TNI & POLRI FORCES IN WEST PAPUA
Restructuring & Reasserting Sovereignty

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1 Linguis and former Australian Dept of Defence (Army) intelligence analyst. Author of Indonesia’s War over Aceh: Last stand on Mecca’s porch, Routledge ‘Politics in Asia’ series, 2006, and Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: an Open Source Intelligence case study, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University (ANU), 2001. This paper was researched from April to July 2006, and is largely based on a briefing given to the Indonesia Study Group (ISG) at the ANU on 14 June 2006. The author thanks ISG attendees who contributed questions and criticism, which became further consideration in this paper’s draft.
Summary
Since the Aceh peace agreement of mid-2005, Indonesian military planning and operations in and around West Papua revealed that area’s priority and emphasis in defence and internal security. Upon the voyage of 43 asylum seekers to Australia in January 2006, West Papua’s situation also took renewed prominence in bilateral diplomacy with Indonesia’s southern neighbor.

The confrontational Indonesia—Australia diplomatic posturing from early 2006 occurred amid a nationwide Indonesian plan for military expansion. Publicly available detail confirmed much of the general planning, and major parts of its achievement, where changes appeared in locally based and deployed force composition, territorial structure and senior command and staff appointments. New local infantry formations reduced the dependency on centrally deployed units, while new special operations forces paralleled concurrent developments in other sites of Indonesian countersurgency. The issue of counterterrorism facilitated much of the political and bureaucratic means crucial for renewed TNI dominance of Indonesia’s polity.

Recent events surrounding the voyage by 43 asylum seekers to Australia indicated sophisticated TNI-run psychological operations combining strategic-level concerns with past methods of infiltration and manipulation into West Papuan resistance groups and their sympathizers. Arrangements in command and control, alongside key officers’ operational expertise and record, further indicated a TNI campaign to penetrate the Australian Government’s leadership elite’s ‘decision cycle’, or its basic, driving psychological processes around informal migration to its shores. Beneath the Indonesian military’s planned ambitious and expensive, ongoing build-up and renewal, that most recent episode in Indonesian—Australian diplomacy indicated the Jakarta leadership elite’s strategic-level success in West Papua operations. Such success would likely see West Papua become the table on which Indonesian leaders could bargain for the most beneficial results of a restored bilateral security treaty with Australia.

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2 This paper uses the conventional name ‘West Papua’ simply to cover both Indonesian provincial entities of ‘Papua’ and ‘West Irian Jaya’ (Iriyab).
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS & TERMS

BAIS  
Badan Intelijen Strategis  
Strategic Intelligence Agency

BAKORINDA  
Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah  
Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body

BIN  
Badan Intelijen Negara  
State Intelligence Agency

BKBPM  
Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlingdungan Masyarakat  
National Unity & Community Protection Agency*

BRIMOB  
Brigade Mobil  
Police 'Mobile Brigade'

DEPDAGRI  
Departemen Dalam Negeri  
Interior Ministry

Irjabar  
Irian Jaya Barat  
West Irian Jaya (Province)

kabupaten  
regency

kesbangpol  
national unity & politics (agency)*

KODAM  
Komando Daerah Militer  
Military area command

KODIM  
Komando Distrik Militer  
Military district command

KOMINDA  
Komunitas Intelijen Daerah  
Regional Intelligence Community

KOPASSUS  
Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army) Special Forces Command

KOREM  
Komando Respublik Indonesia  
Indonesian Police Force

PSYOPS  
Psychological operations

satbantual  
intelligence support force

satgas  
task force

taipur  
combat reconnaissance

TNI  
Tentara Nasional Indonesia  
Indonesian Defence Force

* May be interchangeable in reporting; probably distinguishable by hierarchical level in formal references

MAIN MILITARY SYMBOLS

This study uses a hybrid of Indonesian and past NATO-standard military symbology.
Maps used the following sources:
‘The bigger picture’: national military expansion

All three Indonesian military (TNI) services embarked on significant post-2002 increase in units, headquarters (HQ) and base establishments throughout Indonesia, with particular emphasis on West Papua and other areas with international boundaries. Indonesia’s army, navy and air force enacted and publicized several new initiatives for their forces’ growth and ongoing plans towards greater institutional scale, equipment upgrade, and both counterinsurgent and conventional warfighting strength.

The TNI and other state agencies publicized much detail about plans for force increases and such plans’ progressive realization. The most obvious, implicit purpose of such TNI intentions was the reassertion of national sovereignty internally i.e., in a message to separatist and disaffected populations. TNI expansion and modernization made a clear public depiction of the state’s improved ability to project repressive forces to the outer, border provinces. By explicit contrast, presidential instructions in 2005 specified the TNI’s (and POLRI’s) high-priority mission to assert sovereign national boundaries secure from infiltration, combined with procurement and modernization programs to help achieve that aim. That presidential directive’s emphasis was also a concession to foreign pressure urging Indonesia to apply its military more as a defence and deterrent against potential external threats, or at least to be seen doing so, especially where decentralizing those units and commands holding higher command seniority and deployment readiness.

However, such programmes’ consistently most discrete aspects were their great cost, and their original funding sources, whether for TNI expansion already realized or the yet more expensive units, facilities and equipment still in planning and procurement stages. As presidential instructions indicated, the Defence Department (Dephan) was to become increasingly involved in TNI procurement, refurbishment and construction works aimed at effecting the TNI’s ambitious expansion plans. As the Indonesian Government and foreign donors strove to increase and regulate TNI budgets under greater Defence Department control and oversight, the challenge of meeting the forces’ higher costs of a TNI-initiated build-up became a major factor in Indonesia’s politics and diplomacy, if not also an actual TNI operational objective in some cases of international brinkmanship.

Ground forces

The TNI’s most obvious growth appeared in its army, traditionally a state priority for the near-constant counterinsurgency tasks since Indonesia’s birth; the army continued as the TNI’s overwhelmingly most numerous and politically influential service. The TNI’s essential ground force elements i.e., its infantry, expanded by an additional ten new army battalions from 2003, with at least another four army infantry battalions to be raised, or so underway at the time of writing. Across the TNI’s three services in the brief period from late 2002, the TNI raised, or began the process of raising, a total of at least seventeen infantry battalions, most of them reportedly over-strength i.e., comprising nearly twice the hitherto standard number of soldiers for such units.

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2 ibid. p. 37—8, 41.
3 Reports indicated that many of the battalions’ ‘over-strength’ status was to cover operational tasks previously performed by two or more battalion entities i.e., routine ‘static’ point and route security tasks alongside ‘mobile’ rapid-reaction functions. Infantry expansion was ongoing, so this study did not confirm the exact total achieved by the time of writing. For comparison, the TNI’s total additional infantry battalions’ troops would roughly triple the Australian Army’s standing line infantry component; many of the new battalions’ scale resembled that set for the abortive Australian ‘pentropic’ battalions (and US ‘pentomic’ divisional battlegroup equivalents) from the late-1950s.
Based on the new units’ various planned strengths, the expansion in infantry calculated up to 16,000 extra TNI infantry troops i.e., not counting the concurrently planned and raised combat support units (armor, engineers, artillery, etc.) or new territorial command formations with their additional hierarchy of HQ staff and smaller, co-located sub-units.

Planned new territorial-based brigade formations accompanied the TNI’s strengthened infantry, especially in the country’s outer border provinces. Reporting all but officially confirmed plans for brigade HQ in Aceh, Kalimantan, West Timor and West Papua, with another two, probably Java-based, to complement the two, hitherto only, territorial infantry brigades (1 and 15 infantry brigades on western Java).^6^ TNI amphibious forces - the navy’s Marine Corps - already raised new infantry battalions from 2002. By mid-2005, all three new marine battalions, based in southern Sumatera’s Lampung area, were combat experienced from Aceh deployments. Both the army and marines concurrently embarked on acquisitions of new small arms, artillery, armor and other equipment often allocated as complementary additions for the new TNI infantry and combat support units. Unlike army territorial counterparts, the centrally commanded marines placed their new infantry battalions into a brigade formation immediately upon completing those units’ establishment.

A related development from 2003 was the intensive ‘Raider’ conversion training and re-designation for ten TNI infantry battalions: two from KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) and the rest from eight of the army’s territorial military area command (KODAM) high-readiness ‘strike’ (pemukul) battalions. A new East Java-based infantry battalion was raised to replace one such unit retrained and redesignated ‘Raider’^7^.

Indonesian Jakarta-based observer Aris Santoso stated that the ‘Raider’ battalions would require that new units be raised to replace the previously designated battalions in territorial KODAM formations;^8^ if accurate, up to seven more additional territorial infantry battalions could so raise in coming years.

**Maritime & air forces**

Indonesia’s notoriously neglected maritime forces attracted scrutiny in TNI and Defence Department planning, with the navy’s fleet modernization and restructure made a major part of force expansion and upgrade. New primary naval bases (LANTAMAL) were planned for the Padang, Merauke and Tarakan areas: navy chiefs publicized their intention to have those first two new lantamal – X & XI - underway in 2006. The Indonesian Navy’s simple two-fleet structure would obviously be unbalanced by the new bases, so the naval expansion was set to form three new fleet commands as replacement.^9^ Like corresponding army and mooted further marine corps growth, this new fleet structure would concentrate more maritime power in outlying areas at Tanjung Pinang, Makassar and Sorong. Surabaya would assume its logical role as the national fleet command centre. The projected Sorong-based Eastern Fleet planned for a deepwater capability, including plans for up to six new submarines, including at least two contracted by the time of writing. Other major

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purchases and refurbishment, and some bilateral projects, brought energetic Indonesian defence negotiations within a wide choice of prospective and established partners, including Russia, South Korea, Japan and the Netherlands.

Much publicity trumpeted the TNI’s increased airpower in the dramatic, though modest and gradual, barter acquisitions of Sukhoi SU-29 and -31 fighter jets, and army aviation’s upgraded Hind-series attack helicopters. Although potentially important for TNI operations in West Papua’s airspace, such high-profile upgrades were less significant than the more fundamental additions and plans for the area’s ground-based air defence. A new radar unit was raised at Biak as part of a nationwide expansion, restructure and renumbering of TNI ground-to-air early-warning and intercept capability (see Map 1, p. 7). Radar assets were held at Biak to prepare that base as the control node for the new Air Defence Sector Command IV, to cover much of eastern Indonesia.

Restructure & expansion for West Papua field units

Compared with other regional Indonesian military expansions and plans, West Papua caught the greatest attention for build-up and projected cost. Local force restructure plans for the longer term (to 2019) would ensure previous levels of troop deployments in West Papua were far exceeded by the shift to new locally based units. By the time of writing, new army territorial units either filled the gap from reduced outside deployments, or increased troop numbers in some areas. As elsewhere in Indonesia, local TNI infantry expansion was intended to reduce Jakarta’s reliance on rotated unit deployments of non-local infantry to high-priority areas, especially in the areas of the Freeport mining complex, remote highland centres of insurgency, and along the generally porous Indonesia—PNG border. However, infantry and restructured special forces from outside of West Papua continued to deploy there for this period.

