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JOHN M. McNABB
Acting Chief of Staff

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I
1972

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1973
ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
FOREWORD

(U) The United States Pacific Command encompasses almost half of the earth's surface--some 94 million square miles. It extends from California to Pakistan, and from the Arctic Ocean to Antarctica. The mission of the Pacific Command is to defend the United States and to support U.S. national policy and interests in Asia and the Pacific.

(U) During 1972, the foreign policy of the United States continued to be guided by three basic tenets--the strength of realistic deterrence, the need for partnership with our allies, and willingness to negotiate with our adversaries. President Nixon established a dialogue with the People's Republic of China during his visit in February 1972. Three months later, he continued his negotiation initiatives by visiting the Soviet Union. Before the end of the year, the Japanese Premier had also visited Peking, and Japan had begun negotiations with Russia on territorial disputes and trade agreements. Thus, 1972 was a year of rapprochement among the four major Pacific powers which could begin a new era of peace and reconciliation.

(U) Although encouraging, these developments among the major powers did not eliminate the potential for strife, instability, and conflict in the Pacific area. North Vietnam launched a full-scale offensive against the South during the 1972 Easter season. Bombing of North Vietnam was resumed in May and terminated in October. Negotiations toward a cease-fire had led to apparent agreement in November, but the intransigence of the North Vietnamese in reaching final accord resulted in renewed bombing in December. At the end of 1972, a cease-fire agreement had not yet been reached, but appeared to be imminent.

(U) Elsewhere in the Pacific, political, economic, social, and military conditions continued to constitute potentially explosive elements. The rising social and economic expectations of millions of people, combined with cultural and political differences, provided fertile ground for discontent. Disciplined and dedicated advocates of violent change exploited these conditions, and insurgency was endemic in many areas.

(U) The negotiations during 1972, while cause for optimism, did not lessen our need to maintain a full military presence in the Pacific theater. Strategic realities mandate the presence of mobile and combat-ready sea, air, and ground forces to deter aggression, and to protect the United States and its allies in case of attack. Our military presence is needed to secure our lines of communication, and those of our allies, against a threat to freedom of passage and expansion of trade. And, our presence is needed to maintain a balance of power and to prevent domination of the Pacific area by any nation whose interests are
inimical to those of the United States. Further, we continue to need forward bases, not only for strategic and geographic reasons, but to maintain our presence in the most efficient and economical way possible.

(U) The events of 1972 make it even more important that the concept of partnership with our allies be encouraged. We must continue to provide the guidance and resources which will enable our allies to develop self-defense, self-reliance, regional cooperation, and unity of purpose. This history relates the role of the Pacific Command during 1972 in support of these military, political, and economic goals.

Noel Gayler
NOEL GAYLER
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific
(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

(U) This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on Southeast Asia, to a more functionalized format. This approach was continued in 1972.

(U) Annex A to the CINCPAC Command History for 1972 should be of particular interest to historians. The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam marks the final product in a series begun in 1964. It covers the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973, sixty days after the 28 January Vietnam cease-fire agreement.

(U) The 1972 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Histories of the subordinate unified commands--COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUS Japan, COMUS Korea, and COMUSTDC--are included as annexes to this history, only for those copies being retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS; further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

(U) During fiscal year 1973, two personnel spaces were lost in the CINCPAC History Branch. On 1 July 1972, the reference librarian position was abolished. In past years, the librarian had compiled the glossary and index
for each annual history. On 10 May 1973, a reorganization of the Office of the Joint Secretary became effective. Colonel Charles A. Gatzka, Command Historian since September 1972, became the Chief, Headquarters Administrative Services on that date, and the undersigned assumed general supervision over the CINCPAC history program.

(U) For this history, Colonel Gatzka prepared Chapters II, VIII, and XI. The undersigned prepared Chapters V, VII, IX, and X. Pauline K. Tallman prepared Chapters I, III, IV, and VI, and also supervised the physical layout of the product. Mrs. Tallman and the undersigned jointly compiled the glossary and the index.

(U) The manuscript was typed by Roberta E. Putz, Audrey Y. Sunada, and SSGT Robert M. Avila, USAF. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.

CARL O. CLEVER
Acting Command Historian
A NOTE ON SOURCES AND DOCUMENTATION

(U) The principal means of communication used by CINCPAC headquarters since its inception has been the electrically transmitted message. The originator, date, and time of a message have formed the principal file number and means of control in this headquarters, although other originator log numbers have been cited in footnotes if known.

(U) Messages transmitted and received by the headquarters have been microfilmed and coded by DTG by the J6 Communications Center for rapid retrieval. Messages are kept on file at Camp Smith for three years, then retired to the Federal Records Center (FRC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, 17055. By early January 1971 the volume of messages of various security classifications that carried the additional special handling caveat "Special Category-Exclusive" had increased to the extent that it was necessary to separate them from the General Service (GENSER) message traffic, and from 5 January 1971 these have been microfilmed separately in a system parallel to that of the GENSER traffic. These messages will also be retired to the Mechanicsburg FRC.

(U) Message traffic transmitted through the Special Intelligence Communications System (SPINTCOMM) channel has always been kept separate; these are the messages described as "back channel" or "by other means" (BOM). When messages in this system are exclusive, they bear the caveat "Eyes Only" for designated recipients. These messages are also microfilmed and retrievable by DTG. Microfilm of all messages since the system was established in mid-1965 is available in the Intelligence Division Special Security Office; none has been retired.

(U) All monthly staff historical summaries since 1959 have been microfilmed and retained in the History Archives; since October 1968, documentation cited in the monthly staff summaries, except BOM or Exclusive, has also been microfilmed. When BOM or Exclusive sources are footnoted in this history, the citation is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX), as appropriate. The acronym, RODCA, which follows certain source citations, has a classified definition which may be obtained from Intelligence sources depending upon need-to-know.

(U) Letters are retained in the Headquarters Document Branch for three years, after which they are disposed of as follows: Unclassified letters are microfilmed (with film retained in the Headquarters Document Branch) and then destroyed; classified letters are reviewed in accordance with Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5212.5B, Disposal of Navy and Marine Corps Records, and letters determined to have possible lasting value are retired to the Washington National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409; the rest are destroyed.
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Classification codes have been used in this headquarters for letter serial numbers and the numbers assigned to CINCPAC instructions and related publications. The use of zeros before the assigned number indicates security classification, as follows: none for Unclassified, one for Confidential, two for Secret, and three for Top Secret. Thus, CINCPAC letter serial 000157 of 1963 was the 157th Top Secret of that year. The same code was used with zeros preceding the number in CINCPAC instructions; in addition, a letter following the instruction number indicated a change to the basic instruction, with each subsequent change raising the letter in alphabetical sequence. In 1971 the zeros preceding instruction numbers were changed to the letters "C" and "S" for Confidential and Secret. Superseded instructions have not been retained by the headquarters, nor is there a uniform system for retiring internal staff correspondence.

(U) All documents cited in the CINCPAC histories and not attributed specifically to another headquarters should be considered to have originated in the PACOM headquarters. References to Point Papers, for example, refer to position or problem papers prepared by the staff for the CINCPAC and other key staff officers. Papers in this series date back to mid-1965, and will eventually be microfilmed and retired to the Mechanicsburg FRC. Another frequently cited document until its discontinuance in mid-1970 was the brief of a JCS paper. These were cited in the histories by staff division code and a "Brief Number." There was no staff-wide system for retiring these and most have been destroyed.

(U) A hard copy of every CINCPAC Command Digest is retained in the History Archives indefinitely. Also retained, on microfilm, are daily Command Center summaries dating back to 1965. The summaries were entitled "Briefing Notes" until October 1972, when they were changed to "Command Center Operational Notes." The original copies of these summaries are retired to the Washington National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409.

(U) Occasional footnotes in the Command History will refer to bound publications of other headquarters. Such publications are retained in this headquarters for the current year only, and are then usually destroyed; they will be retired by the issuing headquarters or agency.
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<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 February 1973 (PACOM less Southeast Asia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deployment of Major Air Force Flying and Missile Units, 1 February 1973 (Southeast Asia)</td>
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THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND
SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

Military personnel strengths in the PACOM continued the decline begun in 1968, principally reflecting the drawdown of forces in Southeast Asia. There were increases in the numbers of both Navy and Marine Corps personnel, however, and also increases in the number of Navy and Marine dependents, mostly in Hawaii. The largest change was experienced by the Army, which was reduced by over 100,000 personnel. The Air Force was reduced by over 27,700. The number of personnel in Vietnam was down about 133,000 in 1972 to fewer than 25,000. A comparison of military strengths, by Service, follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jan 72</th>
<th>31 Dec 72</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>179,882</td>
<td>79,373</td>
<td>-100,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>195,983</td>
<td>204,588</td>
<td>+8,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>64,412</td>
<td>65,989</td>
<td>+1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>115,987</td>
<td>88,250</td>
<td>-27,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>556,264</td>
<td>438,200</td>
<td>-118,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents and the amount of change from the year before are shown in the following table. The figures for Japan at the end of the year include personnel in the Ryukyu Islands; the amount of change from the year before is computed against the total in both Japan and the Ryukyus at the end of 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>31 Dec 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>10,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>41,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>62,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>39,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>15,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>31,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The chart showing CINCPAC Staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.
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<td>65,989</td>
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<tr>
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<td>115,987</td>
<td>88,250</td>
<td>- 27,737</td>
</tr>
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<th>Change</th>
<th>31 Dec 72</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>10,071</td>
<td>+ 616</td>
<td>13,068</td>
<td>+ 1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>41,732</td>
<td>+ 6,629</td>
<td>85,257</td>
<td>+25,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>62,085</td>
<td>- 6,991</td>
<td>54,481</td>
<td>- 9,751</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>39,557</td>
<td>+ 1,045</td>
<td>40,482</td>
<td>+ 2,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>15,562</td>
<td>- 89</td>
<td>19,177</td>
<td>- 835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7,987</td>
<td>- 81</td>
<td>5,815</td>
<td>- 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>31,866</td>
<td>+ 679</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>- 1,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>24,044</td>
<td>-132,931</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- 91</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The chart showing CINCPAC Staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

CONFIDENTIAL
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 6.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCAPAC). CINCAPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCAPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: "To maintain the security of the Pacific Ocean and the United Nations forces in the Pacific Ocean; to provide and maintain the defense of the United States, its territories, and its interests; to provide, in coordination with other commands, the resources necessary to support the national policies of the United States; to conduct and coordinate operations to secure the Pacific Ocean; and to conduct operations to secure the defense of the United States in the Pacific Ocean." The mission is divided into three major areas: (a) United States military forces assigned to CINCAPAC for the purpose of conducting operations in the Pacific Ocean; (b) United Nations forces assigned to CINCAPAC for the purpose of conducting operations in the Pacific Ocean; and (c) non-United States forces assigned to CINCAPAC for the purpose of conducting operations in the Pacific Ocean.

2. PACIFIC SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS. CINCAPAC is responsible for the following organizations:
   a. Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Pacific (CGCOMUSPAC)
   b. Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (CINCUSPAC)
   c. Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Air Force (CINCUSPAC)
   d. Commander in Chief, U. S. Marine Corps (CINCUSPAC)

   These commands are responsible for the following operations:
   a. United States Army Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Army Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Marine Corps (USMC), commanded by Commander United States Pacific Defense Command (USPACOM), commanded by Commander United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)
   b. United States Navy Forces, Japan (USN), commanded by Commander United States Navy Forces, Japan (USN)
   c. United States Marine Corps Forces, Japan (USMACFJ), commanded by Commander United States Marine Corps Forces, Japan (USMACFJ)
   d. United States Air Force Forces, Japan (USAF), commanded by Commander United States Air Force Forces, Japan (USAF)

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS. There are five subordinate commands in the PACOM:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (USFK)
   b. United States Marine Corps Forces, Japan (USMACFJ), commanded by Commander United States Marine Corps Forces, Japan (USMACFJ)
   c. United States Air Force Forces, Japan (USAF), commanded by Commander United States Air Force Forces, Japan (USAF)

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF PACIFIC (CINCAPAC). CINCAPAC has established in certain areas where its subordinate unified commands have been established or where significant forces of the United States are stationed, the following:
   a. Commanders of the United States Naval Forces in the Pacific (CINCAPAC)
   b. Commanders of the United States Marine Corps Forces in the Pacific (CINCAPAC)
   c. Commanders of the United States Air Force Forces in the Pacific (CINCAPAC)
   d. Commanders of the United Nations Forces in the Pacific (CINCAPAC)

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (CMAGS). The military assistance programs of the United States are conducted under the following authorities:
   a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan (CMAGJ)
   b. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (CMAGK)
   c. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Philippines (CMAGP)
   d. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand (CMAGT)

   These groups perform the MAI functions on a local basis.

6. SINGLE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COMBINING AUTHORITY). These groups are:
   a. Korea, commanded by Commandant General, Korea (CMAGK)
   b. Japan, commanded by Commandant General, Japan (CMAGJ)
   c. Philippines, commanded by Commandant General, Philippines (CMAGP)
   d. Thailand, commanded by Commandant General, Thailand (CMAGT)

   These groups are responsible for conducting the MAI functions in the respective countries.

7. CINCAPAC. CINCAPAC is responsible for coordinating the MAI functions in the Pacific Ocean.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 7.
# Subordinate Unified Commands and CinCPac Representatives

## Far East Region - Key Personnel

### As of 31 Dec 1972

#### United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding General</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>Donald V. Blinn, USAF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Commanding General</td>
<td>LT GEN</td>
<td>Robert N. Smith, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Surgeon</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>David E. Rogers, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Surgeon</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Robert S. Gushenham, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, UN Command Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Thomas W. Chambers, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, UN Command Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>James S. Mills, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Ralph V. Gonzales, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Albert A. Steinhart, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, US/ROK Combatant Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Carl G. Schedler, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, US/ROK Combatant Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Jack B. McClain, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Frank M. Romanek, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Director, UN Command Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Karl E. Hertlenek, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, UN Command Staff</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>David W. Albrecht, USA</td>
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</table>

#### U.S. Taiwan Defense Command

<table>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Philip A. Reshany, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>William C. Burrows, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director of CORDS</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>George F. Conover, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>John E. Clay, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director of Operations</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Frank E. Morgan, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>William H. Rothenburg, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, Taiwan Command</td>
<td>-Col</td>
<td>Jay L. Brown, USA</td>
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</table>

#### U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>John J. Vogt, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director of CORDS</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>George D. Massey, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>Oliver W. Dillard, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Personnel</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>Edward C. Conover, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director of Operations</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>Robert J. Magill, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Logistics</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>George A. Godley, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Communications</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>John E. Mersky, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>Floyd H. Throgden, USA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, Economic Affairs</td>
<td>BG GEN</td>
<td>John A. Wickham, JR, USA</td>
<td></td>
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### Source

Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 17.
## SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES
### FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL (CONTINUED)

**U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM**

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<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
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**OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, INDIA (ODRI)**

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**SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION**

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**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 18.
## U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups
### Far East Region
#### As of 31 December 1972

### Philippines
- **Chief**
  - BGEN
  - John A. Grimesby, USA
- **Col**
  - COL
  - Michael E. McLaughlin, USA
- **Ch, Ground Forces**
  - COL
  - William J. Stidham, USA
- **Ch, Navy Division**
  - CAPT
  - Willis L. McDermot, USA
- **Ch, Air Force Division**
  - COL
  - Robert R. Ryan, Jr., USAF

### Japan
- **Chief**
  - COL
  - Richard R. Stoddard, USA
- **Deputy Chief**
  - COL
  - C. Lawrence O'Neill

### Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea
- **Chief**
  - MAJ GEN
  - John W. Barnes, USA
- **Sr. Advisor (G&G)**
  - COL
  - James E. Fite, USA
- **Sr. Advisor (A&I)**
  - COL
  - William F. Battles, USA

### Germany
- **Chief**
  - MAJ GEN
  - John W. Cleland, USA
- **Deputy Chief**
  - COL
  - John E. Muenchel, USA

### Vietnam
- **Commander, Chief**
  - MAJ GEN
  - Andrew J. Evans, Jr., USAF
- **Deputy Commander**
  - COL
  - Donald G. Curfors, USAF

### Other:
- **Deputy Chief, Air Force**
  - COL
  - John S. Harris, USAF

### Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 19.
## PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

### SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

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**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 94.
## CINCPAC COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

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Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 95.
## MAAG Personnel - Pacific Command

### Authorized and Assigned Strengths by Service and Civilian Category

Assigned as of 31 Dec 72

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Navy</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>Total Mil</th>
<th>US Civ</th>
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<th>Local Hire</th>
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<td>519</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>39</td>
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*Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 96.*
### AVAILABLE FORCES

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<th>CINCPAC/F</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Army Ags</td>
<td>2 Corps Ags</td>
<td>3 Naval Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Rpts/ U.S. Army Spec</td>
<td>1 Rpt Div (TF)</td>
<td>20 Carrier Air Wings (CVW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Missile Bldg (AFS)</td>
<td>1 Submarine Type</td>
<td>3 Reconnaissance Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Corps Size</td>
<td>1 Special Operations Wing</td>
<td>4 Air Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Special Forces Sp</td>
<td>1 Support Wing</td>
<td>4 Air Force Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Navy Ops (CNO)</td>
<td>1 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing</td>
<td>5 Air Mobility Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Post Office</td>
<td>1 Theater Air-Lift Wing</td>
<td>6 Air Defense Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Army Size</td>
<td>1 Tactical Support Wing</td>
<td>7 Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Air Ops</td>
<td>1 Force Support Wing</td>
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### IN PACIFIC BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC

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<th>USN Reserve Units</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Field Corps</td>
<td>1 6th Div</td>
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<td>1 Army Spec</td>
<td>1 Eng Co</td>
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<td>1 Naval Reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Milt Reserves</td>
<td>1 Milt Reserves</td>
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### MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY

- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Part I, Annex A

---

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 5.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS
(1 August 1972)

VIETNAM

USARY/MACV SPT CMB
USA 25TH INFY
USA 173RD AIRBORNE
1ST AVN REG
1ST AVN REG
12TH AVN REG
25TH INFY
1ST ARN REG
31ST CSG

FRAC
11TH CBT AVN GP
3RD BRIG. 25TH INFY

SRAC
17TH CBT AVN GP

TRAC
12TH CBT AVN GP
1ST BI, 5TH CAV

ORAC
164TH CBT AVN GP

KIANG HWA

1ST MAAF
3/4 MAAF DIV (RETM)
3/4 FISH

OKINAWA

THAILAND

Do, U.S. Army
53rd PSYOP BN
USA 24TH INFY
SEA SPG ACP
USA TROOP GROUP
USA 25TH INFY

7TH FLT
3/2 NAVY DIV (RETM)
1/4 NAVY DIV

THAILAND

MARBEL ARL
25TH INFY DIV (RETM)
1ST AVN REG

JAPAN

KOREA

Eighth U.S. Army

1ST CORPS (GROUP)

20th INFY DIV

20th INFY DIV (REMT)

20th INFY DIV (REMT)

EASTPAC

1ST MAR DIV

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 72, p. 22.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS
(1 August 1972)

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 72, p. 23.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

(1 August 1972)

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

(1 February 1973)

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 2h.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

(1 August 1972)

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (1 August 1972)

NAKHON PHANOM
- 1 SOS
- 20 A-1
- 18 SOS
- 16 AC-130F
- 21 SOS
- 10 CH-53
- 23 TASS
- 50 OV-10
- 554 Perm Sq
- 20 QU-22B
- 40 ARRS (SAC)
- 8 HII-53
- 2 HII-41B
- 162 TEWS Det 1
- 17 KC-47

U-TAPAO
- 635 CSq
- 17 Air Div (SAC)
- (Provisional)
- 107 Strat Wg (SAC)
- (Provisional)
- Radios Relay
- (Provisional)
- 614 BS (SAC)
- (Provisional)
- 365 BS (SAC)
- (Provisional)
- 110 Strat Wg (SAC)
- (Provisional)
- 901 ARS (Provisional)
- 902 ARS (Provisional)
- TALS

UDORN
- 432 TRW
- 16 TRS
- 10 TFS
- 555 TFS

UBON
- 75 TFS
- 15 F-4D
- 411 TFS
- 18 F-4D
- 415 TFS
- 15 F-4D
- 417 TFS
- 10 F-4D
- 16 SOS
- 12 AC-130A
- 2 HII-41B
- 1-3 ARRS (MAC)
- 6 AC-130E
- 2 HII-41B

KORAT
- 188 TFS
- 18 TFS
- 18 F-4E
- 109 TFS
- 18 F-4E
- 42 TEWS
- 8 FB-66E
- 17 WWS
- 12 F-105G
- 7 ABCs
- 7 G-110E
- 1-4 ARRS (MAC)
- 2 HII-41B

DON MUANG
- 74 AF Bg
- 505 TCG
- 8 SOS
- 25 A-17
- 21 TASS
- 45 U-2A
- 150 TALS
- 6 G-7A
- 160 TEWS
- 20 KC-47
- 1-14 ARRS (MAC)
- 4 HII-41B
- TALS (20C-110)

DA NANG
- 31 TASS
- 41 O-2A
- 38 OV-10
- 162 TEWS
- 16 EC-47
- 17 ARRS (MAC)
- 5 HII-53
- 2 HII-41B

BIEN HOA
- 6251 Air Base Sq
- 6251 USAF Disp.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 72, p. 25

Numbers of aircraft indicate USAF authorization.
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

(1 February 1973)

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS (1 February 1973)

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 25

Numbers of aircraft indicate U.S. authorization.
### AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIVISIONS

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<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>1 January 1972</th>
<th>31 December 1972</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
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<td>CIV</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief, Plans and Operations</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief, Security Assistance, Logistics, Administration</td>
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* Administrative Office serves the Chief of Staff and his two deputies.

** Newly acquired detachment in Japan.
Commander in Chief Pacific

(U) Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, succeeded Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, as Commander in Chief Pacific on 1 September 1972. The change of command and related events are described elsewhere in this section. For the period 3 through 11 July 1972 Admiral Bernard A. Clarey, USN, assumed command as CINCPAC while Admiral McCain visited his wife's mother, who was ill. Admiral Clarey was Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). CAPT. T.L. Dwyer, USN, served throughout the year as Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to CINCPAC.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations

(U) MAJ GEN John M. McNabb, USAF, replaced MAJ GEN Milton B. Adams, USAF, on 17 July.

Joint Secretary

(U) COL Leo J. Clark, USAF, replaced COL William C. Harrison, Jr., USAF, on 19 June.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

(U) BGEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, replaced BGEN John J. Gorman, USAF, on 1 April.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN Ralph H. Spanjer, USMC, replaced MAG GEN Robert P. Keller, USMC, on 27 June. As his Deputy, BGEN James A. Young, USAF, replaced BGEN L.J. Westberg, USAF, on 17 October.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics

(U) BGEN Orvil C. Metheny, USA, replaced MAJ GEN John E. Murray, USA, on 6 December.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans

(U) RADM Earl Yates, USN, replaced RADM Lloyd R. Vasey, USN, on 20 July.
UNCLASSIFIED

In the position of Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, BGEN Willard W. Scott, Jr., USA, replaced BGEN Andrew J. Gatsis, USA, on 22 August.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics

(U) BGEN Howard E. McCormick, USAF, replaced BGEN Geoffrey Cheadle, USAF, on 13 June.

Staff Judge Advocate

(U) CAPT Harland B. Cope, JAGC, USN, replaced CAPT D.W. Douglass, JAGC, USN, on 25 March.

Public/Legislative Affairs

(U) COL A.J. Lynn, USAF, continued to serve as the Public/Legislative Affairs Officer, although for the period 2 September to 6 October 1972 the position was held by COL James F. Sunderman, USAF.

Protocol

(U) COL James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC, replaced COL William C. Airheart, USMC, on 1 July. COL Hammond was in turn replaced on 5 December by COL William R. Kephart, USMC.

PACOM ADP Systems Support Group

(U) COL James E. Geurts, USAF, replaced COL C.J. Weinmeister, III, USAF, on 1 July.
Change of Command

(U) Admiral Noel Gayler became Commander in Chief Pacific on 1 September 1972, succeeding Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. President Richard M. Nixon headed the list of distinguished guests and visitors at ceremonies marking the change; the President had been in Hawaii for talks with Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The change of command ceremony was held at Hickam Air Force Base, on the mall near Hickam Tower, with elements of all Services participating; the last two ceremonies of this nature had followed Naval custom and been held aboard ships. Honors were accorded the President on his arrival; he presented the Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral McCain (the Admiral's second such award) and then addressed the troops and guests. After a sentimental farewell speech, Admiral McCain ordered that his flag be hauled down.

(U) Admiral Gayler ordered his flag broken after brief remarks. Under a sparkling, hot Hawaiian sun, men and women of each of the Services passed in review, each Service element consisting of a battalion-size unit and a detachment of women. With perfect timing, at the climax of the review, aircraft of each of the Services flew by, the faster jets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps followed by Army helicopters. President and Mrs. Nixon left Hawaii for Washington immediately following the ceremony; Admiral and Mrs. McCain accompanied them in the Presidential aircraft—the Admiral had been assigned as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the months just prior to his retirement. The Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, was among

From the left, Admiral McCain, Admiral Gayler, Admiral Moorer.
President Nixon and Admiral McCain.

Admiral Gayler and President Nixon on the reviewing stand.
the distinguished visitors at the ceremony, as was the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger. Among the civilians from Hawaii were United States Senator Hiram Fong, Governor John A. Burns, and Honolulu Mayor Frank F. Fasi. Admiral Gayler was honored at a reception immediately following the ceremony at Hickam Officer's Open Mess. Many social affairs honoring Admiral and Mrs. McCain were held prior to their departure in both the military and civilian communities.

(U) The paucity of information on previous change of command ceremonies was noted as planning began. To remedy this situation in the future, complete records and after-action reports were compiled by the action officers to be held by the Protocol Office and the Historian.

(U) The new CINCPAC was born in Birmingham, Alabama on Christmas Day, 1914. The son of a Navy captain, Admiral Gayler spent much of his boyhood on Naval Stations in the United States and abroad. A 1935 graduate of the Naval Academy, he won his Naval Aviator's wings at Pensacola, Florida in 1940. Before and during World War II, he served as a carrier-based fighter pilot in Fighting Squadrons TWO, THREE, and TWELVE, which at various times operated from the

1. RADM Lawrence Heyworth, Jr., USN, was in charge of the ceremony. His final report was contained in JO3/Memo/50-72 of 15 Sep 72. Project manager for the ceremony was CAPT Ramon W. Leary, USN.
carriers ENTERPRISE, LEXINGTON, SARA-
TOGA, and RANDOLPH. He also served as the fighter test pilot in the Flight Test Division of the Naval Air Test Center. He completed the war as Air Operations Officer on the staff of the Commander SECOND Carrier Task Force.

(U) Admiral Gayler has served variously as Deputy Director, Special Devices Center; Head, Fighter Design Branch, Bureau of Aeronautics; with the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the JCS; as Commander Air Development Squadron THREE; in the Air Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and as PACFLT Operations Officer. He was the third U.S. Naval Officer ever to fly jet aircraft and holds the record for the longest jet flight ever made from an aircraft carrier.

(U) He has also served as the Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and as Commanding Officer of the attack aircraft carrier USS RANGER. The Admiral was selected for flag rank in 1960, in which year he reported to the American Embassy in London for duty as U.S. Naval Attaché. Since then he commanded Carrier Division TWENTY; served as Director, Development Programs in the Office of the CNO; served as Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; and from July 1969 had been detached for duty as Director of the National Security Agency.

(U) Admiral Gayler holds three Navy Crosses, the Bronze Star, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit with a gold star in lieu of a second award. In 1949 he received the Sperry Award of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences for development work.

(U) Admiral Gayler's wife is the former Caroline Groves of Webster City, Iowa. Their children are Caroline, Anne, Deborah, Alexander, and Christopher.
Inspector General Position to be Established at PACOM Headquarters

(U) On 6 November 1972 the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had decided to establish at each unified command the position of Inspector General with an anticipated operational date of 31 January 1973. The Inspector General was to be responsible to and report directly to CINCPAC. His concern was to be with matters operational in nature insuring effective command and control, high standards of overall performance, and optimum operational security. CINCPAC advised the JCS on 28 November that he concurred in the implementing directive, although he did request that special mention be made of "logistics readiness" because "operational readiness depends heavily on logistics capability." He provided a recommended addition to his Joint Table of Distribution on 4 December. He outlined a requirement for the Inspector General to be of major general rank, and rotational between the Air Force and Army (initially to be filled by Air Force). The proposal included three assistants: a Marine colonel, a Navy captain, and a colonel billet to rotate between the Army and Air Force. The Inspector General was to be assigned a Navy commander as his executive officer and two clerical personnel; each of his assistants was to be assigned one E-5 level administrator or typist.1

(U) JCS guidance was subsequently expanded to include establishment of Inspectors general, where appropriate, at each subordinate joint command headquarters. In this regard CINCPAC requested the comments of his subordinate unified commanders on their requirements in mid-December. No decisions in this matter had been reached by the end of the year.2

Designations of Battle Staff and Its Chief Revised

(U) The "Battle Staff" was redesignated the "Command Center Watch" effective 18 December. The chief of the Battle Staff was redesignated the Duty Director of Operations (DDO) effective that same date. The new terms were more descriptive of missions and functions.3

New Reporting Section Formed in Operations Division

(U) An addition was created in the Operational Reports and Computer Applications Branch of the Operations Division with the establishment on 1 July of the Nuclear Reports and Military Damage Assessment Section. Functions of the

1. Establishment was implemented in JCS SM-550-72 of 6 Nov 72; CINCPAC 281818Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 042238Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 160314Z Dec 72.
3. CINCPAC Bulletin, No. 1, 3 Jan 73.
new section were transferred from the Nuclear Operations/Safety Branch and were expanded to include responsibility for implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the Coordination of Atomic Operations Standing Operating Procedures (CAOSOP) reporting system; file management of the PACOM Nuclear Capabilities (NUCAP) data base; military damage assessment plans, policies, and programs; monitoring and inputing CINCPAC portions of the Joint Resource Assessment data base; and operation of the Nuclear Damage Information Center during actual or exercise crisis situations.1

Realignment within the Logistics Division

(U) Two organizational elements within the Logistics Division were realigned in 1972. Effective 15 March the Procurement Section of the Materiel and Services Branch (which had been J461) was redesignated the Procurement Policy Branch (J45). During August the CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board/Personal Property Office was removed from the Policy and Programs Section (J471) and identified as a separate Transportation Section (J473). This action was taken to place the $180 million annual transportation expenditure under the direct supervision of the Transportation/PATMA (PACOM Transportation Management Agency) Branch Chief. Headed by a civilian, the new three-man office was moved to the main headquarters building to make it more convenient to representatives of commercial carriers and component commanders who visited the section frequently.2

(U) Other logistics functions within the headquarters and the command were reviewed during the year. Responsibilities of the Engineer Branch were examined in April with respect to essentiality under peacetime conditions and in the light of possible future manpower cuts. In May the Transportation/PATMA Branch began a Study of Control Agencies for Movement in the PACOM (SCAMP). This study was to design an organizational structure that would insure that a peacetime movement control nucleus was maintained with the capability for rapid expansion to a wartime footing; the ultimate goal was to reduce or eliminate the movement control problems that occurred during the Vietnam buildup.3

Unconventional Warfare Planning Activities Transferred

(U) In August the unconventional warfare planning staff was transferred within the Plans Division from the Plans and Policy Branch (J51) to the Psychological Operations Branch (J56). The staff consisted of three officers and one enlisted man. Renamed the Psychological Operations and Special Activities Branch, this organization was responsible for unconventional warfare planning

and PACOM cover and deception activities throughout the command, in addition to psychological operations and planning.1

Joint Secretariat Reorganized

(U) Effective 31 July 1972 the Headquarters Administrative Branch was consolidated with the Headquarters Documents Branch. The new Headquarters Administrative Branch, designated J042, was organized as follows: a Mail and Records Section, Classified Records Section, Security Section, and the Area Clearance/Visitor Control/Travel Section. The Personnel Branch acquired the Awards Section from the Headquarters Administrative Branch. Organization of the Headquarters Support and History Branches remained unchanged. The reorganization was an effort to perform necessary services with fewer personnel; manpower losses had been the result of a JCS manpower survey. Several functional realignments took place also on 1 November; responsibility for the CINCPAC Daily Bulletin was assigned to the Mail and Records Section; the Personnel Branch absorbed control and publication of the CINCPAC telephone directory and the Private Auxiliary Exchange (PAX) listing, responsibility for the personnel locator file, responsibility for obtaining translator and interpreter services as required, maintenance of the identification photo boards for flag and general officers and senior civilians, and responsibility for correspondence and tracer actions regarding awards and decorations given at commands other than CINCPAC.2

1. J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

CINCPAC Activities as the Result of Unified Command Plan Changes

(U) As a result of revisions by the JCS to the Unified Command Plan, effective 1 January 1972, a major change took place in the division of unified and specified command responsibilities. Most of the planning for the change had occurred in 1971 and was discussed in the CINCPAC History for that year, but a number of follow-on events occurred in 1972 and some actions were still not complete as the year ended.

(6) Newly established was the U.S. Readiness Command, replacing the disestablished U.S. Strike Command at MacDill AFB, Florida. On 9 March the USREDCOM forwarded Terms of Reference for the USREDCOM Liaison Officer to CINCPAC and asked that they be reviewed. CINCPAC concurred as they were written. He noted, however, that of particular interest to CINCPAC was the functional responsibility of the Liaison Officer as the focal point to assure coordination between the two commands in planning matters. CINCPAC recalled that this had been the subject of considerable discussion during a visit by USREDCOM staff members to CINCPAC Headquarters in January and it had been agreed at that time that as early an interface as possible in the planning cycle was essential. The USREDCOM Liaison Officer, CINCPAC believed, could materially assist both commands to assure this early planning coordination.1

(6) Also in March CINCPAC reported to the JCS on a recent trip to Diego Garcia. He noted that there was a friendly and close cooperative relationship between the U.S. Navy Island Commander and the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) representative. The U.S. officer had jurisdiction of U.S. personnel and responsibility for construction, while the U.K. BIOT representative was concerned primarily with civil matters. While CINCPAC believed that an objective of negotiations should continue to be to conclude a formal agreement on U.S.-U.K. relationships on Diego Garcia over the long term, "the necessity for such arrangements does not appear to be urgent so long as agreement is reached prior to assignment of a UK military officer commanding a UK military unit." CINCPAC advised that he would monitor the relationship in an effort to continue the harmonious association.2

(6) CINCPAC had assumed responsibility for South Asia on 1 January but he was barred from visiting the area because of political sensitivities resulting from the India-Pakistan War. The question of such a trip had been dis-

1. CINCPAC 250253Z Mar 72.
2. CINCPAC 182254Z Mar 72; J5129 HistSum Mar 72.
cussed in March when CINCPAC called on the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It was concluded at that time that it would be best to avoid such a visit in the existing stage of U.S.-India relations and during an on-going policy review. The Secretary of State advised that the same considerations would also apply to visits by members of higher level military staffs. Finally, in August, permission for a low key staff visit was approved. The visiting team consisted of CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, certain staff officers, and the Deputy Political Adviser. The 3 - 21 October trip accomplished its basic purpose of demonstrating CINCPAC's interest in this new area of responsibility and provided an orientation of the general area. Places visited included Colombo, Delhi, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Calcutta, and Rangoon. Members of the team gained a much better appreciation of the problems existing in the various countries and the groundwork was laid for regularizing CINCPAC relations with the various Country Teams.  

(§) At the end of 1971 it had been apparent that communications adequate to support increased CINCPAC responsibilities in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) to be assumed from the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) were not available to meet the 1 January 1972 reversion date. In December 1971, therefore, CINCPAC had asked that the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaskan Command (CINCAL) retain PARPRO support functions until adequate communications were established. The development of communications suitable to allow adequate coordination between PARPRO participants in Alaska and the 5th Air Force, the PACOM PARPRO Coordinator, were considered fundamental to CINCPAC's capability to assume the ALCOM support functions. Development of a teletype net and an off-hook AUTOVON (automatic voice network) net were requested and approved by the JCS.  

(§) The secure teletype net installation was completed on 17 August 1972, but operational employment was delayed as high distortion had been encountered and further tests were necessary. Completion of the off-hook AUTOVON net was postponed because of delays in funding and subsequent procurement.  

(§) Despite the lack of the AUTOVON network, tests of the teletype portions were held in early October, after delays caused by the high distortion problems. It was concluded that CINCPAC assumption of certain PARPRO support responsibilities should await the completion of the back-up off-hook AUTOVON net and CINCAL was requested to retain those functions in the interim. Expedited action to complete the AUTOVON net was requested. Funding was obtained and procurement.

1. SECSTATE 039436/0801012 Mar 72; CINCPAC 202219Z Sep 72.  
procedures initiated in November; a completion date of 1 April 1973 was estimated.

(S) The completion of the teletype net allowed CINCPAC to assume responsibility on 1 October 1972 for scheduling PARPRO missions formerly listed in the ALCOM Reconnaissance Schedule.²

Emergency Action Procedures in the PACOM

(S) Command and control staff assistance team visits continued in 1972 with such visits made by teams from the JCS to CINCPAC's headquarters and to

1. J3B56 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 0100302Z Sep 72 (BOM); CINCPAC 242055Z Sep 72 (BOM); PCA WHEELER AFB HI 140104Z Nov 72.
2. J3B56 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 140302Z Sep 72 (BOM).
Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities in the command, and by representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC to commands and units in the theater. For both kinds of visits topics and areas of interest included the Human Reliability Program, Emergency Action Messages, All-Source Information Center operations, and the storage and security of the Sealed Authenticator System. Visited by both teams were the Alternate Command Facility on Guam, the 5th Air Force in Japan; COMUSTDC; COMUS Korea, the 314th Air Division, and the Eighth Army; and the 13th Air Force and 405th Tactical Fighter Wing in the Philippines. The JCS team additionally visited CINCPAC’s Airborne Command Post, CINCPACAF, and Commander, Submarine Forces Pacific at Pearl Harbor. The CINCPAC team additionally visited COMUSMACTHAI.

Areas designated by the CINCPAC Staff Assistance Team to need corrective action included a requirement to inventory JCS and CINCPAC Sealed Authenticator Systems once every 15 days, incomplete records for the Human Reliability Program, isolation of the All-Source Information Centers from Command Centers, and a lack of Emergency Action Message copy/completeness formats. Critiques were conducted at all commands and units visited and corrective action begun immediately to remedy discrepancies noted.1

Command Center Evaluation

(U) In February the Chief of Staff requested that an assessment of the Command Center be undertaken. The evaluation was to address two time frames, the first dealing with the immediate future and the second covering the period from the mid to late 1970s. Target dates for the two study phases were 1 May and 1 August respectively. The Operations Division was designated the responsible staff agency with participation provided by the Intelligence, Logistics, Plans, and Communications-Electronics Divisions and the PACOM ADP Systems Support Group. Coincident with completion of the first phase of the evaluation, tasking for the second phase was expanded to include study of the facilities and operation at CINCPAC’s Alternate Command Facility at Kunia. Further evaluation of the objectives for Phase II indicated it would be of great scope. To achieve a meaningful result it was decided to develop a conceptual plan containing the basic concept of command center operation for the 1972–1980 period. Additional time was required to interface ongoing actions into the evaluation and the suspense date for Phase II was extended to 1 December. Study was completed by that date.2

(S) The Phase I study group considered the existing statement of mission

2. J3C212 HistSum Feb 73, which cited J01/Memos 88-72 of 24 Feb and 47-72 of 7 May 72.
to be accurate and complete and that tasks were accomplished with varying degrees of adequacy. Major findings fell into two basic categories. First were the operational concepts. Although the statement of mission for normal command center operations was accurate, it was recommended that the mission of directing peacetime emergencies should be modified to reflect the true nature of the relationship of the Battle Staff Team (subsequently, on 18 December, renamed the Command Center Watch Team) and the specialized function of command center operation. Rather than augmenting the command center team, it was recommended that appropriate staff agencies form a crisis management team to assume operational responsibility in the command center. Secondly, the study group proposed a change in the physical command center layout to better facilitate the concept proposed to improve command center operation and to correct functional deficiencies.

The Phase II study recommended that a Command Center Watch, composed of watch personnel from several staff divisions and agencies, be collocated in a redesigned command center in Building 4, behind and adjacent to CINCPAC’s conference room. The command center, conference room, and certain other areas in the headquarters should be supported by advanced automatic data processing systems and expanded communications facilities. The Kunia facility, serving as an Emergency Relocation Site, should function primarily as a redundant SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) activity with a minimum CINCPAC staff relocation at times of increased defense readiness.

To further the concept of an All-Source Information Center (ASIC), it was recommended that the intelligence and reconnaissance watch officers be collocated within the command center right away. After the command center was remodeled, other staff representatives, such as personnel of the Logistics Readiness Center and National Security Agency Pacific Operations Group, could be collocated to realize a true ASIC.

The interface among command, staff, and the World-Wide Military Command and Control System was to be achieved through interactive automatic data processing, cathode ray tubes, and other display devices. Dynamic satellite sensor information would be acquired through compatible ADP programs. A great increase in command center information availability and presentation capability could be realized with advanced ADP and communications systems and proper programming. This would correct inadequacies identified in the Phase I evaluation. The command and control ADP and communications systems envisioned would provide CINCPAC with a new capability ranging from peacetime monitoring of the PACOM to general war applications. In a crisis the system could assist in comprehensive and flexible development of operational data and decisions with feedback capability.

Another recommendation was to develop the operational requirement
to enter CINCPAC into the Defense Support Program as a high-speed user with full computer correlation and display system.

The command center designs incorporated features to support the conclusions and recommendations of the study. They incorporated watch functions in the center to attain ASIC goals. They provided communications and administrative support to increase the ability to meet surge requirements in crisis situations. Modifications would provide a crisis management capability built into CINCPAC's conference room with the command center relocated adjacent to the conference room to provide full support to action personnel in crisis situations and for CINCPAC's briefings. The new center, as well as other staff agencies, would be equipped with what was envisioned in the study as the CINCPAC Display and Information System (CINDIS).1

Changes proposed in Phase I were completed in 1972; it was anticipated that changes proposed in Phase II might take several years to accomplish.

New Computer System Installed at Kunia

Installation of a Honeywell H6050 computer system in the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia on 24 October was part of the World-wide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS) New Standard System Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Upgrade Program. The new computer was one of 35 authorized by the Secretary of Defense and the first in the Pacific Command. Four more were scheduled to be installed within the command: one for each of the component commands and one for CINCPAC's headquarters at Camp Smith. The new computers will replace existing equipment that will be used elsewhere within the Defense Department. The requirement for compatible computers had been the subject of continuing CINCPAC interest and action since 1968. The Kunia computer was expected to become operational in July 1973. Initially it was to be used to support training and software conversion requirements of the Pacific Command WMCCS Community.

Training began in August 1972; the Oahu Training Center was established at Kunia to support the WMCCS ADP training program. Representatives of the component commands participated. Courses were conducted by Honeywell personnel and included training for ADP managers as well as programmers and computer operators. The Air Training Command at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, was charged with overall responsibility for the WMCCS ADP training program; CINCPAC's ADP Systems Support Group coordinated all courses being conducted at the Oahu Training Center. Training was expected to continue through June 1973. The staff was asked to reduce requirements levied on the ADP Systems Support Group until completion of a major portion of the conversion, 31 December 1973.2

1. J3C212 HistSum Feb 73.
Command and Control Conference

(TS) The first annual conference of the JCS and the commanders of unified and specified commands was held 21-23 March 1972 in Washington. The conference theme was command and control. Discussed were plans, policies, and procedures for command and control required during periods of national emergency, including pre-, trans-, and post-SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) execution in accordance with national strategy guidance. One objective was to provide a common understanding of the role of the JCS and the CINCs in existing emergency action procedures associated with the SIOP to insure responsiveness to directives of the National Command Authorities. The conference provided a forum for discussing refinements to existing procedures to improve responsiveness of the JCS and CINCs to the requirements of such authorities.

Airborne Command Post Activities

(TS) The CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), called BLUE EAGLE, continued in a ground alert status throughout 1972. Prior to 1 January 1970 it had maintained a continuous airborne alert, but budget constraints had grounded it. CINCPAC believed that the survivability of the soft, fixed command and control facilities and the ABNCP aircraft in a ground alert status would be low in the event of a surprise attack. CINCPAC repeatedly advised the JCS about these matters, recommending a return to an airborne alert status, but the JCS took no action in this regard.

(TS) Another subject that had impacted on the possibility of the CINCPAC ABNCP being on continuous airborne alert was the number of BLUE EAGLE aircraft available. On 2 June 1971 CINCPAC had received informal information that the JCS had decided to transfer one of the CINCPAC EC-135P aircraft to the CINC Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). Such action would leave CINCPAC with only four

2. J3C1 Point Paper, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Vulnerability of the PACOM Command and Control System (U).
aircraft assigned. With one aircraft traditionally in modification or being inspected or repaired the majority of the time, four aircraft would be insufficient to support a sustained continuous airborne alert. On 15 December 1972, however, one of the BLUE EAGLE aircraft, #019, was transferred to the Tactical Air Command to serve as the initial CINCLANT ABNCP aircraft. A team of officers from CINCLANT arrived on 11 December for orientation and to study the operation of the CINCPAC ABNCP for possible adaptation to the CINCLANT organization. They participated in an actual scramble and flew as observers during the subsequent Hawaiian orbit mission. After an acceptance check and currency flight for the aircrew, they left with the aircraft on 19 December.

(5) Although in a ground alert status, the BLUE EAGLE exercise and training programs continued. Alternate Command Authority indoctrination or refresher training was periodically provided to senior officers who might serve in that capacity. In addition, no-notice alert exercises were conducted throughout the

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1. Ibid., J3C10 HistSum Dec 72.
year, usually about seven or eight a month. These tested reaction capability and called for varying degrees of action from engine start to launch as soon as possible.

(S) In November the Defense Communications Agency conducted secure satellite and secure very low frequency/low frequency (VLF/LF) communications tests with the ABNCP, TACAMO Pacific, and the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu. Tests were in support of the JCS Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net Plan to determine operational parameters of the communications system. Exact results of the tests had not been determined by the end of the year, but preliminary review indicated the following results. Access to the satellite for the ABNCP and TACAMO terminals was a problem due to satellite loading. Once access to the satellite was obtained for a transmission, reception quality was outstanding. Secure VLF operations with TACAMO were possible. ABNCP AN/ARC-96 receiver settings had no effect on reception of TACAMO's VLF traffic. Note was made, however, that no range testing had been made and that settings might be a factor with increased range. Use of the KW-7s in VLF operations simplified TACAMO's VLF operation with the CINCPAC ABNCP.2

(U) On 22 May BLUE EAGLE had flown its longest single sortie. Battle Staff One took off from Hickam Air Force Base and orbited near Wake Island to conduct VLF tests with TACAMO near Guam and another BLUE EAGLE orbiting near Hawaii. The aircraft refueled twice from another BLUE EAGLE acting as a tanker, first receiving 20,000 pounds of fuel and later receiving another 65,000 pounds. They landed at Clark Air Base after a 14-hour flight that marked not only the longest single BLUE EAGLE sortie but also the first time air-to-air refueling had ever been used during a deployment.3

(S) BLUE EAGLE provided both communications and refueling support in connection with Presidential visits in the PACOM on several occasions in 1972. In conjunction with the President's visit to China, the CINCPAC ABNCP furnished communications support for AIR FORCE ONE on 17 February when the President arrived in Hawaii and on 19 February when he left for Guam. An ultra high frequency multiplex link was established from AIR FORCE ONE, through two SILVER DOLLAR and a BLUE EAGLE aircraft, to the Hickam UHF van. This link enabled the President to have four additional voice and teletype channels to provide secure communications between his aircraft and the White House Communications Agency while the President was still 870 miles east of Hawaii.

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1. J3C10 HistSums Jan-Dec 72.
2. J3C10 HistSum Nov 72.
link was established and maintained until the President was 475 miles west of Hawaii. In connection with the 17 February operation, a BLUE EAGLE aircraft provided 52,000 pounds of fuel to a SILVER DOLLAR aircraft in the air to permit participation by that aircraft in the communications link and then fly non-stop to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. This was the first time a SILVER DOLLAR aircraft had ever been provided air-to-air refueling from another ABNCP aircraft. Similar communications support for the President was provided when he arrived in Hawaii on 30 August for talks with Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, although in this case the multiplex link was established through two BLUE EAGLE aircraft from the President's aircraft to Hickam. The President picked up the additional channels 565 miles east of Hawaii and retained them on his departure on 1 September until he was 840 miles east of Hawaii.

(U) Improvements in ABNCP facilities continued, and in 1972 a permanent facility to house the ABNCP Communications Center was built. It was located in the 9th Airborne Command Control Squadron portion of Building 2155 at Hickam Air Force Base. Construction was begun on 10 January and completed in March, at which time installation of equipment was started by the 1957th Communications Group (PACAF) who operated and maintained the new center. Operations commenced on 8 April. The new facility provided a pass-through window between the Communications Center and the BLUE EAGLE Alert Duty Officer. The center provided two AUTODIN (automatic digital network) terminals that were dual-homed, one on the Wahiawa AUTODIN Switch and the other on the Guam switch. This provided redundant access to the world-wide AUTODIN network for the ABNCP. Removal of an interim communications center from the Battle Staff portion of Building 2155 provided needed space for a Battle Staff training work area.

(G) The subject of PARKHILL for CINCPAC's command aircraft was under study in 1972. PARKHILL was the KY-75, a security device developed by the National Security Agency for narrowband high frequency radio communications. On 2 October CINCPAC asked the JCS to arrange for a PARKHILL capability between his command aircraft and his Headquarters. The requirement was modified on 10 November to make first priority the requirement for a secure voice capability from the CINCPAC command aircraft to the National Military Command Center. The JCS had delayed action on these recommendations while they awaited similar requests from the CINCs of the Atlantic and European Commands. Final action was expected by mid-January 1973. The National Security Agency was expected to be tasked to develop and support the project along with the Navy and Air Force. Late in 1972 informal information was received that the connection with the National Military Command Center was not going to be immediately considered. It was expected,

2. J3C10 HistSums Jan, Mar, Apr 72.
therefore, that only the capability between CINCPAC's command aircraft and Camp Smith would be provided soon.1

Requirement for CINCPAC Representatives

(5) A review of the positions of CINCPAC Representatives (CINCPACREPs) came about early in 1972 as a result of a query by the JCS, who asked that CINCPAC provide recommendations with regard to their retention, modification of their functions, or abolition of certain aspects of their operations. CINCPACREPs had been established in the Ryukyus, Philippines, Guam-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Australia, and at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff/Strategic Air Command. The last named was in response to a JCS requirement for strategic targeting and planning coordination; the others were all double-hatted, serving in other positions in their area.

(5) CINCPAC provided information on the general functions performed by these officers in coordinating "a joint military interface with local government and/or US State Department representatives overseas and to coordinate matters of joint concern to two or more Service components in areas where CINCPAC subordinate unified commands had not been established." Special functions were assigned to certain CINCPACREPs peculiar to their area of responsibility. The elimination of the CINCPACREPs or alteration of their functional responsibilities would degrade CINCPAC's capability to carry out his unified command responsibilities in their respective areas. CINCPAC advised that the positions had been subjected to an extensive review during a revision to his instruction on command relationships in the Pacific Command (CINC PACINST S3020.2 series) in connection with CINCPAC's increased area of responsibility under the revised Unified Command Plan and that no modification of their functional responsibilities was considered appropriate. The JCS were further advised that requirements for CINCPACREPs were the subject of continuous review.2 The position of CINCPACREP Ryukyus was phased out with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan on 15 May 1972.

Pacific Command Operations Liaison Office (POLO) Disestablished

(5) The Pacific Command Operations Liaison Office (POLO) was disestablished on 15 July 1972. The POLO had been a CINCPAC facility located at Fuchu Air Station, Japan. It had been the facility responsible for production of the PACOM Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) Reconnaissance Plan (Preplanned Reconnaissance Pacific (PRERECPAC)), nuclear planning documents, and nuclear operations liaison in the Western Pacific area. The POLO had been manned by four officers

2. JCS 3353/172005Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 231728Z Jan 72; J5121 HistSum Jan 72.
and three enlisted personnel provided by the Service component commands. CINCPACAF, through the Commander, Fifth Air Force, had provided administrative, logistical, facility, and automatic data processing support for the POLO.1

(5) In 1971 CINCPACAF had asked CINCPAC to assume responsibility for data processing support for POLO in order to permit elimination of the Fifth Air Force's redundant and costly automatic data processing facility. CINCPAC approved the request in November 1971 subject to the accompanying relocation of POLO functions to Hawaii and continued component manning, but on a reduced scale. Both CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT concurred, but each also recommended that the spaces for POLO manning become permanent CINCPAC billets rather than component command liaison billets. A manning reduction was feasible due to the simplification of SIOP Strike Timing Plans, an increase in the capability and efficiency of the PACOM SIOP planning system under development at Kunia (CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility), and assumption of functional responsibility by the CINCPAC staff.2

(5) On 15 July 1972, subsequent to publication of the SIOP Revision LIMA Reconnaissance Plan, the POLO was disestablished. The POLO strike and reconnaissance responsibilities were jointly assumed by two branches in CINCPAC's Operations Division, the Nuclear Operations Branch and the Joint Reconnaissance Center Branch. Management of PACOM SIOP strike and reconnaissance source data, together with production and distribution of SIOP strike and reconnaissance planning documents and reports, was being provided by an element of the Nuclear Operations Branch at Kunia.

(5) The SIOP Revision MIKE to the PRERECPAC, to be effective 1 January 1973, was produced and distributed on 26 December 1972. With this effort the assumption of the POLO functions by the CINCPAC staff was complete.3

Combined Korean-U.S. Corps (Group) Headquarters

(5) Following a May 1970 decision to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea, the Korean Government had proposed retaining a combined Korean-U.S. Corps (Group) Headquarters to assume temporarily the functions of similar U.S. elements until the Koreans were capable of unilaterally assuming responsibility. In November 1970 the JCS had approved the concept, but instructed COMUS Korea to insure that the Koreans understood that this was a temporary arrangement. At that time it was anticipated that the phase out of U.S. representation could begin in July 1972 and be completed by the end of that year.

1. CINCPAC 312159Z May 72.
These planning dates were to be reviewed periodically, however, based on the situation at the time. In late November 1971 COMUS Korea expressed concern for the possible loss of operational control that could result following a December 1972 phaseout of U.S. participation; he cited recent turbulence in Korea caused by world events and probable reactions to future United Nations actions regarding Korea as rationale for maintaining the headquarters as long as there were substantial U.S. Forces in Korea. At the end of 1971 CINCPAC had been awaiting CINCUSARPAC's comments on the subject.1

CINCUSARPAC concurred in COMUS Korea's concern for loss of operational control and believed that the combined headquarters should be tied to the tenure in Korea of the remaining U.S. Forces. He recommended that the headquarters be continued until December 1973 and then reviewed in light of the remaining division force. CINCPAC so recommended to the JCS on 27 January. On 7 April CINCPAC was advised that the Deputy Secretary of Defense had approved continuation of the headquarters as long as there was a division-sized U.S. ground force in Korea. He cautioned, however, that continuation of the combined headquarters should not be linked to the presence of a U.S. division in Korea when informing the Koreans of the decision. On 8 April CINCPAC notified COMUS Korea and instructed him regarding advising the Koreans of the decision. He advised that the Koreans be simply informed that continued U.S. participation in the combined headquarters had been approved, and if they pressed for additional information to advise them that its continued desirability would be a matter of periodic review.2

Future of the United Nations Command in Korea

Early in the year the JCS were tasked to examine effects of the dissolution of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea on U.S. military posture in Korea and Northern Asia in general to determine what alternative command and organizational arrangements were possible to assure achievement of U.S. military objectives, including a preferred structure to emerge following UNC dissolution. COMUS Korea, who was also Commander in Chief of the UNC, provided a detailed evaluation of the future of the command. The study was structured to respond directly to the JCS tasking and was based on the premise that the UNC was dissolved.

CINCPAC believed, however, that there were equally relevant questions to be addressed, such as whether the UNC should be retained and, if so, what

2. J5115 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: Combined US/ROK Corps (Group) Headquarters (S); CINCPAC 082241Z Apr 72.
steps the United States could take to insure its retention. CINCPAC offered the following comments to be considered in conjunction with the CINCUNC study. CINCPAC believed that "until we have an opportunity to examine the assumptions and overall political arrangements being considered in evaluating the dissolution of the UNC, the US should use all its political resources (including the power of veto in the UN Security Council) to insure the continuation of the UNC." He explained that the essence of the rationale for this position was that the premature dissolution of the UNC and attendant limitations upon bases in Japan to support Korean contingencies would unnecessarily prejudice the security of Northeast Asia during this critical transition period when the United States was attempting to transfer increasing local defense responsibilities to its allies. CINCPAC commented on CINCUNC's assumption that a "substantial" U.S. military presence would remain in Korea for the foreseeable future. He said that the definition of "substantial" needed to be quantified, noting that if Korea was to be publicized as a successful application of the Nixon Doctrine, and if budgetary constraints continued, the trend of U.S. Forces in Korea in the 1970's was down, toward a meaningful rather than a "substantial" force level.

(S) CINCPAC noted that from a purely operational viewpoint, the dissolution of the UNC would simplify the chain of command and resulting Korean command arrangements. The "efficiencies that would result from eliminating many existing organizational redundancies are considerable and apparent to all concerned."

(S) If the UNC were dissolved and if the COMUS Korea assumed the CINCUNC role as a party to the Armistice Agreement, CINCPAC believed that COMUS Korea should continue to operate as a subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC rather than have U.S. Forces Korea designated a major unified command as mentioned in the CINCUNC study. Also, if U.S. Forces in Korea were diminished to a size that would not, in itself, justify the continuation of COMUS Korea as a four-star position, CINCPAC did not envision the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea absorbing COMUS Korea's activities. "The better solution would be vice versa as long as there were any US combat forces on the Korean peninsula."

(U) CINCPAC heard nothing further on the matter in 1972.

Reversion of Okinawa to Japan

(U) On 15 May 1972 the Ryukyu Islands were officially returned to the Government of Japan and the United States was relieved of the responsibility for the administration of the islands. The ceremonies on that day in Tokyo

1. CINCPAC 2923252 Jan 72.
and Naha symbolized the completion of almost two years of intense negotiations between the United States and Japanese Governments. Admiral McCain personally commended the head of the U.S. Negotiating Team; COMUS Japan; the U.S. Forces Japan Chief of Staff and Chairman of the SOFA Task Group; the CINCPACREP Ryukyus, who was also the High Commissioner; and the U.S. Military Representative to the Okinawa Negotiating Team. He noted that their efforts had been marked by sincere dedication and the highest degree of professionalism on a "difficult job well done."  

(6) A number of organizational changes occurred. In March the U.S. Military Representative to the Okinawa Negotiating Team (USMILRON) had recommended a phased disestablishment of the USMILRON and staff to be completed by 1 August 1972, with the bulk of the staff departing on or prior to 15 July. CINCPAC believed that after reversion COMUS Japan should and would be responsible for all U.S. and Okinawa related military matters, but he recognized the need for some continuity of expertise and coordination in the immediate post-reversion timeframe. He therefore concurred in the phaseout schedule of the USMILRON and his staff. The phaseout period would provide an opportunity for the USMILRON to pass on valuable expertise and to transfer coordinating responsibilities to COMUS Japan.  

(6) The need had also been seen for a coordinating mechanism to accomplish residual military functions when the positions of High Commissioner and CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus (the same person held both positions) were disestablished on Reversion Day. A CINCPAC plan had established an Okinawa Area Field Office as a field extension of COMUS Japan's staff. It consisted of 16 personnel, and provided a time-phased schedule for review of the need for the temporary structure within one year after reversion.  

(6) One matter that was finalized in 1972 was the appointment of the Okinawa Area Coordinator (OAC). CINCPAC had asked COMUS Japan to nominate a Service to be responsible for filling the position, and when the Army was named, he requested that CINCUSARPAC designate an officer for the position. MAJ GEN Herron N. Maples, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Base Command Okinawa was selected. (The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, though senior in rank, was not considered for the position because of contingency responsibilities and possible deployments.)  

1. CINCPAC 170816Z May 72.  
2. CINCPAC 112306Z Apr 72.  
3. CINCPAC 050436Z Feb 72; COMUS Japan 070915Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 092341Z Feb 72; J5124 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Post-Reversion Command Arrangements in Okinawa (U).
Following reversion there were no substantive requirements for inter-
Service coordination by the OAC, and the bulk of the implementing directives
from COMUS Japan had been handled through Service component channels in Japan.
CINCPAC believed, therefore, that a review of the on-island coordinating mech-
nism should be made with a view toward possible disestablishment.1

Responsibility for Japan Submission for Free World Forces Portion of the JSOP

A question arose in 1972 regarding the role of the U.S. Ambassador to
Japan in the preparation of recommendations prepared for CINCPAC on the Japan
Self-Defense Force (JSDF) structure for the Free World portion of the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The responsibility for preparation of these
annual recommendations had been assigned to COMUS Japan by CINCPAC in 1968 inci-
dent to the phaseout of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG),
Japan. This assignment had been reaffirmed in 1969.2

In June 1972, in his response to a CINCPAC query concerning Service
responsibility for assigning chiefs and commanders of MAAGs, Missions, and
military groups, the Chief of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO),
Japan discussed briefly the relationship of the JSDF structure with the U.S.
JSOP. Thereupon, the U.S. Ambassador, in a message to the Secretary of State,
expressed concern that the Japan portion of the JSOP was not discussed with
the Embassy, other than between the MDAO and the Defense Attache's Office (DAO),
and that there had been no opportunity for expression of more general Embassy
views. The Ambassador stated that it was "imperative" that the Embassy have an
opportunity to present its views directly in the course of the annual JSOP re-
view, and he further recommended that the MDAO Japan have the primary responsi-
bility for developing the annual country JSOP input for Japan. The Ambassador
invited comments from CINCPAC and Washington.3

In a message to CINCPAC commenting on the Ambassador's concern and
recommendation for the transfer of JSOP submission responsibility, COMUS Japan
advised that a draft of the recommended Japanese force objectives was shown
informally to the Politico-Military Affairs Counselor at the Embassy by the DAO
and that the proposed force structure was to be provided to the Embassy for in-
formation upon completion of the entire submission, which included recommenda-
tions for Foreign Military Sales, then under development. COMUS Japan also
stated that the assignment of responsibility for JSOP development in Japan,
which was related to residual MAAG Japan functions previously assigned to COMUS

1. J5124 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Post-Reversion Command Arrangements in
Okinawa (U).
2. CINCPAC 030248Z Aug 68; CINCPAC 150135Z Jun 69.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 6950/300932Z Jun 72.
Japan, was working well and there was no reason to transfer this responsibility elsewhere.1

(C) After reviewing the factors relative to development of the initial recommendations for U.S. objectives for Japan's military forces, CINCPAC commented on the Ambassador's proposal on 22 July. He recognized the Ambassador's need to be kept informed of objectives and plans concerning the host country's military forces. He pointed out that CINCPAC's annual guidelines for development of country submissions, provided to both COMUS Japan and the MDAO, included the requirement that the Chief of Mission be advised of the proposed force structure and priorities. CINCPAC discussed briefly the purpose, content, and distribution of the JSOP and the manner in which political considerations at the country level were addressed normally. He expressed his view that in order to utilize the best and most current military expertise in Japan to develop the submission, the responsibility for the submission should remain with COMUS Japan.2

(U) No comments were received from Washington on the issue and the subject appeared to be closed.3

(C) In the same series of messages another matter had been addressed. In mid-1969 when the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan was changed to the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, the rank of the chief had been changed from general officer (brigadier) to colonel. The Chief of the MDAO commented on this subject to CINCPAC in June 1972. He outlined the program in Japan and noted that there was no prerequisite for a particular military Service to fill the position of chief; of more importance, he said, was the type of military expertise and the grade. He commented on the relationships of the Chief with the Ambassador, CINCPAC, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He cited the need in relations with the Japan Defense Agency for the Chief to be capable of maintaining a balanced rapport with top civilian official decision-makers and senior military planners and program executors. He noted that the JDA had viewed the downgrading of the Chief's position as downgrading of U.S. interest in Japan's defense establishment when the intention was quite the opposite.4 He believed that the Chief should be a general officer.

(C) The U.S. Ambassador disagreed, stating that the MDAO had access to the necessary levels of the JDA, Self-Defense Forces, and Japanese industry. He said he was also concerned that the MDAO work well within the Embassy structure.

1. COMUS Japan 110442Z Jul 72.
2. CINCPAC 222206Z Jul 72.
4. CMDAO/Tokyo CMC 1074/300925Z Jun 72.

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"which means close and continuing coordination with both Pol-Mil and Economic Sections. In my judgment, this is better achievable and more consonant with my efforts to streamline total Embassy structure, if MDAO Chief remains at present rank." 1 This subject was not addressed further.

**Movement of CTF 72 Staff in Japan (C)**

(S) In March CINCPACFLT recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the Commander, Task Force 72 be co-located with the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Facility, Western Pacific (FOSIF WESTPAC) at Kami Seya, Japan. This was not considered a major unit move as only the admiral and his staff were involved.

(S) In September, following approval of the move by the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC provided guidance to COMUSTDC and COMUS Japan regarding their announcement of the matter to their host governments. The Japanese Foreign Office and the CINC of the Chinese Navy were subsequently informed without incident. 3

**CINCPAC Headquarters--Intrusion and Threats**

(FOUO) CINCPAC's Headquarters at Camp Smith had been largely by-passed through the years by anti-war protesters or demonstrators. Occasionally pickets or persons attempting to give away hand bills appeared outside the gates, but these events were rare and uneventful. The only actual penetration of the headquarters occurred on 5 October 1972. James V. Albertini, a civilian who had been associated with Honolulu anti-war activities, appeared near CINCPAC's offices with "indictments" in the "Court of Humanity" against Admiral Gayler and an officer who Albertini identified as the head of electronic warfare. He presented the papers, which purported to be a citizen's arrest, to one of CINCPAC's aides. A representative of the Staff Judge Advocate explained to Albertini that he was a trespasser and asked him to leave voluntarily. He replied that he would have to be forcefully removed, but he voluntarily and

1. AMEMB TOKYO 6950/300932Z Jun 72.
2. CINCPAC 122255Z Apr 72.
3. J5122 Point Paper, 5 Oct 72, Subj: Movement of CTF 72 Staff in Japan (C).
peacefully submitted to what he determined to be "force" when the Marine Corps Provost Marshal for Camp Smith led him by the elbow with no struggle. He was removed to the Provost Marshal area, presented with a persona-non-grata letter, and escorted to the main gate. At no time were members of the press or any other news media present. Attempts to discover the intruder's method of entry were unsuccessful.

(U) About this same time of year, but in no relationship to this incident, three bomb threats were received in the headquarters, about a week apart. CINC-PAC was joint tenant of Camp Smith with the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and the threats involved Marine Corp facilities such as the mess hall or bowling alley. Although the case was unsolved, a Marine suspect was transferred and no further threats took place the rest of the year. No bombs were found.
SECTION IV--U.S. BASES OVERSEAS

(U) Base closures had been in progress throughout the PACOM for the last several years, with many further closures anticipated in the future. The changes in the PACOM base posture during the period up to FY 76 were expected to impact on the attainment of U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives in the Pacific. The elements of the PACOM dilemma were the requirement to honor U.S. commitments under the Nixon Doctrine, contrasted with base and force reductions, with both in light of an increasing threat. The reduction of bases and forces, CINCPAC believed, would constrain the flexibility and timeliness of our response as well as prohibit U.S. ability to use military presence to support our political, economic, and psychological policies in Asia, while Soviet influence increased. Our retrenchment placed a burden of defense on allies who did not possess the economic capability to sustain adequate modern forces.

(U) CINCPAC believed that the U.S.S.R. and China might view our actions as a weakening of U.S. resolve to honor our commitments. Their perception of our reduced capability and flexibility to respond might lead to bolder communist encroachment to outflank us in some instances where we were weak and unwilling to compete.

(U) Base closures and troop withdrawals, as viewed by our allies, could indicate U.S. disinterest in Asian affairs, thereby undermining morale and impeding formulation of a stable economic, political, and military posture. Our actions could also force them to seek accommodations with the communists.1

(U) Budget and manpower pressures on all the Services, however, caused a continuing trend toward base closures and force reductions, some of which are discussed below.

U.S. Base Requirements Overseas

(U) CINCPAC forwarded the 1972 revision of U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO) to the JCS on 29 February. This was a report that had been published annually since 1952, except in 1971. New standard reporting codes had been used for the 1972 revision.2

(U) Late in April the JCS proposed a number of procedural revisions, prin-

1. J5151 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: Anticipated PACOM Base Closures, FY 72-76 (U) which lists anticipated closures by country.
2. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 00513 of 29 Feb 72, Subj: Revision to U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO); forwarding of.
cipally concerning input of revised data as changes occurred (instead of annual inputs) and publication on an as-required basis instead of an annual complete edition. They asked for the comments of the unified and specified commanders. CINCPAC recommended that the procedures that had been used in 1972 be continued. He acknowledged that changes as they occurred would provide a more current file in the data bank, but the statement of requirements for bases and facilities was based on extensive coordination and consideration of all other resources. Each change would therefore require coordination both in-country and at the PACOM component command level. Semi-annual negative reports, as proposed, would also require a complete review as such a report would actually be a revalidation of existing requirements. The published document, CINCPAC said, was an inventory of bases and functions but it did not contain data that would indicate the magnitude of the capability to accomplish a function. The data contained was not the kind required for normal planning purposes: Service real estate records and the Base Development Plans for contingency plans were more appropriate for use in planning. CINCPAC recommended that if use of the 1972 procedures in 1973 did not result in the desired product that the matter of a revised update procedure be considered again.

Bases in Thailand

(§) The United States continued to be concerned about the sensitivities of the Thai people regarding U.S. resources positioned there. In June 1972, with the deployment of Marines to Nam Phong, the subject was raised again, although the Thai continued to be responsive to U.S. needs. Nam Phong, about 77 kilometers south of Udorn, had been built as a Dispersal Operating Base in 1966, but it was not activated for U.S. air use until 18 June 1972. This was brought about by the need to increase U.S. air power in Southeast Asia to prosecute the intensified air war in response to the North Vietnamese offensive, while at the same time recognizing the need to achieve Presidential-directed ceilings in the RVN and the deteriorating security situation in and around Da Nang. Among the forces there were Marine Corps F-4 squadrons. The activation of Nam Phong had been resisted by the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok based on traditional arguments against shifting the U.S. military power base from Vietnam to Thailand. (A high Thai official had stressed that Thailand did not want to be treated as a "waste basket" for units from Vietnam.) Additionally, the introduction of Marine Corps as opposed to Air Force units was considered to be a "clear signal of greater U.S. presence." (The Ambassador also considered the assignment of another general officer to Thailand as being less than desirable.)

(§) There were also causes for concern over the security of forces and resources in Thailand. It was possible that reversals of the North Vietnamese

1. CINCPAC 2004362 May 72.
offensive could induce a shift of some North Vietnamese attention to the concentration of U.S. air power in Thailand and provoke covert or overt insurgent actions in an attempt to cripple the major threat to their objectives. Past attacks against Ubon, Udorn, and U-Tapao had indicated a capability for penetration or sapper attacks. Of equal concern was the possibility of stand-off mortar or rocket attacks. All agencies concerned with the problem of base security in Thailand believed that increased off-base patrolling and a stepped-up civic action program would do much to minimize the problem. In this regard CINCPAC, on 22 August, requested funding support for these measures from the JCS and Secretary of Defense.

United States Bases in Japan and Okinawa

(C) Because of Okinawa reversion on 15 May 1972, bases and basing for both Japan and Okinawa are discussed here together. A number of the subjects discussed concern continuing actions begun in earlier years. Some revisions in the base structure were the result of a 1968 study by CINCPAC and the U.S. Ambassador (the Johnson-McCain Study) in which base structure was reviewed with a view toward reducing U.S. holdings while maintaining a base structure that would be responsive to U.S. interests in Japan over the next decade. The study had been prompted by continuing Japanese political pressures against U.S. presence and irritants, and the stepped-up feeling of Japanese "independence." The study recommended actions to release 21 installations to the Japanese government, partial release of 3, release with rights for U.S. joint use of 10, and release upon relocation of 20 installations, a total of 54 installations. Of the installations in which the Japanese government had expressed an interest, all actions had been completed on approximately 39 installations. Eight of the remaining actions were subsequently incorporated in other realignment proposals.

1. J552 Point Paper, 8 Sep 72, Subj: Nam Phong (U); J551 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Bases in Thailand (U).
This study was the first in a series of base realignment actions that have resulted in U.S. holdings being reduced to a total of 99 installations in Mainland Japan at the end of FY 72.  

Subsequently, in 1970, in response to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan's expressed concern over the indiscriminate reductions of U.S. facilities in Japan, CINC PAC had supported a proposal to the JCS to develop a coordinated approach to base reductions for examination in the joint arena. CINC PAC provided operational considerations for incorporation into the JCS action and, in November 1970, a State-Defense Department message had outlined the plan for consolidating, reducing, and realigning U.S. holdings in Japan. The U.S.-GOJ agreement on the realignment concept and major base adjustments was reached at the Security Consultative Committee meeting in December 1970. Subsequent to this realignment decision, adjustments had been made in U.S. holdings in Japan through a consolidation of cryptologic activities, the development of the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan, continued use of the Ship Repair Facility at Yokosuka, and the consolidation of U.S. Army activities in Japan at Camp Zama. These adjustments resulted in the release of several large installations, the reduction of U.S. presence in the Kanto Plain area, and the release of valuable land holdings to the Japanese government.

The period since 1968, thus, had been a time of dynamic changes in the U.S.-Japanese relationship, not only in the military sense but in the political and economic areas as well. Notwithstanding the implications of the Nixon Doctrine, the impact of approaches to China, the UN decisions relative to the Republic of China, and the continuing political and public pressures for decreased U.S. presence in Japan, CINC PAC had maintained a spirit of mutual interest and cooperation in the relationship with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and key Japanese government officials while retaining maximum operational flexibility in bases utilization in Japan and Okinawa. Specific 1972 actions are addressed below.

To facilitate coordination and effective decision making in the use and disposition of facilities and areas in Japan during FY 72-76, CINC PAC had directed completion of a Master Facilities Study in Japan by COMUS Japan. Phase I of the study concerned the Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan--Air Force consolidation into Yokota, Tama, and Tokorozawa. Phase I had been disclosed to Japanese officials in 1971. Phase II concerned follow-on releases in Japan. These included an Army hospital plan and consolidation into Camp Zama and Yokohama North Dock, Navy housing adjustments and consolidation into the Yokosuka area, and Air Force release of Hakata with relocation of communications facilities to Seburiyama. This Phase II was often referred to as the Quid Pro Quo plan.

Master Facilities Study was designed to reduce U.S. bases to selected core facilities (some for joint use). The core structure was defined as the retained austere bases that would support the introduction into Japan of only essential mobile combat, combat support, and service forces.

Under this "core" concept, primary dependence, in case of crisis, would be on the residual Okinawa base structure plus heavy reliance on the Japanese government to provide on a sole use basis additional real estate and facilities. This concept had not been discussed with the Japanese. With only secondary reliance on the Japanese home islands, the concept would require the following facilities in Japan proper:

- An air field complex (Yokota and Iwakuni for sole use; Itazuke and Misawa for joint use).

- A Navy complex (Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo bases, with possible adjustments).

- The command post-communications complex (U.S. Forces Japan and Service headquarters and necessary communications facilities).

- A war reserve storage complex (ammunition, POL, etc.).

- Minimum key logistics centers to support initial introduction of U.S. Forces (Sagami Depot and North Pier Yokohama).

- Minimum essential facilities to support key ongoing activities not covered above (the intelligence community and training areas to include air and sea maneuver areas).

This core concept would require U.S. dependence on Japan to provide a considerable base structure for U.S. use if a major crisis required U.S. mobilization. Re-entry rights to bases returned can be considered only if those bases retain their military configuration, however, and exploding industrial progress and prosperity in Japan have created great pressures for land acquisition and the use of returned American bases was one of the few sources left.

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In connection with the Phase II proposals, a number of matters had to be resolved. For example, the U.S. Army Japan proposed the construction of a 500-bed hospital at Camp Zama for the release of Kishine Barracks and the Zama Army Medical Center. Commenting of this proposal, the Ambassador and COMUS Japan objected to the 500-bed proposal and recommended that the proposal provide for a 150-bed hospital instead. CINCPAC reaffirmed that the 500-bed capability at Camp Zama was essential to provide the capability with which to initiate crucial casualty support for CINCPAC contingency Operation Plans. CINCUSARPAC subsequently recommended that the Army hospital package be modified to delete the requirement for a new 500-bed hospital at Camp Zama. Instead, the 500-bed capability would be satisfied by a quid pro quo proposal to the Japanese to upgrade the existing facilities at the Zama Army Medical Center (Sagami Ono). CINCPAC requested the views of the Country Team and asked the JCS to hold the Army Hospital Plan in abeyance pending finalization of the modification.

COMUS Japan also recommended that instead of negotiating the Phase II actions as a package, the United States should give the Japanese an overall conceptual briefing of U.S. facility actions and submit the quid pro quo projects based on Service requirements and timing. CINCPAC supported this concept to the JCS with its components' concurrence, pointing out that the quid pro quo package contained actions that were so numerous, diverse, and often unrelated that the use of the term "package" should be discontinued. These actions would be referred to as "Phase II follow-on facility actions." In view of the experience that had been gained in previous negotiations of this type, it appeared to be useful to provide a broad presentation to the Japanese government as soon as possible to permit them to engage in an orderly budget planning process. The individual projects would be submitted in detail to the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee separately or in combination as appropriate.

This new procedure, CINCPAC believed, would tend to give the Services added flexibility in timing the submission of facility adjustments; increase chances for success by eliminating unwieldy, expensive, large, complex, and politically sensitive combinations; afford the Japanese government budgetary planning through the presentation of the total overall U.S. facilities adjustments for FY 72-77; and eliminate Service views that its packages were being jeopardized by being combined with some less attractive package of another Service. CINCPAC requested that the JCS obtain State and Defense Department concurrence in the new procedural concept.

In considering the modifications of the Army Hospital package, the

2. CINCPAC 221744Z Mar 72.
Country Team recommended that Kishine Barracks be released immediately without relating it to a quid pro quo; that although COMUS Japan was prepared to submit a proposal to the Japanese that supported the retention of a 500-bed capability by rehabilitating Sagami Ono, the Ambassador believed some other inducement should be found for the Japanese to assume the costs of construction and rehabilitation at Sagami Ono and that CINCPAC should press for an early decision on this issue at the State and Defense Department level. The Ambassador believed it too early to present a panorama of the Phase II actions to the Japanese at the time; he advised that an informal presentation be made in late May or early June. CINCPAC requested State and Defense Department approval to present a proposal to the Japanese that would provide for rehabilitating Sagami Ono to satisfy the 500-bed requirement and proposed that COMUS Japan, in coordination with the Embassy and Services, brief the Japanese on the panorama and general timing of the Phase II actions. On 21 April the Secretary of State approved CINCPAC's proposal.1

Another matter under study at the same time concerned the closure of Hakata Air Station and some related facilities. As a result of force level and budget decisions, the Secretary of Defense had directed that the cryptological mission at Hakata be closed by 1 July 1972. Previously planned actions to close the Itazuke Family Housing Area (FHA) were to be continued and only certain communications and limited support facilities would remain at Itazuke. Subsequently the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that Hakata Air Station be closed by 30 June. Activities other than cryptological were affected. These included troposcatter and microwave communications to Korea and Okinawa, the WESTPACNORTH buffer site at Shingu Wells, the proposed relocation of Itazuke facilities to Hakata to reduce propagation interference, commissary support facilities at Itazuke and Hakata, and the withdrawal of a proposal for 252 family housing units to be constructed by the Japanese government in exchange for the release of the Kasugabara FHA (Itazuke).2

With the announced closure of Hakata and termination of the cryptologic mission there, the Director of the National Security Agency supported the position that the housing quid at Hakata for the release of the Kasugabara FHA should be transferred to Misawa to offset the housing deficit at that location, which was being amplified by the move of a Navy patrol squadron from Iwakuni. COMUS Japan outlined plans for achieving maximum effectiveness of the Defense Communication System facilities in the Hakata/Itazuke/Seburiyama area and emphasized that shifting of the housing quid from Hakata to Misawa would be difficult. He further emphasized that the relocation of facilities to provide for continuation of the vital communications links to Korea, Okinawa, and

1. CINCPAC 300124Z Mar 72; SECSTATE 069526/212124Z Apr 72.
northern Japan established a quid pro quo more directly relatable to the Hakata closure.  

(5) The National Security Agency Director submitted that the best interests of the United States would be served by Japanese construction of housing at Misawa rather than the construction of consolidated communications facilities. The Embassy in Tokyo strongly recommended rejection of the Misawa housing proposal based on the lack of inducement for the Japanese to agree to the proposal. COMUS Japan supported this position.  

(5) After numerous reaffirmations of the opposing positions, CINCPAC supported the position that the relocation of the communications nodal point from the Itazuke/Hakata area to Seburiyama had the best probability of success and was most directly related to the closure of Hakata and adjustments at Itazuke. CINCPAC advised:

...To expect success in a quid pro quo negotiation, there must be some indication that the GOJ is interested in obtaining a facility for which the US has a continuing requirement and for which the GOJ can justify fund expenditures for the construction of a related/comparable facility for the US.  

CINCPAC stated that he considered the continuation of the vital communications link to Korea essential to U.S. interests in North Asia and the overriding factor in the determination of the quid pro quo to be negotiated. CINCPAC also requested early action to relocate family housing units from Chitose and Wakkiana to Misawa and to construct a 400-man dormitory at Misawa in conjunction with the patrol squadron (VPRON) relocation to alleviate the critical housing situation at Misawa.  

(5) In announcing a decision on Phase II follow-on facilities actions in Japan, the Secretary of State approved the use of the Hakata closure in obtaining a housing quid pro quo at Misawa. He also indicated that the release of Camp Fuchinobe could be used in developing a quid pro quo to obtain housing at Misawa. The Ambassador in Tokyo stated that, while it was feasible to induce the Japanese to upgrade Sagami Ono and relocate some activities from Fuchinobe, there was no reason to expect the Japanese to provide 252 housing units at Misawa for the release of Fuchinobe and Hakata.  

1. DIRNSA 262315Z Jan 72; COMUS Japan 070830Z Feb 72; COMUS Japan 070831Z Feb 72.  
2. DIRNSA 081638Z Mar 72; AMEMB Tokyo 2527/110405Z Mar 72.  
3. J5124 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPAC 092225Z Apr 72.  
4. SECSTATE 069526/212124Z Apr 72; AMEMB Tokyo 4379/280001Z Apr 72.
CINCPAC concurred in the Ambassador's recommendation to submit requests to the Japanese for the rehabilitation of Sagami Ono and construction in the Camp Zama area tied to the release of Fuchinobe and Kishine Barracks. This concurrence was caveat to indicate that CINCPAC did not agree to tying the release of Fuchinobe to obtaining housing at Misawa. Rehabilitation of Sagami was estimated to cost $1.8 million, and construction at Zama and Sagami to relocate activities related to the closure of Fuchinobe was estimated at $3.4 million.1

On 13 May the Secretary of State authorized COMUS Japan and the Ambassador in Tokyo to proceed with notification of the Japanese on the Army Hospital plan and to treat the Misawa housing requirement as part of another Phase II follow-on action. On 18 May the Japanese government was advised, in general terms, on the hospital upgrading and Fuchinobe location proposal, and that Kishine hospital would be released at an early date if the U.S. plan was acceptable. The Japanese were receptive to the proposal and began work on budgeting problems that had to be overcome before construction could begin.2

The Sanno Transient Billeting Facility was also the subject of some attention. COMUS Japan reported in May that the Dai Ichi Hotel Company had been successful in having the Tokyo District Court reopen its case against the Japanese government to secure the return of the Sanno Hotel to the company. Since 1961 the government had been under pressure from various owners to have the Sanno returned. The hotel had been granted to the United States for use under the terms of the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and numerous arguments had been presented by the United States to retain its use. The United States had previously agreed, however, that the Sanno could be returned to the owners if a suitable replacement could be provided at an acceptable location. Five alternate sites had been suggested from time to time but all had been rejected by the United States. COMUS Japan indicated that the District Court would probably rule against U.S. retention of the Sanno, but that the U.S. Forces Japan would insist that the Japanese government appeal the case to the highest court. The appeal process could take up to 18 months and the United States would still remain until a suitable replacement was provided, even if the decision required that the government return the Sanno to its owners.3

CINCPAC concurred in retaining the Sanno with no move contemplated until a suitable replacement was provided by the Japanese government. CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan, however, that he believed it realistic to face up to eventual displacement from the Sanno. Therefore, he said, the United States

1. CINCPAC 030207Z May 72; J5124 HistSum May 72.
2. SECSTATE 084467/131724Z May 72; J5124 HistSum May 72.
3. COMUS Japan 040935Z May 72.
should not arbitrarily reject proposed relocation sites since, as time passed in litigation, the competition for hotel sites would increase and the availability of suitable facilities would decrease.1

(S) Navy matters that came under consideration in 1972 concerned principally the retention of the Ship Repair Facility (SRF) at Yokosuka and homeporting of U.S. Navy ships in Japan. In December 1970 the United States had agreed to release the SRF Yokosuka, less Drydock 6, to the Japanese government for use by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF). Subsequently the United States Navy decided to homeport a destroyer squadron at Yokosuka with the possibility that a carrier (CVA) would eventually also be homeported there. At this time Drydocks 4 and 5 were still scheduled for release to Japan by 30 June 1972. Due to the projected expanded U.S. usage, the inability of the USN to use legally Drydocks 4 and 5 after release from U.S. control, and the ability of the JMSDF to operate only Drydocks 1, 2, and 3, the United States sounded out the Japanese government regarding the SRF. While commercial operation of Drydocks 4 and 5 was a possibility, the Japanese Foreign Office was favorably disposed to U.S. retention of them in support of 7th Fleet operations. Since drydock retention reversed the realignment decisions of the Security Consultative Committee of December 1970 and the March 1971 homeporting concept, the United States was asked to submit a formal request to retain Drydocks 4 and 5.2

(S) In negotiating the matter, talks were held in Tokyo on 8 February among CINCPAC, Ambassador Meyer, Japanese Foreign Minister Fukuda, and General Esaki, Director of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). While original planning had called for an exchange of letters of agreement, the Japanese stated that the pressures from commercial interests trying to take over the SRF precluded an agreement being reached at that time. The JDA believed that the commercial interests had the capability of providing required SRF maintenance functions for the USN, particularly if members of the existing work force were hired by the commercial companies, as had been indicated.3

(S) CINCPAC expressed his views on 11 February. Commercial takeover of the drydocks, he said, would result in a loss of flexibility in scheduling repairs that was unacceptable in meeting USN requirements. Also, there were certain technical requirements relative to certain classes of ships and electronic gear that required USN management to insure technical proficiency and quality control. CINCPACFLT was tasked to provide additional rationale to support the requirement for continued use of the drydocks to offset continuing commercial pressures.4

1. CINCPAC 0705062 May 72; J5124 HistSum May 72.
4. CINCPAC 112253Z Feb 72.
CINCPACFLT, in reply, noted that as a commercial firm existed for the purpose of making a profit, it followed that such a firm would divest itself of any portion of its activity for which cost exceeded financial return. A Navy repair activity, in contrast, existed to accomplish any and all work required by the fleet, regardless of frequency of occurrence or cost of maintaining facilities and attaining skills that were required for specialized work that would be accomplished at irregular intervals. He cited some Royal Navy experiences at Malta and Singapore. When turned over to commercial interests both were capable of performing all work required on Royal Navy ships. In both cases, however, they subsequently lost the capabilities and facilities that had supported Navy-peculiar work. To expect otherwise at Yokosuka would not be logical, he said. He also listed a number of skill areas in which the Japanese were deficient in industrial capability (some were skills restricted to U.S. control for security reasons). He asked for CINCPAC assistance in the generation of a State-Defense Department restatement of the requirement that Drydocks 4 and 5 and associated industrial shops continued under USN operation and control beyond 30 June 1972.

In forwarding the additional rationale to COMUS Japan; CINCPAC acknowledged the Japanese right to request confirmation of the U.S. requirement under the SOFA and the use of the Joint Committee as the mechanism for detailed discussions. Since retention of the drydocks involved reversal of a previously agreed position between the two governments in the Security Consultative Committee, CINCPAC expressed the need to apply pressure in the Joint Committee as well as at the Ministry level.

The Japanese Foreign Office, the Ambassador explained, proposed that the United States consider consolidating facilities and releasing some drydocks at Sasebo as a means of lessening the impact of retaining the two at Yokosuka. The State Department authorized release of certain Sasebo facilities if it was thought that failure to do so could jeopardize the SRF agreement. CINCPAC considered the retention of facilities at Yokosuka to be "of paramount importance to US strategic needs," he told the Ambassador. Accordingly, he concurred in the releases and modifications proposed by the State Department.

The Japanese government agreed to permit the United States to retain Drydocks 4 and 5 while the two countries studied ways to satisfy U.S. Navy requirements after the return of the two drydocks.

