full support and assistance of the U.S. State Department. In the end, the U.S. Ambassadors of affected nations will be the linchpins of success. Embassy staffs monitor political developments and will ultimately be charged with "testing the waters" and explaining to host nation governments the rationale and impact of a military restructure. Perceptions involving "balance of power," U.S. resolve to defense commitments, impact on regional stability, and "signals" to allied and belligerent nations will differ widely and differences must be addressed with absolute resolve. In this regard, failure was the price paid by the proponents of Project Pacific Phoenix.

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Project Pacific Phoenix demonstrated the importance of including all the participants in the proceedings. There was a myriad of politicians and statesmen whose voices remained to be heard. Lest one forget that the military is

only an extension of a much larger and more powerful political body, failure to account for politicians and statesmen caused the Army's independent reorganization efforts to be indefinitely postponed. In retrospect, the political considerations espoused by USARJ and EUSA must have indeed been valid. Moreover, these concerns can be expected to take on even greater significance as U.S. involvement in bilateral and combined planning endeavors with Japan and the Republic of Korea continues to increase. This then leads to the next maxim:

- THE WARS OF THE FUTURE WILL BE PROSECUTED ONLY IN A JOINT CONTEXT. This too is axiomatic in view of current doctrine and the manner in which recent crises have been resolved. As mentioned earlier, the basis of current doctrine can be found in the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Unified Command Plan, and JCS Pub 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces). From a U.S. Army perspective, the doctrine, guidance, and responsibilities outlined in the various national and joint level documents have been synthesized and condensed into a single publication, The

Department Of The Army Manual. This document states that the Department of the Army

is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.⁵

The statutory role of the Army is further defined by the statement that it is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of providing for the defense of the United States, supporting national policies, and implementing national objectives.⁶ The Army manual acknowledges that:

The Armed Forces of the United States are organized for the performance of military missions into combatant commands made up of forces from the various military departments under the operational command of unified or specified commanders.

Simply stated, the Department of the Army is responsible for providing a combat ready force to the appropriate unified or specified commander, who will in turn prosecute the war to achieve U.S. objectives. In a joint environment, the unified commander is the focal point for "unity of command," and the respective military departments provide the support and administration necessary to sustain the committed force.

The next logical question is, how does this apply to MACOM? The answer, in view of current command and control relationships, is somewhat complex: it depends on the scope

of conflict! A conflict isolated to the Korean peninsula (the most likely scenario) presents a great deal of confusion in terms of in-country transition; but the situation becomes even more complicated when integrating the plethora of out-of-country supporting commands. Although some major alterations in command lines are envisioned, the degree of "absolute" control the CINC in Korea exercises over commands external to Korea still leaves room for improvement. As an example, Headquarters, USARJ is responsible for the operation of ammunition rebuild facilities and the petroleum distribution system in Okinawa. USARJ could logically be expected to provide offshore support to the Army in Korea as it did during the 1950 Korean conflict; however, the degree to which that support would actually be provided, and the associated priorities, would be best controlled through a direct command channel which currently does not exist. This problem would be magnified if the conflict in Korea became regional.

Regional conflict in Northeast Asia is the second most likely scenario in the theater. If installations in Japan were used to provide offshore logistical support to a conflict in Korea, it is highly probable that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea would seek Soviet assistance to interrupt or sever the lines of communication between the Republic of Korea and Japan. Soviet intervention, at any level, would rapidly escalate to regional concern, and

possibly regional conflict. What then of priorities in Japan? As the likelihood of regional conflict increases, the priority of support to Korea could be expected to decrease as commands in Japan prepared to confront their own contingencies. Current command relationships in the theater dictate that CINCPAC, 3,500 miles removed from Northeast Asia, would be the supported commander during a regional conflict. The ability of CINCPAC to prosecute the war from Honolulu is questionable, and would likely result in a major reorganization of command and control arrangements in the midst of a conflict. The routine "frictions of war" would present enough turmoil without the complications of self-inflicted wounds.

The logical extension of a regional conflict involving the U.S. and the USSR is eventual escalation to theater or global war. While these are among the less likely scenarios, they are also fraught with the most serious consequences; therefore, they cannot be deleted from the realm of possibility. Again, current command and control arrangements would need to be altered to meet the demands of theater or global conflict.