Three over-strength territorial infantry battalions added to the three (751, 752 and 753) already based in West Papua’s two provinces. In March 2004, KODAM XVII Trikora Chief Major-General Nurdin Zainal announced that the new West Papua-based infantry battalions would be fully raised over the period 2004—6; several outside KODAMS’ infantry-run recruit training centres (rindam) had already contributed 260 troops by that early stage, though the local Jayapura-based rindam would certainly contribute some, if not most, of its own locally recruited trainees. Posting a strength of over 1,000 troops each, the new battalions apparently used a less tenured system of individually contracted recruitment, while pre-existing local battalions reportedly prepared for increases to the over-strength scale. Initial operational use of such territorial troops in Aceh and West Papua revealed their greater unit flexibility for commanders. Some of these ‘organic’ territorial

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battalions’ sub-units worked as ‘Raider’ and Rajawali companies in more aggressive ‘strike’ roles hitherto reserved for externally deployed, ‘non-organic’ infantry.\[^{12}\]

The most ambitious TNI plans for local ground forces came in TNI executives’ expressed wish for unprecedented projection of rapid-reaction KOSTRAD and marine brigades. After the Marine Corps’ near-thirty per cent increase in infantry battalions and other amphibious elements from 2002, any ongoing corps growth would signal a conspicuously radical shift in TNI force structure. It was more in optimism than determination that the Corps’ executives proposed the raising of 3\(^{rd}\) Marine Force (Pasmar 3) at Sorong, West Irian Jaya, as mooted in Gus Dur’s presidency.\[^{13}\] Not surprisingly by contrast, army publicity about its similar plans reflected institutional confidence as a more powerful service, and a greater certainty in planning for future West Papua operations. The long-mooted 3\(^{rd}\) KOSTRAD infantry division\[^{14}\] would become an eastern node of deployment-ready troops covering bases from Sulawesi, to West Papua’s Sorong and Jayapura. The new KOSTRAD division’s first stage was announced with the planned brigade base for northern Sulawesi’s Gorontalo Province - the first of three such new KOSTRAD brigades - over the strategic medium-term (five-year) plan to 2009.\[^{15}\] Consistent with the new emphasis on border defence and force expansion, KOSTRAD Chief Lieutenant-General Hadi Waluyo confirmed in March 2005 that the TNI had a mobilization of volunteers for new battalions and deployment to border areas, such as the belatedly recognized Ambalat Island area in the long-disputed Sipadan—Ligitan area of East Kalimantan’s Malaysia border.\[^{16}\]

POLRI units showed modest increases in their own infantry force in the BRIMOB (‘Mobile Brigade’) Corps: its battalion-level Sorong detachment reflected the Papua Police Region’s (POLDA) upgraded status from the period of Gus Dur’s presidency. But police expansion in West Papua concentrated most on the POLDA’s subordinate territorial commands, where newly raised precincts matched many new regency and municipality boundaries. Formal command seniority in decrees of civil emergency government (PDSD, darsip / darurat sipil), and routine primary responsibility for public order did not impair continued TNI command in counter-insurgency and border security tasks, where army-led operations maintained an effective TNI institutional autonomy. However, a significant local change to TNI seniority appeared in Mimika Regency’s Freeport complex, where official security responsibility reportedly transferred to local POLRI command.\[^{17}\] It was unclear how both the based and deployed BRIMOB units would subordinate in practice with the new co-located army brigade HQ, itself reported (probably incorrect) report as a KOSTRAD command.\[^{18}\] West Papua (and Aceh) precedent showed troops’ normal function in patrols, posts and checkpoints run as joint TNI—POLRI sub-units (see also Map 2 and Appendix III).

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Non-Papua BRIMOB unit deployments during the period.

**N.B.** - Sources uncharacteristically deficient on detail for non-Papua BRIMOB unit deployments during the period.

**Province (propinsi)**, **Regency (kabupaten)**, **Region (POLDA)**, **Precinct (POLRES)**, **Interim (persiapan)**, **BRIMOB (police mobile 'brigade')**.

**Map 2**

*Boundaries as depicted in several primary sources - not necessarily agreed / legally recognized.*

**DAVIES**

**TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua**

**p. 9**
Special operations & counterintelligence

Among post-2002 perception-management measures around the assassination of West Papuan activist leader Theys Eluay, and the shooting of US and Indonesian civilians near Tembagapura, the local KODAM’s then chief Major-General Mahidin Simbolon announced in February 2003 a permanent withdrawal from West Papua of the KOPASSUS unit implicated or reported as instigator and/or perpetrator in those scandalous killings. Mahidin Simbolon’s statement referred to KOPASSUS’ ‘covert warfare’ SGI task force (satgasintel, or satuan gabungan intel – joint intelligence unit), known much earlier as Satgas Maleo, later standardized as Tribuana for Aceh, East Timor and Papua deployments, and last re-named Satgas Cenderawasih in West Papua. Mahidin himself said: “If for example we regard our Intelligence Detachment (deninteldam) sufficient then we can temporarily cover [the loss of the SGI from Papua]”. To that effect, KODAM Trikora’s intelligence detachment raised its strength with 65 more troops. Mahidin also stressed that observers must not confuse the role of the officially non-military State Intelligence Agency (BIN) with the TNI’s duties in Papua. At least on that point, reported details of higher-level intelligence coordination would confirm Mahidin’s sincerity.

However, Mahidin seemed much more guarded about other specific and further-reaching changes to his formation’s special operations and counterintelligence effort against Papuan resistance. Checks of junior officer identities on operations revealed that both KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS substituted much of the old SGI ‘covert warfare’ force in West Papua, contrary to earlier publicity that ‘KOPASSUS was out of Papua’. The primary means for that restructure was KOSTRAD’s combat reconnaissance platoons (tontaipur) raised since 2000 under specialist KOPASSUS training. Deployments since then repeatedly indicated KOPASSUS, including its Unit 81 counterterrorist (Gultor) veterans, operating alongside KOSTRAD’s new, agile taipur units. Not that Gultor necessarily predominated among those tasked from KOPASSUS: one member of 12 Para-Commando Battalion was posted into the army’s local territorial apparatus, whether in the expanded KODAM Intelligence Detachment or otherwise specially assigned. Taipur officer tours alternated between Papua and Aceh much as KOPASSUS Tribuana predecessors did. Combined with a cadre of KOPASSUS and other

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21 One ISG participant questioned this study’s use of ‘counterintelligence’ as the function of Indonesian special forces ‘intelligence’ units in West Papua. The conventionally valid ‘counterintelligence’ definition matched past official Australian usage i.e., action against enemy intelligence processes, and the prevention and interdiction of enemy subversion, espionage, and sabotage. This study asserts that TNI doctrine and practice has embedded counterintelligence into its operational methods of agent-handling and PSYOPS (including deception), suiting insurgency’s internal challenge as an otherwise conventional ‘counterintelligence’ matter, thereby overcoming the terms’ definitional ambiguity in counterinsurgency apparent in historical Australian doctrinal sources. See: Army HQ, The Division in Battle: Intelligence (Pamphlet No. 9), Box Hill, 1965, p. ix, 59, and Army HQ, The Division in Battle: Counter Revolutionary Warfare (Pamphlet No. 11), Box Hill, 1965, pp. 54—5. However, the point correctly identified such usage’s potential to mislead the conventionally schooled by seeming to negate those forces’ continued reconnaissance, surveillance, collection, analysis and assessment i.e., defining basic ‘intelligence’ processes against a defined enemy.
special forces, Aceh deployments depicted these units as part of the Cakra Detachment, within command and control by the predominantly KOPASSUS Satgasbanintel, or ‘Intelligence Support Task Force’. Unsurprisingly, KOSTRAD’s taipur troops included the black garb and counterterrorist élan of their KOPASSUS colleague-mentors. In West Papua, these units operated mainly in the highland and border areas. From such details it appeared that KOPASSUS attached officers as a leadership cadre to KOSTRAD’s brigade-level taipur companies, rotated between Aceh and Papua in much the fashion of SGI task forces of years earlier.

Despite higher command’s more vague references, detail from operations in Aceh, Maluku and West Papua revealed how the deployed KOSTRAD—KOPASSUS specialist joint forces incorporated elements of those commands’ old and new unit types with a tandem flexibility in the field. Lower-level identities inadvertently compromised the new arrangement, where separate reporting confirmed KOSTRAD officers Bahtiar S and Mufakher as deployed taipur field commanders, both operating in the same task force against resistance in West Papua’s highland Tiom District, May 2003. The subsequently promoted Bahtiar appeared later with his taipur company in North Aceh, September 2004. Both officers’ parent unit, KOSTRAD’s 1st Infantry Division, was confirmed in publicized work by a photojournalist and TV crew nearly a year later. During the West Papua Tiom area operations, the two above-named junior officers were locally commanded by KOPASSUS’ Major Ontang Sitindaon, himself appearing as an SGI company commander in Ambon, September 2000. In his Ambon tour Major Ontang served under Colonel Asis Wanto, who later took territorial command over that same area in West Papua (see Figure 5, p. 25).

In West Papua, Ontang’s unit was the satbanintel (intelligence support unit, also known by the unwieldy satgasbanintel, intelligence support task force).

‘Counterterrorism’: new anti-guerrilla mode & ‘Trojan horse’

Another important part of West Papua’s force restructure and expanded TNI units’ mission was ‘terrorism response’, an area hitherto normally confined to special action forces of the army’s KOPASSUS and police counterparts. Nationwide the TNI spread newly empowered ‘anti-terror’ and ‘counterterrorist’ (CT) duties to many different units. Even uniform style and equipment advertised such a trend to project an image of forces’ legitimacy as guardians of public safety. In West Papua from 2003, this ‘CT’ fashion combined with the actual retention of KOPASSUS troops in force restructure, despite their claimed withdrawal. Avowed CT priorities would help to ensure KOPASSUS’ continued presence while expanding the red berets’ influence into less specialized, less exclusive infantry units and the territorial KODAM apparatus. New, ostensibly ‘CT’ responsibilities and appointments covered all West Papua’s levels of military and police command, as well as the civil administration.