1. CINCPACFLT 172047Z Feb 72.
2. CINCPAC 202132Z Feb 72.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 0723/210700Z Jan 72; SECSTATE 013312/242233Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 292328Z Jan 72.
In the matter of homeporting ships at Yokosuka, Phase I provided for initial deployment of six destroyers followed by the Phase II deployment of an aircraft carrier (a CVA), with an on-board air wing using Atsugi Air Base intermittently during in-port and maintenance periods. The homeporting was considered dependent on the retention of Drydocks 4, 5, and 6 at Yokosuka. The homeporting of the six destroyers had been approved by Japanese government officials in August 1971. When the homeporting had been accomplished, the Chief of Naval Operations, in March 1972, asked CINCPAC for his views on homeporting the carrier (homeporting was called "extended deployment"). CINCPAC replied that there were on-going issues between the two governments that should be resolved prior to beginning discussions. CINCPAC, however, continued to support the homeporting of the carrier in Japan; he recommended that a determination of when the subject should be broached with the Japanese should be left to the judgment of the Country Team. Nevertheless, he said, prudence dictated that the United States not delay initiating discussions on this matter past the summer of 1972 in order to insure sufficient lead time to accommodate USN planning and operational actions.¹

The carrier plan had still not been briefed to the Japanese government when key Foreign Office officials were advised of the deployment possibility at the Hawaii talks on 31 August 1972. Some conflict continued, however, between the State Department and the CNO regarding housing of added personnel in the Yokosuka area and treatment of nuclear weapons problems. While government had tacitly accepted nuclear weapons on ships entering the Japanese ports in the past, homeporting could surface the issue to a degree that would not permit continued tacit approval. The State Department had indicated that carrier weapons should be removed prior to entry into a port. This suggestion was operationally unacceptable to the CNO.²

In mid-September 1972 the Japanese Foreign Minister acknowledged receipt of the U.S. request for extended deployment of the CVA and stated that it was being studied in accordance with security treaty obligations. The U.S. request had been based on more effectively meeting the U.S. obligations under the Mutual Security Treaty in the face of growing manpower and budgetary constraints. The Mayor of Yokosuka, formerly opposed to the deployment, has publicly stated his readiness to conditionally permit U.S. carriers to use Yokosuka as their "mother port." The JDA Director General has stated that the carrier homeporting was inevitable and indicated that the Japanese government would yield to the U.S. request. Opposition parties were expected to attack the proposal bitterly, however.³

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1. CINCPAC 140416Z Mar 72; J5126 HistSum Mar 72.
2. J5124 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: CVA Deployment to Yokosuka (S).
3. Ibid.
Many of the installations and facilities on Okinawa came under study in 1972. In April CINCUSARPAC requested that the Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (CGUSARYIS) develop and submit a study of facilities utilization on Okinawa in coordination with Navy and Marine components. The request had been based on the recognition that there would be Japanese government requests for further releases of installations and facilities on Okinawa and also Defense Department requests for installation closures, consolidations, transfers, and joint use or exchange of facilities among the Services to assure optimum use at minimum cost.1

While he welcomed and supported efforts directed toward consolidation of functions and joint use or exchange of facilities in the interest of accommodating fiscal and force restraints and political pressures, CINCPAC requested that the joint review, as outlined by CINCUSARPAC, be held in abeyance until a more comprehensive review involving all Services could be conducted. CINCPAC's request was based on the fact that the Japan Master Facilities Study, which had been directed by CINCPAC and developed by COMUS Japan in December 1971, had clearly identified the need to examine the base structure on Okinawa for possible realignments, consolidations, and reductions after reversion. COMUS Japan had been tasked to proceed with the development of this study in the immediate post-reversion time frame when changes to the force posturing became clearer and facilities lists developed as part of the reversion agreement would not be compromised.2

Subsequently CINCUSARPAC advised that the study proposed for USARYIS was not intended to impact on joint plans nor be so comprehensive in nature as to interrupt or replace the proposed master facilities study. It was designed to be a joint effort to consider joint use, consolidation or exchanges of existing housing, administration, and storage facilities that might be of mutual benefit. With this delineation of the study parameters, CINCPAC concurred in the conduct of the study.3

The Master Facilities Study - Japan was updated subsequent to reversion to include an Okinawa Facilities Readjustment Package, prepared in anticipation of discussions with the Japanese. The Okinawa package included 18 new releases (either total or partial) that were proposed for offer to Japan for FY 73 with an additional 22 to be available for the period FY 74-76. The study provided data on the existing base structure, the facilities already offered for release, and the impacts and shortfalls of such releases with regard to contingency plan requirements. CINCPAC approved the plan and forwarded it to the JCS on 10 November. Approval by the JCS was being awaited at the end of the year.4

1. CINCUSARPAC 070246Z Apr 72.
2. CINCPAC 112308Z Apr 72.
3. CINCPAC 160002Z Apr 72; J524 HistSum Apr 72.
(5) The United States and Japan had agreed that the Naval Air Facility at Naha was to be returned to Japan on the reversion of Okinawa as a "meaningful symbol of reversion," provided that U.S. flying activities were relocated to Misawa, Iwakuni, Futema, and Kadena in accordance with a JCS-approved CINCPAC plan. The Japanese government had approved Japan FY 72 credit of $25 million for projects in support of the relocation plan. In providing for budgeting to accomplish the removal of U.S. aircraft from Naha by 15 May, however, the Japanese government had indicated a lack of sufficient budgetary flexibility to provide funds for pre-reversion construction at Iwakuni and Misawa Air Bases. The Japanese proposed that the U.S. Government fund this construction and, in return, the Japanese government would undertake construction projects of equivalent value after Japanese funding became available.¹

(5) CINCPAC reaffirmed his previous position that the relocation plan was defensible and accomplished the removal of flying activities from Naha in the least time with the minimum operational degradation. He continued that failure by the Japanese government to come to agreement could result in flying activities not being removed from Naha by 15 May 1972. CINCPAC also recommended to the JCS that the United States should not accept the Japanese proposal since U.S. agreement would result in another erosion of an established, firm U.S. requirement and a U.S.-Japanese agreement in order to satisfy internal Japanese political sensitivities. CINCPAC indicated that the Japanese should be advised to fulfill their commitments under established agreements without further degradation of capabilities and without further impositions on the United States to accommodate to internal Japanese political pressures.

(5) Subsequently, after much deliberation, the Japanese Finance and Foreign Ministries agreed to start construction as soon as the regular JFY 72 budget went into effect in April, but the Japan Defense Agency Director General was unwilling to agree and, further, had appealed to the Liberal Democratic Party leadership to renegotiate the whole Naha relocation proposal. The Japanese government was warned, in discussion, that in the absence of an early decision to accept and move ahead on the full relocation package, it appeared that the United States would not be able to release Naha Air Base by 15 May. It would also be necessary for the United States to cite an exchange of letters of 15 June 1971 that provided for the United States to remain at Naha should arrangements and construction to accomplish the relocation be incomplete.²

(6) After other delaying tactics by the Japanese government, including suspension of the Futema runway project by the JDA Director General, CINCPAC recommended to the Chairman of the JCS that instructions to the Ambassador in

². J5124 HistSum Mar 72.
Tokyo provide for immediate notification to the Japanese government that the United States would retain flight activities on Naha until completion of essential construction projects in Japan and Okinawa. The JCS concurred in this position. After reporting on several Japanese proposals for interim relocation of the Naha P-3s and Futema KC-130 aircraft, the Ambassador reported that the Japanese government had decided to drop the funds for the Naha relocation from the provisional budget and concluded that the United States would have to remain at Naha after 15 May. The Secretary of State advised the Ambassador to formalize the understanding with the Japanese on the subject by an exchange of letters.

The Japanese had repeatedly, however, suggested placing emphasis on the Okinawa construction and letting the Japan construction requirements await Diet adjournment. On 18 April, at a meeting to finalize the future status of Naha and the exchange of letters, the Japanese suggested that once funds were available the U.S. and Japanese governments should push construction at Kadena and relocate as soon as feasible those aircraft scheduled to go to Kadena from Naha to give a sense of movement from Naha. The Japanese also suggested that Futema construction not be pushed until the political heat was reduced on the onward movement involving Misawa and Iwakuni. Thus, priority of construction was to be Kadena in Phase I, with Futema, Iwakuni, and Misawa in Phase II. The Ambassador supported this scenario.

The Secretary of State concurred in principle with the Japanese proposal to give Kadena first priority, but indicated the desire to proceed with the construction of vertical facilities at Futema in the same priority. (These projects were the costliest Okinawa relocation items and would require long lead time for completion.) The Futema runway construction would be the last priority, thus permitting USMC KC-130s to remain at Futema until construction at Iwakuni was complete.

CINCPAC also concurred, but his comments noted that while it was acknowledged that the KC-130s would remain at Futema until Iwakuni was ready, there was no similar acknowledgement that the VP Squadron would remain at Naha until all category I projects were completed at Misawa, Iwakuni, and Futema. CINCPAC emphasized that after reversion the Japanese could be expected to raise objections to the continued presence of the squadron at Naha, using arguments based on political and public pressures. In addition, as construction at high priority sites was completed, the Japanese could be expected to press for re-location of the VP squadron to an interim site in order to clear Naha of all

1. AMEMB Tokyo 2998/230950Z Mar 72; J5124 HistSum Mar 72.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 3993/180828Z Apr 72; J5124 HistSum May 72.
3. SECSTATE 075186/012104Z May 72.
U.S. flying activity. CINCPAC stated that all concerned should have the full understanding that the VP squadron would remain at Naha until all Category I projects in Japan and Okinawa were completed and that he was opposed to any interim relocation of the VP squadron as it would result in further operational degradation, added expense, and did not adhere to the agreed Naha relocation plan. ¹

(§) The U.S. Secretary of Defense approved 69 projects totalling $18 million for the relocation. Construction criteria packages for the approved projects had been furnished to the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency for preparation of contracts, but no construction had been initiated by the Japanese. CINCPACFLT reported that the prolonged delay in constructing facilities at Misawa was causing increasing hardship in operational and support areas by requiring Operations and Maintenance Fund expenditures for both Iwakuni and Misawa facilities.

(§) In the fall of 1972 the Japanese advised that they wanted complete return of Naha airport by April 1973 in order to begin preparation for the Marine Exposition scheduled for 1975. The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau proposed closing Naha runway during the hours of darkness from 15 November 1972 to 31 March 1973 to resurface it. The Japanese Foreign Office advised, however, that the bureau's action was inappropriate at the time and that no action should be taken pending further discussion with U.S. representatives.²

(§) The "extended reef" relocation plan to vacate Naha, which had the backing of the Services and met CINCPAC's operational requirements, had run into political complications in Japan. This plan included provisions to:

1. Relocate Navy and Marine Corps activities from Naha to Futema (the VPRON) and Kadena (the VC-5 squadron and Marine jets).

2. Relocate the USMC KC-130s from Futema to Iwakuni.

3. Relocate the Iwakuni VPRON to Misawa.

4. Provide facilities improvements and troop housing at Iwakuni.

5. Provide for other Okinawa reversion related construction projects at bases other than Kadena, Futema, Iwakuni, and Misawa (primarily Army and Marine Corps facilities improvements).

1. CINCPAC 050159Z May 72.
2. J5124 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Relocation of Flying Activities from NAF, Naha (U).
6. Provide added maintenance facilities at Futema and Iwakuni.

7. Upgrade Futema to jet-capable status.

8. Provide Defense Department project for troop housing at Kadena (1,000 men).

All of this was to be funded from the $65 million U.S. credit; estimated cost was $51 million.¹ ($65 million for facilities improvements had been part of a $200 million package Japan had agreed to pay in goods and services to cover U.S. military relocation costs and other costs incident to reversion of Okinawa.)

(5) As the study of relocating flying activities continued, the Japanese offered an alternative proposal to the extended reef plan in which all flying activities would be moved to Kadena. They requested agreement in principle by 10 January 1973 so that necessary FY 73 funds could be forwarded in the budget for Diet approval. They indicated types of requirements they would be willing to consider if the United States agreed in principle to the proposal. These included relocation of Air Force and Navy housing and support facilities from Naha to Kadena, Army facilities from Naha to the Makiminato Service Area, and Makiminato Housing Area to Kadena. Projects relating to the move of flying activities to Kadena and from Iwakuni to Misawa, remodeling of Iwakuni facilities, miscellaneous improvement projects, and construction of housing at Misawa and excess housing at Kadena would be debited against the $65 million credited to the United States. All other relocation projects would be funded by the Japanese government outside of the $65 million.²

(5) In response to a JCS inquiry on trade-offs to be sought if the Japanese alternative proposal was accepted, CINCPAC counter-proposed the following projects:

- To be funded in the $65 million U.S. credit:

1. Provide facility improvements and troop housing at Iwakuni.

2. Upgrade Futema runway to jet-capable status.

3. Relocate the Iwakuni VPRON to Misawa and provide support facilities.

4. Provide airman dormitories for 1,000 men at Kadena.

1. J526 Point Paper, 29 Dec 72, Subj: Relocation of Navy/Marine Flying Activities From Naha Airport (U).

2. Ibid.
5. Provide Okinawa reversion-related construction projects for bases other than Kadena and Futema.

   - To be funded by the Japanese government outside the $65 million (relocation-related):

   1. Relocate flying activities and maintenance support facilities from Naha to Kadena (included Tactical Airlift Wing and Tactical Fighter Wing added facilities requirements).

   2. Develop site to provide space for relocation of flying activities as required.

   3. Provide a runway overlay, helicopter support facilities, and miscellaneous requirements at Futema.

   - To be funded by the Japanese government outside the $65 million (quid pro quo):

   1. Relocate Navy and Air Force housing and community support facilities from Naha to Kadena.

   2. Relocate Navy, Air Force, and Army troop housing from Naha to Kadena, Makiminato Service Area, or sites to be determined.

   3. Relocate the Makiminato Housing Area to Kadena (200 units) and Camps Kuwae, Zukeran, and Mercy.

   4. Provide Misawa housing (282 units).

CINCPAC noted that recognition of political realities warranted consideration of the Japanese government's alternative proposal, as modified by CINCPAC. Additionally, the counter-proposal would provide base facilities improvements over the Japanese proposal at reduced cost to the United States; consolidate Air Force and Navy activities, housing, and community support at Kadena; permit evacuation from Naha; and retain some of the operational flexibility lost, due to the release of Naha, through upgrading Futema. The matter was unresolved at the end of the year.¹

(Ç) Earlier, when finalizing the joint use arrangements for Naha after 15 May, the Japanese had requested that the United States forego touch-and-go training. The Embassy advised that there were specific training requirements

1. CINCPAC 280852Z Dec 72.
for the aircraft at Naha, but that the United States could consider limiting such training to the aircraft actually based at Naha. The Japanese had specifically requested that carrier-based aircraft not undergo training at Naha. CINCPAC concurred in the matter of limiting touch-and-go training to aircraft based at Naha after reversion, but he also clarified the status of certain Marine Corps rotational aircraft assigned to Naha for specified periods of training and classified as being based at Naha. These should not be classified as transients, CINCPAC advised, or placed in the same category as carrier-based aircraft. They should, therefore, be permitted touch-and-go training as required. CINCPAC also advised that, as the traffic permitted, commanders would be encouraged to use Kadena, after appropriate coordination, for touch-and-go training.\(^1\)

\(^{(C)}\) Buckner Bay Anchorage requirements also came under study in 1972. During reversion negotiations, the United States and Japan presented conflicting proposals with regard to U.S. Forces' use of Buckner Bay. The USN generally desired rights to all of the Bay and the Japanese wanted to restrict the United States to exclusive rights to an area enclosed by an arc whose radius was centered on Pier Bravo at White Beach and extended 2,500 meters. Subsequently CINCPACFLT forwarded his minimum and optimum requirements. CINCPAC concurred in the optimum requirement and requested Service Department level review and issuance of appropriate negotiating instructions to the U.S. Military Representative to the Okinawa Negotiating Team and COMUS Japan for use in finalizing facilities and areas documentation with the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. CINCPAC affirmed that the Japanese proposal excluding all of Buckner Bay less the area enclosed by a 2,500 meter radius centered on Pier Bravo was unacceptable.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) Another dispute arose, this time over the Iha Castle Hotel. Subsequent to the finalization of facilities and areas lists in the reversion agreement of 17 June 1971, the Marine Corps had negotiated a one-year lease on the hotel for use as a billeting facility for approximately 85 officers. The USMC wanted to have this facility added to the list (List A) of facilities to be retained by the United States under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Okinawans were pressing for release of the facility when the lease expired on 22 September 1972. In response to a query by the State and Defense Departments on the best method of retaining the facility or, alternately, insuring that USMC billeting requirements were met after reversion, CINCPAC requested the views of COMUS Japan. CINCPAC indicated that in his view the billeting requirement was valid, required urgent attention, and that the Castle should be added to List A.

\(^{1}\) CINCPAC 292256Z Apr 72; J5124 HistSum Apr 72.
\(^{2}\) CINCPAC 180425Z Feb 72; J5124 HistSum Feb 72.
COMUS Japan concurred in the Ambassador's assessment that it would seem permissible for USMC residents to remain in the hotel until the lease expired and that negotiations should be undertaken to retain Iha Castle, obtain another hotel in lieu thereof, or request the Japanese government to construct a comparable facility. The Ambassador indicated, however, that funds for construction might have to come from the $65 million reversion relocation fund. CINCPAC stated to the JCS that the most positive way of insuring that USMC requirements were met was to insist on adding the facility to List A. Otherwise, he said, the United States should utilize the Joint Committee to retain use of the hotel or require Japan to build a comparable facility.¹

CINCPAC nonconcurred in using the $65 million relocation fund on the same reasoning being used by Japan to preclude adding Iha Castle to List A, i.e., if the creation of the requirement after the finalization of Lists A, B, and C eliminated it from eligibility for inclusion in the lists, the generation of the requirement after agreement to the funding aspects related to reversion would require that the Japanese fund an alternate facility from funds other than those already agreed upon.²

In negotiating for continued use of the hotel, the United States proposed to release the Harborview Club, the Sedake and Kawata training areas, and Mae Shima range to the government and private land owners. On 18 April Japan indicated that the U.S. proposal was acceptable with the additional agreement that the United States would open a highway through Naha airport to public use once Japan had constructed necessary overpasses and security fences. On 24 April the Secretary of State concurred, subject to concurrence of CINCPAC and the High Commissioner in the Ryukyus. CINCPAC concurred on 6 May, listing conditions for opening the highway to public access, all of which were to be accomplished at Japanese expense. CINCPAC also directed attention to Japanese responsibilities with regard to the security problem created by opening the highway and the need for adequate security measures during periods of public unrest.³

In accordance with the reversion agreement, assumption of the defense of Okinawa by Japan was to be completed by the earliest practicable date subsequent to 15 May 1972, but not later than 1 July 1973. The Ground Self-Defense Forces had about 1,000 personnel on Okinawa by the end of 1972, the Maritime

1. CINCPAC 172232Z Feb 72; COMUS Japan 251330Z Feb 72; AMEMB Tokyo 1725/190410Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 270229Z Feb 72.
2. CINCPAC 270229Z Feb 72.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 3997/180838Z Apr 72; SECSTATE 070693/242227Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 060151Z May 72.
Self-Defense Forces about 500, and the Air Self-Defense Forces about 1,400.1
(The organizations to be deployed were listed in the 1971 CINCPAC Command
History, Volume I, page 79.)

Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) had been under the
trusteeship of the United States for the United Nations since 1946. This was
a strategically located forward area with sufficient real estate for extensive
military installations, and became of increasing interest as U.S. bases and
facilities in many countries of the PACOM were closed or reduced in size. Until
the future political status was determined, however, it was believed that exten-
sive military activity would result in situations that could prove contrary to
overall U.S. interests.

The Micronesians had become dissatisfied over the lack of sociological
and economic advances under U.S. administration and were proposing to get out
from under tight U.S. control. The possible political solutions ranged from
statehood, through free association with the United States, to independence, to
domination by a third country, such as Japan, Korea, or Taiwan. The U.S. stra-
tegic interests were to insure that the area did not fall under the military,
political, or financial influence of another nation. The United States also
sought to preserve certain lands for Defense Department use.

The United States and the TTPI engaged in periodic discussions of
Micronesian status. The third round of such discussions had been held in Hawaii
in October 1971. A number of agreements had been reached, but unresolved was
the matter of termination of any compact that may be agreed upon: the Micro-
nesians believed that any compact should be revocable by unilateral termination,
the United States believed that termination of any agreement should be mutually
agreed upon.2

The fourth round of talks was held at Koror, Palau from 2 to 14 April
1972. The U.S. delegation was again headed by Ambassador Franklin Hayden
Williams. The talks were considered by both sides to be useful and productive
in exploring the issues involving the future status of Micronesia and the
future relationship between Micronesia and the United States. Future relations
were to be under a Compact approved by the Congresses of Micronesia and the
United States, and by the people of Micronesia. It was agreed, in principle by

1. J5124 Point Paper, 13 Oct 72, Subj: Japan Self Defense Deployment/Assumption
   of Defense of Okinawa.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 80-87; J515 Point Paper, 21 Jul 72,
   Subj: TTPI Political Status Negotiations and Assessment (U).
both sides, that Micronesia would have complete authority and responsibility for its own internal affairs and that the United States would be responsible for foreign affairs and defense. U.S. responsibilities were defined as complete responsibility for the defense of Micronesia, the ability to prevent other foreign powers from using Micronesia for military purposes, and the right to use U.S. bases there to support U.S. security responsibilities in the Pacific Ocean area. The U.S. delegation made it clear that the Micronesian government would be fully and regularly consulted on defense and other security matters directly affecting Micronesia.

(6) Defense Department requirements for land were to be negotiated prior to the signing of the Compact. Military land leases were to continue for their full term regardless of Compact termination and would be paralleled by a presigned mutual security pact to take effect upon termination of the Compact.

(6) Unilateral termination of the Compact was accepted by the United States; a concession not made in earlier talks. The Compact could be terminated after an as yet unspecified period of trial (5 to 15 years) and also with an unspecified delay period (3 to 10 years) after notification before final partition.1

(6) The Micronesians asked for an annual support and rent payment of $100 million, but this amount was not accepted by Ambassador Williams.

(6) The fifth round of talks was held in Washington, D.C., in July. CINCPAC representatives did not attend (they had not attended the fourth round either). In October a sixth round was held at Barbers Point, Hawaii, this time with CINCPAC representatives present. After the Micronesians requested that independence and free association be discussed concurrently, the talks were recessed for the remainder of 1972. The future political status of the TTPI remained unresolved.

(6) The matter of American visitors in the TTPI continued to concern CINCPAC in 1972. Because of the large buildup of USAF personnel at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in connection with Southeast Asia operations, appreciable numbers were visiting Saipan and Tinian. The CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI was not informed of the visits nor was there any kind of visitor clearance granted. CINCPAC policy was to maintain a low military profile; visits by flag and general officers had been prohibited. CINCPAC discussed the matter with the Commander, Eighth Air Force in July, requesting that visits be reduced and that

1. J515 Point Paper, 21 Jul 72, Subj: TTPI Political Status Negotiations and Assessment (U); J5156 Point Paper, 13 Jun 72, Subj: TTPI Political Status Negotiations.
the CINCPAC Representative be consulted concerning USAF visitors to the TTPI, particularly to the Marianas District.¹

(C) In connection with preparation of Project GATEWAY, discussed below, U.S. officials met with a group headed by the Governor of Guam on 30 December 1971, principally to discuss land use and requirements. The U.S. group was headed by the CINCPACREP Guam-TTPI. The thrust of the Governor's presentation hinged on the desire of Guam for maximum self sufficiency, the need to create jobs on Guam for Guamanians, the desire of Guam to be a model of self government and cooperative civil-military planning for encouragement of all of Micronesia and the South Pacific region, and the importance of land ownership to the people of Guam. The Guamanians made a point of their favoring the Marianas joining Guam and implied that Guam's autonomy in self government and the hoped-for cooperative civil-military planning model would be a "great influence" on the Marianas and others on the status and acceptance of the U.S. military.

They made the point that the "elected members of the Guam legislature reflected the current anti-military attitude of youth on Guam," which was not the attitude of the Governor's Executive Branch. The Executive Branch desired to reverse this attitude, they said. They also noted that they found it difficult to explain why the United States was returning land and bases to foreign powers while not returning land to the people of Guam who were U.S. citizens.

(C) A number of specific land requirements were presented as was a summary of the importance of land ownership to the people of Guam. They sought to encourage U.S. land return and discourage further U.S. land acquisition, rejecting the exchange of lands on a value-for-value basis and insisting on an acre-for-acre exchange. Near term requirements stated by the Guamanians appeared to be modest and basic. Long-range requirements were more vague and a number of matters needed resolution, but they were incorporated into the Project GATEWAY study.²

(C) Still another meeting of interest to CINCPAC was held in Hawaii 1-6 May 1972, the fourth annual Pacific Conference of Legislators. The President of the conference had invited the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary directed CINCPAC to send an observer in his behalf. The four main topics addressed were Federal land policy, political status of U.S. Pacific territories, economic development, and U.S. military presence. The conference was characterized by a lack of any great interest on the part of delegates and dwindling attendance (the meetings opened with about 160 delegates, only 19 voting delegates attended the final meeting).

1. JS15 Point Paper, 21 Jul 72, Subj: Visitors to Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (TTPI) (U).
2. CINCPAC 050236Z Jan 72.

CONFIDENTIAL
(C) Two speakers from Guam attacked the military presence on Guam, but the attacks were considered mild and most Guamanian representatives recognized that the military presence was vital to their economy. During informal discussions the CINCPAC observer determined that the principal irritants were the Federal land use and turnback policies. Two topics of Defense Department concern, Federal land policies and military presence, did not become major issues during the conference.

(C) The observer concluded that the Pacific Conference of Legislators was still in a formative stage and not a significant political force in the Pacific, largely due to the diverse interests and motives of the various jurisdictions. Membership in the organization remained limited to Guam, American Samoa (which joined in 1972), and the Marianas and Yap Districts of the TTPI. (It was doubtful that Yap would be able to pay the $1,000 minimum annual fee.) Hawaii had not joined; membership would only result in a relatively high annual membership fee as fees were determined by the size of the operating budgets of the various legislatures. The fifth meeting was scheduled for May 1973 in Pago Pago.

(C) In 1972 a number of studies were completed on this area: Joint planning for Tinian Island, Project GATEWAY, and a Wake Island study. CINCPAC's special Guam study, Project GATEWAY (Guam Assessment to Ensure Westernmost Appropriate Yield), was forwarded to the JCS on 8 January. CINCPAC had been asked to examine the capability of military land holdings in the Guam/TTP area to support long term requirements and to present three alternative plans for the Guam real property requirements. The tasking had included an evaluation of land requirements on the TTPI as alternatives for facility shortfalls from Guam. CINCPAC was to determine existing and planned utilization of Defense Department facilities and properties to identify those in non-utilized, under-utilized, or non-optimally-utilized categories based on long range requirements. He was also to determine alternative plans to justify retention of Defense Department holdings and/or to reduce Defense Department holdings on Guam considering near and long term requirements.

(C) The study was developed under stringent assumptions and a "worst case" foreign base denial situation in order to generate the broad spectrum of forces that might need to be accommodated in U.S. territory. Since Project GATEWAY was an assessment of real estate potential, not a strategy study, this "worst case" assumption provided the impetus to identify facilities and land requirements to support forces considered as potential candidates for redeployment. From the standpoint of identifying contingency requirements for Defense Department land holdings on Guam, Project GATEWAY provided requirements that substantiated the advisability of retaining almost all military land under Defense Department

1. J5128 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 1102192 May 72.
jurisdiction, approximately one-third of Guam. An already approved Navy program for acquisition of 3,720 acres for the Sella Bay Ammunition Pier Safety Zone by exchange of lands was considered critical to both U.S. military and Government of Guam land use requirements. A continuing insistence, however, by the Governor for an acre-for-acre exchange for the needed 3,720 acres of Sella Bay land, CINCPAC believed, would stalemate both the approved Navy program and the Governor's near term needs.

CINCPAC advised the JCS that the GATEWAY study had highlighted several areas that warranted further analysis, and caution in the face of strategic realities. The study identified the maximum capability to develop land and facilities to accommodate the assumed forces. These forces had been identified to develop a gross beddown capability. Alternative beddown capabilities were not intended to reflect an evaluation of mission priorities or force mixes for the most effective support of the PACOM forward strategy from Guam. CINCPAC advised that the concentration of forces proposed for beddown on Guam provided the potential for an attractive enemy target, similar to force concentrations on Okinawa or Oahu. It was also recognized that U.S. strategic and forward basing concepts would be reexamined if the base denial assumptions in the study should become fact. The ability to support the PACOM forward strategy was greatly impaired by the postulated rollback. Any tacit endorsement of the overall Guam basing concept, CINCPAC said, must be tempered by scrupulously reemphasizing the need to retain current basing alignments on foreign soil to support the forward PACOM strategy. The study, CINCPAC continued, should be utilized to identify potential relocation sites for forces requiring equivalent land and facilities and should be used as a basis of site selection if selective force relocations were determined to be necessary. CINCPAC noted that Project GATEWAY highlighted the need for coordinated joint planning for using the limited real estate on Guam in order to insure that expediency did not degrade potential future capabilities through oversight or unilateral Service consideration. CINCPAC recommended that the study be utilized as a starting point for any future considerations and decisions regarding Guam bases and future force relocations or assignments to the Guam-TPPI area. He reaffirmed, however, that a basing study should be a follow-up to a threat assessment, strategy determination, and related force posture rather than have basing capability dictate strategy and force changes.1

Shortly after he forwarded the Project GATEWAY study, CINCPAC submitted his report on an Integrated Plan for Military Development of Tinian. This planning was done considering Tinian as part of the overall PACOM basing structure and specifically as an integral element of the Guam-TPPI basing complex. For this reason, the Tinian plan was developed in conjunction with Project GATEWAY.

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0048-72, 8 Jan 72, Subj: Special Guam Study (Project GATEWAY) (U).
were three land use plans for the orderly military development of Tinian to correspond to the three alternative recommendations for utilization of the military land holdings on Guam. As each Tinian plan derived its beddown/mission requirements from its corresponding Guam alternative, the Tinian plans and the Guam alternatives were complementary and together they constituted plans that provided for accommodating military requirements that resulted from denials of bases in certain forward areas. Although several alternative development plans for Tinian were possible for each Guam alternative, only the optimum land development plan based on the minimum essential land area required to accommodate requirements was fully developed. There was only one Tinian plan for each Guam alternative. The Guam alternative selected for implementation would determine the Tinian plan that would serve as the basis for detailed planning and programming actions by the Services for the military development of Tinian, provided that the specified minimum land area was successfully acquired for military use. The Tinian plans represented participatory planning by CINCPAC's components and CINCSAC. CINCPAC explained, to maximize joint use and minimize duplication of requirements. A factor recognized but not considered was the inadvisability of concentrating large military resources on a small island mass. For this reason, CINCPAC recommended that prior to execution of the plans the National Command Authority evaluate the strategic risks and the operational feasibility of the high concentration of military requirements on Tinian.

A Wake Island study was also conducted in 1972. The Air Force was studying the matter of possible base closure and CINCPAC was asked to comment. CINCPAC replied on 23 August after consulting his Army and Navy components. He noted that transport and support aircraft could be routed through various combinations of other islands with the only impact an increase in transit time and a requirement for improved facilities at some stations to accommodate the increased traffic. Until the projected reduction of Southeast Asia forces was complete, however, any reduction of Wake Island's capability to support enroute and overflight of conventional and jet aircraft was not considered in the best interest of expedient, economical, and safe deployment of aircraft to and from the PACOM area. He also noted that in addition to air traffic facilities the commercially operated trans-Pacific submarine cable was routed by Wake; this cable was the prime source of circuitry to the Western Pacific and although the cable head there was not used to capacity, its latent capability increased the advisability of having Wake Island available during contingency operations. CINCPAC recommended that Wake be maintained with existing capabilities as long as air operations in Southeast Asia continued. "Should it become necessary

thereafter to close Wake Island because of budget limitations, facilities there should be maintained capable of quick reopening in event of contingency operations in Westpac. ¹

Alaska Wilderness Area

(5) Late in 1971 CINCPAC had approved a statement to be submitted to the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife emphasizing the necessity for military installations in the Aleutians and agreeing that only those lands necessary for operations should be excluded from being designated as wilderness. Late in 1971 CINCPAC also queried his component commanders regarding their specific requirements for Aleutian lands. On 23 February 1972 CINCPAC advised his Liaison Officer to the Alaskan Command of the continuing requirements, requesting that he represent CINCPAC at appropriate Bureau hearings and present the military land requirements as stated. ²

(5) CINCUSARPAC had no assigned mission in the area and therefore had no requirements for real estate or holdings there. CINCPACFLT listed the Naval Station and the Naval Facility at Adak. He also advised that the possible establishment of a facility to monitor Unimak Strait by hydrophones required that the land being used by the Coast Guard should be retained for military use should the Coast Guard determine at some future time that it had no further requirement for the west end of Unimak Island.

(5) CINCPACAF listed seven sites, some of which were on Coast Guard land, U.S. Navy land, or occupied through agreement with the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. The sites were Shemya Air Force Base, Northeast Cape on St. Lawrence Island, Driftwood Bay on Unalaska Island, Cape Saricheff on Unimak Island, Nikolski on Umnak Island, Adak Naval Air Station (an Air Force communications relay station), and Casco Cove on Attu Island. Both CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT provided rationale for continued use of the facilities listed.

CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 1972

The Soviet Threat in Asia

(TS) During 1972, the Soviets continued to upgrade their military forces in the Far East and along the Sino-Soviet border. While the changes noted in 1972 were not as dramatic as immediately following the border crisis, they did serve to improve the overall capability of the forces. During the year, no significant changes were noted in the Far East Long Range Aviation bomber or intercontinental ballistic missile inventories. The production of Yankee class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in the Far East remained at previous levels with two new units delivered, and one additional unit transferred from the North Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. At year's end, the total Yankee class SSBN strength in the Pacific was nine units.

(TS) The strength of the Far East ground forces continued to increase in 1972. In three areas--Far East Military District, Transbaykal Military District, and Mongolia--the total number of line divisions increased, bringing the total to 33. The total ground forces in the Far East numbered 46 divisions at the end of the year.

(TS) While the size of the Soviet Pacific naval forces did not change significantly during 1972, improvement of their quality continued with some older units being phased out. The trend in the surface navy is toward ships with improved sea-keeping endurance, propulsion, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and, foremost, a missile-armed fleet more capable of self defense and offensive action. However, the Soviet Pacific Fleet generally lags other Soviet fleets in the introduction of new units. The Pacific Fleet did achieve a possible improvement in command and control by the introduction of a converted Sverdlov-class cruiser as a command and control ship. The only other ship of this type was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

(TS) The Soviet naval aviation inventory in the Pacific increased during the year. Most of the increase was in ASW aircraft which increased from 97 (including 56 helicopters) to 124 (including 73 helicopters). The Pacific Fleet concentrated mainly on ASW exercises; however, while there was probably an overall improvement in ASW readiness, no significant breakthroughs were noted.

(TS) Tactical and air defense (PVO) aircraft strength in the Far East and along the Sino-Soviet border showed some increase, but more important was the introduction of new equipment. One ICBM complex, Drovyana, conducted at
least three operational launches to Kamchatka during the year.\footnote{J2212C, D Point Paper, 26 Jan 73, Subj: Soviet Threat in Asia: 1972 Assessment and Trends; J2/Memo/00023-73, 5 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History.}

**Soviet Encroachments in Singapore**

(5) The Soviet interest in Singapore may be designed to achieve several goals: to neutralize Communist China’s growing influence, to take advantage of opportunities stemming from the western withdrawal from the region, and to extend Soviet influence over the Strait of Malacca. The Soviets probably desire to develop a support facility in Singapore to service their naval and merchant ships operating in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The first contract, the repair of three Soviet whalers, was signed on 13 December 1971; the work was done in Keppel Harbor in the spring of 1972. In May 1972, an agreement was concluded providing for the first refit of Soviet naval or naval-associated ships, a cable-laying ship and two oilers.

(5) Refitting of the three Soviet auxiliaries in 1972 was not a serious electronic intelligence (ELINT) threat to Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom (ANZUK) forces. However, since the establishment of the ANZUK Force in November 1971, the presence within the ANZUK naval area of Soviet warships and certain other Soviet ships resulted in at least one communications security restriction being in force in some part of the ANZUK area 80 percent of the time.

(5) About six to eight Soviet naval auxiliary ships per year have called at Singapore. Singapore officials have stated that no naval engineering units or any type of Soviet naval shore presence would be allowed at Sembawang. However, East European vessels were being repaired there at the end of 1972. A Singapore government plan called for converting two former naval ship berths at Stores Basin to commercial use, a move that would permit peacetime servicing of Soviet ships in the Sembawang facility. The availability of dock facilities on a purely commercial basis at Jurong or Keppel dockyards also may be intended. These facilities would be useful to the Soviet Navy for emergency repairs only. As of the end of 1972, all visiting Soviet naval units had been provisioned at moorings in mid-harbor and had not berthed alongside piers. Singapore probably will not allow the Soviets to establish a naval shore facility in face of strong resistance from five-power partners (United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia), and in view of the periodic presence of U.S. fleet units at Sembawang.

(5) Soviet bankers established themselves in Singapore in mid-1972 with the opening of the Moscow Narodny Bank of London. The Singapore government...
Limited the combined savings deposits of the bank to 240,000 Singapore dollars; however, in June 1972 the bank was said to be lending money as if its supply was unlimited.¹

The Communist Chinese Threat

(TS) The People's Republic of China (PRC) intends to attain the status of a major nuclear power, accepting the economic burden involved and the risks of slowing economic development through the diversion of scarce resources and skills to specialized military tasks. Communist China was becoming a major producer of nuclear weapons. Estimates gave the PRC the capability of having 50 to 250 thermonuclear and 250 to 300 fission weapons by mid-1973, and the possibility existed at the end of 1972 that the PRC already possessed a thermonuclear weapon which could be delivered by a missile. Approximately 60 surface-to-surface missile (SS) launch positions had been detected; this included those used for research and development and for training. A year before only five had been detected.

(TS) The PRC's strategic bomber force increased its inventory of TU-16 aircraft from 40 in 1971 to 55 at the end of 1972. Capable of carrying a thermonuclear weapon to a radius of 1,650 nautical miles, the TU-16 could strike most targets in the eastern USSR, South Asia, Japan, and the Philippines.²

(TS) There were sufficient PRC ground and air forces deployed opposite Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula to enter into combat operations with little prior buildup and strategic warning. A buildup for a major offensive against the USSR, India, or Taiwan should provide some prior warning because the preparation for such an offensive would require a major redeployment of forces.

(TS) An all-out PRC campaign against Southeast Asia would aim at the early capture of Rangoon, Burma; Bangkok, Thailand; and Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. The PRC ground forces opposite Southeast Asia numbered 378,000. Augmentation could be accomplished by deploying divisions from other regions. Logistically, in a campaign in Southeast Asia the PRC could support 760,000 troops during the dry season and 76,000 during the wet season. Also available would be 1,500 jet fighter aircraft and 100 IL-28 bombers.

(TS) Up to 50 divisions, more than half a million men, could be assembled by the PRC within 30 days for an attack on the Republic of Korea. The combined Chinese/North Korean ground threat against the Republic of Korea amounted to more than one million men. Supporting the attack from bases in PRC and North

¹ J2213A Point Paper, 24 Jan 73, Subj: Soviet Encroachments in Singapore.

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Korea would be 1,500 Chinese fighter aircraft and 150 light bombers. In a campaign against the USSR, the PRC could initially support a force of 115 divisions. In addition, 1,500 jet fighter aircraft, 300 light bombers, and all PRC strategic forces could be committed.

(TS) Against India, the PRC could logistically support the equivalent of 15 divisions through the many border mountain passes. The optimum period for such an attack would be September through December. A simultaneous attack by nine divisions through Burma could be launched from November to March. About 350 aircraft could support the attack. Without United States intervention, the PRC is believed to be capable of taking Taiwan. Strikes against Taiwan by 1,500 fighter aircraft and 150 bombers could be easily undertaken. Peking would be limited by a lack of an adequate airlift and an initial amphibious assault capability of two to four divisions.

Sino-Soviet Military Confrontation

(S) The Soviets and the PRC seemed anxious to avoid a military conflict along their common border. The border talks were at a stalemate. Moscow's minimum demand was believed to be that the PRC cease making ideological challenges and withdraw border claims to Soviet territory. The PRC seemed unwilling to do either. Communist China has prepared a conventional defense in depth and is systemically deploying in a manner that it is hoped will be a deterrent to a Soviet nuclear strike. The minimum demand of the PRC is believed to be that Moscow drastically reduce and pull back the forces along the border, but indications are that the Soviets will continue to maintain and improve the quality of the border forces.

(S) The Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border will probably continue to be equipped, structured, and deployed for fast moving offensive operations. While the Soviets might have limited objectives under a concept of strategic defense, they would be pushed to a tactical offensive because the population centers and facilities are so close to the border that a defense in depth would be impractical.

(S) There was a reorientation of the PRC strategic defensive posture from the south and east to the north and northeast; however, no major military elements had moved to the border. While the PRC nuclear forces and military capabilities will increase and its international position will improve, the Soviet military technological progress will keep the USSR well out in front for the foreseeable future. The possibility of a major Sino-Soviet conflict will con-

tinue to decrease, but the bitter dispute will not end. Hostilities could still occur as a result of miscalculation, escalation of minor border skirmishes, or a combination of unforeseen circumstances.¹

# Communist Far East Ground Strength

## USSR* as of 1 Jan 1974

### Major Field Units of Soviet Army
- 4 Corps Bases
- 28 Motorized Rifle Divisions
- 6 Tank Divisions
- 2 Artillery (Gao) Divisions
- 2 Motorized Rifle Brigades
- 5 Artillery Brigades
- 5 SS-3 Scud B Bases

### Personnel
- 265,000

Includes Primorsk, Far-Eastern Districts, & Mongolia

Does not include 1st ground units assigned to

- Territorial air defense (PAO)
- Coastal defense forces

- Soviet Navy
- Ground crews 
- Support elements of the air forces 
- 3rd internal security forces 
- and Border Guard Troops

## China as of 1 Jan 1973

### 16 Armies
- 114 Infantry Divisions
- 16 Field Artillery Divisions
- 16 AAA Divisions
- 8 AAA Divisions
- 6 Armored Divisions
- 10 Armored Divisions
- 12 Cavalry Divisions
- 9 Airborne Divisions
- 11 Railway Engineer Divisions
- 11 Engineer Divisions

### Personnel
- 2,525,000

Includes: 1 infantry, 7 tank, and 5 cavalry, 46 border/ internal defense, 19 artillery, and 26 engine. 11 signal 1 anti CW and 17 MRZ Trops.

## North Vietnam as of 1 Jan 1974

### Regular Forces (Note 1)
- 7 Inf Divs
- 1 Inf Div
- 1 Inf Group
- 1 Art Div
- 1 Arm Div
- 7 Indep Bt
- 7 Arm Divs
- 3 Arm Divs
- 11 AAA Divs
- 10 AAA Divs
- 10 AAA Divs

### MILITIA
- Class I: Full Time Militia Members Armed with Semi- automatic weapons and small caliber Army Weapons

### Security Forces
- Regular Army

### Personnel
- 33,700

Includes: 1 infantry, 7 tank, and 5 cavalry, 46 border/ internal defense, 19 artillery, and 26 engine. 11 signal 1 anti CW and 17 MRZ Trops.

### Notes
1. Strength does not include approximately 100,000 men deployed outside of North Vietnam.
2. Estimated to consist of 1,600,000 people's militia/ self-defense forces and 3,700,000 reserve forces.

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*SECRET*

**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 27.
COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION

# COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH
## FAR EAST & PACIFIC

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- **AS OF 1 JAN 73**
- a. One is in reserve (Total: 3)
- b. Six in reserve (Total: 19)
- c. Two in reserve (Total: 20)
- d. As of 1 Jan 1973
- e. 9 Yankee Class plus 2 H-II Class SSBNs, Total 11
- **SOURCE:** Command Digest, 25 Feb 73, p. 30; J2/Memo/80023-73, 5 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History.
# SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>North Vietnam</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighter (Day)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Bomber (D/A)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber (D/A)</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>545</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber (D/A)</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>247</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1116</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Support Aircraft</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Light</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>1670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Piston Transport, Medium</td>
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<td>Jet Transport, Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Transport, Light</td>
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<td>243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Trainer</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>280</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2428</td>
<td>2424</td>
<td>4852</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>636</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>1270</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel Strengths:**

- North Korea: 78,000
- North Vietnam: 11,000
- Total: 165,000
- Total combat aircraft: 10,000

**Notes:**
1. Includes aircraft within the Far East, Transbaikal, Siberian, Central Asian and Turkestan
2. Military Districts which are threat to PACOM
3. Includes 100,000 personnel assigned to A & W SAM / AAA units
4. Does not include ASW Helicopters
5. Includes 117 combat or transport aircraft
6. Includes 14 jet fighters located in China

**Sources:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 32.
## SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AS OF 1 JAN 73</th>
<th>CHINESE COMMUNIST</th>
<th>AS OF 1 JUN 72</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>AS OF 1 JAN 73</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM</th>
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<tr>
<td>TYPE</td>
<td>SITES LAUNCHERS</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>240.400&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SA-5&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.40</td>
<td>SA-5&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>SA-5&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a.** Chi Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.

**b.** Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. Estimated 70 battalions. 25-35 sites 1st to be photo occupied at one time.

**c.** 8 SA-5 complexes may consist of 1 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.

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**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 34; J2/Memo/00023-73, 5 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History.
CHAPTER III--PLANNING

SECTION I--CINCPAC OPERATION PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans were regularly reviewed and revised as necessary, a process that continued throughout 1972. Certain specific actions are described below. One change to planning requirements occurred in 1972. In 1969 the JCS had developed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), in which there were two categories of plans--complete plans and concept plans. Complete plans were those that could be translated into an operation order with minimum alteration. A concept plan was an operation plan in abbreviated format that required further development in detail prior to implementation. Although the requirement to consider operations security in the planning of military operations had existed for several years, definitive guidance had not been provided in planning guidance documents. CINCPAC Operations Security personnel recommended inclusion of a mandatory annex, Annex L--Operations Security, for each complete operation plan. CINCPAC added the requirement in his Planning Guidance Manual and on 1 November it was added to the JOPS guidance provided by the JCS.1

OPLAN 5020A-Z

This was a series of plans that provided a list of possible reprisal options for use against North Korean provocations. On 10 February a one-day planning conference was convened by CINCPAC to explore preliminary planning problem areas and to determine future planning actions necessary to revise and update the plan. The conferees determined a revised list of concept plans that were considered to be feasible and viable options responsive to current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking and PACOM force levels. The revised list deleted seven options, combined six options into three new ones, and added one completely new option. CINCPAC noted that Option Z, which was the implementation of CINCPAC OPLAN 5027, appeared to be beyond the scope of the retaliatory options envisioned in the JSCP for FY 72-73. CINCPAC forwarded the revised list to the JCS for conceptual approval prior to continuing further planning actions necessary to revise the plans.2


2. CINCPAC T90238Z Feb 72; J5118 HistSum Feb 72. The letter designations for certain plans were rearranged; the CINCPAC message of 19 February lists both old and new letter designations.
(TS) The JCS approved the recommendations with the exception of the recommendation to delete the "O" Plan, ROK Deep Penetration of North Korea, for which additional information was requested. When further rationale was furnished, the JCS approved deletion of the plan, as CINCPAC had proposed. CINCPAC designated each of his component commanders as coordinating agents for certain of the options and requested that revised plans be forwarded to CINCPAC by the end of FY 72.1

(TS) Meanwhile, in April, in accordance with JSCP instructions, CINCPAC advised the JCS that recent deployment of USAF forces from Korea, coupled with limited PACOM airlift assets, made it doubtful that the timing (from alert time to execution time) could be met for 10 of the 17 concept plans. He advised that the estimated timing capability for those options was 84 hours instead of 24 to 48 hours.2

OPLAN 5027

(C) CINCPAC Operation Plan 5027, Defense of Korea (6), received considerable staff attention in the process of being revised in 1972, much having to do with the feasibility of moving forces in an execution of the plan. Early in the year a movement feasibility analysis of the force list proposed for the revision of the plan was conducted at the JCS by CINCPAC J4/J5 representatives. They developed simulation computer models MORG/GFE that were used in performing the analysis (Movement Requirements Generator/Gross Feasibility Estimator). The analysis demonstrated that with minor adjustment of the time-phasing of the force list and modification of certain supply policies, movement requirements could be met with existing lift capabilities.3

(C) On 28 and 29 March a conference was held at Camp Smith to update the component commanders, COMUS Korea, and CINCPAC staff planners on the status of the revision, to apprise them of the results of the movement feasibility analysis, identify shortfalls, and arrive at a final integrated Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) for the revised plan. The Service components made changes to the plan concept and introduction of major forces to the area of operation. It was anticipated that major shortfalls would be greatly reduced as a result of the changes. It was believed that a fourth MORG/GFE run would be necessary before the logistic annex to the plan could be finalized.4

(U) Before the conference was held CINCPAC had announced that submission

1. JCS 9812/150042Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 092223Z May 72; JCS 8192/171423Z May 72; CINCPAC 092224Z May 72.
2. CINCPAC 222323Z Apr 72.
4. CINCPAC 150531Z Mar 72; J4721 HistSum Mar 72.
of the Base Development Plan (BDP) would be held in abeyance. As a result of the conference several changes were made that had major impact on the effort to complete the BDP, so production of the plan was to be delayed until a new TPFDL was published. This process of delays continued in several aspects of the planning throughout the year. (The original schedule for completion of the plan had been published in August 1971 and revised in October of that year; at that time completion of the plan revision was scheduled for March 1972.) On 15 April CINCPAC established 30 October 1972 the date for submission of BDP appendixes by the component commanders and COMUS Korea and 15 December as the date for the CINCPAC BDP appendix. The TPFDL was then scheduled for 1 July 1972.1

(C) In May a BDP study group met at Camp Smith to discuss changes to construction category codes, engineer intelligence, and completion schedules. In August another study group (CINCPAC staff members) again appraised the MORG/GFE to analyze plan feasibility and determined that it seemed to be within existing transportation capabilities with the exception of munitions movements from the Continental United States. A more detailed analysis was subsequently prepared.2

(U) On 7 December CINCUSARPAC advised that major problems related to computer assistance would delay BDP submission into 1973; CINCPAC so advised the JCS.3

(TS) In connection with the 5027 plan, CINCPACAF had some questions regarding his plan C104 concerning the organization and operation of the Joint Air Operations Center, Korea (JAOCK). CINCPACAF was revising his plan and requested CINCPAC's interpretation of certain areas of concern for clarification and inclusion in the revision. The areas addressed concerned Annex C, Command Relationships, to CINCPAC's OPLAN 5027 and regarded the manner, format, detail, and frequency of broad CINCPAC guidance to the JAOCK; the type of communications to be utilized during a tactical emergency in Korea; and a recommendation to include the Korean area Rules of Engagement (ROE) in CINCPAC OPLAN 5027.

(TS) CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF that broad guidance would be disseminated by general service SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE messages using standard format and that the detail and frequency would be dependent on the direction received from higher authority. He also advised that during tactical emergencies the most readily available means of communication would be used and he listed the most likely nets. CINCPAC further advised that while it would be possible to incorporate the Korean area ROE in OPLAN 5027, "the spectrum of situations envisioned under ...[the plan] is sufficiently broad to warrant anticipation of changes prior to implementation of this plan." He did not recommend incorporation "at this time."4

1. CINCPAC 202257Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 022316Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 150201Z Apr 72.
3. CINCUSARPAC 072137Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 160416Z Dec 72.
4. CINCPACAF 201930Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 270235Z Feb 72.
CONPLAN 5060

Concept Plan 5060 was concerned with Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC) planning. It provided for military support to be rendered by the PACOM to assist the Department of State in the emergency care, protection, and evacuation of U.S. non-combatants and designated aliens located in countries in the PACOM. CINCPAC's plan had been approved by the JCS in 1971. On 1 January 1972, as a result of revisions to the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC assumed evacuation responsibility for South Asia. He published Change 1 to the 5060 plan on 3 January. He levied military evacuation responsibility for South Asia on the Office of the Defense Representative India (ODRI) and the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP). The ODRI was tasked to act as a military point of contact on evacuation matters and to provide advisory assistance to the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions for India, Bhutan, Ceylon, the Republic of the Maldives, Nepal, and Sikkim. The ODRP was tasked to perform a similar function for Pakistan and Afghanistan. The JCS approved Change 1 on 24 March and CINCPAC so advised holders of the plan on 27 March.1

Cambodia NEMVAC planning also came under study in 1972. Redeployment actions from Southeast Asia had reduced the capability of COMUSMACV to render NEMVAC assistance to the American Embassy in Phnom Penh. The Ambassador had therefore requested development of a military plan for NEMVAC by means other than through Vietnam. On 21 November CINCPAC advised the JCS that, subject to their concurrence, he proposed relieving COMUSMACV of the Cambodia responsibility and tasking COMUSMCTHAI to provide the necessary assistance, when directed.2

At the same time CINCPAC requested that COMUSMCTHAI prepare and submit for approval a draft copy of a supporting plan to CINCPAC 5060 designed to assist the Ambassador in Phnom Penh in the emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated aliens from Cambodia to Thailand. The plan was to be submitted in sufficient time to permit implementation by COMUSMCTHAI prior to the loss by COMUSMACV of the capability to execute his supporting plan. COMUSMACV was requested to coordinate as necessary with COMUSMCTHAI on the transfer of responsibility and to advise all concerned of the approximate date he anticipated losing his capability to execute the plan. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF were requested to be prepared to provide the assets required by COMUSMCTHAI to accomplish the evacuation mission.3

COMUSMACV advised that he could execute his CONPLAN at that time (25 November) only with extreme difficulty and recommended that the NEMVAC responsibility for assisting the Ambassador be transferred to COMUSMCTHAI as soon as possible but no later than 10 December.3

2. SECSTATE 208590/160001Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 212211Z Nov 72.
3. COMUSMACV 251035Z Nov 72.
Pending completion of his supporting plan, COMUSMACTHAI submitted a "concept of operations" on 12 December, how he intended to assist the Ambassador in an emergency evacuation. To facilitate plan development, CINCPAC asked his component commanders to submit comments and recommendations on the proposed concept. They complied, as requested. CINCPAC approved the concept, subject to the incorporation of several substantive comments provided on 20 December. COMUSMACTHAI was advised to ensure that his concept plan indicated that he was the designated coordinating authority for CINCPAC for NEMVAC operations in Cambodia and, as such, was to exercise overall coordination of military evacuation operations and to conduct liaison, as appropriate, with all concerned. As security requirements for NEMVAC operations in Cambodia under "worst-case" conditions might necessitate employment of security forces larger than two Platoons, COMUSMACTHAI was requested to include in his plan provisions for requesting additional support from PACOM reserve forces, as warranted by circumstances.

COMUSMACTHAI was advised to be prepared to implement his Concept of Operations, as modified, if required by circumstances, and to submit his completed supporting plan after effecting necessary coordination.1

OPLAN 5066

CINCPAC Operation Plan 5066, Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Nuclear Weapons Tests (C), provided for intelligence collection operations in the PACOM area. It also provided for collection of data concerned with the effects of a nuclear-disturbed environment on communications systems. CINCPAC had submitted the plan to the JCS for approval in November 1971; approval was received in February 1972.2

OPLAN 5082

CINCPAC Operation Plan 5082 provided for the defense of the western approach to the Panama Canal and for augmentation or support of the U.S. Southern Command. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for FY 72-73 no longer tasked CINCPAC for defense of the canal. Consequently, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the plan be cancelled. CINCPAC advised that he would continue to maintain readiness to augment or support the USSOUTHCOM in minor contingencies as stipulated in the JSCP. The JCS authorized cancellation and CINCPAC so advised all holders of the plan in June.3

1. COMUSMACTHAI 121001Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 121940Z Dec 72; CINCUSARPAC 150242Z Dec 72; CINCPACFLT 160137Z Dec 72; CINCPACAF 160100Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 202116Z Dec 72.
2. JCS 101736Z Feb 72; J5116 HistSum Feb 72.
3. CINCPAC 190318Z May 72; JCS 7726/021824Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 072303Z Jun 72.
OPLAN GARDEN PLOT

GARDEN PLOT was a joint plan that had been developed in 1969 for the employment of Federal military resources in civil disturbance operations in Hawaii, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the island possessions in the PACOM. The plan involved participation by all Services, but was primarily an Army project and CINCUSARPAC was executive agent. On 17 August CINCUSARPAC nominated the new Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division as Commander of Joint Task Force 110 to execute the GARDEN PLOT plan. On 22 August CINCPAC confirmed the nomination and notified the JCS, the Department of the Army, and CINCUSARPAC.1

Single Integrated Operation Plan

The Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) was the general war plan, which was revised semiannually. Revision Kilo was replaced by Revision Lima, which was implemented on 1 July and remained in effect until the end of the year. On 15 and 16 August a briefing team from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff visited Camp Smith to brief CINCPAC and his component commanders on Revision Lima.

The briefing covered the Soviet and Chinese threats to the United States and its allies, the forces committed to the SIOP and trends in vehicle and weapons commitment, the force application for the period covered by the revision considering the threat and available assets, the damage analysis of the application and a look at how it conformed to JCS guidance, the consequences of execution of the SIOP, and future considerations for SIOP planning. In summary, the Soviet and Chinese strategic forces continued to grow. Soviet vehicles were estimated at more than 4,000 in comparison to the SIOP's 1,300. Due to the U.S. lead in multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems our weapons outnumbered theirs by more than 1,000, but the great disparity in mass and tonnage offset our advantage in accuracy and any unknown maneuverability. It also gave the Soviets an advantage in fallout capabilities. The United States was covering a greater number of military targets since the total available to the SIOP had increased by 601, primarily because of the growth of the MIRV systems, but many targets remained that would receive no damage. In addition to quantitative growth, the quality of our missiles in terms of reliability and accuracy had improved. The number of SIOP-committed sorties degraded because of Southeast Asia operations continued to pose a reduction in day-to-day retaliation capability.2

1. CINCPAC 222153Z Aug 72. Before 16 August the GARDEN PLOT commander had been the Commanding General of U.S. Army Hawaii; when that command was disestablished and replaced by the U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii, the GARDEN PLOT function was transferred to the 25th Infantry Division.
SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANNING IN ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER COMMANDERS

CINCPAC Planning in Association with USCINCRED

(§) With the change to the Unified Command Plan that was effective on 1 January 1972, a few matters of planning responsibility remained to be resolved. CINCPAC advised the CINC of the new Readiness Command on some of these matters on 21 January, in response to a query from the REDCOM's antecedent organization late in 1971 regarding the updating of plans in support of CINCPAC subsequent to the change in areas of responsibility. First CINCPAC listed the plans that would task USCINCRED to provide augmentation or reinforcement in accordance with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). These were:

- OPLAN 5001, General War Plan (U)
- CONPLAN 5020F, Rapid Reinforcement of Korea (§)
- OPLAN 5025, Defense of Taiwan/Penghu (C)
- OPLAN 5027, Defense of Korea (C)
- OPLAN 5041/5083, Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia (§)
- OPLAN 5042/5045, Offensive Option to Counter Chinese Communist Intervention in Current Combat Operations in Southeast Asia (§)
- CONPLAN 5096, Defense of India (§)
- CONPLAN 5097, Defense of Pakistan (§)
- CONPLAN for the Evacuation of Non-Combatants from India, Pakistan, and Nepal

(§) CINCPAC then defined the anticipated magnitude of USCINCRED augmentation tasking for those plans. CINCPAC advised that he would effect coordination during early stages of revisions of the plans and that representatives of USCINCRED would be invited to attend those conferences that related to the planned deployment of forces under the control of USREDCOM.¹

¹. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA Me 11828/231622Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 210437Z Jan 72.
Mine Countermeasures and Inshore Undersea Warfare
Planning for Alaskan Waters

(S) In June the Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command (CINCAL) expressed concern over the lack of any identifiable plans for Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Inshore Undersea Warfare (IUW) operations in various Alaskan ports considered strategic in nature. He noted that the U.S.S.R. possessed a significant capability to mine such ports and that such mining might be an attractive option for a measured Soviet response to U.S. actions elsewhere during a confrontation. With no naval component assigned, certain factors relative to an analysis of such potential mining operations were beyond the scope of the ALCOM headquarters. CINCAL, therefore, requested that the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier provide information on the feasibility of Soviet mining in Alaskan waters and a judgment concerning whether or not a countermeasures plan could be developed to enhance the security of Alaskan ports.1

(U) The Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier advised CINCAL that the information requested did not fall within his purview under established guidelines for a single point of contact for Navy operational matters. He recommended that the subject be discussed at the CINCPAC/CINICAL level. CINCAL, therefore, citing his original message, asked CINCPAC to study the matter. CINCPAC asked CINCPAC-FLT for his comments on 1 July.2

(S) On 28 October CINCPAC provided the requested information for CINCAL. When it had been determined that mining of certain ports and waterways was technically feasible, a capabilities plan had been developed to ascertain whether a realistic countermeasures plan could be developed to enhance port security. It was determined that a minimum of 100 minesweepers would be required to appreciably reduce a sustained Soviet mine threat. Conversely, the total PACOM minesweeping assets forecast available as of February 1973 were 16 minesweepers and 1 airborne mine countermeasures unit. In addition to these limited assets, CINCPAC observed that any Soviet mining would probably not be limited to Alaskan ports and that any mining would be viewed as an aggressive military action that could escalate, requiring that the limited assets available be used at those ports considered most vital to the U.S. defense effort. CINCPAC noted that U.S. mine countermeasures forces had not kept pace with Soviet mining capabilities and had been reduced to a token level. CINCPAC concluded that while Soviet mining of specific areas was considered feasible, the paucity of mine countermeasures assets precluded the development of any realistic countermeasures defense plan.3

1. CINCAL 302336Z May 72.
2. COMHANSEAFRON 232020Z Jun; CINCAL 272020Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 012220Z Jul 72.
3. CINCPAC 282322Z Oct 72.
Planning for Weather Evacuation of SAC Aircraft in the PACOM

(S) In response to a request from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to assist in the beddown of PACOM-based B-52s and KC-135s during weather emergency situations, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to develop, in conjunction with SAC, a weather evacuation plan for PACOM. The CINCPACAF submission was based in part on guidance from the State and Defense Departments provided in 1968. It had listed all known restrictions concerning political limitations involved with typhoon and severe weather evacuations to Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand.1

(S) In July CINCPAC advised the JCS that he had reservations about using the 1968 guidance without updating. He noted that the sovereign status of Okinawa, the status of the High Commissioner there, the numbers of aircraft deployed in the Western Pacific area, and the area politico-military considerations had all changed in the four years since the guidance was provided. CINCPAC advised that he concurred in the basic thrust of CINCPACAF's weather evacuation plan, in that it enabled the forces in the PACOM to preserve the maximum flexibility when reacting to potentially destructive acts of nature such as typhoons. He recommended, however, that the basic guidance be updated.2

(U) On 9 November an unclassified B-52 weather evacuation briefing was presented by 8th Air Force representatives to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan to provide a review of weather watch, force generation, and launch procedures leading to evacuation of B-52s from Guam to safe haven air bases in the Western Pacific when a typhoon struck. Procedures included adverse weather diversion of B-52s returning from ARC LIGHT strikes in Southeast Asia. The erratic variations in typhoon activity were discussed as was the lead time required to evacuate a large force. The decision to evacuate had to be based on a "best guess" even if the forecast storm movement later proved erroneous. Wind conditions preceding the main storm were particularly critical in matters of B-52 take-offs or landings. Recovery bases were to be kept to a minimum with every effort to facilitate rapid return to the home station and resumption of operational commitments. Evacuation of B-52s to Yokota would not be undertaken, the Ambassador was told, because of the high profile such action would create and because of the marginal B-52 support facilities there. Kadena facilities were adequate and the location reduced public notice. Evacuated or diverted aircraft were not to be combat loaded and would not launch on strike missions from foreign bases outside of Southeast Asia.3

1. CINCPACAF 150332Z Jul 72.
2. CINCPAC 222159Z Jul 72.
1. COMUS Japan 290736Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 042343Z Oct 72.
Bilateral Planning with Republic of Korea Military Authorities

(TS) In May CINCPAC recommended that he be given authority to initiate bilateral planning with Republic of Korea military authorities to provide for combined participation in counteroffensive air strikes against North Korea, as coordinated by the Joint Air Operations Center, Korea (JAOCK), in the event of resumption of hostilities. On 13 June the JCS approved CINCPAC's request, subject to certain restrictions. These were:

a. Any combined planning will be under the cognizance of CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA and subject to CINCPAC/JCS approval.

b. Defensive counterair will remain the number one priority for the ROKAF.

c. After JAOCK is in operation, all air strikes by the ROKAF in support of CINCPAC objectives will be coordinated by the JAOCK.

d. Extreme care must be taken in the scope, detail, and nature of the planning to insure the ROK cannot infer any added US commitment to the ROK for its defense, nor any specific force levels the US will commit to the defense of the ROK.2

(TS) CINCPAC notified his component commanders and COMUS Korea of the JCS decision, reduced the classification of that part of Operation Plan 5027 that contained the JAOCK concept to SECRET--NOFORN EXCEPT ROK, and authorized ROKAF liaison representation to the JAOCK. In late July CINCPACAF requested authority to downgrade the classification of the Operations Annex to his OPLAN C-104, which provided for the organization and operation of the JAOCK, to allow for the integration of ROKAF liaison representation to the JAOCK. CINCPAC authorized reduction of Annex C, PACAF OPLAN C104 to SECRET--NOFORN EXCEPT ROK on 2 August.3

1. CINCPAC 282119Z Sep 72; JCS 8916/170121Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 051950Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 020030Z Aug 72.
(TS) In his guidance CINCPAC had advised that any planning would be under the cognizance of COMUS Korea and subject to CINCPAC/JCS approval. On 11 July CINCUNC/COMUS Korea addressed the subject to CINCPAC. He noted that the JCS message of 13 June had stated that combined planning would be under the cognizance of CINCUNC/COMUS Korea. "As the OPCON [operational control] of ROK forces has been granted to CINCUNC not COMUSKOREA, it is important that CINCUNC monitor and control this planning. Recommend that...[CINCPAC's guidance of 5 July] be changed to reflect the JCS terminology." CINCPAC, however, recommended strongly to the JCS that their guidance be changed to place combined planning under the cognizance of COMUS Korea. He recognized that the OPCON of ROK forces rested with CINCUNC, but believed this did not preclude bilateral planning between COMUS Korea and the ROK forces in support of CINCPAC unilaterial plan 5027. "The use of the title CINCUNC," CINCPAC continued," has been specifically avoided in CINCPAC bilateral planning correspondence to preclude the connotation of combined planning under the aegis of the UN." The term bilateral was intended to limit planning to U.S. and ROK forces only and to avoid release of information to the United Nations.1

(TS) On 8 August the JCS amended their guidance by directing that bilateral planning be under the cognizance of COMUS Korea instead of CINCUNC/COMUS Korea, thereby restricting such planning to purely U.S.-ROK channels.2

(TS) Since July CINCPAC had been working on a proposed letter of guidance for COMUS Korea for the conduct of bilateral planning with ROK military authorities. He had asked his component commanders and COMUS Korea for their comments. The draft text of the proposed letter was forwarded to the JCS for approval on 25 November. The letter designated COMUS Korea as CINCPAC's principal agent for such planning and identified areas to be included and those to be excluded from planning with ROK military authorities. He noted that planning would stress the primary objective of containing a communist attack and maintaining the territorial integrity of the ROK. COMUS Korea was authorized direct liaison with PACOM Service component commanders. All significant bilateral planning activities were to be reported to CINCPAC; major bilaterally developed plans were to be forwarded to CINCPAC for review.3

(TS) The JCS approved the proposed letter of guidance on 15 December, subject to several changes, one of which deleted the subparagraph relating to possible use of nuclear weapons in defense of the ROK. The CINCPAC staff was awaiting

1. CINCUNC/COMUSK 110649Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 180229Z Jul 72.
3. CINCPAC 250252Z Nov 72.
receipt of amplifying correspondence from the JCS on this matter at the end of
the year prior to finalizing the approved letter of guidance for COMUS Korea.¹

Directives and Plans for Pakistan

(U) In March the Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan requested
information as to whether to continue to operate in accordance with specific
documents that had been promulgated by USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA (the Strike Command/
USCINC Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and South Asia), which had been
disestablished with the Unified Command Plan change effective 1 January 1972.
The documents themselves were not available, but based on the titles the
appropriate CINCPAC document that addressed the same area of interest was
identified. CINCPAC identified those OPLANS that had been replaced by CINCPAC
Concept Plans or CINCPAC Instructions and well as those that were still under
development.²

B-52 Delivery of Navy Sea Mines

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1. J516 Point Paper, 26 Dec 72, Subj: Guidance for Bilateral Planning with ROK
   Military Authorities (U). (The formal letter of guidance was forwarded as
   CINCPAC ltr Ser 00026, 23 Jan 73, Subj: Guidance for Bilateral Planning with
   the Military Authorities of the Republic of Korea (U).)
2. ODRP Islamabad Pakistan 070812Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 222013Z Mar 72.
3. CINCPACFLT 110247Z Oct 72.

TOP SECRET

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1. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 110141Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 070315Z Nov 72.

SECRET

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SECTION III--PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Funding for Psychological Operations Programs

Funding procedures for psychological operations programs had been modified in 1971 in accordance with guidance from the Secretary of State. For the first time the program approved in 1972 was funded from both Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds, and in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand from Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded (MAP/MAFS) funds. Continuing action was taken to further isolate all psychological operations costs in the PACOM provided through the MAP, including training, supplies, and equipment.1

On 29 January 1972 CINCPAC approved a $7.325 million FY 73 program. It was expected that the costs listed below would increase materially when all MAP costs for psychological operations were isolated.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>FY 73 Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>$199,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>122,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PSYOP Group</td>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>2,828,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>1,604,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPCHJUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>1,339,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(U.S. leaflet operations:)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUNTAIN PEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,339,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPCHJUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC Special</td>
<td>OMA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMEDTC</td>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>195,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>$7,325,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For FY 73 requirements, elements of expense were listed as follows: personnel salaries $1,599,581; personnel benefits $118,883; travel and transportation $98,200; printing and reproduction $4,091,740; purchased services $392,070; supplies $501,720; and equipment $157,533. Funds were allocated for almost 6 billion pamphlets, posters, calendars, and magazines.3

2. CINCPAC 292330Z Jan 72.
3. Ibid.
Experience late in 1971 had demonstrated that psychological operations programs that had been being funded by OMA funds in MAP/MAFS countries (Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand) had been materially reduced when forced to complete for MAP/MAFS support with materiel and supplies. CINCPAC's policy was that psychological operations were a vital and viable instrument in the conduct of warfare in Asia and as such must be a component of all U.S. military and political activities conducted within the PACOM. This policy continued to influence psychological operations budget requests and action in 1972.¹

**Strategic Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia**

In mid-1972 CINCPAC assumed responsibility for direct control and management of a consolidated strategic psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign. Annex D to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 72-73, of 28 December 1971, had tasked CINCPAC to conduct, in conjunction with U.S. Embassies concerned, a continuing psychological offensive in Indochina. Strategic operations being performed or supported by COMUSMACV would have been affected by the rapidly diminishing U.S. forces available in Vietnam. These were consolidated into an overall campaign for Southeast Asia and managed by CINCPAC Operation Order 5102. CINCPAC assumed overall responsibility on 1 July.

Objectives of the program were to degrade enemy combat effectiveness by fostering dissension, doubt, defection, desertion, or surrender; to demoralize the enemy by psychologically isolating him from the local population; to create a favorable image of the host government in the eyes of the enemy and the people; when appropriate, to inform the target audience of the legitimate nature of the government— that it was moving in the direction of social justice for the people and that it was deserving of support; to communicate selected factual information of what was taking place within the country and the world; to undermine the political stability of enemy armed forces and civil populations by creating rebellious attitudes and by fostering divisions between the enemy's ethnic, military, religious, and political groups; and to limit the effectiveness of enemy PSYOP and political warfare.²

A number of PSYOP operations, primarily involving radio operations and aerial dissemination of leaflets to target audiences in denied or contested areas of Southeast Asia, were consolidated into the strategic campaign. These are described below.

FRANTIC GOAT (SOUTH) was a high altitude leaflet dissemination operation over the Republic of Vietnam targeted against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese

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1. J5611 HistSum Jan 72.
2. CINCPAC 122040Z Feb 72.
Army. Approximately 40 million leaflets a month were disseminated; one C-130 could disseminate roughly 10 million leaflets per sortie. FRANTIC GOAT (NORTH) was a high altitude leaflet operation directed against target audiences in North Vietnam. This operation had been discontinued when planning for consolidation of programs was in progress early in 1972, but the North Vietnamese April offensive revived it. The program names were changed at the direction of the JCS: FRANTIC GOAT (SOUTH) became PRAIRIE LIGHTNING and FRANTIC GOAT (NORTH) became FIELD GOAL.¹

(§) From the opening of the enemy offensive in April, the primary PSYOP effort had been directed against the armed forces and population of North Vietnam. On 8 May the Secretary of State requested that the Ambassador in Saigon initiate a leaflet campaign to be conducted against NVA forces in the RVN and, as resources became available, in North Vietnam itself. On 9 May the JCS asked CINCPAC to begin immediately a saturation leaflet campaign against NVA forces in both South and North Vietnam. Also on 9 May CINCPAC directed his subordinate unified and component commands to resume aerial leaflet operations using both overflight and wind drift dissemination techniques. On 12 May the Secretary of State expanded the target audience to include the population of North Vietnam. FIELD GOAL employed USAF C-130s and a B-52 on temporary duty from the Strategic Air Command on wind drift missions. It used tactical jet aircraft on overflight missions dropping M-129 leaflet bombs. In addition six drones were shipped to Thailand, arriving 28 June, and SAC reconnaissance was tasked by the JCS to conduct drone leaflet operations along with BUFFALO HUNTER reconnaissance operations (with the reconnaissance operations having priority over the leaflet operations).²

(§) In May, in Washington, the Psychological Pressure Operations Group (PPOG) was formed. (CINCPAC was advised in a joint State-Defense-USIA message on 25 May.) It was an inter-agency group under the aegis of the National Security Council's ad hoc group on Indochina formed to "manage, coordinate, and act as clearing house for President's psychological offensive against DRV." This offensive was to complement the military, diplomatic, and political actions being undertaken. The guiding principle of the group was that there was a "qualitatively different activity to be undertaken--a psychological offensive--which is not limited to the types of activity routinely conducted in the past. Much more is needed than a maximization of ongoing programs," the message said, "although quantitative and qualitative expansion of ongoing programs" was also desired. The PPOG was to carry out four functions: the generation of action (as opposed to thematic) operations; the production of themes and suggested scripts for psychological operations of the spoken and printed word; the gathering of information for pressure operations; and the declassification of informa-

¹ Ibid.; J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
² J562 HistSum Jun 72; JCS 1288/221256Z Jun 72.
tion when needed for pressure operations. This group consisted of State and
Defense Department, and U.S. Information Agency (USIA) representatives.
"Each agency is contributing in an area a little outside, but complementary to
its traditional function, recognizing that the climactic nature of events in
Indochina calls for extraordinary initiative at this time." 1

(TS) Formation of the PPOG was followed by the establishment of the Saigon
PSYOP Task Force (SPTF) to coordinate the offensive against the NVA; this agency
was under the direction of the Ambassador. At this time CINCPAC reviewed Opera-
tion Order 5102 (not yet in effect) to determine if any changes were necessary.
None were necessary to accommodate PPOG and SPTF policy guidance, as 5102 did not
alter the Embassy's role, it only changed the military command that supported
the Embassy (from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC). 2

(TS) On 26 June the JCS requested a new type of leaflet program. They re-
quested that two special leaflets bearing a quality facsimile of a North Viet-
namese one and five dong bank notes be developed, printed, and disseminated as
part of the FIELD GOAL operation. A total of 46.5 million inflation leaflets
were printed utilizing one, two, and five dong notes, and by the end of 1972
all but 3.5 million had been disseminated into North Vietnam by B-52s, drones,
C-130s, and F-4 aircraft at CINCPAC direction. The majority were delivered into
the North Vietnamese Panhandle area, partly because of interruptions in authority
to deliver leaflets north of 20° North Latitude and partly because of limited
availability of vehicles capable of dropping leaflets in the high threat Red
River Delta area. CINCPAC stopped dissemination of the special leaf-
lets on 25 November because of the volume already disseminated in the Panhandle
area. When leaflet and psychological warfare material dissemination above 20°
North was again authorized on 23 December, CINCPAC authorized delivery of the
remaining leaflets into populated areas above 20° North. He also requested that
CINCUSARPAC take preparatory actions to print additional leaflets with
revised text. 3

(TS) CINCPAC planned to disseminate a minimum of 240 million leaflets a
month into North Vietnam (120 million each in the Panhandle and Red River Delta
areas) to comply with the saturation leaflet requirement levied by the JCS on
9 May. This was never achieved, however, due to the combination of adverse
seasonal wind conditions, capacity of delivery assets capable of hitting the
areas, and shortages of delivery assets due to competing requirements. Clima-
tological conditions and operational limitations of the C-130, with an average

1. SECSTATE 092590/2520092 May 72.
2. J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
3. JCS 5286/261904Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 290504Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 250404Z Nov 72;
   CINCPAC 232230Z Dec 72.
Illustrated, above, the front side of the one and two dong notes, the back of the five dong note. The legend on the front of each: "The Party is spending your money on a hopeless war. As the war goes on there will be less and less to buy. The war is ruining your country. Your savings will be worthless." The legend on the back: "Beware of another money reform. You may lose all your wealth, fruit of your sweat and tears."
capacity of 15 million leaflets, meant it was never able to hit targets north of 200 North within acceptable risk factors. The M-129 leaflet bomb inventory became critically short because they were used for chaff dissemination. The B-52 capability was limited by smaller than expected leaflet capacity (8 million versus 28 million) and availability of protective support aircraft. The AQM-34H drone capability was limited by small capacity (300,000 leaflets) and the second priority for support of BUFFALO HUNTER requirements. CINCPAC reviewed available delivery capability for the primary areas of North Vietnam during early August and determined that the B-52 PSYOP delivery capability would be required for the duration of the campaign. On 12 August CINCPAC requested that the JCS authorize up to 15 B-52 leaflet delivery sorties per month for the duration of FIELD GOAL. 1

(STS) The JCS authorized a total of 18 additional sorties on 10 September and on 16 December further authorized one B-52 PSYOP sortie per day for the duration of the leaflet campaign over North Vietnam. Other assets continued to be used as available. Between 9 May and the end of the year 682,156,000 leaflets were delivered into North Vietnam target areas in support of the psychological effort against North Vietnam. 2

(TS) On 1 July, when CINCPAC had assumed overall responsibility for the strategic PSYOP campaign in Indochina, operations began in accordance with CINCPAC's Operation Order 5102. The transition of operations had been smooth and accomplished without significant problems. (One problem concerning visas for Vietnamese nationals employed by the 7th PSYOP Group was eventually resolved; they were needed for leaflet development programs.)

(STS) The leaflet development program in Saigon and other administrative problems pointed out increasing confusion concerning responsibilities for PSYOP functions. On 19 August CINCPAC summarized these matters in a message to the JCS, the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, and CINCUSARPAC (who was responsible for the 7th PSYOP Group on Okinawa). (Leaflet development problems were to be resolved by assigning a 7th PSYOP Group civilian and one officer to Saigon; the leaflet development element was later redesignated as the 7th PSYOP Group Leaflet Development Unit.) CINCPAC identified a number of problem areas, but specifically identified the fixing of responsibility in the matters of research and target analysis; development; production; target selection; dissemination means to include C-130s, B-52s, fighter bomber aircraft, drones, float bags, etc.; dissemination density; and leaflet mix compositions. CINCPAC believed that with the exception of development, these matters were all CINCPAC responsibilities, in coordination with the Ambassador. Until the Vietnamese nationals

1. CINCPAC 1400020Z Aug 72; J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
2. JCS 9380/301927Z Sep 72; JCS 5150/161453Z Dec 72; J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
received visas from Japan, CINCPAC believed that development should be conducted in Saigon. He noted that wherever it took place, the Ambassador was the approving authority for themes and message content and that he approved, by exception, all targeting and leaflet mixes developed by the 7th PSYOP Group. CINCPAC also recommended that messages from the PPOG be addressed to a single action addressee rather than continuing to address both the Ambassador and CINCPAC. He noted that it would improve response time if CINCUSARPAC and the 7th PSYOP Group were included as "information" addressees.1

(SECRET) On 24 August the PPOG concurred with CINCPAC’s recommendations on responsibilities. This resulted in completing full implementation of strategic PSYOP in accordance with CINCPAC Operation Order 5102.2

(SECRET) In addition to leaflet operations, the accelerated psychological effort against North Vietnam also used transistor mini-radios.3 In July CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT, respectively, to prepare radios for float bag delivery and to develop a delivery plan. Because of problems encountered with float bag delivery, the Secretary of State urged expediting the radio deliveries and CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF and CINCSAC develop aerial delivery plans. CINCPAC transferred 13,000 radios from PSYOP assets in Korea to expedite delivery. On 1 October USS J.E. KEYS and USS BERKELEY launched the first mini-radios. CINCPACFLT was further directed to launch mini-radios by helium filled balloons, which permitted greater areas available for coverage while decreasing risk to fleet units. The first balloon-delivered radios were launched on 24 November. Parachute-equipped mini-radios were dropped commencing 13 October. The float

1. CINCPAC 190016Z Aug 72.
2. J5451 HistSum Dec 72.
3. In June 1972 control of the mini-radio program was reassigned from CINCPAC’s Operations Division to the Plans Division.
bag program was completed on 19 October with
12,921 radios dispensed. The target area for
mini-radios was greatly expanded on 4 November
to include the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia. By
the end of the year 45,114 mini-radios had been
delivered, 26,500 to North Vietnam and 18,614
to North Vietnamese Army areas in Laos, Cambo-
dia, and the RVN by float bags, balloons, and
aircraft. The 7th PSYOP was responsible for
contracting, testing, and preparation of the
radios for delivery as well as providing tech-
nical support to delivery units. It was be-
lieved that the dispersal of the radios would
add to the pressures on North Vietnamese leader-
ship by threatening their monopoly on informa-
tion for domestic consumption.1

(5) When CINCPAC took over control and
management of the consolidated strategic PSYOP
campaign in Southeast Asia there were a number of other leaflet programs in
progress; some of these increased in volume during 1972, some decreased. These
programs--FOUNTAIN PEN, TRAIL, and RICE RIVER--are discussed individually below.
Before CINCPAC assumed control, however, the very existence of these programs
had been questioned. On 18 February 1972 the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon had
stated that the Mission PSYOP Committee had reviewed U.S. operations and recom-
manded that RICE RIVER (directed against VC/NVA in eastern Cambodia), TRAIL
(directed against infiltrating NVA forces in the eastern Laotian Panhandle),
and PRAIRIE LIGHTNING support to the NGUYEN TRAI rallier campaign be discontinued.
(Continued U.S. PSYOP support was recommended for the Rewards Program, MACV's
labor relations magazine (THONG CAM), and the White Medevac Helicopter Program.)
The rationale for recommending termination was based on "little return for
efforts expended." The thesis was supported by a presentation of figures from
a 1971 study by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Defense
Department; the study was entitled "PSYOP Studies-Vietnam," and by some 1966
NVA POW statistics. The ARPA-sponsored study did establish, however, that
during 1970 leaflets disseminated in TRAIL and RICE RIVER were effective in
establishing communications with the VC/NVA in the target areas, and that the
leaflets were major contributing factors in VC/NVA rallying. As research had
not continued, no data since the ARPA study was available. Both the Commander
of the 7th PSYOP Group and CINCUSARPAC believed that the programs should be

1. CINCPAC 222158Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 271944Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 160030Z Sep 72;
CINCPAC 070213Z Oct 72. The radios were wrapped in styrofoam packages
8x7x6 inches and weighed about a pound.
continued, however. CINCUSARPAC, on 24 February, noted that the importance of maintaining a PSYOP offensive had increased with the U.S. troop reductions and that PSYOP support of operations in Laos and Cambodia was critical to success in the RVN. He requested that the recommendation to terminate the programs be reassessed.1

CINCPAC provided his comments on 15 March. He concluded that the RICE RIVER and TRAIL campaigns could, with proper management, materially contribute to the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and that the PRAIRIE LIGHTNING program that supported the RVN's pacification/rallier program would take on increasing importance during the forthcoming transition period. CINCPAC recommended continuation of all three programs and that a wider controlled dissemination of leaflets be pursued to obtain a saturation effect--to make sure that the maximum number of people got the word. The leaflet programs were continued throughout the year, as described below.2

TRAIL

TRAIL was a high altitude leaflet operation directed at infiltrating NVA soldiers in the eastern Laotian Panhandle. In January about 90 million leaflets a month were being disseminated; by mid-October the total was down to about 48 million a month, delivered by an average of four C-130 sorties a month.

FOUNTAIN PEN

A high altitude leaflet operation directed at the Pathet Lao and NVA in enemy controlled and contested areas of Laos exclusive of the TRAIL area. In early 1972 approximately 120 million leaflets a month were being disseminated; by mid-October this was up to about 136 million, delivered by an average of 12 C-130 sorties a month.

RICE RIVER

This was a high altitude leaflet operation directed at the VC/NVA operating in the eastern third of Cambodia. In January about 60 million leaflets a month were being delivered; by mid-October this was down to about 26 million leaflets delivered by an average of two C-130 sorties a month.3

2. Ibid.
Another kind of operation in Southeast Asia was FRANK APPROACH, a temporary radio rebroadcast operation directed at the Khmer population in northwestern Cambodia. This was a 50 kilowatt microwave facility that rebroadcast Phnom Penh radio programs from a temporary base in Thailand. Assets and personnel had been deployed in December 1970 and were to remain until a State Department/U.S. Information Agency project to install permanent transmitters at Battambang, Cambodia was completed. The estimated operational date of the transmitter at Battambang continued to slip and at the end of 1972 it was expected to be operational in June 1973. When it became operational, FRANK APPROACH assets and personnel were to return to Okinawa.

Still another radio broadcast operation was used as a PSYOP program during 1972. This was Operation VENTURE ROAD, a fleet radio broadcast operation directed against North Vietnam and initiated by CINCPAC on 2 May 1972. USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19), operating in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone using 10 kilowatt short wave transmitters, rebroadcast Voice of Freedom/Voice of America programs as well as programs developed by the 7th PSYOP Group for 19 hours a day. Policy guidance, theme and message content were provided by the Ambassador in Saigon. Military aspects of the program were under the operational command of CINCPAC. The purpose of the program, as CINCPAC explained in May, was to inform the North Vietnamese of "the President's recent statements concerning the war and of the primary causes for the continuation of the conflict." USS BLUE RIDGE was scheduled to redeploy in late July, so on 30 June CINCPAC proposed alternatives to maintain the VENTURE ROAD operation. The PPOG reaffirmed the continuing interest at the highest national levels in maintaining or improving the propaganda campaign targeted against North Vietnam; they wished to insure timely planning that would preclude interruptions in VENTURE ROAD operations when USS BLUE RIDGE went off station. When CINCPAC was advised that BLUE RIDGE had redeployed and ceased broadcasting on 18 July, he proposed to the JCS three options for expeditiously resuming VENTURE ROAD. One option employed CORONET SOLO aircraft, an Air National Guard program; one involved Navy transmitters installed at Subic Bay in the Philippines or Yokosuka, Japan; and the one CINCPAC recommended, a shore-based AN/TRT-22 Army operation with personnel deployed from the Continental United States. On 31 August the JCS advised that in view of the technical and operational considerations as well as the costs involved, the requirement for VENTURE ROAD was terminated.

Toward the end of the year, when anticipation of a ceasefire heightened, the PPOG tasked the Ambassador in Saigon and CINCPAC to be prepared for an intensified leaflet and mini-radio effort for the brief period between initialising

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 272140Z May 72; CINCPAC 301950Z; STATE 128220/142317Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 210243Z Jul 72; CJCS 2649/031930Z Aug 72.
of the agreement and the moment when it would become effective. The program was to be nicknamed TEMPO SURGE. CINCPAC tasked his components and CINCSAC to prepare stockpiles and be ready to provide dissemination aircraft necessary to support the program. Meanwhile, in further anticipation of the ceasefire in early December 1972, the PPOG directed that on-going leaflet and radio deliveries should be accelerated. CINCPAC directed a doubling of the leaflet dissemination rate and delivery of all mini-radios available as soon as possible. The acceleration continued as the year ended. TEMPO SURGE awaited execution.1

(5) One situation in Vietnam has not been addressed before in the Command History. This was the unique situation of the integration of USIS and military PSYOP in the joint organization called the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), since disestablished. While the concept was considered excellent, the USIA dominated the activities "because the military failed to fill positions in the JUSPAO with properly qualified personnel of sufficient rank to obtain an equal voice with USIS officers in planning and policy manners." In the conduct of PSYOP in the PACOM, military commands have historically been inhibited from pursuing an aggressive PSYOP policy primarily because of the difference in the chain of command that existed between the military commander in the country involved and the U.S. Ambassador. Whereas the Ambassador or USIS representative could address himself directly to Washington, the military commander in that country had to follow the chain of command up through CINCPAC and the JCS. The primary disadvantage was that a State Department-USIA position was established first, before a Defense Department position could be presented, and the recent State-USIA effort had pushed toward a downgrading of U.S. military involvement in PSYOP. In addition, the military position was often softened as it progressed up the chain of command. "The USIA was reluctant to consider itself a propaganda agency and tended to take an extremely 'soft sell' approach with its output." PSYOP, as defined by the military, however, was the planned use of propaganda and other actions to influence attitudes and behavior of a target audience.

(5) The two differing concepts were the basis for existing differences at both the national and in-country levels between the USIA and military commands regarding PSYOP. The USIA believed that the U.S. Government should speak with "one voice," that of the USIA, and "always seems concerned that military PSYOP is or will be too persuasive in its media." This had resulted in recent years in the elimination or planned termination of selected CINCPAC and CINCCUSC PSYOP programs. The termination of all strategic PSYOP for Southeast Asia had been

1. J5451 HistSum Dec 72, which cited SECSTATE 204025/090103Z Nov 72 (EX); CINCPAC 122017Z Nov 72 (EX); SECSTATE 218921/021918Z Dec 72; and CINCPAC 060300Z Dec 72.
recommended also, but before a final decision had been reached at the Washington level, the North Vietnamese invasion had begun.1

Psychological Operations in Korea

(§) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) programs in Korea had been on the decline for the last several years. The Voice of the United Nations Command radio broadcasts targeted against North Korea had terminated in June 1971 after 21 years. FOCUS TRUTH aerial wind drifting of leaflets into North Korea had been suspended since the fall of 1970. In 1972 a number of other programs were discontinued. Publication of the magazine "Friends of Freedom" was discontinued with the July 1972 issue; 500,000 copies of this monthly magazine had been distributed within the ROK. Support to Mobile Motivation Team operations conducted by the ROK Armed Forces in rural areas of Korea ceased with the unavailability of Operation and Maintenance, Army funds.

(§) The two remaining programs were float bag and balloon leaflet operations, both of which were conducted by ROK forces but received major logistical support from the United Nations Command. With the establishment of direct communications between North and South Korea, the program was reevaluated by the CINCUNC, who was also COMUS Korea, and the Ambassador. On 19 September CINCUNC/COMUS Korea stated that support for the operations had been suspended. Further, he recommended, with the Ambassador's concurrence, that the JCS change the CINCUNC's mission from "...initiate and maintain a psychological offensive..." to "be prepared to make an extensive effort...to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive...." CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation on 24 October. On 11 December the JCS changed the UNC PSYOP mission, thus officially terminating all UNC active PSYOP directed against North Korea.2

(Ç) At the end of the year the only U.S. support to the ROK Government in the matter of PSYOP was in the form of radio relay of the Voice of America by the 24th PSYOP Detachment medium wave radio station. This effort was continuing at the direction of the JCS and did not provide active support for UNC operations.3

2. J5622 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: PSYOP in Korea (U); J5451 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 241903Z Oct 72; JCS 8036/111527Z Dec 72.
SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Redeployment of U.S. Forces from Vietnam

(C) At the beginning of 1972 U.S. military strength stood at 156,975 in the RVN, which was 17,975 personnel above the ceiling that had been established for 1 February 1972. Planning for the redeployments continued to follow the pattern that had been set previously. First came the Presidential announcement of a reduction, followed by a directive from the JCS. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC then prepared a concept for withdrawal and the residual force. A troop list was prepared and approved. Finally, a force structure planning conference to finalize the troop list was held at CINCPAC headquarters.1

(TS) The reduction in progress at the beginning of the year, to achieve an authorized ceiling of 139,000, was Increment 10 in the deployment-redeployment sequence and was assigned the code name "KEYSTONE MALLARD." On 13 January President Nixon announced a reduction of 70,000 spaces by 1 May 1972. This was Increment 11 with the code name "KEYSTONE OWL." On 14 January COMUSMACV submitted his Outline Plan to accomplish the redeployment and CINCPAC recommended approval to the JCS on the same day. JCS approval was received 19 January. The final Increment 11 troop list was received by CINCPAC on 28 January and approved by the JCS on 8 February. On that day the force structure planning conference was held. The major impacts and significant changes attributed to this force package included early closure of Cam Ranh Bay with the retention of Da Nang after 1 May in doubt; degradation of intelligence collection capability and only austere security forces; the inability to support a number of programs; and a reduction in the advisory effort. This same consideration of the impact of proposed withdrawals was given succeeding increments, but these are not addressed here as the withdrawals were proceeding in any case.2

(TS) Increment 12, KEYSTONE PHEASANT, was directed by a Presidential announcement of 26 April to continue redeployment to a level of 49,000 by 1 July. Normal planning procedures were followed and the detailed troop list was ready for publication by 29 May.3

(S) The next reduction was announced on 28 June, this to reduce strength to 39,000 by 1 September. This was Increment 13, KEYSTONE WREN. When COMUSMACV

2. Ibid.; J5525 HistSum Jan 72; JCS 5479/191839Z Jan 72.
3. COMUSMACV 270935Z Apr 72; JCS 8671/012330Z May 72; JCS 2509/192339Z May 72; J5521 HistSum May 72.
submitted his proposed force structure, he requested authority to terminate the Civilian War Casualty Program (CWCP). An exchange of messages followed, with CINCPAC concurring with COMUSMACV's comments on the civilianization of certain military spaces and on the CWCP, but non-concurring with an alternate proposal to establish medical teams to assist civilian casualties. The submitted troop list was approved by the JCS, less the CWCP issue which was submitted to higher authority.1

(TS) The next increment was announced on 28 August by the President. This involved redeployment of 12,000 to achieve a force ceiling of 27,000 by 1 December. This was KEYSTONE PELICAN.2

(TS) In the autumn, as cease-fire negotiations continued, the JCS requested that CINCPAC develop conceptual plans for the withdrawal of all forces from the RVN. This included the necessary repositioning of command and control and units in Thailand, retention of intelligence capabilities in Southeast Asia, and a U.S. capability to resurge to October 1972 levels in air and sea power should the military situation in the RVN require. Withdrawal planning proceeded, therefore, as a contingency for cease-fire agreements, the final parameters of which had not been announced by the end of the year. CINCPAC's conceptual plan was provided as follows.3

Phase I - Prior to X-Day—continue KEYSTONE PELICAN

Phase II - X-Day to X+45 OPLAN THUNDERBOLT

U.S. from DaNang and Tan Son Nhut - 750 per day

ROK from Phu Cat and Nha Trang - 855 per day

Other FWMAF commercial or MAC-chartered from Tan Son Nhut

Phase III - X+45 to X+60 - Final transfer of bases and facilities
Closure of U.S. ports of embarkation
Closure of traffic management offices
Exit of rear party functions

At the end of 1972 the actual strength in the RVN was down to about 24,000.