By now, it should be clear that present command relationships in PACOM are workable, but not optimal, for peacetime requirements. Wartime requirements, however, are far different. Regardless of the scenario selected (single

country, regional, theater, or global) command and control structures would require alteration to meet anticipated requirements. What should be equally clear is that the time to revise the command structure is now, not after conflict is imminent, or in progress. The problems in this regard are not limited to the U.S. Army; they involve the entire joint command and control structure in PACOM. The burden of resolution lies on joint shoulders. The situation must not be construed to be an "Army only" problem. Clearly there are deficiencies in the Army structure in PACOM; however, they cannot be resolved by the U.S. Army alone! The optimal command and control structure must facilitate the transition to war, in a joint context, across the entire spectrum of wartime scenarios. No one is better qualified to meet this challenge than the unified/specified commanders under the guidance of JCS. While some changes in the structure may be unavoidable during a transition to war, alterations must be minimal, and must be planned in excruciating detail. Equally as important, such transitions must be the subject of periodic exercise to ensure the system remains viable and to reduce the anticipated "frictions of war."


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CHAPTER IV

NOTES

¹John I. Alger, The Quest For Victory, with a Foreword by General Frederick J. Kroesen (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 186.

²U.S. Department of the Army, The Department Of The Army Manual (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 1-10.

³U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Department of the Army Operating Instructions for U.S. Army Forces Stationed in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, ODCSOPS, 1977), SECRET, p. 3. 

⁴Ibid., p. A-1-3.

⁵U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Manual, p. 1-17.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 2-17.

CHAPTER V

NORTHEAST ASIA IN PERSPECTIVE

The history of PACOM command and control, coupled with the facts and recommendations presented in recent studies, dictates that the future command and control structure in the Pacific meet certain military and political criteria to be effective. In the interest of clarity and simplicity, these criteria are reiterated below. In short, the command and control structure must:

- be addressed in the joint arena. The issues in the Pacific theater transcend 'Army only' problems.

- recognize the State Department's role of coordination and consensus building in nations affected by the proposed military reorganization.

- establish clear lines of authority and responsibility, and ensure the structure is operationally functional in view of distances, forces available, communications, and supporting logistical resources.

- provide functional and credible unity of command.

At the strategic level, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom. . . . In the tactical dimension, . . . coordination . . . is . . . best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and to coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.

- above all, recognize the growing strength and emerging strategic significance of the Northeast Asian nations, and incorporate those factors into effective integrated regional defense planning.

If these observations are kept in mind, the solution to the successful reorganization of PACOM command relationships begins to emerge in the form of a Northeast Asia Command. It is certainly not a revolutionary concept. Even during the Vietnam war, General Westmoreland "visualized a 'Southeast Asia Command' under his command with headquarters in Saigon."² The rationale for his approach is expressed very well by J.S. Army strategist Colonel Harry Summers:

In comparison with the Korean war (especially the early period) where all of the strategic direction came from General MacArthur's GHQ Far East Command, there was no equivalent headquarters for the Vietnam war. Part of the strategic direction (especially in air and naval matters) came from Honolulu, part came from Washington and there was no coordinated unity of effort.³

In the absence of General MacArthur's GHQ Far East Command, the concept of a Northeast Asia Command is a logical extension in a similar region of General Westmoreland's vision. In fact, many of the studies discussed in Chapter III have stated that the concept of a Northeast Asia Command has merit. More significantly, these studies have all recommended a more detailed analysis of the concept. It is interesting to note that the first formal recommendation to

consider a Northeast Asia Command was made by the Strategic Research Institute in 1978, almost five years ago. In the intervening years, the Government Accounting Office and the Strategic Studies Institute have made similar recommendations. Of even greater interest is the fact that no such analysis has been forthcoming as the result of a major study by a qualified institution. The obvious question is why?

~~The~~ answer to that question may well revolve around the dichotomy of risk-versus-gain. If one shoots at the "sacred cow" and fails to hit the mark, he then exposes himself to the trauma of a devastating counterattack. On the other hand, if one sits idly by and watches the "sacred cow" sink in the quagmire of confusion, he knows that in time the animal's own weight will pull it down. In this case, the risk associated with doing nothing is exactly that -- nothing. The central issue then is "time." If one believes that the possibility of conflict in the Pacific theater is remote to nonexistent, then the present "do nothing" tack is an acceptable course. If on the other hand, one subscribes to the concept that conflict in the Pacific theater is indeed possible, then it becomes necessary to sail a new course with a vessel suited to the requirements of war and peace. With reference to the

possibility of conflict, strategist Harold W. Rood put things in proper perspective:

It is not a defect to pray for peace and to hope there will be no war. But those who predict war have statistics on their side; those who predict peace everlasting are always wrong.

A NORTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

Within the boundaries of Northeast Asia, U.S. military interests focus on troop concentrations in Japan and Korea and the progress of PRC normalization efforts which could eventually evolve into expanded regional relations. These expanded relations, given the proper political and military climate, could ultimately result in a regional security coalition. To subsume that area under a Northeast Asia Command requires: first, a delineation of priorities based on the most likely area of conflict; second, selection of a commander; and third, the formation of a staff and location of its headquarters.