23 Kompas, ‘TNI Sergap OPM, 10 Tewas’, 6 November 2003. The reported support unit’s context and membership made implausible any normally defined ‘combat support’ or ‘service support’ functions.
More obvious, superficial changes expressed the political and bureaucratic means used to promote the TNI’s and POLRI’s increasingly claimed ‘counterterrorist’ priorities, whether as pretext, exaggeration, or even redefinition for the term ‘counterinsurgency’ too.28 KOPASSUS’ influence and institutional aura were the trend’s origin: KOSTRAD’s taipur platoons early adopted the CT style and élan as proxy imitators in this sense. The high-profile Presidential Guard (Paspampres) unsurprisingly exhibited the trend in its state VIP escort and close protection duties: all-black uniform and field garb, anti-ballistic attire, heavy close-range armament, and personal anonymity from sunglasses. More anonymous, impersonal appearance in TNI self-advertisement spread the frequent display by black-garbed KOPASSUS’ Unit 81 into imitations by the army’s ten new ‘Raider’ infantry battalions, converted from 2003 under KOPASSUS-led training. The TNI’s executive level nicknamed eight of the Raider battalions “the KODAMs’ own KOPASSUS”, repeating official publicity about Raiders as new CT assets with triple the combat power of normal infantry.29 The black uniform and ski mask / balaclava were previously almost exclusive to KOPASSUS, and detachments in the Air Force (‘Bravo 90’), the navy’s Marines (Jala Mangkara), and POLRI’s dispersed Gegana and ‘Detachment 88’. The TNI publicized its claims of wider CT capability from 2003, but troops so designated were still primarily tasked and deployed for counterinsurgency. Stealthy, often faceless CT trappings appeared much in exercises, parades and other routine, but the forces kept their main commitments in the anti-guerrilla campaigns of Aceh and West Papua.

From the highest levels of state, the new ‘CT fashion’ combined with organizational changes to official command duties overseeing such rapid-response, ostensibly ‘anti-terror’, capabilities. The Security Minister (MENKOPOLHUKAM)30 and Interior Minister took on parallel ‘anti-terror’ bureaux for liaison with all state institutions and agencies. The TNI’s institutional gain from these changes was subtle, not an explicit, direct or formal takeover of civilian intelligence and related CT functions. The Security Minister supervised national-level coordination of multiple branches of civil government apparatus through various regional civilian ‘anti-terror’ desks, but ministerial supervision covered TNI coordination more as a facilitative, intermediary function than a potentially interventionist authority. By contrast, the Security Minister’s authority ran directly into the Interior Ministry (DEPDAGRI) hierarchy via its National Unity and Politics Branch (Dinas Kesbangpol), which oversaw compulsory civilian programmes of militia (siskamling, pamswakarsa) and reporting (wajib lapor). In this seeming hierarchical overlap the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) supervised coordination of all defined (and ‘negotiated’) non-terror intelligence processes beside the separate ‘National Unity’ functionary chain. But the Security Minister’s enhanced formal authority and reach into the Interior Ministry effectively circumvented the previously attained official responsibilities of POLRI in such sensitive and powerful state functions. As if to demonstrate an example of the TNI’s stealthy political use of the new ‘anti-terror’ hierarchy in West Papua, ex-Chief

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28 A similar trend was arguably an international or global phenomenon at the time of writing. Redefinition of ‘counterinsurgency’ too seemed part of contemporary US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: official statements often described resistance forces as ‘terrorists’, while publicity made much of shadowy terrorist figures in the context of vague reports about ground-launched bombing atrocities.

29 For just one example of then Army Chief Ryamizard’s strident promotion of ‘Raider’ battalions as CT troops, see:

30 The office’s full expansion is “Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs”.
of Biak’s KODIM 1708 Lieutenant-Colonel Harri Partono ‘civilianized’ to almost immediately become head of Jayawijaya Regency’s National Unity & Politics office at its lower level in Jayawijaya Regency.\textsuperscript{31}

The interceding National Unity hierarchy, with its separate paramilitary Satpol PP (\textit{Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja}), spelt the TNI’s accompanying nationwide reassertion in state intelligence functions. This gradual process was first apparent in the Aceh Military Emergency measures declared from 2003 and, over a year later, after then presidential favorite Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) birthday and its bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.\textsuperscript{32} Alongside TNI advertisement of CT fashion and related claims about various units’ tactical specialization, the ‘anti-terror desk’ concept carried much further to effectively restore nationwide de facto TNI supremacy via the National Unity shell and its ‘regional intelligence community’ coordinating bodies (KOMINDA, formerly BAKORINDA) at provincial and lower government levels (see Figure 4, p. 21). Earlier, pre-reformasi New Order practice with BAKORINDA gave army territorial hierarchies formal authority over all liaison between civilian agencies involved in their variously specialized, more limited intelligence processes. In Gus Dur’s presidency, police often assumed BAKORINDA supervision, followed by expanded police CT and other internal security responsibility. The TNI’s indirect return to all-of-government intelligence dominance began from presidential edict in 2002 and local systemic changes gradually re-naming the networks KOMINDA, first in the capital Jakarta and its western Java surrounds avowedly responding to local threats from Aceh’s GAM resistance (\textit{Gerakan Aceh Merdeka}, Free Aceh Movement).\textsuperscript{33}

West Papua’s KODAM XVII Trikora established its own, National Unity-compatible ‘anti-terrorism desk’ by late 2005, with a separate, elite training cadre preparing local territorial troops for new roles and operational methods.\textsuperscript{34} Around the same time, KOREM 173 Chief Colonel Tri Assunu donned characteristically black CT-style garb in a parade ground address.\textsuperscript{35} The ‘anti-terror desk’ function carried into additional infantry-based rapid-response sub-units directly commanded from KOREM-level HQ. Despite the new company-minus units’ standard, specific title,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Many questions still surround that bombing, especially where Indonesian press reporting showed such anomalies as: an apparent murder at the Australian police attaché’s residence less than two weeks earlier; an SMS warning to outside BRIMOB guards; claims of a “suicide bombing” when the detonation vehicle clearly stayed mobile and not on a course of direct, most effective attack, and; signs of severe pressure on POLRI in its investigators’ event reconstruction and in the sudden changes affecting veteran detective and anti-terror chief Gorries Mere.
\item \textsuperscript{35} SCTV Liputant6 (TV news), 29 January 2006.
\end{itemize}
command and staff at KOREM 171 described the actual anti-guerrilla context for its own ‘anti-terror’ unit’s primary task. Paraphrasing General Ryamizard’s earlier claim about KODAMs’ raider battalions, 171’s Chief of Staff unsurprisingly nicknamed the high-readiness 752 Infantry Battalion sub-unit “the KOREM’s own KOPASSUS”.36

In its surrounding context of force expansion and upgrade, the TNI (and to different, less certain extents POLRI) trend towards a ‘counterterrorist’ image and justification was a clear manifestation of institutional growth and reassertion. The TNI’s confident publicity around its ‘anti-terror’ initiatives in West Papua showed no trace of conscious irony: possibly the area’s most significant, recent ‘terrorist bomb’ incident, for example, occurred in suspicious, even sinister circumstances of a corruption scandal, where a serious investigation of timber racketeering apparently brought a police precinct chief under extreme pressure and national scrutiny.37 Less ambiguous was the TNI’s newly ratified means to use separate and largely autonomous anti-terror hierarchy both for wider intelligence supervision and in rapid-response, KOREM-level military units in West Papua (and elsewhere). But whatever the extent of TNI manipulation in the ‘anti-terror’ issue, its value was obvious as a vehicle for resurgent political dominance by its traditional bases of institutional power i.e., specialized intelligence functions and their related surveillance assets in the army’s geographically comprehensive territorial apparatus.38

Overlaps & anomalies: territorial base command restructure

As a military organization very different from normal or conventional combat and support units, the Indonesian Army territorial apparatus of KODAM hierarchies had less direct relevance to the TNI programme of force increase and upgrade. Territorial commands made routine liaison and coordination between TNI and service HQ, and central KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS commands, especially in preparing deployments and in planning for new bases and units. For KODAM Trikora, covering West Papua, the greatest and most immediate change from force expansion was to the KODAM’s base regiment (rindam), where a likely increased demand for recruit training was offset by contributions from outside KODAMs in formal postings into the newly raised territorial infantry battalions and other units.

As a separate administrative mechanism embedded among Indonesia’s population, the territorial hierarchy itself did not necessarily become part of such institutional expansion, except where incorporating ‘anti-terror’ roles. However, conspicuous changes to the TNI—POLRI territorial systems in West Papua called attention to particular geographical and operational priorities within those systems. Due to the TNI—POLRI territorial systems’ political importance, certain political priorities were also apparent where those systems reflected both institutions’ relative power and influence in the adjoining civilian government apparatus.39


37 See for example: Infopapua.com, ‘Barang Bukti Hilang, Polres Sorong Berang’, 20 May 2003. The point is not meant to assume the POLRI officer’s guilt in that corruption case: a bomb scare could have plausibly originated from another party most at risk from the POLRI officer’s reasonably assumed ability to expose others to prosecution or scandal from the timber racket case. Other ‘pressure’ on the precinct chief - Deputy Chief Commissioner Faisal Abdool Nasser - appeared in reports that his wife had written pleas to the President, and to many other institutional and departmental executives.

38 Return of TNI ‘primacy’ in KOMINDA came with publicity of “revived” babinsa (village guidance NCO) functionaries, announced with sophist-style ambiguity: the institutions had never ‘died’.

39 For an explanation of the normalized Indonesian de facto martial law, and comparison with the Aceh territorial structure:
cf fn 1 - Davies, Indonesia’s War... op cit., pp. 56—9.
**TNI territorial command & sub-divided civilian administration**

TNI—POLRI territorial commands typically overlapped at certain hierarchical levels, especially in routine executive governance by the leadership triumvirate system (TRIPIDA) and its coordinating (‘consultative’, *musyawarah*) leadership councils. In such manner did many senior TNI territorial commanders (and less so their police counterparts) often assume de facto seniority over two or more areas of civil government, ensuring force priorities, or a ‘security approach’, almost by default.