Southeast Asia Force Augmentation

(TS) In the wake of the North Vietnamese offensive in the spring of 1972, it was necessary to deploy additional air units to Thailand to counter the aggression. In addition, air units that had been stationed in the RVN and were still required in spite of the mandatory force drawdowns in that country were in many cases redeployed to Thailand to continue their necessary part in air operations in various parts of Southeast Asia.

(TS) Early in April, in response to a JCS request, CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to address the problems and ramifications inherent in deploying additional tactical fighter aircraft to Thailand. CINCPACAF provided an assessment of the situation and advised that any sizeable additional deployments would require the re-opening of Takhli and Nam Phong Air Bases. On 10 April CINCPAC provided supplementary comments keyed to the CINCPACAF assessment, including the requirement for close and expeditious coordination with the State Department, the Royal Thai Government, and the CIA in the matter of reopening Takhli or Nam Phong.1

(TS) On that same day the JCS requested that planning be initiated for the possible immediate deployment of four F-4 squadrons to Takhli, verifying the feasibility of deploying three additional F-4 squadrons to Nam Phong, and the deployment of up to 16 KC-135s to Takhli. Deployments were to be for a maximum of 90 days. CINCPAC asked his component commanders for their comments and recommendations, and on 12 April he advised the JCS that the reactivation of Takhli and the opening of Nam Phong were feasible, but that there appeared to be logistic constraints that would have to be overcome. (COMUSMACTHAI had provided information on the POL support capability.)2

(TS) On 15 April CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF for an assessment regarding deployment of an additional one or two tactical fighter squadrons into existing bases in Thailand while the logistics constraints of the deployment of seven squadrons were being solved. CINCPACAF responded that one or two additional squadrons could be based at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). On 16 April CINCPAC recommended to the Chairman of the JCS that, as an interim measure, two additional F-4 squadrons be deployed to Udorn. On 22 April CINCPAC discussed the logistic problems in Thailand and concluded that there were no logistic constraints to the deployment of forces to Takhli or Nam Phong.3

1. JCS 082145Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 090026Z Apr 72; CINCPACAF 100030Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 100727Z Apr 72.
2. JCS 4374/101259Z Apr 73; CINCPAC 102106Z Apr 72; J5524 HistSum, which cited CINCPAC 120526Z Apr 72 and COMUSMACTHAI 130959Z Apr 72.
3. J5524 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 150437Z Apr 72, CINCPACAF 152100Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 220151Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 162341Z Apr 72.
On 25 April the JCS directed the deployment of two additional F-4 squadrons to Udorn and on 3 May they directed the deployment of four tactical fighter squadrons and 16 KC-135 tankers to Takhli. On 4 May CINCPAC asked and received from COMUSMACV the required country clearance for these elements.

On 11 May the JCS advised that activation of Nam Phong had been approved by "higher authority" and that the Secretary of State had initiated action through the Ambassador in Bangkok to obtain approval to open the base. CINCPAC was directed, upon receipt of country clearance from the Ambassador, to initiate action to activate Nam Phong on an austere basis with the capability to receive and operate three tactical air squadrons with necessary support and security personnel to assure provision for adequate perimeter and aircraft security. CINCPAC was to assume that tactical air operations would commence prior to 1 July 1972. A plan for rapid relocation of Da Nang based tactical air assets, if the security situation deteriorated, was also requested. On 14 May CINCPAC provided a plan and tasked CINCPACFLT to take all actions necessary to open and operate three Marine Corps tactical air squadrons from Nam Phong not later than 10 June. On 15 May the Embassy in Bangkok provided Thai Government clearance for an advance party site survey team to visit Nam Phong.

On 17 May CINCPAC provided guidance for command and control arrangements for the opening of Nam Phong and Marine Corps operations from the field. Those arrangements were to continue essentially as then in effect for USMC air assets at Da Nang. "Missions will be fragged by 7AF in coordination with Seventh Fleet." CINCPAC continued that due to the unique command arrangements in Thailand, "frags will be passed from 7AF to DEPCOM 7/13 AF who will then disseminate those orders to operating units." Detailed reporting procedures were to be in accordance with the CINCPAC Instruction on the subject. CINCPAC continued:

At Nam Phong proper the overall installation commander will be the Thai Air Base commander. Normal command arrangements will prevail among U.S. units. Relationships between the USMC commander as host and other U.S. agencies as tenants will need to be defined and agreements reached. Least disruptive courses of action should be sought.

...In-country command relationships between USMC units and COMUSMACTHAI will be as contained in CINCPACINST S3020.2G.

1. JCS 2657/252058Z Apr 72; JCS 1956/0323462 May 72; J5524 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 040451Z May 72 and COMUSMACTHAI 041735Z May 72.
2. JCS 1774/111618Z May 72; CINCPAC 142221Z May 72; J5524 HistSum May 72, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 6697/151135Z May 72.
Terms of Reference for Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand, which establishes COMUSMACTHAI as the Single Senior Military Representative in Thailand, and further specifies relationships between DOD personnel and Local Nationals, and DOD personnel and AMEMB Bangkok.

CINCPACFLT was also addressed with regard to the security situation and the extent and nature of U.S. military support that might be required by the Thai Government. (The problems of base security in Thailand are addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.)

(TS) On 20 May CINCPAC directed that all tactical air deployments to Southeast Asia emanating from Japan would be routed via an intermediate stop for political reasons. These deployments had generated considerable political reaction in countries where the United States maintained overseas bases, but particularly in Japan where the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Embassy had been inundated with queries on the deployments. These queries were the result of opposition attacks on U.S. utilization of the bases for combat operations and on the prior consultation aspects of the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan. To preclude further attacks, CINCPAC directed that all tactical air augmentation deployments, including MACV and PACOM C-130 airlift, emanating from Japan be routed through an intermediate country. The Military Airlift Command viewed the logistical support missions as being in accord with the Mutual Security Treaty and stated his intention to operate without artificial third country stops.

(TS) CINCPAC sought relief from the JCS on the restrictions pertaining to intermediate stops, pointing out that the United States was unnecessarily restricting itself through a rigid interpretation of prior consultation requirements. While it was recognized that tactical combat aircraft deploying to Southeast Asia would require prior consultations with the Japanese Government, logistic support aircraft should be excluded from the requirement for an intermediate stop, CINCPAC believed. On 25 May the JCS directed that the policy concerning the intermediate stops applied only to tactical aircraft capable of expending ordnance and did not apply to logistic support aircraft. Subsequently CINCPAC revised his guidance to conform to the JCS decision, thereby providing MAC and other logistics support flights continuing flexibility in carrying out support operations.

1. CINCPAC 170506Z May 72.
2. CINCPAC 200407Z May 72; MAC 242120Z May 72.
3. CINCPAC 250306Z May 72; JCS 8470/252054Z May 72; CINCPAC 260424Z May 72.

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(TS) Meanwhile, on 21 May, CINCPAC had requested country clearance for about 4,000 USMC and USN personnel for opening, security, and support elements at Nam Phong. It was anticipated that a total of 5,035 would eventually be based there.1

(TS) On 21 May Ambassador Unger in Bangkok commented on the deployment of a general officer to command USMC units at Nam Phong. He said, "While I would greatly prefer not to add another star to our galaxy if it can be avoided, I am prepared to go along with the idea in recognition that this is a temporary, repeat, temporary, situation different from other in-country activities." He continued that he believed that the Thai would understand that the 4-5,000 man force of a Service "now having no combat element in Thailand" would need general officer supervision and control, especially in view of the great amount of work that must be accomplished in very short time. On 26 May CINCPAC strongly endorsed the assignment of a Marine general officer to command the Marines at Nam Phong; such an officer was subsequently assigned.2

(TS) On 21 May the Ambassador requested a Washington level decision on funding to relocate the Thai Volunteer Training Program from Nam Phong, but on 24 May the Secretary of State in a joint message from the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency stated that it was not believed necessary to relocate the volunteer training.3

(TS) On 22 May CINCPACFLT requested that six KC-130 and four CH-46 aircraft be included in the base opening package; CINCPAC approved the deployment on 26 May. On 23 May, however, the Ambassador provided some comments on additional deployments. He noted that the deployment of the Marine Wing to Nam Phong would bring the U.S. military presence in Thailand close to 45,000, or only a few thousand short of the peak reached in 1968 and 1969. The Ambassador noted that although the Thais had been positive in their reaction and swiftly approved our deployment requests, "we also have to point out that we are rapidly approaching the saturation point, not only with respect to available space but, I firmly believe, also in terms of political tolerance." The Ambassador noted that the two were obviously related--as we were running out of space, we would have to displace ongoing Thai activities and/or engage in new construction. A case in point, the Ambassador continued, was Nam Phong, where a training program of great importance to the survival of Laos and thus to the Thais as well as to U.S. regional security objectives was having to be

1. J5524 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 211851Z May 72.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 7063/210653Z May 72; J5524 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 260423Z May 72.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 7069/210721Z May 72; STATE 091415/241751Z May 72.
disrupted, just as important preparations were being made for the next dry season campaign. He said that the displacing or over-crowding of other Thai activities and operations would strain the spirit of cooperation and support that the Thai Supreme Command had so far evinced. He commented on what the Embassy perceived to be a growing sensitivity of Thai leaders to focus national and international attention on Thailand as the major U.S. base area in the Indochina War. The Thai wished to keep our deployments as low key and circumspect as possible. The Ambassador continued:

While flooding RTG [Royal Thai Government] with deployment requests on a case-by-case basis, we have been unable to provide them any insight into the bigger picture of our strategy or to give them our view of a resolution of the Indochina situation that would also take into account their long range security interests and concerns....

In my judgment, we are reaching the point where the tactical advantages of securing additional temporary aircraft accommodations in Thailand will be clearly outweighed by political liabilities of pushing Thai too far. Accordingly, we must establish some clear limits beyond which we will not go in our deployment requests. I think we should not attempt to push Thai forces out of existing operational areas.¹

¹In June, in order to reduce force levels in the RVN, most of the assets stationed at Da Nang were deployed to Thailand bases. On 7 June the JCS authorized deployment of seven F-4 squadrons, other selected aircraft, and associated personnel and equipment from Da Nang to Thailand bases before 1 July. They further directed deployment of 41 KC-135 additional tanker aircraft to Thailand and Philippine beddown bases. They authorized that the existing Thailand manpower ceiling be increased by the number of personnel required for implementation, but they restricted the total manpower augmentation in Thailand to 18,000. (The U.S. ceiling for forces in Thailand had been established in JCS Southeast Asia Deployment Program 19 at the same level as in 1971: 32,200. The augmentation authorization provided for a total force of 50,200.) The JCS also stated that the Secretary of State had initiated action through the Ambassador in Bangkok to obtain approval for aircraft beddown.²

²On 8 June CINC PAC requested country clearance for the temporary deployment of the forces. These forces consisted of:

1. AMEMB Bangkok 6961/231326Z May 72.
2. CINC PAC 080600Z Jun 72, which cited JCS 3854/072351Z Jun 72 and SECSTATE 098667/051744Z May 72.
- Hq 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, 36 F-4 aircraft (4/421 TFS) and 1,450 personnel for beddown at Takhli. (From Da Nang.)

- 18 F-4 aircraft (35 TFS/COMMANDO FLY) and 383 personnel for beddown at Korat. (From Da Nang.)

- Nine F-4 aircraft (390 TFS) and 331 personnel for beddown at Ubon. (From Da Nang.)

- Nine F-4 aircraft (390 TFS) and 331 personnel for beddown at Udorn. (From Da Nang.)

- 39 F-4 aircraft (MAG-15), 6 KC-130 aerial tankers, and 1,035 personnel to Nam Phong. (From Da Nang and Okinawa.)

- 24 KC-135 aircraft and associated personnel for beddown as follows:

  13 aircraft and 338 personnel to Don Muang (From CONUS.)
  4 aircraft and 156 personnel to Takhli (From CONUS.)
  4 aircraft and 338 personnel to U-Tapao
  7 aircraft and a (then) unknown number of personnel to Korat (From CONUS.)

- Six AC-119, two OV-10, three HH-53, and 12 EC-47 aircraft and helicopters and 640 personnel to Nakhon Phanom. (From Da Nang.)

CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and CINCSAC to deploy the forces listed upon receipt of country clearances. CINCPAC authorized direct liaison among all concerned to coordinate deployment efforts and minimize airlift constraints. He requested airlift support from the PACOM Transportation Management Agency and the Military Airlift Command for deployment as required. He provided public affairs guidance as follows: "No announcement of this move will be made." In response to a query, the response was to be, "We do not discuss operational matters. We will have no additional comment with regard to your questions concerning these or any other units."1

(TS) The JCS subsequently extended deployment augmentation authorities to retain the forces in Southeast Asia. These were short-term extensions, but were repeated throughout the year. In each case it was necessary for COMUSMACTHAI to extend country clearance as well. The JCS extensions were granted each month, for a month at a time.2

1. CINCPAC 080600Z Jun 72.
2. JCS 5109/261614Z Jun 72; JCS 3076/261617Z Jul 72; JCS 1636/311920Z Aug 72; JCS 9232/301509Z Sep 72; JCS 5690/281528Z Oct 72; JCS 8680/251637Z Nov 72.
(TS) From time to time aircraft were moved to different locations or returned to the CONUS. The COMPASS FLAG QU-22B aircraft, for example, were replaced by C-130s in August 1972 and placed in a standoff status. In September CINCPACAF advised that there were no theater missions that could utilize the QU-22B and requested authority to redeploy them to the CONUS. CINCPAC so recommended to the JCS. In another case the JCS directed deployment of the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing (48 F-111 aircraft) from Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada to Takhli. Concurrently the 49th TFW (72 F-4s) was redeployed to Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. Deployment began on 27 September when the first F-111 squadron left Nellis. In another action, in October CINCPAC implemented deployment of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (72 A-7 aircraft) from South Carolina to Korat. Concurrently, 72 F-4 aircraft deployed from Thailand as follows: the 523d TFS (18 F-4Ds) from Udorn to Clark Air Base (COMMANDO FLASH); the 35th TFS (18 F-4Ds) from Korat to Kunsan (COMMANDO FLY); the 58th TFS (18 F-4Es) from Udorn to CONUS; and the 307th TFS (18 F-4Es) from Udorn to CONUS. At this time a number of other in-country rebasing and unit equipment changes were accomplished.

(TS) The total authorized strength (with augmentation authorities) of 50,200 was not reached during 1972. In October, for example, it stood at 45,311, with 37,867 of those Air Force personnel, 4,468 Army, 504 Navy, and 2,472 Marine personnel.

(TS) When CINCPAC prepared conceptual plans for the withdrawal of forces from the RVN, his proposed force structure in Thailand, by Service, was as follows:

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<th>X+90</th>
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<td>46,150</td>
<td>43,700</td>
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Anticipated basing was as shown in the following chart.

1. CINCPAC 162310Z Sep 72; J3B25 HistSum Sep 72; J3B25 HistSum Oct 72, which showed disposition of PACOM tactical forces at the time.
2. J5524 Point Papers, 7 Aug 72, Subj: U.S. Strength Ceiling in Thailand (U) and 10 Oct 72, Subj: U.S. Strength Ceilings in Southeast Asia (U).
<table>
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<th>Aircraft</th>
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<td>Udorn</td>
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Note: Airlift and base flight support aircraft would be included.

This force would provide temporary surge capability to 6,700 sorties a month until augmentation forces arrived. To sustain 6,700 sorties a month would require 72 F-4/A-7 equivalents deployed from PACAF or CONUS.

Base Security - Thailand

(5) North Vietnamese successes in the spring of 1972, and the ensuing deployment of additional air units to Thailand to counter the aggression, increasingly focused attention on the physical security of U.S.-occupied bases in Southeast Asia as the threat of Communist retaliation mounted. Early in May the JCS requested an immediate assessment of the security situations at all locations in Southeast Asia housing USAF aircraft and CINCPAC tasked his subordinate commands for the status. COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPACAF responses to these initial queries indicated that security was generally adequate to minimize the danger of sapper attacks, except for Takhi. The danger of standoff attacks, however, although not as pronounced, was pointed out and neither the United States nor the host country was prepared to cope with such a threat. This, coupled with the fragmented manner in which various aspects of the issue were being treated, led CINCPAC to request that COMUSMACTHAI reassess the overall security situation at each installation, tying together loose ends and correcting deficiencies as the threat increased.

(5) COMUSMACTHAI identified overall deficiencies and further indicated that off-base patrolling was considered the most effective deterrent against standoff attacks. He advised that additional assets were required to support this effort, as well as better intelligence input at base level. CINCPAC's subsequent query to the JCS and Secretary of Defense on additional funding for off-base patrolling and civic action evoked a request for more definitive requirements. COMUSMACTHAI, therefore, surveyed existing forces, assets, and the security situation to determine specific requirements.2

(5) In addition, the Embassy, COMUSMACTHAI, and the 7/13th Air Force held discussions with Thai Government officials to explain concepts and recommendations and to work out arrangements. This effort was spurred by enemy attacks on U.S.-tenanted bases. (On 1 October a sapper and mortar attack had been initiated against Ubon, on 2 October a sapper attack against Udorn.) U.S.-Thai conferences were held on 11 and 18 October to initiate actions to get the new off-base program underway. The Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA)

1. JCS 4139/051611Z May 72; CINCPAC 060514Z May 72; COMUSMACTHAI 081200Z May 72; CINCPACAF 092154Z May 72; CINCPAC 242017Z Jun 72.
proclaimed during a meeting with Admiral Gayler that the one RTA battalion per base for external security (being planned) was inadequate and that three each base were required. Further actions necessary to develop and deploy adequate Thai forces continued.

(5) In early October the JCS expressed renewed apprehension over the security of bases and forces and suggested that the Thai Government be again approached to express U.S. concern and emphasize the need for off-base patrolling. CINCPAC informed the JCS of past corrective measures and those ongoing to improve security.

(5) In other actions to improve base defense posture, CINCPAC directed PACAF to reassess security of critical supplies (primarily POL and munitions), tasked USARPAC to determine the security status of U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand installations, and directed the attention of COMUSMACTHAI and the Commander 7/13th Air Force to the need for definitizing additional civic action projects that would improve the environment surrounding U.S.-tenanted Thai bases and complement intelligence efforts.

Free World Military Assistance Forces Redeployments

(5) Seven countries contributed forces to the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in Vietnam; these totaled 54,497 as 1972 began. Concomitantly with U.S. redeployments, the FWMAF began planning their disengagement. Spain had withdrawn its 8-man medical team in December 1971. As of 1 January 1972 the following FWMAF were deployed to the Republic of Vietnam:

Australia, 1,668
Headquarters, Australia Armed Forces Vietnam
Two-Battalion Task Force
Air Service Squadron
Bomber Squadron
Combat Support and Logistics Units
Advisors

2. CINCPAC 130338Z Oct 72.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China, 31</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea, 46,417</td>
<td>2 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction Support Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistical Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Transport Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand, 60</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command/Logistics Elements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, 56</td>
<td>Medical Teams/Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, 6,265</td>
<td>Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (Brigade)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Squadron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Engineer Battalion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signal Battalion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Police Company</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Artillery Battalions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 54,497

(S) By October the total was down to 38,531 with only the Koreans having forces in substantial numbers. The other countries had only residual forces, as listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia, 140</td>
<td>Headquarters (with communications)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jungle warfare instructor element</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Mobile Training Teams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embassy Guard Platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Also a 30-man team to train Cambodian troops in the RVN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, 31</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, 38,230</td>
<td>Token headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand, 45</td>
<td>Training Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Philippines, 47  Headquarters
4 Medical Teams

Thailand, 38  Residual Headquarters, which was designated
Royal Thai Armed Forces Representation, Vietnam

Strength in Laos

(TS) The total U.S. strength ceiling of 1,040 in Laos was the result of
a Presidential announcement. A U.S. military ceiling of 290 (within the
1,040) was established by the Secretary of Defense in January 1972. Within
this ceiling strength varied somewhat throughout the year; as of September it
was: Army, 128; Navy, 3; Air Force, 110; and Marine Corps, 13; for a total
of 254 that did not include 24 U.S. Special Forces training personnel
temporarily there.

CINCPAC Unconventional Warfare Planners Conference

(U) On 6 June CINCUSARPAC, acting in receipt of a message from the John
F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, recommended that CINCPAC host an
unconventional warfare (UW) conference during the first quarter of FY 73. On
9 June CINCPAC concurred and on 28 October forwarded to his component commanders
the agenda to be discussed at the 12 December conference. The overall objective
of the working level conference was to improve UW plans and readiness throughout
the PACOM.

(U) The conference was attended by representatives of the component
commands; the U.S. Readiness Command; the J.F.K. Center; the 1st Special Forces
Group; the Navy's Amphibious Force Pacific, In-shore Warfare Command Group,
Pacific, Special Warfare Group One, and SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Team One; the
Tactical Air Command's USAF Special Operations Force; and members of the CINCPAC
staff. Subjects discussed were the CINCPAC UW Target Selection List; UW
boundaries; base support planning; nuclear authentication procedures; specialized
training; SAFE Area intelligence descriptions; maps and charts; command and
control; intelligence production; the CINCPAC standing operating procedure for
UW; support agencies, and Service briefings from each of the components. The
CINCPAC Plans Division believed that an annual working level UW planners
conference should be hosted by CINCPAC and that representatives from the
subordinate unified commands and UW Resident Coordinators be invited.2

1. J5524 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: U.S. Strength Ceilings in Southeast
   Asia (U).
2. J546 HistSum Dec 72; CINCUSARPAC 060224Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 091942Z Jun 72
   and 280023Z Oct 72.
Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) Studies

Among the early papers received were those for Australia and New Zealand. CINCPAC's comments were basically non-substantive except for a general comment on illicit drug traffic that impacted on U.S. Forces. CINCPAC recommended that the objectives in all East Asia PARAs be expanded to include the aim of suppressing this activity. Such an objective, within host government capabilities, would include identification of sources, distribution systems, transshipment mechanisms, outlet methods, and development of suitable control or interdiction measures.

Under the heading "Courses of Action," CINCPAC recommended deletion of a draft paragraph and the substitution of the following:

If the Australian Labor Party (ALP) gives indications that they are preparing to withdraw from SEATO, urge that the step not be taken. Point out that Australian withdrawal could lead to the eventual collapse of SEATO.

CINCPAC had noted earlier that the comments listed for the Australia study were also applicable to New Zealand. 2

1. J5124 HistSum May 72; J5122 HistSum Jun 72.
2. CINCPAC 122153Z Feb 72.
CINCPAC, in July, recommended a number of changes intended to place emphasis on the Defense Department's role in fostering self-sufficiency through scientific and technological development and co-production. A second draft of the paper was subsequently forwarded to CINCPAC. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he "most strongly" recommended that the draft be revised to reflect some key points. One was that the theater-wide strategic value of maintaining our options for basing and supporting U.S. Forces in Taiwan required more prominent emphasis. A second was that the Defense Department (particularly the JCS) should be the focal point for analyzing, planning, and implementing any reduction of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan, notwithstanding the need for close coordination with the State Department. To reflect these points and other CINCPAC views, a number of specific changes were recommended.

First, CINCPAC recommended inclusion of the following:

...Since the Korean War, Taiwan has been an important link in maintaining flexibility of the U.S. defense system in the western reaches of the Pacific Ocean. In the future, the importance of a cooperative attitude by the Government of the Republic of China toward basing and supporting U.S. Forces in Taiwan might increase significantly if political opposition in Japan and the Philippines reduces our freedom to use overseas military bases.

CINCPAC asked that a sentence be rewritten to read:

...The ROC will need continued access to large U.S. Foreign Military Sales credit loans and to U.S. defense excess material in order to maintain its armed forces and modernize its air and naval defense.

CINCPAC's rationale was that the Chinese armed forces were almost completely equipped with materials of U.S. origin and design. Since they did not have access to alternative equivalent sources of military material, discontinuance of U.S. military Security Assistance "would seriously cripple the GRC armed forces, make Taiwan vulnerable to military aggression, and increase the possible requirement for U.S. Forces to defend Taiwan." Another sentence rewording was suggested by CINCPAC:

1. CINCPAC 232146Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 010444Z Sep 72.
...So might the unification of TDC and MAAG, however, such unification can be considered as a prospective alternative for reducing U.S. military presence.

CINCPAC explained that no implication should be prematurely made that consolidation of the TDC and MAAG organizations was politically or militarily undesirable. Such an option, CINCPAC continued, "might be ideally suited to our dichotomous political objectives towards the PRC and GRC." Also, from a military point of view, CINCPAC noted, there was merit to considering such an option notwithstanding previous GRC objections.

Japan

1. CINCPAC 010444Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 062222Z May 72.
When asked to comment on the Korea PARA, CINCPAC noted that the main thrust of the study closely paralleled a recently completed CINCPAC Korea study effort. The PARA revealed nothing that would change the CINCPAC position that the United States should use all of its political resources, including the power of the veto in the United Nations Security Council, to insure the continuation of the United Nations Command. CINCPAC stated that the United States should neither propose admission of both Koreas to the United Nations nor seek to dissolve the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Instead, CINCPAC recommended that the United States consult closely with the Republic of Korea's government on the proposition that the United States intended to be prepared to accept either or both of those contingencies. CINCPAC said:

"...The Nixon Doctrine has stimulated serious thinking by our Asian allies and antagonists about solutions to Asian problems. The US should establish an environment which encourages this thinking and follow-on actions; therefore,

1. Ibid."
what seems to be required is an appearance of "benign interest" on the part of the US in relation to all the Korean people. The tide definitely appears to be running with South Korea vis-a-vis the North and the US should take whatever behind the scenes steps are required, such as continued economic and military assistance, to assure that ROK economic progress is allowed to consolidate into a self-sustaining base in the 1970's. Simultaneously the U.S. should avoid the appearance of an innovator on the Korean peninsula, full well realizing that there will perhaps be some significant politico-military changes during the 1970's. Being prepared to accept such changes, without actively advocating them, may convince both North and South Korea that the US blood and treasure previously expended on the Korean peninsula were directly related to a bipolar confrontation which has been redefined over time.

Singapore

(§) CINCPAC sent his comments on the Singapore PARA in March. He said that in keeping with the "strategic island" concept, he considered an independent and friendly Singapore of "significant strategic value in advancing US interests throughout South and Southeast Asia." The importance of this tiny island state, CINCPAC continued, evolved from its commanding location, excellent logistical support facilities, and a regional economic and political influence far out of proportion to its small size. The significance of this "strategic island" and the need to preserve U.S. military access there assumed increased importance when viewed in the context of Soviet efforts to penetrate the area and the apparent amenability of Singapore to offer certain services and access to the highest bidder on a commercial basis.

(§) Among specific CINCPAC recommendations was that the first paragraph in the study be recast to read:

The United States has significant strategic interest not only for support of naval and air activities but also in preventing the domination of Singapore by a government, nation or group of nations who would use this commanding location to threaten U.S. or Free World use of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca. U.S. interests are:

1. Strategic - Singapore is located in a commanding position in the center of Southeast Asia and on the principal
and preferred water passage between the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans, is possessed of an excellent port, naval and
commercial hub of the area. It is therefore in the strategic
interests of the United States to assure the unrestricted
future support of U.S. and other Free World military forces
in Singapore. U.S. strategic interests are served to the
extent that the GOS [Government of Singapore] grants
preferential access to U.S. and other Free World forces
vis-a-vis the Soviets....

CINCPAC's rational was that the U.S. and its allies had long recognized the
importance of blunting Soviet efforts to penetrate Singapore. As the paragraph
had been written, CINCPAC noted, the implication was that U.S. strategic
interests in Singapore rested solely in its military use for contingency
situations and for support of Indian Ocean operations. While this may be true
from the military viewpoint, CINCPAC continued, the overall U.S. strategic
interest in Singapore was in denying it to any government that might restrict
Free World commercial or military access to the Strait of Malacca as well as
Singapore's excellent logistical support facilities.

Terrorist Activities in the RVN

(G) On 25 May the CINCPAC Representative to Australia stated that the
U.S. Ambassador had expressed great interest in the subject of terrorist
activities in the RVN. The Ambassador said that he understood that terrorist
activity was taking a large toll among non-combatants and he could not under-
stand why the Western press was not using statistics of this terrorism to the
best advantage, that is, to counter charges by North Vietnam on the number of
non-combatants killed during U.S. airstrikes in the North. The Ambassador, it
was believed, would ask CINCPAC questions about this terrorist activity during
the Chiefs of Mission Conference scheduled for June in Hong Kong.

(G) CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to provide an assessment and current
terrorism statistics by military region. MACV provided the required material
and CINCPAC was prepared to answer questions. It had been noted that parallel-
ing the 1972 assault against the RVN was an offensive designed to expand the
communist base among the people. Along with seizure of territory, the enemy
stressed the proselyting of Vietnamese troops where possible, intimidation
where required, and terrorist activities as a necessary catalyst. The pattern
in 1972 was the same that had been observed each spring since 1968. Members
of the world press, however, were independent and frequently biased in the

1. CINCPAC 050630Z Mar 72.
subject matter they covered, so that any overt effort to obtain their support in countering North Vietnamese propaganda with such statistics would probably be rejected. COMUSMACV and the RVNAF should continue, however, to accelerate declassification procedures in order to provide verified, timely reports of terrorist activity as well as assist in supporting news coverage efforts where possible.

1. CINCPACREP Australia 260145Z May 72; CINCPAC 020318Z Jun 72; COMUSMACV 1tr 8 Jun 72, Subj: Terrorist Incidents in SVN (U); COMUSMACV 220320Z Jun 72; Discussion Topic, J5523, 17 Jun 72, Subj: Terrorist Activities in the RVN (U).
CHAPTER IV

MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I--OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Air Operations

(U) Although U.S. ground activity diminished continuously throughout 1972, air operations in Southeast Asia were maintained at a high rate and reached two surge periods that surpassed anything that had gone before. These surges struck the nerve centers of North Vietnam in a way that had been encouraged by the Pacific Command for many years. Aerial bombardment and the mining of the key harbors of Hanoi and Haiphong plus intense interdiction of enemy supply lines, particularly in response to the enemy's Easter offensive and at the end of the year, appeared to be bringing the enemy to the negotiation of a cease-fire, as PACOM military leadership had long believed it would.

(U) The events related to air operations from the view of the CINCPAC staff were many, varied, and interrelated. The record of those events for 1972 is in generally chronological form with various facets included. Among these are operating authorities, rules of engagement, certain plans for our forces, operations orders, and some reports of air activity. Certain other topics are addressed separately, including electronic warfare and the basing of the aircraft involved in these operations. A great deal of the message traffic associated with these events was classed either as "by other means (BOM)," the security communications means called the "back channel," or in general service message traffic but addressed as "Special Category, Exclusive for..." an individual by name. In many cases, details are not available for inclusion here.

(TS) As the year opened, enemy preparations indicated an increased main force threat to Military Regions (MR) I and II in the RVN. COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC and the Chairman of the JCS of his overall Southeast Asia assessment, in which he pointed out that North Vietnam's basic goal remained unification of Vietnam under a Communist government and that 1972 would see a major effort to improve the Communist position throughout Indo-China. In the RVN he estimated the main force threat to be in MR I and the western highlands of MR II. On 9 January CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that he concurred in COMUSMACV's assessment. CINCPAC pointed out that the enemy offensive in the highlands would probably be centered in Kontum Province. In MR I at least two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions were estimated as preparing to start offensive activity. The threat in the two southern MR (III and IV) was viewed...
as less serious. As January moved on CINCPAC estimated that the enemy had the capability to start a main force offensive by 15 February (Tet).1

(TS) On 20 January COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC of additional authorities required to counter the Communist offensive. In reviewing available intelligence to support his request, COMUSMACV stated, "There is no doubt that this will be a major campaign." He estimated that the main effort would be in northern MR I and the highlands of MR II accompanied by a "general increase in enemy activity in other areas of RVN." COMUSMACV requested authority for:

1. Fighter aircraft to strike enemy MIG aircraft on the ground at Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang.

2. Fighter aircraft, including IRON HAND [surface-to-air missile (SAM) suppression]; to strike active GCI [ground control intercept] radars in NVN below 20 degrees North.

3. Fighter aircraft, including IRON HAND, to strike any SAM site and associated equipment in NVN that is located within 19 NM (SAM range) of the PMDL [Provisional Military Demarcation Line] and within 19 NM of the North Vietnam-Laos border as far north as 19 NM above Mu Gia Pass.

4. Fighter aircraft to strike enemy logistic support facilities below 18 degrees North.

5. Sensor implanting throughout the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone]. This authority will be executed to the extent required to provide the intelligence deemed necessary for safety of forces.

6. Fixed and rotary wing aircraft logistic support, troop lift and MEDEVAC in support of RVNAF limited cross-border operations in Laos or the GKR [Cambodia] when require-

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1. Much of this section for the first five months of 1972 was based on a chronology prepared in CINCPAC's Plans Division and forwarded as part of the J5 Historical Summary for June 1972. It is hereafter cited in this section as J5 Chronology; it covers the period 1 Jan - 31 May 72. Messages cited pertaining to this paragraph were CINCPAC 040329Z Jan 72; COMUSMACV 041237Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 100820Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 110255Z Jan 72; and CINCPAC 180347Z Jan 72, all BOM.
ments exceed VNAF [Vietnamese Air Force] capabilities. Rotary wing gunship employment when necessary to provide security of these operations. ¹

(TS) On 21 January CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's request and included Bai Thuong Airfield as one at which fighter aircraft should be allowed to strike enemy MIG aircraft on the ground. CINCPAC also advised COMUSMACV that no course of action should be overlooked that could contribute in any measurable way to the achievement of our overall objectives in Southeast Asia and requested that COMUSMACV review and comment on additional actions that could contribute toward containment of anticipated enemy initiatives. ¹

(TS) On 26 January the JCS authorized:

(1) Increased reconnaissance in the vicinity of Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang airfields, utilizing appropriate escort and defense suppression force for protective reaction (standing).

(2) Employment of anti-radar missiles against primary GCI site outside RP-6 [Route Package] (through 30 Apr 72).

(3) Aerial implanting of sensors in the northern half of the DMZ (through 30 Apr 72).

(4) Fixed and rotary wing aircraft, logistic troop lift, and MEDEVAC support of RVNAF crossborder operations against any suspected enemy base areas along the RVN/Laos and Cambodia borders. A 24 hour advance notification of JCS required before exercising (through 1 May 1972).

(5) Assuming MIG aircraft airborne from Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang to be hostile once land campaign begins, engagement whenever encountered below 18 degrees north.

The JCS directed preparation of several strike plans:

(1) Against all threat radars below the 20th parallel. (FREEDOM DASH).

(2) One time attack of SAM facilities which constitute most immediate threat from NVN to friendly aircraft supporting ground units. (FREEDOM BLOCK)

2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 210149Z and 211029Z Jan 72.
TOP SECRET

(3) Attacks on staging areas, enemy troop concentrations, logistic support facilities, and all other supply and transport activities in support of the land battle in South Vietnam. (FREEDOM PLAY).1

On that same day, CINCPAC, having been advised of COMUSMACV's request for certain standby authorities, and in light of the growing threat, advised his component commanders of measures to insure operational readiness posture capable of supporting any emergency that might confront COMUSMACV.2

(TS) Sorties levels for the ARC LIGHT B-52s had been established at 1,000 a month for FY 72, a rate lower than had been recommended by CINCPAC. In 1971 the Secretary of Defense had provided some planning figures that reduced the ARC LIGHT monthly sortie rate to 650, but the 1,000-a-month rate was in effect as the year opened. On 28 January the CINC of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) advised CINCPAC that SAC was prepared to implement a 1,200 sortie rate and that necessary actions were being taken to prepare for a possible surge in tanker requirements. CINCPAC also advised the Chairman of the JCS that the Military Airlift Command (MAC) should be alerted to the possible need for use of up to 11 C-141 aircraft to augment the PACOM C-130 capability under surge conditions and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) should be alerted to the possible need for additional intercoastal LST support or for additional hulls for retrograde movement if the amphibious ready group was utilized in either a deceptive operation or in a contingency role in the RVN.3

(TS) On 3 February the Chairman of the JCS asked for a contingency plan outlining those military actions recommended in the event of a major enemy assault across the DMZ into northern RVN. COMUSMACV provided the recommendations and on 5 February CINCPAC provided a revised concept plan for the Chairman; the plan was FRESH MANDATE II.4

(TS) Also on 5 February COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that in his judgement "the enemy's land campaign had begun." He further stated, "The assault phase of the campaign can be set in motion at any time the enemy high command decides to do so." The evidence he cited was limited to the two northern regions of the RVN. He also requested authority for early execution of FREEDOM PLAY, FREEDOM DASH, and FREEDOM BLOCK. CINCPAC directed implementation of authority

1. Ibid., which cited JCS 2002/260032Z Jan 72.
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 262154Z Jan 72.
4. J3B32 HistSum Feb 72, which cited JCS 9969/030108Z Feb 72, COMUSMACV 050055Z Feb 72, and CINCPAC 051209Z Feb 72 (all BOM).
to engage MIG aircraft whenever they were encountered below 180 North and requested that CINCPAC be delegated timing and coordination authority for the execution of the three FREEDOM strike plans.¹

(TS) Again on 5 February the JCS requested an assessment of the MAC and MSC to meet a potential surge requirement. Both agencies responded with assessments of their capabilities. The situation regarding possible surge requirements remained static throughout this period and in mid-February CINCPAC advised that no further action by the MAC or MSC was anticipated at that time.²

(TS) Also on 5 February the JCS directed that the B-52 sortie rate be increased to 1,200 sorties per month. On 7 February they directed that additional B-52s be deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam and additional tankers be deployed to Kadena on Okinawa to provide a capability to temporarily increase the ARC LIGHT sortie rate to 1,500 per month (51 a day). The nickname for the deployment of the SAC forces was BULLET SHOT. Ten KC-135s deployed to Kadena and 29 B-52s to Andersen. On 17 February the ARC LIGHT forces commenced the 1,500 per month sortie rate and continued with 51 sorties a day for the rest of the month.³

(TS) Meanwhile, air operating authorities broadened somewhat on 7 February when the JCS authorized tactical air strikes into the northern portion of the DMZ whenever COMUSMACV determined that the North Vietnamese were using the area in preparation for an attack southward. This authority was to be good through 1 May 1972. The JCS also advised CINCPAC (subject to final approval) to expect authorization on or about 1 March for the request that fighter aircraft, including IRON HAND, be able to strike SAM sites in NVN located within 19 nautical miles of the PMDL and 19 nautical miles of the Laos/NVN border to a point 19 nautical miles north of Mu Gia Pass.⁴

(TS) At about this time certain supply requirements were addressed. On 9 February CINCPAC advised the Defense Supply Agency of potential demands on the POL support system in Thailand and requested interim authority to meet urgent military requirements. CINCPAC also advised COMUSMACV that CBU (cluster bomb unit) assets, as of 31 January 1972, must meet the requirements for the two dry seasons between that time and 30 June 1973.⁵

1. J5 Chronology, which cited COMUSMACV 050915Z Feb 72 and CINCPAC 052008Z Feb 72.
2. Ibid., which cited JCS 3904/052052Z Feb 72, COMSC 052315Z Feb 72, MAC 060155Z Feb 72, and CINCPAC 180423Z Feb 72.
3. J3B215 HistSum Feb 72, which cited CJCS 3849/051804Z Feb 72 and CJCS 5087/072156Z Feb 72 (both EX).
5. J5 Chronology, which cited CINCPAC 090421Z Feb 72 and CINCPAC 102046Z Feb 72.
CINCPAC continued his review of enemy capabilities to employ tube artillery, armor, and AAA in support of the anticipated offensive. The United States was aware that the leaders in Hanoi were split on the strategy for the 1972 dry season offensive. One faction, under civilian leadership and apparently supported by the People's Republic of China, proposed continued guerrilla warfare. The other faction, led by General Giap and apparently supported by the U.S.S.R., favored an all-out conventional attack, led by tanks and supported by heavy artillery. On 22 February COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC and the Chairman of the JCS a detailed analysis of a seven-part series of articles in the NVA newspaper, ostensibly written by General Giap. The MACV analysis concluded that the series "clearly emphasized the withdrawal of the American forces has prepared the way for 'big annihilating attacks' by main forces." The analysis also pointed out that similar articles had appeared in the North Vietnamese press just before Tet 1968.¹

COMUSMACV, on 26 February, cited urgent need for authority for fighter aircraft, including IRON HAND, to strike any SAM site and associated equipment in NVN that was located within 19 nautical miles (SAM range) of the PMDL and within 19 nautical miles of the North Vietnam–Laos border as far north as 19 nautical miles above Mu Gia Pass. COMUSMACV also requested:

(1) Authority to conduct TACAIR strikes against enemy logistic support facilities below 18 degrees North and enemy artillery which is capable of interdicting in MR I.

(2) Additional strikes against 130mm guns at the first available opportunity.²

CINCPAC strongly supported COMUSMACV's request and requested that the following be authorized at the earliest practicable time:

(1) TACAIR strikes, including IRON HAND, against SAM sites in NVN located within 19 NM north of the DMZ and 19 NM of the Laos/NVN border to a point 19 nautical miles north of Mu Gia Pass.

(2) TACAIR strikes against enemy logistic support facilities in NVN south of 18 degrees North.

¹ Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 221037Z Feb 72; J5532 Point Paper, 8 Aug 72. Subj: Prospects and Likely Outcome in Indochina (U).
² J5 Chronology, which cited COMUSMACV 260225Z Feb 72.
(3) TACAIR strikes against enemy 130mm artillery which can reach friendly targets south of the PMDL and against other long range artillery/rocket sites located within 6 NM north of the DMZ and capable of reaching friendly forces/installations.1

(TS) On 29 February COMUSMACV emphasized the need for requested authority for fighter aircraft to conduct SAM strikes as he had outlined in his message of 20 January. CINCPAC strongly concurred and reiterated the requirement for requested fighter aircraft to conduct SAM strikes. Meanwhile, on 28 February the JCS provided routine extension of standing authorities, including those for herbicides, through 31 March 1972.2

(TS) On 1 March the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence briefed CINCPAC and CINCSAC on the RVN ground and air defense threats in Indo-China. The briefing concluded that enemy capabilities were strongest in the northern region of the RVN and were still increasing in MR III where the enemy could conduct attacks in the border provinces. The briefing pointed out that the MR III threat was "potentially the most serious" if not effectively countered because of ARVN [the RVN Army] preoccupation with enemy attacks in the northern regions of the RVN.3

(TS) On 3 March COMUSMACV stated that the authority requested for fighter aircraft to conduct SAM strikes was strongly desired for a 24-hour weather window from 3 to 4 March. CINCPAC concurred, citing the importance of conducting SAM strike operations in visual meteorological conditions.4

(TS) COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC and the Chairman of the JCS on 6 March that enemy forces had been in position to initiate offensive ground operations against the RVN since 5 February. He cited evidence indicating the preemptive U.S. air strikes and ARVN ground operations might have caused the enemy to delay the offensive but had not succeeded in forestalling it completely.5

(TS) Two days later COMUSMACV reviewed the enemy threat throughout Indo-China in a message to CINCPAC and the Chairman of the JCS. In the RVN he summarized the situations and MRs I and II and the concentration of forces

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 270222Z Feb 72.
2. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 291310Z Feb 72, CINCPAC 030336Z Mar 72, and JCS 7048/281900Z Feb 72.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 030925Z Mar 72 and CINCPAC 031350Z Mar 72.
5. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 061209Z Mar 72.
in Cambodia near MR III. He requested authority to:

(1) Conduct TACAIR strikes and naval gunfire attacks against SAM sites, MIgs, GCI sites, AAA, long-range artillery, tanks, and logistic facilities in North Vietnam below 18 degrees North.

(2) Employ area denial munitions in the northern portion of the DMZ.

Subsequently, on 23 March, COMUSMACV deleted the request for naval gunfire from this request and further defined the expanded and integrated enemy SAM threat to U.S. aircraft. He also requested a three-day strike against the enemy air defense system with emphasis on the SAM threat (the three-day strike to be under visual meteorological conditions). CINCPAC strongly recommended approval of COMUSMACV's request.¹

(°S) On 21 March the JCS cautioned that authority for protective reaction may be exercised only (and they repeated only) when enemy air defenses either fired at or were activated against friendly forces. Two days later they requested a compilation of recommended operating authorities, to include the number of tactical reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam, required for the period 1 May through 1 November 1972.²

(°S) On 24 March the JCS again provided routine extension of standing operating authorities, including those for herbicides, and authorized the employment of area denial munitions in the northern portion of the DMZ.³

(°S) CINCPAC reviewed available information about the enemy logistics situation for the Chairman of the JCS on 29 March. The analysis concluded that the enemy was not supply limited in northern RVN, but might be under some degree of constraint because of shortages of supplies in the south. It was stressed, however, that too little information was available to make an accurate estimate of the situation in Cambodia and the southern part of the RVN.⁴

(°S) On 30 March CINCPAC recapitulated, in depth, the ever increasing SAM threat and strongly reiterated the recommendation for approval of authority for fighter aircraft to strike any SAM site and associated equipment in NVN.

¹. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 081155Z Mar 72, COMUSMACV 230959Z Mar 72, and CINCPAC 240400Z Mar 72.
². Ibid., which cited JCS 2980/212257Z Mar 72 and JCS 5394/232321Z Mar 72.
³. Ibid., which cited JCS 6432/241914Z Mar 72.
⁴. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 292225Z Mar 72.
that was located within 19 nautical miles of the PMLD and within 19 nautical miles of the North Vietnam-Laos border as far north as 19 nautical miles above the Mu Gia Pass and to conduct tactical air strikes against SAM sites, MIGs, GCI sites, AAA, long-range artillery, tanks, and logistic facilities in RVN below 18 degrees North.¹

(U) At this time began the days of artillery barrages and probes in depth that culminated with an invasion across the DMZ and in MRs II and III by a North Vietnamese Army force of six divisions, accompanied by armored, heavy artillery, and mobile anti-aircraft units. Spearheaded by tank columns, this was the biggest North Vietnamese drive since the Tet offensive of 1968. It became obvious that General Giap's approach had prevailed.

(S) Both COMUSMACV and the RVNAF were surprised by the ferocity of the attack and the fact that the infantry-tank offensive was supported by such heavy artillery barrages. The shock effect that the NVA achieved in the initial stages was the major reason they were so successful. Also, the invasion was against a thinly-spread green division, the ARVN 3d Division, which had not really had an opportunity to shake down. When the momentum of the attack subsided, the ARVN quickly rallied and conducted several highly successful spoiling attacks.²

(TS) On 1 April as the magnitude of the assault became apparent, COMUSMACV strongly recommended approval of the request for tactical air strikes against SAM sites, MIGs, GCI sites, AAA, long-range artillery, tanks, and logistic facilities in North Vietnam below 18 degrees North. CINCPAC recommended approval of authority to use all the forces made available, and requested that his views be brought to the attention of highest authority.³

(TS) On 2 April for a program known as FREEDOM TRAIN, the JCS granted authority to conduct tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks against SAMs, artillery, and other military and logistics targets no farther than 25 nautical miles north of the nearest point on the DMZ and the use of B-52 strikes throughout the DMZ. This authority was to be extended until the emergency in MR I was terminated or not later than 1 May 1972. Subsequent authorities extended the operating area for tactical air strikes to 17 degrees 35 minutes, then 18 degrees, and on 8 April to 19 degrees. To support this air program against NVN a tactical air strike effort of approximately 120 strike sorties a day (from two attack aircraft carriers) plus USAF sorties.

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 300114Z Mar 72.
2. J5532 Point Paper, 8 Aug 72, Subj: Prospects and Likely Outcome in Indochina (U).
3. J5 Chronology, which cited COMUSMACV 011400Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 012200Z Apr 72.
FREEDOM TRAIN

Operations Reports Bomb Damage Assessment - 3 April through 2 May 1972

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1. J38213 HistSum Apr 72.
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as available, was scheduled for FREEDOM TRAIN. In conjunction with the expanding FREEDOM TRAIN area, naval gunfire support authority was also expanded to include targets up to 20 degrees North. In support of those operations, the JCS approved employment of tactical air in those sorties where naval gunfire was authorized. On 25 April the FREEDOM TRAIN area for air strikes was extended to 20 degrees North. At the request of CINCPAC, the JCS extended to 20 degrees 25 minutes the area authorized for naval gunfire support in connection with FREEDOM TRAIN.¹

(NS) Meanwhile, during the first week in April, CINCPAC recommended a number of specific actions. On 4 April he requested authority to engage all enemy fighter aircraft encountered south of 20 degrees North on the ground or in the air. On 5 April he recommended a one-time strike of Haiphong by carrier forces. In addition to achieving maximum gain with acceptable risk, this undertaking was considered to provide evidence of U.S. willingness to react positively and dramatically in the face of the enemy's escalatory aggressive actions in the RVN. He also proposed, that same day, the aerial mining of the Haiphong port complex.²

(NS) On 8 April the JCS authorized the attack of any MIG aircraft south of 20 degrees North with friendly aircraft or SAMs. This authority was to extend until the existing emergency in MR I was terminated or not later than 1 May 1972. CINCPAC requested that the MIG engagement authority be expanded to include any military aircraft; the JCS approved such authority. CINCPAC also requested authority for friendly aircraft and SAMs to attack airborne enemy fighter aircraft anywhere in North Vietnam, exclusive of the Communist China buffer zone.³

(NS) On 8 April the JCS had also requested that CINCPAC prepare a plan to strike an appropriate target in NVN south of 19 degrees North with at least six B-52s. The plan called for a one-time strike using the B-52s supported by Task Force 77 and 7th Air Force tactical air. After evaluating targets in the assigned area, the Vinh railroad yard and petroleum storage area were selected. At 092018Z Apr 18 B-52s from U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand

2. J5 Chronology, which cited CINCPAC 042026Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 050521Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 050522Z Apr 72.
3. Ibid., which cited JCS 3502/082322Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 090127Z Apr 72, JCS 4689/101915Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 100309Z Apr 72.
struck the targets. This was the first of a series of B-52 strikes on targets located in North Vietnam.  

(TS) On 11 April the JCS requested that CINCPAC prepare a plan for another ARC LIGHT strike on 12 April. This plan was to provide for a one-time strike employing B-52s against a target or targets south of 20 degrees North, and north of Vinh. The JCS selected Bai Thuong Airfield for the strike. On 13 April 18 B-52s struck the target with numerous supporting aircraft from Task Force 77 and the 7th Air Force. The airfield runway was interdicted at 12 places and was unserviceable; the taxiway was interdicted at 9 places, and one MIG-17 was destroyed. There were no U.S. aircraft losses in connection with the strike.  

(TS) FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO was another operation conducted at about this time. On 9 April the JCS requested preparation of a plan for an intensified one-day strike with combined B-52 and tactical air resources against key logistic targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes. On 16 April, Navy A-6s aircraft struck known SAM sites in the Haiphong area. These aircraft were followed by 17 B-52s striking the Haiphong petroleum products storage facilities. This initial strike wave was followed by two more waves of tactical aircraft that struck targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area; these were joint Task Force 77 and 7th Air Force assets. There were no B-52 losses, but one F-105G and one A-7 were lost. In addition the USS WORDEN was hit by a missile. During the strike three MIG-21s were shot down. Photo confirmed bomb damage assessment revealed extensive damage.  

(TS) On 14 April CINCPAC requested two more kinds of authority. One was that authority for the use of riot control agents throughout Southeast Asia be separated from the compilation of operating authorities requested by CINCPAC earlier, on 3 April, when CINCPAC had delineated the operating authorities required for the period 1 May through 1 November 1972. The JCS authorized the use of CS in combat aircrew recovery operations in NVN and Cambodia. This authority was to extend until the existing emergency in the RVN terminated or until 1 May 1972. The second request was to employ units of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in NVN waters as required in the support of Marine helicopters providing naval gunfire spotting service, to include authority to close inside

1. J3B213 HistSum Apr 72, which cited JCS 3500/082321Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 091108Z Apr 72 (both EX).
2. J3B213 HistSum Apr 72, which cited JCS 4940/110006Z Apr 72 and JCS 6327/120530Z Apr 72 (both EX).
3. J3B213 HistSum Apr 72, which cited JCS 3981/092350Z Apr 72.
4. JS Chronology, which cited CINCPAC 030840Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 140217Z Apr 72, JCS 1477/151842Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 142238Z Apr 72, and JCS 1420/1516197 Apr 72.
12 nautical miles of the NVN coast. The JCS authorized use of the ARG, as requested, with authority to extend until 1 May 1972.1

(TS) On 16 April CINCPAC requested expansion of authority for the use of TALOS and TALOS ARM throughout NVN whenever MIG aircraft were airborne. The original request had not included Route Package VI. On 20 April the JCS authorized the employment of TALOS and friendly aircraft to attack airborne enemy fighter aircraft anywhere in NVN exclusive of the Communist China buffer zone and employment of TALOS ARM against GCI sites throughout NVN. This authority was to be effective until 1 May 1972. On 16 April CINCPAC also recommended that the reconnaissance authorities be expanded to allow COMUSMACV to conduct manned tactical reconnaissance missions above 19 degrees North in NVN.2

(TS) For the next week CINCPAC continued making a number of specific recommendations. He requested authority for air surveillance of trawlers within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands, with the surveillance not to be conducted closer than three nautical miles. He requested continuing authority to strike targets in the Do Son area with naval gunfire. He requested authority to employ aerial denial munitions in NVN below 20 degrees North against NVN land and sea lines of communication. He also requested authority to strike a POL storage area northeast of Thanh Hoa.3

(TS) FREIGHTER CAPTAIN and FREQUENT WINNER were the names of the JCS approved special operations against the Thanh Hoa area that were conducted on 22 and 24 April, respectively. Both featured combined employment of B-52 and sizable tactical air assets, commensurate with the tactical air requirements at the time in the RVN. Petroleum products, rail and highway bridges, transshipment points, locomotive shops, and the Bai Thoung Airfield had been targeted, but unfavorable weather restricted the full application of assets. There were no aircraft losses.4

(TS) With the opening of the enemy offensive early in April it had become apparent that additional air resources would be required to meet combat requirements. Air augmentation had started immediately. A summary of the air combat forces in Southeast Asia by the end of April was as shown on the accom-

1. J5 Chronology, which cited CINCPAC 0308402 Apr 72, CINCPAC 140217Z Apr 72, JCS 1477/151842Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 142238Z Apr 72, and JCS 1420/151619Z Apr 72.
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 160529Z Apr 72, JCS 5676/200002Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 161716Z Apr 72.
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 170408Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 180711Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 230544Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 210922Z Apr 72.
### SOUTHEAST ASIA AUGMENTATION STATUS

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<td>180422Z Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>F-4B</td>
<td>Iwakuni</td>
<td>202044Z Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>Udorn</td>
<td>260557Z Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>291333Z Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>F-4</td>
<td>Da Nang/Udorn</td>
<td>300456Z Apr 72 (extension)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>FORCES</td>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>CLEARANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>18 F-4 Commando Fly</td>
<td>MACV 030845Z</td>
<td>Provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 F-4 B/J (USMC)</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 F-4J (USMC)</td>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udorn</td>
<td>18 F-4 Commando Flash</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 F-4</td>
<td>010910Z May 72</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubon</td>
<td>36 F-4 CONUS</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>060720Z Apr 72</td>
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<td>Korat</td>
<td>5 F-105 Kadena</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12 F-105 CONUS</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>060120Z Apr 72</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 EB-66 CONUS</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>071710Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
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<td>240520Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 EB-66</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>179 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>160430Z Nov 71</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>041730Z May 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 EC-121</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>179 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>060420Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 EC-121</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>31 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>060420Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Tapao</td>
<td>7 B-52 (total 55)</td>
<td>AMEMB/Bangkok</td>
<td>14 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120536Z Feb 72</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>010910Z May 72</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 KC-135</td>
<td>(total 46)</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151900Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>010910Z May 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 personnel</td>
<td>for C-130 Rote</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151910Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhon Phanom</td>
<td>5 EC-47 (Da Nang)</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110920Z Apr 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 C-130</td>
<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>010200Z May 72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
panying chart. Other charts list CINCPAC's requests for country clearances and the clearance authorities granted. 1 (See also "Southeast Asia Force Augmentation" in the chapter on Planning.)

(TS) By 22 April it was obvious that the emergency was not going to be immediately terminated and many operating authorities were to expire on 1 May. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended that all operating authorities in effect be extended. The JCS granted an extension until 1 June 1972 of the temporary Southeast Asia operating authorities in effect on or after 26 January 1972 and due to expire on 1 May. Standing air and air-related and special operations authorities in effect were extended until 1 November 1972. The JCS also extended authority to penetrate up to not-closer-than four nautical miles from Hainan and the Taya Islands for the conduct of surveillance, through 31 May. They also expanded authority to conduct manned tactical reconnaissance operations south of 20 degrees 25 minutes North in NVN until 1 June. 2

(S) ARC LIGHT sorties were flown at an ever increasing rate throughout this period. Nearly 2,300 sorties were flown during May, almost all in the RVN in support of the counteroffensive. Augmentation of the ARC LIGHT B-52s had been ordered and executed in May and by the end of that month enough assets were in place to increase the sortie rate even higher. 3

LINEBACKER I - BLUE TREE

(TS) North Vietnamese aggression continued. CINCPAC noted that past protective reaction strikes and isolated special strikes in North Vietnam had had minimum effect on the Hanoi Government's capability or desire to continue a major offensive in the RVN. Finally, in May 1972, additional operating authorities were approved by the JCS. The LINEBACKER program (this phase was subsequently known as LINEBACKER I) was also authorized by the JCS. This was a program to strike the enemy supply and distribution systems. The LINEBACKER campaign replaced the program that had been called ROLLING THUNDER. 4

(TS) The JCS authorization for LINEBACKER was subject to certain guidance:

A. Conduct a continuing TACAIR and NGFS [Naval Gunfire Support] interdiction effort, augmented by B-52 sorties as required, to destroy and disrupt enemy POL and transportation

2. J5 Chronology, which cited CINCPAC 220149Z Apr 72, JCS 6393/290041Z Apr 72, JCS 9264/021538Z May 72, and JCS 9634/022123Z May 72.
resources and LOC in NVN; e.g., POL storage and pumping stations, rails and roads, bridges, railroad yards, heavy repair equipment, railroad rolling stock, and trucks. Utilization of the resources to neutralize defense is also authorized. In addition to attacks against fixed installations, armed reconnaissance is authorized against choke points and other time-sensitive transportation-interdiction targets that develop outside restricted areas.

B. Air and NGFS operations are authorized as applicable in NVN except within the Chinese Buffer Zone. Minimize civilian casualties and avoid damage to foreign shipping.

C. Initial efforts should give first priority to POL storage facilities as well as rail LOC in area between Chinese Buffer Zone and Hanoi; Hanoi and Haiphong areas and LOC leading out of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex to the south. Also, strike remaining lucrative POL and LOC targets in Route Packages I, II, III, and IV.

D. Plan to take maximum advantage of EO/WALLEYE [EO: electro-optical] capability against appropriate transportation targets as well as command and control facilities, and air defenses. In addition authority issued to seed LOC and key choke points with MK-36/40 weapons.

E. Include AAA, SAM defenses and supporting command and control system in targeting plan as required.

F. B-52 strikes require approval of target by Secretary of Defense 24 hours in advance of proposed Time Over Target except in Route Package I.

G. Fixed transportation/interdiction targets may be added to the validated TACAIR/NGFS list at CINCPAC discretion. However, targets within a 10 nautical mile radius of Hanoi or Haiphong, or in the Chinese Buffer Zone, must be validated by the JCS.¹

¹ On 10 May CINCPAC changed all references to the old name ROLLING THUNDER to LINEBACKER. This included title changes to the ROLLING THUNDER/BLUE

1. J382 HistSum May 72, which cited JCS 8619/092356Z May 72.
TREEX Basic Operation Order and the ROLLING THUNDER Coordinating Committee Agreements to LINEBACKER.1

(TS) Before the new LINEBACKER Operation Order was issued on 3 June, however, several other authorities had been received from the JCS. On 10 May the JCS authorized the use of aerial denial munitions against appropriate land targets in NVN south of the Chinese Buffer Zone as well as inland waterways and coastal waters within the three nautical mile limit. They also authorized CINCPAC to delegate approval authority to COMUSMACV for future ARC LIGHT strikes in conjunction with Cambodian cross-border operations from the approved FREEDOM DEAL area south to the Gulf of Thailand. This temporary authority was to be effective until 1 June 1972.2

(TS) CINCPAC's Basic Operation Order for LINEBACKER (LB)/BLUE TREE (UE) was issued on 3 June. It defined the area of operation as all of NVN from the Provisional Military Demarcation Line to the Chinese border. The boundaries of the Route Packages were defined, as were the tasks assigned to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT. BLUE TREE was the tactical reconnaissance program to acquire intelligence data to support LINEBACKER operations and other intelligence objectives in NVN.

(TS) COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT were to coordinate their efforts to prevent mutual interference when conducting classified special operations in the LINEBACKER area. Direct liaison among the three commanders was authorized for coordination and mutually supporting planning efforts. Each was to be the coordinating authority for his respective assigned area of operation. COMUSMACV was responsible for Route Package I; CINCPACFLT for Route Packages II, III, IV, and VI-B; and CINCPACAF for Route Packages V and VI-A.3

(TS) Following the initiation of LINEBACKER operations on 10 May, the number of tactical air sorties flown over North Vietnam by 19 July was 14,437 and by 31 July the number was 16,779. In Route Packages IV, V, and VI the sorties flown by 19 July were 3,514 and by 31 July 4,455.4

(TS) On 31 July the JCS provided suggestions for LINEBACKER target priorities. Accordingly, existing target priorities were amended, as follows:

Priority I: Land/Water Lines of Communication

A. Rail and highway bridges between the PRC [People's Republic of China] and the Hanoi-Haiphong restricted areas.

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 100352Z May 72.
3. CINCPAC 032315Z Jun 72.
B. Other rail and highway bridges.

C. Choke points/transshipment points.

D. LOC construction vehicles equipment, locomotives, rolling stock, watercraft, and concentration of trucks and other vehicles.

Priority II: POL System

A. POL resupply from PRC, related storage/support facilities, and distribution system.

B. Dispersed POL storage/facilities.

Priority III: War Supporting Systems

A. Military supplies.

B. Vehicle/equipment repair facilities.

C. Military installations.

D. Construction materials and equipment.

E. Shipbuilding facilities.

F. Industrial plants.

G. Command and control.

H. Electric power.

While defense installations were not placed in a specific target priority, the following defensive targets would be:

...attacked as necessary to provide maximum freedom of action/safety for friendly strike and reconnaissance forces operating against validated/authorized targets:

Air defense systems (airfields/MIG aircraft, SAM, GCI, electronic warfare, AAA radars/SAM, and AAA equipment).

Coastal defense systems (guns/rocket launchers/associated fire control facilities).
TOP SECRET

Command, control, and communications associated with both systems.1

(TS) During the month of July a number of alleged Chinese buffer zone penetrations and Chinese airspace violations were reported. CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT that these incidents were particularly sensitive and generated high level interest. He requested that immediate action be taken to insure that suspected strikes and overflights in restricted areas were thoroughly checked and the facts reported as soon as possible to CINCPAC and the JCS. The overflight of Hainan Island by a KA-6D refueler aircraft on 15 July was the only alleged airspace violation that could be confirmed. Faulty navigation equipment and adverse weather contributed to this incident. A total of 26 buffer zone penetrations were alleged during the period 5-31 July. Nine of these allegations were confirmed, 12 were declared invalid, and 5 required further investigation. Without exception, confirmed penetrations of the buffer zone were related to avoidance of NVN defenses, adverse weather, or necessary tactical maneuvering to provide maximum protection of the strike force.2

(TS) On 9 August CINCPAC directed intensification of LINEBACKER operations in the northern Route Packages, with Task Force 77 tasked to apply half of the strike sorties from three carriers in Package VI-B and if requested by CINCPACAF in VI-A. Remaining TF 77 forces were tasked in Route Packages II, III, and IV. CINCPACAF was tasked to apply 48 strike sorties per day into Route Packages V and VI-A. Weather was the major factor preventing full application of this effort against the North. Weather in late August and September had been operational only half of the time. Strikes within the Hanoi control area (a 10 nautical mile radius of Hanoi) were suspended on 9 September, apparently because of the release of three prisoners of war; the suspension was lifted on 29 September.3

(TS) By this time ARC LIGHT sortie requirements had reached the level of 105 a day. The requirement was based on the number of aircraft the Strategic Air Command could maintain to meet this level plus the number of targets the JCS wanted struck. During this period (early October) a combat evaluation of a dual targeting concept was begun. This was a program to measure the effectiveness of using one B-52 for two targets on a sortie in order to reduce the total B-52 force, maintain existing target capability, reconstitute the B-52G Single

2. CINCPAC 070216Z Jul 72; J3B21 HistSum Jul 72, which listed the incidents and the message traffic associated with investigating them.
Integrated Operation Plan force, and save dollars and personnel. It was
determined in Washington, however, that more important than economy was the
U.S. presence provided by the B-52 force in Southeast Asia.¹

(TS) On 12 October CINCPAC published Management and Control of Air Warfare
in Southeast Asia Procedures. This included strategy, command responsibilities,
and standing operating procedures. He established a 12-day campaign period.
CINCPAC Air Intentions Messages (AIM) were published to provide specific
guidance for each campaign period. Beginning 15 October the sorties in NVN
were reduced; 250 attack sorties for 15 October and thereafter 150 (80 in
Route Package I, 70 in the other Route Packages).²

(TS) Peace negotiations in Paris appeared to be progressing, and, as a
gesture of good will, air operations north of 20 degrees North were terminated
effective 23 October. All types of air operations north of that line as well
as leaflet dissemination and psychological warfare operations and naval gunfire
support operations were terminated. Only GIANT SCALE and photo drone operations
continued.³

(TS) Throughout November, dynamic changes in operating authorities con-
tinued to impact on air operations. Major changes follow:

A. Authority to use B-52s up to 18 degrees 45 minutes
   North (2 November).

B. Authority to use B-52s up to 19 degrees North
   (5 November).

C. Maximum tactical air/B-52s between the DMZ and the
   Cua Viet River/Route 9 (6-7 November).

D. CINCPAC AIM 3 provided air intentions for the period
   9-20 November (on 8 November).

E. Authority to use B-52s up to 20 degrees North
   (9 November).

F. Directed maximum air effort against lucrative
   military and logistic targets from the DMZ to 20 degrees
   North in NVN (11 November).

¹ J3B22 HistSums Oct, Nov 72; CINCPAC 082137Z Nov 72; JCS 9222/261749Z Nov 72.
² J3B25 HistSum Oct 72, which cited CINCPAC 120208Z, 150450Z, 260330Z, and
   152100Z, all Oct 72 (EX).
³ CINCPAC 222031Z Oct 72.
G. CINCPAC AIM 4 provided air intentions for the period
21 November to 2 December (18 November).

H. Reduced authorized sortie level to 100 tactical air
(attack) sorties and 30 B-52 sorties per day (26 November).1

(TR) From 1 to 18 December air operations were limited to south of 20
degrees North; 100 tactical air and 30 B-52 sorties continued to be authorized.
The objective was to interdict the southbound flow of war-making materials.
Target priorities were to:

- Impede supply movement by interdiction of key LOC.

- Attack transshipment points, supply and equipment
stockpiles, POL, and concentrations of vehicles.

- Strike MIG-capable airfields south of 20 degrees
North, as necessary.2

LINEBACKER II

(TR) The cease-fire sought in Paris proved elusive as the talks reached a
stalemate, and on 18 December the President ordered resumption of the air and
naval war against Hanoi and Haiphong. LINEBACKER II had originally been di-
rected as a three-day campaign, but it was subsequently extended until 29
December. This was a tactical aircraft and B-52 campaign; for the first time
in the air war ARC LIGHT forces participated in a sustained air campaign
against the NVN heartland. The objectives of the campaign were:

Pre-Christmas: Maximum destruction of selected military
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong areas.

Post-Christmas:

- Complete achievable level of damage against approved
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong complexes and Chinese buffer
zone.

4617/050045Z, CINCPAC 050250Z, JCS 6184/062206Z, CINCPAC 070257Z, CINCPAC
080315Z, JCS 8834/090037Z, CINCPAC 090333Z, JCS 2498/110039Z, CINCPAC
110392Z, and CINCPAC 182135Z, all Nov 72 (EX); JCS 9222/261749Z Nov 72;
CINCPAC 261940Z Nov 72.

- Isolate Hanoi—geographically, electrically, logistically.

- Resume destruction of LOC to the northeast and northwest of Hanoi.

Operations continued south of 20 degrees North, but the major emphasis of the campaign was north of that line.¹

(TS) ARC LIGHT aircraft targets, all in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong, included power, POL, rail, logistics, communications, storage areas, airfields, and other military targets.

(TS) At the end of the year, CINCPAC was able to make a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of LINEBACKER II operations. This summary concerned only the area north of 20 degrees North, which included the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Sorties flown were 728 for B-52s, 1,336 tactical air, and 1,292 support sorties for a total of 3,356. Losses in the area were 15 B-52s, 3 F-4s, 2 F-111s, 2 A-6s, 2 A-7s, and 1 RA-5. The overall loss rate was approximately 1.3 percent, the B-52 rate a little over 2 percent, tactical air less than 1 percent, and support aircraft .07 percent. The SAMs were the greatest threat in what has been described as the most heavily defended area in the history of air warfare. They accounted for 15 B-52 losses and 3 tactical air and support losses. An estimated 1,564 SAMs were fired, of which 1,312 were against the B-52s. MIG reactions were sparse, accounting for one suspected support loss, an RA-5. Four MIGs were lost (three shot down and one from fuel exhaustion). Two U.S. aircraft were lost to AAA and four to unknown causes.

(TS) Initial target authorization was for 32 targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong-NVN Heartland area; this was subsequently increased to 90 targets. First time strikes included the Hanoi thermal power plant and railroad station and the Gia Lam railroad station. Preliminary analysis indicated that 15 of the 34 authorized B-52 targets were damaged to the extent that restrike was not immediately warranted. These included power plants and POL, rail, logistic, and communications facilities. It was believed that the Hanoi power plant would be inoperative for from two months to a year and other plants met only 20 percent of Hanoi's demand. LINEBACKER II appeared to have achieved its goals.²

(TS) B-52 aircraft had been in use since June 1965 in Southeast Asia and none had been lost to enemy action until 22 November 1972 when a B-52 on a

¹ J3825 HistSum Dec 72.
² J3821 Point Paper, 29 Dec 72, Subj: Preliminary Assessment of LINEBACKER II Operations (U).
strike sortie was lost to a SAM in Route Package IV. Sustained B-52 raids against key, highly visible targets inflicted heavy damage while achieving psychological impact, particularly in the 1972 surge periods. Employed in a high threat environment like Hanoi-Haiphong, however, it was believed that more effective jamming and SAM-suppression strikes (including IRON HAND) were required. SAM strikes should be scheduled prior to the B-52’s time over target. Among other lessons learned were to insure that flight levels were within the chaff cloud and to make minimum turns in the SAM threat ring.1

Electronic Warfare Operations in Southeast Asia

(5) Electronic warfare (EW) operations in Southeast Asia in 1972 culminated during the two surges of air operations known as LINEBACKER I and II. A number of specific events are discussed below, specifically concerning the introduction of highly sophisticated enemy air defense weapons and U.S. EW measures and countermeasures used in response. The air defense environment encountered by U.S. forces was the most difficult in the history of air warfare. Our limited losses were, at least in part, a reflection of the effectiveness of EW operations.

(TS) During operations in April, B-52 aircraft for the first time bombed Vinh, Hanoi, and Haiphong. Increased EW platforms were brought into Southeast Asia to support the strike forces. A new electronic countermeasures (ECM) technique was employed over NVN that entailed large-scale chaff drops to screen the B-52 raids. U.S. aircraft losses in this period were minimal despite an extraordinary number of enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) expended. In April the STRELLA missile (SA-7) was employed by North Vietnam for the first time. This was a ground-launched infrared homing missile and the immediate result was a significant number of slow flying aircraft losses. CINCPAC had earlier cited the requirement for a countermeasure to shoulder-fired infrared weapons, but none had been developed. Early in May CINCPAC advised the JCS that efforts should be focused on producing equipment to combat ground-launched infrared missiles in Southeast Asia. Area avoidance was the only countermeasure in the meantime; the STRELLA, plus expanded SA-2 operations, further reduced permissive air space in Southeast Asia.2

(5) During May the bombing of the North continued with large-scale chaff drops to screen B-52s and tactical strikes. Emphasis on chaff delivery by means of the MK-129 leaflet bomb highlighted shortages in both the fiberglass chaff and the MK-129 bombs. The bomb shortage was magnified when highest authority directed their use in concentrated leaflet drops. CINCPAC partici-

2. J3B8 HistSum Apr 72 and May 72, which cited CINCPAC 032242Z May 72 (EX).

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pated in the effort to resolve the shortages. The JCS subsequently requested a review of MK-129 requirements and an assessment of the effectiveness of the ALE-38 and the MJU-4 bomb as alternate chaff dispensers. Previously stated M-129 chaff bomb requirements had varied from 500 to 1,600 per month. On 30 September CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a total MK-129 requirement of 1,250 per month for chaff and leaflet missions.1

(TS) Meanwhile, in May the Air Force Special Communications Center reported the possible introduction of new air defense weapons systems into Southeast Asia, possibly the Soviet SA-4 or SA-6 missiles. Although the evidence was tenuous, the apparent characteristics of the missiles fired pointed to the ramjet powered SA-4 and SA-6. Since 1971 CINCPAC had reported on PACOM EW capability gaps and strongly recommended action to enable early allocation of ECM assets to the PACOM to counter these missiles and the SA-3. The JCS, however, had advised that equipment designed to counter these missiles and certain radars and AAA were programmed for U.S. Forces in Europe as a matter of first priority. CINCPAC noted that it was evident from the record that virtually all Soviet air defense systems were subject to deployment to those nations allied to the U.S.S.R., either in fact or ideology. He cited introduction of the SA-7 missile in Southeast Asia as a specific case in point. He also noted that the recent provision of new weapons systems to NVN by the Soviet Union had resulted in a "marked increase in the ability of the North Vietnamese to hinder U.S. (and RVN) air efforts." CINCPAC continued, "Accordingly, it is deemed prudent to deploy our resources so as to be prepared to counter potential threats immediately upon initial appearance, vice expending a large urgent reaction effort after the fact." He outlined the existing PACOM capability to cope with the Soviet systems by Air Force and Navy aircraft. Then CINCPAC:

...strongly recommended that EW assets be allocated to PACOM to provide a full capability to counter subject threats. If assets on hand, and in production, are inadequate to support assignment of the requested EW assets to PACOM, request CINCPAC be advised of current plans to cope with the SA-3, SA-4 and SA-6 when their presence in SEAsia is confirmed.2

(TS) Additional sightings of the new missile were made in June, July, and August and the JCS requested an operational evaluation of the missile and also an unknown type radar associated with it. CINCPAC provided the requested information on 26 August. At a conference held earlier that month, CINCPAC advised the JCS, it had been determined that the new SAM was an unknown guided

1. J3B 15 HistSum May 72; J3B58 HistSum Sep 72; CINCPAC 300040Z Sep 72.
2. AFSPCOMMCE N Kelly AFB Texas 041943Z May 72; CINCPAC 072304Z Jun 72.
missile and not the SA-4 (GANEF). The associated equipment was unidentified but probably compatible with the SA-2 system. The T-8209 emitter, it was believed, was a modification of the WHIFF/FIRECUT AAA radar to enable operation in the "I" band. If the system were deployed in adequate quantity and proved effective, aircraft would be required to carry multi-band active ECM equipment that could dilute ECM effectiveness. The significance of the introduction of the systems into NVN, CINCPAC said, was not in the existing limited deployment, but in the fact that highly sophisticated modern weapons were being supplied to NVN and that little information was available to assess the extent of the threat posed to U.S. operations. To obtain additional information on these systems, CINCPAC believed that a coordinated all-source collection effort was required. He had submitted his requirements to the Defense Intelligence Agency on 15 August.  

(S) At the end of the year CINCPAC provided the JCS with a summary of the EW lessons learned during FY 72. Regarding the threat, CINCPAC noted that after the invasion of the RVN, NVN increased their AAA and SAM defenses in the Panhandle and DMZ areas. The effectiveness of the mobile threat systems was enhanced by the fluid deployment of the enemy and the lack of tactical electronic intelligence (ELINT) assets capable of rapidly and accurately detecting site relocations. While the SA-2B and 2F constituted the major threat, the period was marked by the willingness of NVN allies to provide new weapons systems, such as the SA-7 and the radar-controlled ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft system. A definite shift of SAM and AAA concentrations to the Hanoi-Haiphong area was noted with the resumption of U.S. bombing north of 20° North.

(S) CINCPAC described the introduction of the SA-7 and its capability against low performance aircraft "the most significant development" in Southeast Asia combat operations. The effectiveness of this system necessitated installation of infrared countermeasures equipment in low performance aircraft and the development of counter tactics. Since an effective countermeasures capability was not readily available, interim flare countermeasures were used, including flares fired from VPs and modified illumination flares dropped from dispensers. Effective flare launching was still dependent on timely visual acquisition of the missile launch, however, and a reliable launch warning system was still required. CINCPAC outlined the operational techniques that were employed to counter the SA-7.

(S) In the matter of chaff dispensing, the MK-129 chaff bombs had been replaced by ALE-38 dispensers, both on F-4 aircraft. Employment of chaff with jamming had proved to be an effective tactic for the protection of the strike.

force, but losses of chaff and chaff support aircraft to MIG aircraft indicated the vulnerability of those aircraft to enemy interceptors. "It would be more appropriate for drones to perform the chaff mission," CINCPAC concluded, to minimize aircrew exposure to a hazardous support role and, "more important, increase the availability of F-4's to perform their prime mission."

(5) In the matter of support operations, CINCPAC noted that the EB-66 had contributed significantly to strike force survivability by degrading the effectiveness of North Vietnam low frequency early warning and acquisition radars. Increased support requirements resulting from the North Vietnamese offensive necessitated augmentation from Tactical Air Command resources. The lack of effective tactical EW support measures of ELINT assets to rapidly and accurately locate radars permitted the enemy to maximize his employment of mobile threat systems. CINCPAC noted that there was a continuing requirement to improve and update the EW support posture of the tactical forces.

(5) The Navy's tactical electronic jamming effort reached a historical high for total assets employed (and increased capability) with the addition of the EA-6B to the assigned EKA-3B and EA-6A. Although the EA-6B had not reached its full potential, it had added a new dimension in jamming power and low frequency diversity.

(5) In the matter of EW support for ships involved in shore bombardments, the primary threat had been the coastal defense artillery batteries. Evidence indicated that initial warning of the approach of U.S. units was from CROSS SLOT radar, but that the targets were being tracked and battery fire was directed by optical devices. When this was first noted, missions were changed from day to night. Subsequently, gun laying radar was noted, and on 8 August the USS HOEL took close, accurate fire and intercepted the J-band SNAR-6 radar. CINCPAC listed the number of EW systems installed on naval gunfire ships to improve their short and long-term readiness in EW matters.

(5) Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) were also discussed. The combined efforts of electronic jamming, anti-radiation missiles, IRON HAND (SAM suppression aircraft) tactics, radar homing and warning equipment, and warnings provided by VQ-1/COLLEGE EYE aircraft crews continued to be effective against the SA-2 and MIG aircraft, CINCPAC reported. He described some techniques and tactics that had proved successful.

1. CINCPAC 2918552 Dec 72.
PACOM Electronic Warfare Assets

(S) The EB-66 airframe had been scheduled for phaseout in FY 72 by the Air Force Chief of Staff, but in December 1970 CINCPAC had expressed concern and reiterated his requirement for retention of the EB-66 force in the PACOM until it was replaced by a comparable electronic warfare (EW) system. The CSAF extended the EB-66, but in September 1971 he reprogrammed the phase out for the 3d Quarter of FY 74. No follow-on replacement program was specified. In January 1972 CINCPAC again expressed his concern about the lack of a follow-on capability to replace the EB-66 force, particularly since lengthy lead times would most likely be required. CINCPAC described the EB-66 as the "mainstay" of the PACOM EW effort, and noted that deletion of the aircraft without a replacement of equivalent capability, "will seriously impact on the PACOM EW posture." He "strongly recommended the EB-66 be extended in the inventory or procurement of a suitable replacement capability be expedited to preclude gaps in our EW support force." 1

(S) There were 21 EB-66s in Southeast Asia in the autumn of 1972. Five EB-66Cs, stationed at Korat, Thailand, provided tactical electronic support measures (ESM) and limited standoff ECM for LINEBACKER, ARC LIGHT, and BUFFALO HUNTER operations. The EB-66C was the only ESM platform collecting data in western NVN and northern Laos. There were 16 EB-66E, also at Korat, that provided standoff ECM to LINEBACKER, ARC LIGHT, and BUFFALO HUNTER operations. 2

(S) F-105G (WILD WEASEL) aircraft had been deployed from the Continental United States (CONUS) on temporary duty in March 1972 as a result of the enemy offensive. The term of this temporary duty was scheduled to expire in August and September. CINCPACAF advised that the requirement to replace the F-105G aircrews on a 180-day basis generated increased CONUS training requirements that could not be met with existing assets unless six aircraft and nine aircrews were redeployed to CONUS to augment the training force. CINCPAC concurred and the aircraft returned to CONUS. The remaining F-105G assets in the PACOM were supplemented by F-4E aircraft to provide the required support. These aircraft provided IRON HAND support for LINEBACKER and ARC LIGHT operations. 3

2. J3B59 Point Paper, 5 Sep 72, Subj: PACOM Electronic Warfare (EW) Assets (U); J3B8 HistSum Apr 72.
Other Air Force assets included 46 EC-47 aircraft stationed at Nakhon Phanom, Da Nang, and Tan Son Nhut that provided airborne radio direction finding support.


New equipment introduced in Southeast Asia in 1972 included the ALQ-119, an ECM pod for USAF fighter aircraft; 50 were deployed to Thailand in August for SA-4 contingency. The Navy installed the SHRIKE anti-radiation missile on five destroyers.

One other EW asset introduced in 1972 was the BUFFALO HUNTER drone for use in COMPASS COOKIE, a project to obtain the frequency range of the SA-2F missile beacon transponder. Three BUFFALO HUNTER drones were removed from storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, and modified with special collection packages to receive and retransmit SA-2 beacon signals as well as drone radar homing and warning data to a DC-130 mother ship. The first deployment to U-Tapao was completed on 25 August and the first combat mission flown in September.

Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface

The requirement for compatible tactical air control systems among the Services in Southeast Asia had been recognized as early as 1967, but the interface of those systems had not been accomplished until 1969. Since that time CINCPAC had continued to evaluate the need for the system and had always concluded that the system was required as long as U.S. aircraft continued to have significant operational missions in Southeast Asia.

In June 1972 CINCPAC responded to a JCS request for information on the Southeast Asia Tactical Data System (TDS) Interface, outlining its operational effectiveness, specific uses, and beneficial results. CINCPAC noted that it had been an "extremely effective" system for coordinating employment of Air Force and Navy assets, by permitting all participants to enhance warning and control through access to all source information from a variety of radar and signal intelligence sensors. It had been the "key element" in the rapid and smooth flow of tactical data within the air defense command and control structure.

1. Ibid.
Specific uses included command and control, surveillance, warning, and combat orders. The interface had been used by both Air Force and Navy commands to coordinate and relay messages concerning strike and reconnaissance missions. It was used to monitor friendly aircraft to insure they were adhering to rules of engagement for border and restricted area operations. Information concerning the flight and intended flight of MIG aircraft was used to withdraw slow-moving friendly aircraft from threatened areas without disrupting air operations in less vulnerable areas. One of the most important uses of the data and communications link, CINCPAC noted, was accomplishing the hand-off of interceptors from one agency to another when they were operating on the fringes of individual control areas, such as the hand-off between a COLLEGE EYE aircraft and the Navy PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) ship. The receipt of all source information enabled the Tactical Air Control Center-Northern Sector (TACC-NS) (located at Monkey Mountain, RVN) to give positive control information to position our forces to engage and destroy hostile aircraft. Naval forces used the communications link to warn friendly aircraft to withdraw to the south when a MIG engagement by naval forces was imminent either by SAMs or interceptors. The entire TDS system was utilized to rendezvous, refuel, and monitor B-52 and tactical strikes into and returning from NVN. Search and rescue operations were frequently coordinated and Navy units routinely detected Air Force aircraft in difficulty and on numerous occasions rescued Air Force pilots in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Air Force, conversely, in many instances had provided search and rescue assets in support of Navy pilots in distress. Often joint search and rescue efforts were undertaken. The interface was also used to coordinate naval gunfire support missions in Route Package I and Military Region I with the Air Force to preclude interference with air strikes.

In matters of surveillance, the system provided a continuing exchange of air situation information through the interface of the semi-automated air surveillance system, the airborne tactical data system, and the IRON HORSE system. Information on air targets within the range of the individual facilities was made available for use by all interface participants.

The TDS interface was used to issue warnings to friendly aircraft near the borders of China and NVN. Additionally, it provided a viable hostile aircraft warning.

In the matter of combat orders, an integral part of the interface was the associated TDS covered coordination net: Air Force Green. The net was used extensively to coordinate the employment of interceptors and missiles. It was also utilized to coordinate the handover of air force fighters to naval units and to coordinate Air Force strikes in NVN, search and rescue efforts, and naval gunfire support missions. The interface data link inputs often
provided the basis for the decision making processes reflected by the combat orders given on Air Force Green.

(C) CINCPAC believed that the interface substantially contributed to the capability of Navy and Air Force units to operate in associated areas with a minimum of mutual interference. When cross-utilization of assets was called for, the interface provided the system with an effective command and control capability, which had allowed the two Services to provide mutual support in strikes over NVN. Specifically, fighter and ECM mutual support had degraded the enemy SAM and AAA effort and contributed to the downing of many MIG aircraft. The result was that more strike aircraft successfully hit their assigned targets. Each participant had an air situation display consisting of the best available data from the intelligence community and from real-time sensors. From June 1969 to June 1970 approximately 55 border warnings and 175 "bandit" warnings were issued each month. From June 1970 to June 1971, approximately 38 border warnings and 55 bandit warnings were broadcast each month. From July 1971 to June 1972 these averaged 21 border and 100 bandit warnings a month. In April 1972, 708 SAM warnings were issued or rebroadcast by TACC-NS alone. Because a radio relay aircraft (RRA) was an integral participant, the majority of the warnings issued were widely disseminated. Radar monitoring, hand-off, and flight following of USN strike aircraft from the Gulf of Tonkin by USAF agencies were greatly enhanced. The information and speed with which identification information could be passed between USAF and USN agencies had been improved. Because of the interface, MIG combat air patrol aircraft could be positioned much more effectively. CINCPAC listed a number of other examples of specific effective results of the system.

(C) CINCPAC concluded that the interface worked extremely well and continued to be of mutual benefit and essential to all participants as demonstrated by successful MIG kills. The primary purpose continued to be to provide near real-time border, MIG, and SAM warning information. The system had become an indispensable part of the air defense, counter-air, and interdiction operations. CINCPAC strongly recommended that the interface remain operational as long as significant air operations were conducted in Southeast Asia.

(C) Nevertheless, as forces withdrew from Vietnam, it became increasingly apparent that the interface would be terminated. CINCPACAF, however, began plans to establish an Alternate Tactical Air Control Center (A-TACC) at Udorn, Thailand to serve as a manual back-up system to the TACC-NS in the RVN. On 28 July the PACOM TDS Interface Advisory Group met to consider interface alternatives available to provide the A-TACC facility with an interface capability. The group recommended that the USAF earmark the equipment necessary

1. CINCPAC 072313Z Jun 72.
to provide a future interface capability at the A-TACC should the requirement for it be validated, but that no funds be expended at that time."

In October and November CINCPAC continued to study the interface systems, based on guidance relative to cease-fire planning and the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel. The PACOM TDS Interface Advisory Group considered two alternatives: relocation of the TDCC to a new location in Thailand in the event the cease-fire prohibited cross-border radio or data links, or, if relocation was not feasible, retention of the TDCC at Monkey Mountain with its operation and maintenance under civilian contract. The group decided the most desirable place for relocation was Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, because command and control functions could be consolidated at one location, the space problem was not critical there, less manpower was involved in the total USAF operation there, and the greater distance from Udorn to the Gulf of Tonkin compounded data transmission problems.

CINCPAC subsequently concurred in termination of the TDS upon withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam and reversion to the manual system at Udorn. He said, however, that initiation of a cease-fire did not obviate the requirement for retention of the capability to resume semi-automatic data exchange if the situation warranted. Accordingly, he recommended that actions necessary for reestablishment of the interface, e.g., an operational test of Nakhon Phanom, continue in the event of resumption of hostilities with NVN. Upon termination of the interface, CINCPAC recommended that the major system components be distributed in accordance with Service directives, but that they be designated in contingency plans for any future TDS digital interface requirement.

On 22 November the 7th Air Force advised that effective 1 December the Monkey Mountain facility would cease automated operation and the Udorn facility would assume the TACC-NS mission. CINCPAC, however, requested that there be no reduction in system capabilities, such as reversion to the manual system, prior to receipt of CINCPAC approval.

The TDS interface was kept operational through the LINEBACKER II operations of December. Meanwhile, CINCPAC's 24 November recommendations were approved by the JCS and testing at Nakhon Phanom was scheduled for early 1973.

2. CINCPAC 100427Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 242322Z Nov 72.
4. CINCPAC 290305Z Nov 72.
5. JCS 7979/032122Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 090025Z Dec 72.

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Naval Operations

Naval operations in Southeast Asia in 1972 included on-going programs of infiltration trawler surveillance and interdiction, submarine surveillance operations, naval gunfire support, and the sustained readiness of an amphibious ready group capability. In response to continued and accelerated North Vietnamese aggression, in the program that was called POCKET MONEY, authority was granted to mine the ports, harbors, and riverways of North Vietnam, including the principal ports at Hanoi and Haiphong, which had been proposed for so many years by the Pacific Command. By the end of the year negotiations were in progress and a cease-fire appeared imminent.