Area of Conflict: The most likely possibility for U.S. troop involvement is a conflict which begins in Korea. In comparing Korea with other Northeast Asian countries, the obvious indicators which point to Korea are:

- the high risk of accident or incident between North and South Korea escalating to conflict due to a misunderstanding and the lack of an unbiased third party communications forum to expedite resolution;

- the tactical disposition of military forces in both North and South Korea, to include the wartime footing of the general population;

- the high levels of sustained defense expenditures at the expense of badly needed social and economic reforms in both North and South Korea;

- frequent infiltration incidents into South Korea and periodic skirmishes along the 38th parallel;

- the unresolved issue of reunification of the Korean peninsula.

The likelihood of conflict in Korea is ever present and requires no further explanation. A Korean conflict is indeed the most probable, and the associated command structure must recognize Korea as the first U.S. priority in Northeast Asia.

The Commander: From a U.S. perspective, the choice of a single commander is logically confined to selecting one of the subordinate unified commanders (COMUSJAPAN or COMUSKOREA) in the region, or introducing a "supreme commander" to the area, along with associated staff and facilities. Political considerations and the cost of additional management layering mitigate against the introduction of an additional command and control headquarters. More significantly, from a military perspective, the injection of an additional headquarters in

the PACOM structure would only serve to exacerbate the command and control problems which already plague the region. ✓

The obvious answer therefore is to select one of the existing subordinate unified commanders. The COMUSJAPAN position is currently filled by an Air Force lieutenant general and the COMUSKOREA billet is filled by a U.S. Army general (four-star). The geography of the region, coupled with the threat and forward basing of U.S. ground forces, dictates that the future air-land battle in Northeast Asia will be orchestrated and prosecuted by the ground force commander, with air and naval components in a supporting role. While the current rank differential between the two subunified commanders could be overcome, the disparity between air and ground orientation can be resolved only by a commander with extensive experience in the joint arena and thorough indoctrination in the strategic and tactical aspects of land warfare.

In essence, the commander selected must provide unity of command to "all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal."⁵ Clearly the subordinate unified commander in Korea, with his many responsibilities at many levels, is best qualified to fill the military and political role of a single regional commander for U.S. forces in Northeast Asia. } 4

Headquarters Staffing/Location: If we assume that the Republic of Korea must be the first priority in terms of

U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia, and that COMUSKOREA should be the single commander of U.S. forces in the region, the next requirement is to address staff requirements and the location of Headquarters, Northeast Asia Command (HQ NEACOM).

The staffing and location of HQ NEACOM are inextricably tied together for several reasons. The regional threat, "multihatted" responsibilities of the CINC in Korea, allied perceptions, fiscal constraints, and the need for unity of effort are all key considerations. With COMUSKOREA as the single regional commander, retention of the two existing subordinate unified commands (USFK and USEJ) in Northeast Asia would not be necessary. Ideally, HQ NEACOM would be established as a separate unified command under the Secretary of Defense. Such an organization would hold the following advantages:

- recognize the de facto unified command position currently held by the CINC in Korea.

- reduce the unwieldy span of control currently exercised by CINCPAC. The present PACOM boundaries encompass "more than 100 million square miles and 70 percent of the world's ocean area."⁶

- provide unity of command through its classic definition, clarify and simplify command relationships, and eliminate parochial service rivalries between the service

components of the existing subordinate unified commands and the service component of HQ PACOM.

- demonstrate U.S. recognition of the strategic significance of Northeast Asia.)

- provide a peacetime organization to meet the most likely wartime scenario -- conflict in Northeast Asia.)

Although the establishment of a separate unified command would be the first step toward achieving the optimal command and control structure, it would also provide the first formidable barrier to reorganization. From a parochial point of view, the existence of HQ PACOM has already been challenged by Congressman Addabbo through the 1979 GAO study. Recall that the GAO study team concluded that the peacetime role of CINCPAC has been gradually reduced and the wartime role has become "somewhat vague." Further diminution of CINCPAC's area of operation or responsibility would only attract additional challenge, and resistance from CINCPAC would be strong. }

Aside from parochial interests, the larger issue revolves around valid operational considerations. Based on the apparent U.S. priorities of "NATO first" and "Rapid Deployment Force second," there are only limited assets remaining for the Pacific theater. At this time, there are insufficient conventional forces and resources available to divide between two separate unified commands in the Pacific area. Until such assets can be made available, }

reorganization of the PACOM command and control structure must accommodate the realities of current constraints. However, the reorganization must simultaneously implement measures which improve the current structure and will facilitate the establishment of a new unified command when, and if, such forces do become available.