**Figure 1** TNI primacy’: structural overlap of military seniority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TNI - KODAM (military area command)</th>
<th>POLRI - POLDA (police region)</th>
<th>DEPDAGRI - propinsi (province)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XVII / Trikora</td>
<td>Papua</td>
<td>Ijjabar*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Papua</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOREM (military 'resort' command)</td>
<td>KODIM (military district command)</td>
<td>POLRES (police precinct) level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171 / <em>Praja Wira Tama</em> Sorong</td>
<td>1704 / Sorong</td>
<td>(POLRESTA) Sorong Sorong (municipality)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1706 / Fakfak</td>
<td>Sorong*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1703 / Manokwari</td>
<td>Sorong Selatan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1710 / Mimika</td>
<td>Sorong Selatan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172 / <em>Praja Wira Yakti</em> Jayapura</td>
<td>1701 / Jayapura</td>
<td>(POLRESTA) Jayapura Jayapura (municipality)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1702 / Jayawijaya</td>
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<td>Keerom</td>
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<tr>
<td>173 / <em>Praja Wira Braja</em> Biak</td>
<td>1708 / Biak Numfor</td>
<td>Biak Numfor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1709 / Yapen Waropen</td>
<td>Biak Numfor</td>
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<td>1705 / Nabire</td>
<td>Supiori</td>
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<td>1707 / Merauke</td>
<td>Supiori</td>
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<td>Yapeh Waropen</td>
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<td>Panai</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Puncak Jaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>174 / <em>Anim Ti Waninggap</em> Merauke</td>
<td>1707 / Merauke</td>
<td>Merauke</td>
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<td>Boven Digoel</td>
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<td>Asmat</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Security forces’ privileged position in the territorial apparatus gave them a de facto supervisory role and governmental seniority, perhaps most apparent at formative stages of civil government sub-division, when TNI—POLRI chiefs could oversee new civil administrative entities from the point of their gestation. The overlaps of TNI—POLRI seniority were obvious at KODAM—provincial level since West Papua’s division into two provinces; legislation from November 2002, and inauguration by April the next year, enacted 14 lower-level regency (kabupaten) administrations in West Papua. The TNI exerted particularly broad overlapping boundaries over these new entities, with the notable exception of the already heavily militarized KODIM 1710 in Mimika Regency, site of the Freeport mining ‘vital national asset’ (obvitnas).

The hierarchical anomaly of KOREM 174 / Anim Ti Waniggap
Overlapping TNI—civil apparatus in West Papua was more conspicuous from 2004—5, when the army territorial hierarchy restructured in extraordinary deviation from normal TNI practice. With KODIM 1707 its only sub-unit upon inauguration, KOREM 174 ran against all normal concept of hierarchical military command and control. The unprecedented structural oddity in West Papua’s KODAM Trikora hierarchy appeared in the reported establishment of KOREM 174 in Merauke, mid-2005, publicized as a plan over a year earlier. The appointment of its first chief, KOPASSUS specialist and West Papua veteran Colonel Joy Sihotang, highlighted the exceptional quality of what would otherwise seem a redundant, even inconsequential, territorial HQ entity.

Figure 2 Restructure of Indonesian Army territorial commands, West Papua

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Operational needs for control of field units did not explain KOREM 174’s birth: outside-deployed infantry battalions rotated through the Merauke area much as before (see Map 3, p. 31). Established local precedent of KODIM 1707’s inclusion in sector commands proved the area’s pre-existing manageability for counterinsurgency operations. The newly raised local battalion (755 Yalet) too did not justify the KOREM’s creation: it imposed no greater strain of coordination, control or logistics than that experienced in many other sites of territorial infantry expansion, where new territorial battalions added to Kalimantan and Sumatera KOREMs, for example. Merauke’s unusual KOREM did not meet normal criteria for precedents in separate, mission-specific ‘task force’ commands (satgas) either, where extremes of distance, diplomatic sensitivity, or deployed force numbers compelled extra, non-territorial HQ, as seen in contemporary cases of Aceh and border areas of West Timor and Kalimantan.

KOREM 174’s lack of functioning subordinate commands should have immediately prompted serious scrutiny. Precedent with other new KOREM formations, and comments by senior TNI officers, all confirmed that the absence of sub-unit commands in KOREM 174 was no Indonesian military peculiarity, but a military anomaly by any standard. One year of preparation was enough time at least to begin subordinate KODIM formations on an interim, preparatory basis (KODIM persiapan), as done in 1996 for KODIM 1710 in neighboring KOREM 171, for example, or in counterpart police cases in POLDA Papua’s new precincts. But two new KODIM formations were to be in place only by 2008: some three years after KOREM 174’s official creation, when a new KOREM chief would almost certainly already occupy command – unless the formation was scrapped.

174’s only KODIM - 1707 - continued responsibility for handling events in the area’s more remote (and new) Boven Digoel Regency in 2006, despite claims that KOREM 174 led a cadre HQ element of 30 troops to prepare a new subordinate KODIM in that area. By stark contrast, earlier proposals for new KOREMs in the new provinces of Riau Archipelago, Bangka—Belitung and North Maluku indicated a minimum pre-existing need for at least two subordinate KODIMs. In the Bangka—Belitung case, the KODAM chief himself explained that even two pre-existing subordinate KODIM commands were a deficiency, causing delay to the planned new local KOREM. For most practical purposes then, the West Papua Trikora territorial restructure rendered the single-stacked KODIM 1707—KOREM 174 a de facto ‘independent’ KODIM (BS, berdiri sendiri), like the more politically delicate, high-priority KODIMs on metropolitan Java like 0501 / Central Jakarta. 1707 thus sat alone outside of its normal subordination (to Jayapura-based KOREM 172), but with the co-located appendage of a more senior HQ commander, Colonel Sihotang, and his chief of staff Lieutenant-Colonel Surono equal-ranked with the KODIM 1707 Chief.

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Police restructures too contradicted the Merauke area’s ‘vertical’ growth in KOREM 174. Precinct command remained concentrated in the one POLRI territorial formation: POLRES Merauke, still the largest in Papua Police Region (POLDA). Most other precincts multiplied in sub-division, except for those of greatest operational priority: Mimika, site of the Freeport mining complex and; the more remote central highland and border area of Jayawijaya. The police territorial precinct structure expanded in accordance with much of the new civil administration, but the large Merauke area again stood out in the POLDA organization (see Map 2, p. 9). To the time of writing, several years of precedent allowed for informed observation of such post-reformasi changes, where security forces’ major territorial restructures appeared in Aceh, Maluku, and even the national capital Jakarta. Anomalous post-2004 organizational circumstances in the TNI’s KOREM 174, and in its counterpart police territory, confirmed a priority in the Merauke area.45

**Recent TNI territorial command & staff appointments**

First examination could leave an unremarkable impression from the posting background of post-2005 senior territorial officers in West Papua. Patterns of their operational experience and specialization were generally consistent with colleagues in similar appointments elsewhere in Indonesia: a leavening of Aceh, East Timor, Ambon and West Papua operational tours, with a normally high proportion of KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS background. However, one other obvious commonality among recent appointees’ past service was experience in the territorial bases (*resimen induk* KODAM, *rindam*). The latest command and staff positions in West Papua possibly required a higher-than-usual familiarity with matters of recruitment and training, especially as they applied to the expansion of locally based infantry battalions i.e., intensified activity in drawing on and managing local and transferred recruits, selection and induction of suitable NCOs and officers, and infantry training.

Another conspicuous aspect of recent appointees’ more common background was a past regional association from southern Sumatera postings i.e., in KODAM II Sriwijaya. Possibly relevant to senior officers’ high Sriwijaya-related representation in West Papua was its demographic and operational familiarization for planned transmigrant programmes.46 Lampung Province, covered by KODAM II, was known for its ethnicity-based transmigrant settlements of separate Javanese, Balinese or Madurese townships. That area often preserved distinct ethnic identities within the transplanted communities and their trading networks spread to the province’s interior. Close TNI monitoring of such communities, and enlistment and supervision of their members for militia and other internal security functions, may have been especially relevant to similar operations in West Papua’s transmigrant nodes and, perhaps more importantly, where familiarity could aid local recruitment for the increase in KODAM XVII Trikora-based territorial infantry battalions.

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45 The author’s earlier (2001) study prematurely anticipated army territorial restructure upon more limited and less precedented sub-division of civil administration: cf fn 1 - Davies, ‘Indonesian Security Responses...’, op cit., pp. 13—14, 27.

One ISG participant (separate discussion, 14 July 2006) reasonably mooted KOREM 174’s possible inclusion of KODIM 1710, which would make more logistical and hierarchical sense, while consolidating political efforts toward an earlier-planned third, southern West Papua province. However, reports showed KODIM 1710’s continued subordination to KOREM 171 long after 174’s raising. See: *Cenderawasih Pos*, ‘Satgaspam Diminta Selalu Waspada - Yonif Linud 501/Kostrad Resmi Bertugas di Area PTFI’, 20 August 2005, and


Another aspect of some officers’ Sriwijaya background, though more tentative, was its possible indication of political considerations in certain appointments i.e., where loyalty and some personal vested interest may have determined recent West Papua command postings. As is widely known, President SBY’s only territorial command from provincial levels was in 1996—7, for KODAM II Sriwijaya. Of course, this aspect of recent West Papua appointments could be mere coincidence, but any remote presidential connection may prompt better understanding where such possible influence on recent postings concerned the area’s significantly higher operational and diplomatic priority. The closest parallel in this regard was the temporal association between recently appointed KODAM Trikora Chief Major-General George Toisutta and SBY’s KODAM Sriwijaya command in southern Sumatera. Given SBY’s risen political fortunes since, any such connections would likely survive SBY’s earlier tenure when he had the most direct influence on appointments and links within the civilian community. The other two senior West Papua commanders with identified KODAM Sriwijaya background were there after SBY’s KODAM tenure: KOPASSUS veterans Colonel Tri Assunu at Biak’s KOREM 173, and; Colonel Joy Sihotang at Merauke’s odd, new KOREM 174.47

As ex-Chief of Aceh Operations Command (Pangkoops) and West Papua’s recent KODAM Trikora Chief, Major-General Toisutta obviously reflected the TNI’s priority in West Papua operations since the Aceh peace settlement; continuity in such high-profile postings confirmed Toisutta’s proven record as a reliable and responsible commander. Elsewhere in KODAM Trikora, and in its Merauke area in particular, command and staff appointments showed clearer professional connections where officers’ posting background and operational experience were significant for the restructured territorial command apparatus and its new, expanded local sub-units in the field. Further contradicting earlier claims to have ceased KOPASSUS activity in West Papua, several senior career KOPASSUS officer postings showed that command’s disproportionately strong influence and seniority in TNI planning,

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47 In response to a more abbreviated presentation of associated detail than that listed here, Harold Crouch rejected this study’s assessed indication of possible presidential-level considerations in recent West Papua appointments. Such assessment is made not to pretend conclusive substance, but rather as grounds for further investigation.
operations, and unit training (including for ‘anti-terror’ and other rapid-response roles). Other significance from the new Merauke-based KOREM 174 was apparent in concurrent appointments and events involving related activities of KOPASSUS specialization i.e., intelligence, counterintelligence, and PSYOPS.

Streamlining & priority: military intelligence appointments

The above-described organizational changes in planned and realized force expansion, rapid-response mechanisms for exaggerated (if not redefined) ‘terrorist’ threats, new state intelligence processes, and territorial rezoning were all followed by related changes in key senior TNI officer appointments. At operational- and strategic-level positions since 2005, the TNI discernibly sharpened its focus on West Papua operations and related command and staff positions. From that time, TNI and army HQ concentrated certain influential and West Papua-experienced intelligence and special forces leadership figures into the same specific chain of command and reporting, from West Papua’s regions up to the national level. High-priority and new West Papua-related positions increasingly converged by late 2005, with greater significance to special intelligence functions.