Naval Gunfire Support

(TS) With the assumption of the North Vietnamese offensive in early April 1972, the JCS directed CINCPAC to increase significantly the number of naval gunfire support (NGFS) ships in the Seventh Fleet as soon as possible. CINCPAC so directed CINCPACFLT. On 11 April CINCPAC reported to the JCS that the number of ships in the Gulf of Tonkin had been increased from 13 combatant ships to 45, and 1 additional attack aircraft carrier and 10 more destroyer types were en route. Later CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that he believed that the ships in the Seventh Fleet would be sufficient to satisfy COMUSMACV’s requirements, but that the situation would be closely monitored and additional forces requested, if necessary.  

(TS) On 14 April the JCS authorized NGF against North Vietnamese targets up to 200 North; CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT and further directed that this new authority be exercised at the earliest possible time. On 18 April CINCPAC advised the JCS that the positive manner in which the enemy was reacting to NGFS strikes was clear evidence of its inhibiting effect on enemy operations and recommended that continuing authority be granted to strike targets in the Do Son area with NGFS in conjunction with tactical air strikes from carriers, as needed.  

(TS) In an effort to "heighten NVN tension," CINCPAC recommended to the JCS early in May that word be leaked out that the NEW JERSEY (a battleship) was again being considered to rejoin the active fleet.  

1. J3B41 HistSum Apr 72, which cited JCS 7438/041530Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 041718Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 110341Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 161124Z Apr 72 (all EX).  
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 141819Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 180711Z Apr 72 (both EX).  
3. J3B41 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 030206Z May 72 (EX).
The arrival of the heavy cruiser NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148) in early May presented the opportunity to conduct an all-cruiser strike operation against targets in the Haiphong complex, and this CINC PAC recommended to the JCS. The JCS approved the operation, which was called CUSTOM TAILOR and conducted on the night of 9-10 May by the cruisers NEWPORT NEWS, OKLAHOMA CITY, and PROVIDENCE, with the destroyers HANSON, BUCHANAN, and M.C. FOX in support. They fired for 24 minutes at preassigned targets in the harbor area.1

In September, as the drawdown of U.S. ground forces continued at a rapid pace, CINC PAC received from COMUSMACV a query concerning whether the U.S. Navy would provide NGFS to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) spotters without the presence of U.S. personnel, if the spotting capability were developed by the RVNAF. CINC PAC stated that, for planning purposes, it could be assumed that, upon demonstration of the capability by the RVNAF, and if the military and political situation dictated, the existing policy would be revised to permit Seventh Fleet units to conduct NGFS missions without the presence of U.S. personnel.2

On 11 October CINC PACFLT advised that it was necessary to reduce the number of NGFS ships available for operations. The general condition of the Seventh Fleet destroyer force had deteriorated markedly as a result of the high operating tempo generated by intensified enemy activity. CINC PAC FLT considered it essential to reverse the trend of declining readiness without impairing the required support for on-going operations in the RVN. Effective 15 October he reduced the number of destroyers available for NGFS from 13 to 10. There were concomitant reductions of destroyer commitments in the Gulf of Tonkin to provide for proper maintenance time. In the event of an emergency or other surge requirement, augmentation of forces could be accomplished within six hours or less by utilizing the LINEBACKER NGFS Task Unit. In addition, other NGFS capable units in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea were available in less than 48 hours if additional augmentation were required.3

On 21 November CINC PAC requested authority from the JCS to outchop NEWPORT NEWS and PROVIDENCE from the Western Pacific on 1 December. Later in November CINC PAC approved the outchop of USS LONG BEACH.4

On 22 November CINC PAC requested that CINC PAC FLT coordinate a request from COMUSMACV that 13 RVNAF personnel be scheduled to attend a NGFS course at the U.S. Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California in March 1973.5

1. Ibid., which cited CINC PAC 062055Z May 72, JCS 6082/071444Z May 72, and CINC PAC 132302Z May 72 (all EX).
2. CINC PAC 050148Z Sep 72.
3. CINC PAC FLT 110347Z Oct 72.
4. CINC PAC 210109Z Nov 72, CINC PAC 242154Z Nov 72, CINC PAC FLT 232018Z Nov 72.
5. CINC PAC 220200Z Nov 72.
Infiltration Trawler Surveillance and Interdiction

Enemy maritime supply attempts continued throughout 1972. A review conducted by COMUSMACV for the FY 72 period revealed 18 confirmed North Vietnamese small logistics trawlers detected, all but one of which aborted its mission subsequent to detection. The trawler that attempted to fulfill its mission, an SL-4, was destroyed while attempting to evade after being intercepted. The number of enemy maritime supply attempts by small boat was difficult to assess without highly reliable intelligence reports to indicate actual occurrences. The withdrawal of U.S. Forces resulted in less information being available. Of the 18 confirmed trawlers, 17 were initially detected by P-3 air patrol and the other by a submarine. In the unsuccessful attempts to intercept the trawlers, they aborted, making it impossible to intercept them before they returned to their home waters. 1

There were a number of noteworthy specifics in connection with these operations in 1972. The first RVN participation in trawler surveillance occurred on 22 February—the SL-3 was last seen approaching Chinese Communist territorial waters. On occasion the trawlers were configured falsely so that they appeared to be oilers. A new tactic was initiated by the North Vietnamese in late March when they simultaneously deployed four trawlers, apparently in an effort to allow at least one to penetrate. This was believed to illustrate the enemy's determination and apparent need to infiltrate supplies by trawler. 2

On the night of 24 April, about 170 nautical miles west of Kompong Som, the trawler was challenged by a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) ship and attempted to evade. The trawler refused to identify itself or heed warning shots across the bow and was taken under fire by the VNN ship HQ-4. Within 15 minutes the trawler had experienced two secondary explosions, following which it disintegrated, apparently from self-destruction measures. This successful operation was considered to be the direct result of encouragement, initiated by CINCPAC, of the VNN to pursue their rules of engagement and to intercept a trawler in the open sea. Although the actions of the trawler would not have supported a U.S. determination of hostility, VNN Rules of Engagement permitted the action and CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that such actions would "be supported as necessary by U.S. Forces."3

3. J3B41 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 230520Z (EX); CINCPAC 231330Z Apr 72.
(TS) In June CINCPAC investigated the feasibility of waterborne logistic craft (WBLC) interdiction through the use of PTFs (fast patrol craft) from a mother ship, such as an LSD (dock landing ship). Based on comments received from COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC concluded that overriding disadvantages would accrue if such operations were conducted. Hazards from enemy shore batteries, the relatively short on-station time of the patrol craft, their limited fire power, and the necessity for considerable support assets mitigated against their use in this type of operation, at the time. CINCPAC informed the Chairman of the JCS that he considered a more effective new concept for close-in interdiction of NVN lighters or WBLC to be that of the Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and the Marine COBRA Team, previously approved by CINCPAC.

(S) On 12 August the JCS informed CINCPAC that higher authority had noted that the upsurge in enemy activity in the Delta indicated that supplies were reaching the enemy. They asked for a review of maritime interdiction activities in FY 72. COMUSMACV's study on the subject, mentioned above, provided the requested information. CINCPAC concurred in the results of the study and indicated to the JCS that steps taken to improve coastal surveillance efficiency, such as expanding cloud unit utilization, had resulted in major improvements. Continuing action was required, however, to insure future responsiveness to the infiltration threat. CINCPAC indicated that, in conjunction with COMUSMACV, he would continue to monitor the efforts of the VNN to improve MARKET TIME effectiveness, with a view toward reassessing or revising procedures as might be necessary.2

(TS) Toward the end of the year, when the surge of air and naval activity against North Vietnam was authorized, the JCS granted authority to strike SL-8 class light cargo ships (AKLS) in conjunction with authorized attacks on KOMAR class PGMG's, as recommended by CINCPAC, subject to the following conditions:

- The SL-8 is not flying a third country flag or other identification which would classify it as a third-country vessel.

- The SL-8 is located in NVN territorial waters.

On 28 December the JCS granted, in addition to existing Southeast Asia temporary operating authorities, authority to attack all KOMAR and other patrol type boats


2. J3842 HistSum Aug 72, which cited JCS 1933/121528Z Aug 72, CINCPAC 130212Z Aug 72, and COMUSMACV 170940Z Aug 72, all EX.

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within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam south of the Chinese buffer zone. In addition, authority was granted to attack all KOMAR and other patrol type boats in the Gulf of Tonkin west of 108° East, which were south of the Chinese buffer zone.

1. CINCPAC 182225Z Dec 72; JCS 7287/191434Z Dec 72; JCS 6514/280325Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 090172Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 090638Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 060430Z Apr 72; JCS 8241/132056Z Apr 72.
3. J3841 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 110339Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 270150Z Apr 72 (both EX).
4. CINCPAC 142224Z May 72.
1. JCS 5065/311500Z May 72; CINCPAC 312234Z May 72; CINCPAC 0201122 Jun 72; JCS 9264/021538Z May 72; CINCPAC 021723Z May 72.
2. CINCPAC 190200Z Jul 72.
3. CINCPACFLT 082345Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 102023Z Aug 72.
Amphibious Operations

(TS) The use of amphibious forces, including CINCPAC's reserve force, an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), came under study in 1972. In some cases the plan was to use such forces for cover or deception or for an amphibious feint on North Vietnamese territory. U.S. Forces were not used in such a role, however.

(TS) In early April, after the opening of the North Vietnamese offensive, and as a follow-up to an earlier request for recommended places to use amphibious feints in conjunction with air and naval gunfire support strikes, CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to develop and forward plans to include amphibious deceptive opera-

1. JCS 9561/012226Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 170856Z Aug 72.
2. CINCPAC 060351Z Sep 72.
3. CINCPAC 012322Z Nov 72.
tions, raids, and coordinated raid and deception activities. The operations were to be held between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and 20° North against facilities and installations that would require considerable time to reconstruct, at locations that would tend to require the enemy to consider diversion of forces to defend, and against targets whose loss would cause interruption to lines of communications supporting enemy efforts in the RVN.1

(TS) CINCPACFLT forwarded a plan for a 29-32 day campaign for a four-battalion landing team force that involved deceptive operations against Dong Hoi, followed by an amphibious raid at Quang Khe; an amphibious raid on Hon Matt; and deceptive operations against Vinh. The campaign was to provide a credible threat of an amphibious invasion against Vinh. By reducing the effort to a one-battalion landing team operation, the time could be compressed to 12 days.2

(TS) On 8 April the JCS requested that CINCPAC submit a general plan for amphibious raids below 18° North utilizing Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMC) personnel, and to include comments as to its feasibility as well as to suitable targets for landings in North Vietnam. In the meantime, CINCPAC forwarded an amphibious deception Letter of Interest to the Chairman of the JCS advising that recommendations as to its execution would be held in abeyance pending receipt and evaluation of the places for amphibious raids against North Vietnam.3

(TS) On 13 April CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS that a deception operation appeared to be the most immediately feasible amphibious alternative and recommended that authority be granted to proceed at the earliest practicable time with deception operations depending upon the tactical situation, with adjustments in holding and staging areas and the amphibious objective area. Deception operations could be held in areas other than Quang Khe.4

(TS) Meanwhile, planning for certain other operations proceeded. On 18 April CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that a turn-away assault by amphibious forces, and their helicopters or landing craft (or both) was desired to be conducted in the vicinity of the DMZ, south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line, at the earliest practicable time. (A turn-away landing was one in which the forces went through the landing approach but then turned away before landing.)

1. J3841 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 042145Z and 080428Z Apr 72 (both EX).
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPACFLT 170015Z, 130235Z, 270125Z, 290405Z Apr 72 and 030045Z May 72 (all EX).
3. Ibid., which cited CJCS 3490/082302Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 090640Z Apr 72 (both EX).
4. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 130425Z Apr 72 (EX).
The criteria were to include:

a. The turn-away point should be as close landward as possible without accepting undue hazard to helos and landing craft from shore batteries and SAM/AAA.

b. Turn-away should be preceded by appropriate air and NGFS strikes to lend credibility to the operation.

c. Use of air and NGFS support should be realistic and adequate.

CINCPACFLT was requested to provide a recommended D-Day and a definition of the proposed area of operations. CINCPACFLT recommended Vinh.¹

(TS) In May, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to develop, in coordination with COMUSMACV, a plan for an amphibious raid north of the DMZ in the Dong Hoi, Quang Khe, Vinh areas, using RVNAF landing elements. CINCPAC subsequently directed CINCPACFLT to conduct an amphibious feint north of the DMZ, using NGFS and air support to lend credibility. COMUSMACV, however, advised that an amphibious raid in NVN would require at least a regimental size force, and no forces were available that could be released. CINCPAC directed continuation of plan development and requested to be advised when the forces became available.²

(TS) On 9 May CINCPAC approved the CINCPACFLT amphibious feint plan for execution. The plan was called HEROIC ACTION. Subsequent operations required the use of the ARG for a shore-to-shore vertical assault employing a two-battalion VNMC brigade, and execution of HEROIC ACTION was ordered postponed.³

(TS) In view of the possibility that evacuation of critical areas could depend on timeliness, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that authority be granted to employ Marine helicopter assets in response to evacuation requests as may be directed by proper authority, and to employ Marine personnel ashore as deemed necessary by the on-scene amphibious commander to insure the security of the helicopters and safeguard the evacuation operations. Authority was so granted by the JCS and implemented by CINCPAC. CINCPAC also granted permission to use ARG assets in a second VNMC amphibious operation in the vicinity of Hue and the DMZ.⁴

1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 180659Z and 302250Z Apr 72 (both EX).
2. J3B41 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 050320Z and 052020Z May 72, COMUSMACV 070306Z May 72, and CINCPAC 090153Z May 72 (all EX).
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 090459Z May 72 and CINCPAC 101921Z May 72 (both EX).
4. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 120452Z, 230437Z, and 210539Z May 72 (all EX).
(TS) On 22 June COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval for use of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)/ARG airlift and sealift assets to support the planned counteroffensive in Military Region I. The broad concept of operations, as provided by the commanding general of the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) in Hue, provided for a two-battalion air assault by airborne elements and a one-battalion air assault by Marine Division elements in conjunction with a two-battalion amphibious landing, all to take place on or about 27 June, which had been designated D-Day. Subsequently, two additional air assaults were contemplated north of Quang Tri.\(^1\)

(TS) CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT for his comments. CINCPACFLT indicated that the ARG/MAU employment requested by COMUSMACV in support of offensive operations to recapture major portions of Quang Tri Province was considered feasible and was recommended. He also indicated that although plans for the operation had not yet been received, indications were that the MAU/ARG support requested would consist of helicopter lift of two VNMC battalions into two landing zones with a reserve battalion to be helo-lifted into either landing zone as the tactical situation required. The over-the-beach landing had been deleted and D-Day had been tentatively scheduled for 28 June with the VNMC helo-lifts on D+1. Cover and deception operations related to the actual operation were to consist of an ARG/MAU and Vietnamese Navy amphibious demonstration on D-1 just north of the Cua Viet River. It was planned that the Vietnamese Navy would embark one ARVN battalion. Naval gunfire, tactical air, and ARC LIGHT strikes were planned for employment in the cover and deception operation. In light of CINCPACFLT's comments, on 24 June CINCPAC approved utilization of ARG/MAU assets for this operation.\(^2\)

(TS) In order to facilitate over-the-beach resupply operations to support the RVNAF counteroffensive in MR I, COMUSMACV recommended that authority be granted for a minimum number of ARG Marine Shore Party and Navy Beach Master personnel to assist the FRAC in planning and eventual on-site advising and instructing of RVNAF personnel in over-the-beach resupply operations. Resupply would not begin until the beach area was secure from hostile fire and the FRAC was to insure that the commanding general of MR I provided beachhead security. COMUSMACV indicated that the personnel involved could be absorbed within the MACV authorized ceiling. COMUSMACV further estimated that the on-site advisory personnel would be required for a period of about 10 days after the causeway had been installed. By that time the RVNAF was expected to be capable of carrying out the resupply operation. CINCPAC approved the proposal on 28 June.\(^3\)

\(^1\) COMUSMACV 220400Z Jun 72.
\(^2\) CINCPACFLT 232155Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 240246Z Jun 72.
\(^3\) COMUSMACV 271127Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 280402Z Jun 72.
(TS) Planning for another situation began in early June when COMUSMACV forwarded plans for use of a Marine landing force in MR I in the event an emergency situation threatened the security of U.S. personnel and facilities in the Da Nang-Hue-Phu Bai areas. The concept of operations was that the employment of the Marine landing force would be dependent on the tactical situation existing at the time of the request and the capability of the RVNAF to provide adequate security for U.S. personnel and installations. Specific areas of interest would depend on the tactical deployment of ARVN forces at the time of implementation, so that any planning should be of sufficient flexibility to permit rapid reaction to any developing threat. Employment of forces in the Hue-Phu Bai and Da Nang areas was outlined. Subsequent to CINCPACFLT concurrence, CINCPAC approved the plan for planning purposes.1

(TS) On 3 July CINCPACFLT indicated to CINCPAC that the force level, operating tempo, and scheduling considerations made it desirable to return to the normal Western Pacific amphibious posture of one deployed amphibious squadron (PHIBRON) (one vertical assault capable ARG and one surface assault capable ARG) as early as feasible. CINCPACFLT indicated that in addition to providing the capability to support contingency security requirements in the Da Nang-Hue-Phu Bai areas, a posture of two vertical assault capable ARGs would provide for:

a. LPD (amphibious transport dock) Hunter-Killer operations.

b. Medical and surgical team support facilities.

c. Support of RVNAF operations of a scope equal to that provided in previous and on-going operations.

d. Personnel extraction.

CINCPACFLT indicated that with CINCPAC concurrence he intended to reduce the Western Pacific amphibious posture to one PHIBRON and one additional LPH (amphibious assault ship) with two vertical assault capable ARG, commencing in early July. CINCPAC concurred.2

(TS) In order to provide support for MR II offensive operations intended to destroy enemy forces and base areas in northern Binh Dinh Province, COMUSMACV requested authority to plan amphibious operations with representatives of

1. J3842 HistSum Jul 72, which cited COMUSMACV 301040Z Jun 72 (EX) and CINCPACFLT 022155Z Jun 72 (EX); CINCPAC 040226Z Jul 72.
2. CINCPACFLT 032125Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 040354Z Jul 72.
Commander, Task Force 76. CINCPAC, in amplification of previous guidance, granted authority on a continuing basis for direct liaison between CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV or their designated subordinates for all planning involving provision of support by amphibious forces to Vietnamese Army or Marine Corps initiatives in the RVN. CINCPAC requested that he be kept advised of actions contemplated and the progress of planning; he reiterated that actual participation by amphibious forces in specific operations would continue to require CINCPAC approval. CINCPACFLT further delegated his liaison authority to the Commander, Seventh Fleet. Operations in MR II did not materialize. The commander there indicated that the plans developed would not require dependency on support by U.S. amphibious resources. ARG/MAU support was authorized by CINCPAC, however, for a battalion size combat assault in MR I on 22 July.\footnote{COMUSMACV 100020Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 102243Z Jul 72; CINCPACFLT 129525Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 201103Z Jul 72.}

\footnote{(TS) As requested by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC on 3 September approved the utilization of PACOM ARG/MAU assets in support of an amphibious demonstration north of the Cua Viet River, with D-Day scheduled for 7 September; CINCPAC subsequently extended the authority when the operation was delayed by adverse weather associated with Typhoon ELSIE.2}

\footnote{(TS) On 7 October CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's views on extending the response time of the on-station ARG/MAU from 12 to 72 hours to improve training and permit ashore activities of the embarked troops. On 12 October COMUSMACV concurred with the 72-hour response time during periods of normal activity in MR I, provided that during periods of increased concern, as determined and announced by COMUSMACV, the ARG/MAU would return to a 12-hour readiness posture as soon as possible, but not later than 60 hours from time of commencement.3}

\footnote{(TS) On 20 September CINCPACFLT requested authority to reduce the Western Pacific area amphibious posture on 25 October. He requested authority to outchop the USS OKINAWA, without relief, which would reduce U.S. posture to one vertical assault capable ARG and its embarked MAU and one surface assault capable ARG and its embarked battalion landing team (BLT), with one ARG in the Gulf of Tonkin continually and the other within 120 hours of MR I.}

\footnote{(TS) Before a decision had been reached, COMUSMACV advised on 26 September that plans envisioned the evacuation of the Da Nang and Hue-Phu Bai areas by fixed wing aircraft. Should the military situation preclude evacuation by this means, however, helicopters would be the only remaining method to permit rapid evacuation.}

\footnote{1. COMUSMACV 100020Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 102243Z Jul 72; CINCPACFLT 129525Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 201103Z Jul 72.}

\footnote{2. CINCPAC 030630Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 060353Z Sep 72.}

\footnote{3. J3B42 HistSum Oct 72, which cited CINCPAC 070308Z Oct 72 and COMUSMACV 120228Z Oct 72.}
reaction to any threat. The existing posture of two ARG/MAU with vertical lift
capability insured that this capability would always be available for support
of CINCPAC approved RVNAF operations in MR I and in support of existing con-
tingency plans for the security and emergency evacuation of the Da Nang and
Hue–Phu Bai areas. COMUSMACV further stated that the planned reduction from
two ARG/MAU to one ARG/MAU and one ARG/BLT seriously affected the capability of
U.S. forces to accomplish the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Hue–Phu Bai and
Da Nang areas and in view of the existing tactical situation in MR I and the
possibility for emergency requirements for immediate response, he requested
authority to plan for the use of two ARG/MAU, on a contingency basis only,
beyond mid-October for the emergency security of U.S. personnel in MR I.1

(TS) CINCPAC concurred with the COMUSMACV position. On 3 October he
recommended that the JCS provide an amphibious assault ship (LPH) from other
than PACOM assets to relieve OKINAWA on station by 30 October or as soon as
practicable. CINCPACFLT was requested to adjust OKINAWA’s schedule to remain
in the Western Pacific until relief could be provided.2

(TS) On 30 October the JCS directed CINCLANT to deploy an LPH to the
Western Pacific on 9 November as augmentation and relief for OKINAWA. On
24 November CINCPAC approved the outchop of USS OKINAWA from the Western
Pacific on or about 13 December, when relieved by USS INCHON (LPH-12).3

POCKET MONEY

(TS) POCKET MONEY was the nickname for the mining campaign conducted in
North Vietnam. Despite the fact that 85 percent of North Vietnam’s imports
had been routed through Haiphong, CINCPAC’s requests to mine the ports, which
had been initiated in 1967 and frequently since that time, had never been
approved until May 1972. In the wake of the enemy’s spring offensive in 1972,
the JCS granted authority to begin major air and mining operations against
North Vietnam in an effort to convince the Hanoi government that its aggression
was unproductive. The objectives of the mining activities were to deny the
enemy outside resupply from the sea and to reduce the flow of enemy war-making
material within North Vietnam (and into the RVN, Laos, and Cambodia) to the
lowest possible level. To attain these objectives and counter North Vietnamese
aggression, the mission was to conduct a campaign to minimize third country
resupply from the sea and to interdict, destroy, and disrupt North Vietnamese
transportation and supply distribution systems, lines of communications, storage
facilities and stockpiles, and other selected targets.4

1. ADMN CINCPACFLT 201105Z Sep 72; COMUSMACV 261042Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 030353Z Oct 72.
3. JCS 7346/302356Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 292122Z Nov 72.
Priorities for LINEBACKER/POCKET MONEY Campaign (U).
Another consideration was a CINCPACFLT concept plan calling for the scuttling of two or three cargo laden hulls of the T-2 and VC-2 class at strategic locations in the Haiphong approach channel. This was forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS on 28 April with the CINCPAC recommendation that no decision be made for its execution at that time for reasons that included a low probability of success.²

As various alternatives were considered, and rejected, it became increasingly more clear that mining of the harbor was probably the most promising. On 1 May CINCPAC reemphasized to the JCS an earlier recommendation that Haiphong harbor should be aerially mined as a step forward in the campaign against the North Vietnamese war-making potential.³

On 8 May the JCS directed the mining of North Vietnamese ports and waterways. Execution was to be at 090000 May 1972, Saigon time, in accordance with plans previously developed for the action (Commander Minecraft Pacific Minefield Planning Folder - Area 21), with the initial effort concentrating on the main shipping channel of Haiphong harbor. The following guidance had been provided by the JCS:

- Utilize MK 52-2 mines in the Haiphong main shipping channel (minefield segments 2111A and 2111B) and set an arming delay of seventy-two hours and a sterilization time of 180 days.

- Forty-eight hours after mining the Haiphong channel, seed Hon Gai and Cam Pha with MK 36 destructors, so as to obtain activation concurrently with the mines emplaced in the main shipping channel.

1. J3B41 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 180710Z and 260600Z Apr 72 (both EX).
2. Ibid., and CINCPAC 260600Z Apr 72 (EX).
3. J3B41 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 012235Z May 72 (EX).
- Seed, as required, with MK 36 destructors other harbors and coastal routes along the NVN coast utilized by small craft, to include Dong Hoi, Quang Khe, Vinh and Thanh Hoa.

- Reseed, as necessary, to maintain mine and destructor fields.

The follow-on effort, after the MK 52-2 mining of the main Haiphong channel with 116-day sterilization setting to 5 September, mined the other ports with an arming delay of 24 hours in order to have all weapons arm simultaneously on 12 May, Saigon time.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1} During the month of May POCKET MONEY operations accounted for the mining of all major ports, harbors, and waterways along the coast of North Vietnam. Reseeding operations began, as necessary, and were continued in accordance with the minefield planning folder for Area 21. By the end of May, no shipping had been reported departing of entering Haiphong, and North Vietnamese mining countermeasures had not been successful.\footnote{2}

\footnote{2} To provide timely and accurate information on the mining operations and the reactions of the North Vietnamese and other powers to those operations, CINCPAC directed daily aerial photographic and visual surveillance of North Vietnam's harbors, ports, and waterways; daily reporting by CINCPACFLT and the Commander, 7th Air Force identifying naval and merchant ships and activities within those harbors, ports, and waterways; and submission of selected photographs of noteworthy activity by FLASH precedence by the COMPASS LINK system. In addition, CINCPAC requested that his component commanders devote their personal attention to insuring the timely and accurate reporting of North Vietnam mining and related operations.\footnote{3}

\footnote{3} In June POCKET MONEY operations consisted of seeding the remaining waterway mouths that had not been completed in May. In addition, numerous reseeding operations were conducted. On 30 May the JCS had submitted a suggested mining plan for the area north of Haiphong in case the People's Republic of China should initiate supply operations from the north to North Vietnam via waterborne logistics craft. CINCPAC reviewed the plan and recommended that some additional minefields be incorporated. The plan was

\footnote{1} J3B22 Point Paper, 11 Jul 72, Subj: POCKET MONEY (U); J3B22 HistSum May 72.
\footnote{2} J3B22 HistSum May 72.
\footnote{3} CINCPAC 090341Z May 72; CINCPAC 092213Z May 72; J3B510 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 110300Z May 72.
incorporated into the minefield planning folder for Area 21.

(TS) On 26 June the JCS provided new operating authorities, cancelling CINCPAC authority to seed minefields as required. JCS approval was to be required for the seeding of all new minefields. On 1 July, however, CINCPAC recommended that the authorities be modified to allow for mining new minefield segments with MK-36/40 destructors, as required. As revised, the Chairman of the JCS needed to approve each operation to seed or reseed mines (MK 52-2). The use of MK-36/40 destructors was authorized in and around the entrances to ports, river mouths, inland waterways, together with islands and other areas in the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam, provided that third country shipping was not present in the area. Mines or destructors were not to be implanted in the vicinity of the Chinese anchorages at Hon Nieu or Hon La, even if Chinese ships temporarily vacated these areas.

(TS) By mid-July the only real threat to the complete success of the mining campaign had been the enemy's use of waterborne logistics craft to lighter supplies to shore from merchant ships anchored off the coast of North Vietnam. To counter this threat, around-the-clock surveillance was maintained, and any craft caught clear of a merchant ship and within the 12 nautical mile limit of North Vietnam claimed territorial waters, was attacked by U.S. Navy ships and aircraft.

(TS) Certain mining operations also took place in the RVN. On 13 July CINCPAC indicated to COMUSMACV that although the RVN counteroffensive plans for MR I could be assumed to encompass the eventual regaining of lost territory in northern MR I up to the DMZ, actions to accomplish such goals might not occur in the near future. Accordingly, in order to deny the use of waterways in the areas controlled by the enemy in Quang Tri Province, CINCPAC proposed that consideration be given to the use of MK-36/40 destructors, set on short-term sterilization, in such rivers as the Cua Viet, east of Dong Ha. COMUSMACV advised that his intelligence indicated that the enemy used the waterways for the movement of personnel and material; he recommended that such mining be accomplished. CINCPAC approved the operations and they were conducted on 25 July.

1. J3B22 HistSum Jun 72, which cited JCS 3888/301517Z May 72 and CINCPAC 072230Z Jun 72 (both EX).
2. J3B22 HistSum Jun 72, which cited JCS 5190/261720Z Jun 72 and CINCPAC 010245Z Jul 72; J3B22 Point Paper, 1 Sep 72, Subj: POCKET MONEY (U).
4. J3B42 HistSum Jul 72, which cited CINCPAC 130145Z Jul 72, COMUSMACV 191035Z Jul 72, CINCPAC 210149Z Jul 72, and COMUSMACV 250940Z Jul 72 (all EX).
(TS) By 1 September, 52 POCKET MONEY segments had been seeded; 72 MK 52-2 mines had been seeded in the Haiphong main channel. This channel had been reseeded on 11 August with the mines preset for 116 day sterilization, which would be 5 December. Approximately 7,000 MK-36s had been seeded with various sterilization settings used. The destructors had been timed to self-destruct between 5 June 1972 and 24 February 1973. There had still been no known successful enemy mine countermeasures nor had shipping been reported entering or leaving any North Vietnamese port or harbor. 1

(TS) Shortly after the JCS authorized the mining, they initiated a requirement for a daily list of ships, by nationality, that were advised of the presence of mines and other hazards to shipping. These operations occurred infrequently and the daily reports had been mostly negative, so CINCPAC on 28 July asked CINCPACFLT for his comments and recommendations on modifying the notification line report to an as-occurring basis, turning the mission over to the Vietnamese Navy, or eliminating the function altogether. CINCPACFLT replied that he considered notification of third country merchant ships the responsibility of the United States, not to be turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. He did not consider it desirable to eliminate the function at the time, but he believed that it was no longer necessary to dedicate a destroyer to that task and he recommended that the requirement for dedicated notification line ships be eliminated. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended to the JCS that the notification line report be submitted only when a significant event occurred, rather than daily, and indicated that, with JCS concurrence, CINCPAC intended to eliminate the requirement for dedicated notification line ships. On 14 September the JCS granted such authority. 2

(TS) During September the first MK-36 destructor MOD 4s were implanted in North Vietnam. This new destructor added a magnetic/acoustic capability to the inland seeding program and compounded the enemy's problems associated with mine countermeasures. 3

(TS) A solar storm took place 4 to 8 August, and the Naval Ordnance Systems Command reported that as a result of that storm all destructors set on high sensitivity self-destructed. New measures were initiated to reseed areas of reduced threat level. 4

1. J3B22 Point Paper, 1 Sep 72, Subj: POCKET MONEY (U).
2. J3B42 HistSum Aug 72, which cited CINCPAC 280020Z Jul 72 and CINCPACFLT 100745Z Aug 72 (both EX); CINCPAC 192114Z Aug 72; J3B43 HistSum Sep 72, which cited JCS 3531/142156Z Sep 72 (EX); CINCPAC 202309Z Sep 72.
3. J3B22 HistSum Sep 72, which cited CINCPACFLT 140055Z Sep 72.
4. Ibid.
Based on guidance from the JCS on 27 October, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to terminate seedings of Destroctors MK-36 MODS 1 and 1A. Any seedings of MK-36 MODS 2 and 3 were to be set on self-destruct times of 30 days. Any seedings of MK-36 MOD 4 were to be set on self-destruct times of 45 days.¹

On 2 December CINCPAC FLT advised CINCPAC that sterilization settings placed on the MK-52-2 mines in the main Haiphong channel could cause 100 percent sterilization by 5 December. Based on this information CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that no immediate action be taken to reseed, but that surveillance be continued and reseeding actions taken when the minefield appeared ineffective.²

On 18 December, however, as the cease-fire negotiations reached a stalemate, the intensified air campaign known as LINEBACKER II began and the JCS directed limited renewed mine and destructor reseeding.³

At the onset of this LINEBACKER II activity against NVN, the minefield segments in the main Haiphong ship channel were once again reseeded with 35 active MK-52 MOD 2 mines (plus one mine that was released on "safe" mode) for another 116 day period to 11 April 1973. These mines were set to sterilize by self-destruction by a special modification of the mine. Thirty-one A-6 and 34 A-7 sorties also delivered 618 MK-36 destructor MOD 4s and 9 MOD 4s during 6 of the 12 LINEBACKER II days. These minefield seedings and reseedings occurred only in the Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha areas with 75 and 100 day self-destruct settings and other settings as appropriate for expected magnetic only countermeasures. One A-7E was lost to hostile reactions during this period. It was targeted for Minefield 2106 in the Cam Pha area on 24 December, and it is not known whether this aircraft delivered its MK-36's on target prior to its loss. The last minefield segment in North Vietnamese coastal waters was seeded on 29 December 1972.⁴

Mine Countermeasures--FORMATION SENTRY (END SWEEP)

Even while the mines were being planted in Southeast Asia, plans had begun for the United States to counter them, as agreed in the cease-fire negotiations. On 4 November CINCPAC directed CINCPAC FLT to deploy and pre-

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2. CINCPAC 060316Z Dec 72.
3. J3B42 HistSum Dec 72, which cited JCS 6292/181617Z Dec 72 (BOM); CINCPAC 181912Z Dec 72.
position all USN airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) assets at an advanced staging base at Subic Bay in the Philippines as soon as possible. Further, when these assets were ready for sea, CINCPACFLT was to preposition the maximum effort MCM forces in South Vietnamese waters in general proximity to North Vietnam and report when ready to execute FORMATION ENTRY.¹ (This operation was subsequently known as END SWEEP.)

(TS) On 10 November the JCS directed that upon arrival of the AMCM assets at Subic Bay no action should be taken to reassemble helicopters or other major equipment. AMCM forces were not to deploy from Subic Bay to RVN waters as previously directed, but rather remain in condition to permit either deployment or return to the Continental United States. In addition, no action was to be taken to break the integrity of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ALFA or BRAVO or to make ready two mid-Pacific based ocean minesweepers (MSO) for Western Pacific MCM until further advised.²

(TS) Meanwhile, also on 10 November, CINCPAC reported to the JCS that plans for emergency evacuation of U.S. advisors during the period of reduced ARG helicopter capability off the RVN, because of AMCM operations, would be provided as soon as possible. CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT explore all possibilities to provide maximum contingency evacuation support to COMUSMACV from ARG assets not employed in AMCM.³

(TS) On 18 November the JCS authorized the reassembly of MH-12 CH-53 AMCM helicopters at Subic Bay in order to conduct local training flights. Activation or use of minesweeping equipment other than the helicopters was not authorized.⁴

(TS) On 20 November CINCPAC had recommended approval of another CINCPACFLT request; this a request to embark HMH-463 (a Marine heavy helicopter squadron) with CH-53D helicopters and appropriate support personnel and equipment in

1. CINCPAC 0410002 Nov 72.
2. JCS 2404/102313Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 100005Z Nov 72.
4. JCS 2006/181805Z Nov 72.
5. CINCPAC 192220Z Nov 72; JCS 4883/301919Z Nov 72.
USS INCHON for transit to Cubi Point. The JCS granted the authority requested on 22 November. On 26 November the JCS authorized INCHON to sail from Pearl Harbor on 27 November with HMH-463 on board, but the helicopters were flown aboard after INCHON was out of sight of land to minimize visibility of the event.1

(TS) Two apparent mine incidents involving U.S. ships had occurred earlier in the year (to USS JOSEPH STRAUSS, DDG-16 on 4 June and USS WARRINGTON, DD-843 on 17 July). At the time CINCPACFLT had stated that the two incidents would be thoroughly investigated and consideration was given to conducting a bottom search of the area using an ocean minesweeper with mine-hunting sonar. The matter remained under study, however, and on 24 November CINCPAC concurred with CINCPACFLT's intention to defer, for an indefinite period, MCM operations in the vicinity of the STRAUSS and WARRINGTON incidents. This was to permit the final sterilization date to pass for any destructors that might have caused the explosions.2

(TS) Plans for mine countermeasures in the waters of North Vietnam continued. On 2 December CINCPAC concurred with CINCPACFLT's proposal that should the removal of sterilized mines from the Haiphong main channel be directed by higher authority, MCM forces should be prepared to do so utilizing techniques requiring the least possible use of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or other personnel. CINCPACFLT also proposed certain measures for AMCM unit readiness. These included the assembly, testing, and towing of AMCM gear, modification of HMH-463 aircraft to commence upon the arrival of INCHON at Subic Bay, and the training of HMH-463 aircrews on their arrival at Subic and the training of HMH-462 aircrews during ARG/MAU upkeep periods. On 10 December the JCS disapproved the request to assemble, test, and tow the AMCM gear, but they authorized helicopter modification and aircrew training that could be accomplished without use of the AMCM sweep gear.3

(TS) On 15 December CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to conduct such continuing maintenance and upkeep as were required to arrest and prevent material deterioration of AMCM sweep gear, provided the gear was not assembled, tested, or towed. This maintenance and upkeep were to be conducted with as low a visibility as possible.4

(TS) In a related matter, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a plan for emergency evacuation of U.S. advisors from MR I during a period of reduction in ARG

1. CINCPAC 202312Z Nov 72; CINCPACFLT 192125Z Nov 72; JCS 5959/222158Z Nov 72; JCS 8883/260204Z Nov 72.
2. CINCPAC 181953Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 112231Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 242330Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 062236Z Dec 72; JCS 7460/102015Z Dec 72.
4. CINCPAC 150402Z Dec 72, JCS 3232/142326Z Dec 72.
helicopter capability off the RVN coast if mine countermeasures were in progress. The plan insured adequate ARG/MAU support to COMUSMACV in the event of contingency evacuation, but it would not provide maximum MCM effort at the earliest possible time as it would delay commencement of MCM operations for certain units. It represented the optimum allocation of available assets to protect U.S. forces during this period while also permitting early commencement of MCM operations, with a buildup to maximum MCM efforts as soon as the military situation permitted.¹

(TS) No actual minesweeping operations were begun in 1972.

Aircraft Carrier Requirements in Southeast Asia

(TS) Aircraft carrier requirements exceeded assets in the PACOM in 1972 and augmentation from the Atlantic Command was necessary. It was considered inadvisable to retain attack carriers (CVA) on the line over nine months, and as CINCPACFLT did not have sufficient assets to relieve the CVAs within that time and retain four on the line (six in the Western Pacific area), CINCPAC requested augmentation from the Atlantic Fleet. Based on JCS direction, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) was ordered from the West Coast to relieve USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) and USS AMERICA (CVA-66) was ordered from the East Coast to relieve USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43) in May.² USS SARATOGA had been previously deployed from the Atlantic Command to Southeast Asia.

(TS) Also in May, in view of a potential submarine threat to Seventh Fleet forces operating in the South China Sea, CINCPAC directed the sailing of USS TICONDEROGA (CVS-14), an antisubmarine warfare support carrier, and four escorts to the Western Pacific area.³

(TS) On 13 July, pressed by the heavy demand on CVA assets for operations in Southeast Asia, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) provided information on the employment of LANTCOM CVAs and offered options to fulfill future carrier commitments. The JCS asked CINCPAC to comment, and include the impact of those options on PACOM operations and commitments, with no reduction in the level of effort in Southeast Asia. The CINCLANT options impacting on the PACOM involved the return of the USS AMERICA from Southeast Asia in time to assume duties in the Mediterranean by 1 December 1972.⁴

¹. CINCPAC 160220Z Dec 72.
². J3B41 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 200316Z May 72 and CINCPAC 272127Z May 72 (both EX).
³. Ibid., which cited CINCPACFLT 120345Z May and CINCPAC 140441Z May 72 (both EX).
⁴. CINCLANT 132327Z Jul 72.
Based on comments received from CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC informed the JCS that maintaining the existing level of effort without further LANTCOM assets would require extension of the deployment for each of three carriers to 12 months, KITTY HAWK until relieved by CONSTELLATION in late January 1973, SARATOGA until relieved by CORAL SEA in mid-March 1973, and AMERICA until relieved by HANCOCK in late April 1973. CINCPAC indicated that extended deployment of the carriers, beyond nine months, particularly in the Southeast Asia combat environment, was considered to be excessive with both short and long range deleterious impacts and he considered them, accordingly, inadvisable. Additionally, maintaining existing deployed CVA force levels impacted directly on mobile logistic support force schedules with deployments extending to as such as 11 months and redeployments for another lengthy period after only 5 months in the Continental United States (CONUS). Another consideration was the onset of the rainy season in September and October, which would seriously degrade the interdiction effort in North Vietnam because of the reduction of strike sorties. CINCPAC indicated that reduction of the CVA force during the Northeast Monsoon was an option to be considered. This would permit some units to return to CONUS for much needed rest and essential maintenance, and yet provide assets for subsequent redeployment in the spring of 1973 when the weather improved, should such action become necessary.

While he recognized that the reduction of deployed force levels would be contingent on the tactical situation at the time, CINCPAC strongly recommended that consideration be given to reducing the attack carriers in the Western Pacific area, with a proportionate reduction in the Navy tactical air level of effort as follows:

a. 10 October - Reduce to 5 CVA's with OUTCHOP of KITTY HAWK after an 8.1 month deployment to permit return for extended selected restricted availability for F-14 Jet Blast Deflector modification.

b. 1 November - Reduce to 4 CVA's with OUTCHOP of AMERICA after a 5 month deployment in order to permit relief of the FDR in the Mediterranean as proposed by CINCLANT.

c. 15 November - Reduce to 3 CVA's with OUTCHOP of SARATOGA after a 7 month deployment to commence a delayed overhaul.

1. CINCPAC 210242Z Jul 72.
CINC PAC indicated that the deployments recommended could sustain the following on-line posture:

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Each posture could be increased in varying degree up to a posture of 100 percent of the deployed CVA force level for approximately 30 days, after which there would have to be a mandatory reduction. CINC PAC also recommended a commensurate reduction in mobile logistic support force ships, escorts, and naval gunfire support ships should the tactical situation in Southeast Asia permit the approval of a reduction in the CVA deployed force level in the fall.1

On 23 July CINC PAC FLT informed CINC PAC that, because of casualties to two deployed carriers, an adjustment of the planned on-line CVA posture was required to expedite repairs. The on-line carriers had to be reduced to three for the period 25 through 27 July. CINC PAC approved the proposal.2

On 30 November CINC PAC recommended to the JCS approval of CINC PAC FLT’s request to reduce the carrier on-line posture from four to three. Reaction time to the Gulf of Tonkin, for the remaining Seventh Fleet carriers, was to be 48 hours for the fourth CVA, 96 hours for the fifth, and 120 hours for the sixth CVA.3

Special Warfare

Special Commando Units

In January the JCS requested CINC PAC’s comments and recommendations on the employment, within existing authorizations, of the MACSOG (MACV’s Studies and Observation Group) Special Commando Unit (SCU) exploitation companies with appropriate reconnaissance team support in the PHU DUNG area of Laos for a two to three week period. In response to CINC PAC’s inquiry, in turn, COMUSMACV informed CINC PAC that employment of non-U.S.-led MACSOG SCU forces in Laos did not present a viable option, and would not achieve

1. Ibid.
2. J3B42 HistSum Jul 72, which cited CINC PAC FLT 232325Z Jul 72 and CINC PAC 240247Z Jul 72 (Both EX).
3. CINC PAC 300024Z Nov 72.
the desired effect. CINCPAC concurred with the COMUSMACV comments and recommendations. In addition, he advised the JCS that the diversion of critical MACV helicopter and tactical air assets for support of MACSOG company-size SCU operations at the time would pose an unacceptable degradation to other high priority MACV missions.1

(TS) On 9 March the Chairman of the JCS approved future plans to disband the nine MACSOG SCU with retention of the last three companies dependent on Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force (JPRTF) requirements. In addition, the JCS recommended that the RVN Joint General Staff be encouraged to transfer SCU leadership to ARVN units, make every effort to recruit contract personnel into the RVNAF for continued use in ground interdiction operations, and to make provisions to release equipment and facilities to PHU DUNG/THOT NOT or other priority projects. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 11 March that there was no requirement for the three SCU companies for JPRTF operations. COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that recruitment of SCU personnel had been explored with the Joint General Staff and outlined actions that both COMUSMACV and the JGS had taken to utilize SCU assets. On 26 March CINCPAC informed the JCS that COMUSMACV and the Joint General Staff were making every effort to utilize the SCU assets as a recruiting base and that COMUSMACV's decision to utilize SCU personnel in a base security role was sound and indicated good use of available assets.2

Maritime Assets

(TS) On 22 October 1971 COMUSMACV had recommended that instructions to maintain a capability to conduct MACSOG (MACV's Studies and Observation Group) maritime missions against North Vietnam be rescinded, and authority granted to return the seven assigned PTFs (fast patrol craft) to the U.S. Navy by 31 December 1971. CINCPAC concurred on 5 November. On 10 January 1972 COMUSMACV again requested that the seven PTFs be returned to the U.S. Navy immediately. CINCPACFLT concurred, noting that two were then undergoing extensive and expensive repairs at Subic Bay. CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACV proposal and "strongly" endorsed the recommendation.3

(TS) The JCS provided CINCPAC with authority to return the MACSOG PTFs to the U.S. Navy and approved relief from the maritime mission assigned to MACSOG. CINCPAC relieved COMUSMACV of the mission and granted authority for the return of the ships by 1 May 1972.4

1. J3B64 HistSum Jan 72, which cited JCS 6107/110014Z Jan 72; COMUSMACV 131005Z Jan 72, and CINCPAC 140359Z Jan 72 (all BOM).
2. J3B63 HistSum Mar 72, which cited CJCJS 8983/092340Z Mar 72, CINCPAC 112212Z Mar 72, COMUSMACV 190420Z Mar 72, and CINCPAC 262208Z Mar 72 (all BOM).
3. COMUSMACV 100722Z Jan 72; CINCPACFLT 110355Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 131910Z Jan 72.
FRI DAY GAP

(5) The U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh informed CINCPAC late in January
1972 of a FANK (Forces Armées Nationale Khmer, the Cambodian Army) Special
Forces (SF) training requirement for 38 personnel constituting the staff of
the FANK SF Group. Training was to be conducted by U.S. personnel and tailored
to FANK SF concepts of operations. CINCPAC requested that CINCUSARPAC examine
the Ambassador’s request with a view toward organizing a Mobile Training Team
(MTT) capable of coordinating, planning, and conducting the requested training.
CINCPAC requested the views of COMUSMACV on the feasibility of conducting the
training in the RVN utilizing temporary duty PACOM assistance. CINCUSARPAC
requested the comments of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu on his capa-
bility to support FANK SF training with a 1st SF Group MTT and the availability
of interpreters/translation. CINCUSARPAC was advised that the 1st SF Group
could provide an MTT fully capable of training the FANK SF without any foresee-
able adverse impact on planned activities.1

(5) COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the FANK SF training was feasible at
training sites in the RVN with PACOM MTT assistance. CINCUSARPAC informed
CINCPAC that USARPAC could provide an MTT to conduct specialized training for
selected personnel. The one area still open to question was that of translators
and bilingual instruction. In addition, CINCUSARPAC concurred in the utilization
of 1st SF Group assets to perform the mission. CINCPAC requested that
CINCUSARPAC prepare to deploy an MTT capable of coordinating, planning, and
conducting FANK SF training in the RVN under the control of COMUSMACV. The
training project was given the unclassified nickname FRI DAY GAP. On 1 March
the Ambassador in Phnom Penh advised CINCPAC that coordination had been com-
pleted for the organization and implementation of FRI DAY GAP.2

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1. J3B63 HistSum Feb 72, which cited AMEMB Phnom Penh 0571/281050Z Jan 72,
   CINCPAC 022308Z Feb 72, CINCPAC 022310Z Feb 72, CINCUSARPAC 042100Z Feb 72,
   and CGUSARYIS 091540Z Feb 72.
2. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 101100Z Feb 72, CINCUSARPAC 110330Z Feb 72,
   and CINCPAC 122152Z Feb 72; (all BOM); J3B63 HistSum Mar 72, which cited
   AMEMB Phnom Penh 1189/010320Z Mar 72.
1. 7/13AF 121605Z Jan 72; COMUSMACV 122158Z Jan 72; J3B32 HistSum Jan 72, which cited CINCPAC 130003Z Jan 72, JCS 8246/130002Z Jan 72, COMUSMACV 231340Z Jan 72, CINCPAC 232126Z Jan 72, CINCPAC 251506Z Jan 72, JCS 6332/292240Z Jan 72, and CINCPAC 300508Z Jan 72 (all BOM); J3B32 HistSum Feb 72, which cited CINCPAC 260101Z Feb 72, JCS 6299/272329Z Feb 72, and CINCPAC 281902Z Feb 72 (all BOM); J3B31 HistSum Jun 72, which cited CINCPAC 231328Z Mar 72, CINCPAC 212316Z Apr 72, JCS 2086/291804Z Mar 72, JCS 8257/011519Z May 72, and JCS 5450/011705Z Jun 72 (all BOM).

2. J3B31 HistSum Jun 72, which cited 7/13AF 070320Z Jun 72, COMUSMACV 080503Z Jun 72, CINCPAC 090003Z Jun 72, and JCS 9665/131833Z Jun 72 (all BOM); J3B31 HistSum Aug 72, which cited 7/13 AF 270740Z Jun 72, CINCPAC 291843Z Jun 72, and JCS 3986/050022Z Jul 72 (all BOM); J3B31 HistSum Aug 72, which cited JCS 3986/050022Z Jul 72, CINCPAC 280024Z Jul 72 and JCS 3996/042338Z Aug 72 (all BOM); J3B31 HistSum Oct 72, which cited JCS 1351/042215Z Oct 72 and JCS 8663/312334Z Oct 72 (both BOM); J3B31 HistSum Nov 72, which cited JCS 5179/302303Z Nov 72; J3B31 HistSum Dec 72, which cited JCS 7197/282107Z Dec 72.

1. J3B31 HistSum Aug 72, which cited CINCPAC 102012Z Aug 72 and JCS 1871/121321Z Aug 72 (both BOM); J3B31 HistSum Oct 72, which cited CINCPAC 092114Z Sep 72 and JCS 4575/151920Z Sep 72 (both BOM); J3B31 HistSum Oct 72, which cited CINCPAC 072225Z Oct 72 and JCS 1353/142202Z Oct 72 (both BOM); J3B31 HistSum Nov 72, which cited CINCPAC 082157Z Nov 72 and JCS 5950/141925Z Nov 72 (both BOM); J3B31 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 082157Z Nov 72 and JCS 3329/150124Z Dec 72 (both BOM).

2. J3B31 HistSum Nov 72, which cited CINCPAC 271545Z Oct 72, CINCPAC 180235Z Nov 72, and JCS 2069/181956Z Nov 72; J3B31 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 212134Z Dec 72 and JCS 7184/282054Z Dec 72 (both BOM).

3. J3B61 HistSum Mar 72, which cited COMUSMACV 310240Z Mar 72 (BOM); J3B61 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 040251Z Apr 72, JCS 7320/130111Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 160338Z Apr 72 (all BOM).
Personnel Recovery

(TS) CINCPAC remained vitally concerned that every effort be made to recover U.S. and Allied personnel, including efforts to search for and locate crash and grave sites to trace the missing. On 17 September 1966 a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) had been formed as a staff section of MACSOG (MACV's Studies and Observation Group), consisting of five officers and five NCOs to establish a capability within MACV for the recovery of Free World Military Assistance Forces that were considered missing or detained throughout Southeast Asia. The JPRC, with no assigned operational forces, served as the focal point for intelligence on such personnel. On 18 June 1971 MACSOG organized a mission-dedicated, quick-reaction force for recovery operations until July 1972, the date the drawdown of forces was anticipated to negate COMUSMACV's capability to conduct recovery operations. On 16 August 1971 CINCPAC Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5100 proposed the organization of a U.S. battalion-size force to continue recovery operations after July 1972. In November 1971 COMUSMACV proposed a U.S.-led, indigenous battalion-size Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force (JPRTF) organized from MACSOG assets to continue the personnel recovery (PR)/crash site inspection (CSI) mission in Southeast Asia after July 1972. PR/CSI operations, which carried the nickname BRIGHT LIGHT, were authorized in the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Authority to conduct operations in North Vietnam had to be requested on a case-by-case basis.1

(TS) Early in the year CINCPAC was concerned with personnel for the JPRTF. CINCPAC advised the JCS that temporarily additive personnel requirements of 390 for COMUSMACV and 320 for COMUSMACTHAI were firm planning requirements under existing basing programs as related to the specific air assets indicated for the JPRTF. CINCPAC reinforced his recommendations outlined in November and December 1971 that "all spaces properly identified with personnel recovery, crash site inspection (PR/CSI) requirements be considered temporary augmentation to other ceiling/authorization levels, current or future, until the PR/CSI mission terminates. The vulnerability of the JPRTF plan is hinged to a favorable decision in this matter."2

(TS) Also in January, CINCPAC requested that his component commands review procedures used to provide the JPRC with pertinent crash site data. CINCPAC directed the components to insure that all pertinent aircraft loss reports were routed to MACV and the JPRC.3

2. CINCPAC 040303Z Jan 72; J3B64 HistSum Jan 72, which cited CINCPAC 290435Z Jan 72 (BOM).
3. CINCPAC 120119Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 220327Z Jan 72.
In February CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV that the MACSOG Joint Table of Distribution and the USAF's 20th and 90th Special Operations Squadrons (SOS) not be drawdown pending receipt of further guidance from the JCS regarding the CINCPAC JPRTF plan. CINCPAC informed the JCS that a CINCPAC conference, planned for 8 February to finalize the Increment 11 Troop List, made a requirement for a JCS decision on the plan urgent, since continued delay would severely complicate COMUSMACV's deployment planning. COMUSMACV had stated that the JPRTF could not be supported in the 69,000 force structure and still accommodate other requisite functions. He had recommended the reduction of the MACSOG to an advisory effort of 155 spaces on 30 April, the standoff of the 90th SOS on 15 February 1972, and the standoff of the 20th SOS on 15 March.

CINCPAC concurred in and approved COMUSMACV's position on the JPRTF and proposed alternative courses of action to maintain a PR/CSI capability in Southeast Asia. COMUSMACV concurred in the alternative courses of action and endorsed the feasibility of off-shore based PRTFs, continued stationing of the JPRC in the RVN, and air support of PR/CSI operations from Thailand. COMUSMACV did not consider it feasible, however, for the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) to conduct PR/CSI operations or to use the advisory structure to support the development of dedicated, indigenous forces for PR/CSI operations. CINCPAC forwarded to his component commanders for comments and recommendations the revised JPRTF plan.

The CINCPAC CONPLAN for PR/CSI (CONPLAN 5100) for the period after May 1972 was being reviewed by CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified commands. Some of their comments and recommendations follow. CINCUSARPAC concurred, and designated the 1st Special Forces Group as the Army unit to conduct PRTF missions in Southeast Asia. He also recommended that the plan be coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, because the deployment of the 1st SF Gp PRTF from Okinawa could pose a problem after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. CINCPACFLT also concurred in the plan, although he made numerous recommendations for change, additions, or deletions. CINCPACAF concurred with minor changes and additions.

COMUSMACHTAI concurred in CONPLAN 5100 with minor recommendations and a request to brief the Ambassador in Bangkok on PR/CSI operations. CINCPAC cited appropriate references as authority for conducting such operations.

1. J3864 HistSum Feb 72, which cited CINCPAC 030612Z Feb '72, CINCPAC 030614Z Feb 72, and COMUSMACV 041055Z Feb 72 (all BOM).
2. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 060144Z Feb 72, COMUSMACV 140915Z Feb 72, and CINCPAC 262236Z Feb 72.
3. J3864 HistSum Mar 72, which cited CINCUSARPAC 040210Z Mar 72 and CINCPACAF 080215Z Mar 72 (both BOM); CINCPACFLT 060825Z Mar 72.
Thailand and authorized COMUSMACTHAI to brief the Ambassador. The DEPCHJUS-MAGTHAI concurred in the plan and stated that tasking for his office was feasible and could be effected so long as the limited operational capabilities and austere manning of the DEPCH's Headquarters were kept in mind.¹

(TS) CINCPAC requested that COMUS Japan brief the Ambassador in Tokyo on the general concept and Japan-related aspects of CONPLAN 5100 to include CINCPAC's interpretation of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. On 27 March COMUS Japan advised CINCPAC that the Ambassador had been briefed on the plan. The Ambassador had agreed with CINCPAC's interpretation that there was no need for "prior consultation" with the Government of Japan when elements of the Special Forces or USAF on Okinawa were deployed forward to Southeast Asia under PRTF operations, as long as they first moved to and stopped at bases outside Japan before engaging in operations. CINCPAC requested that COMUS Japan advise the Ambassador that recommendations were appreciated and would be accommodated in the PRTF command relationship arrangements when a mission was directed.²

(TS) Meanwhile, on 11 March, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS, his Service components, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAI a revised CONPLAN 5100 for continued PR/CSI operations in the past April 1972 time frame.³

(TS) On 17 March CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments and recommendations for a CINCPAC Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for PR/CSI operations in accordance with CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100. CINCUSARPAC, however, recommended that preparation of an SOP be held in abeyance pending submission of all supporting plans and that the finalized SOP be produced in committee by appropriate Service/agency representatives. CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC that SOP finalization would be delayed until CONPLAN 5100 had been approved by the JCS and supporting plans submitted.⁴

(TS) COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that basing, logistic, and administrative capabilities at potential Thailand launch/staging sites had been surveyed and identified. The Ambassador in Bangkok requested copies of messages and other pertinent documents regarding the latest PR/CSI planning that involved Thailand or the Royal Thai Government in any way. CINCPAC requested authority from the JCS to provide applicable extracts from PR/CSI plans to the Ambassador. He also

1. COMUSMACTHAI 060810Z Mar 72; J3864 HistSum Mar 72, which cited CINCPAC 070401Z Mar 72 and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 071040Z Mar 72 (BOM).
2. J3864 HistSum Mar 72, which cited CINCPAC 090235Z Mar 72, COMUS Japan 270645Z Mar 72, and CINCPAC 290146Z Mar 72.
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 112153Z Mar 72 (BOM) (which superseded CINCPAC 170400Z Nov 71 and CINCPAC 100243Z Dec 71).
4. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 172344Z Mar 72; CINCUSARPAC 150155Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 180423Z Apr 72.
asked COMUSMACTHAI to provide detailed briefings on on-going PR/CSI planning as it affected the Ambassador, and he informed the Ambassador of his instructions to COMUSMACTHAI. The JCS on 27 April approved the CINCPAC request to provide applicable information to Bangkok. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACTHAI of the JCS approval to provide extracts from PR/CSI plans, but CINCPAC advised that if the briefings would satisfy the Ambassador's requirements, he requested that no distribution of PR/CSI extracts be made and continued "close hold" of the information be maintained.¹

(TS) Also in April, during the enemy's offensive, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's views on constituting a U.S.-led, mission-dedicated recovery force for employment in the RVN for the duration of the on-going high intensity tactical air support operations. He also requested COMUSMACV's views regarding the exposure of advisory personnel with forward ARVN units to escape and evasion contingencies. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that his current recovery concept was to use small pick-up teams for fast reaction operations, employing 7th Air Force search and rescue and remaining MACSOG assets for the recovery of downed airmen and/or advisors. He also advised CINCPAC that all U.S. Army personnel were required to receive escape and evasion training prior to deployment to the RVN and that advisors in the field were issued basic survival kits. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV that this concept appeared to be an excellent solution for the existing tactical situation and that CINCPAC stood ready to assist as resources permitted in supporting this important effort.²

(TS) The JCS subsequently requested a status report on the planned use of U.S.-led, mission-dedicated PR forces and whether these forces had been employed in such operations to date. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide the information. COMUSMACV advised of measures taken to exploit an incident cited by the JCS, and impediments to PR activities stemming from NVA/VC counterintelligence measures. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to identify support requirements for inputs, to include special studies beyond COMUSMACV capabilities.³

(TS) In May CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's views on direct Strategic Technical Directorate (STD)/JPRC coordination for recovery of U.S. evaders. COMUSMACV

1. COMUSMACTHAI 140100Z Apr 72; J3B64 HistSum Apr 72, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 5146/140924Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 160339Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 160340Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 160341Z Apr 72 (all BOM); and JCS 4459/271441Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 282055Z Apr 72.
2. J3B64 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 160300Z Apr 72, CINCPAC 210042Z Apr 72, COMUSMACV 220220Z Apr 72, COMUSMACV 250225Z Apr 72, and CINCPAC 270243Z Apr 72.
3. J3B61 HistSum Jul 72, which cited JCS 7530/210010Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 212243Z Jul 72, COMUSMACV 270207Z Jul 72, and CINCPAC 300148Z Jul 72 (all BOM).
informed CINCPAC that the establishment of a permanent, mission-dedicated command and control structure and force for recovery of U.S. evaders was premature.\(^1\)

\(\text{TS}\) Also in May the JCS authorized CINCPAC to stage a PRTF into the RVN or Thailand, when required, to conduct individual recovery operations in Southeast Asia, except at specified ceiling target dates. CINCPAC so advised his component and subordinate unified commands, noting, however, that specific requests would be forwarded to CINCPAC for approval.\(^2\)

\(\text{TS}\) PR-related intelligence activities came under study. On 7 August COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC of PR-connected intelligence activities, reiterated PR-related essential elements of information (EEI) and suggested reemphasis be given to them as requested in MACV's BRIGHT LIGHT Special Collection Program dated 6 December 1971. CINCPAC requested his Service component commanders, the Defense Intelligence Agency, COMUSMACV, the Defense Attachés in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, and the Ambassador and the JANA/ (Joint Army, Navy, Air Force) in Vientiane to review intelligence holdings for answers to EEI identified in the MACV BRIGHT LIGHT Special Collection Program. Information that would support development of potential target areas identified in the MACV monthly BRIGHT LIGHT report would be particularly desired. The JCS requested that CINCPAC comment on the possibility of RVNAF STD employment to enhance on-going collection efforts related to POW detention facilities in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC passed the request to COMUSMACV, also requesting that COMUSMACV comment on the employment of national indigenous forces in Cambodia and Thailand in keeping with JPAC functions. CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV inform the JPAC that the Defense Intelligence Agency was prepared to provide assistance in the analysis of POW related reports and the development of potential BRIGHT LIGHT targets. COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the STD could be requested, on a case-by-case basis, to conduct PR and CSI intelligence collection missions when air assets and target intelligence information were available and that the response to such requests would depend on STD commitments in support of the on-going war. In addition, COMUSMACV advised that an STD Advisory Team (STDAT) 158/CAS conference had been scheduled for early September to discuss employment on national indigenous forces in the PR/CSI program.\(^3\)

\(\text{TS}\) On 26 August COMUSMACV requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency review all BRIGHT LIGHT initial information reports produced on Kratie, Sper, Sihanoukville, Battambang, and other sites. CINCPAC passed the request to COMUSMACV and COMUSMACV

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1.} J3B61 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 050440Z May 72 and COMUSMACV 090655Z May 72 (both BOM).
\item \textbf{2.} Ibid., which cited JCS 8122/171304Z May 72 and CINCPAC 180328Z May 72 (both BOM).
\item \textbf{3.} CINCPAC 120310Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 222152Z Aug 72; J3B61 HistSum Aug 72, which cited COMUSMACV 070825Z Aug 72, JCS 7529/181732Z Aug 72, CINCPAC 190150Z Aug 72, and COMUSMACV 250040Z Aug 72 (all BOM).
\end{itemize}
and Meout (Laos) for possible identification of detention sites, and that the
debriefing of SSG John C. Sexton, USA, who had been released from captivity in
October 1971, be reviewed to identify camp facilities at which SSG Sexton had
been detained. The DIA forwarded the requested information on 1 September.\footnote{1}

(TS) On 12 September the JCS requested that the RVN Joint General Staff
be queried regarding their willingness to assume a future PR/CSI mission for
the STD, with anticipated U.S. support requirements. CINCPAC passed the action
to COMUSMACV, requesting additionally that COMUSMACV comment on the employment
of the STD in PR/CSI cross-border operations, the impact of the proposed drawdown
of STFAT Field Advisory Detachments, restraints as to employment of U.S. personnel
in cross-border operations, and information concerning the intelligence collection
programs of the Embassies in Laos and Cambodia in support of PR/CSI operations.\footnote{2}

(TS) On 18 September the JCS requested a status report on the Special Mission
Force/Coastal Recovery Force (SMF/CRF) regarding expected training completion
date, capabilities, planned activities, and problem areas. CINCPAC asked COMUS-
MACV for the information.\footnote{3}

(TS) Intelligence collection remained under study. On 17 October COMUSMACV
advised CINCPAC that the existing MACV Human Intelligence collection program
had no operation dedicated solely to the acquisition of PR/CSI intelligence.
The RVNAF had agreed to provide support for cross-border and in-country employ-
ment of specialized operational and supporting forces of the STD to prosecute
CSI, to gather information on POW and missing in action personnel, and to
conduct recovery operations in response to intelligence reports. CINCPAC
concurred in COMUSMACV’s appraisal of the program.\footnote{4}

(TS) In Cambodia, COMUSMACV advised, because of limited U.S. presence and
capability, all intelligence collection was accomplished through FANK (Cambodian
Army) programs. There were no specific programs in support of PR/CSI. The
Vientiane Embassy interrogation of Pathet Lao and NVA PWs and ralliers was
effective under the aegis of CAS and the Army Attaché, and included questioning
each PW and raller on their knowledge of U.S. POWs, PW camps, and crash sites.\footnote{5}

(TS) The Ambassador in Vientiane advised that CAS Udorn was the control
mission element coordinating CSI in Laos. Units in the field operated under
\footnote{1} COMUSMACV 260710Z Aug 72; DIA 2652/011627Z Sep 72.
\footnote{2} J3B61 HistSum Sep 72, which cited JCS 9729/121413Z Sep 72 and CINCPAC
160034Z Sep 72 (both BOM).
\footnote{3} JCS 5185/182321Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 202249Z Sep 72.
\footnote{4} J3B61 HistSum Oct 72, which cited COMUSMACV 100105Z Oct 72 and CINCPAC
172123Z Oct 72 (both BOM).
\footnote{5} J3B61 HistSum Nov 72, which cited COMUSMACV 040058Z Nov 72.
precise guidelines and requirements, emphasizing the high national level of interest in determining the status of U.S. missing in action by the investigation of crash sites in Laos. All investigation results were reported to COMUSMACV.1

(TS) Automatic data processing (ADP) support for the JPRC came under study in 1972. Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) support for the JPRC was to terminate 15 days after a cease-fire was agreed on. The BRIGHT LIGHT ADP file, however, could not be used with the IBM computer at Nakhon Phanom, to which it was planned to move the JPRC. CINCPAC's ADP Systems Support Group assumed responsibility for converting the language of the system so that it would be compatible with the Thailand computer. The PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center was tasked to provide interim support capability, if necessary, if the conversion had not been completed by the required date.2

(TS) On 1 November COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the JPRC and the Joint Central Graves Registration Office had been combined into one organization under the MACV Director of Intelligence. In addition, COMUSMACV requested an early decision on relocating the JPRC to Thailand and authority to begin the move as soon as possible. Upon commencement of operations from Thailand, the JPRC was to assume the title "Joint Casualty Resolution Information Center (JCRC)" as proposed by CINCPAC. To insure continuity, two experienced JPRC personnel, augmented by other MACV personnel, were to accomplish essential JPRC functions from the RVN during the movement. Upon commencement of operations from Thailand, those personnel would serve as JPRC liaison officers with the MACV staff. CINCPAC requested that the JCS grant authority to move the JPRC to a location to be determined later.3

(TS) Also in November the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) organization, which had been called the Joint Information Center, came under extensive study. The JCS had asked CINCPAC to provide information on a JCRC Liaison/Planning Office to be located in Thailand. They wanted to know CINCPAC's desires regarding date of establishment, number of personnel, and the location of the office. COMUSMACV forwarded a concept for the establishment and operation of the JCRC, to be under the command of CINCPAC and under the operational control of the Commander U.S. Support Activities Group/7th Air Force (COMUSSAG/7AF). CINCPAC advised the JCS that plans for the movement of the JCRC were incorporated in the overall MACV plans for the establishment of the USSAG/7AF headquarters at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. As billets, office space, and necessary communications became available, three personnel from the JPRC would be deployed to Nakhon Phanom as the JCRC Liaison/Planning Office.4 Remaining JCRC personnel

1. Ibid., which cited AMEMB Vientiane 8209/030454Z Nov 72.
2. J3C442 HistSum Nov 72; CINCPAC 252347Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 302249Z Nov 72.
3. COMUSMACV 011046Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 022024Z Nov 72.
4. JCS 4697/212214Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 290300Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 292348Z Nov 72.
and records would be moved along with other elements as soon as possible after a cease-fire.

(TS) CINCPAC forwarded his revised CONPLAN 5100 to his components, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and CHMEDTC for comments and recommendations. It provided for search and resolution of crash and grave sites in a post-hostilities environment in Southeast Asia while continuing PR operations as required. The DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI concurred in the revised plan pending the definition of the term "support" as it appeared in his tasking statement. CINCPAC advised that the "support" envisioned was "within present capabilities." The DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI advised that his support capabilities were limited to monitoring and coordination of JCRC activities only. COMUSMACTHAI replied that he foresaw no problems concerning tasks involving coordination, administration, and logistics support contained in the revised plan. In addition, he advised that the U.S. Army Special Forces, Thailand had the capability of providing support for casualty resolution teams with the exception of qualified explosives ordnance disposal personnel. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI to initiate demolition specialist familiarization training for the Special Forces in aircraft ordnance, including seat ejection devices likely to be encountered in crash sites. COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC that EOD augmentation should be considered for the Special Forces in order for them to assume their PR mission; CINCPAC replied that such EOD personnel would be provided as required from PACOM assets. CHMEDTC advised CINCPAC of the capability, authority, and budgetary shortfalls critical to full implementation of the plan. COMUSMACV and the components also forwarded their comments and recommendations.¹

(TS) COMUSMACV recommended that the nickname BRIGHT LIGHT continue to be used for JCRC activities; CINCPAC concurred.²

(TS) Personnel for JCRC missions came under further study. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to review funding requirements for the JCRC to include funding estimates for civilian hire personnel for Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN. CINCPAC advised the Ambassador in Vientiane of a plan being staffed that provided the JCRC with the option of employing civilian personnel if the need arose. CINCPAC also requested the Ambassador's views on the use of military personnel in civilian clothing, pending JCS approval or the non-availability of qualified civilian personnel. The Ambassador in Vientiane advised CINCPAC that before commenting...

1. J3861 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 020405Z Dec 72; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI/UDORN 040805Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 072355Z Dec 72; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI/UDORN 090616Z Dec 72; COMUSMACTHAI 050415Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 060319Z Dec 72; COMUSMACTHAI 140335Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 152017Z Dec 72; MEDTC FWD 051045Z Dec 72; COMUSMACV 061115Z Dec 72; CINCUSARPAC 060243Z Dec 72; CINCPACFLT 060605Z Dec 72; CINCPACAF 062200Z Dec 72.

2. COMUSMACV 020645Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 022344Z Dec 72.
further on the use of U.S. military personnel to conduct actual physical inspection of grave and crash sites in Laos, additional details concerning the plan were required. CINCPAC advised the Ambassador that JCRC planning envisioned development of country plans with the advice of and coordination with the Ambassador concerned.\footnote{1}

\textit{(TS)} Although the Secretary of State had asked the Ambassador in Bangkok to approach the Royal Thai Government at an early opportunity to obtain its concurrence for relocating the JCRC to Thailand, no official word had been received by the end of the year.\footnote{2}

**IGLOO WHITE**

\textit{(TS)} The counter-infiltration barrier, which developed into a sensor surveillance system, had its beginnings in 1966. At the end of August 1972, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC concurrence to phase out the IGLOO WHITE system by 31 December 1972. CINCPAC addressed the JCS on the subject in mid-October and the JCS approved CINCPAC's request on 18 November.\footnote{3}

\textit{(TS)} The JCS, however, stated that there would be a requirement for the surveillance of possible NVN ground movements in Southeast Asia in violation of the terms of a cease-fire agreement. They envisioned a sensor system, less sophisticated than that employed in IGLOO WHITE, to monitor selected major egress routes from NVN in an area generally extending from the Nape Pass southward along the NVN-Laos border to the DMZ and then eastward to the coast. The JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments as well as a detailed plan for possible immediate implementation, based on the assumption that the modalities associated with the cease-fire agreement would prohibit overflight of NVN, but that overflight and implantation of sensors in Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN would be authorized.

\textit{(TS)} CINCPAC forwarded his comments first. He said:

I do not consider use of sensor systems to monitor or provide support to confirm possible NVN cease-fire violations practicable for the following reasons:

1. J3B61 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 042127Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 042237Z Dec 72; AMEMB Vientiane 9122/081056Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 120421Z Dec 72.
2. Ibid., which cited SECSTATE 222139/072357Z Dec 72.
3. The nicknames associated with the various evolutionary parts of this program were defined in the CINCPAC Command History 1968, Vol. III, p. 6. The program itself has been discussed in the Command Histories since 1966, when appropriate. JCS 2108/182217Z Nov 72, which cited CINCPACAF 310313Z Aug 72, COMUSMACV 250220Z Sep 72, and CINCPAC 150155Z Oct 72 (EX).
a. Sensors have not been effective to monitor or measure personnel movements.

b. Sensors can provide limited detection of vehicle activity, but have limited discrimination ability. They cannot determine difference between local activity, resupply or enemy force augmentations. Other intelligence inputs necessary to confirm possible cease-fire violations detected by sensors.

c. Resource requirements and costs considered excessive for limited information received. To cover major egress passes and routes identified...[by the JCS] approximately one-third of IGLOO WHITE program resources required. Resource requirements to monitor extensions along Cambodian RVN border and supply corridors from China to Laos exceed resources used in IGLOO WHITE program.

CINCPAC noted that the plan would require extensive overflight rights for Laos and the RVN, but according to the published nine-point peace plan, overflight rights might not be available. The JCS proposal to extend sensor coverage along the Cambodia/RVN border and supply corridors from China to Laos created technical problems and was not considered feasible, CINCPAC continued. A proposed concept to implant supporting sensor strings in the NVN did not appear to offer increased surveillance advantages; assuming no overflight rights after the cease-fire, the data collection would be limited by sensor life—approximately 60 days. CINCPAC listed a number of other drawbacks. He also listed limited resources for such a program.

(TS) CINCPAC summarized that although a limited sensor program could be implemented without significant impact on current operations, the use of sensors would not provide definitive data and reinitiation of any major sensor program was not consistent with IGLOO WHITE termination or the projected tenure of the support command. He believed that in an environment in which both the United States and NVN may be authorized the replacement of equipment, development of human and signal intelligence resources capable of quantitative discrimination appeared the most desirable program to expand. He recommended that installation of any sensor program be withheld pending detailed knowledge of the cease-fire agreements, and, as extended sensor coverage as proposed was not considered feasible, that further consideration of the extended programs be discontinued.

(TS) At the same time, however, CINCPAC submitted the planning concepts that had been requested by the JCS. On 24 November COMUSMACV submitted his

1. CINCPAC 222154Z Nov 72.
recommendations for sensor string locations in the southern Laos/NVN passes and DMZ areas to monitor the cease-fire agreement. There were 39 strings, 8 in the DMZ, 4 in NVN, 1 in the RVN (northern MR I), and 26 in southern Laos (in the STEEL TIGER border area).¹

(†S) On 1 December the JCS directed execution of the system as proposed by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. CINCPAC so directed COMUSMACV on 2 December. CINCPACAF was directed to support the program with appropriate equipment.²

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1. CINCPAC 222155Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 240331Z Nov 72.
2. JCS 6584/012353Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 020300Z Dec 72.
Manned Tactical Reconnaissance Authorities

1. CINCPAC 020416Z May 72.
2. J3B510 HistSum May 72, which cited JCS 022123Z May 72 and CINCPAC 030249Z May 72 (both EX).
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 100105Z May 72 (EX).
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 230435Z May 72 (EX).</td>
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<td>J38510 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC 050511Z Apr 72, DIRNSA ADP-186-72/042352Z Apr 72, JCS 03232/051641Z Apr 72 and SACRECONCEN 051935Z Apr 72 (all BOM).</td>
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1. J3B510 HistSum Jul 72, which cited NSACSS 301623Z Jun 72, COMUSMACV 100937Z Jul 72, CINCPAC 130309Z Jul 72, CINCPAC 300038Z Jul 72, and 690833 271230Z Jul 72 (all BOM).

2. J3B510 HistSum Sep 72, which cited CINCPAC 190234Z and 271710Z Sep 72 (both BOM); J3B510 HistSum Oct 72, which cited AFSSO 7AF 102310Z Oct 72 and CINCPAC 170325Z Oct 72 (both BOM).

3. J3B510 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 152252Z Dec 72 (EX) and CINCPAC 202046Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 170400Z Dec 72.
Drone Operations

BUFFALO HUNTER drone operations in Southeast Asia took on new tasking capabilities with the introduction of the "H" and "N" series of AQM-34 vehicles. The "H" AQM-34 provided the OL-UA with the capability to deliver psychological operations leaflets to targets in North Vietnam while the AQM-34 "N" was used for electronic intelligence collection. These were high altitude drones that could be launched and recovered with existing BUFFALO HUNTER assets. During September OL-UA flew four COMPASS COOKIE and nine leaflet missions. Of the four COMPASS COOKIE missions, which were flown in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, three were considered to be of marginal value because of technical problems, equipment malfunction, and weather. The fourth mission was flown on 29 September and, although the drone was lost to a SAM, analysis of the data tapes indicated that the mission was a success. Both the SA-2 downlink beacon frequency and the warhead fuze frequencies were detected by the drone and recorded by the DC-130 before shutdown.

Reconnaissance Programs in Korea

2. J3853 HistSum Sep 72; J3859 HistSum Sep 72.
1. J3B55 HistSum Jan 72; JCS 3448/082029Z Oct 71; 5AF 300637Z Dec 71.
2. J3B8 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPAC 280342Z Apr 72; see Sec. VI, EW Support in Korea.
3. J3B56 HistSum Jun 72, which cited USAFSS 172200Z Feb 72, AFSSO PACAF 190214Z
   Feb 72, CINCPAC 070013Z Mar 72, NSAPAC 222157Z Mar 72, CINCPAC 280424Z Mar
   72, SSO Korea 291226Z Mar 72, CINCPAC 292259Z Mar 72, JCS 101434Z Apr 72,
   PSR 310155Z May 72 (all BOM).

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(5) In an unrelated program, the Naval Oceanographic Office requested aerial photographic reconnaissance in support of an oceanographic study of the Korean coastal waters, Korean Strait, and parts of the Sea of Japan during the spring and fall of 1972. CINCPAC recommended approval to the JCS and tasked CINCPACFLT to provide the required sorties. The JCS approved the operation. NUGGET RANCH was the nickname of the program. The operation consisted of two RA-3B aircraft from VQ-1, an ES-81 mobile color photo processing van, and necessary personnel; the program operated from Osan Air Base. NUGGET RANCH operations were terminated as scheduled on 10 November.2

1. Ibid., which cited SSO Korea 120701Z May 72 and JCS 302050Z May 72 (both BOM).
2. CINCPAC 290256Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 020028Z Aug 72; JCS 3009/012209Z Sep 72; CTU 70.2.3 DET OSAN 101415Z Nov 72.
3. DNA 032156Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 262206Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 130442Z Apr 72.
1. CINCPAC 122028Z Apr 72; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 210351Z May 72; CINCPAC 252141Z May 72.
2. JCS 4713/271844Z Apr 72.
3. JCS 4278/131247Z May 72; CINCPAC 190427Z May 72; JCS 9560/261712Z May 72; CINCPAC 270428Z May 72.
4. CINCPAC 152255Z Jun 72; CTU 92.6.1 160723Z Jun 72.
1. CTU 92.6.1 252042Z and 302106Z Jun 72; JCS 9734/301706Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 301903Z Jun 72.
2. CINCPAC 040146Z Jul 72; CTU 92.6.1 272015Z Jul 72.
1. CTU 92.6.1 312306Z Jul 72; JCS 9658/020104Z Aug 72; CTU 92.6.1 070703Z Aug 72; CTF 92 120236Z Aug 72; CINCPACFLT 142143Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 180234Z Aug 72.

2. JCS 6028/091820Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 102307Z Jun 72.
1. CINCPACFLT 060359Z Jul 72; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 180227Z Jul 72; CINCPACFLT 260104Z Jul 72; AAC 172020Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 210245Z Jul 72; JCS 8729/212323Z Jul 72; CINCSAC 252118Z Jul 72; CTU 92.2.6 132115Z Jul 72; J3B42 HistSum Jul 72.
2. CTU 92.2.6 170800Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 050203Z Aug 72.
1. JCS 6589/090036Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 112244Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 160255Z Sep 72; CINCPACFLT 060359Z Jul 72.
2. JCS 7947/092154Z Aug 72.
1. CINCPAC 100951Z Aug 72; JCS 4333/152010Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 162057Z Aug 72; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 120358Z Sep 72.
2. J3842 HistSum, which cited NCACSS 070348Z Oct 72 (BOM); CINCPAC 101740Z Oct 72; CTU 92.2.2 181415Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 200321Z Oct 72.
3. J3842 HistSum Nov 72, which cited NCACSS 201902Z Nov 72 (BOM); CINCPAC 210358Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 230030Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 242152Z Nov 72; CTU 92.2.2 280410Z Nov 72; CTU 92.1.1 280510Z Nov 72; CTU 92.2.1 280530Z Nov 72; CTU 92.1.9 280621Z Nov 72; CTU 92.1.8 280650Z Nov 72.
4. CTU 92.2.4 140341Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 142051Z Dec 72; JCS 4620/160039Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 160130Z Dec 72.
1. CINCPAC 122209Z Dec 72.
SECTION III -- EXERCISES

Peacetime Emergency Situation Exercises

Tests in the peacetime emergency situation exercise series continued in 1972, but only two were conducted compared to four the year before. The series had begun in 1969 to test command, control, and communications procedures and to insure expeditious reaction to emergency situations as authorized in Rules of Engagement and CINCPAC instructions. The first of the 1972 exercises was FREEWAY PHANTOM, conducted on 9 January, which portrayed the simulated loss of control of a COMBAT DAWN drone and its subsequent overflight of North Korea. Information was passed laterally and vertically in a timely manner to all commands capable of support. Simulated reaction was timely and in accordance with existing rules of engagement. Utilization of the All-Source Information Center Communications (ASICOM) Net was "exceptional."

The second exercise was FREEWAY QUIZ on 21 March, which portrayed the simulated unauthorized flight of a C-130 aircraft by unknown persons from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan. The aircraft was subsequently shot down by Mainland Chinese Air Defense Forces, according to the scenario. Information was passed in the same manner as in the previous exercise and all exercise critiques from participating commands were favorable.

Exercises in this series were not discontinued, but no others were held during 1972.

FORECAST STORM

Exercises in the FORECAST STORM series continued in 1972. These were emergency communications timing exercises to test communications systems and to exercise the procedures that insured expeditious relay of time sensitive information. The exercises simulated a Condition One abort of a Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance (PARPRO) aircraft, which transmitted the timing message over appropriate frequencies using the standing operating procedures. In these exercises CINCPAC's Executive Assistant and Aide was to be contacted within five minutes no matter where he was. This criterion was met in every case in 1972, on 28 June in one minute and on 27 October in two minutes, even though in that case the Executive Assistant was in Saigon. The exercises were normally conducted once a month; in some cases it was necessary to cancel them to pre-

2. J3C231 HistSum Mar 72.
clude the possibility of interference with real operations. Such was the case in December when the exercise was cancelled because of LINEBACKER II operations.¹

JOLLY ROGER

JOLLY ROGER was an annual PACOM-wide (less Southeast Asia) general war command post exercise, designed to improve the overall general war readiness of the PACOM, ascertain discrepancies in existing plans and procedures, and prepare command center teams and planning group participation in the JCS-sponsored HIGH HEELS series of exercises. In 1972 the JOLLY ROGER scheduled for 5–9 December was cancelled because of the situation in Southeast Asia.²

ELK TREE

On 30 November, in conjunction with a visit by a JCS Command and Control Staff Assistance Team, an exercise in the ELK TREE series was conducted. The exercise consisted of a simulated intelligence briefing, a simulated emergency telephone conference, a SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) execution consideration briefing, and preparation of SIOP execution Emergency Action Messages by the CINCPAC Emergency Action Team of the Battle Staff on duty. Admiral Gayler and key staff personnel participated in the exercise.³

FREQUENT RIDER

Two exercises in the FREQUENT RIDER series were conducted in 1972. These were designed to exercise command center and augmentation personnel in procedures relating to rapid crisis buildup culminating in general nuclear war. The first, a one-day exercise on 24 February, commenced at 0330 hours, Hawaii time, upon receipt of a message announcing a simulated increase in Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON). At 0506 hours a simulated DEFCON 1 message was received and Battle Staff One assumed ground alert in the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) alert aircraft (BLUE EAGLE) in a strip alert configuration in order to simulate a continuous airborne status without expending additional flying time. Simultaneously, a recall of ABNCP personnel was initiated. After accomplishing a Battle Staff-to-Battle Staff update between the ABNCP Ground Alert Facility and the alert aircraft, Battle Staff Three relieved Battle Staff One and assumed strip alert in the aircraft at 0713. Battle Staff One "played" the balance of the exercise from the Ground Alert Facility. Battle Staff Two proceeded to the CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility at Kunia and observed the exercise from that location. At 1100 a BLUE EAGLE FOUR message was received.

2. CINCPAC 070145Z Nov 72.
from the Kunia facility that launched the alert aircraft, which was airborne in 8 minutes, 42 seconds. At 1200 Battle Staff Four, at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, took off and entered one of the BLUE EAGLE Philippine Orbit Areas.

(3) At 1320 the CINCPAC ABNCP in the Hawaiian Orbit assumed control of PACOM forces for exercise purposes due to a simulated communications outage at the Kunia facility, which was the primary CINCPAC command center for the exercise. At 1345 an update between Battle Staffs Three and Four began and at 1430 Staff Four in the Philippine Orbit assumed the airborne watch and was in control of PACOM forces for exercise purposes until 1530, at which time the Kunia facility reassumed control. The exercise was terminated at 1630 with all major objectives accomplished in a successful manner.

(3) Of special note was the fact that two National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft also participated in FREQUENT RIDER. SILVER DOLLAR ONE was airborne in an Okinawa orbit and SILVER DOLLAR TWO was in a ground monitor status at Yokota Air Base, Japan. Both aircraft were in the area in support of the President's visit to China. In order to lend more realism to the exercise, the subsequent execution order was actually transmitted from SILVER DOLLAR to the CINCPAC ABNCP (BLUE EAGLE) for dispatch to PACOM forces.1

(U) In October, in conjunction with their deployment in the Western Pacific, Battle Staff One conducted an exercise in the FREQUENT RIDER series at the Alternate Command Facility, Guam (ACFG). The ACFG Battle Staff was manned by new and inexperienced personnel who required detailed supervision and instruction. CINCPAC's team found that the ACFG would require additional concentrated training prior to achieving a crisis management capability.2

Amphibious Training Exercises

(3) The introduction of political considerations in military exercises conducted in foreign countries had heightened in 1969 and increased since as areas were designated "sensitive" and where the "propriety" of the exercise was to be determined at the Washington level by the Defense and State Departments. In September 1970, however, a joint message from the State and Defense Departments had authorized designated U.S. Ambassadors to approve amphibious training under specified conditions. The intent of the authorization had been to shorten the sometimes lengthy Washington approval procedures for this type of training.3

1. J3C10 HistSum Feb 72. Battle Staff Five was in a leave status during the exercise.
In 1971 CINCPACFLT suggested approaching the U.S. Ambassador in Canberra, Australia for approval; he provided an outline for a proposed U.S. unilateral amphibious training exercise in Australia. In response to a CINCPAC query, the Ambassador and the CINCPAC Representative, Australia stated that approval could not be given at that level and recommended that CINCPAC seek Washington approval.¹

Planning for the unilateral exercise continued with the JCS granting approval of Exercise KANGAROO ONE, as it came to be called, but it was postponed from the spring of 1972 because of the increased tempo of operations in Southeast Asia. In May 1972 the U.S. Ambassador in Canberra reported that the proposed delay was acceptable to the Australian Department of Defense (ADOD), and that the ADOD desired to participate in the exercise. This changed the nature of the exercise from a unilateral demonstration to a combined exercise, which required a revised Significant Military Exercise report for approval by the JCS. First scheduled for the fall of 1972, the exercise was rescheduled in the spring of 1973. CINCPAC believed that this exercise might become the first of a series of exercises that in the future might be expanded in size and scope, to include antisubmarine warfare.²

1. J3B11 Point Paper, 2 Jun 72, Subj: Amphibious Training Exercises Australia; Exercise KANGAROO ONE (C).
2. CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 35; J3B11 Point Paper, 2 Jun 72, Subj: Amphibious Training Exercises Australia; Exercise KANGAROO ONE (C).
SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Joint Research and Development Objectives Document

(§) In 1971 CINCPAC had submitted to the JCS his recommendations for inclusion in the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD) on 14 November. At that time CINCPAC had submitted 10 objectives, nine under the Tactical Warfare Category and one under the Strategic and Space Systems Category for the period FY 74-91. JCS priorities were established as Critical, High Priority, and Priority. Of the 10 submitted by CINCPAC, five were designated by the JCS as critical in military importance, two were of high priority, two were priority, and one was not discussed in the Executive Summary published as Parts I and II of JRDOD FY 74-91. The heavy support for CINCPAC programs was believed due in part to the change in approach to the JRDOD. Earlier versions had contained long "wish lists" and were Service oriented. The research and development objectives of the FY 74-91 edition were a restatement of deficiencies in operational capabilities identified by contributors. The result was more emphasis on the needs of operational commands and less on parochial Service programs.¹

(§) CINCPAC's recommendations for JRDOD 75-92 were submitted on 19 September 1972. The 11 objectives included one concerned with Strategic Warfare Systems, nine with Tactical Warfare Systems, and one with Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Two of the objectives were new: one concerned the location of hostile artillery while the other concerned Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) satellite communications and the need for hardened satellite communications.²

PACOM Research and Development Problem Areas

(§) CINCPAC had been sending semi-annual reports to the JCS identifying significant research and development problem areas in his command, consisting of a list of problem areas cited by his staff, component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUS Korea. In his submission of 6 March CINCPAC stated that the two most critical deficiencies had been frequently identified in the past: one was mine and booby trap detection and clearing and the other was the need for all-weather...

air operations. CINCPAC noted that some improvements in all-weather close air support had been made, but that the improvements did not offer full mission spectrum capability. Continued effort was required, CINCPAC believed, in improving self-contained navigation and weapons delivery systems.

CINCPAC listed a number of other requirements next in relative importance. These were concerned with wide-area personnel detection and location devices and means; electronic warfare (development of miniaturized jammers that could be carried on strike aircraft and rapid development of visual-optical, electro-optical, and infrared countermeasure equipment); anti-submarine warfare and defense against naval surface-to-surface missiles to include detection and kill capability; and a requirement for artillery-delivered anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, which could be used to impede and canalize enemy infantry and armor attacks. He listed several subjects of lower priority and then listed two subjects of particular interest to CINCPAC. These were improved narrowband secure voice communications and improved high altitude psychological operations capability.