If we must acknowledge that U.S. strategic priorities and limited military resources mitigate against the establishment of a new unified command in Northeast Asia, the next best solution would be a single subordinate unified command for the region. Several considerations, including the distinction between the "preparation for war" and the "war proper,"⁷ coupled with the expanded area of influence inherited by HQ NEACOM, mean that neither of the existing subordinate unified commands in Northeast Asia, as separate entities, are currently staffed or positioned to meet the increased demands of regional contingency planning and war prosecution. The combined efforts of both headquarters, however, as a single joint staff under one regional commander, could meet the requirements. The merger of USFJ and USFK would provide the majority of staff, facility, and communication assets to form a Northeast Asia Command.

- - LOCATION: Potential sites for the location of HQ NEACOM include Hawaii, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan.

When considering Hawaii, the specter of extended lines of communication is ever present. The Philippines, located 2,000 miles from Northeast Asia, has the same lines of communication problems. Locating the strategic regional headquarters on the Korean peninsula, the most likely area of conflict in the Pacific theater, threatens command and control survivability at a time when they would be most needed. Colonel Summers summarized the thinking on the optimum location of a strategic regional headquarters by saying:

During World War II the strategic headquarters for the conduct of the war in Europe was originally in London but displaced forward as the war progressed. The same was true in the Pacific where MacArthur's headquarters moved from Australia to New Guinea to the Philippines in order to direct the war. During the Korean war the strategic headquarters was close by in Japan. By comparison, during the Vietnam war the so-called strategic headquarters, Pacific Command, was located in Honolulu over 5,000 miles away.

From a military perspective, the strategic headquarters for Northeast Asia should be centrally located in Japan. Furthermore, in the interest of good judgment, the headquarters must be established before the outbreak of hostilities to avoid the "island-hopping" which would be necessary to maintain adequate command and control. From a political perspective, however, locating NEACOM in Japan bears implications which can only be resolved by the active support and assistance of the U.S. ambassadors in Korea and Japan. Considering that HQ NEACOM would provide the

strategic direction and guidance for U.S. participation in a Korean conflict, we reasonably assume that such a facility would be placed at the top of North Korea's strategic target list. Although overt aggression against a U.S. facility on Japanese soil would have global ramifications, to rule out the possibility would require one of two assumptions:

implicates J
in K war.

1 - either the Combined Forces Command or NEACOM would have to maintain "absolute" air superiority; or

2 - one must assume that all belligerents would act in a rational manner.

Neither assumption is sufficiently valid to stave off the very real concerns of Japan.

On the plus side, establishing NEACOM in Japan demonstrates an increase in U.S. resolve and commitment to the region. NEACOM in Japan would also provide the catalyst for establishing a regional coalition (U.S./ROK/Japan, and possibly the PRC), the political and military climate permitting. These political considerations only serve to emphasize the need for continuous coordination between military and foreign service officials.

- - STAFFING: When considering the multihat responsibilities of the CINC in Korea and the need to establish and maintain cohesion of U.S. effort in the region, the actual creation of a headquarters staff must take into account several major considerations. First,

although the CINC in Korea should command HQ NEACOM located in Japan, the responsibilities associated with his other duties (CINCUNC and CINCCFC) preclude his physical presence in Japan on a full-time basis. In fact, it is envisioned that the majority of the CINC's time would be spent in Korea. As such, HQ NEACOM would be provided with a Deputy commander, in the grade of lieutenant general, responsible for the conduct of regional contingency planning, multilateral affairs, and the day-to-day administration of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia. The CINC in Korea would provide command and control by delineating regional planning guidance, establishing regional military objectives, and retaining direct authority over those matters deemed appropriate.


This then leads to the next consideration, regional cohesion. A regional headquarters located in Japan, commanded by a U.S. Army four-star general stationed in Korea, provides the optimal combination necessary to integrate the intricate regional security considerations of Japan and Korea with overall U.S. interests and responsibilities in the area. Routine communication between the commander in Korea and the headquarters in Japan would be assured by providing a small detachment from HQ NEACOM to the CINC in Korea. The primary mission of that office would be to ensure the unhampered flow of secure communications between the headquarters in Japan and the CINC in Korea.

Although other staff considerations would be contingent on the magnitude of the combined responsibilities of what is now USFK and USFJ, it is reasonable to assume that "economies of scale" would negate a staff size larger than a combination of the current personnel strengths.