National-level intelligence promoted the experience of recent West Papua KODAM Chief Major-General Nurdin Zainal, who assumed the post of TNI General Staff Assistant for Intelligence (asintel kasum TNI) then, only a few months later, additional office as Chief of BAIS (TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency). Not since the 1980s had an officer held both senior TNI intelligence positions simultaneously. Nurdin Zainal had some three years of continuous duty as KODAM Trikora Chief and Chief of Staff before overseeing the TNI’s entire intelligence apparatus: his previous BAIS exposure was as attaché a few years earlier in the Netherlands, with its relatively large population of Indonesian (covering West Papuan, Acehnese, etc.) émigrés and activists. Apart from protracted duty in West Papua command, Nuradin’s overseas intelligence experience indicated his proven record in Indonesian diplomatic circles. He graduated as an officer in 1974, along with: the Security Minister’s ‘Papua Desk’ Head Setia Purwaka; Trikora Chief and Chief of Staff colleagues Mahidin Simbolon and Getson Manurung (see Appendix I); ex-Army Chief Ryamizard Ryacudu, and; KOPASSUS luminaries Prabowo Subianto and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin.

Brigadier-General Hotma Marbun, like Nurdin, entered the KODAM Trikora executive circle after a term as Army Deputy Security Assistant (Waaspam KSAD). An obvious advantage from both Nurdin’s and Hotma’s previous internal security roles was their continuity in restricting access to sensitive matters. The KODAM Chief of Staff was well placed to pay particularly strict attention to limiting certain operational detail to a minimum among commanders and staff, in a conventional ‘counter-intelligence’ role preventing mission compromise. Streamed as a career KOPASSUS officer, Hotma took up his new post as Trikora Chief of Staff just after that office created its own rapid-response forces for ‘anti-terror’ and its formal reach

48 It was highly probable that BAIS experience covered part of the unidentified past postings of recent KODAM Trikora senior officer appointees, especially where gaps arose in publicity about officers recently assigned as Trikora KOREM chiefs and chiefs of staff (see also Figure 3, p. 19). BAIS’ secretive role limited this study’s findings to Nurdin Zainal’s initial and current BAIS postings.


into militia and civil surveillance via the officially autonomous, but lower-ranked National Unity & Community Protection Agency (BKBPM, *kesbanglinmas*).

From Nurdin Zainal’s above-mentioned army academy colleagues came a special ministerial-level appointment for presidential oversight of West Papua operations in the same way President SBY created facilitative roles when Security Minister coordinating Aceh operations. Just as the anti-GAM campaign from 2003 brought an ‘Aceh Desk’ under SBY’s protégé and election campaign staffer Lieutenant-General Sudi Silalahi, a similar ‘Papua Desk’ arose in reporting by early 2006. That desk’s head, Major-General Setia Purwaka, was reportedly another of SBY’s long-term confidantes. TNI Chief and Chief of Staff posts also indicated attempts at presidential oversight: those senior officers graduated from their academy training in 1973: the same year as the President himself. Of course, such executive- and ministerial-level positions took no direct part in intelligence functions, but their responsibilities included approval for assigning officers and units to intelligence-related posts for West Papua operations.

**Figure 4** West Papua- and Merauke-focused command & intelligence, Jan. 2006
The army territorial apparatus’ overlap of civilian bodies was crucial to the TNI’s reaffirmed lead throughout state intelligence (including counterintelligence). Figure 4 locates key TNI officers as appointed by new year 2006, but within an altered state intelligence and army territorial apparatus already in place by mid-2005. Although abbreviated to show only the main, relevant bureaucratic links and specializations, the reconstruction here could still easily baffle observers familiar with simpler, more conventional hierarchical models. Despite superficially apparent interlocking hierarchies and duplication of effort, such reconstructions should be regarded as both organizational chart and network diagram i.e., not a normal layout of separate organizations’ vertical seniority. De facto TNI authority and greater, routine lateral coordination indicated in Figure 4 were the means by which the Indonesian state system coerced a ‘security approach’ onto civil government: overlapping the territorial commands onto cadastral civilian zoning; weakening of POLRI powers by the National Unity hierarchy’s separate Satpol PP; ensuring practical TNI seniority over POLRI and civilian colleagues, and; a solid BAIS—KOPASSUS and army territorial intelligence apparatus almost entirely beyond non-TNI scrutiny.

The ‘security approach’ meant that army territorial chiefs could expect the civilian apparatus to cooperate in surveillance and information, but without the reciprocal or reverse process beyond TNI—POLRI tasking for information and advisory briefings on threat. The system was characterized more by its networked and militarized rather than departmental and civilian qualities, reinforced in civil agencies’ de facto military supervision by TNI retirees or serving specialists under the Security Minister, BIN and DEPDAGRI, and closer civilian—police structural and practical alignment. POLRI’s weakened status in these arrangements could seem unclear: after all, a senior policeman Inspector-General Ansyaad M’bai headed the National Unity ‘Anti-Terror’ Desk. However, his authority extended only to the Interior Ministry’s Satpol PP: more a token force of ministerial security guards or pseudo-police than a means of deploying armed power against identified or claimed threats. In a more specific, situational sense – whether in Central Java, Aceh or West Papua - the army placed its new KOREM-based anti-terror units of higher-readiness local infantry almost invariably at higher positions covering wider territory. By those same means could TNI intelligence functions pre-empt and counter any potential bureaucratic rival, whether from POLRI, the Chief Prosecutor (Kajati), BIN, or the Security Minister’s interceding National Unity & Community Protection chain itself.

Although Figure 4’s most conspicuous ‘anti-terror’ changes applied across Indonesia’s provinces, the army’s Trikora restructure with KOREM 174 accentuated effects of TNI intrusion, influence, and control in that system’s post-2005 West Papua transformation. KOREM 174 added an extra layer of command in the Merauke area to shift pre-existing command and staff into a lower-level concentration from the regencies onto districts and villages. Reports indicated a chief of staff and an intelligence officer as the only other functionaries in Colonel Joy Sihotang’s Merauke KOREM HQ. That limited detail possibly reflected a coincidence of source deficiency in this study, but the previously mentioned (and confirmed) anomaly of KOREM 174’s lack of subordinate KODIMs further suggested the extraordinary nature of Colonel Sihotang’s tasks. One report showed that KOREM 174 directly commanded a timintelrem (KOREM Intelligence Team); another of that command’s anomalies

Note that Figure 4 applies less to ‘Martial Law’ (Military Emergency, darurat militer) patterns of subordination, which formally delegate direct authority to the TNI chain of command.

given the TNI’s established territorial hierarchy for intelligence staff and units. Normal subordination from the KODAM’s ‘detachment’ (denintel) descended to a KOREM’s timintelrem (platoon) to the next-lower KODIM level’s smaller ‘section’ (siinteldim), sometimes also termed the timintel.\footnote{Tanter, R. (1989), “The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the Indonesian State” in Arief Budiman (ed.), \textit{State and Civil Society in Indonesia}, Clayton: Monash U.P., 1994, p. 228, Davies, M., “The ABRI Intelligence Apparatus: a ‘corps’ of many lanyards”, in \textit{Australian Defence Force Journal}, January—February 1999, and \textit{Suara Pembaruan}, ‘TI Tolak Berdialog Dengan GAM’, 16 August 1999.} Intelligence commanders used the title of ‘chief’ or ‘head’ (kasiintel) at KOREM, with direct command of KODIM sections by a ‘section intelligence officer’ (pasiintel). In these details too KOREM 174’s intelligence chain overtook KODIM 1707: further to its unusual ‘team’ status, KOREM 174’s intelligence head held the same rank (captain, not a KOREM’s normal major) as the previously noted KODIM 1707 counterpart: Captain Mandjakala. Thus did Colonel Sihotang’s KOREM add an extra specialist layer (or merely take on some KODIM staff). Just as anomalous, its single KODIM command and staff almost certainly concentrated their efforts at the lower sub-district commands (KORAMIL).


But at lower levels too, officers’ career progression and past associations were useful background information when analyzing new intelligence appointments for any unusual changes. Colonel Sihotang’s posting to the new KOREM 174 highlighted the
priority and focus seen from the appointments of Nurdin, Hotma and Setia Purwaka. Joy Sihotang’s West Papua experience was recent enough: his previous time there was as KODAM *Trikora* Operations Assistant some four years earlier. Another career KOPASSUS officer, Sihotang’s record included an Army Command & Staff School instructional position (1998—9) and, before KOREM 174, command of the KODAM *Sriwijaya* Base Regiment. His most specialized past role, and probably greatest career success, was as commander of the KOPASSUS *Sandi Yudha* (Covert Warfare) *Maleo* Task Force in its tour of West Papua over the drawn-out 1996 Mapenduma—Geselama hostage siege.\(^56\) In that mission, *Maleo* was fundamental to activities of reconnaissance, agent-handling and infiltration into OPM circles, where the task force’s influence was critical, especially when the case became an international issue due to the several foreign hostages taken allegedly on the orders of regional OPM veteran chief Kelly Kwalik. It would not be far-fetched to conclude that Sihotang’s success in *Maleo* brought him institutional prominence, if not fame, in discrete KOPASSUS and army circles: then KOPASSUS Chief Prabowo Subianto directly contributed by adding a local higher-level field command, with CT (Gultor) and other troops in a separate strike role. However, Joy Sihotang’s force had the most significant presence in the siege, though it was far more discrete in news reporting.

A parallel appointment to Sihotang’s was that for KOPASSUS colleague Colonel Ervi Tri Assunu, posted to command the pre-existing KOREM 173 at Biak from the same time i.e., mid-2005. Ervi Tri Assunu also had previous ‘Covert Warfare’ experience from command of the *Tribuana* Task Force (the standardized succeeding title for *Maleo* and similar missions in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor). Available sources specified Tri Assunu’s tour of Aceh in that function, but the nature of such missions probably saw his ‘rotation’ in a deployment cycle covering West Papua too. However, unlike Sihotang’s role, Tri Assunu’s did not imply the same level of professional accomplishment which would apply from a case such as the 1996 Mapenduma siege; neither did it involve a new, anomalous command like KOREM 174 in Merauke. From the available detail on senior post-2005 army West Papua officer appointments, Joy Sihotang appeared to hold almost central importance in a less formal sense. Past links and experience, quite apart from formal authority and function, depicted Sihotang as an esteemed ‘hub’ in West Papua’s KODAM *Trikora* hierarchy from mid-2005, deemed most suitable for allocation to a command with the TNI’s highest priority among all of West Papua’s KOREMs (see Figure 5, p. 25).