Future reports of this kind were to be furnished by CINCPAC only once a year, to arrive in July. This reduction in frequency of reporting was due to the lessening of U.S. Forces involvement in Southeast Asia. It did not connote a reduction of emphasis by CINCPAC on the need for a strong research and development program. In April 1972, the JCS suggested that CINCPAC eliminate the significant Research and Development Problem Areas Report and submit those problem areas as an addendum to the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD). CINCPAC concurred with the JCS suggestion and the JRDOD submission in September contained approximately 70 Significant Problem Areas as an addendum.1

Assistance for Agency for Defense Development - Korea

In 1971 the ROK government had established an organization called the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) for military research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for in-country production of military equipment, a concept first introduced by Defense Minister Jung during meetings at Camp Smith in July 1970. CINCPAC had been interested in the agency because a successful ADD would support the Nixon Doctrine by permitting the Koreans to move toward self-sufficiency. It had been determined that the ADD required U.S. technical and financial assistance at the beginning and it was further decided that a high level advisory team would be recruited by the Advanced Research Projects

1. CINCPAC Itr Ser 00555, 6 Mar 72, Subj: PACOM Significant Research and Development Problem Areas (U); J3/Memo/000702-73, 28 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History, Review of draft.
Agency (ARPA) and sent to Korea early in 1972. U.S. Ambassador Porter had originally opposed any support for the ADD and the Secretary of State had expressed some skepticism, but it was believed at the end of 1971 that these differences had been resolved.\footnote{1}

The Defense RDT&E Counterpart Group in Korea, headed by Mr. Clyde Hardin, arrived in Korea on 6 January 1972; his charter called for a six month effort. After 90 days he was to recommend the form and content of continued assistance. His 4 April recommendations pertained to U.S. support for ROK RDT&E efforts and the internal functions of the ADD. CINCPAC's comments on the report were primarily concerned with the recommended U.S. support. COMUS Korea's comments and recommendations were consistent with the CINCPAC position. CINCPAC found the immediate contributions made by the counterpart group in the areas of Military Assistance Program (MAP) transfer and co-production "very rewarding." CINCPAC noted that he supported the position that continuing U.S. RDT&E assistance was necessary to insure an orderly and successful path to ROK military self-sufficiency. Accordingly, he recommended that the mission of the Defense RDT&E Counterpart Group to advise ROK RDT&E agencies and the JUSMAG-K be extended to 1 July 1973; that the JUSMAG-K mission statement be modified to include the responsibility for providing assistance to ROK RDT&E agencies, with appropriate JTD changes incorporated into the Joint Management Program for FY 73; and that the JCS and appropriate organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense continue to support the effort as they had in the past. CINCPAC concluded:

President Park is placing heavy emphasis on the home production of defense materials. Other PACOM countries are watching Korea with understandable interest; and the outcome there will have considerable influence on similar efforts elsewhere. It is important that the showcase effort in Korea exemplify our desire and willingness to help our Allies acquire self-sufficiency. In this respect, the attainment of certain national objectives of both the United States and Korea will be enhanced by continuing the U.S. support for ROK RDT&E efforts.\footnote{2}

On 23 June the JCS, by memo to the Secretary of Defense, concurred in the CINCPAC position.

The Ambassador, it seems, had never looked favorably on the assistance being given to the ADD. Embassy comments on Mr. Hardin's 90-day report were

\footnote{2} CINCPAC ltr Ser 0439, 2 May 72, Subj: Initial Report of Defense RDT&E Counterpart Group in Korea (U).
not favorable to his proposals. Basically the Ambassador supported a modest
management assistance role, specified that any equipment furnished be within
the Modernization Plan, and noted that overall endorsement to the report could
not be given due to the "lack of an action plan and answer to question of how
many people, for how long, at what cost."  

(5) As a result of the difference of opinions that surfaced, a meeting
was held between the Embassy and COMUS Korea, following which a joint message
was promulgated. There were three main points of agreement. One was the
identification of four specific areas of support for technical assistance:
automotive, spare parts, electronics equipment, and limited munitions and
ammunition expansion. Any further support was to be decided on a case-by-case
basis. Secondly, the JUSMAG-K Industrial Development Division would provide
technical assistance in addition to its other responsibilities. Four spaces
in the Joint Table of Distribution were agreed as being adequate to provide the
required support. The third matter of agreement was that the ARPA team, having
concluded its mission, would depart not later than 1 September 1972. Selected
personnel were permitted to stay until suitable replacements could be found in
order to provide continuity for on-going projects.  

(6) CINCPAC did not agree with the tenor of the joint Embassy-COMUS Korea
message. He pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the ARPA group was to
provide advice and assistance in developing management, organization, and planning
of the material acquisition process with the intent of guiding the Koreans into efficient utilization of their resources. The position developed by the
Ambassador and COMUS Korea, CINCPAC believed, indicated a concentration on
several potential co-production programs and not on the development of a worth-while management system.  

(6) Meanwhile, in May, the Embassy unilaterally cancelled a series of
technical seminars scheduled to be given by high level Service scientists and
engineers. Then, at the U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Committee meeting in
July 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird agreed to provide "appropriate assistance
to the ROK military R&D effort," which meant to the ADD. All CINCPAC efforts
to persuade the Office of the Secretary to release a message delineating
"appropriate assistance" were fruitless. The State and Defense departments
discussed for several months the definition of "self sufficiency" and the role
that Security Assistance, and in particular RDT&E assistance, was to play in
attaining self-sufficiency for friendly nations.  

1. J3OR Point Paper, 21 Jul 72, Subj: Korean Agency for Defense Development
   (ADD) (U).
2. AMEMB Seoul 4410/2801322 Jul 72.
3. CINCPAC 3101022 Jul 72.
4. J3OR Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: U.S. Assistance to the Korean Agency for
   Defense Development (ADD).

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On 28 July the Embassy, in the midst of the confusion in Washington, ordered the Defense RDT&E Counterpart Group out of Korea by 1 September. On 22 August the State and Defense Departments supported the position of the Ambassador and COMUS Korea. As a result, the responsibility to advise the ADD was turned over to the JUSMAG-K on 1 September and the remainder of the team left Korea on that date. The joint message from the State and Defense Departments had pointed out that the original reason for providing advice to the ADD, "was based on assessment that while the ADD staff was considered strong in scientific training, they were seriously weak in practical management capability relevant to technical and material processes for which they were established. Therefore some measure of U.S. support appeared necessary."  

To carry out its added responsibility, a 15-man Industrial Development/RDT&E Division was established within the JUSMAG-K organization. Eight of those spaces were RDT&E oriented. At the end of the year, however, most of the spaces remained vacant; there were normal difficulties associated with finding good RDT&E people who were willing to work in Korea and a freeze on civilian hiring was in effect. As a temporary measure, JUSMAG-K asked ARPA to provide three temporary duty advisors in the areas of communications-electronics, quality assurance, and test and evaluation.  

Despite the U.S. organizational changes, the ADD itself had a fine staff of engineers and technicians and a new headquarters facility. Co-production of vehicles, boats, and radios was considered a distinct possibility as 1972 ended, and the ADD was producing many prototypes of military equipment. It also had a limited capability to test and evaluate. The relationship between the Embassy and the RDT&E community was gradually improving and the outlook for future RDT&E accomplishments in Korea was considered promising.  

Survey of Republic of China RDT&E Activities  

At the request of the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group China, and with the concurrence of the Embassy and the COMUSTDC and the approval of the Chinese General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense (MND), a CINCPAC team conducted a survey of Chinese RDT&E activities in mid-June 1972. The team was headed by CINCPAC's Research and Engineering Consultant. Team objectives were to determine existing Chinese technological activities and capabilities and provide recommendations to the MAAG Chief on possible courses of action in relationship to Chinese RDT&E activities. An additional objective was developed during the course of the survey: to provide comments to the MND at the completion of the survey.

1. SECSTATE 152668/2217422 Aug 72.  

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(U) Principal team recommendations developed as a result of the survey were that a small RDT&E advisory group should be established in the MAAG; that this group should have the primary function of assisting the MND in developing an R&D management system; and that the MAAG, in conjunction with other members of the Country Team, should encourage the formulation of an R&D program that utilized the potential of both the civilian sector and other government agencies.\(^1\)

(U) Based on the recommendation of the CINCPAC team, the Chinese established a 12-man RDT&E office under the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Planning/MND. By the end of the year personnel actions were underway to assign several highly qualified RDT&E people to the MAAG for the purpose of providing RDT&E management assistance to the Chinese MND.\(^2\)

**ARPA Projects within the PACOM**

(U) The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was a Defense Department research and development agency under the direction and supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In June 1969 the Secretary of Defense had authorized CINCPAC to establish policy governing the projects of the ARPA field units operating in foreign countries of the PACOM. The terms of reference between the two agencies provided that projects being conducted within the PACOM would be reviewed periodically, at least annually, by CINCPAC and ARPA together, with respect to their continuation, expansion, consolidation, redirection, or termination.\(^3\)

(C) The third such annual review was held at CINCPAC Headquarters on 14 and 15 February 1972. It brought together representatives from ARPA in Washington and its PACOM field directors with representatives of CINCPAC and his component commands and his subordinate unified commands in Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea. The lowered ARPA profile in Thailand was noted. Remaining ARPA projects were scheduled to be turned over to the Thai or to COMUSMACVTHAI by 30 September, with the ARPA unit to be disestablished on that date and all personnel out of the country by 31 December 1972. COMUSMACVTHAI had established a Research and Development Advisory Section since the last ARPA review; this section was the focal point for RDT&E advisory assistance to the Thai. Ongoing programs in Vietnam and Korea were studied. (These are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this section.) The Government of Australia was considering an ARPA proposal by which the Australians would test and evaluate certain items developed under ARPA auspices such as small arms and sensors for small

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unit operations, over-the-horizon radar for ocean surveillance and air defense, and a towed array for submarine surveillance. CINCPAC endorsed ARPA's proposed joint program with Australia.

(U) Several tasking proposals introduced warranted further consideration and were to be staffed by CINCPAC and ARPA. The success of the reviews, it was believed, warranted continued annual scheduling.\(^1\)

(\(\S\)) Several other proposed ARPA field unit tasks were considered throughout the year. In February CINCPAC concurred with an ARPA-Thailand task entitled "Scientific and Technological Potential of Thailand: Data Base for Planning and Advisory Purposes." The major objectives of the study were to identify material that described the scientific and technological potential of Thailand, and to advise and assist the National Research Council in organizing the data to make it most usable and in ways to keep it current.\(^2\) In August CINCPAC concurred in an ARPA-Korea program plan to test an "Acoustic Identification System," which provided for an operational test and evaluation of a towed hydrophone array in the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea to demonstrate the feasibility of the towed array concept, specifications for which indicated that it should detect and identify North Korean agent boats at ranges up to 15 nautical miles.\(^3\)

**Phaseout of ARPA/RDFU Vietnam**

(U) The Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam (RDFU-V) had been established by the Director of Defense Research Engineering in 1961 in Vietnam. In March 1972 the Director of ARPA proposed to COMUSMACV the phaseout by 1 July 1973 of the unit. The RDFU-V's mission at the time was to undertake research and development in support of Vietnam military forces. It accomplished this mission by advising the Vietnamese Combat Development Test Center. The Director of ARPA also requested that MACV appoint a staff element to assume this advisory responsibility. CINCPAC forwarded the ARPA Director's proposal to COMUSMACV, supporting the concept of maintaining a small but active technical organization in the Vietnamese force structure. In June 1972 COMUSMACV concurred with the planned phaseout and appointed the office of the Technical Assistance Coordinator as the agency responsible for support of the Combat Development Test Center (CDTC) subsequent to 1 July 1973 and responsible for insuring an orderly transfer of support functions.

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2. This task was subsequently extended (CINCPAC 271857Z Sep 72), as was a task associated with translating training manuals (CINCPAC 262039Z Sep 72).
3. CINCPAC 262240Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 130003Z Aug 72.
to COMUSMACV. CINCPAC concurred, noting that, "During the past eleven years many of the projects developed by ARPA have contributed significantly to the combat efficiency of the Free World Military Forces in Vietnam." He also commented that ARPA work with the CDTCC had "provided the Vietnamese with a viable RDT&E capability." The timetable for phasing the support of the CDTCC to COMUSMACV was subsequently accelerated due to the drawdown of U.S. Forces in Vietnam.¹

Machine Assisted Translation

(U) With the announcement of the Vietnamization Program had come the problem of translating thousands of pages of English into Vietnamese, mainly in technical areas of maintenance. To help with this problem, CINCPAC had established a requirement for a computer assisted translation system. Since 1970 a system had been under development by the Logos Corporation to aid in translation.

(U) The Air Force, executive agent for this effort, announced in June 1972 that it was terminating its efforts to develop a machine assisted translation system. As CINCPAC had been instrumental in identifying the original requirement, the Air Force's action caused CINCPAC to review the program. The review established that machine assisted translation was not as timely or responsive as the manual translation effort; the quality of machine assisted translation had been rated "poor" by the Vietnamese Air Force; and the cost per translated manual was estimated to be 29 times greater than for manual translation.

(U) CINCPAC recommended that the priority of the machine assisted translation be reduced, but that further research and development be conducted on the concept of machine translation in order to overcome the existing problem areas and further the discipline.²

Incendiary Testing Requirement Studied

The Deseret Test Center was a jointly staffed and funded agency responsible for the planning and conduct of tests to determine the military value of incendiary devices.

¹. CINCPAC Command History 1962, p. 167; ARPA Memorandum for COMUSMACV, through CINCPAC, 7 Mar 72, Subj: Transfer of Support for the Vietnamese Combat Development Test Center; CINCPAC 1tr Ser 1328, 18 Mar 72, Subj: Transfer of Support for the Vietnamese Combat Development Test Center; COMUSMACV 1tr to Director, ARPA, through CINCPAC, 15 Jun 72, Subj: Transfer of Support for the Vietnamese Combat Development Test Center (CDTCC), and CINCPAC first endorsement thereto, Ser 2628, 7 Jul 72; J3/Memo/000702-73, 28 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History; Review of draft.

². CINCPAC 072305Z Jun 72.
value of chemical and biological weapons and defense systems. It had received a requirement from CINCPAC in 1967 to "determine the optimum incendiary for use in jungle destruction and the techniques and quantitative requirements for employment under a variety of conditions." The center asked CINCPAC to reconsider the requirement in light of operational experience gained in Southeast Asia since its submission.

CINCPAC recommended that the requirement be cancelled. He noted that experience had indicated that incendiary devices such as the M-35 cluster bomb were adequate for ignition purposes, but experience in Southeast Asia operations such as HOT TIP and PINK ROSE had shown that a good incendiary for ignition was not enough to cause jungle destruction, even when only moderately heavy vegetation was present. Any effort at jungle destruction, CINCPAC advised, should be preceded by a period of approximately six months during which time the vegetation was thoroughly dead and drying as a result of prior herbicide spray preparation. Otherwise, the clearing of forest and jungle areas by fire was "ineffective." (Even when the jungle was set afire, thunderstorms generated by the powerful thermals resulting from the fire quickly extinguished it.)

**Herbicide Operations**

In April CINCPAC provided the JCS with the plan for Vietnamization of herbicide operations that had been worked out with COMUSMACV. The matter of herbicide use had been under study throughout 1971 and 1972. COMUSMACV's authority to use herbicides of any type had expired on 1 May 1971. This authority was subsequently extended by the President until 1 December of that year and the United States continued to use herbicides as needed around fire support bases and installations. CINCPAC, in September, recommended continuing authority for use beyond 1 December as the herbicides provided the only practical means of controlling vegetation in areas containing mines, booby traps, and tactical wire. In the event that approval could not be obtained, CINCPAC also recommended the use of growth inhibitors as the best alternative and requested that adequate stocks of growth inhibitors be made available by 1 December.

The CINCPAC-COMUSMACV plan for Vietnamizing herbicide operations had been initiated in March 1971. A JCS-Defense Department plan based on this input was submitted in September 1971 to the President for approval. The Embassy in Saigon did not initially support the Vietnamization plan, and guidance from the Secretary of State was subsequently provided to revise the PACOM plan. In the spring of 1972 a plan was devised to provide the RVNAF with a limited capability.

2. J30S2 HistSum Sep 71; CINCPAC 291124Z Sep 71.
to perform herbicide operations around the perimeters of firebases and installations when other means of vegetation control were not possible or feasible. One helicopter spray system per corps was to be provided to the RVNAF with in-country spray equipment transferred as it became available from U.S. units on a one-time basis and without Military Assistance Service Funded support. Concurrently, the JCS were to be advised to establish commercial sources of herbicides to meet future RVNAF requirements.\footnote{J30S2 HistSum Sep 71; CINCPAC 182211Z Apr 72.}
SECTION V--REPORTING

Operational Reporting - Southeast Asia

(U) CINCPAC continued in 1972 to seek to minimize the number of reports required in connection with activities in Southeast Asia and to minimize redundancies among the reports required. He also sought to insure that the reporting periods were the most satisfactory to both the forces in the field and officials in Washington. A number of individual matters in connection with these goals are discussed below. As forces and activities fluctuated, so did the requirements for reports, which had been greater throughout this war than ever before.

(G) Extremely high classification and transmission precedence continued to impose burdens on all involved. In this regard, COMUSMACV, on 20 April, requested relief. He advised:

...For the past several months, message traffic dealing with combat operations in SE Asia, both planned and under way, has increasingly come under the SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE classification. This practice has now reached the point where virtually all such traffic, except for routine QPREP messages, is now placed under this restrictive classification.

...Staffing the large volume of operational actions so classified has become both administratively and practically cumbersome. The restricted distribution of such messages has made it difficult to take efficient and timely staff action.

...Therefore recommend that consideration be given to applying less restrictive security classification and handling procedures to all but the most highly sensitive communications which should require SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE handling.

(M) This subject had been raised in connection with a requirement from the JCS that COMUSMACV provide a Commander's Personal Appraisal of the military situation in Southeast Asia, which had been generated by the enemy's spring offensive. (An earlier requirement for a biweekly Commander's Personal Appraisal of the situation in Cambodia, required since May 1971, was

1. COMUSMACV 201145Z Apr 72.
discontinued in February 1972, on CINCPAC's request, based on the stabilization of the situation there and the availability of information contained in other more definitive and systematic reports.) The JCS revised the appraisal requirements to reduce the ever increasing reporting responsibilities. CINCPAC, upon receipt of the revisions, modified the format of the report and downgraded it to Top Secret.¹

¹( TS) In May CINCPAC requested that the JCS again modify the appraisal to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of our air strikes in relation to ground operations in the RVN; he emphasized the importance higher authority placed on the personal appraisals. The JCS indicated that they were having difficulty correlating bomb and gun damage assessments with enemy sightings and other intelligence information and stated that it would be helpful to receive examples of the most effective application of air and naval gunfire support so as to present a true picture of their effectiveness to Congress.²

²( TS) CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV correlate enemy activity reported through intelligence channels with results supported in the Personal Appraisal and include examples of effective utilization of air and naval gunfire assets. He further emphasized the importance of the Personal Appraisal to high authority and indicated that CINCPACFLT's daily summary might be helpful in meeting the new requirements.³

³( S) A number of operations in Southeast Asia were extremely sensitive and classification problems persisted. An associated problem was to get data concerning them into computerized data files, which were classified no higher than Secret. On 25 April CINCPAC advised CINCSAC, CINCPAC’s air and naval component commanders, COMUSMACV, and several other Service commanders of reporting procedures to be used for special operations. All communications prior to initial launch were to be placed in general service communications channels, classified Top Secret and marked SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR. After initial launch, OPREP-1 and 2 messages were to be downgraded to Secret. Messages were to have automatic downgrading and caveat removal date and time. OPREP-3 and 4 messages transmitted prior to final crossout from North Vietnam of all strike and support forces were to be placed in general service channels, classified Secret, and marked LIMDIS (limited distribution). The LIMDIS was to be removed after final crossout. Notification of final crossout was to be provided by the commanders of the 7th and 8th Air Forces and Task Force 77 for their respective operations.

1. J3C42 HistSum Apr 72; J3C42 HistSum Feb 72, which cited CJCS 3963/150019Z Feb 72 (EX); CINCPAC 170302Z Feb 72.
2. J3C42 HistSum May 72, which cited CJCS 4526/052146Z May 72 (EX).
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 060512Z May 72 (EX).
forces, by FLASH OPREP-3 PINNACLE voice report. The last daily OPREP-4 for
the day for a special operation was to provide a total of the strike and support
sorties flown. CINCPAC then prescribed which reports were required of which
commanders.1

(5) Subsequently the JCS provided CINCSAC with OPREP downgrading
instructions and requested that he utilize the classification and OPREP-3
crossout reporting procedures promulgated by CINCPAC. CINCSAC discussed the
procedures to be followed to comply with the request. CINCPAC advised the
JCS and CINCSAC that the procedures suggested satisfied CINCPAC's information
requirements.2

(6) Message precedence also came under study. The enemy spring offensive
resulted in an increased volume of high precedence message traffic, which led
to a deterioration of message response time from the reporting units. CINCPAC
determined that the OPREP-3 PINNACLE submitted for naval gunfire support
missions was not required by FLASH precedence. The instruction on preparation
of the report was changed to allow for IMMEDIATE precedence for such reports.
(In May CINCPAC had established a requirement for reporting the commencement
of naval gunfire support strikes against targets in North Vietnam using the
OPREP-3; in November, in a continuing effort to reduce reporting requirements,
CINCPAC cancelled the requirement.)3

(7) Reporting air operations (Air OPREP-5) was modernized in 1972 as
CINCPAC combined the in-country and out-country daily reports into a single
report. In connection with the revision, CINCPACFLT indicated that significant
Navy bomb damage assessment (BDA) was being omitted because of limited target
categories; he requested that new categories be added. CINCPAC expanded the
report format to include several additional categories.4

(8) An attempt to reduce reporting redundancy in the narrative and
statistical summaries concerning sensor detections in STEEL TIGER and air
operations in BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER (COMMANDO HUNT/IGLOO WHITE/OPREP-5)
was not successful because CINCPACAF required the COMMANDO HUNT/IGLOO WHITE
information and could not acquire it in such useful form from other reports.5

1. J3C43 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPAC 252219Z Apr 72.
2. J3C42 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 060315Z May 72.
3. J3C42 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 270851Z May 72; CINCPAC 032158Z Nov 72.
4. J3C42 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 251957Z May 72.
5. CINCPAC 022153Z May 72; CINCPACAF 120135Z May 72.
ARC LIGHT reports were somewhat consolidated in 1972. In August the 7th Air Force consolidated into one the two weekly BDA reports, which CINCPAC approved. In September COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the daily SPECAT EXCLUSIVE ARC LIGHT report be eliminated and the BDA information provided in a weekly summary. The JCS approved the recommendation on 25 September. Again, in December, CINCPAC requested that the JCS delete the requirement for the Special ARC LIGHT report, and the JCS did so.

CINCPAC, in the December request regarding ARC LIGHT, also requested that the JCS delete the requirement for the COMUSMACV Supplemental Commander’s Personal Appraisal and the OPREP-3 Preliminary BDA report. The JCS concurred, but requested that certain damage assessment be included in the Southeast Asia Weekly Ground OPREP-5. CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to include data on enemy tanks, armored personnel carriers, and trucks destroyed or captured in the weekly Ground OPREP-5 report; this data had appeared in the supplemental personal appraisal, which was cancelled.

CINCPAC’s interest in minimizing reporting requirements included the Phung Hoang Reports, measuring the neutralization of the Viet Cong infrastructure. COMUSMACV advised that the monthly reports would terminate with that for February 1972 as a result of initiation of a new Neutralization Accounting System by the Vietnamese National Police Command. The JCS requested a description of the Qualitative Neutralization Goals System and an outline of those goals as established in the Vietnamese 1972-75 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. CINCPAC obtained the required information from COMUSMACV. He also agreed with COMUSMACV’s recommendation that the required reports be quarterly, rather than monthly. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to continue development of the quarterly report.

In the matter of reporting Southeast Asia ground operations, CINCPAC initiated a single daily OPREP-4 on a test basis starting 1 April. The test period for the new report lasted a month and the once daily OPREP-4 was adopted on 1 May.

To keep track of Thai counterinsurgency operations, the JCS asked that CINCPAC provide a weekly summary. When tasked, COMUSMACThai recommended that the information be provided only twice a month, partly because of the small number of reportable incidents. CINCPAC, upon further review, again

1. CINCPAC 31021Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 270117Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 100323Z Nov 72 and 020045Z Dec 72.
3. COMUSMACV 200622Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 082016Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 090555Z May 72.
4. CINCPAC 290321Z Apr 72.
requested that the report be provided weekly. COMUSMACTHAI confirmed CINCPAC's request and provided basic background information on Thailand for use with the weekly situation report. The use of OPREP-3 PINNACLE reporting procedures for significant events was to continue.  

In the matter of maintenance of the Situation and Incident Report (SITRA) data base, in 1971 COMUSMACV had recommended that CINCPAC assume coding responsibilities. CINCPAC studied time delays that would result, a matter of seven days delay in currency. CINCPAC assumed responsibility for coding large and small scale incidents and incidents initiated by the enemy into the SITRA on 17 April.  

CINCPACFLT sought to improve reporting procedures with his recommendation that a new Southeast Asia Naval Surface Electronic Warfare OPREP-5 report be implemented and the requirement for electronic intelligence data in the naval gunfire support OPREP-5 be deleted. CINCPAC and the JCS concurred and CINCPAC directed implementation on 1 May.  

LINEBACKER tactical air operational reporting was reviewed by CINCPAC in August. In these actions over North Vietnam, the Navy and Air Force were using different definitions for types of sorties, resulting in reporting discrepancies. The Navy was reporting large numbers of armed reconnaissance sorties, while the Air Force was reporting large numbers of strike sorties for the same kinds of activity. The Chairman of the JCS had indicated that North Vietnamese sorties reported as armed reconnaissance missions actually included strikes against Basic Encyclopedia-numbered targets and should have been reported as strikes instead of armed "recce." He added that specific route segments against which the armed recce missions were committed were not identified in the operational reports. The Chairman requested that specific modification be made to LINEBACKER operational reporting to include fragging of route segments, reporting hard targets as strike missions, and reporting when Basic Encyclopedia-numbered targets were hit incident to armed reconnaissance missions. To resolve these matters CINCPAC held a meeting with CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT representatives on 7 August.  

It took a while to correct the discrepancies; at first 7th Air Force reported as strikes those sorties flown in Route Package I that did not expend on Basic Encyclopedia-numbered targets. CINCPACAF requested immediate action to comply with instructions, and 7th Air Force reiterated to the units the

1. CINCPAC 062022Z Feb 72; COMUSMACTHAI 101220Z Feb 72.  
2. COMUSMACV 751125Z Nov 71; CINCPAC 122030Z Apr 72.  
3. CINCPACFLT 030431Z May 72; CINCPAC 010012Z May 72.  
proper procedures. CINCPAC continued to audit LINEBACKER OPREPs 1 and 4 and made a number of recommendations to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT to insure that certain discrepancies were corrected. Basic Encyclopedia numbers were to be reported with all strike sorties, estimated time over target was to be included in OPREP-1, and route segment and area information were to be designated for all armed reconnaissance sorties. CINCPACFLT and 7th Air Force requested that their units make corrections as necessary to meet operational reporting requirements.1

In another LINEBACKER reporting matter, on 12 August CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to forward comments on the desirability and feasibility of a daily appraisal, such as that prepared by COMUSMACV, of the air effort in Route Packages V and VI, to clarify special efforts and situations and to supplement the limitations of the operational reporting system. CINCPACAF concurred and recommended that, because of the high level interest in Washington in the recent PRIME CHOKE/LINEBACKER operations, that CINCPACAF submit an appraisal of those operations.2

In anticipation that mine countermeasures might be required, CINCPAC prepared instructions for operational reporting connected with such activities. A daily OPREP-4 was to be required with OPREP-3 reports as special incidents or events occurred.3

Reporting periods as well as actual time of receipt of reports by users also came under study in 1972. In some cases it was necessary to reduce allowed transmission time to insure prompt receipt of required information. Also, certain requirements changed when Washington, D.C. went on or off daylight saving time. Then in October the JCS requested that the matter of changing the daily reporting period for all operational reports from the HOTEL day to the ZULU day be evaluated. CINCPAC asked reporting units about the impact of such a change. ZULU time was Greenwich Mean Time, HOTEL local time in Vietnam. When no adverse effects were expected, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the ZULU day be adopted. On 28 October CINCPAC advised all concerned that the change would take place at 0001 ZULU on 1 November. This message also contained periods for weekly or monthly reports.4

1. CINCPACAF 172205Z Aug 72; 7AF 210912Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 272130Z Aug 72; 7AF 300227Z Aug 72; CINCPACFLT 300942Z Aug 72.
2. J3C42 HistSum Aug 72, which cited CINCPAC 120242Z Aug 72, CINCPACAF 170315Z Aug 72, and CINCPAC 260820Z Aug 72, all EX.
3. CINCPAC 292033Z Nov 72.
In October 1971 the JCS requested that specific changes be made in the reporting of OPREP-3 Events and Incidents to include incidents concerning nuclear accidents or other related nuclear capabilities or warning systems to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. CINCPAC, accordingly, in October 1971 implemented a change to the CINCPAC Instruction C34/0.6A, PACOM Event/Incident Report (OPREP-3) Reporting Guide (U), to include the reporting of nuclear incidents as requested by the JCS.

Subsequently, several questions concerning procedures arose. CINCPAC asked the JCS for further guidance. In the matter of classification, the JCS

1. JCS 3531/082151Z Oct 71; CINCPAC 222355Z Oct 71,
2. CINCPAC 262231Z Feb 72.
direction was that the initial NUCFLASH be unclassified and unauthenticated. This provided a problem for 5th Air Force units in Japan, where the word "nuclear" was extremely sensitive and where aircraft that were nuclear capable were identified by classified code names when they transited the area with or without nuclear weapons on the aircraft. CINCPAC requested that classification of the initial voice report be at the discretion of the sender. He also requested further clarification of authentication procedures as there were many such procedures for various levels of command. Finally, he requested clarification of what constituted a nuclear-capable aircraft; for example, CINCPAC asked if an aircraft, theoretically unable to arm a weapon but capable of dumping the weapon with a one point detonation, was considered nuclear capable."

For Force Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT)

(U) FORSTAT was a JCS Joint Reporting System report that had been under study and revision for several years. In 1972 the new FORSTAT replaced the old. The new report had been begun in late October 1971, but had been quickly discontinued. The new FORSTAT was started again on 20 January, with dual reporting under both systems planned for a short period. The JCS terminated the old report on 29 February and the new report began officially on 1 March 1972. CINCPAC directed his component commands to continue dual reporting in order to correlate information in the new and old data bases. CINCPAC continued such dual reporting until 24 March, at which time reporting in the old FORSTAT was terminated for CINCPAC and the component commands. Automatic data processing problems in the new FORSTAT were largely corrected during an assistance visit by representatives of the National Military Command System Support Center and the IBM Corporation from 14 to 22 April. Efforts were still required to rebuild the CINCPAC FORSTAT data base and correlate it with that of the JCS and CINCPAC's component commands."

1. CINCPAC 122222Z May 72.
SECTION VI--MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Nuclear Weapon Basing

2. J5363 Point Paper, 11 Jan 73, Subj: Nuclear Weapon Deployments in Korea (S-FRD)

2. J313 Point Paper, 9 Nov 65, Subj: Permissive Action Link (PAL) (U). Considerable background material is provided here as this subject has not been addressed in previous CINCPAC Histories. A chronology of significant actions in the evolution of the PAL in Europe and the Pacific is contained in J3B73 Point Paper, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Permissive Action Link (PAL) (U).

3. J3C3 Point Paper, 28 May 68, Subj: Permissive Action Link (PAL) for Army Nuclear Weapons in Korea (S), which cited JCS 6638/060014Z Jan 68.
1. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 170320Z Jan 68.
2. J3C3 Point Paper, 1 Aug 68, Subj: Permissive Action Link (PAL)(U), which cited JCS 2733/181628Z Jun 68.
1. J3C3 Point Paper, 9 Jul 68, Subj: Permissive Action Link (PAL) for Army Nuclear Weapons in Korea (S), which cited ADMINO CINCPAC 211758Z Jun 68.

1. Ibid.
2. JCS Point Paper, 19 May 69, Subj: PACOM Concept for the Limited Application of Permissive Action Link (PAL) in Korea (S).
3. Ibid., which cited PACOM Point Paper, 12 Sep 69, Subj: PACOM Concept for the Limited Application of Permissive Action Link (PAL) in Korea (S).
Cambodia

Prior CINCPAC approval was required for visits to Cambodia. CINCPAC provided such approval to CINCPACFLT on 14 September, subject to diplomatic clearance, for USS ST. LOUIS (LKA 114) to visit Kompong Som on 18 September to offload six LCM-6s that had been approved for Military Assistance Program transfer to Cambodia. A second visit was approved in November for USS ABNAKI (ATF 96) to deliver a small floating dry dock and pick up a patrol escort ship.

2. J3873 HistSum Dec 72.
5. J3843 HistSum Sep 72.
India

(5) Indian officials had effectively denied the visit of U.S. warships in 1971 when they had required denial that nuclear weapons were aboard a ship proposed to call at Cochin. The United States practiced a policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of such weapons aboard U.S. Naval vessels, a matter known to Indian officials who inserted the denial requirement in ship clearance procedures.

(6) The matter was studied again in 1972. The Defense Attache in New Delhi recommended in February that a ship visit request be made to test a possible change in the attitude of the Indian Government toward the matter of nuclear declaration. CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT to nominate a ship at the earliest feasible time. In the meantime, however, the Secretary of State asked that no such visit request be submitted. It was noted that the United States continued to be interested in principle in making port visits to India, but the State Department did not wish to request permission until it had completed a review of South Asia policy and had more definite indication of a change in Indian policy. If ship visits were permitted to resume, "it is essential that in first instance calls be limited to ships assigned/attached COMIDEASTFOR [Commander Middle East Force] rather than CINCPACFLT." CINCPAC cancelled his request for ship visit nominations and asked the JCS to advise when the situation supported proposing ship visits to India.

(6) In November CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that USS LASALLE (AGF-3) visit Bombay in late February and early March 1973 to accommodate the anticipated personal visit of the Commander Middle East Force; LASALLE was his flagship. The JCS did not approve the visit. Before such visits could be resumed, the JCS advised, "it will be necessary to break impasse precipitated by Indian non-nuclear declaration. This issue is currently under consideration but unlikely to be resolved prior to dates requested" for the visit. The JCS informed CINCPAC that he would be advised should conditions change.

Indonesia

(6) In June CINCPAC concurred in CINCPACFLT's proposed visit by USS DAVIDSON (DE 1045) to Djakarta from 6 to 9 August, providing that diplomatic clearance was obtained. The Ambassador commented that the policy of carefully spaced ship visits to Indonesia had worked exceptionally well over a four-year period. Not only did it avoid putting a strain on Indonesia's limited personnel

1. SECSTATE 029501/190109Z Feb 72; J3841 HistSum Feb 72.
2. JCS 7842/242133Z Nov 72.
and facilities, but it also portrayed reasonable U.S. naval presence in relationship to visits by vessels of other navies, the Ambassador said. "We expect to continue this successful policy." He noted that the request for clearance for DAVIDSON followed soon after an approved visit by USS SUMTER (LST 1181) planned for 17-21 July. He recommended that USS DAVIDSON request a port visit to Ujung Pandang (Makassar) instead of Djakarta. He believed such a recommendation would be more likely to meet with the approval of Indonesian authorities. CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT, who indicated that a visit by DAVIDSON to Makassar was not desired during that period. He cancelled the proposed visit.1

Japan

1. CINCPAC 041322Z Feb 72; AMEMB Tokyo 1315/080615Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 260111Z Feb 72.
2. J3B41 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPAC 160343Z Apr 72.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 5178/180857Z May 72; CINCPAC 292159Z May 72; J3B41 HistSum May 72.
Pakistan

(a) CINCPAC granted approval for USS TRIPPE (DE 1075) to visit Karachi from 20 to 24 September. USS LASALLE, denied a visit to Bombay, India, was scheduled to visit Karachi in late February 1973.2

Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

(b) Not all CINCPAC requests for ships to visit Sri Lanka were approved in 1972, mostly for political reasons. A number of individual actions occurred. Proposed visits by USS MOBILE (LKA 115) in January and USS ROARK (DE 1053) in March were approved.3

(c) A proposed March visit by USS MYLES C FOX (DD 829) was postponed until the political situation in Ceylon could be assessed. It would have followed shortly after a visit by CINCPAC to Colombo.4

(d) In view of political sensitivity, and in order not to give the impression to the Ceylonese that visits were other than routine, CINCPAC in June proposed to the JCS a schedule for port visits for the first quarter of

2. CINCPAC 222108Z Aug 72; J3B42 HistSum Nov 72.
4. SECSTATE 035720/020040Z Mar 72.
FY 73 in order to allow a long lead time for consideration of the request by
the State and Defense Departments. CINCPAC listed two ships for routine visits
and four others for brief stops for fuel. The JCS approved one of the routine
visits, but addressed the other requests separately.

(4) In order to avoid a situation that would bring five ships into Colombo
during late August and early September, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the State
and Defense Departments had proposed that only two of four planned destroyer
visits take place. CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT for a revised proposal. USS
BASILONE (DD 824) and USS TRIPPE (DE 1075) were nominated and CINCPAC approved
visits for both to Colombo from 29 August to 2 September. On 4 October CINCPAC
approved a visit to Colombo and the Maldives Islands by USS SELLERS (DDG 11) in
early December 1972. The purpose of this visit was to accommodate Ambassador-
Designate Christopher Van Hollen in presentation of credentials to the Government
of the Maldives Republic.

(5) Proposed visits of three destroyers for brief fuel stops were not
approved, however. CINCPAC had approved such visits for USS DEWEY (DLG 14),
USS DAVIS (DD 937), and USS J. HEVES (DE 1078) on 9 November, subject to
diplomatic clearance, cancelling a visit by USS RACINE (LST 1191) that had been
scheduled for mid-November. The Chief of Naval Operations advised that the
State Department did not grant diplomatic clearance based on the presence of
three U.S. warships in Colombo the week after the new U.S. Ambassador presented
his credentials combined with Ceylonese actions in the United Nations on the
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(5) On 27 February CINCPACFLT requested that USS WOODROW WILSON be allowed
to visit Saipan 2 and 3 March to conduct a planning conference for subsequent
operations with USS SARGO (SSN 583). Based on consideration of political
overtones and the forthcoming future political status negotiations, CINCPAC
disapproved the visits of both WOODROW WILSON and SARGO.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance on the High Seas

(5) The second round of Incidents at Sea talks concluded in Washington on
17 May between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with both sides accepting the

1. CINCPAC 020316Z Jun 72; JCS 4574/162143Z Jun 72.
2. JCS 1145/111817Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 062223Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 040110Z Oct 72.
3. CINCPAC 192223Z Oct 72; CNO NO3128/170442Z Oct 72.
4. CINCPAC 011510Z Mar 72.
text of an agreement that was signed in Moscow on 25 May 1972. The agreement was designed to prevent incidents at sea, and on 3 June CINCPAC implemented the agreement throughout the PACOM. He provided general guidance on reconnaiss ance and surveillance of foreign ships on the high seas. In conjunction with the promulgation of this guidance, temporary surveillance closest-point-of-approach (CPA) restrictions, which had been imposed while the criteria governing surveillance operations were being reviewed by the JCS, were rescinded. Additionally, the CPA restrictions that had been placed in effect for the duration of a visit by the President to the U.S.S.R. were also rescinded.1

(5) In a follow-on action based on JCS guidance, CINCPAC requested that commanders and commanding officers at all levels of command be informed of the critical interest in denying the Soviets any basis for strengthened arguments for imposing fixed distance standoff criteria during scheduled annual reviews of the agreement. CINCPAC informed his subordinates that during the talks leading to the signing of the agreement the U.S. Government position had been that fixed distance formulations for separation of air and surface units of the two sides were to be avoided in favor of a general wording approach. The U.S. position was based on a belief that general wording formulations, when coupled with a sincere desire to prevent incidents, would best enhance safety on and over the sea, as well as on consideration of certain missions, such as air defense, intelligence collection, and surveillance, that would be adversely affected by a set of arbitrarily fixed standoff distances. The agreement, however, also provided for a U.S.-Soviet committee to consider, among other things, the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between air and surface units. It was expected that the Soviets would continue to press, in that forum and during the annual reviews of the agreement, for fixed distances. CINCPAC indicated that it was particularly important that PACOM forces did not contribute to the Soviet case for fixed distances. No specific guidance beyond that already given for encounters with Soviet units was considered necessary except to emphasize the requirement for the exercise of mature judgment in such situations so that the U.S. position in future talks would not be weakened.2

(3) In June CINCPAC was advised that his message of 26 November 1971, which had presented CINCPAC's negotiating position on the incidents at sea talks, had been seen by unauthorized personnel and an assessment of the compromise was conducted. As the recommendations contained in the message had

1. JCS 5020/230008Z May 72; JCS 4901/102303Z Apr 72; JCS 7311/021148Z Jun 72; and CINCPAC 032334Z Jun 72 (which quoted the text of the agreement in full).
2. J3B42 HistSum Jun 72, which cited JCS 4900/261237Z Jun 72 and CINCPAC 280844Z Jun 72 (both EX).
been substantially included in the U.S.-Soviet agreement, which had been publicly announced worldwide, the security classifications of the positions and recommendations had been nullified. The U.S.-Soviet agreement, however, included a provision that a committee be designated to meet within six months of the signing to consider specific measures in conformity with the agreement. These measures included concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft and ships, and aircraft. In that the CINCPAC document had contained the U.S. position on specific encounter distances, the original classification and downgrading instructions of the document were reconfirmed.¹

Operations Security

(U) CINCPAC continued a vigorous operations security (OPSEC) survey program in 1972. The purpose of these surveys was to identify possible sources of forewarning or foreknowledge that may be exploited by the enemy to degrade operational security and effectiveness. These surveys were concentrated in Southeast Asia again in 1972, although they occurred throughout the PACOM. Air, ground, and naval operations came under study and in some cases combined operations were reviewed. In the case of a combined operations security survey of Target Generation Procedures in the RVN in October and November, the purpose was to regenerate RVNAF interest in the OPSEC program. Earlier, in March and April, CINCPAC had sent a team to provide indoctrination and training assistance to Republic of Korea forces in Korea.

(U) In September CINCPAC surveyed the combined U.S.-Australian-Canadian-New Zealand antisubmarine warfare exercise RIMPAC 72. The purposes of the survey were to assist in upgrading the security and effectiveness of future operations and exercises of this type and to evaluate the applicability of OPSEC survey techniques to peacetime exercises.

(U) CINCPAC prepared semi-annual OPSEC progress reports, which were forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS. Additionally an OPSEC briefing was presented semi-annually to officials in the JCS, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and joint Services points of contact in OPSEC matters in Washington. In 1972 the briefings were presented 17-19 July and 11-13 December.²

1. CINCPAC 060438Z Jun 72; CINCPACFLT 161909Z Jun 72; and CINCPAC 200335Z Jun 72.
WESTPACNORTH Compatibility Program

2. CINCPAC 311941Z Mar 72.
1. CINCPAC 270003Z Apr 72.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 11265/210437Z Oct 72.
Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference (MIJI)

(5) The Air Force Special Communications Center (AFSCC) had been designated in 1969 by the JCS as the agency responsible for analysis and evaluation of MIJI reports on a world-wide basis. Because of the bank of knowledge accumulated through the channeling of information to a single agency, the program had developed and increased in value. In the summer of 1972, plans began for an AFSCC educational briefing to be presented to PACOM units in Guam, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan, and to naval units in the Gulf of Tonkin. The component commands were asked for proposed itineraries.2

(6) On 12 September COMUS Korea, in the course of recommending the list of specific units to be briefed in Korea, requested that selected Korean military personnel possessing SECRET clearances be allowed to attend the briefings. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he recommended release of the information to the Koreans, noting that he believed that the scope of the MIJI program should be broadened, insofar as possible, to allow for disclosure of this information at the SECRET security level to our allies throughout the PACOM.3

(6) The JCS did not approve release of the information because the program revealed vulnerabilities of U.S. equipment and the fact that sensitive, all-source operational and intelligence data on worldwide MIJI activity were involved. CINCPAC so advised COMUS Korea on 28 October, noting that this restriction did not preclude release of evaluations of specific MIJI incidents experienced by the Republic of Korea; these evaluations were to be released on a case-by-case basis.4

(6) The number of requests from U.S. agencies for the MIJI briefing was greater than had been anticipated, so the tour was broken into two parts.

1. CINCPAC 290155Z Oct 72.
3. CINCUNC/COMUS Korea 120921Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 161917Z Sep 72.
The first began in Hawaii on 3 November and continued in Guam, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The northern portion of the tour—Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan—was rescheduled for January 1973.1

EW Support in Korea

A requirement for photo intelligence near the Korean DMZ had resulted in initiation of the BENCH BOX reconnaissance program, which required RF-4C aircraft to fly near the DMZ. Early in the year, evidence of a North Korean air defense buildup along the DMZ revealed that the SAM lethal envelope extended over Republic of Korea (ROK) territory and planned BENCH BOX tracks. Accordingly, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to employ ECM pods to provide protection for BENCH BOX and other appropriate missions that operated in areas potentially subject to the North Korean SAMs. Upon review of the requested CINCPACAF-5th Air Force pod employment plans, CINCPAC revised a portion of the tactics to preclude possible provocative jamming. Jamming initiated because of erroneous threat indications could have been considered provocative.2

The requirement for the aircraft to carry ECM pods was rescinded by CINCPAC on 28 April, however, after field testing demonstrated that the pods produced an adverse effect on BENCH BOX imagery. In May CINCPAC initiated a requirement that airborne ECM-equipped escorts be provided for all BENCH BOX missions. This was because the increased state of defense readiness occasioned by the situation in Southeast Asia had focused attention toward other areas in which a reaction, if taken, might impact upon the Vietnam conflict.3

In June CINCPACAF requested that the requirement for airborne escort be discontinued. He cited added costs, degradation of aircrew training, and doubled airframe commitment as factors influencing his request. After a review of the risk factors in relation to added costs, CINCPAC rescinded the escort requirement.4

CINCPAC Missile Intelligence Agency Conference

The Army's Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama commented on 3 May on a CINCPAC Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) conference that had been held on the SA-2F missile. That command had indicated that the conference had

1. CINCPAC 18013Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 090313Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 060638Z Feb 72; 5th AF 150800Z Feb 72; CINCPACAF 161941Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 211947Z Feb 72.
3. CINCPAC 280324Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 092215Z May 72.
4. CINCPACAF 232000Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 291959Z Jun 72.

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resulted in well-analyzed conclusions on this system because of the gathering of highly qualified technical representatives from various Services and agencies. The AMC recommended that meetings of the same type be held at least every three months.

CINCPAC advised the Army Chief of Staff that he concurred in the need for and proposed frequency of the recommended conferences, but he also recommended that the scope of such conferences be expanded to include all threat systems dependent on electronics or electro-optics. Further, he recommended that the conferences convene at the PACOM ELINT Center or, alternatively, at a suitable West Coast facility that would best support the objectives to be achieved.

Joint Rescue Coordination Center

On 1 May 1972 a Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) was established in the Honolulu offices of the 14th Coast Guard District. This facility combined the search and rescue (SAR) agencies of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier (CINCPACFLT), the 41st Air Rescue Wing (CINCPACAF), and the 14th Coast Guard District under a single roof to achieve improved coordination in the conduct of SAR operations. The JRCC functioned primarily in support of SAR activities in the Pacific Maritime Region. However, it was also responsible for the generation of SAR activities in the South and Southwest Pacific Sub-Regions, utilizing air and surface units as appropriate. The establishment of a JRCC for those PACOM areas was in accordance with the national SAR plan and Defense Department directives.

PACOM Assistance in Philippine Disaster Relief—Operation SAKLOLO

SAKLOLO was a Tagalog word meaning help. After heavy rains in the Philippines, U.S. Ambassador Byroade reported a request from the Philippine Government for assistance. This was on 19 July. By 22 July, Amphibious Readiness Group ALFA with embarked helicopters and a surgical team, six Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DART), USAF C-130 and HH-3/43 aircraft, a U.K. frigate (HMS LINCOLN) and C-130 were all furnishing assistance to flood victims under the coordination of the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines, RADM John H. Dick, USN. The flooding eased temporarily between 24 and 27 July. Food, medicine, and supplies were transported by U.S. resources to distribution points where Philippine Government agencies took over local distribution.

1. CINCPAC 030450Z Jun 72.
(U) Heavy rains began again, and by 29 July the flooding surpassed its previous extent. An additional DART team was brought in and the Philippine Government requested that the units on the scene be extended. The U.S. Ambassador requested $20 to $25 million in extraordinary U.S. governmental assistance and the military units were authorized to continue their activities. Most of the cost to PACOM assets was reimbursed by a U.S. Agency for International Development funding authorization.

(U) By the end of July, Clark Air Base had recorded over 90 inches of rain, compared with a mean monthly total of 12 inches for that month. The land transportation system of central Luzon (roads and bridges) suffered extensive, long-term damage. There were dangers of starvation and epidemic, and some disturbances of public order were noted in connection with food redistribution efforts. The long-term economic and social impacts were predicted to be extensive and burdensome. By the second week in August the flood crisis had passed.

Evacuation, Surveillance, and Recovery of Johnston Atoll

(S) Johnston Atoll was the storage site for the chemical munitions that had been removed from Okinawa in 1971. In 1972 the atoll and the munitions storage areas withstood Hurricane Celeste successfully.

(U) All non-essential personnel were evacuated on 18 August, with only 10 left for security and maintenance purposes. These 10 were evacuated on the evening of 18 August when a 45-foot surf and 100-knot winds were forecast.

(U) CINCPACAF was designated coordinating authority for all actions related to the surveillance and recovery of the atoll, with direct liaison authorized to all concerned. CINCPACFLT dispatched the USS LLOYD THOMAS (DD 764) to provide surface surveillance and transport recovery personnel. The Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Force Pacific provided aerial reconnaissance of the island as soon as weather permitted. Photographic coverage was air delivered to the recovery team (composed of USARPAC and Edgewood Arsenal technical personnel) aboard LLOYD THOMAS.

(U) The initial landing by the recovery team took place on 23 August. An initial damage assessment was completed that same day, with no munition damage or contamination reported. Additional personnel started returning on 24 August and all were back on Johnston by 30 August.

1. J3B11 Point Paper, 8 Aug 72, Subj: PACOM Assistance in Philippine Disaster Relief - Operation SAKLOLO.
CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS

INTRODUCTION

The logistics picture in the Pacific theater during 1972 was characterized by three dominant dimensions--tactical, transitional, and strategic or ultimate. Tactically, the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam in response to the Easter offensive by the North Vietnam Army generated an increased logistics flow in support of the U.S. air effort. Associated with the Thailand-based air effort and the expected cease-fire in Vietnam was the need to assure continued logistical support to Laos and Cambodia. And, under the Vietnamization program, the time-phased delivery of weapons and equipment to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) was accelerated.

Meanwhile, and concurrently, theater-wide strategic forces, weapons, and bases were being shifted; facilities were being relinquished while others were being built; and planning alternatives were being considered for the preservation of a workable logistics pipeline. These actions were part of a transition from a relatively high visibility profile centered on support of Vietnam to the Nixon Doctrine posture of low profile and self-help in allied nations.
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SECTION I—LOGISTICS PLANNING

Planning for Common Supply in the PACOM

(U) Assuming the retention of some forward supply bases, and in view of increasing budgeting constraints, planning continued in 1972 to develop a system of common supply in overseas areas. The concept of common supply support had received intensive study in past years, and had been applied with moderate success in Vietnam. A trial project for common supply had also been initiated on Guam in 1969. Reviewing these two cases in 1970, the Joint Logistics Review Board (JLRB) concluded that, while desirable and workable, the application of the common supply principle was handicapped by a lack of true common usage between the Services. The JLRB stated that common supply offered an opportunity to provide effective and economical support of military activities overseas where it was limited to integrated management items with high, stable, predictable demands of large bulk and tonnage, and was used by two or more Services. Among the recommendations of the JLRB was the stipulation that implementation of common supply in both peacetime and emergencies be at the direction of commanders of unified commands.¹

(U) More specifically, the JLRB concluded that Defense Supply Agency (DSA) distribution points should not be established in combat areas. A decision to establish DSA distribution points overseas should be thoroughly evaluated for such military considerations as responsiveness to military requirements, requirements for security, impact on military resources, conflict in demand for local resources, and command relationships.²

(U) In 1971, still another study was undertaken to review common supply overseas. The Analysis Division of the DSA was appointed to chair a joint task group composed of representatives from the JCS, the Military Services, and the DSA. This Logistics Systems Policy Committee Task Order 4-71 directed a review of all previous and on-going studies related to common supply. Common supply potential and requirements in overseas areas were to be determined, and a recommended plan of action was to be originated by the joint task group. The specific tasks assigned were:³

1. Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era; Monograph 4, "Common Supply"; JLRB circa 1970; Ch. II, V.
2. Ibid.
3. Memo, ASD (I & L) to Director, DSA, Subj: Review of Common Supply Overseas; Logistics Systems Policy Committee Task Order 4-71, dated 30 Oct 71.
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(1) Catalog and list the degree to which common supply support currently exists in overseas areas where two or more DOD Components have installations.

(2) Determine the degree to which common supply support arrangements should be, and can be, effected in such areas.

(3) Develop the criteria for determining the range of items to which common supply support should be applied.

(4) Determine the best method for funding common supply support.

(5) Ascertain the best method by geographic area for effecting common supply support arrangements, when they are appropriate.

(6) Define the role that a Unified Commander should have in controlling or monitoring common supply support arrangements.

(7) Develop an implementation plan, including all actions necessary and the time phasing of significant actions to fully attain Logistics Systems Policy Objective No. 10 in the 1972-1975 time frame.

(U) As of the end of 1972, no specific plan had yet been forwarded to CINCPAC as a result of this study. Meanwhile, however, CINCPAC was requested, on 2 June 1972, to comment to the JCS on a DSA plan for world-wide integrated management of wholesale subsistence stocks. Among the proposals with which CINCPAC did not concur was the consolidation of the subsistence supply support of Clark Air Base with the Naval Supply Depot at Subic Bay in the Philippines. CINCPAC noted that storage space (especially refrigerated storage) did not exist at Subic, and that the cost of new construction was not reflected in the study. Also, the proposal to distribute stocks at the Tracy Depot in California to various Pacific locations appeared to reverse the consolidation movement embodied in the Subic proposal. CINCPAC pointed out that if, for example, stocks re-positioned from Tracy to Subic were needed in Hawaii, Japan, or elsewhere, prohibitive back-haul costs would be incurred.

(U) Other areas of CINCPAC non-concurrence were in funding of the additional proposed wholesale storage activities by the Services rather than the DSA and the fragmenting of centralized off-shore procurement by establishment of separate subsistence procurement facilities. Referring to the command relationships reflected in the study, CINCPAC stated that the major shortcoming was the proposed establishment of various Defense Regional Subsistence Offices.

1. CINCPAC 012132Z Jul 72; J46 HistSum Jun 72.
in overseas countries. Command control was shown from DSA to these offices, but command relationships between DSA, the Service components, and the unified commander were not shown. This, in effect, introduced another major command right in the middle of forward logistics operations without addressing the issue of the Service or unified commander responsibilities. Additionally, CINCPAC did not concur in the separation of inventory management from funding responsibility. Except for Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), which did not operate overseas depots and was not directly involved, CINCPAC's naval component, the Pacific Fleet, and army component, U. S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) also did not concur with the DSA study. 1

Support Services on the Island of Oahu

(b) In late 1972, CINCPAC responded to a query from the Chairman, JCS regarding a proposed consolidation of supply support on the Island of Oahu. The office of the ASD (I&L) advocated a study of the various Service supply systems on Oahu. On 5 December 1972, CINCPAC requested USARPAC to provide an up-dated inventory of administrative and logistics capabilities in the Hawaiian area, by Service. Based upon this inventory, CINCPAC initiated a revision of existing consolidation procedures. Also, in January 1973, a PACOM Overseas Coordinating Group meeting was scheduled to consider other possible areas for consolidation.2

(c) On 16 December 1972, CINCPAC's response to the JCS noted that the objectives of such a study were to enhance combat readiness, personnel welfare, and effect cost reductions. These objectives could be met with the greatest efficiency by a continuous process of participatory management using joint local means rather than through a DOD-directed study. CINCPAC recommended a broader scope, to include communications, intelligence, and other additional functions than solely logistics/support services. No definitive action had transpired as of the end of 1972.3

Army Supply Consolidation

(e) Early in 1972, USARPAC published a second Logistics Support System (LSS) plan which outlined continuing actions for 1972/1973 in the Army supply reorganization world-wide. LSS 72/73 followed LSS 71 in a time phased movement toward centralization of Army logistics in a field-level standard Army Inter-

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1. Ibid.
2. J46 Point Paper, 27 Dec 72, Subj: Review of Support Services on the Island of Oahu; Ltr, Hq USASCH to CINCPAC, 20 Dec 72, Subj: Inventory of Administrative/Logistic Capabilities, Hawaii Area, w. 1 encl, Inventory of Administrative/Logistics Capabilities Hawaii Area.
3. Ibid.

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mediate Level System (SAILS) and a world-wide Standard Army Logistics System (SALS). SALS encompassed the functional areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, and support services. In the PACOM, LSS 72/73 projected the elimination of Army depots in Korea and Japan, along with a reduction in direct and general support unit stockage to fast moving, demand-supported items. The initiation of direct supply support procedures throughout the PACOM was envisioned, with a reduction in order and shipping time from Continental U. S. (CONUS) depots to direct support units. In conjunction with the direct supply support concept, LSS 72/73 projected the increased use of C-5 aircraft to reduce the pipeline and overseas inventories under a Routine Economic Airlift (REAL) program. The direct exchange of repairable assets was to be expanded and standardized, and consideration was to be given to the application of the single pipeline concept, already in use for munitions, to other classes of supply with centralized management by USARPAC.¹

Logistics Projects for Vietnamization

(1) As an integral part of the Vietnamization process, the delivery to, and, absorption by, the RVNAF of equipment and supplies had been underway for several years. In 1970, a revised Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) was adopted which correlated the improvement and modernization of the RVNAF with plans for the redeployment of U. S. Forces from the RVN. The CRIMP provided for a build-up of RVNAF logistics personnel and handling capability to absorb an ever-increasing flow of materiel.²

(16) In mid-1971, logistic projects 981/982 were initiated by the Secretary of Defense. These projects required that a 120-day ammunition stock be maintained for the RVNAF; that all POL tanks be filled by 30 September 1971; that all major items scheduled for receipt by the RVNAF in FY 72/73 be transferred by 30 September 1971; that a one-year requisitioning objective be established for the RVNAF on repair parts and other secondary items; that the communications system needed by the RVNAF be transferred with operational support by contract; and, that contract support for the Military Equipment Delivery Team-Cambodia (MEDTC) be established. These goals had been reached by 30 September 1971.³

Project ENHANCE

(16) In May 1972, by direction from the Department of Defense (DOD), a new

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project, "ENHANCE", was begun. Project ENHANCE was, in effect, a major re-
structuring of the CRIMP which was designed to increase immediately the exist-
ing combat power of the RVNAF while providing enough new equipment to permit
the activation of new RVNAF units. The plan specified the immediate replace-
ment of all RVNAF combat losses; the accelerated delivery of CRIMP items still
outstanding; and, a new list of items for delivery was provided, many of which
had not been requested by the RVNAF or MACV. All items listed were to be de-
ivered by 1 August 1972. On the surface, Project ENHANCE seemed to be rela-
ted to Projects 981/982.1

(CS) Certain of the ENHANCE requirements, which had not been coordinated
with CINCPAC or MACV, were not considered to be feasible by these organizations.
For example, MACV did not believe the provision of Short Take-off and Landing
(STOL) aircraft was necessary or advisable. Also, the Project ENHANCE change
to a "Push" issue of combat loss equipment, rather than the "Pull" system which
had been effective to date was not supported by MACV. Finally, the ENHANCE
stipulation that all materiel be delivered in-country by 1 August prohibited
the inclusion of existing theater assets which were undergoing off-shore over-
haul. The end result of ENHANCE would exceed legitimate requirements both in
quantity and in time phasing, saddling MACV and the RVNAF with large quantities
of materiel to be stored and maintained because the RVNAF was not able to
absorb it.2

(CS) CINCPAC supported the MACV objections to specific items on the list
of equipment, as well as modifications to the required delivery dates and the
retention of the "Pull" system to replace combat losses. Project ENHANCE was
modified by the JCS to accept the CINCPAC and MACV recommendations.3

Project ENHANCE PLUS

(CS) As anticipation of a cease-fire in Vietnam grew toward the end of
1972, Project ENHANCE PLUS was initiated by the DOD. A new and longer list
was involved, consisting of Army and Air Force materiel only. The initial
suspend, using normal modes of transportation, was 20 November 1972. By
that date, the JCS directed CINCPAC and the Service chiefs to move large quan-
tities of tanks, vehicles, artillery, aircraft, radios, generators, and other
equipment to Vietnam. All items were to be in serviceable condition, and
assets of active and reserve forces, as well as diversions from production
lines and depots, were authorized as sources to meet the itemized list. Divers-
isions from international logistics customers and loans of previously delivered

1. J4114 Point Paper, 3 Jun 72; Subj: Project ENHANCE.
2. Ibid.
3. J4114 Point Paper, 5 Sep 72, Subj: Project ENHANCE.
equipment from other countries were also authorized. Title transfer to the RVNAF was to take place immediately, and authorized levels of munitions, POL, and spare parts were to be achieved as soon as possible. CINCPAC was directed to arrange for the receipt, storage, and security of material not required for current operations, and to ensure that contract augmentation of the RVNAF was sufficient to continue essential logistics services without a U. S. military presence.¹

¹ By the end of October, sources for all items had been identified except for F-5 aircraft. Negotiations with Iran, Korea, and Taiwan were underway to provide a total of 126. Iran had already agreed to provide 32 and Taiwan 20. The F-5 was not in production in the U. S., and none were available in the U. S. inventory. No other delivery problems were anticipated. However, a CINCPAC logistics paper noted that the number of aircraft being provided to the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) far exceeded its capability to fly or maintain. In the case of 32 C-130 transport aircraft, there was no capability at all, and contract personnel would be needed to store, maintain, and fly most ENHANCE PLUS aircraft.²

² Originally, the JCS had directed that, under ENHANCE PLUS, all remaining U. S. bases and equipment essential to their operation be turned over to the RVN as soon as possible. On 27 October, CINCPAC informed MACV that this guidance had been modified. The U. S. was to retain ownership as long as the bases were needed by U. S. Forces. All actions requisite to transfer were to be taken so that ownership could be transferred instantly, if required.³

³ One day later, CINCPAC altered the foregoing guidance. COMUSMACV was directed to transfer base ownership immediately unless a post cease-fire residual U. S. presence such as Agency for International Development (AID) or contractor personnel would need the facilities. Agreements were to be executed which would assure continued U. S. possession and use until no longer needed. The reference to facilities needed by contractors was based on original ENHANCE PLUS concepts. The contractor problem was further pinpointed when the JCS requested CINCPAC's assessment of possible options involving continuing administration of current contracts and the award and administration of new contracts. Although the options were to include either the presence of DOD procurement personnel or contractor personnel, both would require facilities from which to operate. Consequently, CINCPAC reiterated his guidance to MACV that, when transferring facilities to the RVN, the right to re-occupation of most-likely-candidate facilities would be arranged. CINCPAC further directed that MACV headquarters

¹ JCS 2513/260208Z Oct 72.
² J4114 Point Paper, 29 Oct 72, Subj: ENHANCE PLUS.
³ JCS 2513/260208Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 270101Z Oct 72.
facilities be retained for contract or other, then unspecified, purposes.¹

(NS) In response, MACV informed CINCPAC that, per original plan, title transfer of all facilities not required by the U. S. Mission or contractors would be prepared for execution prior to X-day, and that inventory and actual transfer of facilities, real property, and related assets would take place prior to X+50. A memorandum of understanding insured continued possession and use until no longer needed, and stipulated the right of the U. S. to re-enter and use those facilities so annotated on the title transfer documents. On 3 November, the JCS directed that title transfer of all bases take place by 10 November except the MACV headquarters complex. On 4 November, MACV answered that all U. S. bases would be transferred by 6 November except the MACV complex and nineteen other bases. These had been identified by the U. S. Embassy, AID, and the Property Disposal Office (PDO) for future U. S. Mission and contractor use. CINCPAC requested JCS approval to retain the nineteen facilities specified, with additional refinement if needed after coordination with the U. S. Embassy.²

(NS) The JCS replied to CINCPAC that, "Unless there are valid reasons for not transferring title to MACV Hq's complex and the 19 other bases...with retention rights...as long as needed, all these bases will be transferred NLT 10 Nov 72." CINCPAC answered that MACV had reported 188 bases transferred, with 23 remaining. A meeting was scheduled with the U. S. Embassy and the RVNAF to discuss the remaining bases.³

(NS) As a result of the consultation with the Embassy and AID, COMUSMACV requested reconsideration of the JCS decision cited above. The Embassy argument for retaining the properties was that they were urgently needed for efficient operation of continuing U. S. Government functions. The Embassy also contended that the specified properties were not military bases per se because, together with the accessorial facilities, they were principally offices or residential facilities. Some of the facilities in question included the MACV headquarters, MACV Annex, the Naval Forces compound, the Brinks Bachelor Officer Quarters, the Armed Forces Television Network office, portions of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, and the PDO yards. CINCPAC recommended that 31 facilities be transferred to the Embassy and AID rather than to the RVN. Such retention would be in consonance with continued U. S. DOD civilian and

2. COMUSMACV 301052Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 041855Z Nov 72, which cites JCS 3564/032356Z Nov 72 and COMUSMACV 041012Z Nov 72.
3. JCS 6273/062324Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 070421Z Nov 72.
contractor presence in-country.

(15) On 8 November, the JCS approved the transfer of the listed facilities to the Embassy and AID not later than 10 November. This transfer was accomplished as directed, except for the Vung Tau Rest and Recuperation Center, which had been borrowed from the Australian Government and was returned on 10 November.

Post Cease-Fire Logistics

(16) The purely logistical guidance provided by Projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS was followed by a JCS directive which tasked CINCPAC to develop a detailed withdrawal plan to be implemented after the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. On a date to be determined (X-day Plus), MACV would relinquish operational control over U. S. land-based combatant air forces in Southeast Asia. Concurrently, a U. S. military command would be established in Thailand to provide air command and control over continuing operations outside the RVN. CINCPAC was to recommend arrangements for the control and management of matériel usage, communications, intelligence, and other RVNAF support functions by a residual force after X-day. The plan also was to assure that maintenance support and supply support for consumables would continue and that hard equipment would be replaced, but only on a one-for-one basis.

(16) CINCPAC was requested to provide concepts and recommendations for command and control, force structure, rules of engagement, intelligence and communications requirements needed to sustain operations outside Vietnam after X-day. In the context of logistics control and support, CINCPAC was also tasked to provide:

- a concept for continued logistic support of the RVNAF, withdrawal of U. S. and Free World forces, and retrograde of U. S. equipment and stocks not needed or committed in-country;
- in-country civilian manpower and organization for the effective management and supervision of a program to support the RVNAF;

1. COMUSMACV 071310Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 080357Z Nov 72, which listed the designated facilities by item and location.
2. JCS 8766/082316Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 101105Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 200710Z Nov 72.
4. Ibid.; For a broader discussion of the operational, organizational, and command control aspects of withdrawal planning, see Ch. V, Plans.
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- the composition, mission, and functions of a 50-man Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon;

- anticipated civilian contracting and funding requirements to support the RVNAF; and,

- a contingency plan for the continued supply support and training of Cambodian forces without drawing on assistance from the RVNAF.

Defense Resources Support and Termination Office

(\(\text{\textcopyright}\)) CINCPAC's reply to the JCS, on 5 November, was a detailed message which contained optional force structures, command arrangements, communications, actions, intelligence posture, and logistics concepts. Central to logistics control after a cease-fire in Vietnam was a proposed Resource Surveillance and Terminal Office. This organization, manned either by DOD, or contract civilians, would provide logistic assistance, contract surveillance, technical representative service, security, end-use inspection, property disposal operations, negotiate all contracts for U.S. in-country services and third country firms, validate requirements, administer the contracts, and ensure contractor performance.\(^1\)

\(\text{\textcopyright}\) During the balance of the year, many refinements and modifications of the proposed residual organization in Vietnam were advanced, including the evolution of unit nomenclature to Defense Resource Support and Termination Office (DRSTO). Various manning strengths and command arrangements were postulated by MACV, CINCPAC, and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. However, none altered the basic concept of in-country logistics support by a dominantly civilianized organization. Because the cease-fire did not materialize during 1972, the ultimate strength, organizational structure, and command arrangements had not been determined at year's end. However, the JCS authorized the activation of DRSTO on 18 November. On 21 November, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to establish, as a companion to the DRSTO, a "defense attache element" within the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Saigon. The defense attache element was initially authorized 21 billets, and the Chief, DRSTO was also to be the Defense Attache (DATT). CINCPAC was requested to provide Terms of Reference (TOR), which was done on 26 November. The CINCPAC TOR specified that the assistant DATT would perform the normal DATT duties, thus allowing the Chief, DRSTO to devote full attention to logistic support of the RVNAF.\(^2\)

(\(\text{\textcopyright}\)) On 27 November, COMUSMACV submitted a detailed organizational and

1. CINCPAC 0500012 Nov 72.
2. JCS 2132/182317Z Nov 72; JCS 4580/212036Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 260108Z Nov 72.
manning structure for DAO/DRSTO which included two optional command relationships. In the first, MACV recommended that DAO/DRSTO function under MACV. After MACV was disestablished, the Chief, DAO/DRSTO (U. S. Army major general) would become a member of the U. S. Mission Country Team. As such, he would "respond" to the Chief of Mission for in-country military activities, and would "coordinate" and "support" those in-country military operational requirements of the Commander, U. S. Support Activities Group (USSAG) in Thailand which were "within the purview" of the USSAG. Upon disestablishment of the USSAG, the Chief, DAO/DRSTO would continue as a member of the Country Team. He would "coordinate and support" in-country operational requirements of CINCPAC which were "within the purview" of CINCPAC. 1

(6) As a second option, MACV recommended the separation of DAO and DRSTO. The DAO element would be expanded under the DATT to include the operations/ intelligence function and a military staff to advise on military assistance affairs. The DRSTO would be completely separate and civilianized, with a civilian chief, to perform the military assistance tasks. The civilian chief would report directly to the DATT. The U. S. Embassy concurred that DAO and DRSTO should be separate organizations, but recommended that each report directly to the Ambassador. The DAO and DRSTO would be in separate locations, but the Chief, DRSTO could report "covertly" to the DATT. The Embassy also held that, even in the second option, the civilian staff of the operations/ intelligence division was too large, and that the number of civilians proposed in the DRSTO was also excessive. 2

(6) CINCPAC concurred in the proposed DAO/DRSTO organizational structure submitted by MACV with some modifications. Specifically, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the MACV-labeled "MAP/MASF Support Division" be changed to "Logistic Support Division" because the latter term was considered to be more descriptive of the full range of the tasks assigned. CINCPAC did not concur in the proposed command relationships because they were not considered to allow for effective management of DOD resources in Vietnam. CINCPAC noted that MACV had extracted all military spaces from the DRSTO and placed them under the DAO. This, CINCPAC stated, was undesirable because separation of the military and civilian logistics would complicate and degrade control over the large numbers of DOD and contract civilians engaged in logistics support activity. Also, CINCPAC did not agree with the Embassy proposal in which DAO and DRSTO would report directly to the Ambassador. Such an arrangement would reduce coordination between the two units to "covert" channels, authoritative control over DRSTO by USSAG and CINCPAC would be lost, and discontinuity of DOD control over the RVNAF military assistance program would result. 3

1. COMUSMACV 270215Z Nov 72.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 022036Z Dec 72.
On 7 December, CINCPAC submitted proposed TOR for the DRSTO to the JCS. The mission of the DRSTO was to manage the security assistance programs for the RVN; coordinate U. S. military activities remaining in-country; maintain liaison with the Joint General Staff of the RVNAF; monitor, evaluate, and report current RVNAF operational activities; monitor, coordinate, and support psychological and casualty search and rescue operations in RVN and adjacent waters; and, coordinate, develop, and report intelligence information in RVN. As recommended by CINCPAC, the DRSTO command relationships were:

A. Command Relationships:

1. The Chief DRSTO commands the DRSTO. During his absence the command of DRSTO will be vested in the next senior military officer eligible to assume command by the regulations of his service.

2. The DRSTO functions under MACV until MACV is disestablished:

3. When MACV is disestablished:

   A. The Chief, DRSTO will also serve as the Defense Attache (DATT) and DRSTO becomes part of the Defense Attache Office (DAO).

   B. These terms of reference will in no way alter the command relationship of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Attache (DATT) Saigon.

   C. The Chief, DRSTO, serves under the military command of COMUSSAG/7TH AF and is immediately subordinate to him and reports to COMUSSAG/7TH AF concerning in-country military activities and Department of Defense statutory responsibilities. When USSAG/7TH AF is disestablished Chief DRSTO serves under the military command of CINCPAC.

   D. Chief, DRSTO, for matters pertaining to security assistance planning will report directly to CINCPAC keeping COMUSSAG/7TH AF informed until such time as the USSAG/7TH AF is disestablished.

1. CINCPAC 070355Z DEC 72.
(E) The Chief, DRSTO, functions under the supervision of the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Republic of Vietnam, to the extent provided by law and in accordance with executive orders and such other instructions as the President may from time to time promulgate. As Chief of a separate element of the US Diplomatic Mission, he will coordinate DRSTO activities with other U.S. governmental agencies represented in the US Diplomatic Mission which are concerned with the execution of foreign assistance legislation. The Chief, DRSTO, will cooperate with the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Republic of Vietnam, and will assure that he is kept fully informed concerning current and prospective military assistance plans and programs and DRSTO activities. The Chief, DRSTO, shall have direct access to the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Republic of Vietnam. In the event the Chief, DRSTO, does not concur with the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Republic of Vietnam, concerning operations of the DRSTO and the security assistance programs, he may refer these differences through appropriate military channels to higher authority for resolution.

(F) The Chief, DRSTO, is the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Ministry of Defense Republic of Vietnam.

At the end of 1972, various levels of civilian manning had been postulated by the JCS. However, final organization, command relationships, and manpower levels were still to be decided when and if a cease-fire agreement was reached.1

Consolidated Logistics System, Thailand (COLOGS)

As one part of an overall plan to improve U.S. support to Laos, the logistics annex (COLOGS) was approved for implementation in December 1971, and was scheduled for completion by 1 July 1972. COLOGS relieved DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI of responsibility for operating a logistic pipeline for Laotian support. The plan specified that USARSUPTHAI would receive, store, maintain, and issue all U.S. Army materiel, common service materiel, and USAF munitions for DEPCH in addition to the U.S. Army equipment maintenance, procurement, and transportation services formerly provided under Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA). DEPCH continued to be responsible for USAF maintenance and peculiar materiel.

1. J41 HistSum Dec 72; JCS 5277/619002 Dec 72.
less munitions, but would accomplish these tasks by contract. USARSUPTHAI assumed control of storage sites and stock held by DEPCH, but such stock remained military assistance service funded (MASF) property. The major improvements to be derived from COLOGS included provisions for USARSUPTHAI to fill urgent requirements in Laos methods to screen supply excesses in the PACOM for identified Laotian requirements; and closer surveillance of U. S. support to Laos which could be exercised when DEPCH was relieved of routine logistics matters.¹

By 1 July 1972, all phases of COLOGS had been implemented. As a result, USARSUPTHAI provided the following for all Services in Thailand:

- In-country rail and highway transportation service (exclusive of fuel) by contract.
- Common item supply support including subsistence, packaged POL, and munitions.
- Contract port and stevedoring services at the port of Sattahip.
- Delivery of fuel by pipeline from Sattahip to U-Tapao airfield.
- In-transit storage for all munitions.

The Defense Fuels Supply Center in CONUS provided fuel to up-country installations by destination contract. The Sub-Area Petroleum Office (SAPO) in Bangkok, a part of MACTHAI, administered the contract. The U. S. Air Force provided common support for in-country airlift of passengers and high priority cargo, aerial port services, and medical supply support.²

The DEPCH received requisitions from RO/USAID and forwarded them to USARSUPTHAI for fill or local purchase. If items were not available at the Udorn storage area, the requisitions were passed to the U. S. Army Base Command in Okinawa (USABCO).

All transportation support was provided by Thai

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tractor for land haul and by Air America for insertion in-country. Receipt
and storage facilities were located at Sattahip for surface and U-Tapao for
air transshipment.

Support Cambodia Out of Thailand (SCOOT)

1. On 27 October 1972, CINCPAC was directed by the JCS to develop a con-
cept plan to support the MEDTC from other than Vietnam bases. The plan was
also to include provisions for the continued logistic support of Cambodia in
the event that lines of communication (LOC) were interdicted by the enemy.
CINCPAC's original concept plan, as refined during a CINCPAC-convened meeting
in Bangkok, was transmitted to the JCS on 6 November.

2. The security assistance program for Cambodia was administered by the
MEDTC, which had a forward element in Phnom Penh and a rear element in Vietnam.
The CINCPAC plan provided for the disestablishment of MEDTC-Rear, and the
establishment of a permanent liaison element of the MEDTC in Thailand. Other
provisions of SCOOT included the re-location of the Military Assistance Pro-
gram (MAP) ammunition pipeline from Vietnam to Thailand; the continuation of
administrative and logistical support to MEDTC personnel; and continuation of
logistic support to Cambodia, including alternative LOC during enemy interdic-
tion of surface LOC. The ammunition pipeline was to be relocated to Thailand
in two phases, after which support procedures would correspond to the COLOGS
concept, with MEDTC forecasting requirements, requisitioning air and ground
munitions, calling forward munitions requirements from Thailand to maintain
stock levels in Cambodia, and submitting air and surface transportation re-
quirements to USARSUPTHAI. The long range objective of the ammunition support
program was to shift from SCOOT to the use of an upgraded storage site at
Kompong Som, with debarkation from deep draft vessels and onward surface move-
ment via Route 4.

3. Administrative and personnel services were to be assumed by the PACOM
component Services through Thailand subordinate units, except that COMUSMACTHAI
was to provide office space, furniture, housing, telephone service, mess, and
supply support for the MEDTC liaison unit in Thailand. MACTHAI also was tasked

1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 020345Z Nov 72, which cites CINCPAC 301905Z Oct 72; CINCPAC
030403Z Nov 72, which cites JCS 272200Z Oct 72; COMUSMACTHAI 060930Z
Nov 72. For discussion of Kompong Som as a port of entry, see Trans-
portation Section, this chapter. MEDTC operations are discussed in
Chapter VIII, Security Assistance.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 060930Z Nov 72.
to arrange for medical and dental support, and to provide vehicle support for MEDTC liaison personnel on duty in Thailand.1

Because communications from Cambodia were oriented toward Vietnam, SCOOT provided for establishment of reliable voice and data transmission between Phnom Penh and Thailand. CINCUSARPAC was charged with conducting site surveys and planning for a multi-channel radio system, including equipment, personnel, and logistics support. COMUSMACHTHAI was levied for automatic data processing capability. Support to Cambodia for POL would continue to come from commercial sources. Other support functions to be provided in Thailand were administrative airlift, aerial delivery and rigging, and training of Cambodian Armed Forces personnel.2

In the second portion of SCOOT, CINCPAC developed five LOC options, with various combinations of surface and air LOC. In the worst case, with the port of Kompong Som, the Mekong River, and overland routes 4 and 5 closed, all materiel support would be via airlift from U-Tapao to Pochentong Airfield in Phnom Penh.3

CINCPAC requested the JCS to approve the plan with authority to implement it by 12 November 1972. Qualified approval to implement was received on 14 November. The JCS noted that SCOOT would need to be reconciled and updated in consonance with the terms of a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. Also, the introduction of a MEDTC liaison team in Thailand would have to be negotiated with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) by the U.S. Ambassador. The JCS indicated that possible alternative guidance would be forthcoming regarding the communications and ADP functions. Lastly, the heavy use of critical U.S. airlift resources specified in the LOC contingency options could have a "...negative effect...on the achievement of a self-reliant capability..." by the Cambodian Armed Forces to maintain Route 4 and the Mekong River LOC as clear access routes for logistic support.4

On 24 November, a U.S. Embassy message was quoted by COMUSMACHTHAI which stated that informal approval had been obtained from the RTG Supreme Command to use the port of Vayama-Sattahip as the transshipment point for ammunition and other supplies to be shipped by sea to Cambodia. It was understood that a small MEDTC liaison element would be stationed in Thailand, and emergency re-supply by air from U-Tapao was also confirmed. The Thai spokesman (LGEN Kriangsak) said that approval in writing would be forthcoming, but

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; J4116 Point Paper, 10 Nov 72, Subj: Plan for Support of MEDTC.
4. CINCPAC 110051Z Nov 72; JCS 5039/140048Z Nov 72; J41 HistSum Nov 72.
that SCOOT could proceed in the meantime based on his oral assurances. At the same time, stated his expectation that sea transportation services would be procured locally and that two maritime transportation companies owned by the RTG would be invited to bid.  

(5) Based on the tentative approval of the RTG, CINCPAC directed that SCOOT be implemented, and CINCUSARPAC directed the Commander, USARSUPTHAI to implement the plan effective 1 December 1972. On 28 November, MACTHAI notified CINCPAC that formal approval of SCOOT had been received by the Embassy from the RTG. The secret written approval stated that the sole stipulation was that the State-owned shipping lines, "...must be used to accomplish the water borne portion of the proposed logistics system." MACTHAI stated that "bid closing" was scheduled for 28 November, and that negotiations between the Military Sealift Command, Far East (MSCFE) contracting officer and the "bidders" were scheduled to take place on 30 November.  

(6) The SCOOT concept, when fully implemented, would make the MEDTC and DEPCHUSMAGTHAI both customers of COLOGS.  

Environmental Control Policy  

(U) A CINCPAC policy of protection and enhancement of the environment had been in effect since 1966. In August 1971, the Secretary of Defense issued DOD Directive 6050.1, which implemented the National Environmental Policy Act (P.L. 91-190 of 1 January 1970). The directive specifically tasked commanders of unified and specified commands to issue implementing directives. On 20 May 1972, CINCPAC's Instruction 11000.4, entitled "Environmental Considerations in PACOM Actions," was distributed to component and subordinate commands. All military activities in the PACOM were required to consider environmental factors in the decision-making process and to prepare environmental impact statements for major actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.  

(U) In June 1972, CINCPAC was requested by the JCS to comment on recommendations by the National Council on Environmental Quality to improve compliance  

1. COMUSMACTHAI 240906Z Nov 72, which quotes AMEMB Bangkok 16613/24 Nov 72, (no DTG).  
2. CINCUSARPAC 280234Z Nov 72, which cites CINCPAC 252348Z Nov 72; COMUSMAC- THAI 280942Z Nov 72.  
3. J4116 Point Paper, 10 Nov 72, Subj: Plan for Support of MEDTC.  
with the National Environmental Protection Act. In reply, CINCPAC stated that
the number of environmental impact statements submitted via CINCPAC would be
limited because the majority of military activities within the PACOM were in
foreign countries. Also, only those actions involving two or more Services
were in the purview of the CINCPAC directive.¹

(U) In the summer of 1972, an opportunity arose to demonstrate to the
people of Hawaii the sincerity of military concern for environmental pollution.
The City and County of Honolulu (Oahu) initiated a project, using volunteer
labor and equipment, to rid the island of at least 2,000 derelict automobiles.
The hulks were to be placed on the ocean floor as artificial reefs, which were
known to create excellent breeding grounds for aquatic life. In July, CINCPAC
requested component commanders to appoint project officers to assist in the
campaign.²

(U) During the period 12 August through 2 September, the Armed Forces on
Oahu provided most of the equipment and volunteer labor for the pick-up, which
netted a total of 2,409 automobiles. Of this total, 2,166 were picked up by
the various military units which participated in the round-up.³

Lao Armed Forces Logistics System Reorganization

(%) On 19 August 1972, the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI informed CINCPAC that a reorgan-
ization of the Lao Armed Forces logistics system was being investigated. The
Lao Chief of Staff and other logisticians, with whom the subject was discussed,
had agreed that fundamental system improvement was desirable. The DEPCH asked
whether a logistics assistance team could be provided. After coordination with
CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC notified the DEPCH, on 29 August, that a 10-man technical
assistance team could be made available within two weeks. Because of internal
friction on the Laotian general staff, however, it was not until 10 November
that the DEPCH requested a technical assistance team to report in-country by
1 December for 30 days.⁴

(%) From 29 November through 11 December, a CINCPAC logistics staff repre-
sentative, together with a USARPAC team, evaluated the Laotian military logistics
system. A proposed reorganization evolved which would change the system
from a Technical Service Chief structure to the Director for Logistics concept.
In January 1973, CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC personnel were to deploy to assist
with the proposed reorganization.⁵

1. J42 HistSum Jun 72, which cited JCSM-JSM-1255-72 dtd 6 Jun 72; CINCPAC
   282206Z Jun 72.
5. J41 HistSum Nov 72.

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SECTION II--EXCESS AND RETROGRADE

PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)

(U) In fiscal year (FY) 72, PACOM supply units reported $719 million in excess materiel. Actual shipments amounted to $53 million. During calendar year (CY) 72, reports of excess materiel valued at $637 million were received, and referrals amounted to $97 million.

Storage of Herbicide ORANGE

(5) Chemical defoliants had been used by U. S. Forces in Vietnam since 1962. On 1 May 1971, COMUSMACV was directed to cease all defoliation operations, and, on 19 August 1971, was given limited authority to employ those herbicides known as BLUE and WHITE for weed and vegetation control in the vicinity of five support bases and perimeters. On 10 September 1971, a decision was announced by joint State/Defense message to retrograde all stocks of ORANGE herbicide from Vietnam to the U. S. On 27 September 1971, the JCS directed the U. S. Air Force to act as the executive agency for retrograde and custody.

(5) On 10 February 1972, CINCPAC declared his support of the Air Force plan, Project PACER IVY, for retrograde and temporary storage of ORANGE at Johnson Island. PACER IVY was completed on 28 April 1972, when the last of 25,219 drums (1,361,826 gallons) of herbicide ORANGE was off-loaded at Johnson Island for temporary storage.

Retrograde Operations

(U) The significance of retrograde operations was succinctly summarized in an article written in late 1972 by the U. S. Army Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics:

1. J46 HistSum Jan-Dec 72.
3. Ibid.; J46 HistSum Apr 72.
...The aftermath of past conflicts has seen the accumulation of vast surpluses. For example, we were left with $12 billion worth of excess assets after the war in Korea. Because of deterioration and obsolescence many of these after-war surpluses had little use or salvage value. For the first time in the history of military operations, we have taken action to clean up the battlefield in the Republic of Vietnam before hostilities are actually terminated, and today we are making maximum use of this excess war materiel.

...Our success in reducing the excess "pile" from 650 thousand short tons to 50 thousand short tons as of 30 June 1972 is a tribute to all who participated....

(U) While the foregoing explained the why, the how was explained in a July 1972 article which would have been music to the ear of the American taxpayer if printed in a popular publication:1

...Unlike the situation following World War II when many ships returned from overseas empty, except for ballast, the Military Sealift Command controlled ships are now being backloaded with retrograde cargo for their return to the United States. This improved utilization of sealift minimizes costs for returning this cargo to CONUS....

Empty Ship Program

(U) Carrying the concept of retrograde one step farther, ships that had completed cargo discharge outside of Vietnam were designated as "empty ships" and scheduled for retrograde shipments from Vietnam in early 1972. By the end of February, a total of 29 ships had been so designated by MSCFE for use by COMUSMACV. A weekly list of available ships was provided; these were then assigned to ports of embarkation/debarkation (POE/POD) by the MACV Traffic Management Agency (TMA). With the decline in retrograde cargo, accomplished primarily as a result of the empty ship program, the program was terminated in May 1972. A total of 63 ships had been used.2

(TS) As plans for withdrawal after a Vietnam cease-fire progressed in late 1972, CNCPAC recommended, and the JCS approved, the resumption of the empty

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ship program on X-Day. COMUSMACV was directed to identify cargoes and POE for empty ships in order to expedite the removal of the remaining retrograde when the cease-fire became effective.  

Retrograde of Aircraft and Watercraft from Vietnam

(5) Of approximately 824 aircraft which had been identified for retrograde from Vietnam by May 1972, MSC-chartered Seatrain ships had moved 271 by February 1972. About 90 watercraft had been identified for retrograde by June 1972, of which 15 were Navy-owned and 76 were owned by the Army. The Navy craft were scheduled for movement to Guam, and all but two of the Army craft were scheduled for storage at Poro Point, Philippines. By March, all but 44 aircraft had been shipped from Vietnam via surface, and 43 watercraft had been moved. 2

(5) In April, because of the tactical situation in Vietnam, retrograde of all serviceable UH-IH, AH-IG, and OH-6A aircraft was halted. Forty-four other aircraft were surface-lifted from Vietnam in April, and 17 watercraft were retrograded. In May, 102 aircraft were sealifted from Vietnam and 15 watercraft were also moved. In June, all further retrograde of aircraft was halted until the offensive by North Vietnam had been contained.

(5) In November, again as part of post cease-fire planning, COMUSMACV advised that approximately 206 Army aircraft would require retrograde after X-Day. COMUSMACV proposed that an aircraft carrier be used to transport these aircraft to Subic Bay for processing and transshipment to the CONUS. Such use would make Seatrain ships available for urgent retrograde of other U. S. and Free World equipment during the 60-day redeployment period, and would allow longer retention of the aircraft in-country to assist in movement of personnel and equipment.

(5) At CINCPAC's request, CINCPACFLT conducted an extensive review of Seventh Fleet operational requirements to determine availability of a carrier for retrograde use. It was determined that a carrier could not be made available; moreover, neither aircraft nor personnel could be assimilated at Subic Bay.

(5) On 14 November 1972, COMUSMACV advised that 225 Army aircraft had been identified for retrograde, and proposed an alternative to the use of an aircraft

5. Ibid.

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carrier. He suggested that the 30 fixed wing (U-8) aircraft be flown to an off-shore location for transshipment to CONUS; the use of one Seatrain ship prior to X-Day for a short shuttle of deck-loaded aircraft to a PACOM port for onward transshipment; and, the balance of the aircraft to be retrograded on two Seatrain ships after X-Day. CINCPAC concurred with the MACV proposal, and agreed that an in-transit PACOM POD might be needed for all retrograde aircraft. On 2 November, 19 of the aircraft departed DaNang on the short shuttle.1

By December, the decision was to retrograde all Army fixed-and-rotary winged aircraft from Vietnam directly to CONUS. If, however, sufficient ships were not available, the aircraft would be shuttled in increments from Vung Tau in Vietnam to Sattahip, Thailand for temporary storage. An alternate plan provided that the U-8s be flown from Vietnam to Sattahip or Singapore and prepared for surface shipment to CONUS. Any movement of aircraft into Thailand would require RTG approval and probably a negotiated quid pro quo.2

In November 1971, CINCPAC had supported a COMUSMACV request to reduce the number of PODs to which retrograde cargo could be shipped. CINCPAC, in seeking JCS approval, had noted that 78 percent of retrograde cargo had gone to only seven PODs. Volume for the other 25 built up so slowly that timely bookings could not be made, and calling in ships for small volumes was expensive and wasteful of sealift resources. On 10 December 1971, CINCPAC proposed that COMUSMACV be authorized to ship CONUS-destined cargo to either Oakland or Mobile, and that cargo consigned to PACOM locations be shipped to major PACOM ports and transshipped as required to reach ultimate destination.3

The JCS approved in principle the reduction in PODs on 22 December 1971. On 16 January 1972, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV of shipping procedures for general, vehicular, and container retrograde shipments. All shipments consigned to Okinawa would be shipped to Naha; Yokohama was the POD for Japan, Sattahip for Thailand, and Pusan for Korea. Retrograde consigned to other PACOM destinations was to be transshipped through Naha, Yokohama, or Sattahip depending on proximity to the ultimate destination and frequency of service.4

On 4 February, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that, for retrograde consigned to Taiwan, two ports would continue to be considered PODs. Because of

1. Ibid.
2. J472 HistSum Dec 72.
4. CINCPAC 160239Z Jan 72.
port and internal line of communication limitations, both Kaohsiung and Keelung would be used.1

(U) By June 1972, COMUSMACV advised that the reduction in PODs had been a major factor in the movement of record retrograde tonnage since the beginning of the year. Because, by mid-year, the level of remaining cargo was not sufficient to warrant the continued use of the reduced retrograde POD concept, COMUSMACV proposed to revert to normal POD scheduling. CINCPAC agreed on 28 June 1972, and the program was terminated.2

1. CINCPAC 040136Z Feb 72; J472 HistSum Feb 72.
2. COMUSMACV 261227Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 282212Z Jun 72; J472 HistSum Jun 72.
The military construction (MILCON) program in the PACOM during 1972 continued to be influenced by the shifting U.S. Force posture. The need to balance actual construction with transfers of existing facilities between U.S. and indigenous military forces required continuous revision of construction projects and fund allocations. Especially taxing was the situation in Vietnam, where normal programs to enhance Vietnamezation were complicated by the enemy Easter offensive, the on-going peace negotiations, and the need to plan for residual forces and support facilities.