The organization discussed thus far, in the context of a next best solution, would be as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Proposed Unified Command Structure



*Commander wears three hats: CINCUNC, CINCCFC, Cdr NEACOM.

SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS

Within the current subunified structure in the Pacific, both USFK and USFJ have separate air, naval, and ground component commanders. Unification of the regional military structure negates the need for two component commanders from any single military service. A merger of component headquarters from Korea and Japan, similar to the merger of the subunified commands, would be necessary. The differences in Army, Navy, and Air Force operational

requirements, however, impose some unique considerations. Although a detailed discussion of restructure alternatives for the air and naval components transcends the scope of this paper, the postulated reorganization of the U.S. Army in the region may well have parallel applicability to the other components.

The U.S. Army structure in Northeast Asia currently consists of Headquarters, EUSA and Headquarters, USARJ/IX Corps, each with a small number of subordinate commands (See Appendix 3). Although oriented toward their respective geographic locations, both Army headquarters conduct similar operational and planning missions and bear similar responsibilities as major Army commands. More importantly, it is expected that the two commands would provide mutual support and assistance in the event of a regional crisis. This expectation is based on historical precedent and the geographic proximity of the two commands. The point of contention, however, lies in the difference between "expectation" and clear-cut requirements. As explained earlier, a regional conflict would produce independent priorities which may not guarantee the required level of mutual support, particularly in a situation where resources are scarce. The doctrine outlined in JCS Pub 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces) recognizes the obvious dichotomies inherent in having two component commands of the same

service and specifically establishes provisions for a single service component commander.'³

Clearly there can be only one Army component to HQ NEACOM. The issue, however, is which headquarters should it be, EUSA or USARJ, and where should it be located? A merger, of sorts, between EUSA and USARJ is necessary. The mechanic of that merger, however, require careful consideration. The relocation of either headquarters may be interpreted, by some, as a manifestation of U.S. policy to reduce U.S. Army presence in the region. Furthermore, physically removing the headquarters from either Japan or Korea would reduce the ability of the U.S. Army to capitalize on the "in-country" expertise and bilateral relations which have taken so long to develop. More significantly, the ability of the Army to accomplish the diverse range of operational and planning requirements in both Japan and Korea would be curtailed. To fill the void, such responsibilities would need to be delegated to an in-country subordinate command. In reality, however, these requirements would far exceed the capabilities of either of the two garrison commands in Japan, or the 2d Infantry Division and 19th Support Command in Korea. The solution to the dilemma is to establish an Army component with elements stationed in both Korea and Japan. The same concept was in effect in 1955 when HQ AFFE/8A was located at Seoul, Korea and HQ AFFE/8A (Rear) was located at Camp Zama, Japan (See

Appendix 2). The rationale for locating the primary Army headquarters in Korea, and the "Rear" element in Japan, was apparently linked to the military and political climate that prevailed in 1955. Japan had surrendered ten years earlier and was well on the way to establishing a new governmental and economic system. The occupation and reconstruction programs of the United States were already beginning to fill the pages of history in Japanese text books. A U.S. ground force presence in Japan, even in the form of a major Army headquarters, strained resources, particularly in view of the situation in Korea. Although the Panmunjom armistice agreement had been signed in July 1953, tensions between North and South Korean forces remained high. CINUNC had been charged with the enforcement of that agreement, and with the external defense of Korea--the emphasis on ground force capability and presence belonged in Korea.

Today's environment, however, is significantly different. In the context of command hierarchy in Korea, CINUNC is the highest level of command, and will prosecute the war effort if directed by the United Nations. In the absence of United Nations participation, however, the United States may still find itself assisting in the defense of the Republic of Korea. Under such circumstances, the war will be prosecuted in a combined context by CINCCFC. In no case is a unilateral U.S. force expected to defend South Korea

against external aggression. As such, the role of the U.S. Army component has changed from one of "principal protector/prosecutor" in 1955, to one of providing and sustaining U.S. combat forces for Combined Forces Command in future conflicts. The commitment of combat forces will occur in consonance with current contingency planning concepts; however, the support mission will require constant planning and attention throughout the "three days of war" (before, during, and after). Historical precedence established during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts indicates that the logistical focus will be on off-shore support from Japan. It then follows that the Army component headquarters should be established in Japan to facilitate regional force sustainability. It does not follow, however, that the Army headquarters should be removed from Korea where it fulfills a very viable role in orchestrating in-country support operations, and planning for the reception, staging, and deployment of U.S. Army forces introduced during time of war.