Colonel Sihotang’s return to West Papua operations occurred on the same time scale covering the premature birth of his KOREM 174 command (or HQ shell) in Merauke, as well as outgoing *Trikora* Chief Nurdin Zainal’s ascension to the TNI’s joint BAIS-asintel peak – and those executive intelligence functions’ combination in a single appointment. At the next-higher executive level above Joy Sihotang, the Indonesian Army expressed its own operational priority in West Papua by posting George Toisutta to command KODAM *Trikora*: Toisutta was earlier entrusted with the Aceh campaign’s counter-offensive phase from the start of 2004. In the same brief period from mid-2005 to early 2006, publicly available reporting confirmed the fully transferred national priority from Aceh operations to West Papua, as the Security Minister’s ‘Papua Desk’ replicated the previous Aceh-focused counterpart activating greater all-of-government discipline and coordination.

Mission for a Veteran West Papua PSYOPS Specialist

Details of HQ staff composition, force structure and precedent elsewhere in Indonesia all depicted KOREM 174 as an anomaly probably tasked with a special, unusual mission. But Sihotang’s Maleo background in special tasks pointed to other operational peculiarities, or achievements, which better explained his new Merauke assignment. Agent-handling, infiltration, deception and associated psychological operations (PSYOPS) were major distinguishing characteristics of such KOPASSUS Covert Warfare troops’ tasks in operational areas like West Papua. In the last, more general category of ‘PSYOPS’, the TNI had no monopoly on the complex practice of trying to destabilize elusive guerrilla enemies and their support base via intrigues of deception, or disinformation, in fabricated scenarios and spoiling tactics to disrupt guerrilla leadership and spread publicity favorable to Indonesia’s government and security forces. Precedent from Australian counterinsurgency doctrine specified some basic PSYOPS goals and techniques thus:

b. Create dissension and distrust within the insurgent organization. c. Undermine confidence in insurgent leadership. d. Secure the defection of groups or individuals...

Insurgent leaders, whose general locations and appointments are known, can be
effectively neutralized through cleverly worded news releases or by planted rumors which reveal supposed cooperation with government forces. This technique is most effective immediately after a successful military operation. Names of insurgent leaders should not be mentioned but other facts should be revealed that leave little doubt as to the identity of the man in question.

That early (1965) source betrayed an underdeveloped, even formative, quality by introducing the topic with a caveat all but admitting its unsophisticated level of understanding about counterinsurgency PSYOPS, stating that such techniques: “... are limited only by the imagination and creativity of the psywar operator or his commander”.

The TNI however was no newcomer to counterinsurgency and counter-revolutionary PSYOPS, having for years exercised its creative energies to practise such sinister warfare from East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua into metropolitan Java. Many Indonesian sources detailed specific cases of state repression where the TNI resorted to destabilization and infiltration of separatist resistance and other dissident targets, using techniques developed from local application since the early 1960s, if not earlier. The Indonesian Army inadvertently revealed KOPASSUS’ familiarity with sophisticated operational-level PSYOPS techniques in a formal army administrative instruction which survived East Timor’s 1999 sacking. Indeed, PSYOPS seemed the officially preferred TNI—POLRI weapon in more remote and sparsely-populated West Papua, with its own resistance tenuously united between severe topographical divides, many different languages, tribal sub-ethnicities and poor communications infrastructure. TNI special action forces retained such ‘covert warfare’ capabilities in West Papua through rapid adjustments to its deployed force structure. But from its various, longer-term changes in stealthy bureaucratic chicaneary claiming exaggerated ‘anti-terror’ responsibilities, Indonesia’s military was arguably better placed than ever to wage its own preferred PSYOPS-led anti-guerrilla war i.e., via volunteer militia cadres within a large conscripted civilian base of sentry—proxies. That counter-intelligence and agent-handling effort would be overseen by special forces in training—mentoring roles and de facto field leadership over an expanded base of line infantry.

Creative PSYOPS deception could twist many intriguing permutations to misrepresent targeted resistance leaders’ loyalties, motives and even identities, but simple approaches apparently sufficed in most cases. The harsh central highland terrain, so tactically favorable to guerrillas, also favored disinformation campaigns by TNI—POLRI counterintelligence veterans whose easier access to communications and mass media afforded them almost uncontested ‘information dominance’ i.e., a situation in which Indonesian command could not only predominate in the quantity of disseminated information but even in the very initiation of scenarios designed to convey images of enemy mendacity, incompetence, disunity, etc. The highland interior therefore became the arena for a shadow war of perceptions, or ‘black’ information operations, with two prominent cases useful for retrospective consideration. The first case was the 1996 Mapenduma hostage siege; the second in the smaller 2001 kidnapping in the nearby Ilaga area. The targets in both cases were

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57 cf fn 21 - Army HQ, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, op cit., p. 59, 70.

It was no mere speculative digression to recall these events as case studies into TNI counter-insurgency PSYOPS: Colonel Joy Sihotang’s official functions were most closely relevant to the conduct of each deception operation, first as the field-deployed Covert Warfare *Maleo* Chief and later as the KODAM *Trikora* Assistant for Operations. Reports of both kidnapping incidents spread the impression of serious OPM disunity (‘factionalism’), as though Titus Murib opportunistically misrepresented himself as Kelly Kwalik. Tenuous anecdotal detail, rumor and some unclear photographs gave the story credibility among local and foreign journalists and other observers. Indonesians and foreigners alike repeated the impressions of permanent OPM internecine strife and callous opportunism as apparent in the double-deception of the perpetrator/s’ account: there was little other information in either case, while thorough, third-party investigation would likely only further endanger the hostages. Nonetheless, KODAM Chief Nurdin Zainal himself later flatly contradicted those divisive intrigues when stating that Kelly and Titus ran a joint command in the successful OPM raid on Wamena’s KODIM 1702 armory.\footnote{Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), “Philippe Simon, documentary filmmaker IMPRISONED. Johan van Den Eynde, documentary filmmaker IMPRISONED”, 7 June 2001, Detikcom, ‘Pembebasan Sandera Belgia (3): Batal, Karena Larangan Agum’, 27 August 2001. Online: <http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2001/08/27/2001827-120437.shtml> (accessed July 2006), and Christian Science Monitor, ‘Violence, a US mining giant, and Papua politics’, 3 September 2002. Online: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0903/p01s04-woap.html> (accessed July 2006). The point is not to ignore established OPM kidnapping tactics in apparently genuine cases e.g., the Williem Ondel-led kidnapping of timber workers in the Merauke area. See, for example: Tempointeraktif.com, ‘OPM Janji Serahkan Sandera Hari Ini’, 7 February 2001. Online: <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2001/02/07/brk,20010207-11,id.html> (accessed May 2004).}

Where paid and/or coerced proxies kidnapped foreign journalists, aid workers, researchers, etc., a layer of plausible deniability protected the TNI’s public image. Veteran KOPASSUS militia sponsor and *Trikora* Chief Mahidin Simbolon could compound the deception to put neutral third parties on the defensive, even feigning magnanimity and fairness towards the OPM. According to Mahidin, the two Belgian journalists in 2001 had not been kidnapped at all but had voluntarily joined up with an OPM band, then falsified a letter addressed to then President Gus Dur, complete with a simple, bombastic extortion demand for West Papuan independence.\footnote{Tempointeraktif.com, ‘TNI Kerahkan Dua Kompi untuk Kejar Penyerang Kodim Jayawijaya’, 5 April 2003. Online: <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2003/04/05/brk,20030405-07,id.html> (accessed July 2006).} Although these PSYOPS activities were generally obvious when considered in hindsight, they had high counterinsurgency value at the time. Their resulting wide cast of suspicion and confusion: harmed morale among OPM guerrillas and their supporters; endangered them through lures of false contacts posed by planted agents; disturbed or even severed their crucial, mutually sustaining links, and; seriously discredited West
Papuan resistance in outside perceptions, while depicting the TNI as a necessary, stabilizing guardian. In other words: disruption, destabilization and, most sought of all, entrapment of genuine dissidents, sympathizers and guerrillas, in politically motivated publicity favorable to Indonesia’s military and police.

West Papua PSYOPS deception appeared to shift emphasis from 2003, showing less direct effort at discrediting OPM leaders, instead providing cover for expanded recruitment and infiltration involving TNI—POLRI agents and other proxies. Intensified surveillance from compulsory civilian siskamling sentry and ‘night watch’ (jaga malam) duties provided TNI—POLRI commanders greater coercive means to detain and co-opt assessed guerrilla relatives and other close supporters spotted in apparent courier or supply tasks from populated areas. From that point, staged and rumored ‘separatist surrenders’ aimed to later increase the rate of genuine surrenders and the chance to compel and/or entice full defection, or ‘turning’ of guerrillas into cooperative proxies for special operations. Such shadowy activity was never explicit, but its indications stood out among more routine accounts. From the northern coast’s Sarmi Regency, TNI Information Centre (Puspen TNI) composed a triumphal early 2006 claimed surrender / defection by 198 guerrillas. Half a year earlier, local resistance sources identified Daniel Buriyan (also “Buriam”) as a previous, more isolated case of a TNI-claimed ‘surrendered separatist’: OPM Combat Area Command II Chief Hans Yoweni described Daniel as member of a ‘fake OPM’ (OPM gadungan) with earlier paramilitary status as an army territorial auxiliary.62

Even less clear than the Daniel Buriyan—Sarmi case was the TNI’s claimed defection by southern Merauke area OPM chief Yosep Makonama, whose very existence was in doubt after his own earlier complaints about concentrated efforts against his life by paid assassins.63 The Makonama case suggested the potentially fictitious extremes in such counterintelligence activity, whereby an actually assassinated target could ‘live on’ as an agent’s cover-name where deemed useful to infiltration or manipulation of resistance sympathizers normally removed from the very limited, cautious and discrete OPM networks. Like Colonel Sihotang’s new command, that subtly different PSYOPS technique, or approach, appeared limited to the Merauke area.

The temporal and situational confluence in new forces, plans, restructure and key appointments all suggested a deliberate and extraordinary campaign with much wider and bigger objectives than previous West Papua counterinsurgency operations. Additional factors prominent in reports from 2003—5 were an emphasis on professionally specialized intelligence and special forces background in key positions, the anomalous new Merauke command, internal population surveillance and coercion, beside indications of various related PSYOPS techniques. These developments aimed not only to comprehensively destabilize, demoralize and marginalize the West Papuan resistance as a regional threat to the Republic of Indonesia’s Unitary State (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia); the militarized Indonesian State and its traditionally aggressive guardian in the TNI sought also to attain, opportunistically, any institutional advantage from its new priority mission. Although most indicators were crystal clear about West Papua’s new priority, many questions were unanswered

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about Sihotang’s strange Merauke command. In pursuing those questions, the TNI—
state leadership priority and intensified effort on West Papua located their more recent
activities to a higher, strategic- and diplomatic-level campaign.