In March 1972, the Secretary of Defense noted what appeared to be a lag in obligation of MILCON funds for Vietnam. The DOD, therefore, proposed that $15 million of Army construction funds (MCA) be withdrawn by the Department of the Army and held in unapportioned reserve for possible use outside Vietnam. CINCPAC was requested to evaluate the impact of such a withdrawal.\(^1\)

Based on information provided by MACV, CINCPAC concurred in the withdrawal of MCA funds, but with the stipulation that funds from unapportioned reserves would be available for unforeseen contingencies. CINCPAC revalidated those projects which had previously been submitted in the FY 73 MILCON program, and also validated the remaining unfunded items listed by MACV as the most urgent and essential unfunded MASF/MILCON projects required to support Vietnamization.\(^2\)

By October 1972, the reduction in contractor activity had generated a $33 million reserve fund surplus from Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contractors. This surplus was to be redistributed $16.5 million to the Army; $8.58 million to the Navy; and $7.92 million to the Air Force for use on authorized FY 74 MILCON programs. On 4 November, the JCS requested CINCPAC to analyze the MILCON program in Vietnam to determine which projects should be continued, cancelled, or changed in the event of a cease-fire. Consolidated information from MACV and the Service components listed projects in various stages of completion; these were categorized as nation building projects or direct military support projects. Regardless of cease-fire implications, however, MACV noted

1. SECDEF 7004/162122Z Mar 72; J42 HistSum Mar 72.
2. CINCPAC 182134Z Mar 72; COMUSMACV 300816Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 080215Z Apr 72; CINCPAC Ltr, Ser 1665, Subj: Army MASF/MILCON Projects for RVN, 13 Apr 72; J42 HistSum Apr 72.
### MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING

**SEASIA - SEASIA SUPPORT - KOREA**

**FY 65 TO DATE MILCON PROGRAMS**

**AS OF 30 NOV 1972**

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<td>813.6</td>
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**SOURCES:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73. Includes Laos.
that past emphasis had been to promote Vietnamization through construction of necessary facilities for long term support of the RVNAF. In that context, most on-going construction was considered valid to maintain a combat ready RVNAF posture.¹

² CINCPAC supported the program submitted by MACV, noting that, although termination of U.S. operations could soon be achieved by negotiation, facilities planning and construction should continue to parallel the goal of Vietnamization. On 22 November, CINCPAC requested MACV to submit an estimate of facilities which would be required to support DRSTO in Vietnam and the USSAG, to be located at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. This information would be the basis for a strong recommendation, through joint channels, to reimburse the Services for operations and maintenance (O&M) funds which might be spent on emergency facilities to support DRSTO and USSAG. Also, a current recapitulation would alert the JCS and Defense Department to the need for timely approval of projects beyond the scope of Service Secretary approval authority.²

³ CINCPAC forwarded the facilities projects identified by MACV to the JCS on 6 December. These included communications relocation and reorientation projects to support USSAG and MEDTC by the U.S. Army, and administrative facilities, troop housing, and roads and utilities by the Air Force. The total cost was estimated at approximately $1.8 million. CINCPAC anticipated that, in order to assure timely mission capability, the Services would need to initiate most of these projects using O&M funds, the availability of which was not known to CINCPAC. For this reason, the JCS were urged to obtain formal approval to use the appropriate categories of O&M funds, and to recommend that these funds be reimbursed from residual MILCON funds in Southeast Asia.³

⁴ After discussions with the Office of the ASD (I&L), the JCS informed CINCPAC that approval would not be forthcoming for reimbursement of O&M funds, and that MILCON projects above Service authority were to be submitted to ASD (I&L) on a case-by-case basis. The JCS stated that no delay was envisioned in securing ASD approval if MILCON projects were promptly identified through Service channels and validated by CINCPAC.⁴

⁵ On 12 December, PACAF notified CINCPAC that 36 MILCON projects had been hand carried to Air Force Headquarters with a request that residual MILCON

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1. CINCPAC 040427Z Oct 72; JCS 3629/04005BZ Nov 72; CINCPAC 042100Z Nov 72;
COMUSMACV 070715Z Nov 72.
2. CINCPAC 090005Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 220414Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 290443Z Nov 72;
J42 HistSum Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 062055Z Dec 72; J42 HistSum Dec 72.
4. JCS 1852/132124Z Dec 72.

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funds be used. These projects, plus one more, were supported by MACV, who requested CINCPAC validation to the JCS. MACV noted that the total cost was estimated to be about $3 million, which would require the allocation of MILCON funds at Service level. In validating the Air Force projects, CINCPAC recommended early funding from residual MILCON funds returned to Air Force control from the CPAF surplus previously discussed.1

Also in compliance with the ASD guidance on project approval, the U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific forwarded a project to relocate a communications facility from Vietnam to Nakhon Phanom for urgent MCA consideration. CINCPAC also validated this project, again with recommended funding from residual surplus CPAF funds.2

Review of RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program

(U) The dependent shelter program was initiated by the RVN in 1961, and continued without U.S. participation through 1966. The 75,000 units constructed during this period were of varying design, but were basically of wooden siding without water, electricity, or sanitary facilities. By 1966, the deteriorating internal security in-country had virtually stopped the program. In 1967, U.S. participation was initiated by the provision of $2.8 million for a self-help Army of Vietnam (ARVN) pilot program for 1,378 units. This program was reoriented in 1968 to provide $.8 million for the ARVN pilot program. The balance of the $2.8 million was programmed for commodity support for CY 69 and CY 70.3

(U) On 8 August 1969, the U. S. Navy programmed $1.5 million in FY 69 MILCON funds for construction of 2,420 units by the U.S. Navy for the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). Construction did not begin, however, until CY 70, when the U. S. Air Force also undertook a program in support of the VNAF. These two shelter programs were intended to speed the availability of shelters at U. S. bases which were scheduled for transfer to the RVNAF during 1970 and 1971. Meanwhile, COMUSMACV established a joint U. S. - RVNAF action group to supervise the dependent shelter program. The Dependent Shelter Program Group (DSPG) was established to provide overall planning and direction; to coordinate U.S. responsibilities; and to monitor the use of U.S. material. Construction responsibility and management thereof remained with the RVN. In April 1970, the DSPG reported that only 49,000 of 85,000 units previously constructed were considered assets,

1. Ltr, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 12 Dec 72, Subj: Facility Requirements, Project ENHANCE PLUS; COMUSMACV 230215Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 272356Z Dec 72.
2. Ltr, USASTRATCOM to Hq USASTRATCOM, 14 Dec 72, Subj: Reconfiguration of the DSCS; CINCPAC 280539Z Dec 72; J42 HistSum Dec 72.
3. COMUSMACV 010915Z Mar 72.
partly because of combat action during the 1968 Tet offensive and partly because of deterioration of shelters constructed in the early 1961-1969 period. The DSPG established a requirement for 200,000 shelters to be built over an eight year period at $6 million per year. The U. S. support was to be for such items as lumber, cement, roofing, and hardware. In May 1970, President Nixon approved U. S. support for a five year period in a letter to President Thieu.1

(U) In January 1972, the ASD (I&L) voiced concern over problem areas which had been reported by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to be inhibiting the attainment of the DSPG objectives and construction goals. COMUSMACV was requested to review the entire program, with specific attention to the shortcomings as contained in the GAO report. The review was also to recommend either continuation of U. S. support at current or reduced levels, or even discontinuance of U.S. support.2

(U) COMUSMACV strongly rebutted the findings of the GAO, and recommended funding of the RVNAF CY 72 program at $6 million to provide material for 20,000 units; completion of the U.S. Air Force program for 2,400 units; and completion of the U.S. Navy program for 5,000 units. After review of both the GAO report and the MACV response, CINCPAC strongly endorsed the MACV position. CINCPAC noted that, since the GAO team departed Vietnam in August 1971, improving skills of ARVN troops and intensive management had brought about a dramatic increase in program execution. As of 31 January 1972, figures from 1 June 1971 had nearly doubled. Almost 19,000 units had been completed under the RVNAF program begun in early 1971, and 14,976 were under construction. In the two months of December 1971 and January 1972 alone, 2,912 units were completed, even though U.S. troop strength had been almost halved. This was an indication of the high priority ascribed to the dependent shelter program by the RVNAF.3

(U) CINCPAC also invited attention to the fact that the U.S. role in the dependent shelter program had been advisory—not one of command and control—and that the entire role of the U.S. military was in support of a commitment by the President. CINCPAC concluded with a recommendation that the Secretary of Defense continue to support the program, with an annual review of progress and an evaluation for continued support subsequent to the expiration of the initial commitment.4

(U) On 29 March 1972, the Secretary of Defense authorized the continuation

1. Ibid.
2. SECDEF 4026/2720162 Jan 72.
3. COMUSMACV 010915Z Mar 72.
4. Ibid.
of U.S. support as then approved through CY 1972. It was stipulated that the DSPG and U.S. advisors were to assure that U.S. materiel was properly utilized and that the RVNAF be encouraged to restrict use of the dependent shelters to dependents. The ASD (I&L) also instructed each Service and COMUSMACV to make the shelter program an item of special interest during reviews, inspections, and audits.¹

**MILCON in Thailand**

Construction in Thailand during 1972 was oriented toward two primary considerations: one, to improve facilities needed to upgrade single pipeline supply storage; and two, to support the deployment of U.S. Marine air units to Nam Phong Air Base.

**Nam Phong Construction**

Nam Phong was one of the original locations considered for use by the U.S. Air Force during the build-up of air power in 1965 and 1966. After the construction of an air strip, the decision was made to stop further construction, and to concentrate on the operational bases at Takhli, Udorn, Ubon, Korat, and Nakhon Phanom. Until May 1972, the base consisted of a runway, taxiways, parking aprons, minimum roads, and a water supply.²

When North Vietnam began its Easter offensive on 2 April 1972, the initial thrust raised the possibility that the depleted U.S. forces at Da Nang could be overrun. On 11 May, CINCPAC was notified by the JCS that the opening of Nam Phong on an austere basis had been approved, and requested CINCPAC to submit a redeployment plan for the Da Nang-based tactical air assets. On 7 June, the JCS ordered CINCPAC to deploy the seven tactical squadrons then based at Da Nang to Thailand. The four U.S. Air Force squadrons were dispersed to bases at Takhli, Korat, Udorn, and Ubon. The three Marine squadrons were ordered to Nam Phong. By 18 June, the Marine Air Group was in place and Nam Phong was declared to be operational.³

Although Nam Phong was acknowledged to be an austere dispersal operating base, to which mobile facilities would be transported if operational units were deployed, some basic improvements were needed to accommodate three of the Marine air squadrons. On 7 June 1972, CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC to validate the up-grading of the water supply, storage, and distribution system. Also re-

¹ SecDef 1815/291346Z Mar 72; J42 HistSum Mar 72.
² CINCPAC Thailand Construction Review, 1 Jan 68, pp. XIII-1, 2, 3.
³ CINCPAC 120450Z May 72, which cites JCS 1774/111618Z May 72; JCS 3854/072351Z Jun 72; COMSEVENFLT 180218Z Jun 72.
quested was the substitution of wood frame huts for the initial beddown personnel tents. The estimated cost for the water system was $150,000 and for the huts, $350,000. CINCPAC validated the stated construction requirements; however, the hut construction was not approved by the Defense Department because of expected short tenure.¹

On 19 September, CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC to validate the installation of security lights and fence at Nam Phong at an estimated cost of $262,000. This protection was needed to minimize the threat from sapper attack and pilferage. It was noted in the request that Navy O&M funds amounting to $1.7 million had been spent on base facilities, and that additional expenditures would require MILCON funding. CINCPAC validated the request on 22 September, the Defense Department approved it in October, and contract action began in November.²

Tanker Augmentation - Don Muang

When the JCS ordered the redeployment of tactical air assets from Vietnam to Thailand, CINCPAC was also directed to coordinate the deployment, with the Strategic Air Command (SAC), of 41 KC-135 tankers. Beddown of the KC-135 augmentation was 17 to Clark Air Base, Philippines; 13 to Don Muang; 4 to Takhli; and 7 to Korat. The basing of the 13 aircraft at Don Muang was limited to 120 days by agreement with the RTG.³

Inasmuch as the duration of the requirement to maintain augmented tanker support was not known, CINCPAC requested PACAF and SAC to plan for an alternate to Don Muang if the 120 days expired. If, for example, U-Tapao were considered to be the most feasible alternate, costs and schedules should be developed for any necessary additional construction at that location. CINCPAC also requested information as to the costs of needed additional construction at U-Tapao as compared with the cost of basing the tankers at the most feasible off-shore locations.⁴

PACAF replied that parking apron, taxiway, POL outlets and storage tanks, and additional living quarters at U-Tapao would cost about $4.3 million. Construction lead time was estimated at six months, with a possible bad weather extension of 30-60 days. SAC provided figures which reflected the additional

1. CINCPACFLT N11000/070153Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 090132Z Jun 72; CNO N11000/162019Z Jun 72; J42 HistSum Jun 72.
2. ADMIN CINCPACFLT N11000/190444Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 222255Z Sep 72; J42 HistSum Sep 72.
4. CINCPAC 092242Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 132237Z Jun 72.
tankers which would be needed from off-shore to match the performance of the 13 tankers at Don Muang:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Don Muang</th>
<th>Clark</th>
<th>CCK (Taiwan)</th>
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<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Sorties</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hrs/Day</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Manning Total</td>
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Relating the operational figures to comparative costs, SAC also stated that the duration of the on-going operations, combined with long-term plans for U-Tapao should determine whether construction there would be the most cost-effective. SAC noted that the estimated construction cost at U-Tapao would equate to less than 30 days of operational cost from Clark Air Base or Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan.¹

CINCPAC passed the comparative figures to the JCS, and stressed the need for an early decision in view of the 120 day constraint at Don Muang. On 30 June, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the construction of additional facilities at U-Tapao had been discussed with the DOD. The reaction was negative. The consideration which militated against the U-Tapao construction included the "excessive" construction lead time, the unknown duration of the need for tanker augmentation, and the necessity to balance cost factors against other on-going programs. The eventual decision was to provide tanker support from off-shore after the expiration of the 120 day agreement with the RTG.²

Ammunition Storage Facilities

In May 1972, CINCUSARPAC requested CINCPAC to validate two construction projects for improvement of ammunition storage facilities. One was a proposal in two phases, for improvement and construction at the facility at Udorn. Total cost was estimated at $690,000. Coupled with the PEPPERGRINDER restoration was a proposal to install air conditioning at Camp Samae San at an MCA cost of $281,200. CINCPAC strongly supported the need to

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¹ CINCPACAF 210130Z Jun 72; CINCSAC 211710Z Jun 72.
² JCS 8966/300026Z Jun 72 (EX) which cites CINCPAC 241312Z Jun 72; Interview with LCOL A. J. Granheim, CINCPAC Logistics Staff.
protect the 9,000 tons of ammunition and $5 million worth of general supplies
normally stored at the PEPPERGRINDER facility from heavy rains and flooding.
He noted that this installation was essential to the support of the U.S. mis-
mission in Laos, and recommended, "...earliest approval and completion of the
urgently required PEPPERGRINDER up-grade projects." With an implied lesser
priority, CINCPAC also validated the proposal to up-grade the troop housing.
In July, ASD (I&L) approved the MILCON project at PEPPERGRINDER; the troop
housing project was not approved.1

The second ammunition storage facility which CINCUSARPAC requested
CINCPAC to validate was a $2.9 million, three-phase project at Camp Vayama.
This facility was known as the Vayama In-transit Ammunition Storage Area
(VIASA). The three phases were to consist of construction of 20 additional
ammunition storage pads; repair of 37 existing pads; and improvement of se-
curity at the VIASA complex. This facility was central to the single pipeline
concept embodied in COLOGS and SCOOT, as related previously. Envisioned was
the total transfer of Cambodian munitions support from Vietnam to Thailand and
additional munitions storage to eliminate back-haul from interim storage at
Takhli. CINCPAC again strongly endorsed this proposal, noting that the Satta-
hip complex, in which VIASA was located, would become increasingly important
as a logistics hub in Southeast Asia for future contingencies.2

In June, the JCS informed CINCPAC that validation of the VIASA project
was deferred pending consideration of alternate means of providing munitions
support to Cambodia. Having consulted with his Service components and the MSC,
CINCPAC ruled out the alternative of offshore storage and transshipment because
of excessive costs, untimely response, and political sensitivities. Realisti-
cally, however, CINCPAC concluded that the original $2.9 million proposal for
VIASA would not be approved because of competition for limited MILCON funds.
Therefore, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to revise his proposal so that total
cost would be less than one million dollars, which was within MILCON funds
programming authority of the Secretary of Defense. Also, references to Cam-
bodian support were to be deleted and the Phase II projects for repairs and
maintenance of existing facilities should be programmed for O&M funds. On
14 July 1972, the revision was submitted for CINCPAC validation. The revised
proposal was in two phases: one for 12 additional ammunition storage pads;
one for improvements in security. Total cost was estimated to be $999,800.
The repair and maintenance portion of the original proposal was submitted to
the Army as an O&M project for $681,000. CINCPAC, once again, validated the
revised projects.3

1. CINCUSARPAC 030008Z May 72; CINCPAC 120509Z May 72; J42 HistSum May 72.
2. CINCUSARPAC 060258Z May 72; CINCPAC 120508Z May 72; J42 HistSum May 72.
3. CINCPAC 040234Z Jul 72; Ltr, USARPAC to Hq DA, 14 Jul 72, Subj: VIASA
Ammo Storage Facility, Thailand; CINCPAC 250112Z Jul 72.
On 27 September, the Secretary of Defense approved the VIASA construction for $999,800. The existing 20,000 short tons of ammunition storage capacity would be increased to 26,000 short tons, and the security of the installation would be improved. Lower levels of stockage would be possible at [redacted] and stocks for use in Laos would no longer be stored at Takhli. Construction was expected to be complete in approximately six months, or about mid-1973.1

Relocation of Thai School

(U) In mid-1971, the RTG had surfaced a noise pollution and safety hazard problem concerning a school located next to the runways at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). A noise survey was conducted at the Kai Prajak school in August 1971 by a U.S. Air Force bio-environmental engineer which confirmed levels detrimental to student welfare. Also, it was confirmed that aircraft passing directly over the school complex at 35-70 meters altitude constituted a safety hazard. CINCPAC brought the problem to the attention of the Defense Department, recommending that the estimated cost for school relocation of $107,000 be funded by AID or joint RTG/AID action. At year’s end, no decision had been reached on the possible source of funds to relocate the school.2

(U) On 28 April 1972, COMUSMACTHAI forwarded a signed agreement, dated 26 April 1972, between the U.S. Air Force and the RTG to share the cost of relocating the school. The agreement stipulated that the payment of one million baht ($50,000) by the Air Force toward the relocation cost would absolve the U.S. Government of any damage claims that had or could arise from the flying activities at Udorn. Payment was to be made in two increments; the first, for 500,000 baht, within 30 days after the agreement was signed; the second, also for 500,000 baht, when the existing school buildings had been removed from proximity to the airfield. The agreement further provided that construction of a new school would begin by 3 May 1972, and that the old school would be removed by 1 November.3

(U) On 15 September, representatives of the U.S. Air Force presented the final payment of 500,000 baht to representatives of the RTG. This payment represented, "...the United States Air Force’s contribution for the relocation of Kai Prajak school..." On that date, the old school buildings had been removed; one of the new buildings was in use; and the second, nearing completion, was also already in use.4

1. J422 Point Paper, 9 Nov 72, Subj: Construction Considerations for Thailand.
3. Ltr, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, 28 Apr 72, Subj: Relocation of Kai Prajak School, with 1 encl., Memorandum of Agreement, 26 Apr 72; J42 HistSum May 72.
4. 7/13 AF 180500Z Sep 72.
PAVE ONYX Construction

In May 1972, personnel and aircraft were deployed to Thailand to test and evaluate the PAVE ONYX concept, which involved a sophisticated real-time target acquisition system. On 25 May, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC to validate a construction proposal to the JCS in support of PAVE ONYX. Included were hangars, a dormitory, a warehouse, a jet stable-fuel system, and a parking pad, for a total estimated cost of $2.132 million. On 9 June, CINCPAC validated the proposal.1

No further action on this proposal was forthcoming until 27 November, when the JCS informed CINCPAC that ASD (I&L) had deferred a decision on PAVE ONYX construction funds pending completion of flight test and evaluation.2

Construction in Laos

Prior to FY 73, MILCON in Laos was accomplished with residual MILCON funds. These construction projects were not identified in the Laos MASF Program, and were controlled and processed by the CINCPAC Logistics staff. In FY 73, all new MILCON was incorporated in the MASF programmed year fund ceiling, under the cognizance of the CINCPAC Security Assistance staff. Thus, most of the on-going construction in Laos during CY 72 was funded from MILCON funds, not subject to the "Symington Ceiling." The ceiling was expected to have considerable impact on future construction because other Service-funded operational items such as ammunition would be in competition.3

Intelligence Facility - Vientiane

In January 1972, the Defense Attache Office in Vientiane, Laos advised CINCPAC of a requirement to construct an interrogation facility for the Laotian Armed Forces (FAR) at the national level. On 11 February, CINCPAC replied to the Ambassador's office requesting certification that the construction was urgent, that no alternative to new construction was available, and that MASF fund-

1. CINCPACAF 252315Z May 72; CINCPAC 091200Z Jun 72, which cites CINCPAC 032200Z Jun 72; J42 HistSum Jun 72.
2. JCS 1195/272258Z Nov 72. At the time this 1972 history was written, the decision against deployment of the PAVE ONYX system to Southeast Asia had already been made (JCS 2114/282140Z Mar 73).
3. J834 Point Paper, 10 Nov 72, Subj: Laos MASF Military Construction (MILCON). The Symington Ceiling was imposed under Public Law 92-156 of 17 Nov 71, which established a dollar ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos. The ceiling for FY 72 was $350 million--$196 million for MASF programs and $154 million for all other U.S. agency programs.
ing vice DOD MILCON funds was not feasible. CINCPAC also instructed the DEPCHIEF, after receipt of certification, to develop the necessary project documents in coordination with the Officer-in-Charge of Construction (OICC) in Bangkok. 1

On 9 May, the DEPCHIEF responded that the Embassy had certified the urgency of the project, and submitted program documents for the construction of a facility considered necessary to exploit effectively the intelligence information possessed by enemy prisoners of war. The estimated cost was $208,000. On 2 June, CINCPAC validated the requirement to the JCS, stating that the existing interrogation facilities in Vientiane seriously degraded the potential for exploiting strategic and tactical intelligence. CINCPAC urged that early approval and funding be sought, and suggested the use of unobligated Southeast Asia MCA funds. If the intelligence exploitation center were not provided, CINCPAC stated, the improvement of FAR capability to meet its own intelligence requirements would be delayed, thus encouraging continued dependence upon U.S. assets. Also, the collection of U.S. strategic intelligence, including information concerning U.S. prisoners of war, would be impaired. 2

Subsequently, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, in coordination with DEPCH, determined that cancellation of the project was in the best interest of both the U.S. and Laotian Governments. 3

Ammunition Storage Depot - Pakse

When the Laos Military Region IV ammunition storage depot was totally destroyed by enemy action on 25 March 1972, the DEPCHIEF submitted a MILCON construction replacement proposal amounting to $431,700 on 17 May. The American Embassy had certified the construction as urgent, and CINCPAC's validation was requested. CINCPAC supported the program to the JCS on 24 May, recommending that unobligated Southeast Asia MCA funds be used. 4

On 20 July 1972, CINCUSARPAC, verifying the need for a new ammunition storage depot, also cited the adverse impact on the ammunition storage and transportation systems in Thailand caused by the loss of the depot. However, on 26 September, the Defense Department requested that the project be reviewed to reduce construction standards and costs. CINCPAC, while acknowledging that standards and costs could not be drastically reduced and still provide a useful

1. J42 HistSum Feb 72; CINCPAC 110052Z Feb 72.
2. Ltr, DEPCHUSMAGTHAI to CINCPAC, 9 May 72, Subj: MILCON for FAR Detention Facility; CINCPAC 020315Z Jun 72.
3. DEPCHUSMAG UDORN 271007Z Dec 72.
4. DEPCH/Udorn 171203Z May 72; CINCPAC 241958Z May 72; J42 HistSum May 72.
facility, nevertheless asked the DEPCHIEF to accomplish the review. 1

(§) On 16 October, the DEPCHIEF submitted a revised proposal which reduced the estimated cost to $383,000, indicated that total costs would not exceed the Symington ceilings, and estimated a possible further reduction of at least $100,000 if FAR engineer troops could accomplish part of the construction. CINCPAC again strongly supported the revised proposal, stating that costs had been reduced to a minimum consistent with storage requirements, security, safety, and effective maintenance. On 31 October, ASD (I&L) notified the Office of Security Assistance that realignment of Southeast Asia MILCON funds was approved for $383,000, and requested MACV to make the money available, from MCA funds, for withdrawal by the Army.2

MILCON in Korea

(§) In November 1971, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSK) had submitted a reprogramming of FY 70 MCA construction, primarily because of the consolidation of U.S. Army facilities in Korea. One of the proposed revisions had been the deletion of air lines of communication (ALOC) construction at Waegwan, adjacent to Camp Carroll, and the addition of an ALOC cargo ramp at Taegu airfield. As a result of internal CINCPAC staff interest, COMUSK was asked whether the deployment actions visualized in CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 (Defense of Korea) had been considered in the decision to eliminate Camp Carroll as an intra-country ALOC airfield. CINCPAC noted that Taegu was already planned for use as an inter-theater base, and that the two USAF F-4C squadrons (48 aircraft) were also scheduled to deploy to Taegu on D+1. Further, about 75 Republic of Korea (ROK) aircraft were currently stationed at Taegu. CINCPAC's concern was how the main U.S. Army logistics base at Camp Carroll would be supported from Taegu if existing roads, bridges, and tunnels were interdicted.3

(§) On 3 January 1972, COMUSK replied to CINCPAC, stating that the elimination of the Waegwan ALOC and construction of an ALOC cargo ramp at Taegu had been coordinated with the 314th Air Division in Korea. Based on this reply, CINCUSARPAC's previous concurrence on 24 December 1971, and CINCPACAF concurrence of 7 January 1972, CINCPAC validated the revised FY 70 MILCON as submitted by COMUSK in the amount of $23.58 million.4

1. CINCPAC 300154Z Sep 72, which cites CINCUSARPAC 200001Z Jul 72 and SECDEF 3653/260128Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 182346Z Oct 72, which cites DEPCHJUSMAA 161002Z Oct 72; SECDEF 7425/310105Z Oct 72; J42 HistSum Oct 72.
4. CINCPAC 052129Z Jan 72; CINCPACAF 072200Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 210120Z Jan 72; J42 HistSum Jan 72.

SECRET
Included in the revised FY 70 MILCON had been the upgrading of eight ALOCs, including the one discussed above. In February 1971, COMUSK requested that four additional ALOCs be included in FY 71 MILCON. These had originally been programmed for FY 72, but no funds had been allocated for FY 72 Korea MILCON. Noting that the four additional ALOCs did not meet urgent funding criteria, CINCOPAC directed COMUSK to include them in the FY 73 MILCON. COMUSK complied on May 1971, and CINCOPAC, as part of an overall presentation to the JCS on MILCON programs in Southeast Asia and Korea, validated the requirement for four additional ALOCs for FY 73.1

On 8 March 1972, the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, submitted an urgent funding request for the four ALOC projects to CINCPAC. The urgency was generated by a surge in North Korean offensive and defensive capabilities which significantly increased the potential threat to South Korea. However, in an effort to reduce the costs, one of the four ALOC sites would be deferred, thus reducing the total from $1.4 million to $1.1 million. The Army request was supported by COMUSK on 9 March because of the recent intelligence relating to North Korean capability. On 1 April 1972, CINCOPAC validated the request for accelerated construction of the three ALOC fields under the FY 72 MCA program or other MILCON funding resources available to the Army. However, CINCOPAC recommended that the fourth, and last, ALOC field be reinstated for FY 73 programming action.2

As of 31 December 1972, the following major facilities were under construction or had been programmed with approved funds:

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2. CG EUSA 080758Z Mar 72; COMUSK 091257Z Mar 72; CG EUSA 230040Z Mar 72; CINCOPAC 010255Z Apr 72; J42 HistSum Apr 72.
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$11,049

| Ordinance Storage and SIOP Support |

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1. CINCPAC 080111Z Mar 72, which cites CINCPAC 312344Z Dec 70; CSAF 092030Z Feb 72; Ltr, CINCPACAF, 26 Feb 72; COMUSK 220706Z Feb 72; J42 HistSum Mar 72.
1. CINCPAC 2920422Z Dec 71.
2. JCS 3699/051339Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 120232Z Feb 72.
3. CINCPACAF 191902Z Feb 72.
4. CINCPACFLT N0000/262245Z Feb 72.
Okinawa Reversion-Related Construction

(6) Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands reverted to Japanese control on 15 May 1972. The U.S. Government had agreed to vacate Naha Air Base and to withdraw or relocate U.S. military units from other bases under U.S. control. As part of the reversion compensation, $65 million was to be provided by Japan for the construction of facilities at various bases over a five year period. The first increment, amounting to $25 million, was to be made available during the Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 1 April 1972 to 31 March 1973.²

(6) By November 1971, ASD (I&L) had notified CINCPAC that only $4 million of the $65 million which was to be provided by Japan was uncommitted. In April 1972, CINCPAC requested the JCS to solicit Defense Department guidance on the usage of reversion funds. Specifically, CINCPAC needed information on the actual projects to which $61 million had been committed, and programming constraints for the uncommitted $4 million and year of availability. On 19 May, the Defense response to the JCS listed $25 million for relocating Marine and Navy flying units from Naha to four other bases, and noted that dollar devaluation had reduced the $65 million to $54 million in purchasing power. The remaining $29 million, if broken into four increments, would amount to about $7 million for FY 74-77. CINCPAC's Service components would be expected to submit a requirements package for each of the four years, and CINCPAC would recommend the overall priorities for each year within a $7-10 million range.³

(6) Still later in May, CINCPAC was advised that the release of funds by Japan could possibly occur in uneven amounts or in entirety in the JFY 73 budget. Therefore, CINCPAC was directed to submit a package in any amount up

1. CINCPAC 140220Z Mar 72; J42 HistSum Mar 72.
3. CINCPAC 130026Z Apr 72, which cites ASD (I&L) Memo, 5 Nov 71, Subj: Marine Corps staging Area Project, White Beach, Okinawa; SECDEF 2288/192041Z May 72; J42 HistSum Apr-May 72.
to $35 million, with a copy provided to the U.S. Embassy and COMUSJAPAN, by mid-June 1972. An integrated project package of reversion-related construction was developed by a CINCPAC working group in close coordination with the component Services. The package was forwarded to ASD, the JCS, and Services headquarters on 16 June, and contained the $35 million priority listing and a supplemental list for $11 million as substitute candidates. The JCS validated the package and forwarded it to Defense on 28 June 1972.

On 17 August, ASD notified CINCPAC that 42 projects, amounting to $31.792 million, were approved as the first increment of Phase II ORRCP. The approval was for review purposes by the Embassy and the Government of Japan to determine those projects which were acceptable for inclusion in the JFY 73 budget submission. When acceptance was obtained from Japan, the projects would be formally released to the U.S. Army, as executive agent, for the preparation of construction criteria.

(U) On 31 August, COMUSJAPAN recommended that CINCPAC support to the Defense Department the substitution of a family housing project on Okinawa for some approved projects which COMUSJAPAN considered to be less essential. Consolidation of all Okinawa housing assets under joint management indicated a shortfall in the number of units needed to house all eligible military families. CINCPAC agreed that the shortage in family housing was critical; however, he did not believe that revision of the approved Phase II ORRCP was the answer. CINCPAC recalled that family housing had been discussed during the working group meeting, but had been deferred for accomplishment by other means. Moreover, great emphasis had already been placed on "people enhancement" projects to improve dormitories and barracks. A significant shortfall remained in facilities adequate to enhance the goals of the all volunteer force; nevertheless, a judicious balance between available funds and Service priorities was the prudent course. Another reason CINCPAC could not support the housing project request was the imminence of JFY 73 budget formulation, which could be upset by last minute program changes. Lastly, CINCPAC stated that the construction of new military housing would be highly visible to the Okinawan (Japanese) public, which could view this as representing a military buildup and an extended U.S. military presence. Under the existing political climate and pressure for accelerated base reductions on Okinawa, all ramifications of U.S. actions needed to be considered carefully. The welfare and morale projects in the approved program were improvements to existing facilities or replacements, and, as such, were comparatively low profile.

2. SECDEF 6704/172258Z Aug 72; J42 HistSum Aug 72.
3. COMUSJAPAN 310616Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 112100Z Sep 72; J42 HistSum Sep 72.
By December 1972, however, it appeared that U.S. concern for Japanese sensibilities was misplaced. Agreement had been reached between the U.S. and Japan in 1971 which involved four other bases in the removal of U.S. military from Naha Air Base. This relocation plan had come to be labeled the "billiard ball" plan. On 22 December 1972, the U.S. Embassy was presented with a new proposal by the Government of Japan (GOJ) which proposed, in effect, to remove one of the "billiard balls." The original agreed moves called for Navy units to move from Naha to Futema Air Base on Okinawa; Navy and Marine units from Naha to Kadena; and simultaneous movements of a KC-130 squadron from Futema to Iwakuni Air Base in Japan, and a Navy squadron from Iwakuni to Misawa Air Base in Japan.1

The new GOJ proposal was made because of "deeply-rooted opposition against any change to the status quo" by the people and officials at Iwakuni. Further, albeit belatedly, the GOJ cited "extremely strong opposition" to the move of Navy aircraft from Naha to Futema on Okinawa. In view of these "difficult political situations," the GOJ proposed that all air units using Naha Air Base be moved to Kadena. Then, noting the need to include "an early undertaking of financial measures which were understood between the two governments in course of Okinawa reversion talks," the GOJ requested a reply not later than 10 January 1973. Conditions to which the GOJ would be "willing to grant consideration" if the U.S. agreed to the new proposal were provided informally, including some projects which might be funded by the GOJ outside the $65 million package. The U.S. Embassy Charge d' Affaires noted that he had called to the attention of the GOJ representative the "unrealistic" deadline for response of 10 January.2

Unrealistic or not, CINCPAC recognized that political realities warranted serious consideration of the GOJ alternative proposal. Even though U.S. planning for the original "billiard ball" relocation was well along, CINCPAC requested his component commanders to submit estimates of the near and mid-term impact of force beddown and contingency plans of the new GOJ proposal. He also requested recommendations on specific tradeoffs of building projects within and outside of the originally agreed upon $65 million reversion fund. Based upon the replies from the Service components, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS, on 28 December 1972, a counter proposal which would make the GOJ alternative proposal acceptable to the U.S. In summary, the CINCPAC counter proposal recommended more base facility improvements than offered by the GOJ; consolidation of Air Force and Navy units, housing, and base support facilities at Kadena; housing at Misawa; and, the upgrading of Futema to jet-capable status to retain some degree of operational flexibility after release of Naha. CINCPAC requested the JCS to support his position as a starting point for negotiations with the GOJ.3

1. AMEMB Tokyo 13724/220925Z Dec 72.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 280852Z Dec 72; J42 HistSum Dec 72.
SECTION IV--PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS

POL Consumption

(U) Total POL consumption in the PACOM during 1972 reflected the renewed operational activity. The LINEBACKER I and II bombing campaigns against Vietnam caused a surge in POL consumption to about 121.4 million barrels. The peak of consumption in the PACOM had been reached in 1968, when 172 million barrels were used. Reductions in operations and force redepolyments had reduced consumption from 127.5 million barrels in 1970 to 97.3 million in 1971. By area, the consumption rates for Okinawa and Japan reflect the change in reporting after the 15 May 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan (see accompanying charts).

Management of Bulk Petroleum

(U) In 1971, CINCPAC had expressed strong reservations about DSA plans to centralize POL management. The unified command Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) system had functioned successfully in meeting the POL needs in the PACOM, CINCPAC stated. Thus, the collocation of proposed Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) field offices with the existing JPOs appeared to be a duplication of capability. CINCPAC recommended that the JPO be designated DSA representative, and that the Sub-Area Petroleum Offices function as contracting officer representatives.¹

(U) On 1 November 1972, a Defense Fuel Office, Pacific (DFOP) was established by DSA and collocated with CINCPAC's JPO. As the first step in the centralization of fuels management under DSA, the responsibilities of the DFOP were limited to contract administration and management of Quality Assurance Representatives in the PACOM. Final authority for POL logistics continued to be vested in CINCPAC.²

Pre-Positioned War Reserve Requirements (PWRR)

(U) In March 1972, the JCS requested unified commands to review and evaluate theater Service-prescribed PWRR for POL. One objective of the review was to determine whether the PWRR could be reduced on a selective basis. CINCPAC submitted his review to the JCS on 19 June 1972. The days of supply (DOS) objectives for PWRR POL were developed for four different resupply source alternatives. These were the West Coast, the Caribbean, the Gulf Coast, and

² DSA General Order No. 40, dated 13 Nov 72; J44 HistSum Nov 72.
# 1972 POL CONSUMPTION

(In thousands of barrels)

## BY PRODUCT

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<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
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**Revision Date** | 1 May 1972

**Total** | 7,868.4 | 7,815.3 | 8,000.9 | 9,207.9 | 11,740.8 | 11,497.0 | 10,840.2 | 10,756.2 | 11,067.1 | 9,878.1 | 11,077.5 | 121,378.3
the Arabian Gulf. Of the four alternatives, CINCPAC considered the West Coast of the CONUS to be the most valid. Sailing time from the West Coast was significantly lower than from the Gulf Coast or the Caribbean, and CINCPAC believed that, in wartime, the primary POL support to the PACOM would be from West Coast sources. Although the West Coast region depended primarily on POL imports, both crude and refined, it could be assumed that civilian consumption would be severely rationed in wartime, and the DOD requirements would have first priority. Also, seven million barrels of military stocks were stored in West Coast terminals. CINCPAC acknowledged that, after the first 60-90 days, resupply from the Gulf Coast might be required. However, in the critical early days, the West Coast would be the most reliable and expedient.  

In considering theater commercial assets, CINCPAC noted a tremendous growth of the petroleum productive base in the Pacific in recent years. A significant portion of current PACOM requirements were met from refineries in the PACOM area, either by contract destination delivery or by MSC tankers. Contractors had provided direct major support to combat operations in Southeast Asia since the early days of the conflict. Any evaluation of PWRP POL stocks should place some value, however conservative, on reasonably available commercial assets in the event of a general war. The acceptance of this concept, CINCPAC declared, would be perhaps the single most important benefit which could result from the review.  

In October, the JCS published new joint planning guidance for the determination of bulk POL PWRP, based on the reviews submitted and subsequent coordination with Service components. The JCS Memorandum discussed the reliance of wartime procurement on reliable industrial sources, and noted that U.S. military peacetime petroleum distribution patterns included foreign sources which could be denied in wartime. Primary source areas supplying U.S. Forces overseas included the Caribbean, Middle East, U.S. Gulf Coast, U.S. West Coast, Singapore, Taiwan, Guam, and the Canary Islands. If Middle East sources were not available, then Singapore, Taiwan, Guam, and the Canary Islands would be unreliable because a large portion of their crude supply came from the Middle East. Moreover, the strong national interests of the oil-producing countries and the possible Soviet influence in the area imposed doubt that Middle East sources would be available to the U.S. in wartime. Even if they were, they were vulnerable to interdiction by the Soviets. Therefore, planning factors for bulk POL storage would assume that petroleum resupply from the Middle East would not be available.  

1. Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 001395 of 19 Jun 72, Subj: Review of Bulk Petroleum Pre-positioned War Reserve Requirements, with 7 enclosures.  
2. Ibid.  
The JCS paper did not consider favorable CINCPAC's recommendation that the West Coast would be an expedient resupply source. Therefore, the Caribbean and Gulf Coast are considered to be the most reliable initial sources of crude and refined petroleum during wartime. The JCS directed that PWRR planning be based on those sources. Other planning factors were classified as CONUS terminal time, convoy makeup time, sailing time, overseas terminal holding time, terminal to user time, and a minimum safety level of at least 15 days. Commercial bulk petroleum stocks in overseas areas were accepted as a portion of total in-theater stockage, but unified commands were to submit annual assessments of the quantities which could safely be considered as available from such foreign country sources. The military Services retained the perogative to determine the actual quantity of commercial stores which would be applied against the PWRR. The recommendations of the unified commanders were to be considered.1

POL in Vietnam

In spite of the higher intensity of conflict which evolved in Vietnam during 1972, Vietnamization plans continued. The takeover of the POL system by the RVNAF was one goal which was reached by the end of the year.

POL Complex at Da Nang

By mid-year, all U.S. POL terminals in Vietnam had been turned over to the RVNAF except the POL complex at Da Nang. On 15 July 1972, a plan was developed which provided for a gradual assumption of operations by the RVNAF, with complete takeover scheduled for 1 September. The U.S. Army provided a residual force to control pipeline scheduling and tanker cross-loading and discharge for those MSC vessels still in the POL supply system for Military Regions 1 and 2. It was planned that commercial POL deliveries would begin by 1 January 1973, which would eliminate the need for MSC operations and USARV support personnel in Da Nang.2

The target date, 1 September, for the turnover of the entire Da Nang POL complex was met. However, COMUSMACV cautioned that negotiations for commercial delivery should be completed as soon as possible, because POL for Military Regions 1 and 2 was vital to continued military operations in those regions.3

End of POL Supply by MSC

On 9 December 1972, the last MSC tanker to deliver POL to Vietnam de-

1. Ibid.; J44 HistSum Nov 72.
2. COMUSMACV 270907Z Jul 72; J44 HistSum Jul 72.
parted Vietnam waters. In mid-December, tankers owned by Shell and Esso commenced delivery, thus ending seven years of MSC POL deliveries to Vietnam. Shuttle tankers operated by MSC, however, continued in operation, as noted previously. By the end of the year, only two shuttle tankers remained in service, and these were expected to be released in January 1973.1

POL in the Philippines

Heavy rains and massive flooding in the Philippines during 1972 contributed to a one month interruption of POL pipeline supply from Subic Bay to Clark Air Base. On 1 August, the 405th Fighter Wing at Clark reported that erosion to the pipeline right-of-way had caused three critical wash-outs requiring shoring and back-fill. At that time, sufficient fuel inventory was on hand for approximately 30 days of normal operations, but a rupture of the pipeline could be critical. When, on 4 August, pumping was resumed, a pipeline rupture did, in fact, occur. On 5 August, Thirteenth Air Force at Clark requested that the KC-135 tanker force at Clark be relocated to Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan, which was done. Meanwhile, continued monsoon weather conditions delayed repair of the pipeline rupture, which was completed on 23 August. After intensive pressure tests, normal pumping was resumed on 1 September 1972.2

The Subic-Clark pipeline is 41.5 miles long, 10 inches in diameter, and buried from 3 to 10 feet underground. In 1971, CINCPAC had concurred in Air Force plans to convert the pipeline to a full multi-product service; i.e., add the ground fuels, such as MOGAS and diesel, to the existing aviation fuel capability. The object was to reduce the possibility of Clark and Subic base operations being paralyzed by labor strikes or interdiction of fuel truck distribution by dissident groups. Action had been initiated by PACAF to obtain funds for the conversion, and construction had been scheduled to begin in May 1972. However, no progress had been reported on the project by the end of 1972.3

POL Monobuoy

As the operational tempo in support of Southeast Asia increased, so

1. MSCU 4020/100945Z Dec 72; COMUSMACV 010130Z Dec 72; MSCFE 3120/110452Z Dec 72; J44 HistSum Dec 72.
2. 405 FW 011000Z Aug 72; CINCPACREP PHIL 4020/040627Z Aug 72; CINCPACAF 052305Z Aug 72; SAP0 PHIL 180500Z Aug 72; Memo, MGEN Murray to LGEN Corcoran, 24 Aug 72, Subj: Subic Bay-Clark AB POL Pipeline Repairs; 405 FW 300130Z Aug 72; J44 HistSum Aug 72; J44 Point Paper, 7 Feb 73, Subj: POL Pipeline, Subic Bay-Clark AB, Philippines.
did the throughput of POL at Subic Bay. Consequently, consideration was given to reactivation of the monobuoy which had been inactivated in July 1971. Among the agencies favoring activation was the MSC, so that deep draft tankers could be discharged. On 31 May 1972, the CINCPAC representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREP PHIL) recommended against activating the monobuoy. Concerning the use of deep draft tankers, CINCPACREP PHIL observed that shore tankage was a limiting factor, and that, by the time sufficient ullage could be created to receive the giant tanker cargo, Subic's reserve would be critically low. Furthermore, because of the diverse customer usage, unpredictable operations schedule of the Fleet, and the limited tankage, many small cargoes were needed each month rather than several large cargoes. CINCPACREP PHIL concluded that reactivation of the monobuoy would create more problems than it could solve. Because storage and usage patterns ruled out giant tankers, smaller vessels would have to be used. Turnaround time at the POL pier was less than had been required when the monobuoy had been used. No advantage would accrue to MSC if turnaround time was increased by discharging at the monobuoy, and an equal number of personnel would be needed for a one-ship monobuoy discharge as was being used at the POL pier for a two-ship discharge.\footnote{1}

\footnote{The Naval Supply Depot (NSD) at Subic agreed that, unless a significant increase in the tempo of operations occurred, POL throughput could be handled without the monobuoy. On 3 June, the Commander, Service Force, Pacific (COMSERVPAC) stressed that the monobuoy should be maintained in full operational status for contingency requirements. Accordingly, NSD was directed to conduct a full inspection of the monobuoy and initiate procurement action to replace and repair all defective parts. The monobuoy was to be restored to operational condition as soon as possible. On 18 June, CINCPAC advised all concerned that the level of POL supply to the Philippines may have peaked, and that reactivation of the monobuoy was not considered to be necessary at that time. In passing, CINCPAC noted that rehabilitation of the monobuoy had escalated from a 45-day, $70,000 project to a potential 120-day, $200,000 scope which would require periodic evaluation of the necessity and desirability of various facets of the project.\footnote{2}}

\footnote{1} CINCPACREP PHIL 4000/310746Z May 72.
\footnote{2} COMSERVPAC 4000/030029Z Jun 72, which cites NSD Subic 300947Z May 72; CINCPAC 180058Z Jun 72; J44 HistSum Jun 72.
SECTION V--MUNITIONS

Air Munitions

(M) As a result of the intensified air campaign in Southeast Asia in 1972, including substantial tactical air, B-52, and support aircraft force augmentation, the in-theater stores of 500-lb. (MK-82) and 750-lb. (M-117) conventional bombs were drastically reduced. It became evident that increased production and interim draw-down of world-wide assets would be necessary to maintain the high sortie rates. On 24 May 1972, CINCPAC addressed this problem to the JCS, noting the need for increased production of general purpose bombs. The JCS directed CINCPAC to assign allocation priorities, by user, of the projected production. In response, CINCPAC submitted the approved and funded general purpose bomb schedule, and the current assets versus programmed expenditures. A monthly allocation of assets at a reduced rate was proposed to maintain the minimum sustaining level, as well as a proposed substitution of less preferred munitions.¹

(XX) On 15 June, the JCS informed CINCPAC that world-wide general purpose bomb assets could be made available, but requested CINCPAC to host a conference on 20-22 June to identify alternate methods of supporting current sortie levels, including substitution of less preferred munitions. This meeting was attended by representatives of the JCS, CSAF, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), SAC, and Service components. It was determined that moderate substitutions of less preferred munitions, such as MK-81, MK-83, and MK-84, would support the mission with no degradation through 1972. It was assumed, however, that the in-theater force structure would remain constant through December 1972; that sortie rates and operational planning factors would not change; that world-wide weapon assets could be used if necessary; that production of the less preferred bombs could be increased; and that an adjustment of shipping schedules to move munitions from the production line to the user more rapidly might be accomplished.²

(XX) On 7 July, the JCS approved the CINCPAC expenditure and allocation projections for use of MK-82/M-117 bombs, and requested immediate notice of any developments which could significantly affect air munitions support for Southeast Asia forces. The next day, 8 July, CINCPAC directed the redistribution of theater MK-83 assets to establish an initial level of supply for substitute bombs. On 26 July, CINCPAC requested resolution of Service funding

1. CINCPAC 240432Z May 72; JCS 282122Z May 72; CINCPAC 072216Z Jun 72; all cited in CINCPAC 012121Z Jul 72.
2. CINCPAC 012121Z Jul 72; J3B21 Point Paper, 3 Jul 72; Subj: Munitions Shortfall.
SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS
(Short Tons)
INVENTORY/EXPENDITURES
AS OF 31 DEC 1972

- Average End of Month Inventory for Past 12 Months
- Average Monthly Expenditures for Past 12 Months

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 111.
SEASIA
AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES (SHORT TONS)
JAN 1968 THRU DEC 1972

THOUSANDS OF TONS

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 114.
problems and establishment of a pipeline for resupply of MK-83 assets, which would be exhausted after August 1972. CINCPAC noted that a further delay in accelerated MK-83 and MK-84 production could adversely affect air munitions support for Southeast Asia Forces.1

On 2 August, the CNO advised the CSAF that production of MK-83 bombs was being pressed to the maximum with Navy funds in view of the lack of Air Force funding. However, Navy funds could sustain production only until November, and Air Force funds were needed by mid-August to avoid termination of production. The CNO advised CINCPAC that firm production schedules would be provided when available, but estimated a year-end shortfall of Air Force MK-83 requirements of 21,000 bombs.2

On 5 August, CINCPAC issued the second CINCPAC Ammunition Transfer Order (CATO) since the June conference. As did the first, this order directed the transfer of MK-83 bombs from Navy assets to support Air Force requirements in Southeast Asia. In October, CINCPAC again hosted a conference to plan for munition support based on revised production figures supplied by the JCS. By that time, another air munitions shortfall—cluster bomb units (CBU) 24/58—appeared imminent. On 2 August, CINCPAC reviewed the expenditure rate from January to June 1972, and noted that a serious shortfall could develop unless expenditures were closely controlled. Consequently, CINCPAC recommended to MACV that, once again, operational tradeoffs be evaluated and suitable mixes with less preferred ordnance be developed. At the same time, CINCPAC asked CSAF whether CBU-58 production could be increased. The Air Force reply cited production difficulties, and estimated that CBU-58 output from August through December would total 17,125 units. Considering that the CBU-24 was no longer in production, and that the combined expenditures of the two munitions in May and June alone had been 15,500, it was apparent that CINCPAC's concern was justified.3

Another indication of a potential shortage concerned CBU-55 munitions. On 26 July, the CSAF requested accelerated delivery of the Air Force FY 73 buy of CBU-55. The CNO advised that production lead time was six months, but that the current Navy production could be diverted to the Air Force, since CINCPACFLT had no foreseeable combat requirement through 1972. All Navy production was diverted to the Air Force, with repayment in kind to Navy stocks after Air Force needs were met.4

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1. JCS 6688/071601Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 262239Z Jul 72, which cites CINCPAC 080451Z and CNO 192117Z Jul 72.
2. CNO 8000/021435Z Aug 72.
3. CINCPAC 020026Z Aug 72; CSAF 082106Z Aug 72.
4. CNO 8000/021820Z Aug 72, which cites CSAF 261358Z Jul 72 and CINCPACFLT 312301Z Jul 72.
Ground Munitions-Vietnam

By July 1972, the surge of operational activity in Vietnam had reduced in-country ground munitions to a critical level. The 90-day stockage level for the ARVN and the 60-day level for MEDTC in support of FANK operations in Cambodia were both short of the required tonnage. Special air mission resupply had been used during the initial heavy consumption period. By September, the only ground munition which remained at critical levels was 105mm high explosive cartridges. In a paper prepared for the incoming CINCPAC, Admiral Noel Gayler, the logistics staff noted an astronomical expenditure of 105mm rounds. In March 1972, the rate had been 750,000 rounds. For August, the rate had risen to 2.1 million rounds. World-wide assets and CONUS production together could support such a rate only through 1972. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics recommended that CINCPAC discuss with MACV the effectiveness of ARVN management controls over ammunition expenditures.1

Post Cease-Fire Munitions-Southeast Asia

Air, ground, and naval munitions for the Vietnam Armed Forces were supplied directly from U.S. supply sources—USARPAC for ground, Hill Air Force Base, Utah for air, and the Naval Supply Depot at Subic Bay for naval munitions. Review and validation of RVNAF munitions requirements, the responsibility of MACV during 1972, were expected to be accomplished by the planned DRSTO in Saigon after cease-fire. The projected stockage level in Vietnam was 195,000 short tons.2

No significant changes were expected in munitions supply procedures in Thailand after a cease-fire. Supply levels at each U.S. operated air base in Thailand would be maintained at the 45-day level. USARSUPTHAI would maintain a 90-day level (19,200 short tons) for Laos at Takhli, Korat, and when the planned relocation of MEDTC-Rear from Vietnam to Thailand took place, USARSUPTHAI would support Cambodia with approximately 9,000 short tons.3

The stockage objective for Laos (19,200 short tons) included a 90-day

supply of ground and 60-day supply of air munitions. Ownership of munitions was retained by the U.S. Military Department until the shipment arrived at Thailand depots, at which time assets were billed to the Laos MASF program. The fiscal accounting required by the Symington Amendment applied when the assets crossed the Thai/Laos border. A 15-day air/ground level was maintained in Laos. The types of munitions needed in both Laos and Cambodia were almost identical. Thus, the SCOOT and COLOGS pipeline could be used with great flexibility to support both countries.1

SECTION VI--TRANSPORTATION

(U) As discussed in Section II of this chapter, transportation was the main theme of the retrograde program in the PACOM. Other facets of transportation which were of continuing interest to the CINCPAC staff included Military Airlift Command (MAC) inter-theater channels, intra-theater air-and-sea lift, the C-130 transport force level, and the difficulties connected with support to Cambodia and Thailand under adverse tactical and political conditions.

MAC Channel Service to Vietnam

In January 1972, the U.S. Army in Vietnam (USARV) advised that plans for the closure of the Da Nang and Long Binh personnel replacement centers in April were being prepared. On 28 February, USARV requested formally that MAC passenger channels into Da Nang and Bien Hoa be discontinued by 30 April. In March, MAC requested that consideration be given to the discontinuance of MAC cargo channels to Cam Ranh Bay by 31 May 1972, discontinuance of all MAC channels to Da Nang, and cargo channels between Dover and Kelly Air Force Bases in the CONUS and Bien Hoa as soon as possible. By September, Saigon was the principal CONUS cargo and passenger POE for regular MAC service to Vietnam.¹

Thailand Inter-Theater Airlift

In September 1971, daily MAC C-141 service had begun from Clark Air Base, Philippines to Thailand bases at Bangkok, Korat, Ubon, Nakhon Phanom, and Udorn. This new service eliminated the stopover at Bangkok of U.S. Air Force personnel enroute to Thailand up-country bases. In November 1971, C-141 cargo and mail service was instituted between Bangkok and the up-country bases, and on 1 January 1972, MAC C-141 service from Clark to U-Tapao began. Use of the MAC aircraft had reduced the in-country demand for CINCPAC's C-130 resources to two aircraft which serviced smaller bases, plus one C-130 for the weekly run from Thailand to Diego Garcia.²

On 7 January, however, the CSAF proposed that MAC C-141 service between Clark and U-Tapao, as well as all intra-Thailand service, be discontinued. CINCPAC interposed no objections to the reduction of intra-Thailand MAC support so long as the airlift requirements of his component Services were met. The alter-

ention of MAC service was proposed in two phases; the first would continue one C-141 flight from Clark to Tan Son Nhut to Thailand daily, with augmentation by two C-130s, for a total of five C-130s rotating from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan to Thailand. Short term TDY of 16 maintenance personnel would also be needed. The second phase, to begin about 1 April 1972, would involve basing the C-130s in Thailand, with requirements for ramp space, housing for 50 aircrew personnel, 45 maintenance personnel, and doubling the manning of the Airlift Control Element (ALCE) for 24-hour operation. On 2 March, CINCPACAF requested CINCPAC to initiate country clearance to increase the C-130 rotation to five aircraft and 16 TDY personnel. CINCPAC was also requested to determine whether sufficient tradeoff spaces were available from PACOM resources to accommodate 93 Air Force personnel in Thailand for the second phase changeover.1

These early 1972 plans regarding Thailand support were overtaken by the need to support renewed operational activity after the North Vietnam Easter offensive and resumption of full-scale bombing in the North. Takhli RTAFB, from which all U.S. Forces except caretaker had been withdrawn, was reopened for U.S. Air Force deployments. As discussed in Section III of this chapter, U.S. Marine air units had deployed to Nam Phong. On 15 June 1972, a MAC CONUS to Korat cargo channel was reinstated to support PACAF units at Korat and Takhli, and on 30 June, MAC cargo/passenger channels were approved from Cubi Point in the Philippines to Bien Hoa and Nam Phong. The latter were to support Marine units deployed at both locations.2

On 2 July, new MAC passenger channels between Cubi Point and Iwakuni, Japan and Cubi to Kadena, Okinawa were requested, as was a CONUS to Takhli passenger channel to support Air Force units at Takhli. The Cubi to Iwakuni and Kadena channels were approved on 31 August. The passenger channel from CONUS to Takhli was also approved.3

In September, CINCPACFLT recommended that the Marine support channels between Japan, Okinawa, Vietnam, and Thailand be flown directly, eliminating the need for double processing of passengers at Cubi Point. This recommendation was supported by MAC and the 22 AF at Travis. In October, MAC cargo channels were established from Tinker Air Force Base to Korat and Takhli to support Air Force requirements.4

1. Ibid; CINCPACAF 020147Z Mar 72, which cites CSAF 072157Z Jan 72 and CINCPAC 162202Z Feb 72.
4. 22AF 290140Z Sep 72, which cites CINCPACFLT 132112Z and 132113Z, both Sep 72; J471 HistSum Oct 72.
Thailand Customs Problem

During 1972, an apparent paradox in RTG attitudes toward the U.S. created some impediments to in-country logistics movements. Although the RTG had accepted the higher profile of renewed operations against North Vietnam on the one hand, a hardening of policy toward support of the operations developed on the other hand.

In June 1971, the U.S. Air Force had proposed a test of containerized munitions delivery by surface vessel to the port of Sattahip. The containers would then be moved to their destination in-country by commercial carrier, which would provide chassis, tractors, and materiel handling equipment. By early 1972, plans for containerized delivery to Thailand and Kompong Som, Cambodia by 1 April and July 1972, respectively, had been formulated. These plans included general cargo and reefer cargo as well as munitions.1

In April 1972, the U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) advised that major problems had been overcome, and, on 31 May, 50 containers arrived at Sattahip. These were delivered to consignees without problems. Suddenly, between 16 June and 20 June, all containers then in-country were impounded by the (Thai) Tax Suppression Board. In addition to the impoundment of the Sea-Land containers, Thai customs officials declared that all sea shipments must be cleared prior to leaving the port in the future. On 21 June, a second shipment of 97 containers arrived in port, but were held pending resolution of the problem. On 30 June, a 101-container shipment intended for Sattahip was diverted to Cam Ranh Bay, primarily because of the unresolved customs problem. On 26 June 1972, the RTG extended the requirements for customs clearance to the receipt of cargo on MAC-chartered commercial aircraft. This dictum did not apply, however, to military aircraft.2

As a result of the delay of two to four days delay encountered in onward movement of commercially flown cargo, CINCPAC, on 19 July 1972, imposed an embargo against further contract carrier deliveries to Thailand. Meanwhile, the movement of Sea-Land vans into Thailand and subsequent linehaul delivery up-country was stymied by the reluctance of the RTG to permit the introduction of chassis and vans unless penalties were paid. Early in July, the U.S. Embassy indicated that the basic problem with containerized cargo was that a major shift in logistics mode had been initiated without fully informing the RTG of its pur-

1. J4631 HistSum Jun 71; CINCPACAF 2403132 Jun 71; J471 Point Paper, 11 Mar 72, Subj: Containerized Shipments to Thailand and Cambodia.
pose. By the end of July, Sea-Land Service, Inc. had paid its fines and taxes, and commercial delivery was resumed.¹

(9) In spite of the acquiescence of the commercial carrier to payment of taxes and fines, the container movement problem continued. During August, the movement of Sea-Land vans into Thailand and subsequent up-country delivery was hampered by continued reluctance of customs officials to clear the container vans. This was particularly true for vans containing items such as beer and cigarettes. When, also in August, the U.S. asked permission for temporary routing of MAC contract aircraft into Takhli, Udorn, Korat, and Ubon, permission was denied. The reason given by the RTG was a shortage of immigration and customs officials to provide the clearances required by Thai law. The RTG, moreover, considered the visibility of U.S. commercial carriers transiting inland bases as politically undesirable. The Embassy, therefore, felt that further efforts to obtain RTG approval for up-country landing rights would not be productive.²

(9) Still more evidence of Thai intransigence was available in connection with the berthing of tankers. Large tankers had regularly been berthed at Sattahip by Thai pilots for years without incident. In July 1972, the RTG and Thai pilots stated that tankers exceeding 625 feet and 34 foot draft would not be berthed. After several incidents of refusal by Thai to berth tankers, which were perforce berthed by the masters of ships, a U.S. Navy pilot was assigned to Sattahip on berthing duty. Subsequently, the RTG advised MACTHAI that only Thai pilots could be used in Thailand ports, and the Navy pilot was withdrawn on 11 September 1972. Further investigation revealed that pilotage is not compulsory at Sattahip. Although the use of U.S. pilots is illegal, ships' masters may berth their ships.³

MAC Service to Singapore

(9) In June 1971, the Defense Department authorized the negotiation of contracts for aircraft maintenance and repair in Singapore. The FY 72 aircraft repair program in Singapore amounted to about $2.2 million, and existing U.S. Navy ship repair programs amounted to approximately $1.5 million. The need for timely movement of parts to support the aircraft and ship repairs generated a request by the Air Force Logistics Command to establish a weekly C-141 Flight from Clark Air Base to Singapore. The estimated cargo weight for Air Force and Navy parts was 90,000 lbs. monthly.⁴

The requested weekly flight was approved by CSAF for cargo and passenger service on 26 November 1971. The scheduled 1 January 1972 starting date for C-141 service was delayed until 2 February because of runway repairs at Changi Airport, Singapore. Each flight thereafter carried an average payload of 20 short tons.1

C-130 Force Level

In response to the Tet offensive in 1968, the number of C-130 squadrons assigned to the PACOM had risen to 14. Declining activity had enabled CINCPAC to approve incremented withdrawals of C-130 assets until, in early 1972, the C-130 force level stood at five squadrons. This airlift capability was augmented for short term contingency missions by MAC C-141 aircraft under the nickname OLD MAP. In March 1972, PACAF requested authority to deactivate the 774th Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS) at Clark Air Base beginning 1 April 1972. MACV was requested to review the C-130 workload in view of the PACAF request and submit the results to CINCPAC for evaluation.2

The resurgence of air operations, and the attendant increase of airlift requirements, prompted CINCPAC to ask the JCS for a delay in reduction of the C-130 Force. Further, CINCPAC also requested that JCS arrange for the loan of 10 C-130 aircraft from U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) resources. The JCS approved and REDCOM was tasked to deploy the aircraft for beddown at Ching Chuan Kang in Taiwan.3

In May 1972, as a result of CINCPAC’s review of anticipated airlift needs and determination that two C-130 squadrons were needed to augment the five squadrons in the theater, the JCS directed REDCOM to deploy two C-130E squadrons to Taiwan for 179 days. In July, CINCPAC notified the JCS that two of the PACOM C-130 squadrons could be released; the JCS, therefore, approved the previously planned inactivation of the 774th TAS at Clark and the redeployment of one REDCOM squadron, both effective 1 September 1972.4

In September and October, the combination of operational support and maintenance downtime was vitiating the authorized 80 aircraft force level; dur-

1. Ibid.
4. JCS 2142/112216Z May 72, which cites JCS 5110/280019Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 072256Z and 102301Z, both May 72; J471 HistSum May, Aug 72.
In September, the average operationally ready and possessed aircraft available to CINCPAC was 66 C-130s. On 4 October, CINCPAC advised PACAF of the need to maintain the five squadron level and improve the status of possessed aircraft.1

CINCPAC plans for post cease-fire beddown and location of C-130 forces were two-fold. In the short term, the five squadron level would be used to provide in-country support to Vietnam. The main force of C-130s would continue to be located in Taiwan. However, basing for intra-Vietnam support in Thailand for contingency operations might be needed. CINCPAC advised MACTHAI that country clearance for such deployments should be maintained. CINCPAC plans in the long term envisioned an eventual reduction of C-130 squadrons in the theater to three.2

Transportation Support to MEDT Cambodia

In October 1971, the JCS had tasked CINCPAC to develop a time-phased logistical plan which would shift Cambodian logistical support from dependence on Vietnam as part of the LOC. In response, CINCPAC developed a plan the nucleus of which was the use of the Kompong Som port and peninsula as the primary terminal and in-transit storage area for receipt of U.S. MAP materiel. A test of this plan began in November 1971. The first shipment of 25 vehicles was delivered to Kompong Som on 1 January 1972, and was convoyed overland to Phnom Penh on 15 January.3

The second increment of test shipping, consisting of 79 trucks, was off-loaded at Kompong Som on 3 February 1972. Twenty-five of these trucks were distributed locally, and 54 were convoyed overland to Phnom Penh. The third and last increment of the test was completed on 11 March, when 211 vehicles were received at Kompong Som. Utilization of the port was considered to have been proved feasible and full use was scheduled.4

In view of the successful conclusion of the Kompong Som system test, CINCPAC requested the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) to designate a single CONUS POE for MAP cargo consigned to Cambodia. This would facilitate the accumulation of sufficient general cargo and vehicles for direct shipment and possible use of containers. CINCPAC followed that request

1. CINCPAC 040427Z Oct 72; J471 HistSum Sep 72.

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with a query to MEDTC about the feasibility of containerization of MAP shipments to Cambodia. CINCPAC noted that containerization was also under consideration for Thailand, as discussed earlier in this chapter, and declared that a container system appeared to be the best long-range method for Cambodia as well.1

On 1 April, MEDTC replied that the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) did not have the capability to use milvan or 20 ton commercial trailers. They lacked the skills, port equipment, and tractors. Further, they did not have the foreign exchange resources to contract for such an operation. FANK had, however, demonstrated the ability to handle and transport conex containers, using existing material handling equipment and flat-bed trucks. MEDTC agreed that the best method for moving MAP cargo would be by sealed, throughput containers. Experience in Vietnam had shown losses from combat action were likely to be less than losses from breakage and pilferage. However, the use of throughput containers presented a procedural problem because, unlike Vietnam, title to MAP cargo passed to the Khmer Government upon offloading at the port of entry.2

On 8 April, MEDTC requested that incoming MAP Cambodia cargo be diverted from Vietnam to Kompong Som, and on 21 April, MTMTS directed that all cargo for Cambodia be directed to New Orleans for consolidation and onward shipment. CINCPAC acknowledged the foregoing, and requested MTMTS to consider the development of container service to Thailand concurrent with a container service to Cambodia. CINCPAC, in view of the MEDTC remarks concerning FANK ability to process containers, also noted that containers could be unstuffed at Kompong Som and the empties picked up by return voyage from Sattahip in Thailand. In May 1972, both MSC and MTMTS advised CINCPAC that projected cargo tonnage to Cambodia was insufficient to support both container service and the single dedicated port concept which had been previously established.3

The offensive mounted by North Vietnam, the renewed air operations against the North, and the level of enemy activity in Cambodia were all factors in the decision to support Cambodia from Thailand which was discussed in Section I of this chapter.

The effort to develop viable ground LOC to Cambodia was accompanied by the need for alternate means to deliver air cargo. In May 1972, MEDTC advised CINCPAC that diplomatic clearance had been obtained for 15 flights per week for movement of MAP cargo from U-Tapao, Thailand to Cambodia.4

1. CINCPAC 070501Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 110043Z Mar 72; J472 HistSum Mar 72.
2. MEDTC FWD 1931/011235Z Apr 72.
3. CINCPAC 180042Z Apr 72, which cites CHMEDTC FWD 08023Z Apr 72; COMTMTS 211327Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 220508Z Apr 72; COMSC 031809Z May 72; COMTMTS 022040Z June 72; J472 HistSum Apr, May 72.
4. MEDTC FWD 3142/230240Z May 72, which cites CINCPAC 202317Z May 72 and COMUSMACTHAI 160430Z May 72; J471 HistSum May 72.
In April 1971 CINCPAC had directed COMUS Korea to undertake the development of a national telecommunications system for the Republic of Korea (ROK), capable of serving both civilian and military requirements. The plan for such a system would minimize duplication of existing facilities, enhance the ROK capability to assume total communications-electronics support, and provide for retention of U.S. control over U.S. command and control and special/integrated networks. CINCPAC indicated that the U.S. Mission should be consulted in the preparation of the plan, and that plans to use Defense Communications System (DCS) equipment or facilities would have to be approved by the JCS. The plan that was subsequently developed was modeled generally after the Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP) developed for Vietnam and a similar plan for Thailand.

At the end of 1971, CINCPAC awaited approval by the JCS of the plan that had been developed. The JCS approved the Single Integrated Telecommunications System-Korea (SITS-K) plan on 28 January. Approval for release of portions of the plan to the ROK was still pending in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On 19 February CINCPAC provided guidance to his components, COMUS Korea, and the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific on the plan. He noted that the SITS-K program would provide the central direction and basis for all communications-electronics plans and programs for Korea through FY 76. All plans by the Service components were to be formulated so as to conform to the SITS-K program. The concept of integrating the various military communications systems in Korea was strongly supported. The integration of civil and military systems, however, could present difficult and unique problems. Questions of operational control, management direction, operations and maintenance, and improvement-modernization efforts would have to be carefully addressed. Telecommunications improvements aided by the U.S. military should encourage and complement an overall long-term communications development strategy for the country. Projects should maximize the dual utility of telecommunications on the basis that resources were too limited for single
purpose projects. Joint projects with the Agency for International Development should be considered whenever feasible.

CINCPAC continued that the ultimate goal should be to develop a National Telecommunications System for Korea that would be capable of serving both civil and military requirements. It then followed that the capability of the ROK Government to assume the total communications-electronics support mission should be enhanced. Communications required for U.S. command control and special/dedicated networks, however, while most assuredly interfacing and interconnecting with the national system, were to remain under U.S. control. It would also be necessary to address contingency re-entry requirements.

CINCPAC advised that unilaterally developed plans and programs, not in full accord with the SITS-K, were to be subject to CINCPAC review and concurrence prior to final approval or funding action. In each such case the views and recommendations of COMUS Korea were to be sought.\(^1\)

The interface and interconnection of the DCS with the ROK Army and Air Force systems had begun early in the year and was operational in the spring.

On 13 June COMUS Korea delivered the plan to the ROK, less two annexes. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) had approved the basic concepts and objectives of the plan, but had stated that release of Annex F (Korean Ministry of Communications Systems) and Annex T (Korean National Telecommunications Systems) to the ROK Government was "not favorably considered at this time." The approval, comments, and recommendations of the ROK Government had been requested on the furnished plan.\(^2\)

COMUS Korea had requested reconsideration of the restrictions placed on the release of Annexes F and T. He noted that during preparation of the plan it had been concluded by COMUS Korea and Agency for International Development officials that the best approach would be to strive for a National Telecommunications System. He also cited the trend by the ROK Ministry of National Defense to centralize its functions. Also the Ministers of National Defense and Communications had (on 4 November 1971) signed an agreement calling for the mutual, no-cost exchange of their available circuitry. Denying them the annexes precluded COMUS Korea's pursuance of the concept of a completely integrated system.\(^3\)

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1. CINCPAC 190326Z Feb 72.
3. COMUS KOREA 170949Z May 72.
CINCPAC advised the JCS that he concurred in and fully supported COMUS Korea's position. He recommended early release of Annexes F and T to the Koreans as well as active encouragement of the integration of Korean telecommunications systems under centralized ROK Government management (while assuring U.S. control of U.S. command-control systems).\(^1\)

Meanwhile, the ROK Army microwave systems had been expanded with the United States gaining use of 60 channels for alternate routing from Seoul to Taegu and Pulmosan, greatly enhancing survivability. The ROK Army system and the Defense Communications System were interconnected at Seoul, Paldongsan, and Pulmosan. Also, on-the-job training of ROK military personnel in frequency management had been completed.\(^2\)

**Post-Hostilities Communications-Electronics Planning---Thailand**

The plan that had been devised for Thailand at the conclusion of hostilities was called the COMUSMACTHAI Communications-Electronics Phaseout/Turnover Schedule Thailand 1-70. The plan had been approved by the JCS in October 1970 as a basis for further planning, but most aspects of the plan had not yet been implemented. On 16 February 1972 CINCPAC reaffirmed his previous recommendation to hold in abeyance unimplemented portions of the plan. If the JCS did not consider this acceptable, he recommended that the requirement for semi-annual review of the plan be changed to require only an annual review and update. CINCPAC also forwarded his recommended additions and deletions to the schedule.\(^3\)

The JCS concurred that future reviews should be annual with the next scheduled for review by the JCS on 1 June 1973. CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI to prepare the annual update to arrive at CINCPAC's Headquarters not later than 15 May 1973.\(^4\)

On 4 August, after several years of planning and review of the Thai communications systems and the approach of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) to those systems, CINCPAC recommended a change in U.S. policy. Back in 1969 CINCPAC had submitted a post-hostilities concept that envisioned the integration of RTARF and U.S. long-haul requirements into a residual U.S. Integrated Communications System (ICS) with ultimate turnover of that residual ICS to the

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1. CINCPAC 252316Z May 72.
3. CINCPAC 160323Z Feb 72.
RTARF; the JCS had conurred in this concept. The Secretary of Defense, however, had directed that maximum use be made of the Thai Government’s civil communications system to satisfy U.S. and Allied requirements wherever practical and economical. He had further stated that excess equipment that would achieve RTARF combat readiness should be considered for turnover to them and other excess equipment of the ICS should be considered for turnover to the Thai Government for expansion and improvement of its civil communications system. In this case, the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT), a state enterprise with a profit motive. The TOT system had been tested in 1971 and CINCPAC had recommended that use of the TOT to satisfy U.S., Allied, and RTARF military requirements be adopted as a valid concept and that COMUSMACTHAI develop and include plans for the gradually increasing use of the TOT in the post-hostilities phaseout/turnover schedule. In the spring of 1972 the matter of leasing circuits from the TOT had been studied. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) had requested information on proposed locations where leased services could replace U.S. military communications links and trade-off costs resulting from deactivation of the military links as well as the number of links by location and type for the extension of leased circuits from each TOT terminating point to the U.S. location, including any costs involved in purchase of additional equipment by the TOT where the U.S. was expected to pay for such purchases. He also asked for identification of U.S. civil government circuit requirements that would be transferred from U.S. military communications links to leased services and projected costs.

1) On 1 July CINCPAC provided detailed information in response to the Deputy Secretary’s questions. In the final analysis this information substantiated that it would be neither practical nor economical to pursue a leasing program. CINCPAC, therefore, recommended that no further consideration be given to a leasing program. The Thailand Country Team concurred in this recommendation. 2

2) CINCPAC provided additional information to the JCS. He noted that the phaseout/turnover schedule further visualized the integration of the RTARF long-haul communications requirements within the framework of a main TOT trunking system and that RTARF tactical equipment would be used to extend service off the TOT into outlying areas depending upon the threat situation. The ultimate goal was RTARF total reliance on the TOT and reduction of the individual Service long-haul systems, which would enhance self-sufficiency. Therefore, integration of the existing RTARF systems was not encouraged. It

2. CINCPAC 042347Z Aug 72, which cited CINCPAC 012339Z Jul 72.
was becoming more evident, however, that integration was the main thrust of the communications division of the Supreme Command Headquarters (SCHQJ6), and upgrading of existing systems was the goal of the Services with minimum reliance on the TOT, sufficient in their estimation to satisfy U.S. pressure. Evidence of RTARF reliance on military systems and deferral or possible rejection of the TOT usage concept was manifold and CINCPAC cited several examples. CINCPAC noted that although COMUSMACTHAI had discouraged the development of existing RTARF systems, the SCHQJ6 was pursuing its integration through the Military Telecommunications Agency (MTA, similar to the U.S. Defense Communications Agency). Tacit approval may have been given by the Supreme Headquarters Chief of Staff, it appeared.

CINCPAC then addressed the TOT. Our approach, he noted, had been toward RTARF and U.S. use of that system, and he had envisioned possible turnover of certain excess fixed ICS equipment to assist in making that system more viable. He believed, however, that the TOT would become a viable system through its normal five-year expansion programs, although this process could be advanced depending on the extent of any U.S. leasing. Although the TOT had stated that it could fulfill all military requirements in Thailand, the problem was that it would take a considerable outlay of funds by the leasee so that the TOT could purchase necessary additional equipment. Even with the money provided, it took from a year to 18 months from time of firm commitment until a line was ready for traffic. But the profit motive was uppermost with the TOT and when COMUSMACTHAI had queried them about the possibility of establishing a link that would provide an alternate route to the Northeast and Udorn (with U.S. provided equipment), the response was that it was not commercially feasible.

As the RTARF continued to plan and expend funds for the expansion and integration of military systems, CINCPAC examined the advantages and disadvantages. He noted that an integrated system built with existing RTARF assets could be in conflict with the Defense Department's goal of self-sufficiency because it could require continued MAP support for an indefinite period of time. Recent Thai planning and expenditures might evidence that they were getting an early start on self-sufficiency.

If the RTARF were not planning on extensive use of the TOT, integration of the military systems was the next most logical approach and offered several advantages, which CINCPAC listed, reducing costs and streamlining management.

CINCPAC, therefore, stated that he believed that a change in U.S. policy regarding an RTARF integrated system would be appropriate, with the turnover of excess, fixed ICS equipment. He recommended that U.S. policy in Thailand should be in support of this system instead of support of a civil
communications system under Thai civil control. The Thailand Country Team, CINCPAC concluded, concurred in all aspects of this concept.\[1\]

\[\text{(R)}\] The JCS requested amplifying information. On receipt of this information, they advised, the matter would be studied by the Joint Chiefs. Until a decision was reached, they recommended that the phaseout/turnover schedule plan be held in abeyance. CINCPAC provided details of the Thai military and civil systems on 25 November, and awaited JCS guidance at the end of the year.\[2\]

**Evaluation of the Pacific AUTODIN Complex**

\[\text{(R)}\] With the gradual reduction in troop strength in the PACOM, it was considered appropriate to evaluate communications complexes associated with the AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network) Switching Centers to determine those operations that could be successfully curtailed. The matter had received special attention in Japan, particularly in the Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan (KPCP). CINCPACAF, who had Operations and Maintenance (O&M) responsibility for the Defense Communications System in Japan had submitted a plan in October 1971 that did not reflect accurately the proposed base reconfigurations of the other Services. Another major contested item was the closure of the Camp Drake AUTODIN Switching Center (ASC).

\[\text{(R)}\] After a series of meetings arranged by CINCPAC and the Defense Communications Agency Pacific (DCA PAC), CINCPAC directed that PACOM commands submit to CINCPACAF their future communications requirements for FY 72 through FY 75, and submit separately their AUTODIN requirements for FY 74. CINCPACAF was instructed to evaluate those requirements and determine if the Drake ASC could be deactivated without affecting the quality and quantity of communications service to support the Defense Department mission.

\[\text{[R]}\] On 14 July 1972 CINCPACAF resubmitted the communications portion of the KPCP. CINCPACAF had interpreted the PACOM-submitted AUTODIN requirements as being indicative that the switch could be deactivated, but this position was not supported by the DCA, the DCA PAC, CINCUSARPAC, or CINCPAC. The DCA pointed out that a second switch at Taegu, Korea was justified based on a requirement for less than the proposed number of circuits that would be required to be rehomed on a Taegu and Ft. Buckner, Okinawa ASC, if in fact the Drake ASC was to close.\[3\]

**References**

1. CINCPAC 042347Z Aug 72.
2. JCS 7105/282220Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 1tr Ser 002502, 25 Nov 72, Subj: Communications Planning Thailand (U).
The Air Force data supported the possibility of efficiently operating the required communication complex within the triad of Okinawa, Japan, and Korea (off the Taegu AUTODIN facility that was not yet operational). The DCA PAC was equally adamant with its supporting data that mission degradation would occur if the Camp Drake customers were switched to Taegu and Ft. Buckner.

CINCPAC requested additional data from his components. CINCPAC also took this opportunity to evaluate the entire PACOM AUTODIN complex with the goal of reducing, if possible, those facilities that could be eliminated and simultaneously maintain communications within the area, not only for existing requirements, but for future requirements as well. At the end of the year the matter of retaining the Drake switch had not been resolved. The Air Force still wanted to close it. Other PACOM components and the Defense Communications Agency did not.¹

CINCPAC Concept Plan for the Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu (COTCO)

In June the JCS advised CINCPAC of increased pressure to improve the speed of service of record communications and of concern for the mounting costs of military telecommunications. By agreement among the senior communications officers of the Services, an inter-Service working group had been established; this group had embarked on a program of identifying locations on a world-wide basis where inter-Service consolidation might prove feasible in terms of cost savings and operational efficiency. The island of Oahu was one of the locations so identified. Oahu had also become the subject of Congressional interest as a potentially fertile area for cost reductions and improved message service by judicious application of automation techniques and sound inter-Service consolidation principles. It had been specifically identified by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) as a high priority area for study. The JCS, therefore, requested that CINCPAC review military telecommunications requirements throughout the island of Oahu and develop a plan for consideration by the JCS. The plan, they directed, should be in sufficient detail to permit evaluation of costs attendant to the resultant configuration and should identify resources, including personnel and equipment, that would be rendered excess.²

The result was the CINCPAC Concept Plan for Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu (COTCO), forwarded to the JCS on 8 September. COTCO called for a decentralized user-tailored and operated

2. JCS 7019/101436Z Jun 72.
terminal system. Accounting and management of traffic was to become automatic and transmission and distribution were to be accomplished through electrical means direct to and from the users. Each user terminal was to be connected to a modular system of automatic teleprocessors, which would accomplish total writer-to-reader and intermediate internal coordination service. The only communications specialists in the system would be those at the Automatic Message Processing Centers (AMPCECN) who would provide system management, user assistance service, and routine system updating. It was inherent in the plan that "in office" cryptographic devices and/or intrusion proof cable must be provided. Further, the question of authentication to enter information, and authority to receive information, was implied where user terminals were installed.

(U) CINCPAC presented several appropriate alternatives, as requested; in all alternatives the special intelligence terminals had been handled on a compartmented basis (separate AMPCECN) in the system and homed on both Wahiawa and Kunia for reliability of service.

(U) The COTCO had been developed on the premise that consolidation of telecommunications functions must be accompanied by a large degree of automation. The evolution of consolidation and automation to the final objective would, when achieved, make existing record communication methodology obsolete. Implementation of the new capability, as proposed, would of necessity have to be deliberate and phased. The writer-to-reader concept developed for the plan would require extensive user re-education.

(U) The plan provided an inventory of existing facilities on Oahu including locations and site layouts. The plan had been coordinated with CINCPAC’s component commands, the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific, and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Pacific (NCPAC).

(U) By separate actions, sponsored by individual commands on Oahu, many extensive record communications center/facility consolidations had already taken place or were in the process of taking place. The CINCPAC study concluded that additional physical consolidations of any major degree could not be accomplished because of the distances between the many commands and elements and the various missions supported by the existing facilities. Many of the large, heavily-manned manual centers, however, would be disestablished if and when the concept of the COTCO plan was implemented and the automated AMPCECN envisioned were actually installed.

(U) Because of the short time allowed, only a conceptual plan for the COTCO could be developed. While it was considered that automation by use of computerized communications processors with terminal input-output devices was
a logical approach to further consolidation, there had been insufficient time available to perform an in-depth identification of the requirements necessary to affirm application of this approach. The concept required further development and evaluation against solid requirements before a definitive system design and an associated implementation plan could be achieved. It was estimated that this would require at least a year. CINCPAC advised the JCS, "Without question, an experienced, highly professional systems engineering organization, assisted by NSA COMSEC systems engineers, should be tasked to perform this follow-on effort." The COTCO, however, was believed to be a valuable foundation for the further work required.

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0933-72, 8 Sep 72, Subj: CINCPAC CONCEPT PLAN for Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu (COTCO); J620 HistSum Sep 72.
SECTION II--COMMAND AND CONTROL

Sealed Authenticator Systems

1. J6423 HistSum Feb 72.
2. CINCPAC 130107Z Sep 72; DIRNSA 261623Z Sep 72; JCS 191328Z Sep 72. The acronym USCAS was derived from United States Code System Authentication, Special Purpose.
3. CINCPAC 112200Z Nov 72; CINCSAC 120300Z Nov 72; AFCD KELLY AFB TEX 132123Z Nov 72; 327AD TAIPEI AS TAIWAN 270700Z Nov 72.
Communications Security Material System (CMS)

On 1 October 1972 the name of the Registered Publications System (RPS) was changed to the Communications Security Material System (CMS). Earlier, in January and February the CINCPAC RPS custodian initiated action that resulted in the elimination of eight excess Romulus Material Systems (MATSYMS), thereby reducing accounting procedures and improving security of the CINCPAC RPS account.

Throughout the year MATSYMS were added or deleted, as required by the programs they served.

Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program Communications

To provide the communications required to satisfy the increase in mission responsibility levied by the JCS revision of the Unified Command Plan that had been effective 1 January 1972, and which assigned CINCPAC responsibility for additional areas north of 49°N, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to establish a communications network between Alaska and Japan that was also connected with CINCPAC's Command Center through 5th Air Force CAF/ASIC. The network was to consist of one full duplex Special Intelligence teletype circuit and one off-hook AUTOVON (Automatic Voice Network) circuit paralleling the teletype circuitry. The network was to be hubbed to the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) Indications Center at Elmendorf Air Force Base and connect the two Alaskan sites--Adak and Eielson--with the 5th Air Force at Fuchu Air Station, Japan. The system was to be dedicated to Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program.

2. COMNAVSECGRU WASHDC 141501Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 302229Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 170321Z Oct 72; DCMS WASH DC 121825Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 181305Z Oct 72.

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(PARPRO) related missions and utilized as a PARPRO Operations Command net. CINCPACAF notified CINCPAC on 29 August 1972 that the teletype portion of the network was installed and ready for operation.

The voice portion of the network, consisting of the dedicated off-hook AUTOVON system, was still not completed by the end of the year. The delays were in Alaska and had to do with funding and contractor bid procedures. See also the item on Unified Command Plan revision associated activities in Chapter I.

**PACAF High Frequency/Single Side Band Network (COMMANDO ESCORT)**

In November 1971 CINCPAC had become aware that CINCPACAF was conducting a study that could result in the recommendation to close seven COMMANDO ESCORT stations (Andersen, Kwang-ju, Taegu, Tan Son Nhut, Udorn, Taipei, and Kunsan). CINCPAC requested additional information, informally, which was furnished by CINCPACAF. CINCPAC had particular concern for the proposed closure of the Kunsan, Udorn, and Guam facilities. He advised CINCPACAF of his requirements for the continued operation of those stations in January 1972 and his rationale for those requirements. The stations continued operational throughout 1972.²

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**Message Traffic and Communications Support**

(U) Figures for the gross message traffic, by month, and the average daily number of messages processed by the CINCPAC Communications Center during 1972 were as follows:

2. J625 HistSum Jan 72, which cited CINCPAC 132211Z Jan 72.
### Monthly Message Traffic vs. Average Daily Traffic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Message Traffic</th>
<th>Average Daily Traffic</th>
<th>% Change from Previous Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>48,356</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>-15 (from Dec 71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>48,836</td>
<td>1,684</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>48,836</td>
<td>1,575</td>
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<td>54,250</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>57,388</td>
<td>1,851</td>
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<td>56,098</td>
<td>1,870</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>53,949</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>51,994</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>50,243</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>47,750</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>46,418</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Monthly Average: 51,382

The average messages per month was down over 12 percent from the year before and over 18 percent below the all-time high reached in 1968 of 60,808 messages a month.

(U) Communications support for the Commander in Chief while away from his headquarters continued to be an important function of the Communications Branch. During 1972 there were 3,754 ALFA messages transmitted to the CINCPAC and 387 TANGO messages received.

(U) Automation of the CINCPAC Message Center had been under study for several years. The Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) System finally came into being in 1972, with only formal testing and acceptance not completed. Construction began in the spring and the first of three computers, the UNIVAC series 70/1600 AUTODIN (automatic digital network) terminal, arrived and was installed in April. This terminal successfully completed the Defense Communications System AUTODIN acceptance test on 4 May and was activated on 7 May to the Hawaii automatic switching center. The UNIVAC 1004 was used for backup until it was removed from the Communications Center on 19 May. On 28 and 29 June the final acceptance test was conducted by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT) in Washington. The test went well and was considered more than satisfactory. Representatives of CINCPAC and the Fleet Marine Force message centers attended the test demonstration.

1. J63 HistSums Jan-Dec 72.
2. Ibid.
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(U) Operation of the system began on 25 July, although the existing manual system continued to function in a parallel manner to insure processing of message traffic. On 9 September the LDMX began functioning alone, but an unrecoverable error on 12 September necessitated a return to manual operation. The LDMX resumed automatic processing on 16 September. A number of problems and discrepancies arose and final test and acceptance were postponed until mid-January 1973.

(U) To prepare messages in the precise form the machine could "read," staff personnel were trained by Communications Center personnel on Optical Character Reader message preparation. There were 74 typists trained during November and an additional 53 in December. Typewriters throughout the headquarters were adjusted to conform to the requirements of the system.

Reduction of Circuits at CINCPAC Headquarters

(U) In August the JCS had directed all unified command headquarters to review the telecommunications circuits serving the headquarters with the intent of reducing their number. The Command and Control Telecommunications Branch performed the survey and advised the JCS of the reductions, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deactivations</th>
<th>Monthly Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Administrative lines</td>
<td>$46.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Administrative extensions</td>
<td>$74.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Electronic switching center drops</td>
<td>$564.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Intercom systems (20 stations)</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Hot lines</td>
<td>$113.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Private auxiliary exchange drops</td>
<td>$23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Long-haul circuits</td>
<td>$607.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 CINCPAC teletype alert nets (and alternates)</td>
<td>$11.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Special Intelligence communications circuits</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1,441.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 4258, 21 Nov 72, Subj: Circuit Reductions at the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
SECTION III—SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Communications Support for Air Augmentation, Southeast Asia

(1) The activation of Takhli and Nam Phong Air Bases in Thailand in May and June 1972, and the subsequent redeployment of tactical fighter assets from the RVN, resulted in burgeoning communications requirements that saturated the Integrated Communications System (ICS) in Thailand and all military communications systems linking that country with the world. New requirements for communications channels could be met only through preemption of lower priority users or by requiring requesting agencies to provide a trade-off from existing channels. Continuing efforts to reduce the U.S. presence in the RVN resulted in further increases in tactical air redeployments to Thailand. The inherent inability of the ICS to satisfy increased requirements for communications support was recognized and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) Thailand proposed a plan for upgrading the system based on the assumption that operations would extend beyond an original 90-day limitation.