To meet simultaneously all requirements, the Army component must locate its primary headquarters in Japan, with a forward element deployed in South Korea. The methodology would involve the appointment of a single three-star Army component/MACOM commander, a delineation of responsibilities and authority for both elements, a significantly strengthened "linkage" between the two staffs,

and the redesignation, or naming, of the component headquarters. Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army enjoys a history of success and respect in the region as a wartime headquarters; additionally, the name, EUSA, does not include any specific "country" association, affiliation, or preference. As such, the component headquarters in Japan should be redesignated HQ EUSA/IX Corps, and the element in Korea designated as HQ EUSA (Forward).

The final step in completing unification of the command and control structure in Northeast Asia would be to establish the bond between NEACOM and EUSA which would be necessary to prosecute the envisioned air-land battle. That bondage would best be assured by designating the Army component commander, already located in Japan, as the Deputy Commander, NEACOM. Although the CINC in Korea would no longer exercise direct command of EUSA, he would have operational command, in a joint context, exercised through his Deputy Commander. Although the air and naval component commanders are not considered logical choices to fill the position of Deputy Commander, NEACOM, due to their anticipated mobility during conflict, the NEACOM Chief of Staff should certainly be from one of the other services. Regarding the mobility/availability of the Deputy Commander, NEACOM, the inherent responsibilities associated with that position dictate a continuous presence to ensure continuity of regional operations.

SUBORDINATE ARMY COMMANDS


The last area to be addressed is the command relationship of subordinate Army commands to the new Army component command in the region. In substance, it is envisioned that little would change. U.S. forces which currently report to HQ EUSA in Korea, and HQ USARJ/IX Corps in Japan, would continue normal operations. The establishment of administrative, logistical, and operational procedures, responsibilities, and authority would ensure effective coordination between HQ EUSA (Forward) and HQ EUSA. Such coordination would facilitate the consolidation and centralization of the information necessary to meet regional Army requirements. Additionally, such procedures would permit the development of unified positions on matters pertaining to Army participation in the joint environment. Figure 2 reflects the proposed structure.

MULTIROLE DILEMMA

The staffs of various major headquarters in the Republic of Korea are currently occupied in many cases by the same individuals. This practice is generally referred to as dual- or triple-hatting, in some cases more. The chart at Appendix 4 reflects the degree of dual-hatting which currently exists between USFK and CFC staff principals.¹⁰ A similar situation also exists with the UNC staff. To fully appreciate the magnitude of the

Figure 2.

Proposed Reorganization of Pacific Theater



1. Commanded by CINC in Korea; Deputy Cdr is dual-hatted as Army Component Cdr; HQs located in Japan.

2. Commanded by U.S. Army LTG, also dual-hatted as Deputy Cdr, NEACOM. Army component Deputy Cdr for Japan affairs is a Major General; HQs in Japan.

3. HQs operates as forward element of Army Component Cdr, and is located in Korea. Operations are supervised by a Major General, as EUSA Deputy Cdr for Korea affairs. HQs exercises OPCON over subordinate units located in Korea, but assigned to the Army Component Cdr.

4. Although not shown, other service components to PACOM would remain the same as the current structure.

multihatting arrangements, it must be understood that the procedure is not confined to staff principals, and in many instances, staff officers have responsibilities to three or more headquarters. While a detailed analysis of the multihatting dilemma transcends the purpose and scope of this paper, it must be recognized that the proposed command and control structure (Figure 2) would preclude continuation of the current arrangements. Although there is a possibility that certain of the UNC and CFC spaces could be filled by residual personnel resulting from the merge of USFK and USFJ, the details would require further analysis.

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

While the final structure could differ somewhat from that postulated in Figure 2, the establishment of a Northeast Asia Command is a marked improvement over the current Pacific command and control structure. Within the Northeast Asia region, command and control would be unified at all levels, survivability and sustainability would be enhanced, and the ability to meet peacetime missions and, as necessary, transition to a wartime footing, would be vastly improved. The NEACOM headquarters, under the operational command of PACOM, would be prepared to meet the requirements of the full spectrum of conflict in the theater. What the postulated organization does not do, however, is fully address the problems which currently exist among the Pacific

MACOMs. Unless preemptive actions are initiated in conjunction with the establishment of HQ NEACOM, the disagreements and tensions between the MACOMs of the future will duplicate the petty parochial bickering which dominates the Pacific Army environment today.

Against this background, a primary realization is that WESTCOM does make a valuable contribution to the overall military mission in the Pacific theater. In addition to communication and coordination at the unified level, WESTCOM shoulders major mobilization responsibilities under the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) and conducts essential contingency planning at the theater level. Additionally, WESTCOM provides Army liaison, assistance, and support to a host of friends and allies in the Pacific--a function which would otherwise not be performed. Although WESTCOM makes a significant contribution to the overall effort, the "potential" for contribution far exceeds the current level.