The Merauke case: operations & perceptions

The Merauke area, covered by KOREM 174—KODIM 1707 and POLRI’s Merauke
Precinct, was not exceptional by the standard measures of TNI—POLRI counter-
insurgency from 2003 to the time of writing. Infantry battalions made border patrols
and routine support to the territorial apparatus in the interior, before rotating after
year-long deployments from outside KODAMs. Local territorial infantry indicated a
steady increase over years past when Merauke was long home to C Company, 751
Battalion (HQ Jayapura): the new 755 Battalion began to establish on Merauke town’s
edge in part of the vast Wasur National Park (see Map 3, p. 31). Some reports
specified troops in wanton shootings of civilians – most frequently cited was a case
involving West Kalimantan’s 643 Battalion; other reports of varied detail described
sexual assaults against indigenous female civilians. The area’s main repressive
activity was characteristic of intensified counterinsurgency throughout West Papua
i.e., the post-2003 activation of compulsory civilian sentry duty under militia cadres.
Unofficial TNI—POLRI economic activity in the area appeared to continue much as
before in logging- and fisheries-related sectors, though some public relations effort
from 2003 pointed to internal POLRI corruption investigations and fewer (mostly
non-army) TNI cases. In the latter sense, publicity from that time began to depict the
army as a protector of forestry, where separate West Papua-wide operations strove for
public perceptions of a more regulated local timber industry.

Merauke, however integral to routine TNI—POLRI operations against OPM
guerrillas, was nonetheless a contrast to activity in the other PNG-border areas. The
more mountainous OPM heartland eastward from Paniai reported many more combat
incidents and atrocity cases. The most prominent examples of the OPM’s central
highland area’s warfare were in 2003: an overwhelming assault on a Military Sub-
District (KORAMIL) and occupation of the local township—airstrip near Enarotali,
and the lower-scale but equally significant and successful Wamena area armory raid.
Also exceeding Merauke were cases in the adjoining north coast area to Jayapura,
recorded many more recorded cases of arbitrary detention, interrogation, killings, and
combat surrounding the activist hotbed of Papua Province’s harbor capital. Recent
demonstrations, reprisals and OPM raids in the Jayapura area from late 2005 were
another contrast with the Merauke at the opposite, southern coastal lowlands.64

Apart from the March 2004 announcement to create the new KOREM 174,
mid-2004 saw the earliest indication of unusual, exceptional activity in the Merauke
region. From that time, several reports consolidated impressions of a Merauke-based,
TNI-led PSYOPS campaign to provoke and deceive local OPM resistance
sympathizers into revealing their anti-Jakarta sympathies. The tactic was subtle in that
the actual OPM support base, much less OPM members and leadership, could not be
feasibly lured by the methods applied. Rather than better-known PSYOPS targeting
OPM leadership, for example, the apparent campaign had a more gradual and modest
aim i.e., to excite enough popular dissent against outlandish official statements so that
local dissidents could be identified and cultivated for later manipulation. Such
intrigue, almost defining a combination of counterintelligence work with PSYOPS
deception as a case study, was the only plausible explanation for the immoderate but

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64 For a usefully succinct, referenced summary of those events (and earlier background), see:
clearly deliberate public statements by senior Merauke-based TNI—POLRI officers from that time.

The first aspect of the extraordinary official approach would easily categorize within the Indonesian State’s mnemonic acronym ‘SARA’, denoting social divisions along categories defined as “ethnic-tribal, class, racial and religious” (suku, antar-golongan, ras, agama). Local indigenous catholics protested after Merauke’s KODIM and Precinct chiefs held repeated official and unofficial meetings with the newly appointed non-indigenous (possibly ethnic Javanese or Chinese) Bishop Nico Adisaputra and a select group of non-indigenous members of the laity. Instead of any accommodating measures for the offended West Papuan laity, authorities inflamed the situation by alleging protesters to be separatists, provocateurs and racists. Even the state-owned RRI broadcast the inflammatory allegations, all but confirming a deliberately sanctioned approach by the TNI—POLRI chiefs from their coordination meetings with other government agencies (MUSPIDA), if not also with select local religious leaders. There was no report of any resolution to that ensuing discontent when Chief of the new KOREM 174 Colonel Joy Sihotang publicly claimed, over a year later, that Bishop Adisaputra had aided his TNI mission through fruitful cooperation, crediting his formation’s mission success to support by community leaders including the Bishop.

Contrary to the attention on other contemporary events in West Papua, from violent Jayapura and Timika protest and repression to sporadic, yet more intensely violent guerrilla warfare and reprisal in the highlands, developments in the Merauke area confirmed its greater, unusual predominance of PSYOPS and related counter-intelligence activity during the period. A resistance source seemed uncannily accurate when linking the new (then pending) Merauke-based KOREM 174 with local TNI claims to have turned OPM commander ‘Yoseph Makonama’. Whether genuine, or another identity groomed for a future covert role posing as the OPM commander, the subject ‘defector’ was kept under close, but apparently comfortable TNI—POLRI watch. Makonama was reportedly targeted several months earlier by missions which pointed to other, indigenous ‘SARA’ intrigue enlisting agents from the area’s Marind people. Like the new KOREM 174 formation, the Makonama defection did not seem the typical ‘surrender’ case where Indonesian nationalist publicity could advertise a responsible, repentant ex-guerrilla seeking a normal life.

Further abnormal PSYOPS arose just after Joy Sihotang officially took charge of Merauke’s new, odd KOREM 174. Resistance sources themselves seemed baffled by the new provocation, drawing no conclusions beyond the simplest and worst expectations of intensified violent TNI—POLRI repression. Staff from KODIM 1707 and Merauke Police Precinct’s Intelligence & Security (Intelkam) disseminated ‘news’ of an impending East Timor—INTERFET-style deployment to usher in West Papuan independence. The territorial apparatus continued such bizarre disinformation six

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Map 3  Mixed events & perceptions: the Merauke area, 2004–6

Religionist intrigue especially around appointment of local bishop

2. September 2004
OPM’s Yosep Makonama claims assassination attempts by Merauke Regent Gebze’s paid agents

3. 5 February 2005
Reported defection by OPM’s Yosep Makonama to Merauke Regent’s residence

4. 1 June 2005
Official appointment of KOREM 174 Chief (DANREM) Colonel Kitaran Joy Sihotang

5. 25 July 2005 (Merauke), early January 2006 (Boven Digoel)
Reported PSYOP tactic: ‘news’ by KODIM 1707 & Merauke Police Precinct Intelligence & Security branch (Intelmam) claiming planned INTERFET-style entry to Papua

6. 13-17 January 2006
Voyage from Merauke by 43 West Papuan asylum seekers

7. 1 February 2006
Report citing Merauke Regency Government: evacuation of 500+ nearby coastal civilians to Merauke's TNI & regency government facilities; storm damage and locals' ‘fear of tsunami’

8. 4-5 April 2006
President SBY celebrates harvest time with Merauke community & apparatus
months later farther away in the area’s Boven Digoel interior. The otherwise bombastic effort would be regarded a cynical TNI—POLRI joke at the expense of West Papua’s resistance, except when considered within the local context of topography, ethnic division, and poor civilian communications exacerbated by a pervasive fear of military, police and covert counterintelligence surveillance through eavesdropping and infiltration. Like the blatant SARA provocation of indigenous catholics in the Merauke Diocese, the deliberate ‘INTERFET news’ PSYOPS tactic was no desperate naïve attempt to snare OPM leaders, rank-and-file members, or their clandestine and covert networks: that cautious, active minority - dependent upon reliable internal communication for their lives - knew far better than to respond to such tall stories. In that case, Indonesian troops in the Merauke area rather sought the easiest catches in the guerrillas’ pond i.e., the more naive, uncritical types among the mass of indigenous resistance sympathizers, otherwise safely disconnected from genuine resistance networks which had very little safe means of countering the TNI—POLRI ruse. But after exciting enough nearby questioning and speculative talk, the forces’ agents could make their approaches to sympathizers as part of a covert OPM—aktivis gadungan (fake OPM—activist) recruitment drive.

Following this linear-temporal summary, subsequent Merauke-related events took much greater public attention, carrying the area into immediate international scrutiny. Forty three West Papuan asylum seekers made a voyage from Merauke to the Australian mainland at Cape York, displaying a prominent pro-resistance banner, replete with the OPM ‘Morning Star’ (Bintang Kejora) flag. Their departure area seemed oddly close to concentrations of TNI—POLRI HQ, troops and other facilities, including the Merauke Naval Base. On the other hand, Indonesia’s PNG border security had reportedly intensified,70 probably due to the presence of a near-established and over-strength 755 Territorial Infantry Battalion available as a local cadre for border surveillance and interception patrols. Upon close examination of the area up until that time, the voyage from Merauke indicated a deliberate manipulation by TNI PSYOPS veterans, buffered by proxy agents for strict deniability – both to OPM resistance circles and to those at the destination: Australians and their government.71

**Pak Ogah Arafuru & Phoney Infowar?**72

After public requests from at least February 2006, President SBY visited Merauke in early April to appear at harvest celebrations.73 Certainly Merauke had symbolic resonance in Indonesian nationalist history: nearby Boven Digoel was the site of first

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71 Further to previous discussion about the several indications of covert PSYOPS, this study’s assessment is in no way meant to contradict or diminish the West Papuan asylum seekers’ claims for visa status.

72 Pak Ogah is the colloquial name for roadside extortionists, especially infamous in peak-hour Jakarta. Arafuru is the Indonesian-Malay name for the Arafura (Sea).

president Soekarno’s forcible exile under the Dutch colonial regime. Merauke, with Aceh’s Sabang Island, colloquially defined the longitudinal span of state sovereignty ‘from Sabang to Merauke’. Regardless, those sentimental factors, however valuable for Indonesian State publicity, were also not enough to best explain Colonel Sihotang’s mission in the anomalous command of KOREM 174. Other, more compelling sentiments – and resentments - probably contained more significance for Jakarta’s national leadership, spanning between emotionally patriotic, nationalist stalwarts and the cynical pragmatists alike.

The wider realm of diplomacy, international aid and alliances pointed towards the more likely cause for harvest celebration after recent West Papua operations and the controversial asylum seeker voyage to Cape York. Whatever the protests, diplomatic posturing (ambassador recalled), threatened commercial boycott for Australian goods, canine-inspired newspaper cartoons, and other symbolism arising from the Australian grant of temporary protection visas to 42 West Papuans, the timing of the asylum seekers’ voyage could hardly have been more fortuitous for Indonesian diplomacy. Negotiations with Australia were due to resume in order to restore some bilateral security treaty for the one Jakarta repealed in consternation over (belated) Australian efforts in mobilizing an international force to supervise and enforce East Timor’s 1999 transfer from Indonesia to the UN before formal independent East Timorese sovereignty. Indonesia’s leadership perceived a seriously cynical betrayal over its loss of legally negotiated rights to East Timor’s offshore fossil fuel reserves. In the same period, Jakarta took another severe financial loss upon the flight of Hendra Rahardja to Australia after misappropriating state reserves to the value of billions in US dollars: Hendra lived in Australia (variously Sydney, Melbourne or Perth, according to press reports) until reported dead in early 2003 amid one of the greatest money-laundering cases in world history, and unsuccessful Indonesian attempts at extradition after his conviction in absentia.