(2) In an effort to more accurately determine system requirements and insure satisfaction of time-sensitive, mission-oriented requirements, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACTHAI, in coordination with the DCA Thailand and user agencies, to validate all requirements, satisfied or unsatisfied, and order them by priority. By reallocating existing channels and upgrading the ICS it was hoped to be able to satisfy requirements.2

(3) A number of upgrade actions were recommended. For example, a multiplex system was installed on the Takhli-Korat link; this plus discovery of some redundant channels allowed satisfaction of all Takhli requirements. Other interim actions consisted of shifting multiplex equipment to relieve saturated links and recovering some low priority circuits for reassignment to meet high priority needs.3

2. CINCPAC 120307Z Jul 72.
(g) The JCS concurred in the CINCPAC request for high quality, reliable secure voice service and tasked the DCA to investigate all reasonable possibilities for providing the service. The DCA recommended three possible programs of action. On 19 May the JCS initiated action to implement immediately the program that called for using spare keying equipment and two analog/digital converters to be procured on an expedited basis. In this manner a single wideband trunk could be completed in about 30 days from the time the contractor was authorized to start. Depending on completion of successful tests, the JCS authorized another DCS recommended program, this one utilizing equipment immediately available, which would permit wideband service in two or three weeks. The tests, however, indicated that the system was not operationally reliable.

(h) Study of the communications systems continued throughout the year and a Thailand communications capabilities study was completed on 2 December at MACTHAI. This study, under the joint chairmanship of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACK, was conducted to determine communications expansion and reconfiguration necessary to support the anticipated shift of command control of the air war into Thailand. The study confirmed that an expansion of the existing Defense Communications System (DCS) link from Nakhon Phanom to the major DCS station at Warin, Thailand would be necessary to handle forecast requirements.

1. CINCPAC 102231Z May 72. COMPASS LINK was a program for transmitting photo imagery from the RVN; it transmitted about five hours a day.
2. J624 HistSum Jul 72; JCS 3416/122028Z May 72; JCS 2406/192215Z May 72.
On 13 December CINCPAC directed that CINCUSARPAC install an AN/TRC-132 tropospheric scatter radio system from Nakhon Phanom to Warin with a relay station at Phu Mu. This provided an additional 48 voice grade communications channels on the saturated link. In addition, an expansion of the existing LRC-3 tropo link from 84 to 132 channels by adding ancillary equipment was directed. These actions provided sufficient capacity to support new command control requirements.

In September a special Contingency Communications Unit had been formed in Thailand. The 100-man Army unit was under the operational control of the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Thailand. It was manned and equipped to provide emergency communications support in Thailand or the RVN should existing facilities be destroyed or damaged. It was capable of providing minimum essential service to a regional assistance command headquarters or other field command post, and a limited ability to restore critical command and control circuits on the integrated communications system providing long-haul trunking throughout Thailand and the RVN. This Army Contingency Communications Unit complemented the already existing Navy and Air Force emergency communications capabilities in the PACOM.³

Turnover of Communications Equipment to Thai Armed Forces

In November 1971 CINCPAC had informed the JCS that nine AN/TRC-90 tactical radio sets would become excess to U.S. Army requirements in Vietnam by the end of FY 72. He pointed out that the sets could serve to fill an increasing need for tactical communications capability on the part of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF). The COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI Communications-Electronics Phaseout/Turnover Schedule 1-70 contained plans for eventual

2. J61S HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 010341Z Dec 72; JCS 5893/081955Z Dec 72.
turnover of AN/TRC-90 equipment used by U.S. Forces in Thailand in support of the Integrated Communications System (ICS). Since the plan had not been approved for implementation by the JCS, and since the projected dates for turnover of the TRC-90 equipment in Thailand had slipped and were no longer valid, COMUSMAC THAI proposed that RVN excess equipment be provided to satisfy RTARF requirements. CINCPAC supported that approach and recommended that the portion of the turnover schedule applicable to the turnover of tactical troposcatter equipment be approved by the JCS for implementation and that a military department be tasked as the implementing agency, utilizing rehabilitated TRC-90 equipment from the RVN.

In response to a CINCPAC recommendation, the JCS tasked the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, in coordination with CINCPAC, to take the necessary action to turn over the equipment and to insure it met Military Assistance Service Funded standards. CINCPAC was also tasked to implement that portion of the Phaseout/Turnover 1-70 schedule pertaining to the turnover of the TRC-90 equipment. CINCPAC, in turn, tasked CINCUSARPAC to implement the program utilizing the TRC-90s from the RVN.

In January 1972 COMUSMAC THAI reported a serious deficiency. The material arriving from the RVN was complete in all respects with the exception of power generation equipment. As the projected RTARF use of the equipment required mobility, power generators were essential. The equipment had been operating in a fixed mode in Vietnam, however, and the generator sets required for normal tactical operations had not been requisitioned. The First Signal Brigade at Long Binh, the agency that was preparing and shipping the equipment, recommended that an alternate source for the generators be found.

As the date for turnover of the first unit of TRC-90 equipment approached, COMUS MAC THAI realized that no tasking for logistical support of

1. CINCPAC 030319Z Nov 71.
2. COMUSMAC THAI 100337Z Dec 71.
3. MJCS 365-71, 9 Dec 71, Subj: AN/TRC-90 Turnover to the Royal Thai Armed Forces (U); CINCPAC 210311Z Dec 71.
4. COMUSMAC THAI 111009Z Jan 72; CG 1st SIG BDE (USA STRATCOM) LBN 150520Z Jan 72.
the equipment had become evident. As the turnover schedule provided to a
two-year support period before the RTG could assume maintenance and logistic
functions, it was imperative that such support be outlined and implemented.
In the absence of funding guidance to support logistics and maintenance of the
equipment to be turned over, CINCUSARPAC requested clarification and guidance
from the Department of the Army concerning the Army's commitment, and additional
components for maintenance mock-up to provide the RTARF with operational TRC-90
equipment and a full range of support. When there had been no guidance from
DA by mid-March, CINCPAC dispatched a message detailing his interpretation of
implementation of that portion of the Phaseout Turnover Plan 1-70 pertaining
to the TRC-90s. He also tasked COMUSMACTHAI to ascertain cost data for the
two-year transition period and to provide an impact statement of the effect on
existing Military Assistance Plans.¹

(8) In his impact statement, COMUSMACTHAI estimated that the yearly
support figure for nine AN/TRC-90s would be approximately $306,524, including
$191,600 for repair parts and $114,924 for contract maintenance services.
Since the turnover was to be on an incremental basis with the first unit
scheduled for July 1972, COMUSMACTHAI expressed the opinion that support could
be provided with minimal impact on existing Military Assistance Program plans.²

(8) Meanwhile, the Department of the Army requested clarification and
guidance concerning the Army's TRC-90 commitment from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. On 31 March the Secretary advised that support was to
be funded by normal MAP/MASF procedures until such time that the RTARF could
assume full responsibility for all support functions. The length of time
required before the RTARF developed expertise in operations and maintenance
and generated budget requirements to assume complete responsibilities was to
be determined after further discussion between COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPAC.³

Communications Security

(8) CINCPAC remained keenly aware of the importance of maintaining
communications security (COMSEC) and continued to give it his personal emphasis.
For example, when a Soviet ocean rescue tug, possibly configured for electronic
intelligence collection, was sighted in Hawaiian waters, CINCPAC commended
CINCPACFLT and the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier for their rapid response
and warning disseminated. CINCPAC also requested that the Service components
place command emphasis on COMSEC awareness and take positive action to

1. CINCUSARPAC 240327Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 152203Z Mar 72.
2. COMUSMACTHAI 291108Z Mar 72.
3. DA 161550Z Mar 72; SECDEF 4646/312232Z Mar 72.

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disseminate warnings of increased signal intelligence threat during periods covered by COMHAWSEAFRON notification messages with particular attention to the requirements for telephone security.¹

(8) The security of code and authentication tables in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) came under study. The Pacific Communications Area (PCA) at Wheeler Air Force Base was tasked by the Air Force Cryptologic Depot with establishing procedures pertaining to the deletion/destruction of all code and authentication tables within the RVN consistent with the existing situation. The PCA requested blanket approval regarding disposition of COMSEC material within Vietnam proper from controlling authorities (including CINCPAC) should the need arise for immediate removal or destruction of the material. CINCPAC granted authority to destroy keylist codes and authentication tables consistent with the existing situation; CINCPAC was controlling authority for such material.²

(9) The Director of the National Security Agency, however, requested information on the criteria that would be used by the PCA to issue disposition instructions rather than the responsible command. The PCA advised which materials would be destroyed. Controlling authorities would be kept informed of all actions taken.³

(10) The PACOM COMSEC Council continued to meet regularly throughout the year. Increasing emphasis was being placed on Operations Security (OPSEC) surveys of exercises being conducted in the PACOM.⁴

Tactical Voice Call Sign System Development

(8) The use of unchanging or infrequently-changing tactical voice call signs had long been recognized as a significant weakness in the overall COMSEC posture of various major segments in the PACOM. Although tactical secure voice equipment obviated the need for call sign security, complete ciphony protection for all tactical voice circuits was not to be achieved for the foreseeable future. For this reason, the need to provide call sign security remained.

(8) Efforts to devise daily-changing tactical voice call signs had been initiated by CINCPAC in early 1969, but these were later abandoned because of

1. CINCPAC 070235Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 040217Z Oct 72.
2. PCA WHEELER AFB HI 110220Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 112355Z Nov 72.
3. DIRNSA 291831Z Nov 72; PCA WHEELER AFB HI 302355Z Nov 72.
opposition by the component commands. The attempt, however, served to focus
JCS attention on the problem and resulted in the conduct of a world-wide
study of possible means for protecting tactical call signs and radio frequencies
through frequent changing by the Research Analysis Corporation. Following
this study, the National Security Agency was assigned primary responsibility
for developing operationally-acceptable systems for changing signs and symbols.
As it appeared impracticable to devise a universal system to accomplish this
for all military environments, the problem was fragmented to provide for the
development of systems to change naval surface call signs, naval surface
frequencies, air call signs, air frequencies, and ground call signs and
frequencies. Because of its relative simplicity, the development of a daily-
changing naval surface call sign system was undertaken first.

(A) During the summer of 1971 CINCPACFLT directed that the Commander,
First Fleet test the NSA-devised AKTI-6 System for changing the voice calls of
naval surface ships, afloat commanders, and task organizations. Commander,
First Fleet reported that the system was generally usable, but CINCPACFLT
later decided that the scope of the test had been too narrow to be conclusive
with respect to its possible application in a multi-task force environment,
and directed further testing.

(B) In December 1971 the Director NSA proposed a six-month trial
implementation of AKTI-6 in the First Fleet as a basis for developing user
familiarity to be followed by a conference to discuss application and revision
of the system. CINCPAC accepted the recommendation.

(C) On 16 March CINCPAC concurred that the AKTI-6, as then constituted,
was unacceptable as a single system for changing tactical voice call signs

2. CINCPACFLT 230431Z Jan 71; CINCPAC 130335Z Jan 71; Ltr, Commander First
Fleet to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0180, 8 Oct 71, Subj: Final Report on the AKTI-6
Changing Call Sign Evaluation (U); Ltr, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, Ser 50/01384,
10 Dec 71, Subj: PACFLT Changing Call Sign System (ATKI-6) Evaluation (G).
3. DIRNSA 291858Z Dec 71; CINCPAC 310221Z Dec 71.
4. CINCPACFLT Ltr to CINCPAC Ser 51/0159A, 14 Feb 72, Subj: PACFLT Changing
Call Sign System (ATKI-6) Evaluation (G).
throughout PACFLT and withdrew the recommendation that the system be implemented for continuing test by the First Fleet. CINCPAC noted, however, that the NSA was developing a replacement system designed to overcome many of the alleged weaknesses of the AKTI-6. He stressed the importance of realistic operational testing of the system, and identified the basic issues that would have to be resolved in such tests.

Addressing all of the unified and specified commanders, the JCS requested in October that organizations involved in testing NSA systems for changing voice call signs provide the JCS with copies of all interim and final test reports.

1. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 0282, 16 Mar 72, Subj: PACFLT Changing Call Sign System (AKTI-6) Evaluation (C).
3. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 0899, 29 Aug 72, Subj: PACFLT Testing of Changing Tactical Voice Call Signs (U); CINCPACFLT 1tr Ser 51/01020, 4 Oct 72, Subj: PACFLT Changing Call Sign System (AKTI-6) Evaluation (C).
5. DIRNSA 250000Z Oct 72; CINCPACFLT 282344Z Oct 72.
Earlier, in September, the CINC Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) had requested JCS approval for a call sign change from "SLATE ROOF" to "EAGLE WING" for his ABNCP. The JCS coordinated the matter with CINCPAC, who did not concur. He noted that EAGLE WING was possible to confuse under degraded communications conditions with BLUE EAGLE, the code word for the CINCPAC ABNCP, which was commonly used in teletype and voice radio communications. Subsequently CINCLANT proposed the use of "NORTH SEA," with which CINCPAC concurred.  

Generation and Production of Communications Security Keying Material

CINCPAC was required by the National Security Agency to report annually on locally generated, produced, reproduced, or fabricated crypto-materials. This requirement had been initiated in 1966. In 1972, in response to CINCPAC's query on this subject, only two commanders reported local reproduction, COMUSMACV and the CINCPAC Representative Guam-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In his reply to the NSA, CINCPAC noted that confusion existed as to the reporting channels for this report. If the report could not be eliminated, he recommended that instructions state that the Service headquarters were responsible for reporting for all of the field elements and that the unified commanders were responsible only for reporting information pertinent to their respective headquarters and those of their subordinate joint commanders. CINCPAC advised that the vigorous program in the PACOM to identify and eliminate unauthorized (home made) cryptosystems had been highly effective. The local generation of cryptosystems had ceased within the PACOM and local reproduction of NSA-produced materials was limited and normally associated with temporary anomalies in the distribution of cryptographic materials. Insofar as the report applied to the PACOM, therefore, it no longer served a useful purpose and CINCPAC recommended that it be discontinued.  

1. JCS 4760/212326Z Nov 72; DIRNSA 172115Z Nov 72; JCS 6969/092051Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 300324Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 270333Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 142205Z Oct 72.
3. CINCPAC 032124Z Aug 72.
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Frequency Management

(U) A number of changes in frequency management procedures occurred in 1972, streamlining and simplifying the programs. One procedural change in 1972 was the result of a CINCPAC proposal regarding discontinuance of a lengthy format used in frequency deletion actions nominated to the Joint Frequency Panel (J/FP) in favor of a more efficient, condensed version. The proposal reduced format length to less than a third. The J/FP implemented the proposal on a trial basis in the PACOM, and in October it was adopted on a permanent basis, world-wide.¹

(U) In another matter, on 27 October CINCPAC advised the JCS that the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) Frequency Resources Records System (FRRS) had proved superior to the antiquated PACOM Frequency Assignment and Usage (FAU) document in meeting the needs of the frequency management community. For a year and a half both systems had been maintained in parallel. CINCPAC advised that maintenance of the FAU would be discontinued immediately, in favor of the FRRS, unless he was advised to the contrary.²

(U) The JCS approved this implementation and tasked the Air Force to provide the necessary funding. CINCPAC's strong position in support of the FRRS was felt throughout the Defense Department with other unified commanders and Service components demonstrating renewed interest and growing support for the FRRS system.³

(U) As one example, on 11 December the Air Force Chief of Staff approved elimination of the CINCPACAF Frequency Management Document in favor of the FRRS. This discontinued an expensive and redundant records system in the PACOM and moved toward establishment of the FRRS as the sole radio frequency management data base throughout the Defense Department.⁴

(U) Frequency coordination for the Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) did not progress as smoothly. CINCPAC efforts to coordinate frequencies for use in the FLTSATCOM in response to a J/FP message of 25 July resulted in generally negative responses from host governments throughout the PACOM. Difficulties encountered were compounded by the fact that the U.S. Government had not yet determined the exact frequencies desired or the specific geographic locations planned for earth terminals in the system. Comments

1. CINCPAC 220316Z Jan 72; J/FP WASH DC 161612Z Oct 72.
2. CINCPAC 270441Z Oct 72.
4. CSAF 111704Z Dec 72; J6412 HistSum Dec 72.
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received from various host governments included an understandable objection
to the expense involved in shifting existing national assignments to
frequencies outside the band of interest and a reluctance to approve assigning
an important portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to exclusive United States
use. The initial responses indicated that coordination of FLTSATCOM require-
ments would require considerable effort on the part of PACOM area frequency
coordinators and in some cases would require diplomatic action.¹

(U) Activity in this area came to a temporary halt in September while
CINCPAC waited for a response from the J/FP regarding his request for definitive
information regarding the order of priority by frequency plan/amplifier repeater
plan, and whether the U.S. Government was prepared to defray the costs incurred
by host government administrations incident to sanitizing appropriate radio
frequency bands to accommodate the FLTSATCOM.²

(U) Frequency management matters concerning the reversion of Okinawa to
Japan had been the subject of negotiations with the Government of Japan for
more than two years. All matters were successfully resolved and on 30 September
the Okinawa Area Frequency Office ceased functioning after handling all
frequency matters related to reversion. Effective 1 October all such matters
relating to Okinawa were processed through COMUS Japan.³

Tactical Training Frequencies

(U) Annual negotiation with the Federal Communications Commission regarding
military tactical training frequencies in the non-Government band was accomplished
in September. The negotiation resulted in obtaining FCC authorization for
military use of approximately 80 discrete frequencies more than the number
authorized the year before.⁴

Manned Spacecraft Recovery Support

(U) CINCPAC was concerned with frequency management in connection with
two events in the APOLLO Program in 1972. The PACOM Radio Frequency Control
Center, co-located with Commander Task Force 130 at Kunia, was activated
during APOLLO 16 (the space flight was from 16 to 27 April). Propagation
anomalies caused higher than usual interference to recovery forces' primary
high frequency communications circuits, but adequate backup frequencies were
available to provide reliable communications.⁵

2. J6412 HistSum Sep 72.
5. J641 HistSum Apr 72.

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(U) During APOLLO 17, the last mission in the APOLLO series which was conducted from 7 to 19 December, the Joint Frequency Panel in Washington, on 11 December, ordered PACOM-wide silence on a primary APOLLO recovery command and control frequency in favor of the White House Communications Agency (WHCA). Because of impending APOLLO recovery and insufficient time to shift the APOLLO frequency, CINCPAC suspended the WHCA use of the recovery frequency. The Chairman of the Joint Frequency Panel agreed that the interference risk to APOLLO was unacceptable and supported CINCPAC's suspension. Radio frequency protection for APOLLO 17 was terminated on 19 December. The protection afforded APOLLO 17 was the best provided in the entire APOLLO series.¹

COMUS Korea Circuit Requirements

(U) A situation that occurred in October illustrated the role CINCPAC had in coordinating the activities of the various agencies interested in communications requirements in the PACOM. At the request of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), CINCPAC initiated a reevaluation of Korean DCS circuits. COMUS Korea's list of proposed circuits was distributed to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and the DCA Pacific for comment. In evaluating those comments, it became apparent to CINCPAC that the different commands were not using the same data base. CINCUSARPAC was comparing the additions and deletions to the Korean circuitry with a data base printed in January 1972, CINCPACAF with one printed in September 1971, and the DCA PAC with one dated June 1972. To eliminate the subsequent confusion, CINCPAC requested that the DCA PAC provide the component commands and the Strategic Communications Command Pacific with an identical data base. This required the reprocessing of the reevaluation by COMUS Korea, who resubmitted his proposed circuits for validation.²

Tokyo-Fuchu Microwave Circuits

(U) CINCPACAF notified CINCPAC that as a result of highrise building construction in the Tokyo area, the 180-channel microwave system between Tokyo and Fuchu was in danger of being blocked. CINCPAC requested JCS authorization and funds, on an emergency basis, to lease 120 channels from the Japanese commercial telephone system to replace the 180-channel government-owned microwave. The JCS concurred with the request, stipulating that the United States should approach the Japanese Government to reimburse the United States for any unusual expenses resulting from the transfer from the microwave system to the lease system.

¹ J6412 HistSum Dec 72; J/FP 112048Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 130327Z Dec 72.
² J621 HistSum Oct 72.
(U) CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF of the JCS request, adding that all effort should be made to reduce the required number of leased channels as an economy move. CINCPACAF's negotiation, through COMUS Japan, resulted in Japanese Government agreement to absorb the one-time cost of the initial lease of the circuit with the U.S. Government then being responsible for the monthly charges. The circuits were transferred in an orderly manner from the government-owned microwave system to the leased circuitry.¹

¹ J621 HistSum Oct 72.
TOP SECRET

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC
COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME II
1972

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1973

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(U) In what was interpreted by some observers as a reaction to the United Nations vote to seat Mainland China and expel Taiwan, the U.S. Senate had rejected the House foreign assistance bill for fiscal year (FY) 1972 on 30 October 1971. The Senate subsequently voted to revive foreign aid, but joint conferences failed to resolve differences, and no funds for FY 72 had been appropriated by the end of 1971. On 17 December 1971, a Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) was passed which permitted foreign aid spending at an annual rate of $2.84 billion through 22 February 1972. It was not until 2 March 1972 that FY 72 funds were finally appropriated, and the levels had been reduced to substantially less than originally requested by the Administration. The amount of this reduction for the Pacific Command (PACOM) was approximately 25 percent in grant aid Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds. However, this did not include the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) programs for Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, or Korea.¹

(U) Meanwhile, the customary presentation of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget for FY 73 was made in February 1972. In his presentation, Secretary of Defense Laird stated:²

> It is important that the Congress recognize and understand the important role that grant military assistance and other forms of U.S. security assistance have played over the past two and a half decades in countering threats to non-Communist countries. For while the burdens in blood and dollars which the American people have borne to help defend others have been great, they would in my judgment have been far greater without security assistance. During the past few years, I believe that we have made major progress.


through security assistance, in strengthening the capabilities of Free World nations to defend themselves, thereby helping move toward a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

(U) In a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 14 March 1972, Secretary of State Rogers noted that the initiatives of President Nixon to break the locked-in hostility between the United States, China, and Russia were important innovations. Nevertheless, much of the success of the President’s efforts depended upon our security policies. Only on a strong foundation of security—for ourselves and for those countries in which our interests were deeply engaged—could we hope to establish a stable and peaceful long-term relationship with countries which have been adversaries. Secretary Rogers noted that an effective security assistance program was a necessary part of this foundation. He expressed regret that Congressional appropriations for FY 72 had fallen far short of the President’s request. Continued failure, he said, to balance the reduction of our military presence abroad with carefully programmed security assistance could be interpreted by the international community as signaling an American retreat from international responsibility.

(U) Before the same body on 23 March 1972, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green noted the concern of the countries of East and Southeast Asia engendered by the FY 72 aid reductions. These countries were not concerned about the intentions of the U.S. to provide adequate assistance under the Nixon Doctrine, but rather about its ability to do so in the face of what appeared to them to be a growing anti-aid attitude in the U.S. These countries were watching closely to see exactly what was meant when we say we stand by our commitments and that we intend to remain a Pacific power.2

(U) Again on 17 April 1972, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary Rogers solicited Congressional support for FY 73 security assistance funds. Once more, he noted the statement by the President that the FY 72 appropriation had been inadequate for the goals of the Administration.3

(U) In spite of these strong representatives by knowledgeable officials, resistance to foreign aid continued to build in the Congress. On 24 July 1972, the U.S. Senate killed the FY 73 foreign aid bill after critics of U.S.-Vietnam policy succeeded in adding a mandatory end-the-war amendment. In the vote to

defeat the measure, Administration supporters joined with traditional foes of the aid program because the amendment would have cut off funds for U.S. combat operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.¹

(U) In October 1972, the Congress extended CRA for FY 73 to provide interim funds until 28 February. However, the CRA established much lower levels of new obligational authority than had been requested. MAP funds were limited to $550.6 million versus $780 million requested; supporting assistance was set at $600 million versus $840 million requested; and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) levels were set at $400 million versus the requested $527 million.²

(U) Thus, calendar year (CY) 1972 passed, as had the two previous years, without a foreign aid appropriations measure for the new fiscal year. In August, CINCPAC cautioned the military assistance missions under his jurisdiction that the constraints of CRA could continue for some time. In November, CINCPAC stated:³

Foreign military assistance faces a serious challenge to its continued existence from the Congress. CINCPAC recognizes this, but believes that there is no substitute for military assistance as a means of filling the vacuum created by the retrenchment of U.S. military forces in the Pacific. We must do a better job in selling the idea of the importance of military assistance to the maintenance of security. We must also do our job better and more efficiently.

(U) CINCPAC and other U.S. Government officials were not alone in their awareness of the growing jeopardy of foreign military assistance. Many articles in leading periodicals addressed this subject. One analyst noted that reductions of U.S. Forces abroad, combined with "normalization" of U.S. relations with China, would generate increasing pressure for reductions in both the U.S. military budget and the security assistance program. This analyst suggested a reappraisal of true U.S. self-interest--a questioning of the allotment of 95 percent of U.S. security assistance to ten of the world's 130-odd nations. What the author called a "policy dilemma" was that these ten countries, with few exceptions, could only marginally affect U.S. security, whereas those countries which could, did not need U.S. assistance. Noting that many former

1. CINCPAC Military Assistance Activities Bulletin No. 9, 092300Z Aug 72, hereafter cited as MAAB with appropriate number and date/time group; The Honolulu Advertiser, 25 Jul 72, p. 1.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 5342/250350Z Oct 72.
3. CINCPAC MAAB No. 9, 092300Z Aug 72 and MAAB No. 10, 290211Z Nov 72.
advocates of foreign aid in the Congress no longer supported the Administration, the writer predicted a consensus upon a revised and more selective aid program. Without such a consensus, the future of security assistance programs was in doubt.

1. Orbis, Vol. XVI, No. 3, Stephen P. Gibert, "Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy." In this article, the ten countries named by the author as receiving 95 percent of foreign assistance funds were Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. This included MASF, MAP, and FMS.
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SECTION II--PLANNING

CINCPAC Guidance to Field

(U) The problems posed in MAP planning by the continuing fund appropriation delays and reductions were discussed in the preceding section. As one means to assist PACOM military assistance missions in planning and programming, CINCPAC began a series of Military Assistance Activities Bulletins (MAAB) in September 1971. The MAAB, dispatched in message format, summarized significant MAP actions, decisions, and trends. In the first MAAB, CINCPAC foresaw the need to define more precisely the achievable goals for self-sufficiency in defense in each PACOM country, and to establish timetables for reaching defined goals. At the same time, CINCPAC acknowledged that setting timetables for achieving specific host country goals would be very difficult without firm commitments of supporting U.S. resources.

(U) In October 1971, CINCPAC reiterated the need for military assistance missions to review MAP objectives and plans. Such a review would enable the planners to contribute to a new country assessment program initiated by the State Department called Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA). The PARA studies in each country were intended to define U.S. interests and objectives and relate them to U.S. policies, programs, and the country environment. Resource requirements to meet these objectives could then be identified for one to five year time periods.

(U) In January 1972, CINCPAC acknowledged the legislative turbulence which inhibited proper planning and programming schedules. Nevertheless, the incorporation of security assistance into the five-year DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) as part of the "total force" concept made some sort of time-phased milestones necessary.

(U) Prior to FY 72, the Security Assistance Program was independently developed, justified and funded. The integration of security assistance with the DOD PPBS began with the FY 73-77 cycle. It was slightly out of phase with the development of other portions of the DOD budget, since security assistance was a late entry. In FY 74, for the first time on schedule, security assistance was completely integrated with the PPBS. This new system for security assistance

1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 1, 050023Z Sep 71.
2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 2, 062156Z Oct 71.
3. CINCPAC MAAB No. 5, 270246Z Jan 72.
planning had several major impacts, all favorable, on the traditional
development of such planning. Unified command recommendations, developed
within dollar guidelines furnished by SECDEF, were first considered by the
JCS. The views of the JCS were then furnished to the SECDEF in a separate
annex to the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) which was developed within overall
defense constraints and fiscal guidance issued by the SECDEF. The development
of this new annex, concurrently with the JFM under the total force concept,
ensured an appraisal by the JCS of recommended funding for support of free-
world forces in relationship to recommended funding for U.S. Forces. The JFM
was then used by the DOD in the development of the Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) for security assistance. The Security Assistance POM competed
with military department and other Defense Agency POMs for available defense
resources. In August of each year, the SECDEF issued his Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) approving the Security Assistance POM as presented or revised
during the review process. An interagency review of the security assistance
program was scheduled for mid-September, followed by budget submission to the
White House. When the SECDEF issued his fiscal guidance FY 75-79, expected in
eyear CY 73, unified command recommendations would take the form of recommended
revisions to the FY 74-78 POM, thus eliminating the previous requirement for
development of detailed separate country plans. Integration of security
assistance with the PPBS not only reduced the administrative workload of
planning, it produced programs more realistic and defensible under the total
force concept.1

(U) The MAABs issued by CINCPAC covered two other areas concerned with
overall field planning. These were Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and shortfall
management. CINCPAC noted that, as the trend toward grant aid reduction
continued, gaps created by such reductions should be filled either by host
country resources or by the U.S. through cash or credit FMS. Pending a revamp
of DOD directives related to FMS, unified commands and Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) chiefs would be made aware by DOD of the progress of
FMS negotiations. The PACOM MAAGs were instructed to include recommended
items for FMS in the annual Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for each
country.2

(U) Regarding shortfall management, CINCPAC defined shortfall as the
difference between a validated requirement and the assets on hand or due in to
meet the requirement. MAAGs were cautioned that shortfall was part of the
overall resource requirement. Acquisition of items carried in shortfall by

1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 9, 092300Z Aug 72.
2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 5, 270246Z Jan 72; CINCPAC MAAB No. 7, 062235Z May 72.
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means other than MAP should reduce shortfall just as if the assets had been acquired through MAP.¹

(U) One other subject which directly concerned CINCPAC's responsibility as the executive agent for DOD security assistance in the PACOM was the channel of communication between the field units and CINCPAC. CINCPAC reminded the PACOM units that it was essential that he be kept fully informed on security assistance and MAAG administrative matters. The inherent political sensitivity and PACOM-wide implications of security assistance policies, actions, and proposals required unified command evaluation of possible effects. There was no objection to including higher headquarters as information addressees on field communications; however, care was needed not to preempt CINCPAC consideration of a proposal by directly communicating with Washington agencies. A free exchange of information, CINCPAC stated, was an absolute requirement in fulfilling his responsibilities.²

FY72/73 Funds

(U) As stated in Section I of this chapter, the FY72 appropriations bill was not passed by the Congress until 2 March 1972. The authorization bill for FY72 had included several constraints pertaining to the PACOM. Beginning in FY73, the MASF program for Thailand was to be transferred from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) budget to funding under the grant aid MAP budget. The ban on military assistance to Pakistan was expanded to include defense services and military-related industrial licenses. A fund limit of $341 million and a personnel limit of 200 was set for Cambodia. Third country nationals in Cambodia, supported by U.S. aid, were limited to 85, and U.S. advisers for Cambodian police or intelligence units were prohibited. Another new requirement was that countries receiving U.S. grant aid deposit local currency equal to ten percent of the aid received in an account available to offset U.S. expenses in administrative support. Two carry-over stipulations limited the number of foreign military students in the U.S. to the number of Fulbright scholars studying here, and limited FMS credit terms to ten years.³

(U) On 9 February 1972, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) of the DOD passed to CINCPAC the interim FY72 CRA fund levels for PACOM MAP countries. Supply operations were listed separately because they would be managed by DSAA on a world-wide basis (in thousands).⁴

1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 6, 300126Z Mar 72.
2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 8, 090034Z Jun 72.
3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 14 Feb 72, p. 22.
4. SECDEF 6809/091445Z Feb 72.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Materiel and Training</th>
<th>Supply Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>$170,000</td>
<td>$9,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>16,908</td>
<td>1,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>6,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>132,949</td>
<td>17,051</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (2)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (2)</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Training Only.
2. U.S. Training Only.

(U) The severity of the Congressional reductions for FY72 can be seen from the following end-of-year funded levels provided to CINCPAC by DSAA in July 1972, compared with dollar guidelines issued at the beginning of the fiscal year in July 1971. These figures are combined materiel, training, and supply operation costs (in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY72 Dollar Guidelines</th>
<th>Funded FY72 Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td>$179,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>18,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>10,956</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>239,400</td>
<td>153,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>14,043</td>
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<td>Afghanistan (1)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (1)</td>
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<td>Pakistan (1)</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Added to PACOM on 1 January 1972. Figures include U.S. training only.

1. CINCPAC Command Digest, 15 Feb 72, p. 135; SECDEF 6998/072036Z Jul 72;
USSTRICOM Command History 1970, pp. 64, 70, 82, 83; CINCPAC Command History

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# Military Assistance Program

## Dollar Guidelines

### As of 5 January 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>72 2/</th>
<th>73 3/</th>
<th>74 4/</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>78</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>228.5</td>
<td>380.0</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
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<td>Rep of China</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>133.3</td>
<td>173.0</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>138.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>79.1</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>.2</td>
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<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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<td>132.8</td>
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<td>77.9</td>
<td>58.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,839.5</td>
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<td>1,474.4</td>
<td>1,432.4</td>
<td>1,415.6</td>
<td>1,408.3</td>
<td>200.8</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>.1</td>
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<td>.015</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.015</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>.234</td>
<td>.234</td>
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<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>.029</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1/ Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)
2/ Source: DASS (ISA) Table 700 of 29 Sep 72
3/ FY73 Interim CRA level for MAP Countries
4/ Tentative Presidential Budget Decision for MAP Countries

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 133; J8/Memo/00010-73, 30 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 CINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft.
Meanwhile, the Administration's formal presentation of the FY73 authorization bill had been delayed from January 1972 until March pending the outcome of the FY72 appropriations bill. When finally submitted, substantial increases in grant aid, FMS cash and credit, and supporting assistance were requested over the amounts for FY72. In January, the Secretary of Defense provided CINCPAC with FY73 program levels for planning. These figures did not include supply operations and administrative costs (MAP figures in thousands; FMS levels in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MAP</th>
<th>FMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>$209,541</td>
<td>$   -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td>55.0</td>
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<td>Pakistan (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>375</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Added to MAP in FY73.
2. U.S. Training Only.

When, as previously related, Congress extended CRA for FY73 security assistance until 28 February 1973, DSAA provided the revised funding levels to CINCPAC in November 1972. One half of the FY72 appropriation, or $250 million, was established as the upper limit for FY73 funding through 31 December 1972. Of that amount, $231.9 million had already been funded by 20 November, which left only $18.1 million remaining world-wide for the balance of the calendar year. The MAP total interim CRA levels for FY73, excluding supply operations and administrative costs, were (in thousands): 2

1. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 Mar 72, p. 16; SECDEF 3298/171855Z Jan 72.
2. J815 HistSum Nov 72; SECDEF 6056/222327Z Nov 72.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CPD Level*</th>
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<td>Pakistan (2)</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon (2)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Congressional Presentation Document level differs slightly from the guidance in the previous table which had been provided by DSAA before actual presentation to the Congress.

1. Training Only.
2. U.S. Training Only.

(U) In order to remain within the time cycle for the five-year PPBS program, CINCPAC provided dollar guidelines to the field in February 1972 for MAP and FMS in FY74-78. The following figures included supply operation costs (in $ millions).¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY74</th>
<th>FY75</th>
<th>FY76</th>
<th>FY77</th>
<th>FY78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ CINCPAC 060007Z Feb 72; CINCPAC 120033Z Feb 72.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY74</th>
<th>FY75</th>
<th>FY76</th>
<th>FY77</th>
<th>FY78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>240.0</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA (2)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (3)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP (1)</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Materiel and training.
2. To the extent feasible excess defense articles should be used to implement the program.
3. Overseas and U.S. Training only.

The one-year planning guidance for those PACOM countries receiving only Continental U.S. (CONUS) training was the same for FY74 through FY78; i.e., Afghanistan, $215,000; Ceylon, $15,000; India, $234,000; Nepal, $29,000; and Pakistan, $243,000.

Security Assistance Manpower

In November 1971, the Secretary of Defense had announced a world-wide reduction in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG), Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (JUSMAG), and other security assistance elements. Unified commands were requested to provide optional reduction schedules which would reflect cutbacks of 10, 25, and 30 percent of total MAP spaces under their jurisdiction. This anticipation of the adverse climate for foreign aid in the Congress

1. Ibid.
proved to be well-founded. The bill eventually passed for FY72 specified a 15 percent reduction in military assistance personnel world-wide by 30 September 1972.1

(6) To help accommodate the mandatory reduction, the JCS proposed, and DOD approved, the establishment of a joint support activity at unified command level to carry non-security assistance support spaces. These spaces were to be identified in separate paragraphs of revised Joint Tables of Distribution (JTD). In February 1972, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the manpower space ceiling in PACOM for FY73 was 1,259. Submissions of new JTDs were also to include the identification of one or more management advisory positions, and that these resources management positions be noted as such on the submission.2

(6) In August 1972, the PACOM security assistance ceiling for U.S. military personnel was again reduced from the February figure of 1,259 to 1,184. The JCS explained that the further reduction was necessary because of legal impediments to the removal of personnel from mission JTDs to the planned joint support activity. A comparison of authorized military strengths in September 1971, February 1972, and August 1972 for PACOM security assistance units was:3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sep 71</th>
<th>Feb 72</th>
<th>Aug 72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDT Cambodia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG China</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR India</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLG Indonesia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAO Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Korea</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR Pakistan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Philippines</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Thailand</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPCH Udorn</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Ibid., which cites SECDEF 6076/172200Z Feb 72; State/DEF 18421/050230Z Feb 72; JCSM-49-72; DOD Directive 200.10 dated 17 Jan 72, Subj: Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel; J1311 HistSum Feb 72.
In October, CINCPAC responded to the JCS regarding another possible reduction in spaces in increments of 10, 15, and 25 percent. Based on the ceiling of 1,184, these reductions amounted to 118, 177, and 296 spaces respectively. Because of existing counterinsurgency efforts and direct relationship to the Vietnam war, CINCPAC excluded the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), Cambodia, the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI), and JUSMAG Thailand from the projected reductions. Also excluded was the Defense Liaison Group (DLG), Indonesia, because of planned increases in the Indonesian MAP. Accordingly, CINCPAC allocated the reductions thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sep 72</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>15%</th>
<th>25%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAAG China</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR India</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAO Japan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Korea</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODR Pakistan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSMAG Philippines</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>653</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CINCPAC noted that authorizations for India and Pakistan had been eliminated in the preceding allocation because of the uncertainty of future relations and the limited scope of activities between these countries and the U.S. CINCPAC also invited attention to the size of the reductions for MAAG China (9, 21, and 45 percent) and for JUSMAG Korea (20, 29, 45 percent). For both countries, in the worst case, all remaining personnel would have to be located together, with performance limited to periodic field trips, increases in telephonic/written reports, and decreased personal contacts with host country representatives. CINCPAC concluded that, if reductions were in fact directed, actual allocations would be reassessed based on the existing situation. However, further reductions of the PACOM security assistance ceiling would not be in the best interest of the U.S. Government.

On 6 October 1972, CINCPAC informed the MAP missions that the JCS would not accept an increase from the FY73 manpower authorizations in FY74 unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. Any increases requested were to be accompanied by compensating trade-offs from within the units existing.

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1. J131 HistSum Oct 72; CINCPAC 072102Z Oct 72, which cites JCS 5937/191545Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 072102Z Oct 72.
resources, and further decreases in total authorizations for FY74 should be anticipated. All units were expected to maintain current manpower tables reflecting 20 and 40 percent reductions.1

(a) To recapitulate, the assigned strength of U.S. and third country security assistance personnel in the PACOM as of 31 December 1972 was:2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>CIVILIAN</th>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>TOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand-JUSMAG</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMA/AIRA (404)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>1,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel

(a) On 17 January 1972, the Secretary of Defense established policy guidance for the selection and training of security assistance personnel. The DOD directive specified four phases: selection, preparatory training, Washington orientation, and regional/country orientation. Key MAAG personnel qualifications were a graduate degree, intermediate Service school attendance, and high level staff officer experience. In March, CINCPAC advised all PACOM security assistance missions that Phase IV-regional/country orientation--training would be held at CINCPAC headquarters in July. Two other training sessions were held during FY73 in Bangkok and Taiwan.3

(a) The question of MAAG personnel qualifications was of long standing--not only in degree but in purpose. In October 1971, CINCPAC informed the

2. CINCPAC 162155Z Jan 73.
military missions of a Department of State Inspector General report for Latin America which challenged the degree of training received by MAAG personnel before assignment to MAAG duties. In December, CINCPAC emphasized the need to specify in manpower documents the skills and specialized training desired. In a message to the JCS on 4 December 1971, CINCPAC stressed the importance of higher skill levels and more sophisticated training for personnel assigned to security assistance organizations. CINCPAC maintained that the selection criteria should be at least equivalent to those for attaché duty. Experience in such disciplines as economics, industrial engineering, procurement, operations research, systems analysis, public communication, operational test and evaluation, resource allocation, and decision making was needed. CINCPAC recommended joint school emphasis on such education, with special acknowledgment by the Services that security assistance assignments would receive recognition for promotion and selection to senior Service schools.

(U) The Phase IV training provided by CINCPAC was designed to assist newly-assigned MAP planners and programmers to adapt to PACOM procedures for administering the security assistance materiel and training programs. The first Phase IV course under the new DOD guidance was conducted on 17-21 July 1972. Thirty-four MAAG personnel, one observer from the Army Military Assistance Advisors School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and representatives of CINCPAC component commands attended. Based upon student critiques and test results, the course was revised for future presentations. Of this first class, only six students had received prior military department training in security assistance duties. As CINCPAC noted in his bulletin to the field, this was a major problem which would alter significantly the level and scope of Phase IV training.

(U) In the second of two MAAG Chiefs conferences held in 1972, the subject of the kinds and purposes of MAAG advisors needed for future trends in security assistance was discussed. As a result, CINCPAC posed some provocative questions to the PACOM missions in November. He acknowledged arguments that a "new breed" of advisors was needed--mature individuals, experienced in planning at the national level, experienced in resource management, experienced economists, logisticians, and production engineers. In short, this argument went, advisors should no longer be concerned with teaching rifle marksmanship, or how to pull a lanyard or kick a rudder. Then, CINCPAC asked whether this argument represented a valid goal. He noted that, at the MAAG Chiefs Conference, concern had been voiced over an allied army's ineptness in small unit tactics. The PACOM units

2. CINCPAC MAAB No. 8, 090034Z Jun 72 and MAAB No. 9, 092300Z Aug 72.
were asked to express opinions as to whether the "new breed" of advisor would be responsive to the needs of our allies. Was it practical to expect advisors to be expert in the sophisticated field of resource management?1

(U) Two replies, selected at random, revealed not only a divergence of opinion, but brought into focus the factor of motivation and receptiveness by the armed forces of a host country. The U.S. Defense Attaché at Katmandu, Nepal called upon his own past assignments as an advisor in Korea and Thailand. In Korea, as a lieutenant colonel operations and artillery advisor at army headquarters level in 1958, he functioned mainly as a consultant. He rarely became involved in tactics or techniques at the lower unit level. In visits to lower level field units, however, he recalled that advice involving such things as camouflage and concealment or rifle marksmanship was received coldly, although improvement was frequently needed. In Thailand, as a captain advisor to lower units in 1956, he functioned as a "much needed" advisor on lanyard pulling/rudder kicking techniques. He believed that little of this advice was accepted, and, in fact, thought that more harm than good was accomplished. This was because the Thai, at that time, did not take war seriously and "tuned out" any advisor who suggested the need for improvement. He recommended that advisors for tactics, techniques, and basics be assigned only when requested by allied nations, and that defense attaché, Service attaché, and MAAG chief vacancies be filled by personnel with top level management skills.2

(U) The JUSMAG in Thailand held that a mix of advisors was needed depending upon the degree of development of the host country and the level of sophistication of its managers. While the Defense Attaché in Nepal remembered the Thai as unmotivated and inept in 1956, JUSMAG Thailand stated that the Thai armed forces had reached a stage of development where it was no longer necessary to use advisors in "hands on" training. However, a need continued to exist, at operating levels, for advice on simple management skills, leadership, tactics, planning, etc. Therefore, at this level, at the middle management level, and at senior level, advisors were needed. Thus two kinds of advisors were needed--at the working level to impart rudimentary management techniques, and senior advisors who could explain and demonstrate the benefits to be derived from scientific management and decision-making techniques.3

(U) While valid conclusions could not be drawn from the foregoing opinions, the need for "working" advisors as well as highly skilled managers seemed to depend on the degree of development of the host country and the magnitude of the program being administered by MAP personnel.

1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 10, 290211Z Nov 72.
2. USDAO/Katmandu 006/091030Z Jan 73.
3. MACTHAI 120911Z Dec 72.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Reduction of MAP Data Handling

(U) In May 1972, the Secretary of Defense (DSAA) advised CINCPAC of several measures being considered to streamline the MAP management process. Among these measures was the reduction of the number of items listed in the Military Articles and Services List (MASL); the short term deletion of two levels of programming by MAP Element (MAPEL); and, the complete elimination of MAPEL programming in the long term. Comments were also requested on a proposal that prior year program management, to include reprogramming, rest with the country MAP missions and the Service departments.¹

(U) In reply, CINCPAC voiced support of means to reduce MAP data handling at all levels. He prefaced his comments on specifics by noting that the system for MAP data processing was designed to satisfy management controls at four different levels. Changes to the system, therefore, should assure that a trade-off of benefits to management at one level by eliminating data required at other levels did not occur. Specifically, CINCPAC concurred in a reduction in the number of items contained in the MASL, provided that items requiring high visibility were retained. He recommended that the retained items be based on generic categories representing major weapons and equipment which affect the host country capability to achieve MAP objectives. In addition, CINCPAC suggested that all ammunition lines be deleted as "each" items and rolled into ammunition "dollar lines." Countries would requisition ammunition against these lines in a single pipeline system. Also recommended was the removal from the MASL of all source of supply excess lines because excess defense articles (EDA) were under separate management control and financial accounting.²

(U) CINCPAC did not concur in the elimination of the third and fourth aggregate programming levels of MAPEL, which were useful for data retrieval at country level as well as at unified command level. If these MAPEL were eliminated, manual maintenance of records already available by mechanical means would become necessary. Nor did CINCPAC concur with the eventual complete elimination of MAPEL, for the same reason. CINCPAC supported the management of prior year programs by the MAAG and Service departments, subject to unified command and DSAA supervision and control. He also recommended the elimination of deferral priority lists and substituting funding priority lists on an as-required basis.³

1. JB13 HistSum May 72; SECDEF 5938/151933Z May 72.
2. JB13 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 020513Z Jun 72.
3. Ibid.
(U) On 23-25 February 1972, the first of two MAAG Chiefs' conferences was held at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. Among the recommendations presented for CINCPAC consideration was a reduction in the size, frequency, and duration of operational assistance and evaluation visits to the MAAGs and host countries. Another suggestion, related to the above discussion of automatic data processing reductions, was apparently accepted by DSAA as a valid goal. A third suggestion from the conferees was the withdrawal of MAAG budget lines N40 and L30 from the country ceiling. In December 1972, DSAA informed CINCPAC that, effective for FY73 and thereafter, all MAAG costs (L30) would be charged to administrative expenses. Also, (N40) command training support activities would be charged to administrative expenses at the departmental level. Other recommendations ranged from a standardization of nomenclature for U.S. security assistance missions to the need for more combined planning and more dollar guideline disclosure authority for long range U.S./host country planning. As stated above, at least two of the subjects addressed during the February conference were accepted for action by the Defense Department.

(U) The second MAAG Chiefs' conference for 1972 was held on 20-22 September. The purpose of this conference was to review programs for FY74, examine general problem areas, and exchange ideas. The Washington representatives made a special point, as already narrated in Section I of this chapter, that foreign military assistance faced a serious challenge to its continued existence from the Congress. In his summation of the meeting to the JCS and Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC acknowledged the mood of the Congress and the American public. However, he stated, "...there is no viable substitute for military assistance as a means of filling the political/military void created by the continued drawdown of U.S. presence overseas...."2

(C) CINCPAC also noted what appeared to be a paradox with respect to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Although objectives and policies had remained unchanged, or even broadened, the financial and manpower resources to accomplish these objectives were constantly being reduced. CINCPAC suggested that a careful reexamination of MAP/military/national objectives and policies be undertaken for each country to determine whether they remained feasible and obtainable. The conferees had expressed a general dissatisfaction with the

1. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 1594, Subj: Pacific Command MAAG Chiefs' Conference Report, 7 Apr 72, with 2 encl: (1) Executive Summary with CINCPAC Comments; (2) PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference Report, 23-25 Feb 72; SECDEF 1820/132049Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 072104Z Oct 72.
Excess Defense Article program, which needed to be more fully integrated into country programs. However, CINCPAC cautioned against programming projected EDA assets against high priority items unless reliable EDA projections could be obtained.

Another problem discussed during this conference was the need for a light/medium transport aircraft. Approximately 350 transport aircraft were scheduled to become unsupportable in the PACOM alone, and an acceptable replacement was needed as soon as possible. The conferees also expressed concern about the inability to provide MAP support to some police forces and other para-military units engaged in host country national defense and internal security. Unless such units were part of the local defense department establishment, no MAP support could be provided. CINCPAC noted that it had taken a long time in Vietnam to recognize that a basic effort in controlling insurgency and providing internal security should be aimed at the village and hamlet level through local para-military forces. In some countries, there was no problem with MAP support; e.g., the Philippine Constabulary. In Thailand, however, regional border patrol units were not identified as part of the Thai defense establishment, and no MAP support could be provided. CINCPAC suggested that, from his point of view and at the country level, such a restriction appeared to be arbitrary.}

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
SECTION III—TRAINING

In his first Military Assistance Activities Bulletin for 1972, CINCPAC discussed the contribution of the Military Assistance Training Program (MAP-T) in fostering good will toward the United States. The training of host country personnel had a potential for large returns on a relatively modest investment. While the returns were not always quantifiable, such training could influence the making of lasting friends. "I frequently see positive evidence of this forward-looking program as I travel through the various countries of the PACOM and meet with Asian leaders who have participated in our training program."1

Implicit in the Nixon Doctrine was the goal of self-reliance among those nations receiving foreign aid from the U.S. To assist in reaching this objective, the Secretary of Defense initiated, in November 1970, a concept of specialized assistance called resource management training (REMAN). The purpose of the program was to encourage more efficient use of manpower, property, weapons, equipment, materiel, money, and services. This was to be achieved by the teaching of management principles parallel to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the U.S. Government. However, the application of these principles was to be modified and adapted to the level of development and management sophistication of each recipient country.2

In the PACOM, REMAN plans for FY 72-76 were submitted from Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. In August 1971, Indonesia was added to the program. By mid-1972, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) had developed a partial in-country capability to teach national REMAN philosophy and principles to Thai military personnel. A REMAN Task Group had been formed within the Ministry of Defense to spearhead REMAN development in the RTARF, and a REMAN course of instruction had been developed by the Thai National Institute for Development Administration.3

In Taiwan, the MAAG staff was augmented by a systems analysis expert to work with the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The FY 72 training program for the Republic of China (ROC) emphasized management training, with 22 percent of the CONUS courses devoted to improving REMAN in the armed forces.

1. CINCPAC MAAB No. 5, 270246Z Jan 72.
2. Interview with CDR J.T. O'Der, USN, CINCPAC Security Assistance Staff, 19 Jun 73; DOD Military Assistance Manual, Ch. T.
## MAP TRAINING PROGRAM

**FY 1973**

**AS OF 1 JANUARY 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY-MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>$207,935</td>
<td>$137,080</td>
<td>$204,750</td>
<td>$549,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>544,390</td>
<td>268,739</td>
<td>649,200</td>
<td>1,462,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
<td>1,003,513</td>
<td>177,510</td>
<td>296,455</td>
<td>1,477,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS*</td>
<td>1,485,388</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>603,880</td>
<td>2,089,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAYSIA</td>
<td>94,940</td>
<td>17,870</td>
<td>69,960</td>
<td>182,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>288,920</td>
<td>238,740</td>
<td>187,450</td>
<td>715,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>633,766</td>
<td>453,735</td>
<td>572,800</td>
<td>1,660,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAM*</td>
<td>2,561,811</td>
<td>806,398</td>
<td>21,664,215</td>
<td>25,032,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM REGION</td>
<td>142,950</td>
<td>67,750</td>
<td>75,590</td>
<td>286,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMBODIA</td>
<td>2,092,821</td>
<td>186,621</td>
<td>1,673,563</td>
<td>3,953,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>113,550</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>85,050</td>
<td>198,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>22,180</td>
<td>107,560</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>133,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAL</td>
<td>26,615</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>26,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>118,160</td>
<td>89,260</td>
<td>74,650</td>
<td>282,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI LANKA</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>53,490</td>
<td>53,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals 9,336,939  2,551,263  26,214,533  38,102,735

Source: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 132; J8/Memo/O0010-73, 30 Jul 73, Subj: 1972 GINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft.
The MND had established a systems analysis division to provide alternatives and recommendations on all plans, programs, and operations susceptible to quantitative analysis. In Indonesia, the REMAN concept had been accepted as a military goal, and 30 percent of the FY 73 CONUS training program was scheduled for REMAN training. All PACOM security assistance missions reported acceptance of the REMAN objectives. The limited reservoir of qualified host country personnel, however, would determine the degree of understanding and application until more had received REMAN training.

Student Quotas and Funds

In April 1971, CINCPAC had submitted the proposed PACOM FY 72 training requirements to the DOD. Training was programmed for about 3,600 students in CONUS and 53,264 overseas trainees. The cost, including MAAG support, was estimated at $52.8 million. The initially approved guidelines allotted about $51.9 million to train 3,299 CONUS students and 54,588 in overseas locations. By the end of CY 71, however, the $12.8 million FY 72 guideline for Cambodia had been reduced to $4.7 million, and the student quotas for Cambodia had been changed from 44 to 54 CONUS and from 45,564 overseas to 39,522.

By 1 July 1972, a total of 3,493 students had received CONUS training under the FY 72 program, and 49,504 had received overseas training. The increase in numbers of CONUS-trained students included the assumption of responsibility by CINCPAC for CONUS-only training students from Afghanistan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan effective 1 January 1972:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MAP/MASF</th>
<th>Students (CONUS/Overseas)</th>
<th>Dollar Cost (Thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td>55/39,978</td>
<td>1,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td>161/106</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>232/95</td>
<td>1,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>318/169</td>
<td>4,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>25/2</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>228/225</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>14/-</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/-</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>21/-</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,070/40,575</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,258</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Students (CONUS/Overseas)</th>
<th>Dollar Cost (Thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>47/ -</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>280/ 5,096</td>
<td>3,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>415/ 384</td>
<td>2,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,681/ 3,449</td>
<td>23,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,423/ 8,929</td>
<td>30,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MAP/MAF</td>
<td>3,493/49,504</td>
<td>40,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 31 December 1972, the programmed FY 73 costs for the PACOM MAP-T reflected a decrease from the FY 72 final level of $40.56 million to $37.83 million. Funding was increased for Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, and CONUS-scheduled training for Sri Lanka (Ceylon) was resumed. The Cambodian program more than doubled, and training funds for Vietnam increased. All other country costs were reduced; those for Korea and Laos were severely reduced. The Thailand program, which reverted to MAP funding vice MASF on 1 July 1972, also reflected a sharp decrease. The following summary of the completed FY 72 program and the FY 73 schedule at the end of 1972 illustrated the trend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Cost in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 72</td>
<td>FY 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan (1)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Previously exempt by USCINCPAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
<th>COST IN THOUSANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONUS FY 72 FY 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (2)</td>
<td>1,681 1,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,493 3,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) CONUS Training Only
(2) MASF

PACOM Country Training Programs

Vietnam

Training of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) was conducted under the MASF program at off-shore facilities, in-country facilities, and by on-the-job training. Early in 1972, the thrust of training was to develop professional leadership in the RVNAF so that all training could be Vietnamized.

Later in the year, the surge of operational activity after the North Vietnam offensive deflected the thrust of management and professional training for the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). The activation of additional VNAF units and the earlier than programmed delivery of ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS aircraft caused an upward revision in the training requirements for pilots, aircrews, and ground support. The most pressing problem in meeting this need was the selection and training of new recruits to qualify for English language training. The renewed combat activity in Vietnam during 1972 also resulted in the need for unprogrammed refresher training to the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) ground battalions and irregular security forces.

Laos

Security assistance to Laos was administered for CINCPAC by the Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand, located at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).

In May 1972, the DEPCH advised CINCPAC of an urgent need for a crash program to train 18 battalions of the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) by 15 October 1972. The Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the U.S. Ambassador concurred in the

1. J852 Point Papers, 14 Jun 72 and 7 Sep 72, Subj: RVNAF Training.
On 31 May 1972, CINCPAC agreed that the program was necessary, and authorized direct liaison between DEPCH, the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMCTHAI), and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC) for planning purposes.¹

Cambodia

(5) In Cambodia, where intensive combat operations continued throughout 1972, the armed forces (FANK) failed to maneuver properly and to apply their power effectively when faced by determined opposition. This failure was ascribed to poor leadership, lack of experience, and the need for professional advice. The U.S. was prohibited from providing advisors by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, which also limited U.S. support of third country advisors to 85 personnel. Early in 1972, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) expressed concern for the military situation in Cambodia and interest in providing field advisors. In the judgment of the U.S. Ambassadors to Indonesia and Cambodia, the U.S. would have been expected to finance the Indonesian advisors. There

was a question as to the expertise available from Indonesian sources, and, more importantly, opposition from the U.S. Congress was likely. The State Department, in conjunction with DOD, cautioned that no initiative should be taken by U.S. officials, but that bilateral discussions could be encouraged.  

(S) In June, the Republic of Korea (ROK) embassy in Vietnam conveyed to the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) possible interest in providing military advisors to Cambodia. The State Department reiterated that only bilateral arrangements should be encouraged. In July, discussions began between the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) and ROK officials in Phnom Penh. The GKR proposed that ROK advisors be employed in the five FANK training centers and certain in-country service schools. In late August, a ROK military team was scheduled to arrive from Seoul to make an appraisal. However, by October, the ROK Ambassador to Laos informed the U.S. Ambassador that the issue was dormant. In Cambodia, the subject was broached during a meeting between the Chief, MEDTC, and GKR and ROK military people, but the U.S. Ambassador to Korea informed CINCPAC that the ROK Government had not indicated any interest in providing advisors. Besides money, the constraints of language, image, and foreign relations were prohibitive.

(S) Although the foregoing feelers for U.S.-subsidized advisors in-country were discouraged, Indonesia and Korea, as well as Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and China, had provided training assistance outside Cambodia. Since resumption of MAP in late 1971, and continuing through FY 72, most GKR Force training had been conducted outside the country. As of the end of FY 72, approximately 60,000 personnel had been trained in Vietnam. Other training, including territorial infantry companies, FANK Special Forces, and Khmer Air Force (KAF) pilots and crews, had been conducted in Thailand under bilateral agreements. The Chief, MEDTC had submitted training schedules through FY 73 which envisioned the activation of five ground training sites in-country. The first two MAP-supported battalions ever to be trained in Cambodia began training at Kompong Speu on 5 July 1972. Full development of an in-country training capability was complicated by enemy activity, preoccupation with operational matters, and fund shortages. Therefore, it was planned to retain one site in Vietnam, operated by U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and FANK instructions, to continue out-of-country training through November 1973. At the end of 1972, the effect of a Vietnam cease-fire on these plans was not known.

(S) By late 1972, the surge of combat activity in Indochina had pinpointed the need for increased training requirements for the KAF. Several alternatives

1. J5541 Point Paper, 23 Feb 72, Subj: Third Country Advisors for FANK.
2. J5542 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Third Country Advisors for FANK.
were examined pertaining to training sites and trainer personnel. One of the first to be considered was the assumption of KAF training responsibility by Detachment One, 56th Special Operations Wing at Udorn. This U.S. Air Force unit had been training Laotian air force (RLAF) personnel. However, the goal for RLAF replacement training self-sufficiency was not until 1 July 1974. Thus, problems of manpower, ramp space, air space, housing, and mess facilities would be presented if KAF training were to be assimilated.  

(S) On 9 December 1972, COMUSMACHTHAI informed CINCPAC that the RTG had received a formal request from the GKR to place U.S. MTTs in Thailand to train KAF AU-24A crew members and maintenance personnel. Sites under consideration by the RTG for this training included Takhli and Kokethiem RTAFBs. COMUSMACHTHAI also recommended that Detachment One be expanded to provide KAF training requirements for the T-28, 0-1D, C-47, and AC-47. The RTG had approved such training at Udorn, but required a GKR to RTG request before formal approval was granted.  

(S) On 15 December 1972, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) conveyed to CINCPAC an impression that the KAF was not making the best use of pilot and instructor products of CONUS training to expand its own training capability. The CSAF suggested that out-of-country training priorities be assigned:  

Priority One - XM-93 (UH-1H weapon system) and C-123K aircrew and maintenance training.  
Priority Two - 0-1D and AC-47 aircrew training and 0-1D maintenance training.  
Priority Three - All other aircrew and maintenance training.  

(S) The CSAF recommended, as "the most efficient and expeditious" means to train C-123 crews, the CONUS training of four crews and 30 maintenance personnel beginning in January 1973. These personnel could then be used as training cadres upon their return to Cambodia. The CSAF questioned the need for high priority training in the AU-24A, for which large numbers of U.S. trainers in addition to the MTT would be required. Further, the U.S. Air Force did not have French-speaking pilots qualified in the AU-24, and qualified Cambodian personnel with English-speaking capability were limited.  

1. DEPCH Udorn 080900Z Dec 72.  
2. COMUSMACHTHAI 09051Z Dec 72; the AU-24 is a light, armed short take-off and landing aircraft.  
3. CSAF 152237Z Dec 72.  
4. Ibid.
At CINCPAC's request, the Chief, MEDTC responded to the CSAF message with a complete résumé of factors and constraints in the KAF training programs. These included the almost seven-fold expansion of KAF personnel in less than three years; the U.S. legislative restrictions on the size of the MEDTC and in-country advisors; the recent and accelerated influx of aircraft new to the KAF combined with low experience and training levels of KAF personnel; and, the need to meet operational needs while training new personnel. The Chief, MEDTC provided CINCPAC with a summation of the country team position on training program priority which did not differ materially from the CSAF view, with the exception of T-28 and AU-24 training:

Priority One - Training for C-123 and UH-1H (XM-93 weapon system).
Priority Two - O-1D, C-47, and AC-47 training.
Priority Three - T-28 and AU-24A training.
Priority Four - All other training. Within this priority, Chief, MEDTC considered on-the-job training by U.S. personnel of KAF general maintenance and support specialists to be of primary importance.

On 27 December 1972, CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC of training program actions which were planned while waiting for RTG approval for intensified training in Thailand. The capability of Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base in the Philippines to support C-123 MTT, students, and aircraft was being explored. This would require the GKR to arrange diplomatic clearances with the Republic of the Philippines (ROP). PACAF recommended that students should immediately be identified and placed in English language training. Four crews and maintenance personnel would be trained by an MTT, and this cadre would then return to train additional Cambodians in their native tongue. The planning for XM-93 training in Vietnam should continue, but an alternative site could be required depending on cease-fire restrictions. In the absence of French-speaking U.S. instructors for the AU-24, PACAF recommended that students be identified and placed in English language school. Once the location and date of training had been determined, action to call up MTT and technical assistance could be initiated.

Final action on T-28 training could not be taken, PACAF stated, until expansion problems at Udorn had been resolved. As a general overall recommendation, PACAF felt that the key to successful training, once the other obstacles

1. CHMEDTC 201110Z Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 162314Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPACAF 270233Z Dec 72.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
had been overcome, was a core of qualified English-speaking Cambodian students. PACAF suggested that, pending resolution of other problems, students identified for all training programs begin English language training.

Meanwhile, on 21 December, the Secretary of Defense solicited CINCPAC comments on a consolidation of Southeast Asia air training. Citing the recent additions of AU-24s, C-123s, T-28s, UH-1Hs, and O-1s to the KAF and the planned addition of C-123s to the RLAF, coupled with the imminent cease-fire agreements and heavy U.S. Air Force training requirements, the DSAA suggested, "...a new look at our air training concept in Southeast Asia." CINCPAC was requested to evaluate the establishment of a consolidated training base in Thailand. Training requirements for Laos and Cambodia, including training underway by Detachment One at Udorn, would be met at one location. CINCPAC was asked to determine the approximate U.S. personnel requirements to staff such a consolidated training facility, as well as the most feasible base in Thailand for such a facility. DSAA considered that quality training could be accomplished economically, and that once in operation, VNAF and RTAF training could also be provided. CINCPAC was to assume that the necessary political clearances could be obtained.

On 24 December, the Chief, MEDTC fully endorsed the concept of a consolidated training base to accomplish out-of-country Lao and Cambodian air training. On 2 January 1973, however, this endorsement was qualified as an outstanding long-term solution, but action should continue to resolve problems which would allow short-term training to be accomplished. Addressing the PACAF comment regarding English language, the Chief, MEDTC stated that English language training facilities were limited and operating at full capacity. The Khmer Language Institute had more than doubled its training capacity in less than one year, but even this increase could not keep pace with the rapidly expanding needs of all Cambodian military services. Therefore, MTT deployment to accomplish pilot, aircrew, and maintenance training was considered to be mandatory in the short-range. Coupled with MTT's at other bases, the assimilation of some KAF training at Udorn was also the preferred short-term solution.

No conclusive action, either to accelerate KAF training or to consolidate air training needs on one base in Thailand, had been taken by the end of 1972. However, on 5 January 1973, the JCS informed CINCPAC that all further discussion or comment on the consolidation of Southeast Asia air

1. Ibid.
2. SECDEF 1066/212025Z Dec 72.
3. CHMEDTC 9021/240814Z Dec 72; CHMEDTC 011/020500Z Jan 73.
training would be addressed to the JCS. In providing his evaluation of the concept, CINCPAC was requested to consider these pertinent points:  

A. A phased reduction of USAF T-28 instructor personnel at Det. 1 is scheduled to begin in March 1973, with the goal of RLAFF training self-sufficiency by Jan 1974.

B. The RTAF and VNAF training programs are functioning successfully at present and require a minimal number of U.S. instructor and support personnel.

C. Location of a training facility in Thailand serving the needs of four separate nations would have greater political implications and complications than a similar facility serving only the KAF.

D. The USAF can staff a small PCS detachment in Thailand for a one or two year period, augmented as required with instructor and technical assistance personnel to meet the immediate training needs of the KAF. Base and operating support could be provided by either U.S. military personnel or by contract, as appropriate. Required aircraft and materiel support could be drawn from existing/planned KAF inventory.

E. The long term goal of any U.S. training program for KAF should be, insofar as practicable, to make KAF self-sufficient in all aspects including training.

Indonesia

(C) In January 1972, the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (CHUSDLG) requested CINCPAC's assistance in upgrading the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) technical and professional training. The object was to establish an AURI Technical Training Center and provide new training curricula, training aids, and instructors patterned after U.S. Air Force training procedures. A technical survey MTT was to examine the kinds of technical courses needed. Two AURI enlisted personnel in each specialty would receive CONUS training, and another MTT would follow this cadre to Indonesia to assist in establishing new courses. Also envisioned was the establishment of an AURI Institute of Technology with a curriculum related to professional training of AURI officers. The overall

1. JCS 4888/0511402 Jan 73.
FY 73 training goals were to increase CONUS training in REMAN areas; to increase management and logistics training; to increase professional and specialty training; and to improve English language training.¹

(8) In April 1972, a REMAN MTT completed a survey of the Indonesian DOD (HANKAM) and the Indonesian Armed Forces. The purpose of the team was to develop a Five Year REMAN Training Plan. Restrictions in gaining access to financial and logistics officials and the non-availability of previous training records prevented the team from achieving its purpose. However, valuable information on the political, organizational, and operational workings of the HANKAM was compiled. The REMAN report was refined at CINCPAC and sent to the DOD, and CHUSDLG was to undertake the formulation of the Five Year Plan at CINCPAC's request.²

(8) In July 1972, transition and fighter pilot training in the T-33 was begun for six experienced Indonesian jet pilots. Concurrently, maintenance training in CONUS was begun for two officers and 16 enlisted men. The enlisted training was scheduled for completion by March 1973, the pilots by April 1973, and the maintenance officers by June 1973. The final phase of the T-33 plan was to deploy two U.S. Air Force MTTs, one for maintenance and one for pilots, to assist the cadre of trained AURI personnel in establishing a T-33 training base. Sixteen T-33 aircraft were scheduled for delivery to Indonesia under MAP after training was completed.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

(8) Sri Lanka was programmed as a CONUS-training-only country under MAP. However, $308,000 worth of MAP equipment was received in 1968 through FMS. The MAP-T for Ceylon was initiated in 1964, but was terminated by Prime Minister Bandaranaike in 1971. In FY 71, by Presidential determination, $3 million of equipment was promised to Ceylon under the MAP. The grant aid offer stipulated that no lethal weapons be included and no military advisors would be provided. The package included communications equipment, single propeller aircraft, engineering vehicles and equipment, and four Bell jet helicopters.³

(8) On 26 February 1972, the U.S. Defense Attache in Ceylon reported a change in the antagonistic attitude of the Ceylon Government. Consent was

1. J853 Point Paper, 6 Jun 72, Subj: Training for Self-Sufficiency in Indonesian Air Force (AURI); J853 Point Paper, 8 Jun 72, Subj: Indonesian MAP Training Program (FY 72 - FY 73).
given for a port call by a U.S. ship, and, in March, CINCPAC visited Ceylon. During his visit, CINCPAC discussed the resumption of MAP training for Ceylon, but no commitment was given by the Government. On 14 September 1972, the U.S. Ambassador to Ceylon advised that the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) had submitted a request for the training of Sri Lanka Air Force personnel under MAP. The request was for one officer and 14 enlisted men to be trained in the maintenance and overhaul of U.S.-furnished helicopters and avionics equipment. 1

The number of Ceylon students trained under MAP from FY 68 through FY 70 was: 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>TOTAL CONUS</th>
<th>ARMY CONUS</th>
<th>AIR FORCE CONUS</th>
<th>NAVY CONUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68/</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/</td>
<td>Officer</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/</td>
<td>No program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION IV--MAP/MASF AIRCRAFT

Free World Aeronautical Modernization Plan

(U) On 29 March 1972, the Secretary of Defense requested the JCS to submit a free world aeronautical modernization plan for FY 74 - FY 78 as a supplement to the Joint Forces Memorandum. On 30 March, the JCS tasked unified commanders to provide projected MAP aircraft requirements and recommended program type; i.e., MAP, grant aid, FMS, EDA, or research and development. CINCPAC requested PACOM country MAAGs/MILGP's to respond with detailed data direct to the JCS. On 14 April, CINCPAC concurred to the JCS in the submissions but clarified some inputs. He suggested that the JSOP for China, which specified 196 F-5Es, be modified to conform with realistic funding expectations for the FY 74 - FY 78 period. Thus, he recommended that 100 F-5s be programmed (45 in FY 74, 55 in FY 75) as a feasible objective for that time frame. CINCPAC confirmed the eventual operational requirement of follow-on fighter, transport, and anti-submarine warfare squadrons for Indonesia, but they were not priority objectives. The planned 72 F-5s for Korea were programmed with 3 in FY 73, 38 in FY 74, and 31 in FY 75. In the Philippines, limited funds and competition with other high priority items would govern the introduction of F-5s; these were programmed at two in FY 74, four in FY 75, and 12 in FY 76.

(E) On 28 April, CINCPAC submitted additional comments to the JCS relating to the aeronautical modernization plan. He noted that the need for MAP replacement aircraft to meet PACOM force modernization objectives was a continuing one. To ensure that the required aircraft would be available within desired time frames, it was essential that positive action be taken as early as possible because of long lead times associated with development, test, evaluation, and production of weapon systems. Although funding restraints could present obstacles, the proposed plan and the establishment of a special budget account appeared to be the most practical approach to eventual resolution of the persistent funding problems. CINCPAC recommended that the modernization plan be presented as a separate MAP program entity to assure its preservation in the planning, programming, budgeting system.

(E) CINCPAC acknowledged that the F-5E production would be responsive to the fighter aircraft requirements; however, funding would remain a problem for

1. J812 HistSum Apr 72; JCS 3618/302330Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 142224Z Apr 72.
2. CINCPAC 280345Z Apr 72.
most recipient countries. During the FY 74 - FY 78 time period, therefore, CINCPAC considered replacement counterinsurgency (COIN) and transport aircraft to be the highest priority because these types in the U.S. inventory were known to be limited. These two priorities were followed by reconnaissance, helicopter, anti-submarine warfare, and utility aircraft. Replacement trainers were accorded a lower priority. These priorities could vary by country; e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines wanted light and medium transports, while COIN aircraft were most desired by Thailand. Nevertheless, CINCPAC's stated priorities, in general, identified requirements most likely to compete for limited funds.¹

**COIN - STOL Aircraft Status in PACOM**

(5) As related in the CINCPAC History for 1971, the T-28 aircraft was the nucleus of the air effort against insurgency in Indochina. As the VNAF acquired the ability to operate more advanced aircraft, the T-28 became the main COIN force for Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The U.S. Air Force inventory of T-28s, however, was extremely low, and development of an alternate COIN aircraft was vital to the COIN capability of these countries.²

(5) During 1972, two STOL aircraft (AU-23 and AU-24) were tested by the U.S. Air Force and found to be unsatisfactory for adoption as the MAP COIN aircraft. These aircraft were then declared excess to U.S. requirements. The AU-24s were provided to Cambodia (See Section III--Training), and the AU-23s were offered to Thailand on a one-for-one exchange basis for the RTAF T-28s. The T-28s would then be used to maintain the authorized levels for Laos and Cambodia, where combat attrition, maintenance time, and training requirements created serious replacement problems. By October 1972, the KAF was authorized 48 T-28s but possessed only 21. The RLAF was authorized 86 and possessed 74. Of the Cambodian T-28s, only 14 were available for combat. Laos had 52 available for combat and 19 committed to training. In contrast, Thailand possessed 50 T-28s, five more than authorized.³

(5) In support of the T-28 requirements for Laos and Cambodia, a program (Project PEACE POST) was begun in 1972 to convert all remaining U.S. Air Force T-28 assets (50) to the combat configuration. These were scheduled to become available starting in May 1973, and conversion was scheduled for completion by

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1. Ibid.; Aircraft needs for individual countries are discussed more fully in the following section of this chapter.
3. JB37 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: STOL Aircraft for Thailand, with 1 atch, PACOM MAP-MASF T-28 Status; For detailed discussion of Thailand aircraft situation, see next section.
December 1973. The sole remaining source of T-28s was the U.S. Navy inventory of about 400 aircraft. The Navy had previously allocated 72 T-28s, under Project PEACE PROP, all but one of which had been delivered and assembled by the end of 1972.

Once the authorized levels of T-28s were achieved for Laos and Cambodia (86 and 48 respectively), 96 more would be needed for expected attrition in FY 73-75, against a total of 87 expected to become available during that same period.²

2. Ibid.
SECTION V--MAP/MASF COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Cambodia

Funds and Force Levels

In Section II of this chapter, it was shown that funds for Cambodian MAP were severely reduced from initial FY dollar guidelines. The end FY 72 figure of about $170 million was reduced from initial guidelines of $200 million. The initial FY 73 PPBS dollar guideline of $279 million was changed in December 1971 to $259.5 million under the control of MEDTC, but $40 million was reserved for supply operations to be administered at DOD level. In effect, this was an implied increase in materiel and training funds of $20.5 million. The figure finally presented to the Congress for FY 73 was $209.5 million. By November 1972, the interim CRA fund level had been reduced to approximately $133.3 million.

The impact on the Cambodia MAP of the FY 72 cut to $170 million was discussed by the Chief, MEDTC in a February 1972 message to CINCPAC. He stated that FANK force level objectives had been deferred to reach the $170 million program level (excluding supply operations). This represented a calculated risk that enemy pressure against the GKR would not markedly increase, and that the reduced MAP support would not vitiate GKR military and political resistance. When, by December 1972, half of FY 73 had passed without a Congressional appropriation, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide funding estimates for MAP Cambodia under various cease-fire scenarios. As a point of departure, the estimated total FY 73 obligations to 31 December 1972 were to be indicated in each case.

The MEDTC reply to CINCPAC analyzed the funds needed under three scenarios, all assuming a cease-fire prior to 1 January 1973. Scenario number one assumed continued force modernization and expansion as programmed in the MAP plan. Scenario number two assumed force modernization at the FY 73 goal of 220,000 personnel. Scenario number three assumed a current (December 1972) MAP-supported force of 181,000 with MAP providing only operations and maintenance (O&M) costs and equipment replacement on a one-for-one basis. Each option was presented under the condition of no enemy activity or continued combat activity.

1. J833 HistSums, Jan and Nov 72; SECDEF 6056/222327Z Nov 72.
2. CHMEDTC 141300Z Feb 72; J832 HistSum, Dec 72; JCS 6410/012124Z Dec 72.
**MAP COUNTRIES AND PROGRAM SUMMARIES**

**KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)**

**BASIC INFORMATION**

- **Area:** 66,000 sq mi
- **Population:** 18,400,000
- **GDP:** $900 million
- **GDP per Capita:** $50
- **Annual Growth:** 2%
- **Agriculture:** 70%
- **Industry:** 15%
- **Services:** 15%
- **Literacy Rate:** 31%
- **Defense Budget:** $15 million
- **Self-Financed:** 72%

**MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES**

- **Army:** 142 INF BN, 1 MECH BN, 1 ARTY BDE, 1 SF CMD, 1 PARACHUTE BN, 1 FGR BN, 1 SIGNAL BN, 1 TRANS BDE, TOTAL STRENGTH 87,200
- **Navy:** 2 PC, 34 PHR, 19 RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT, 22 LCM, 3 NAV INF BN, TOTAL STRENGTH 5,400
- **Air Force:** 22 T-28, 15 C-47, 17 MI-17, 6 AC-47, 14 T-41, 8 USA, TOTAL STRENGTH 6,400

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**

- **U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**
  - **Ambassador:**
  - **Chef CMOET:**

**MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**

(A) To provide Cambodian Armed Forces the capability to maintain national independence and territorial integrity.
(B) To train Cambodian Armed Forces sufficiently capable to disrupt enemy logistic and LOCs in the Communist countries and a limited objective of disrupting Viet Cong supply and logistics in support of the cia's ground forces.
(C) To encourage and assist third country efforts to support the Communist forces.
(D) To avoid U.S. influence beyond limits consistent with U.S. interest.

**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 134.
The first half of FY 73 obligations was listed in all cases at $59.5 million, while the last half FY 73 and entire FY 74 figures were, in millions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario #1</th>
<th>Scenario #2</th>
<th>Scenario #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jun 73</td>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td>Jan-Jun 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Combat</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Combat</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>167.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus with the $59.9 million already obligated in FY 73, the FY 73 totals envisioned by the MEDTC analysis, with or without combat, in the three situations were, in millions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario #1</th>
<th>Scenario #2</th>
<th>Scenario #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Combat</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>154.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Combat</td>
<td>200.2</td>
<td>200.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relating the above monetary figures to FANK MAP-supported force levels, the following figures were provided to CINCPAC and DOD in October 1972:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>FANK</th>
<th>MAP SUPPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Reserve</td>
<td>94,099</td>
<td>91,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>112,405</td>
<td>109,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQS and Support</td>
<td>24,432</td>
<td>23,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>5,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td>4,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>242,344</td>
<td>234,742</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of the end of FY 72, only 110 of the 366 general reserve and territorial infantry battalions were considered to be MAP-supported. By the end of FY 73, it was planned to support 188 of these battalions, and the programmed increase for FY 74 of 58 would total 246 MAP-supported battalions. Reviewing the monetary and force level projections, the likelihood of achieving the force goals under the continuing budgetary constraints was dependent upon a valid cease-fire and consequent reduction of ammunition costs—the largest single expenditure under O&M.

1. CHMEDTC 8582/081230Z Dec 72.
2. CHMEDTC 6744/050914Z Oct 72.
3. Ibid.
Equipment Actions

A parallel to the accelerated delivery of equipment to Vietnam, discussed in the Logistics chapter of this history, was the decision, in November 1972, to speed up delivery of MAP items to Cambodia. On 15 November, the Department of the Army (DA) authorized the acceleration of selected funded program items, with a required delivery date (RDD) of 31 December 1972. The project was tailored after the special ENHANCE PLUS delivery procedures, with a priority second only to Vietnam. Major items to be included under Project Code LDE were 21 anti-personnel carriers (APC), 3 mortar carriers, and 12 105mm howitzers. One week later, DA authorized the same priority for helicopters, machine guns, M-16 rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars. These FY 71/72 items were to be delivered by 20 February 1973 under Project Code LNS.

In March 1972, the JCS directed that the FY 73 Cambodia MAP UH-1H maintenance contract be executed by the U.S. Air Force. The contract was funded by an interdepartmental transfer of Cambodia MAP funds from DA to CSAF. In April, MEDTC requested approval to add one unit of UH-1H helicopter gunships to the FY 73 KAF force structure. CINCPAC recommended approval, and in May, the Secretary of Defense approved the expenditure of FY 72 MAP funds to procure the delivery of six UH-1H aircraft to KAF during FY 73.

On 8 August 1972, a KAF UH-1H helicopter was shot down by a surface-to-air missile (SA-7). The Chief, MEDTC submitted an urgent request for infrared (IR) Diffuser Kits to install on all KAF helicopters to counter the SA-7 threat. CINCPAC located and coordinated the transfer of the diffuser kits from U.S. Army, Vietnam stocks. By 22 August, all kits had been received and installed on the KAF helicopters. Also, arrangements were made to assure that UH-1Hs delivered to Cambodia in the future would be equipped with the IR kits.

In order to solve the persistent shortage of T-28s available to the KAF, the DOD approved CINCPAC's recommended allocation of nine MAP T-28D aircraft from Thailand in May 1972. Six of these were allocated to Cambodia and three to Laos. In November, 16 T-28B aircraft from U.S. Navy sources and five from Thailand were also delivered to Cambodia. These deliveries brought the KAF inventory up to the authorized level of 48 T-28s. All of the T-28Bs from the Navy had been assembled by the end of 1972.

1. J833 HistSum Nov 72; DA 152211Z Nov 72; DA 222218Z Nov 72.
The delivery of AU-24A mini-gunships discussed in Section II of this chapter was made on 10 November 1972. Fourteen AU-24s were delivered on a short-notice, expedited no-cost basis to be used as convoy escorts, forward air controllers (FAC), and in reconnaissance. By the end of 1972, six of the 14 had been assembled and flight checked. Other aircraft deliveries during December included 12 UH-1H helicopters funded from the FY 72 program, for a total of 29 in Cambodia. Four T-41 aircraft, also funded in FY 72, were delivered to make 15 in the KAF inventory. Eight C-123K and 13 O-1A aircraft surplus to the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) were allocated to Cambodia, but delivery dates had not been set by year's end.

In Section I of the Logistics chapter the submission by CINCPAC and approval by the JCS of the Support Cambodia Out of Thailand (SCOOT) plan is discussed in detail. CINCPAC directed the implementation of SCOOT effective 1 December 1972, and, on that date, MEDTC headquarters relocated from Saigon to Phnom Penh. Concurrently, a Joint Liaison Office was established at Samae San, Thailand to assume the duties formerly performed by the MEDTC-Rear in Saigon. These included Cambodia MAP matters related to ammunition, airlift, dry cargo, and administration.

One of the primary objectives of SCOOT was to establish a single munitions pipeline through Thailand to Cambodia. On 9 December 1972 CINCPAC requested clarification of original pipeline funding and loss replacement responsibility. The reply from DOD stated that the Cambodia MAP munitions pipeline would continue to be Service funded. Also, the MAP was required to absorb losses incurred after "constructive delivery," which was defined as the time of issue from Thailand depots. The Cambodia MAP, therefore, would be billed on the basis of issues from U.S. Thailand depots. These charges were to include pre-financed Service packing, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&T) costs incurred in anticipation of reimbursement from MAP funds.

Republic of China

MAAG Reorganization

On 31 December 1971, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was authorized 190 military personnel, 26 U.S. civilian personnel, and 26 local

2. J832 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 030403Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 252348Z Nov 72; CHMEDTC 8537/071245Z Dec 72.
3. J833 HistSum Dec 72; SECDEF 2577/222131Z Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 092256Z Dec 72.

national employees. By 31 December 1972, the strength had been reduced to 157 military, 24 U.S. civilians, and 26 local hires. To cope with this reduction, the Chief MAAG China proposed a drastic reorganization. The Service sections were reduced to basically liaison advisors, while the level of principal advisory effort was raised to Ministry of Natural Defense (MND) and Republic of China (ROC) Military Service headquarters level. Logisticians, communicators, and advisors of the three U.S. Service sections were pooled at centralized offices. This new organization was put into effect on 1 July 1972.¹

This internal MAAG reorganization prompted the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) to suggest that past proposals to combine the two organizations be reexamined. In his end-of-tour report dated September 1972, he cited several benefits to be derived from such a consolidation. Command relationships would be clarified, with a single U.S. military voice in Country Team and ROC advisory matters. The viability of the Mutual Defense Treaty would be enhanced if security assistance force objectives were melded with the joint commander's contingency responsibilities. The available manpower resources could be used to better advantage if combined, particularly to maintain continued instructive contact with lower level ROC military units. Lastly, the COMUSTDC noted that political developments such as the United Nations expulsion of the ROC and U.S. overtures to the People's Republic of China (PRC) would probably temper previous ROC objections to such a merger. At the end of 1972, however, no moves were apparent to act on the COMUSTDC recommendation.²

MAP/FMS Funds

At the beginning of 1972, the dollar level for FY 73 grant aid having been reduced from $20 million to $7.642 million excluding PCH&T, a six-year projection of grant aid and FMS levels was:³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP Ceiling</td>
<td>$19.5</td>
<td>$7.6</td>
<td>$15.0</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCH&amp;T</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training &amp; MAAG Spt</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;O&quot;</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ltr, USTDC Ser 0047 of 30 Aug 72, Subj: End of Tour Report, Transmittal of, with 1 encl, End of Tour Report, VADM W.H. Baumberger.
3. J825 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: FY 72-77 China MAP.
By June 1972, the FY 72 dollar level was reduced from $19.5 million to $10.9 million, including $6.3 million for PCH&T. In July, the aeronautical modernization program had been introduced--although funded separately from the grant aid program--and the following six-year security assistance fund levels were programmed. A comparison shows that all programmed out-year MAP level had also been reduced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I&quot; FMS Credit</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile the levels of FMS credit were also subjected to adjustments based on Congressional action and other FMS needs world-wide. On 15 February 1972, the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC and MAAG China that the FY 72 programmed level of $45 million remained in doubt. Only $5-$10 million in new obligational authority was expected, which might be used as a DOD guaranty against bank loans totalling $20-$40 million. Together with $20 million of credit funded in October 1971, a total FY 72 ROC credit program of $40-$60 million might be reached. On 3 March, the Secretary of State announced a $45 million FY 72 FMS credit level for China.

Modernization of ROC Planning

Even though the ROC contributed ten percent of its gross national product to defense, almost 94 percent of that budget was needed for O&M costs.

2. J825 HistSums Feb, Mar, Apr 72; SECDEF 3865/152233Z Feb 72; SECSTATE 036887/032015Z Mar 72; AMEMB Taipei 1177/080130Z Mar 72; SECSTATE 042797/132142Z Mar 72; CHMAAG China 190901Z May 72; CINCPAC 250422Z May 72.
Little was left for investment in more modern equipment. Recognizing the burden on the ROC economy, consultations were initiated by the Country Team with the MND to develop a plan for reorganizing and modernizing ROC forces. Planning efforts were begun by the MND in 1970, but, without planning directives and with unrealistic threat analyses by the ROC Services, progress was nil. With assistance from the MAAG, the MND completed an initial Five Year Plan for Force Modernization in May 1972. The plan was for Fiscal years 1972-1976. The MAAG considered the new product to be a significant improvement over earlier efforts, and was hopeful that it would become a vehicle for realistic reorganization and modernization of the ROC Armed Forces.¹

(continued) Another step forward was recorded as a result of a June 1972 visit to Taiwan by the CINCPAC Research and Engineering Consultant (RAEC). This team recommended that a small research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) advisory group be established in the MAAG. Its primary function would be to assist the MND to develop a research and development management system, utilizing the potential of both the civilian sector and government agencies. Subsequently, the ROC established a five-man RDT&E office in the Plans section MND, while the Chief, MAAG requested approval to create a four-man RDT&E office in the MAAG. Pending approval of the MAAG request, an experienced RDT&E officer was sent to Taipei on temporary duty to assist the MAAG.²

Co-production Programs

(continued) The major co-production program in China began in February 1971, when the first Bell UH-1 helicopter was disassembled in the U.S. and crated for shipment to Taiwan by Bell-trained Chinese technicians. By the beginning of 1972, major component assemblies were shipped to Taiwan, mated with Chinese-produced parts, assembled, and tested. The total co-produced was 50 UH-1 helicopters.³

(continued) In December 1971, the Country Team recommended approval for the co-production of 68 additional UH-1H aircraft, for a total of 118 helicopters. However, this level would not be reached until 1976. Also in 1971, the ROC had expressed interest in co-production programs for the Lycoming T-53 engine (UH-1H), and PG-92 Patrol Gunboats. On 22 April 1972, the Ambassador in Taipei advised of coordinated Country Team support for the PG-92 co-production program. This approval was based on a 1971 study by the U.S. Naval Ship Systems Command which concluded that the Chinese Navy had the capability to construct

PG boats under close management. The Ambassador reiterated support for the additional 68 UH-1Hs, but recommended disapproval of the T-53 co-production proposal because the foreseeable production run (118) would not be large enough to make co-production economically feasible.¹

(5) The initial Country Team disapproval of T-53 engine co-production was challenged by the Chief of the ROC General Staff, who thought the Country Team position was shortsighted. He indicated that, if U.S. grant aid or FMS credits were not forthcoming from the U.S., the ROC would proceed using ROC funds entirely. ROC officials considered the attainment of aircraft design and production capability to be a matter of national pride and prestige. On 26 May 1972, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS and DOD that T-53 co-production be approved, and that the Country Team be asked to reassess its position. CINCPAC noted that the JSOP force level objective of 236 helicopters for China was a recognized and accepted goal, and one which would eventually be attained. On that basis, and since the T-53 was the engine used on UH-1H helicopters, CINCPAC considered co-production of the engine to be logical and compatible with the UH-1H program.²

(5) Apparently, CINCPAC's recommendation was accepted, since, on 22 June, the DOD advised that a DSAA sales representative would visit Taiwan to negotiate for the helicopter and engine co-production programs. On 15 August, the Secretary of Defense notified the Chief, MAAG China of White House approval to provide FMS credit for the T-53 engine assembly program. The Chief, MAAG was authorized to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the DOD for the additional helicopters and the T-53 engine co-production. Direct FMS credit agreements for FY 73 amounting to $13.7 million were allocated, allowing $3 million for vehicle modernization, $7 million for the UH-1H program, and $3.7 million for T-53 engine co-production. The Memorandum specifically included a total of $8.5 million FMS credits through FY 74 for the T-53 program.³

(5) Early in 1972, the ROC evinced interest in another area of co-production—the F-5 International Fighter Aircraft (IFA). On 15 May the Chief, MAAG received a request from the Chief of the General Staff for grant aid assistance to co-produce 145 F-5 aircraft. The MAAG requested price quotations for direct procurement and information regarding financial arrangements in order to discuss the costs to the ROC of direct procurement versus co-production costs. After Northrop Aircraft representatives had discussed the co-production of F-5s with

2. J825 HistSum Apr 72; CHMAAG China 220501Z May 72; CINCPAC 260415Z May 72.
SECRET

ROC authorities in August, however, Northrop recommended against a full co-production effort by the ROC. Instead, they suggested either direct procurement or a local assembly program.