Regardless of fault, current coordination problems must be corrected immediately, whether the Northeast Asia Command concept is accepted or rejected. Corrective action must assume the form of clarifying specific duties, areas of responsibilities, and limits of authority. The key word is "specific," not "general." To begin with, the current area of responsibility, as defined by CINCPAC, must be restated to accommodate the subunified responsibilities of NEACOM and

its component commands. WESTCOM should act as the Army component command to PACOM, "less the geographical area of Northeast Asia." HQ NEACOM would be responsible to PACOM for Northeast Asia, and the Army component to NEACOM would answer to the subordinate unified commander on joint matters, and to HQDA on matters of interest to the "Army only." WESTCOM must be divorced from the responsibility of attempting to develop the so-called "Army position" on joint matters. In the joint arena, the Army Chief of Staff, in coordination with the Army Staff (ARSTAF), develops and defends the "Army position" for JCS. If a new Army position is deemed necessary, it may be developed within the theater of operations, but it must be coordinated with, and approved by HQDA. It is then incumbent upon the Army Staff to weigh the merits and to anticipate the repercussions of such positions with appropriate activities, then to obtain a decision, and disseminate the results to all concerned. The thrust of these comments is that HQDA must become actively involved. That then leads to the next point, the responsibility of HQDA.

As indicated in Chapter II, the past actions, or inactions in some cases, by HQDA have only served to aggravate the strained relations between the Pacific MACOMs. DA must first resurrect the Department of the Army Operating Instructions for the Pacific (DAOI-PAC) to clarify missions,

tasks, coordination responsibilities, executive authority, and a host of other procedures. Second, Department of the Army Regulation 10-1 must be rescinded by Department of the Army, and revised/republished by WESTCOM as the internal organization and functions manual it was intended to be. Third, The Army Staff must make a concerted effort to recognize the distinction between the two Pacific MACOMs (WESTCOM and EUSA) and "put the right peg in the right hole" in terms of staff actions.

SUMMARY

Regarding the possibility of successful reorganization, General George C. Marshall phrased it perfectly in 1941: "There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this"11

The difficulties of arriving at a single command in the Pacific theater have already been explained. The establishment of a Northeast Asia Command, as a new unified command, represents the optimal solution; however, this option is unlikely because of current force/resource constraints and parochial interests.

In lieu of the optimum solution, the alternative proposal is to establish a single "subordinate" unified command for Northeast Asia, under PACOM. However, that command must be structured to enable it rapidly to assume

the role of a unified command should a regional conflict develop in Northeast Asia and should forces be made available. Those forces could either be "chopped" from PACOM, with CINCPAC assuming a supporting role or be made available from other sources, with both PACOM and NEACOM as separate unified commands.

The postulated command and control structure outlined in this chapter, and depicted in Figure 2, would establish a single subordinate unified command in Northeast Asia capable of effective and expeditious transition across the entire spectrum of conflict. In a political sense, the proposed structure recognizes the strategic significance of Northeast Asia, and would restore, in some measure, the credibility of U.S. statements regarding the importance of Japan and Korea. From a resource perspective, the organization could likely be structured within current personnel space authorizations, thereby alleviating anticipated congressional objections.

The overriding consideration is that something must be done, and it must be done soon. The current structure nurtures a degree of parochialism that interferes at the most fundamental level with mission accomplishment. Additionally, the existing structure jeopardizes the conduct of a transition to war which would be essential in meeting the most probable level of conflict in the theater.

For almost 40 years, U.S. military and political establishments have enjoyed the luxury of dealing with the frictions of theater and global war only in a theoretical sense. Unfortunately, 40 years of reflection have still not produced satisfactory results, particularly in the Pacific. The time to study and reflect has ended; the time to act is now!

CHAPTER V

NOTES

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: August 1982), p. B3-B4.

² William C. Westmoreland, General, USA. A SOLDIER REPORTS (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 76-77.

³ Harry G. Summers, Jr., COL, USA. ON STRATEGY: THE VIETNAM WAR IN CONTEXT (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 92.

⁴ Harold W. Rood, Kingdoms of the Blind: How the Great Democracies Have Resumed the Policies that so Nearly Cost Them Their Life (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), p. 3.

⁵ Field Manual 100-5, p. B4.

⁶ General Accounting Office, Roles and Missions, p. 67.

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret with Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie and a Commentary by Bernard Brodie, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), II: 2, p. 133.

⁸ Summers, ON STRATEGY, p. 91.

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), with Change 1 (DOD, December 1975), p. 48 (30231).