Indonesia’s projected military build-up was to impose an unusually severe long-term cost on the state’s existing budget and internally managed TNI finances, and at a time when international donors demanded more regulation in that sector through budgetary control by Indonesia’s civilian-led Defence Department. But opportunity presented itself to Jakarta’s leadership in several potentially safe and lucrative channels. The Australian Government had pledged much aid after the tsunami and earthquake devastation of Aceh and Nias; that money was to be released at Canberra’s discretion on the grounds of concern for possible misappropriation. Another possible avenue was the Australian Wheat Board which, besides contentious dealings with proxy businesses of Iraq’s former Saddam Hussein regime, had also reportedly made anti-competitive payments to Indonesian bodies. Possibly yet greater opportunity rested with a bilateral security: secrecy provisions of national security could impose draconian restrictions on public scrutiny over any financial transactions the treaty deemed essential for ‘regional stability’. After all, the defence forces on both sides of the Arafura were notorious for arbitrary financial mismanagement, whether explained as mark-ups, project cost over-runs, or simply left as unaccountable public-sector accounting mysteries. It was misleading to focus on indirectly related excitement generated around Australian parliamentary debates on border protection bills, revised coastline status in unauthorized migration, and bureaucratic ‘offshore processing’ for asylum seekers. Although those aspects gave some symbolic sign of Indonesian diplomatic pressures, the real effects would be likely far more substantial.
**The Arc of Policy Instability**

Through its handling of the 2006 Merauke case, Indonesia’s military and government apparatus clearly embarked on a sophisticated operation around the very policy considerations driving Australian Government decision-makers. Whether by real actions, or merely as purported action in publicity, Jakarta’s leadership showed a canny ability to penetrate the Australian Government’s ‘decision cycle’\(^{74}\) i.e., to attain favorable results by predicting Australian Government responses around unauthorized migrants, their religious affiliation, and the potential for a larger, ongoing exodus to Australian territory. In light of Indonesia’s far-reaching and expensive military restructure, procurement, and expansion, it was likely that those recent events would bring enormous cost to Australia. The Australian Government had all but ‘locked in’ to such policy to appease major constituencies: ‘SARA’ prejudices played a part there too, as Indonesians knew, about an area of political manipulation Indonesia’s military knew better than most. If viewed as a sophisticated psychological operation in a wider ‘infowar’ campaign publicly expressed in diplomacy, the most significant strategic Indonesian result achieved from the 43 West Papuans’ voyage from Merauke was destabilization of a large Australian target via a profound effect of ‘cognitive dissonance’, both in the Australian Government itself and its constituents.\(^ {75}\) Australian ex-diplomat Bruce Haigh identified the same likelihood of calculated Indonesian – and TNI - manipulation of Australian policy over informal migration, although Haigh did not cover the specific complexities around the West Papua military situation.\(^ {76}\)

Like the TNI’s steadily achieved restoration of more numerous KODAM formations as announced from April 1999, the military presence in West Papua was set to substantially increase in accordance with its own plans. Indonesia’s apparent diplomatic victory from Merauke probably gave the TNI yet greater scope for expansion. Therefore, the Merauke case’s most enduring irony could be that Australia helped Indonesian military expansion not in the conventional area of most Southeast Asian strategic contest and dispute over sovereignty but rather in that part of Indonesia closest to the land mass of Australia itself.


\(^{75}\) Recalling past meetings with TNI officers in Australia, Greg Fealy questioned whether the TNI had the sophistication to predict Australian responses in this case. In fact, recent Australian ‘border protection’ policy and action was rarely missed in Indonesian journalism, while their underlying origins appeared profound, almost iconic prominence in Australian history as the White Australia policy, ‘yellow peril’, and fears of Russian invasion at the time of the Crimean War (unintentionally memorialized by cannon at Queenscliff, Victoria, where many TNI officers took courses at the fort-cum-command and staff college). At least as widely known, or fresher in public consciousness, was the coalition government’s reliance on such phobia to excite wide constituent support in a decade of electoral success.

Appendix I  Identified key TNI territorial leadership, West Papua 2002—6

>" - continued posting by previous appointee
?
" - unidentified / doubtful continuation by previous appointee

‘NA’ - not applicable to force structure during the period

N.B. - Appointment ‘stagger’ in practice i.e., juxtaposition in columns not always reflecting matched terms of officers’ postings

| Chief KODAM XVII Trikora | KASDAM (Chief of Staff) | Asinteldam (Asst for Intelligence) | Dandeninteldam (Chief Int Det) | Chief KOREM 171 | KASREM 171 (Chief of Staff) | Chief KODIM 1703 | Chief KODIM 1704 | Chief KODIM 1706 | Chief KODIM 1710 | Chief KODIM 1712 | KASREM 172 | Chief KODIM 1701 | Chief KODIM 1702 | Chief KODIM 1707 | Chief KOREM 172 | KASREM 173 | Chief KODIM 1705 | Chief KODIM 1708 | Chief KODIM 1709 | Chief KOREM 174 | KASREM 174 | Chief KODIM 1707 |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------.----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Brigadier-General Hotma Marbun | | | Colonel Kaharuddin Wahab | | > | | | Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Bargo | | > | | | | | > | | | | | | | |

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### Appendix II  Identified POLRI territorial chiefs, West Papua 2002—6

- * - continued posting by previous appointee  
- {?} - unidentified / doubtful continuation by previous appointee  
'NA' – not applicable to force structure during the period  
N.B. - Appointment 'stagger' in practice i.e., juxtaposition in columns not always reflecting matched terms of officers’ postings

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<th>Comm. Pasero</th>
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<tr>
<th>Teluk Bintuni</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Comm. Piet Renmaur</th>
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<tr>
<th>Kaimana</th>
<th>NA</th>
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<th>Dep. Ch. Comm. Matius D. Fakhiri</th>
<th>?</th>
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<th>Sorong Selatan</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Comm. Wempy Batlayeri</th>
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### Appendix III  Estimated Indonesian force strengths, West Papua 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation / command / service</th>
<th>Composition by sub-category / subordinate elements</th>
<th>Troop totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KODAM XVII</td>
<td>HQ, Armd, Engr, Mil Pol, Sigs &amp; Tpt elms</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREM</td>
<td>HQ KOREM 171-3 &amp; 174 cadre</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KODIM - KORAMIL</td>
<td>KODIMs 1701-1710 &amp; sub-formations</td>
<td>3,200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terr inf bns (organic)</td>
<td>751-6 inf bns (over-strength)</td>
<td>4,800+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other increase to organic KODAM elms</td>
<td>armd cav det raised to bn; new inf bde formation</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satgasbanintel</td>
<td>KOPASSUS cadre &amp; KOSTRAD taipur elms</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf bns (non-organic)</td>
<td>KOSTRAD &amp; terr inf bns</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval bases</td>
<td>Primary Naval Base V (Jayapura), Biak, Sorong, Timika, Manokwari Depot, upgraded Merauke interim Primary Naval Base, inc. based marines</td>
<td>400+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air &amp; air defence bases</td>
<td>Jayapura, Biak, Timika, Merauke</td>
<td>300+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total TNI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12,800+</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLDA Papua-Irian Jaya</td>
<td>HQ &amp; support staff</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLRES-POLSEK</td>
<td>POLRES &amp; POLSEK at regency &amp; district levels</td>
<td>8,500+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIMOBDA Papua</td>
<td>3 X organic POLDA BRIMOB dets</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIMOB (non-organic)</td>
<td>BRIMOB coy elms from DEOPS &amp; other POLDA</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total POLRI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11,100+</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY FORCES TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>23,900+</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

**Army territorial (KODAM XVII):** Increases in infantry battalions (*‘organic’ KODAM XVII*) reflect an officially announced programme for the new battalions from early 2004 up to the end of this year. Therefore, battalions are undergoing probably the second-last expansion phase at the time of writing, as the latest component companies settle in to their respective posts. As seen with Aceh and other prioritized border/insurgency areas, the TNI was even more discrete about expansions to pre-existing territorial infantry battalions (751, 752 and 753), but several Indonesian references on that aspect, and its more practical implications for command, control and planning, would all confirm its proximate inclusion in the expansion. It is unconfirmed whether that part of the expansion was concurrent with the phased ‘steps’ for the newly raised battalions, or was instead set for a separate, later series of postings.

**KOSTRAD:** The 3rd KOSTRAD Infantry Division (Divif 3) was not planned to add 15,000 troops to West Papua, but approximately 10,000 at Sorong and Jayapura, with a smaller number for divisional HQ and other assets; one of that planned division’s ‘organic’ brigades was allocated to Gorontalo Province, northern Sulawesi, for which preparations already began by May 2006.

**Navy (inc. Marine Corps):** The planned Merauke Primary Naval Base was intended as part of a fleet upgrade programme commencing 2006. More tentative proposals existed for a 3rd Amphibious Force (Pasmar 3) at Sorong which would, if realized beside KOSTRAD additions, make for a total extra 15,000 West Papua-based troops. As corps and navy chiefs themselves explained, Marines’ proposals hinged on funding availability. However, that hurdle could have been overcome via concessions from donor states, particularly Australia following its West Papua asylum-seeker controversy and bilateral security agreement.

**Police (POLRI):** Research from early 2003 showed a serious deficiency in the author’s 2001 SDSC paper’s estimate for POLRI numbers in West Papua. POLRI sources (Online: <www.spers.polri.go.id.s atker>, accessed from 2002—early 2004) recorded a progressive increase from 8,300—9,100 (allotted or ‘establishment’ strength of 10,000, possibly reached or exceeded since the creation of post-2004 precincts). Those figures counted BRIMOB troops ‘organic’ to POLDA Irja/Papua, while 300+ civil servants were deducted. The increase, and part of the 2001 paper’s under-estimation, are explained by the increased police territorial numbers since 2001. The official POLRI personnel branch source was blocked from public access since early 2004, probably by setting permissions for internal IP addresses.

**BRIMOB (POLRI):** Locally based BRIMOB units (‘organic’ POLDA) changed their designation from ‘battalions’ to the more accurate ‘detachments’ (note the resulting 2001 paper’s probably over-estimation). BRIMOB companies deployed from outside (‘non-organic’ POLDA Papua) have been more discrete in reporting, though still continuing that pattern especially since being freed up from the heavy Aceh commitment (notwithstanding their own considerable combat and tsunami losses there).