¹⁰ Appendix 4 is a copy of a viewgraph from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. ~~This viewgraph was used in CGSC core course P714 (1982-83) Planning For Combined Operations: Northeast Asia and the Pacific.~~ > < 1507

¹¹ Delk, Army In PACOM, p. 6.

APPENDIX 1

USARJ REORGANIZATIONS: 1941-47

The following information was extracted from USARJ Regulation 10-1, Chapter 2, and is intended to provide a chronology of the reorganization turmoil experienced by a single U.S. Army headquarters (USARJ) from 1941 to 1947:

Jul 1941

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFPE) was established at Manila, Philippine Islands.

Mar 1942

HQ USAFPE was evacuated under enemy pressure and reestablished in Australia.

Apr 1942

HQ USAFPE was reduced to a nominal staff and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was established; both were commanded by General MacArthur.

Feb 1943

Headquarters, USAFPE was expanded to assume administrative functions for all U.S. Army forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Jun 1945

General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC) was activated to replace GHQ SWPA and absorbed the functions of HQ USAFPE. HQ USAFPE remained an active headquarters in name only due to statutory reasons.

Aug 1945

HQ AFPAC was relocated to Tokyo, Japan.

Jan 1947

Enactment of the 1947 National Security Act redesignated GHQ AFPAC to GHQ Far East Command (FEC).

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2

USARJ REORGANIZATIONS: 1950-78

The following information was extracted from USARJ Regulation 10-1, Chapter 2, and is a continuation of the chronology provided in Appendix 1. This information is intended to emphasize the magnitude of reorganization experienced by a single U.S. Army headquarters (USARJ) from 1950 to 1978: >

Aug 1950

Japan Logistical Command established to meet administrative and occupational functions previously performed by Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). EUSA efforts were now directed to the conflict in Korea.

Apr 1952

Headquarters, Far East Command moved from Hibiya, Tokyo to Ichigaya, Tokyo. HQ USAFFE relocated to Yokohama. >

Oct 1952

HQ USAFFE was redesignated as HQ, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (HQ AFPE), assumed the functions of Japan Logistical Command, and moved to Yokohama, Japan. Japan Logistical Command was disestablished.

Nov 1953

HQ AFPE moved from Yokohama to Camp Zama, Japan.

Nov 1954

HQ AFPE was combined with HQ EUSA at Camp Zama and was redesignated HQ, U.S. Army Forces Far East and Eighth U.S. Army (HQ AFPE/8A).

Jul 1955

The stationing of HQ AFPE/8A at Seoul, Korea was announced. The headquarters located at Camp Zama was redesignated HQ AFPE/8A (Rear).

Jul 1957

As a result of Secretary of Defense directed changes, HQ AFPE/8A was discontinued as a combined headquarters. HQ EUSA remained in Seoul, Korea and AFPE missions were transferred to HQ, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) in Hawaii. EUSA was subordinated to USARPAC and a new headquarters, subordinate to EUSA, was formed in Japan. That headquarters was designated HQ, U.S. Army Japan/United Nations Command/EUSA (Rear). The new headquarters in Japan was assigned responsibility for phasedown of Army operations in Japan.

Mar 1959

The command in Japan was redesignated HQ, U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ); UNC (Rear) functions were transferred to a UNC unit located in Japan; and EUSA (Rear) functions were dropped.

Jul 1959

HQ USARJ was redesignated HQ USARJ/6th Logistical Command with a mission confined to logistical support for the region.

Jul 1960

HQ USARPAC in Hawaii was reorganized, and the command in Japan was redesignated HQ USARJ as other subordinate commands were consolidated and relocated to improve command and control, and to facilitate support of U.S. operations in Vietnam. The same time period saw extensive buildup and reorganization of the Army structure in Vietnam.

Dec 1974

HQ USARPAC was disestablished and HQ USARJ and HQ EUSA assumed major Army command (MACOM) responsibilities.


1976-78

As a result of the reductions directed by the WESTPAC plan, HQ USARJ initiated major reorganization efforts to further consolidate Army operations in Japan. By 1978, most Army functions had been transferred from Okinawa and surrounding islands to the Kanto Plain region in central Honshu, Japan. HQ USARJ had merged with HQ IX Corps and had been redesignated HQ USARJ/IX Corps.

APPENDIX 3


APPENDIX 4

COMMAND AND STAFF--CFC



ALSO DUAL-HATTED AS USFK STAFF PRINCIPALS

APPENDIX 4



SOURCE: CINCPAC COMMAND DIGEST (Modified by SSI)

Lieutenant General Commanding Since 1 Oct 81

(U) US Army Pacific Organization




Figure 2. (U) Command Relationships in PACOM

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251 (10)

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