(3) As postulated by the Chief, MAAG, the reluctance of the ROC to participate in the F-5E program for China by utilizing FMS credits was the main obstacle, not only to direct procurement but to co-production as well. The original F-5 program for China, as stated in the DOD Program Objectives Memorandum for FY 74-78, had proposed 50 F-5E aircraft under MAP grant aid, and 75 for ROC purchase through FMS credit. The possibility of acquisition by grant aid was eliminated on 18 September, when funds for FY 74-75 F-5 grant aid were deleted by the Secretary of Defense. On 21 September, the ROC signed a $50,000 contract with Northrop for a co-production survey. On 8 November, the Chief, MAAG advised DOD of a ROC request for a $5 million credit deposit with Northrop to insure procurement of long lead time materials. The Country Team recommended approval of the ROC request, regardless of method of acquisition, i.e., direct procurement, in-country assembly, or co-production. 2

Medium Tank Requirements

(3) In the fall of 1970, the ROC expressed interest in obtaining M48 tanks through MAP excess, since M41 tanks were no longer available. In early December 1970, CINCPAC recommended the allocation of 45 M48 tanks to China, and verified the ROC ability to rebuild, maintain, and arm the tanks. The State Department opposed the provision of additional tanks because other ROC defense needs should have higher priority. Following a visit to Taipei in June 1971, CINCPAC determined that efforts to obtain excess M48 tanks for the ROC should be renewed. In August 1971, the Embassy submitted a Country Team position that up to 200 M48 tanks should be allocated to the ROC. CINCPAC supported this position. 3

(3) On 25 January 1972, a joint State/Defense offer of 281 M48 tanks was made on an as is--where is basis. This proposal specified that the ultimate goal should be to gradually replace the ROC tank inventory, scrapping or returning three older or smaller tanks for each two M48s received. The

2. CHMAAG Taipei 0109092 Sep 72; J826 Point Paper, 10 Oct 72, Subj: Defense Production/Co-production Activities-ROC; J825 HistSum Nov 72; CHMAAG Taipei 0807012 Nov 72.
Country Team welcomed the allocation of 281 M48s, but requested that all M41 tanks then on hand be retained. The older M24s and M18s could be replaced one-for-one.¹

(§) On 1 July 1972, CINCPAC requested MAAG China to submit a plan for phasing out M24 tanks and M18 gun carriages as M48 tanks were introduced. The MAAG reply, on 26 July, proposed a one-for-one replacement of M24s and M18s as M48s were delivered, with delivery recommended in increments of 60. CINCPAC concurred in the MAAG plan, noting that the 475 M48s would almost balance with the 411 M24/M18 on hand in the ROC inventory.²

(§) The Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC, on 7 August 1972, that the DOD would propose an initial pilot program for M48 tanks. One battalion would be equipped with 60 M48s. Before a formal proposal, the Chief, MAAG was to submit a draft Memorandum of Understanding which would commit the ROC to declare M24/M18s as redistributable MAP property as the M48s became operational. The Memorandum was also to include the caveat that the pilot program would not be construed as a commitment by the U.S. to provide additional tanks. The Chief, MAAG submitted the draft Memorandum on 10 August, and CINCPAC added his support on 23 August.³

(§) In September, a MIMEX offer of 200 M48 tanks by the U.S. Army was subsequently reduced to 100, and, on 21 September, CINCPAC was informally advised of consideration by State/Defense to sell 60 M48s to the ROC. No decision was expected, however, until after the 7 November election, and no further action had transpired by the end of the year.⁴

Transfers, Loans, Sales of U.S. Vessels

(U) Several U.S. vessels were acquired by the ROC during 1972. On 7 March, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) announced the processing of a navy-to-navy lease of the USS CAHOKIA to the Chinese Navy. The terms were for five years, renewable, at no cost to the ROC. On 20 March 1972, the Secretary of the Navy approved the lease, and turnover of the vessel took place on 14 April, the effective date of the lease. Also, on 29 March, the USNS KEATHLEY was transferred to the Chinese Navy.⁵

1. J825 Point Paper, 18 Feb 72; Subj: Medium Tank Requirements; J825 Point Paper, 21 Jul 72, Subj: Medium Tank Requirements.
4. J826 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72; Subj: Transfer of M-48 Tanks to GRC.
On 30 March, the CNO advised of an offer to sell the USS MADDOX (DD-731) to the Chinese Navy on an as-is--where is basis for $229,500. The MADDOX would replace an older destroyer escort vessel in the Chinese Navy. CINCPAC concurred in the offer, and the Chinese Navy accepted. The letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed for the ROC on 20 April, and the MADDOX was transferred to the ROC on 6 July 1972 at Naval Station Long Beach.

On 29 June, the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC that 120 Landing Track Vehicles (LVTP-5) had been allocated to the ROC. These had been offered by the U.S. Marine Corps under the Major Items Excess program. On 1 July 1972, the USS ELKHORN (AOG-7) was decommissioned and transferred to the Chinese Navy. The ship was recommissioned as the RCN HSING-LUNG (AOG-517).

On 18 August, the CNO offered, and the Chinese Navy accepted the sale of the USS LLOYD THOMAS (DD-764) on the same terms and for the same price as the MADDOX. And finally, in a reversal of the foregoing acquisitions, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the EX-USS RODMAN (DD-456) stricken from the U.S. Naval Vessel Register on 1 November 1972. Accordingly, the CNO terminated the loan of the RODMAN effective that date, and requested MAAG China to assume custody from the ROC and proceed with disposal. Cannibalization was authorized for usable material to support similar ships in the Chinese Navy inventory before the vessel was offered through local U.S. disposal sale procedures.

Submarines for the ROC

In past years, the ROC had expressed intense interest in the acquisition of submarines for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and defense. This interest had initially received a cool reaction from U.S. military agencies, but, by October 1971, State and Defense had jointly agreed to provide submarines. No announcement of this decision was to be made until after President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972. It had also been agreed that submarine crew training for Chinese crews could begin in March 1972. The entire subject was to receive very low key treatment.

Indicative of the sensitivity of the submarine issue, the Associated Press reported, on 19 March 1972, that Chinese Nationalist sailors would start

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1. J825 HistSums Apr and Jul 72; CNO 4900/30202OZ Mar 72; CINCPAC 0503502 Apr 72; CHMAAG China 110905Z Apr 72; COMNAVBASE LOSA/LBECOFF 4900/0623332 Jul 72.
submarine training in the U.S. The article speculated that any attempt to provide Nationalist China with submarines could arouse protests from U.S. Senators who were concerned about the "still-fragile" U.S. relations with the CPR. It was recalled that an administration proposal to loan three submarines to Taiwan in 1970 had been blocked by the U.S. Senate. The balance of the article speculated on friction between the DOD and State Department on the issue, reported the inability of the Seventh Fleet to provide training targets for Chinese surface craft as it had in the past, and noted that the CPR possessed more than 40 diesel-powered attack submarines.\footnote{The Flint (Mich) Journal, 19 Mar 72, p. 16, Fred S. Hoffman, "Chinese Nationalists Start U.S. Training, Sub Deal Expected," dateline, Washington (AP).}


\footnote{2}{J825 HistSum May 72; CHMAAG China 170903Z May 72.}

\footnote{3}{Ibid.}

(§) The speculation regarding possible friction between U.S. agencies, noted above, appeared to have some substance. In April 1972, a tentative offer to sell two submarines to the ROC was made with apparent State and Defense concurrence. The Chief, MAAG was requested to obtain an answer of acceptance from the ROC by 1 June. This offer was subject to the concurrence of CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy in Taipei. CINCPAC had concurred on 28 April and, according to the Chief, MAAG, the Embassy was about to concur:

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \n
...Marshall Green, by telecon approximately 28 April to DCM Gleysteen, requested no action by Taipei until green light obtained by State from White House.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \n
So here we stand. We are unable to advise Chinese of offer even though NOFORN classification was withdrawn regarding ROC, and all documentary messages indicate offer has been made.

The Chief, MAAG concluded by stating his concern that no submarines would be available by the time (23 May) that the first ROC submarine crew completed CONUS training.\footnote{On 20 July, the Chairman, JCS announced that consideration of transfer of submarines to the ROC would be deferred until September 1972. During that time, an evaluation of political and military factors bearing on the subject.}

\footnote{3}{On 20 July, the Chairman, JCS announced that consideration of transfer of submarines to the ROC would be deferred until September 1972. During that time, an evaluation of political and military factors bearing on the subject.}

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would be made. On 7 August, in response to requests from the JCS and CINCPAC, the Chief, MAAG provided an evaluation of the situation. He began by stating that, "...no new developments" had occurred since, "...SECSTATE and SECDEF agreed with the Country Team and CINCPAC..." to provide submarines. He repeated the military need for the ROC to pursue ASW training in light of the acknowledged attack submarine capability of the PRC. Politically, he stressed the super sensitivity of the ROC to U.S. intentions and actions since the softening of U.S. relations with the PRC. He noted that, whether the decision was for or against providing the training submarines, it would be viewed by the ROC as far more significant than if the decision had been made as late as one year ago. The Chief, MAAG reiterated his support for an affirmative decision, adding that the provision of submarines to match the crew training was at least implied, even though not guaranteed. 1

On 12 August, CINCPACFLT concurred in principle with the MAAG China evaluation, noting that the Seventh Fleet capability to provide ASW training to the ROC was extremely limited. Further, the state of Chinese Navy ASW training and the value of the U.S. ASW-related security assistance investment in the ROC could be expected to diminish appreciably unless training submarines were provided. CINCPAC concurred in the MAAG evaluation and the CINCPACFLT comments to the JCS on 21 August. CINCPAC stated that there appeared to be no overriding political considerations which could clearly militate against the transfer of submarines to the ROC. 2

On 4 December, the CNO advised that transfer of two diesel-powered submarines to the ROC had been approved. The USS CUTFASS (SS-478) and USS TUSK (SS-426) were available for FMS on an as-is—where is basis on 13 April 1973 and 1 October 1973, respectively. The sale price for each was $153,000, subject to ROC agreement that the submarines would be used for ASW training exclusively. The Chief, MAAG China notified all concerned that the Chinese Navy had accepted the offer on 8 December 1972. 3

MAP Support for ROC Army Reserve

In October 1972, the Chief, MAAG proposed that the ROC Army reserve divisions be certified eligible for limited MAP support. To encourage the ROC to reduce the size of the active Army force, MAAG China also proposed that

1. J825 HistSum Jul 72, which cites JCS 7522/202351Z Jul 72 and CINCPAC 251828Z Jul 72 (both Ex); J825 Point Paper, 21 Jul 72, Subj: Submarines for China; J825 HistSum Aug 72; CHMAAG China 070501Z Aug 72.
2. CINCPACFLT 4900/120211Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 212134Z Aug 72.
units converted to reserve status continue to be authorized the same equipment levels as when active. As newer and more modern equipment was acquired by the active units, the World War II vintage equipment could be used to bring the reserve units up to equipment strength. CINCPAC agreed with the long-term JSOP goal to reduce ROC active ground units in favor of improved air and naval defense.1

(5) In November, the DOD suggested that MAP material generated as excess to active force requirements be purchased by the ROC for the reserve units. The Chief, MAAG did not agree. He noted that it was doubtful that the ROC would pay even scrap prices for the World War II equipment, nor would the reduction of active duty forces be accepted as easily if they were forced to purchase the old equipment. CINCPAC agreed with MAAG China, and recommended DOD approval of the original proposal. On 5 December, DOD authorized the transfer of excess vintage MAP material to the ROC reserve units.2

Background

(5) Bilateral agreements of 15 August 1950 and 13 August 1958 formed the basis for the initial Military Assistance Program (MAP), or Security Assistance (SA) Program, to the Government of Indonesia (GOI). Though modest in nature, this assistance continued through 1964, at which time the expanding gap in Indonesian - U.S. political relations caused its demise. The Communist (PKI) coup attempt of 30 September - 1 October 1965 started a chain reaction of events which ultimately led to the transfer of presidential power from the late President Soekarno to the incumbent president, General Suharto. The advent of the current government was accompanied by a normalization of international relations with neighboring countries, with a return to membership in the United Nations, and a resumption of U.S. MAP in accordance with a U.S. Presidential Determination made in September 1966. A subsequent bilateral agreement of 14 April 1967, a special agreement of 17 April 1969, and a third agreement of August 1970 served to refine the terms of U.S. SA grant aid to Indonesia. Militarily, no overt external threat to Indonesia existed. However, having suppressed an attempted Communist inspired coup, the Indonesian Government was very sensitive to the possibility of renewed external interest in revitalizing and supporting the PKI, and took active measures to prevent the development of either an internally or externally supported threat. GOI pursuit and harassment

1. J825 HistSum Nov 72; CHMAAG China 190904Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 010346Z Nov 72.
2. J825 HistSums Nov and Dec 72; SECDEF 9563/171407Z Nov 72; CHMAAG China 290903Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 022359Z Dec 72; SECDEF 1414/052339Z Dec 72.
of residual PKI cadre effectively suppressed that organization. The GOI and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), individually and collectively, monitored internal security in Indonesia (especially) and the political/military security scenario in Indochina very closely. The military theme in Indonesia was internal defense, and the ABRI plan to restore military readiness extended through the 1970's. Any deterioration, however, in the military situation in Indochina could be expected to accelerate the Indonesian timetable for military buildup, obviously at the expense of their economic development timetable.  

(§) In view of the uncertainties concerning future Indonesian performance and requirements in solving its indigenous political and economic problems, initial dollar guidelines were considered purely illustrative. Planning was conducted in such a way as to permit adjustments in military assistance levels if dictated by U.S. interests. In August 1969, for example, the following low key, dollar guidelines were in effect:  

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1/Grant aid dollar guidelines to include supply operations. * In millions of dollars.

Policy Changes

(§) At the beginning of FY 70 the USDLG was organized into three sections: the Office of the Chief, an Administrative Section, and a Civic Action Section. The Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) then in effect authorized a personnel strength of 24 personnel: eight officers, five enlisted personnel, and 11 local nationals. In the succeeding three years this strength increased by a factor of approximately 300 percent. A CINCPAC Manpower Management Survey Team in January 1970 confirmed a badly needed personnel increase of seven additional U.S. personnel for the USDLG to manage even the modest $6 million MAP for FY 70. In view of the FY 71 program value increase (first to $15 million and then to $18 million) another survey was requested in February 1971. This second manpower survey documented what eventually resulted in the current (FY 72) JTD and which increased USDLG personnel strength to 69 permanent

1. Ltr, Hq USDLG Ser S28-72 of 9 Aug 72, Subj: End of Tour Report, with 1 encl., End of Tour Report, Col Taylor R. Fulton, USA, Chief, USDLG.
2. Ibid.
personnel: 23 officers, 22 enlisted, four U.S. civilians, and 20 local nationals. This figure did not include nine contract and DOD civilian personnel, a two-man APO, and a five-man communications detachment assigned to the USDLG on a permanent basis. Almost concurrently with the second manpower survey team study, a Washington Inter-Agency Study Group (headed by RADM William R. Flanagan, USN, OASD/ISA) was established at the direction of the White House (with policy guidance from the NSC) and visited Indonesia to study and make recommendations as to the direction and structure of future year SA programs for Indonesia. The findings and recommendations of the Inter-Agency Study Group report (commonly called the Flanagan Report) triggered a series of USG decisions at the highest levels which culminated in a redirection of Indonesian MAP policy whereby USDLG was selected as the prototype Security Assistance Agency to test the "Nixon Doctrine" and enter into joint SA planning with the host government. The thrust of the MAP changed from civic action to improvement of internal defense capability and a planned MAP dollar ceiling of $25 million was authorized for the budget and plan years (FY 72 and 73).  

(§) Commencing with the planning for FY 72, the Indonesians did enter into joint planning with the USDLG for the first time. Though handicapped by a lack of understanding of MAP methodology, the HANKAM presented to the USDLG a list of 17 projects (in order of priority) and recommended funding parameters for each. This original Indonesian FY 72 program proposal was refined and expanded into a viable and objective FY 72 and FY 73 MAP by open and frank discussion on both sides, thus validating the theory that joint planning was feasible if conducted in an understanding, patient, and responsible manner by both sides. The original HANKAM proposal presented to the Flanagan Study Group in February 1972 remained the basic document on which the FY 73 MAP was based and upon which the plan and out-year programs (FY 74 thru 78) were structured.  

Australia - U.S. Cooperation on Indonesian MAP

(§) In September 1971, the JCS notified CINCPAC of an Australian proposal to provide Indonesia with 16 F-86 Sabre Jet aircraft, plus a sizable quantity of spare parts. The initial JCS reaction was favorable if Australia intended to provide sufficient training and support so that Indonesia would not seek to use limited U.S. MAP funds to support the aircraft. CINCPAC concurred in the JCS evaluation that this development was beneficial to all concerned; however, CINCPAC added that it should be closely monitored and evaluated because the Indonesians already had large numbers of obsolete aircraft.  

2. Ibid.; JBT2 Point Paper, 27 Jun 72, Subj: Assessment of Security Assistance Levels in the PACOM.
In April 1972, the DLG and Australian representatives began an exchange of information to coordinate the F-86 transfer with the U.S. delivery of T-33s. Both aircraft squadrons were to be based at Iswhajudi Air Base on the island of Java. In August, CINCPAC authorized the Chief, DLG to discuss details of the FY 73 security assistance program and out-year planning on a one-time basis. This authority was later confirmed and extended by joint State/Defense/JCS message, subject only to the withholding of information deemed politically sensitive at a given time. Thus, a continuing informal dialogue at the Country Team level was begun in order to avoid duplication of assistance efforts. An additional benefit was that an appearance of joint U.S.-Australian positions on military assistance matters could be avoided.

T-33 Aircraft for Indonesia

Original programming had provided for Indonesia to receive 12 T-33 aircraft in FY 72 and four in FY 73. The decrease in fund level for FY 72 prompted reprogramming, with eight T-33s to be delivered in each fiscal year. An MTT was to undertake maintenance and pilot instructor training, but sufficient trained Indonesian personnel would not be available until March or April 1973. On 29 March 1972, CINCPAC concurred in the use of projected excess T-33s to meet the Indonesian programmed requirements, with CONUS storage assets as the source. The standard acquisition cost would be $99,458, plus PCH&T, overhaul, modification, etc. CINCPAC also recommended that the total of 16 T-33s be acquired from FY 72 reprogramming action, and that they be stored either at CONUS locations or at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa after corrosion control processing.

C-130 IRAN for Indonesia

In September 1971, the Chief, DLG solicited CINCPAC's support to develop an Inspect and Repair as Needed (IRAN) capability for Indonesian Air Force (AURI) C-130 transport. Eight C-130s possessed by the AURI were in need of IRAN, last accomplished in 1968. CINCPAC concurred with the DLG proposal that IRAN of two C-130s be accomplished by the Lockheed Air Service, Singapore (LASS), with concurrent training of AURI maintenance technicians. The remaining six C-130s could then be IRAN processed in-country, using the on-the-job trained personnel as the nucleus of a formal IRAN facility. Supervision and technical assistance in-country would be provided by LASS personnel. Following the release of FY 72 funding levels by DSAA, CINCPAC requested various interested agencies

1. J823 HistSum Nov 72; SECDEF 6764/281638Z Sep 72, which cited CINCPAC 212209Z Aug 72.
to expedite actions needed to implement the IRAN plan. The proposal was supported by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and, on 23 March 1972, DSAA provided certification for off-shore procurement and IRAN of two C-130 aircraft.\(^1\)

**Excess C-119 Aircraft Proposal**

\(\text{In March 1972, a visit to Indonesia by a Fairchild Industries representative generated considerable AURI interest in the C-119K aircraft. The Chief, DLG envisioned the use of the C-119K in several configurations for such missions as assault transport, search and rescue, gunship, and reconnaissance/ASW. If this were possible, programmed requirements for light transport, search and rescue, and ASW squadrons could be merged into one C-119 squadron. The limiting factor to such usage was that 115/145 octane fuel was not available in Indonesia; therefore a lower performance 100/130 octane fuel would have to be used. CINCPAC replied to the DLG on 25 March, stating that the engine used on the C-119 would lose power and performance with the 100/130 fuel, which was recommended only for emergency operations. Also, the use of this fuel would increase maintenance and overhaul costs. Therefore, it was recommended that the C-119 not be identified for Indonesian MAP. Other considerations listed by CINCPAC included the inadvisability of introducing a completely new weapon system to the marginal AURI logistics and maintenance base; the cost of aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and spare parts, which would be $4 million for six C-119K aircraft; and, the fund limitations which would force program deviations to the detriment of other requirements.}^{2}\)

**Helicopters for AURI**

\(\text{In April 1972, the deletion of programmed UH-1H helicopters from the FY 72 MAP caused the HANKAM and AURI to express deep concern and disappointment. The Indonesian military had planned to use the helicopters during counterinsurgency operations later in 1972. Consequently, the Chief, DLG requested CINCPAC guidance or alternative means to meet the operational needs of the AURI. The DLG suggested that excess H-34D helicopters could be modified to an H-34T twin jet pack configuration, using $3.5 million in EDA funds which had been allocated to Indonesia.}^{3}\)

\(^{1}\) J824 HistSum Mar 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 120840Z Sep 71; CINCPAC 202135Z Mar 72; CSAF 242227Z Mar 72; Memo, DSAA Ser IT-4375/2 dated 23 Mar 72, Subj: Certification and Authorization of MAP/OSP for the Support of the Military Assistance Program.

\(^{2}\) J823 HistSum Mar 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 220216Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 252008Z Mar 72.

\(^{3}\) J823 HistSum May 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 060825Z Apr 72.
The U.S. Air Force indicated the availability of H-34s for the suggested modification; however, when PACAF recommended that the availability of reconditioned UH-1s be investigated, CINCPAC requested additional information on which to base a decision. After being advised by DA of a two-year lead time for UH-1s, and by DLG of the desire to meet a 1 October delivery date for some type of helicopter, CINCPAC recommended that the DLG plan for H-34 conversion via excess be approved by DOD.\(^1\)

In June, the question was raised as to whether the prospective reconditioning and modification of H-34 aircraft could be accomplished by Air America at Udorn, Thailand. Containers of excess H-34 spare parts, AGE, and engines generated by Vietnamese Air Force excess had already arrived at Sattahip, Thailand for further disposition. The Deputy Chief, Udorn expressed alarm at this turn of events, citing the existing Air America workload in support of ongoing operations in Laos. On 14 July, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) offered to provide 14 flyable H-34 helicopters for the AURI at no cost, and suggested to CINCPAC a working level conference to define procedures. The DLG immediately acknowledged the CNO offer, noting that it had probably forestalled undesirable political repercussions resulting from inability to fulfill a commitment to the host country.\(^2\)

After the working conference requested by CNO was convened by the USAF Chief of Staff, it developed that the Navy H-34s could not be used because of cost and shipping lead times. Therefore, it was decided that 12 USAF excess H-34 helicopters at Udorn would be repaired by Air America. The project was designated PEACE ROTOR, with an initial goal of four deliveries to Indonesia by October 1972.\(^3\)

The first four PEACE ROTOR UH-34s were delivered at Halim Air Base, Djakarta, Indonesia on 7 October 1972, having been ferried from Udorn to Indonesia by Air America crews. The Chief, USDLG expressed deep appreciation to all concerned, stating, "...The United States has achieved an important success in its relations with Indonesian Government and military establishment."\(^4\)

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1. CSAF 111631Z Apr 72; CINCPACAF 140051Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 152346Z Apr 72; DA 212115Z Apr 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 020754Z May 72; CINCPAC 082340Z May 72.
4. J824 HistSum Sep 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 300856Z Sep 72; DEPCH Udorn 151000Z Sep 72; CINCPACAF 260030Z Sep 72; J823 HistSum Oct 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 100828Z Oct 72.
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At the end of the year, it appeared that the "important success" achieved by the crash delivery of the four UH-34s was a fleeting one. On 1 December, the Chief, DLG advised CSAF that the Indonesian military was pressing for accelerated delivery of additional UH-34s under the PEACE ROTOR program. 1

Destroyer Escort for Indonesian Navy (ALRI)

In May 1971, CINCPAC had been informed by DOD that among the items programmed for Indonesian MAP were jet aircraft and destroyer escorts for the ALRI. CINCPAC had expressed reservations on the inclusion of these items, and requested the Chief, DLG and the U.S. Ambassador not to open discussions with Indonesia prior to formal approval. At the same time, however, the State Department had authorized the Ambassador to discuss the MAP in general terms with the president of Indonesia. On 14 June 1971, CINCPAC and the State Department were informed by the Ambassador that his briefing of 10 May to President Suharto had included the jets and destroyers. The Ambassador added that, since the inclusion of these items had been greeted with pleasure by Indonesian officials, he did not see how the U.S. could renege on this offer. 2

On 21 November 1972, CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC of the forthcoming decommissioning of the USS JOHN R. PERRY (DE-1034). This would be the destroyer escort transferred to Indonesia if an offer was made by the U.S. On 26 November, CINCPAC passed this information to the DLG, but cautioned against discussing the impending offer with the Indonesians. The CNO announced approval of the transfer of a destroyer-type ship to Indonesia, and the official selection of the USS JOHN R. PERRY. The vessel could be made available, on an as is--where is basis on 15 February 1973. The sale price would be $147,000 and Indonesian acceptance or rejection of the offer would be required not later than 15 January 1973. On 27 December 1972, the Chief, DLG made the formal offer to the HANKAM, and an ALRI inspection team was scheduled to arrive at Pearl Harbor on 7 January 1973 to inspect the PERRY. 3

T-56 (C-130) Engine Overhaul

Related to the need for a formal IRAN program for C-130 aircraft discussed earlier was the critical engine failure problem on the C-130s which arose almost simultaneously. Indonesia had purchased 10 C-130Bs from the U.S. in 1962. Included had been 10 spare T-56 (Model A7A) engines, a spare parts

1. J824 HistSum Dec 72; USDLG Indonesia 010932Z Dec 72.
3. J823 HistSum Nov 72; CINCPACFLT 4900/212030Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 252306Z Nov 72; J824 HistSum Dec 72; CNO 4920/141847Z Dec 72; USDLG Indonesia 270940Z Dec 72.
package, and training aids. By August 1972, when the engine problem was broached to CINCPAC by the DLG, two of the C-130s had been lost, but four engines were salvaged. The AURI inventory of T-56 engines thus stood at 45. A shortage of funds had caused a complete standdown of the C-130s for 18 months in 1968 and 1969. The oil leaks and turbine damage which resulted beginning in 1970 were attributed partially to this idle period. No MAP support was provided to the AURI C-130 squadron until FY 70, and, of the eight aircraft possessed, only seven were MAP-supported in 1972. For FY 73, in addition to the C-130 IRAN program, C-130 MAP included two major wing modifications, five engine overhauls, technical assistance, and some spare parts, AGE, and other support. One C-130E ($4.2 million) was programmed for FY 74, and one each year thereafter until 16 were on hand. Delivery of the first C-130E was not scheduled until early FY 76.

It was imperative that some immediate means be found to overhaul the deadline T-56s, as requested by DLG in August 1972. Nonetheless, CINCPAC tasked the DLG to assist in the development of a plan by AURI to upgrade the entire C-130 maintenance and supply capability. Such a plan, CINCPAC stated, was essential before additional MAP support for engine overhauls could be programmed. CINCPAC conceded that the T-56 engine situation was serious. For example, of the 25 serviceable engines reported by DLG, all were on aircraft. Thus, the AURI would have a serious engine shortage for at least six to nine months.

On 29 December 1972, the CSAF offered a proposed solution to the T-56 engine problem. First, USAF T-56 A7A engines were undergoing a safety-of-flight modification to replace turbine wheel spacer and turbine blades. This modification changed the engine designation from A7A to A7B. Therefore, the Air Force recommended that all AURI T-56 engines also be modified, not only for safety reasons, but for future spare parts support. It was proposed that the Air Force immediately provide up to 12 serviceable A7B engines to Indonesia in exchange for 12 repairable A7A engines. Indonesia would be required to program or otherwise pay for the USAF overhaul of each repairable A7A engine and its modification to A7B configuration at a total unit cost of $34,698. No reaction to this offer was forthcoming at year's end.

2. JB23 HistSum Aug, Sep, Oct 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 280448Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 300141Z Aug 72; CHUSDLG Indonesia 050148Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 252346Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 130251Z Oct 72.
3. JB24 HistSum Dec 72; CSAF 291940Z Dec 72.
Impact of FY 72 Reductions

In February 1972, CINCPAC notified JUSMAG-K that the FY 72 MAP funding level would be $132.95 million, plus $17.2 million for PCH&T. This total ceiling constituted a reduction from the programmed $240 million of $90 million. In March, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSK) advised CINCPAC that such a drastic reduction would preclude the continuation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) five-year modernization plan, as approved by President Nixon in February 1971, unless a supplemental appropriation were requested. The ROK, stated COMUSK, considered the five-year plan as the keystone to future security. Because of this commitment, the ROK had come to accept the Nixon Doctrine, and had accelerated efforts toward self-sufficiency. Moreover, the mutual agreement to a reduction of 20,000 U.S. military personnel in Korea by June 1971 had been based on the prompt modernization implied in the five-year plan. An abrogation of the plan provisions would render future U.S. troop withdrawals more difficult politically. COMUSK noted that, in order to program modernization for five years, some weapon system procurement was projected over several years. These multi-year programs required continued funding, which, in effect, front loaded the program. COMUSK, therefore, recommended a FY 72 supplemental appropriation of $135 million.

FY 73 MAP/FMS Funds

Two months prior to the COMUSK request for a FY 72 supplemental appropriation, the DSAA had announced revised guidelines for FY 73 MAP and FMS. Grant aid was set at $215.7 million, excluding PCH&T, and FMS at $25 million. Considering the extraction of PCH&T costs from the FY 73 figure, the actual reduction of FY 73 grant aid was about $13.6 million. As related in Section II of this chapter, the $215.7 million figure was presented to Congress as $211.7 million, and the CRA level set by DOD pending a FY 73 appropriation was only $132.8 million.

In August 1972, DSAA advised JUSMAG-K that an FY 73 FMS credit arrangement had been signed for $15 million, at six percent. The M-16 co-production program was allocated $4 million; $6 million was for ammunition expansion; and, $5 million was for the patrol gunboat program.

2. J821 HistSum Jan 72; SECDEF 3298/171855Z Jan 72.
KOREA

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 50,018 SQ. KM
POPULATION: 37,948,000
ANNUAL GROWTH: 2.0%
ADJUSTED POPULATION: 39,795,900
LITERACY RATE: 95%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 60
GROSS NAT. PROD. (GDP): $14,540 MILLION
PER CAPITA: $748
DEFENSE BUDGET: $1,250 BILLION
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED: 21%
AS % OF GDP: 9.4%

PRESIDENT: GEN Park Chung Hee
PRIME MINISTER: Kim Jong Pil
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Kim Yoon Sil
CHIEF OF STAFF: GEN Kim Joon Yoo
COMMANDANT: MARSHAL KI, PARK, HWA JOO

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

ARMY

1) 11 1/2 DT, 10 RES DIV, 2 ARMY TN, 1 ADA TN, 1 ADA BN, 18 COMBATANT ARTC (CFT), 6 SDF CO, 1 INF BN

2) 11 1/2 DT, 1 ADA TN, 2 ARMY TN, 2 HN TN, 1 ADA BN, 19 COMBATANT ARTC (CFT), 6 SDF CO, 1 INF BN

NAVY

6 DDG, 2 DD, 4 DDH, 8 PK, 3 PB, 11 DE, 1 LOH, 16 PB, 3 AE, 10 LN, 13 LOH, 24 DE, 2 AE, 6 AR, 6 AE, 1 AR, 1 AE, 1 MAR, 1 ISLAND (C), 1 HEL CO, 1 RES BN

AIR FORCE

1 TFW, 12 TPS, 1 HEL CO, 2 TAC AE, 50 TAC AE, 2 TAC AE, 50 TAC AE

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

PROJECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HONORARY: H. W. B. HARRIS
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
HONORARY: H. W. B. HARRIS
CHIEF, USMAC K
HONORARY: J. K., CHUNGHWA R

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

1. Assist ROK in maintaining modernized forces capable of deterring/defending against North Korean aggression with limited U.S. support or against Sino-American aggression in its own defense.
2. Assist in providing effective counter-infiltration capability.
3. Ensure continued availability of essential rights authorizations and facility arrangements.
4. Commitment of U.S. forces.

combat capability

ROK forces are capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including amphibious assault, close-in, or limited strikes, and conducting ground operations. The ROK's capability to conduct limited strikes is being evaluated.

Maintenance of internal security and effective control over the population. The ROK military is capable of performing a broad range of tasks, including amphibious assault, close-in, or limited strikes, and conducting ground operations. The ROK's capability to conduct limited strikes is being evaluated.

Maintain internal security and effectively repel external threats from South Korea, including the assistance of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. military.

Sources: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 136.
At about the same time, COMUSK had requested the release of about $5 million in CRA funds to sustain ROK operations through the first quarter of FY 73. Funds amounting to about $4.2 million were released, but, in September, COMUSK once again advised that additional funds were needed. Particularly critical was the supply of petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) assets to support operations and maintenance of aircraft, ships, vehicles, missiles, and other military equipment. Funds were needed to maintain the mobility of ROK Forces. Also at critical levels were funds for maintenance, rebuild, and overhaul of aircraft, vehicles, ships, communications equipment, weapons, and air defense missile batteries. Other items listed by COMUSK as prospective MAP casualties were ammunition, pilot proficiency training, technical assistance, CONUS overhaul programs, and general supplies such as parachutes, helmets, G-suits, photography supplies, and automated data processing supplies. The total requested by COMUSK for these second quarter operations costs was $15.6 million. This money was considered essential to support major ROK force requirements.

When the CRA guidance from DOD was received in November which established the $132.8 million figure cited previously, COMUSK submitted a revised FY 73 MAP which reflected a $91.1 million reduction. The major items deleted from the FY 73 program were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generators</td>
<td>37 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td>190 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grader</td>
<td>21 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set</td>
<td>423 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Set</td>
<td>20 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H Helicopter</td>
<td>13 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2T Truck</td>
<td>3,220 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Towed</td>
<td>54 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer SP</td>
<td>18 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker</td>
<td>99 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST Truck</td>
<td>146 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Trailer</td>
<td>54 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Compressor</td>
<td>5 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tool Kits</td>
<td>1,073 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB22 Switchboards</td>
<td>42 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC292 Antenna</td>
<td>24 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2T Dump Truck</td>
<td>391 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T37C Aircraft</td>
<td>14 EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>3 EA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Status Report, ROK Modernization Plan

On 3 November 1972, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that a comprehensive report on the status of the Korean Five-Year Modernization Plan was needed to support the FY 74 budget presentation. CINCPAC and JUSMAG-K assistance was requested to assemble a report by 30 November 1972. As an outgrowth of this requirement, the DOD desired to establish a reporting system to

1. J821 HistSum Sep 72; COMUSK 080510Z Sep 72.
2. J822 HistSum Nov 72; SECDEF 6056/222327Z Nov 72; COMUSK 020420Z Dec 72; COMUSK 050604Z Dec 72.
permit periodic updating of the status of the modernization plan. The reporting system would meet DOD needs for proper management, and provide information for other departments of the Executive Branch and the Congress. The 30 November status report was to be the basis for an automated reporting system, and CINCPAC was assigned responsibility for status input. The frequency of such inputs was to be decided by consultation between DOD, CINCPAC, and COMUSK.

Deletion of SUSLAK from MAP Funding

The Special U.S. Liaison Advisor to Korea (SUSLAK) was the representative of the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA). The SUSLAK mission had been funded by Korea MAP since about 1956. COMUSK and CINCPAC had made several attempts to have SUSLAK investment costs funded by alternative sources, since, by FY 71, investment and operating costs were programmed at about one million dollars annually. The absorption of these funds by the Korean MAP impacted directly on the austere five-year plan to provide an adequate deterrent and defense against an attack by North Korea. In November 1970, based on JCS information, CINCPAC had directed COMUSK not to program SUSLAK costs in the MAP beyond FY 71. On 17 March 1971, however, the Secretary of Defense directed that SUSLAK activities continue to be funded by MAP beyond FY 71, and CINCPAC so directed COMUSK.  

In developing the FY 72-77 MAP plan, COMUSK had allocated $900,000 annually to SUSLAK costs. The Chief, SUSLAK supported by the National Security Agency, Pacific (NSAPAC) requested additional funding in FY 72 and future years. The following figures represented the SUSLAK request (in thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
<th>FY 74</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment Costs</td>
<td>$933</td>
<td>$879</td>
<td>$935.0</td>
<td>$935.0</td>
<td>$935.0</td>
<td>$935.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>396.5</td>
<td>420.3</td>
<td>420.3</td>
<td>420.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>1,331.5</td>
<td>1,355.3</td>
<td>1,355.3</td>
<td>1,355.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSK Allocation</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900.0</td>
<td>900.0</td>
<td>900.0</td>
<td>900.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortfall</td>
<td>$385</td>
<td>$352</td>
<td>$431.5</td>
<td>$455.3</td>
<td>$455.3</td>
<td>$455.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. SECDEF 3514/032320Z Nov 72.
3. J553 HistSum May 71; Ltr, SUSLAK NRK 260/71 of 14 Apr 71, Subj: ME7BEA for SUSLAK.
SECRET

(§) JUSMAG-K reiterated that only $900,000 was available for SUSLAK support, and, on 8 May 1971, NSAPAC requested CINCPAC support of the full funding levels requested by SUSLAK. Based on JUSMAG-K suggestions, CINCPAC once more stated to DOD and NSAPAC that only $900,000 annually was available from MAP funds. CINCPAC voiced full acknowledgment of the importance of the SUSLAK mission, and support for full funding of SUSLAK requirements. However, he recommended that either funds above the $900,000 level be obtained from other agencies, or that Korea MAP dollar guidelines be increased to absorb the SUSLAK program. If neither of those alternatives could be accepted, and as a last resort, CINCPAC recommended that the FY 72 Korea MAP PCH&T level of $29.23 million be reduced to $28.44 million, thus freeing about $385,000 for the stated FY 72 SUSLAK budget.

(§) The severe reductions in FY 72 and FY 73 funds for Korea MAP made the SUSLAK support impact on MAP even greater. However, it was not until 9 December 1972 that CINCPAC was advised by DOD that funding responsibility for SUSLAK would be transferred from MAP to the Defense budget. CINCPAC was directed to delete all SUSLAK support from the Korea FY 74 and out-year MAP.

Continuing MAP Items

(§) In October 1971, the ROK had requested FMS credit to purchase from three to five patrol gunboats (PG) provided such funds would not be applied to reduce the FY 71-75 grant aid dollar guideline. On 4 January 1972, the CNO provided characteristics and seakeeping assessment of Nasty Class Fast Boats (PTF) which DSAA had proposed for the ROK Navy in lieu of FMS credit for PGs. Essentially, the CNO comments indicated that PTFs could not be expected to perform efficiently in the ROK coastal waters. Nevertheless, the DOD supported the acquisition of four PTFs as an interim fast boat capability for the ROK, while emphasizing opposition to PGs and long-term support for Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft (CPI). Twenty CIPIs had originally been scheduled for procurement in the five-year plan. In December 1971, a contract had been awarded to the Tacoma Boat Building Company to construct nine CIPIs in CONUS, with co-production of eight more to follow in Korea.

1. J5331 HistSum May 72; NSAPAC 080336Z May 71; COMUSK 102351Z May 71; CINCPAC 1302452 May 71.
2. J821 HistSum Dec 72; SECDEF 6838/091555Z Dec 72; For future research, it is noted that, except for the last paragraph, the sources for the SUSLAK discussion originated in CINCPAC J5. In October 1971, the separate CINCPAC Security Assistance Division, J8, was established.
SECRET

COMUSK did not agree that the ROK Navy should receive four PTFs; however, he did agree that PGs should be supplied by FMS credit provided Korea MAP grant funds were not reduced. CINCPACFLT also supported COMUSK, and on 20 January 1972, CINCPAC informed the DOD and JCS that PTFs were not desired because of high operational costs and restrictions. He did affirm support for an FMS credit of $16 million for the purchase of three PGs. CINCPAC also supported continuing action to acquire the 17 CPICs. On 28 January, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the PTF proposal had been dropped.¹

Meanwhile, on 12 January 1972, the ROK provided to a Tacoma representative a letter of intent to purchase three PGs, subject to FMS credit availability. The first two PGs would be constructed in Tacoma, Washington, and the third at a Tacoma-built shipyard in Korea, where the co-produced CPICs would also be constructed. On 25 January, the Naval Ships System Command provided estimated cost data for construction of the 17 CPICs: FY 72, $11.7 million; FY 73, $20 million; FY 74, $12.2 million. The U.S.-built prototype would be provided to the ROK between July and September 1973, and the remaining 16 CPICs would be delivered between January and October 1974.²

In February, COMUSK and CINCPAC agreed that, rather than reduce grant aid by the amount of FMS credit to procure PGs, the FMS credit could be applied against the excess dollar ceiling. The PGs would be considered substitutes for other items programmed in the excess program. This proposal was taken under advisement by DOD, which was pressing for approval of the PG FMS credit. In May, Secretary of Defense Laird informed the ROK Minister of National Defense that the FMS credit request for three PGs had been approved, and that no charge would be made against other five-year plan funds. In the same letter, Laird indicated approval in principle with the CPIC program, and stated that the U.S. Navy would proceed with production planning.³

On 19 August 1972, the "Ship Construction Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Tacoma Boat Building Company, Inc." was signed by the ROK and Tacoma Boat Building Company. The agreement stated that, as previously stated, the first and second ships would be built at Tacoma, Washington. The third would be built in Korea. By the end of 1972, however, technical problems in the prototype CPIC propulsion and weapon systems had

¹. COMUSK 111005Z Jan 72; CINCPACFLT 4900/172153Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 200255Z Jan 72; JCS 5293/282004Z Jan 72.
². COMUSK 211058Z Jan 72; NAVSHIPS/COMHQ 9820/250103Z Jan 72.
³. JB21 HistSums Feb and May 72; COMUSK 010915Z Feb 72 (EX); CINCPAC 041320Z Feb 72 (EX); SECDEF 1265/121446Z Feb 72; SECDEF 9544/021658Z May 72.
caused the CNO to prohibit obligation of additional funds for the CPIC program until the prototype had demonstrated satisfactory performance.¹

On 14 April 1972, CINCPAC was notified by the JCS that Public Law 92-270, authorizing loans of naval vessels, had been signed by the President on 6 April. The loan of two destroyers to the ROK was authorized. The law stipulated that loans would not exceed five years, at which time each ship was to be returned to the U.S. Navy. In May, the ROK accepted a loan offer of the USS CHEVALIER (DD-805) and the USS EVERETT F. LARSON (DD-830). In response to ROK query, the Secretary of State requested the U.S. Ambassador to inform the ROK that no extension of the loan period beyond five years could be included on the loan agreement. Such an extension would require new legislation. However, Secretary Rogers authorized the Ambassador to assure the ROK that, "...it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances that would cause us to terminate the loan so long as the loan continues to enhance our mutual security."²

The programmed acquisition of T-37 aircraft for the ROK Air Force was caught in the budget squeeze of FY 72 and FY 73. Twenty-five T-37B aircraft had been programmed for procurement--11 in FY 71 and 14 in FY 72. The FY 71 aircraft were funded, at a cost of $343,000 per aircraft. The severe MAP dollar reduction for FY 72 necessitated the FY 72 buy to be reduced to two aircraft. However, CINCPAC was advised in May 1972 that such a reduction would increase the cost to $757,000 per aircraft for two. As the year passed, the cost per aircraft, even if the original 14 for FY 72 were reprogrammed for FY 73, would be $409,000 for T-37Cs. In November, COMUSK suggested a trade-off of excess U.S. Air Force T-37s for T-28s possessed by the ROK, thus helping to alleviate the T-28 shortage in Southeast Asia. That proposal was rejected by the U.S. Air Force, which advised that no excess T-37Bs were available. At year's end, the only option available was an order for either 7 or 14 T-37Cs at $387,000 each, with the proviso that the order was received by 1 April 1973.³

In September 1972, the DOD requested CINCPAC to confirm that C-119G transport aircraft were not suitable for Korean air transport requirements. Sixteen of these aircraft had been held in storage for possible EDA procurement. The C-119 unsuitability was confirmed by COMUSK, who concurred in the ROK position that the cost to establish a maintenance capability for the aircraft

3. J821 HistSums May, Jul, Nov, Dec 72; CSAF 152113Z May 72; CSAF 282257Z Jul 72; COMUSK 010916Z Nov 72; CSAF 162129Z Nov 72; CSAF 220001Z Dec 72.
and engine would be prohibitive. Sufficient C-119s to satisfy the ROK Air Force requirements would exceed O&M cost limitations. COMUSK noted that the need for a modern, yet unsophisticated, tactical airlift aircraft for MAP countries had been discussed at the PACOM MAAG Chief's conference. Until the development of such an aircraft, COMUSK stated, the Chief of Staff, ROK Armed Forces was prepared to operate the C-46 and C-54 fleet then in operation. Based on this reply, the Korea MAP for FY 75 and FY 76 retained amounts of $11 million and $1 million respectively, programmed as Improved Transport Aircraft.

In 1971, a co-production program had been established for M-16 rifles, and a ROK-U.S. agreement had been signed to expand and convert the ROK ammunition arsenal. In 1972, two co-production projects for the ROK Army were begun—one for AN/PRC-77 radios, the other for 2-1/2 ton trucks. By March 1972, studies had been proposed to determine ROK capability to produce these items in-country.2

Meanwhile, and in order for the ROK Army to operate, action was taken to assure that programmed supplies of the tactical radios and tactical wheeled vehicles would be available. In September, a potential shortage of M35A2 cargo trucks and M342A2 dump trucks was surfaced by DA. Sufficient assets from overhaul sources to meet the Korea MAP needs in FY 73-74-75 were not available. In November, however, DA advised CINCPAC that 1,000 M35A2 cargo trucks (2-1/2 ton) could be programmed in FY 73-74 Korea MAP at a unit price of $7,504.3

COMUSK also requested information regarding planned delivery schedules for funded but undelivered AN/PRC-25/77 tactical radios. Of 4,739 radios funded in FY 68, only 1,100 had been delivered. Of 2,504 funded in FY 71, none had been delivered as of the end of 1972. These radios were needed by ROK Army and Marine units in forward positions, confined to fixed command posts, and equipped with obsolete AN/PRC-9/10 radios. Better tactical communication for these units was of urgent high priority.4

On 3 August 1972, the Departments of State and Defense informed the ROK Defense Minister that COMUSK would study, in conjunction with the ROK, a reordering of priorities to fund a second Vulcan missile battalion earlier than the programmed FY 75. As a result, the DOD requested CINCPAC and COMUSK to

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1. J821 HistSum Sep 72; SECDEF 6628/090102Z Sep 72; COMUSK 290523Z Sep 72.  
3. J821 HistSums Sep and Dec 72; DA 292055Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 022156Z Oct 72; DA 272120Z Nov 72.  
4. J821 HistSum Dec 72; COMUSK 050354Z Jan 73.
investigate this possibility. Among the pertinent considerations was that the Vulcan production line would close following the completion of ROK weapons for the first Vulcan battalion in January 1973. Start-up costs would be about $1.5-2.0 million, and a delay could mean a unit cost increase because of inflation. A decision to advance the second Vulcan battalion to the FY 73 program, and funding by 30 September, would allow production to be added on to the present production line.\(^1\)

\(^{(S)}\) COMUSK and CINCPAC agreed that the foregoing rationale was valid, and submitted the necessary program changes for the M167 basic weapon system. In December, in order to procure auxiliary equipment concurrently with the basic system, COMUSK submitted program changes to the Korea FY 73 MAP to accomplish such concurrent production. However, and in spite of the expeditious action by CINCPAC and COMUSK, the contractor quoted an increased price for the M167. Negotiations had not been completed by the end of 1972; however, the price increase was from $167,000 to either $205,000 or $217,000, depending on the final contract. This was a total MAP increase for the basic battalion of 48 weapons from $8 million to either $9.8 million or $10.4 million.\(^2\)

\(^{(S)}\) During 1972, military assistance to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) continued to be a Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. Control of the military situation in Laos remained with the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane. CINCPAC responsibility was limited to MASF support to the Ambassador through the Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI) at Udorn (DEPCH/Udorn). In 1962, the U.S. had withdrawn its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) from Laos, as required by the Geneva Protocol. In order to provide U.S. military support to the anti-communist factions in Laos, the DEPCH was established in Bangkok (moved to Udorn in 1971). In-country representation was delegated to civilians assigned to the Requirements Office, U.S. Agency for International Development (RO/AID). The Ambassador, through RO/AID, developed military requirements with the assistance of the U.S. Army and Air Force attaches (ARMA/AIRA). These requirements were reviewed by the DEPCH, developed into a fiscal year program, and submitted to CINCPAC for approval. After review and approval by CINCPAC, the plans were submitted to the DOD for approval.\(^3\)

1. J821 HistSum Sep 72; SECDEF 3268/052133Z Sep 72.
2. J821 HistSum Dec 72; CDR WECOM Rock Island 212248Z Dec 72.
### LAOS

#### BASIC INFORMATION

- **Area**: 91,449 sq. mi.
- **Arable Land per Capita**: 4 acres
- **Population**: 2,927,000
- **Literacy Rate**: 20%
- **Annual Growth**: 3.8%
- **Life Expectancy**: 53 years
- **Gross Natl Prod**: $282 million

#### MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49 C-130, 15 A-1H, 1 F-105G, 1 P-3B, 16 B-57, 6 B-57C, 7 F-4E, 1 T-33, 1 FT-5, 1 RF-101, 1 F-106</td>
<td>1 Composite Sqn (70 T28, 20 A-1, 5 B-17, 75 A-1B, 10 A-26, 20 B-57C, 1 T-33, 1 RF-101, 1 T-33, 3 B-57C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 L10G, 2 CT-4, 2 C-130, 9 Transport, 9 Transports, 2 Utility Craft</td>
<td>5 Composite Sqn (60 T28, 22 B-57, 6 B-26, 22 B-17, 10 A-1B, 15 T-33, 1 T-33, 3 B-57C, 5 1-11, 5 1-12, 5 1-13, 5 1-14, 5 1-15, 5 1-16, 5 1-17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### COMBAT CAPABILITY

- Maintain limited air cover for a portion of the country and limited air support for local forces. Air superiority is in question without substantial outside assistance.

#### SOURCE

Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 137.

*Does not include Pathet Lao or dissident neutralist military forces.*
The Symington Amendment

(§) The Symington Amendment to the Defense Procurement Authorization Act (Section 505F), Public Law 92-156, imposed a $350 million ceiling on total U.S. aid to Laos for FY 72. This bill, signed into law by the President on 17 November 1971, also specified the submission to the Congress of a quarterly report showing total expenditures in, for, or in behalf of Laos by the U.S. Government. CINCPAC was assigned responsibility for establishing a delivery control and reporting system for all defense articles and services under the control of either CINCPAC and/or DEPCH. The initial report, for the period 1 July - 31 December 1971, was delivered to the DOD in January 1972. Subsequent reports were submitted on a monthly basis.

(§) To comply with the reporting requirement, the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff for Security Assistance and his staff developed a mechanized card format which was coordinated with the DEPCH. The monthly reports were forwarded to the DOD, which provided CINCPAC and the DEPCH with cumulative figures after each report. The initial report for the first half of FY 72 reflected a total of $88.83 million of MASF money.

(§) By the end of FY 72 (30 June 1972), DSAA projected the total FY 72 U.S. aid to Laos was within Symington Amendment limits.

(§§) On 15 September 1972, the Secretary of State notified all concerned that the Defense Procurement Act for FY 73 included a new legislative ceiling on total U.S. assistance to Laos--$375 million.

MASF Funds - FY 72 and FY 73

(§) At the beginning of CY 72, the FY 72 dollar ceiling had been set by the DOD at $215.4 million. The FY 73 ceiling had been increased from $224.2

1. J835 Point Papers, 7 Jan 72 and 24 Feb 72, Subj: Symington Amendment to Defense Procurement Authorization Act (Sec. 505F).
2. Ibid., for 13 Mar 72.
3. Ibid., for 16 Jun 72.
4. J835 HistSum Sep 72; SECDEF 8172/211310Z Sep 72; J836 Point Paper, 10 Nov 72, Subj: FY 73 Legislative Expenditure Ceiling of $375 million for Laos (§); J836 HistSum Nov 72; SECSTATE 168515/150106Z Sep 72.

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443
million to $297.4 million on 18 October 1971. On 14 January 1972, the DOD approved an FY 72 ceiling increase to $251.6 million to cover special projects, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) gunships, long lead time items, and the establishment of a pipeline for consumables and ground munitions. Special projects included M-60 machine guns (200 each) for Laos forces; the support of eight UH-1M gunships; and long lead time and pipeline procurement for the LGC and Laos irregular forces (LIF).

By June 1972, it had become apparent that the FY 73 program would develop a total shortfall of $51.8 million. Of this amount, $49 million was for ammunition. The U.S. Ambassador stated, "that in the absence of a complete reversal of the present military situation, the FY 73 shortfall position will not permit us to successfully prosecute the war effort." CINCPAC agreed with the Ambassador. In August, the DOD advised that the new FY 73 ceiling was $360 million, vice the last authorization of $297.4 million. At the same time, the former FY 74 dollar guideline of $150 million was raised to $300 million and the level for FY 75 was raised from $100 million to $150 million.2

Along with the increase in ceiling for FY 73, the DOD provided special instructions to CINCPAC:

A. In FY 73 and subsequent years, all DOD expenditures for support of forces in Laos must be contained in MASF program except for U.S. combat air support. In FY 73, estimate $68.3 million for transfer in Washington under switchback procedure. This amount should be refined in collaboration with Country Team...with distinctive MAPELS for ZAE [LIF] and LGC portions....

B. In FY 73, and subsequent years, MASF program should contain as supply operations costs only those incurred for last leg from storage points in Thailand to Laos.

C. You should program within the FY 73 ceiling all support for Lao irregulars plus volunteer irregular battalions and replacement training units and personnel. However, you

1. J834 Point Paper, 17 Jan 72, Subj: Laos Military Assistance; J834 HistSum Jan 72; Prior to 1 Jul 72, the LIF was designated ZAE.
3. Ibid.
should instruct DEPCHIEF to support formation of new Thai
volunteer battalions beyond the existing 25 numbered units
only after the following two previously agreed conditions
are met:

1. Deployed units are manned at least 80 percent of
authorized strength, and

2. New units when deployed are at 100 percent strength.

When the new legislative ceiling of $375 million for total U.S. aid
was established, the DOD instructed CINCPAC to support no more than 25
irregular battalions until further notice. CINCPAC requested clarification
from DOD and the JCS as to whether that support also included the group mobile
headquarters, heavy weapons companies, and task force headquarters attached
Pending a formal decision, the DEPCH advised CINCPAC,
on 3 October, that these auxiliary units would be supported as in the past,
even though they had not been carried by name in the program. The DEPCH noted
that investment costs would increase by only $200,000 for this support.1

Improvement of Indigenous Forces

In October 1971, the ARMA Vientiane briefed a CINCPAC staff officer
on a plan to improve the Forces Armees Royales (FAR). This plan, approved in
principle by the Ambassador, contained measures to improve administration,
morale, training, force structure, armor, and artillery. On 1 December 1971,
forwarded the essential elements of the plan to the State
Department, stating his support. In February 1972, the Secretary of State
announced the initiation of a study of necessary actions and improvements,
"...to attain a viable integrated non-communist armed force in Laos with minimum
direct U.S. presence." The JCS tasked CINCPAC to conduct the study, which was
to be short, concise, and conceptual. The nickname FRAME PICTURE was assigned
to the project, and a CINCPAC study team was dispatched to Thailand and Laos on
12 March 1972.2

On 14 April, CINCPAC approved the study and it was forwarded to the
JCS in a 48-page conceptual form. On 11 May, the conceptual study was forwarded

1. J835 HistSum Sep 72; SECDEF 8172/211310Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 272246Z Sep 72;
JCS 2924/032058Z Oct 72; DEPCH Udorn 031130Z Oct 72.
2. J553 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: Forces Armees Royales Improvement Plan
(FARIP); CINCPAC 032231Z Mar 72, which cited SECSTATE 032140/250103Z Feb
72 and JCS 4908/260033Z Feb 72.
to the Secretary of Defense and thence to the Indochina Ad Hoc Interagency
Group. The JCS had recommended to the DOD that any inference in the study
that DEPCH or the U.S. Military had operational functions or responsibilities
for the conduct of the war be deleted.

Manpower assets and functions of the RO/AID and Project 404 would be assigned
to the CAS station chief for consolidation of effort. The DEPCH, Udorn would
continue to operate within the same terms of reference, and with no change in
his relations with CINCPAC or other U.S. elements in Laos and Thailand.¹

(3S) The CINCPAC study included the following conclusions
and recommendations:²

. No immediate reduction of the current total force is feasible.

. U.S. military efforts will continue to be constrained by
  1962 Geneva Agreements.

. Irregular units should be integrated into the existing
  regular force structure.

. The RLG ground, naval, and air branches should remain as
  one service under FAR.

Other points in the study related to the organization and use of the new single
national force; the orientation of this force toward an unsophisticated, mainly
defensive posture; and the need to coordinate the budgets
for Laos to ensure the best use of available funds.

(3S) Although no definitive action was taken by the U.S. on
during 1972, ongoing peace negotiations in December emphasized the imperatives
of certain recommendations. For example, on 12 December the
Laotian People's Forces (LPF) demanded that the Lao irregulars be dissolved.
On 26 December, Prime Minister Souvana Phouma replied that the RTG was planning
to integrate the irregular forces into the FAR.³

1. JCS 4316/131346Z May 72, which cited Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 000109 of 14 Apr 72;
2. J5531 Point Paper, 14 Jun 72, Subj: Study Regarding Improvement of
   Indigenious Forces in Laos
3. J5531 Point Paper, 8 Aug 72, Subj: Study Regarding Improvement of Indigenious
   Forces in Laos
Helicopter Support for Laos

There were three basic missions for helicopters in Laos—MEDEVAC, gunship escort for MEDEVAC, and heavy lift helicopters for logistics resupply and troop transport. In early March 1971, the Secretary of Defense had authorized the assignment of six UH-1D helicopters for MEDEVAC and resupply missions in Laos. The helicopters were assigned to the DEPCH, and made available for use by Air America under contract. Protection for the unarmed MEDEVAC helicopters was initially provided by A-1 aircraft, then by UH-1C helicopters on loan from Vietnam. On 30 November 1971, the DOD approved the temporary transfer of eight UH-1M helicopter gunships from the U.S. Army to the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) to provide MEDEVAC escort. These aircraft were scheduled to be returned to the U.S. Army by 31 May 1972.¹

As the 31 May 1972 date for return of the UH-1M gunships drew near, the DEPCH Udorn proposed that the eight UH-1Ms, equipped with the XM-21 weapon system, be replaced by UH-1H helicopters and the XM-93 weapon system. The UH-1Hs would be utilized year round—in logistics support during the wet season, and in the gunship role during the dry season. CINCPAC concurred in the basic idea, as did DOD; however, the scarcity of available UH-1Hs and long lead time on the XM-93 led to DOD approval for continuation of UH-1M support (Project WHITEHORSE) past the 31 May return date.²

2. J835 HistSum Apr 72; J834 Point Paper, 13 Jun 72, Subj: Laos Military Assistance.
On 28 January 1972, the DEPCH, based on an Embassy estimate of approximately 75 flying hours per month per aircraft, provided CINCPAC with monthly cost factors for the additional UH-1H aircraft. In February, however, and based on a joint State/Defense position received on 19 January 1972, CINCPAC declined to support the requested augmentation.¹

In November 1971, the DEPCH Udorn was informed by CINCPAC that the subject of future medium and heavy lift helicopter support for Laos was under study at the JCS/DOD level. Upon query by CINCPAC in February 1972, the JCS indicated that the matter was still under study. In June, the DOD directed the DA to make eight CH-47C helicopters available to the Laos MASF program. This project was nicknamed BLACKHORSE, and was to be supported by the FY 73 and out-year budget. The first-year costs were estimated at about $3.5 million, and the aircraft were to be operated and maintained under contract with Air America.²

Philippines

MAP Funds

As previously related in this chapter, one provision of the foreign aid bills had been the deposit of ten percent of dollar levels in foreign currency by recipient countries to defray in-country U.S. costs. On 9 June 1972, the Secretary of State informed the Embassy in Manila that the Philippines was exempt for FY 72 by Presidential determination. On 5 September, the DOD notified CINCPAC that the Philippines as well as Thailand had also been exempted from the ten percent requirement for FY 73. The Philippines MAP was funded for $14.0 million in FY 72, and the end of calendar year CRA level for FY 73 was $15.7 million.³

Philippine Government MAP Proposals

In 1971, the Philippine Government (GOP) had bombarded various U.S. officials with shopping lists of equipment which it hoped to acquire through MAP. At the end of 1971, a GOP five-year plan to improve and modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had been presented to the GOP/U.S. Mutual

Footnotes:
1. DEPCH Udorn 0038/281233Z Jan 72; J5533 Point Paper, 23 Feb 72, Subj: Helicopter Support for Laos.
3. J825 HistSums Jun and Sep 72; SECSTATE 103496/092350Z Jun 72; SECDEF 3244/052103Z Sep 72; see also Section II, this chapter.
**PHILIPPINES**

**BASIC INFORMATION** *(FY 78)*

<table>
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<th>AREA</th>
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<td>POPULATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEATH RATE</td>
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<td>$50 MILLION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% OF GDP</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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**MAJOR FORCES GUIDELINES** *(FY 77)*

**ARMY**
- 2 DIV, 2 REP, 2 DIV Operations, 2 EOD Org (Coast), 1 Indep Inf Org, 1 Const Div, 1 ENG BN, 1 MED BN, 1 FA BN, 1 M CTG, 1 BBCTG, 1 FIRE BN, 1 DET BN, 1 IND BN, 1 ARMY POLICE BN

**NAVY**
- 1 BR, 4 PT, 4 P, 9 G, 71 PT/MHT, 4 PWH, 2 HM, 2 GH, 2 AV, 3 HMT, 2 LSY, 44 CNCT, 1 ARE/AQ, 1 AS/AD, 1 CIL BN, 1 CMT BN, 1 IPE BN, 1 46TH BN, 1 MARINE BN

**AIR FORCE**
- 2 TPS, 1 AIR COMMAND, 1 EJ, 1 EJ SQM, 1 AIR RESCUE SQM, 1 AIR TRANSPORT SQM

**MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES** *(FY 78)*

<table>
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<th>FORCES</th>
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<td>7 DIV, 2 REP, 2 DIV Operations, 2 EOD Org, 1 Const Div, 1 ENG BN, 1 MED BN, 1 FA BN, 1 M CTG, 1 BBCTG, 1 FIRE BN, 1 DET BN, 1 IND BN, 1 ARMY POLICE BN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>1 BR, 4 PT, 4 P, 9 G, 71 PT/MHT, 4 PWH, 2 HM, 2 GH, 2 AV, 3 HMT, 2 LSY, 44 CNCT, 1 ARE/AQ, 1 ARE/AQ, 1 AS/AD, 1 CIL BN, 1 CMT BN, 1 IPE BN, 1 46TH BN, 1 MARINE BN</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>2 TPS, 1 AIR COMMAND, 1 EJ, 1 EJ SQM, 1 AIR RESCUE SQM, 1 AIR TRANSPORT SQM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OVERALL OBJECTIVE**
- TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO, AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

**U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION**
- U.S. AMBASSADOR: PAUL W. PHILPOT TRENZELL, PAUL W. PHILPOT TRENZELL, PAUL W. PHILPOT TRENZELL
- U.S. CONSUL: NORMAN E. YARBOROUGH, NORMAN E. YARBOROUGH, NORMAN E. YARBOROUGH
- U.S. CHIEF, JOSEPH M. BURK, JOSEPH M. BURK, JOSEPH M. BURK
- U.S. MILITARY ATTACHÉ: JAMES A. GRIMES, JAMES A. GRIMES, JAMES A. GRIMES

**MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES**
- 1. Maintain essential rights, authorities, on site, facility arrangements.
- 3. Improve of logistical support.

**COMBAT CAPABILITY**
- 1. CONDUCT LIMITED OF規模 PATROL AND MOTOR ACCOMPANIED A BDT 17-06-17
- 2. CONDUCT LIMITIED OF規模 PATROL AND MOTOR 17-06-17 17-06-17
- 3. CONDUCT LIMITIED OF規模 PATROL AND MOTOR 17-06-17 17-06-17

**SOURCE:** Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 136.

**FY 77 OBJECTIVES**

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Defense Board. In September 1972, the Executive Secretary to President Marcos delivered an Aide Memoire to Ambassador Byroade requesting specific equipment under a proposed five-year acquisition program. The list, characterized by the Country Team as unrealistic, included 10 C-130H aircraft, 36 OV-10 aircraft, 24 helicopter gunships, 30 F-5Es, 17 LSTs, etc.  

Assistance to the Philippine Air Force (PAF)

The objective of modernizing the transport aircraft possessed by the PAF was supported by CINCPAC, but within realistic programming of the MAP. Several aircraft had been considered, including the C-123K and the C-119G. The GOP wanted C-130s, but the costs were prohibitive within MAP dollar levels. By the end of 1971, the GOP had tentatively agreed to the acquisition of four C-119K aircraft (two each in FY 72-73) from existing MAP.

In January 1972, the CSAF advised the JUSMAG PHIL that Philippine Undersecretary for National Defense Manuel O. Salientes had approached the Air Staff in Washington. The primary topic of interest to Salientes was C-130 aircraft for the Philippines. He informed the CSAF that the GOP was considering the purchase of two C-130s by FMS credit. It was explained to Salientes that the total package cost for two C-130s was about $10 million. Also, he was reminded of the C-119K option and the uncertainties regarding the FY 72 foreign aid bill.

On 10 April 1972, the DOD advised that Lockheed Aircraft had received a letter of intent to purchase two C-130s, signed by the Commanding General of the PAF. The DOD questioned the impact of such a purchase on the C-119K program. On 12 April, the State Department expressed strong reservations about the proposed purchase, and requested Country Team comments. A joint Embassy/JUSMAG message replied that the PAF general had signed the letter as an exploratory gesture following discussions initiated by a Lockheed representative. The letter had not been cleared by higher authority, according to the GOP, and had no official status. JUSMAG PHIL reaffirmed opposition to GOP acquisition of C-130s, whether through FMS or commercial purchase, but cautioned that the GOP might proceed despite the disclaimer.

In July, the Embassy notified the State Department that the GOP had indeed placed an order for four used C-130s with Lockheed, contingent upon

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1. J825 HistSum Sep 72, which cited CHJUSMAG PHIL 251014Z Sep 72 (EX).
3. CSAF 19214Z Jan 72.
4. J825 HistSum Apr 72; SECDEF 4610/101746Z Apr 73; SECSTATE 062757/121926Z Apr 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 190750Z Apr 72.
obtaining an Export-Import Bank loan. The price was purported to be $14 million, plus $5 million for the support package, including spare parts and training. This decision, stated the Embassy, clearly had implications for the MAP and for the projected renegotiation of U.S. security assistance agreements with the Philippines. Although the Embassy had not been officially notified, the Philippine Executive Secretary indicated that President Marcos had decided against the C-119K acquisition, then programmed under FY 74 MAP. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Ambassador saw no alternative to U.S. support of the GOP request for Export-Import financing.\(^1\)

\(^{\text{(C)}}\) On 14 August 1972, the JUSMAG advised that the Export-Import Bank had proposed to finance a $19.7 million loan for the purchase of four used L-100-20 Hercules Air Freighters (C-130s). The terms offered were 10 percent down, 45 percent Ex-Im Bank direct loan, and 45 percent Ex-Im guarantee of a commercial bank loan, with repayment over a seven-year period.\(^2\)

\(^{\text{(S)}}\) In October, the Chief, JUSMAG PHIL advised CINCPAC that he had received formal notification that the AFP no longer wished to acquire the C-119K, and that the terms for acquisition of four C-130s had been approved. The AFP, therefore, wished to program four more C-130s for acquisition through a mix of FMS/MAP over several program/budget years. The Chief, JUSMAG and the Ambassador agreed that, pragmatically, the AFP desires should be supported. Further, the JUSMAG strongly recommended that the funds programmed for C-119K acquisition not be deleted, but be retained in the Philippine MAP for application to other, equally critical, items.\(^3\)

\(^{\text{(S)}}\) In November, the CSAF responded to JUSMAG query on the cost of introducing four C-130H aircraft into the PAF inventory, if programmed by 1 January 1973. The estimated cost, with spare parts, spare engines, AGE, and training, was $26 million. On 1 December, the Ambassador again dispatched a plea for support in modernizing the PAF air transport. He recalled the $80 million contributed by the U.S. toward relief and rehabilitation after the disastrous floods of July and August, and alluded to Filipino gratitude.\(^4\)

4. J825 HistSums Nov and Dec 72; CSAF 102302Z Nov 72; AMEMB Manila 11619/010939Z Dec 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 080240Z Dec 72 (EX); AMEMB Manila 12493/240920Z Dec 72.
4. The Filipinos have been very grateful for this prompt and generous assistance on our part. In fact, you might say President Marcos has exhibited this gratitude by according, in response to my request, certain benefits here affecting our overall long range interests, as readers of certain very highly classified messages will know. This was done without any hint of bargaining or demand for quid pro quo which would certainly not be an unusual practice in the Orient. I might add that the Filipinos were also fully aware of large numbers of aircraft, including 38 C-130s, which transited Clark Field on the way to Saigon during the last month. [Ed. note: See Logistics, ENHANCE PLUS.]

5. I am convinced that if they are not able to obtain our assistance in acquiring air transport, they will be determined to purchase some of what they need directly from available suppliers, regardless of the effect on their development and reform programs or on their presently responsible monetary policy in observance of IMF rules.

6. I am fully persuaded that there is ample justification for our making a special effort to review our inventory of these aircraft worldwide to determine whether there are not six C-130s (or 8-12 C-123s if available) and twelve huey helicopters we could make available in the near future to the Philippines. Even if we were to disregard their real and immediate needs, this would make sense in terms of the role the Philippines plays in our strategic forward posture in the Western Pacific with its contribution of the bases at Subic and Clark which we continue to hold at a minimum financial cost. Though, at this point I feel a bit like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, I would appreciate a thorough review of this request and the favorable outcome which all reason and logic insist that it deserves.

Three weeks later, on 24 December, the Ambassador suggested another source of PAF transport aircraft. He had learned that 48 or more C-123s had been moved from Vietnam to Clark Air Base in the Philippines for temporary storage pending determination of their ultimate destination. He had also learned of CINCPAC's recommendation to the DOD that the C-123s be retained for assignment to PACOM countries, including some for the Philippines. The Ambassador recognized the many other claimants for these assets, including U.S.
Air Force national guard and reserve units, but he strongly supported CINCPAC that these aircraft be retained in the Pacific. He requested the State Department to, "...help influence the Pentagon decision in our favor." He urged the allocation of 12-16 C-123 aircraft for the Philippines, which could ease the pressure for U.S. support of C-130 acquisition. Besides, the Ambassador noted, "...the C-123s are arriving daily from Vietnam and the Filipinos from Marcos on down know that they are at Clark." He acknowledged the lack of funds, and the competing "equally essential" items such as helicopters, rifles, radios, etc. The most feasible solution, therefore, appeared to be long term credit arrangements or, "...a Presidential decision to declare the aircraft excess...."

(C) CINCPAC and the Chief, JUSMAG PHIL had always supported the orderly improvement and modernization of the AFP, within the limitations of MAP/FMS fund allocations and the AFP capability to assimilate new equipment. In addition to the C-130 episode, there were other indications during 1972 that GOP officials had discovered a means to by-pass the MAP. On 2 November, the Chief, JUSMAG PHIL informed CINCPAC of GOP discussions in Washington about the possible purchase of OV-10 aircraft from North American Rockwell. The aircraft company representative had been requested to discuss the matter with State Department and DOD officials. The Executive Secretary to President Marcos was the initiator of this discussion, and the representative of North American was requested to convey the result of his State/DOD talks to Undersecretary Salientes and the PAF commanding general. The aircraft representative assisted the PAF general in preparing a letter establishing a requirement for FMS purchase of 12 OV-10 aircraft. Previous discussions between JUSMAG and GOP officials had placed the OV-10 as a low priority MAP possibility. The Chief, JUSMAG, therefore, requested CINCPAC to verify whether U.S. Washington agencies supported FMS acquisition of OV-10 aircraft for the GOP. 2

(C) On 9 November, CINCPAC advised the DOD that he did not concur with OV-10 acquisition under any circumstances. He noted that the OV-10 was not included in current or future PAF force objective plans, and that other high priority items were already in shortfall for lack of funds. CINCPAC also recalled the serious impact of flood damage on the Philippine economy, and that one squadron of OV-10s (18 aircraft) would cost over $19 million. 3

(C) In yet another example of emerging PAF independence, the Chief, JUSMAG reported to CINCPAC in October that the PAF had begun negotiations with

1. Ibid.
2. J825 HistSum Nov 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 020304Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 0922347Z Nov 72.
an Italian aircraft company for purchase of a training aircraft. Five representatives of the Italian company had arrived in Manila with a demonstration aircraft, designated as the SF-260M. The commanding general of the PAF had flown the demonstrator and was pleased with the performance. The PAF desired 30 SF-260M aircraft, which were quoted at $70,000 each. The Chief, JUSMAG stated that the PAF had experienced a shortage of T-28s for several years, and that the U.S. could offer no suitable replacement, either MAP or FMS. Accordingly, this action was recognized by JUSMAG as "...a move towards self-sufficiency and the solution of their own problems."\(^1\)

\(^1\) In November, the CSAF advised that the U.S. Air Force inventory included no aircraft comparable to the Italian trainer. Several makes of commercial aircraft could possibly be modified to provide the desired capability at comparable or lower cost, and representatives of several companies had been notified. On 13 November, however, the Chief, JUSMAG PHIL informed CINCPAC that the PAF had purchased the demonstrator SF-260M; that evaluation and training of pilots was underway; and, that negotiations were continuing for the purchase of 30 trainer aircraft.\(^2\)

**Assistance to the Philippine Navy (PN)**

\(^2\) In October 1971, the DOD had advised the Ambassador, while visiting Washington, that three 542-class LSTs, numbers 587, 643, and 626, were available for transfer to the PN under MAP. The vessels were held by the Military Sealift Command in Japan. By mid-January 1972, a joint JUSMAG-PN team had inspected the LSTs, which were found to be in very poor condition. In a priority message to the DOD, the Ambassador expressed dismay that the condition of these LSTs did not bear out his statements to President Marcos that they were immediately operable. He had based his assurances to Marcos on his "understanding" of discussions with DOD officials in Washington. He concluded by requesting that better LSTs be found for the PN.\(^3\)

\(^3\) In March 1972, the CNO offered to make available for inspection, and possible transfer, three other LSTs. Alternatively, the PN was offered a navy-to-navy lease of LSTs 222, 488, and 546 on a "hot ship" turnover basis during the first half of FY 73. With the concurrence of CINCPAC and the Ambassador, JUSMAG PHIL informed the PN of these options. The PN accepted the "hot ship" transfer option.\(^4\)

2. J825 HistSum Nov 72; CSAF 062314Z Nov 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 130712Z Nov 72.
On 15 May 1972, the CNO authorized the turnover to the PN of the three LSTs on 15 July 1972. The lease was on a no-cost, five-year tenure basis.

In March, the CNO had proffered the lease of two minesweepers on a navy-to-navy, no-cost basis. The two MSOs were the USS ENERGY (MSO-436) and the USS FIRM (MSO-444). This offer was accepted by the PN in April, and the CNO authorized planning to begin for a "hot ship" turnover in July. In May, a joint State/Defense message alerted the Ambassador to possible developments in Southeast Asia which could delay the transfer until late in FY 73. The Philippines Ambassador to the U.S. had already indicated his intention to attend the 3 July turnover ceremony at Long Beach, California. The Embassy reply from Manila indicated that the GOP would be disappointed at a delayed transfer, but would understand the necessity for it. On 23 May, another joint State/Defense message advised that a review of requirements had been made, and that the transfer of the two MSOs could take place as planned. On 8 July, the Commander, Minesweeper Flotilla Three notified all concerned that the official turnover had taken place on 5 July 1972.

On 1 September, JUSMAG reported that major engineering difficulties had been encountered while the MSOs were underway to the Philippines. A one-time exception to policy was requested to use MAP funds for repairs. CINCPAC concurred, noting the severe impact of flood relief operations on the AFP budget, and the unexpected nature of the shipboard failures. The DOD disapproved the use of MAP funds, but authorized a change in the terms of transfer from lease to loan, where MAP funding was authorized. After consultation between CINCPAC, PACFLT, and JUSMAG, it was determined that such a change could be open to criticism by Congress or the General Accounting Office. Therefore, CINCPAC recommended that the lease arrangements not be changed, and that the necessary repairs be paid for by the PN. The DOD agreed, and, on 29 September, rescinded the authorization to change the terms of transfer.

On 29 February 1972, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter KUKUI (WAK-186) was decommissioned and transferred to the PN. The transfer was on an as-is--where-is basis. The ex-KUKUI was commissioned in the PN as RPS MACTAN TK-90.

1. J825 HistSum May 72; CNO 4910/151625Z May 72.
2. J825 HistSum May and Jul 72; CNO 4900/042040Z May 72, which cited CNO 091717Z Mar 72 and CHJUSMAGPHIL 280246Z Apr 72; SECSTATE 081926/102140Z May 72; AMEMB Manila 4523/170734Z May 72; SECSTATE 090935/232142Z May 72; COMINEFLOT THREE 4910/080201Z Jul 72.
3. J825 HistSum Sep 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 010630Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 082245Z Sep 72; SECDEF 4854/152254Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 252107Z Sep 72; SECDEF 8453/292213Z Sep 72.
Assistance to the Philippine Army (PA)

In 1971, the FMS credit purchase of M-16 rifles from Colt Industries had been approved and funded. Delay in delivery prompted JUSMAG to request CINCPAC assistance to expedite delivery. The earliest delivery date promised in October 1972 was January 1973 for 1,200 of 4,010 M-16 rifles ordered. JUSMAG stressed the precarious internal security situation in the Philippines which caused high-level GOP interest in the M-16 deliveries. In November, CINCPAC suggested that the GOP consider a commercial purchase of M-16s from Colt, and JUSMAG replied that the GOP was negotiating for the direct purchase of 7,000 M-16 rifles from Colt. Meanwhile, the GOP had begun negotiations in October with various firms for the indigenous production of small arms, particularly 5.56mm assault rifles. The GOP goal was 150,000 rifles within five years, with an in-country manufacturing capability of 30,000 units per annum by the third or fourth year. The two companies considered to be the foremost contenders for the proposal were Colt Industries with the M-16 and the German company of Heckler and Fuch with the HK-33. Colt officials had informed JUSMAG that the total package of technology, equipment, and materials was estimated to be about $22.5 million. No additional action on this move by the PA had been taken by the end of 1972.

Project FORESIGHT SIERRA

The first increment of Project FORESIGHT SIERRA was completed and turned over to the Philippine Government on 24 November 1971. This was a long range program to upgrade the fixed communications available to the AFP using MAP support. The first contract established a main tropospheric scatter link from Tagaytay, Luzon to Mt. Luay, Cebu, with microwave extensions from Tagaytay to Ft. Bonifacio on Luzon and from Mt.-Luay to Lapu Lapu on Cebu. On 28 August 1971, JUSMAG PHIL submitted a plan to extend the system by adding Cebu-to-Cagayan and Cagayan-to-Zamboanga links. Excess U.S. Army equipment from Vietnam, worth about $3.5 to $5 million, together with $500,000 to be reprogrammed into FY 72 MAP, would geographically double the span of control, via communications, of the GOP.

The extension of the system had come to be called FORESIGHT SIERRA Communications System Expansion (FSCS-X). It was delayed by a State Department Inspector General report which alleged that the FSCS was duplicative of civil communication capability. The Country Team reply stressed the reluctance of

1. J825 HistSums Oct and Nov 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 270154Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 302050Z Oct 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 222311Z Nov 72; CHJUSMAG PHIL 022254Z Nov 72.
private communications companies to invest in facilities outside of all but the most lucrative areas. These did not include the proposed sites for the FSCS. Moreover, the need for positive and reliable communications under military control had never been questioned, particularly those to the southern islands. GOP military leaders and the President regarded the FSCS-X as vital to internal and external security; equally significant was the interest of the U.S. in an adequate communications network from the southerly direction.\(^1\)

(6) Based on the strong Country Team support for the FSCS-X, and on a strong CINCPAC recommendation that the project proceed, the DOD approved and authorized the reprogramming of $500,000 in FY 71 funds, from automotive parts to the FSCS-X. On 24 August 1972, JUSMAG requested the release of the excess equipment from Vietnam. On 3 October, the DOD cited the long history of the program and exempted FSCS-X from certain requisitioning cut-off policies on items which normally would have expired.\(^2\)

**Thailand**

**History of Military Assistance**

(5) United States military assistance to Thailand commenced in 1950 to provide Thailand the strength to sustain its integrity against internal subversion, and to participate in its own defense against external threats. The program was influenced by the U.S. desire to use air bases and other facilities in Thailand. A concerted U.S. Country Team effort to cause the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to act vigorously against the insurgent threat was the main thrust of the security assistance program. From FY 50 through FY 72, the RTG had received slightly more than one billion dollars in grant military assistance; had purchased $44.5 million through FMS; and had received about $40 million in excess defense articles.\(^3\)

**MASF/MAP Funds**

(5) At the beginning of calendar year 1972, the dollar guidelines for the Thailand security assistance program were $68 million for FY 72, and $60

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1. J824 HistSum Aug 72; Rpt, SECSTATE IGA to SECDEF, 6 Jun 72; AMEMB Manila 5574/1608572 Jun 72.
3. Ltr, Hq USMACHTAI/JUSMACHTAI to CINCPAC, 22 Sep 72, Subj: Senior Officer Debriefing Report, with 1 encl: Debriefing Report by MGEn James J. Gibbons, USA, Deputy Commander, USMACHTAI, hereafter cited as the Gibbons Report.
THAILAND

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 203,000 SQ. MI.  LIFE EXPECTANCY: 48 YEARS
POPULATION: 42,000,000  CROSS RACE MARRIAGE 19-1/2, 7.5, 11%
ANNUAL GROWTH: 7.6%  PER Capita: 135,000
AVERAGE LAND PER CAPITA: 11.5 ACRE  DEFENSE BUDGET: 1.53
LITERACY RATE: 84.1%  ARMED FORCES: 91,354
DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY

CINC: Phumiphon Adul-let
PRIME MINISTER: Tha Phom Phumiphon
DEFENSE MINISTER: Tha Phom Phumiphon
GOVERNOR: Tha Phom Phumiphon
BRANCHES: 1. AIR FORCE
2. NAVY
3. MILITIA

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES

ARMS
1. ARMY 2. NAVY 3. AIR FORCE

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

1. NATIONAL SECURITY
2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
3. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

OVERALL OBJECTIVES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

ASSIST THAILAND IN SUSTAINING NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COMMUNITY SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND RESISTING POSSIBLE OVERLAP AND PROMOTE REGIONALISM AND ASSURE US BASE RIGHTS

U.S. EMBASSY

CHARGE D' ECONOMIQUE: THOMAS VAIL

MAJOR AIR FORCES

1. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
2. RECON NAVAL COMMAND
3. HELICOPTER COMMAND
4. AAD COMMAND
5. TAC SUP COMMAND

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES

1. Maintain U.S.-Thai rights and facilities.
2. Assist the RGC in strengthening its internal security capabilities including those of military, paramilitary, and police forces.
3. Support the development of Thai Air Force capabilities to defend against limited external military threats, not to include, however, a capability for unlimited defense against large-scale nuclear or conventional attacks.

MILITARY CAPABILITY

1. MODERATE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGRRESSION.
2. LIMITED ABILITY TO CONDUCT COASTAL DEFENSE AND PATROL IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS.
3. LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND SOME SUPPORT OF THE ARMY, NATIONAL SECURITY.

1. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
2. RECON NAVAL COMMAND
3. HELICOPTER COMMAND
4. AAD COMMAND
5. TAC SUP COMMAND

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 141.
million for FY 73-76. In April 1972, the ceiling was raised to $87.5, and on 7 July, the end-of-year funded level for FY 72 was established at $92.24 million.¹

(5) On 1 July 1972, the military security assistance program for Thailand reverted from the Service-funded program to the MAP, funds for which were appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act. On 29 August, the President waived the FY 73 requirement that ten percent of MAP funds be deposited by the host country for Thailand and the Philippines (see previous discussion).²

(5) By the end of CY 72, the Secretary of Defense had reduced the CRA funding level of the FY 73 Thailand MAP from approximately $60 million to $37.875 million, including supply operations. The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand registered lengthy and detailed protests to the State Department against such abrupt and drastic reductions in MAP support. He especially emphasized the contrast between the resurgence of U.S. operations from Thailand, with RTG assent, and the apparent intention of the U.S. to withdraw aid when the immediate need for operational bases had passed. Further, at a time when the persistency of our advisors regarding counterinsurgency emphasis was bearing fruit, the drastic cut in funds would cause a Thai reappraisal of program priorities.³

U.S. Commitments to the RTG

(5) On 9 November 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, consummated an agreement with Air Chief Marshal Dawee, Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), regarding the deployment of a Thai division to Vietnam. Among the commitments made by the U.S. to assist the RTG in funding this deployment was the transfer of equipment possessed by the Thai forces in Vietnam to the RTG upon redeployment to Thailand. Another commitment was to construct and equip a Thailand Overseas Replacement Center (ORTC), which would revert to Thai ownership when training of personnel for the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Volunteer Force in Vietnam (RTAVF) had been completed. Still another commitment had been the deployment of a HAWK missile battery to Thailand.

2. J838 Point Paper, 6 Sep 72, Subj: FY 73 MAP Funding and 10% Provision of Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)-Thailand; J837 HistSum Sep 72; SECDEF 3244/ 052103Z Sep 72.
including training and equipment. In 1971, the redeployment of the RTAVF began, and, as they redeployed, their equipment was transferred to the RTG.¹

($) When the RTG agreed, in July 1971, to accept substitutes for the HAWK Battery, an increase of $6.5 million to the FY 72 dollar ceiling was authorized. These funds were marked for the purchase of 14 UH-1H helicopters and two CH-47 helicopters. A review of the RTAVF equipment revealed shortages, based on the pre-embarkation inventory, amounting to $3.9 million. In April 1972, CINCPAC recommended that the FY 72 MASF be increased to replace these equipment shortages. On 27 April, the DOD authorized the increase solely to satisfy the Unger/Dawee agreement. The RTG accepted a letter from Ambassador Unger, dated 6 July 1972, which proposed the termination of the U.S. obligation by the payment of $7.7 million. The check for that amount was accepted by the RTG on 28 July 1972.²

($) In May 1972, discussions between Vice President Spiro Agnew and RTG officials resulted in a tentative commitment to provide helicopters, armored cars, and communications equipment as add-ons to the FY 72 program. On 13 June, the DOD advised that, by direction of higher authority, $5 million would be added to the FY 72 MASF program. The funds were allocated to procure 12 rebuilt UH-1H helicopters, 14 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and 6 armored commando cars. Also, the higher priority delivery of programmed radios was directed.³

($) One other explicit commitment was the Doi Inthanon Air Control and Warning Facility (PEACE RIDE II), which was to be provided to the RTG as a quid pro quo for permission to construct and operate a strategic space tracking site (COBRA TALON). In March 1972, a $3.8 million contract was let for the construction of a 48 kilometer access road to the intended radar site. One of two remaining U.S. commitments for this project was $2.5 million for construction of the radar site cantonment area. This money was to be awarded when the access road construction was almost complete. The final commitment was for communications-electronic equipment worth $500,000 which was to be delivered between FY 73 and FY 75.⁴

Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT)

Related to the regular security assistance program, which provided operations, maintenance, and investment funds to the RTARF in support of internal and external defense, was the proposal called Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT). The initial concept, under the title of "Strengthening Thailand for Defense" (STFD), was to encourage the RTG to accelerate the improvement of RTARF capabilities, especially in counterinsurgency operations, by providing more U.S. MASF and Public Law 480 funds. In exchange, the RTG was to increase its defense budget. The new proposal by the U.S. Government under AAT specified the addition of $15 million to the FY 72 grant aid program, combined with PL 480 fund increases of $15 million in FY 72 and FY 73. The RTG was to allocate an additional $10 million in each of the two fiscal years for defense in the RTG budget. This proposal engendered little enthusiasm from the RTG when first offered in August 1971. At the end of 1971, negotiations were underway which, excluding the PL-480 provision, involved a total defense increase of $35 million—the FY 72 MASF add-on of $15 million, and the two $10 million additions in the RTG defense budget. Agreement had been reached that the RTA would receive $22 million, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) $10 million, and the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) $3 million.

On 24 January 1972, the U.S. agreed to provide an A-37 aircraft squadron as part of the FY 72 MASF program, on condition that the RTG release T-28s for use in Laos and Cambodia. In March, the two governments came to terms on the AAT, called RAMASOON by the RTG. The program objectives included an increase in RTA and RTN manpower; improvement and expansion of RTA and RTN training; expansion of counterinsurgency operations; upgrading of logistics facilities; and, improvement of the RTAF capability to conduct sustained "contingency" operations (aimed at improved RTAF support in Cambodia).

RTAF Operations in Cambodia

In July 1970, the RTAF began operations in north and northwest Cambodia. Initial Thai efforts were promising because Cambodia was urgently seeking assistance and the Thai sensed a threat to their borders. In 1971, the FANK demonstrated limited enthusiasm for RTAF air support, and the RTAF appeared to be reluctant to expend resources in Cambodia. This reluctance was at least partially related to the AAT objective of encouraging RTG resource expenditure in support of Cambodia in turn for more U.S. aid in Thailand.

In May 1972, discussions began between the RTG and Cambodia to locate four RTAF T-28s and one 0-1 forward air control (FAC) aircraft in Cambodia to provide close air support to Cambodian ground forces. On 17 May, the Secretary of State responded to CINCPAC's request for guidance as to whether Cambodian MAP-supplied POL and munitions could be used to support the Thai aircraft. The State Department offered two options for such support: FMS purchase by the RTG of the necessary materiel; or, the use of such materiel which had been provided under MASF funding prior to 1970. The State response noted that, although not specifically prohibited by the FAA, the use of Cambodian MAP to support RTAF operations in Cambodia could present other legal issues.1

In June, meetings between RTG and Cambodian officials ended in disagreement. The RTG had proposed two T-28s to be stationed at Ream Air Base (Kompong Son), with 80 support personnel; the removal of the Direct Air Support Team (DAST) from Battambang (Phnom Penh); the establishment of a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at Phnom Penh; and, Cambodia to provide food, transportation, POL, and munitions support. Cambodia objected that 80 personnel were not necessary at Ream, a fully operational base, to support two aircraft; also, the RTG-proposed manning of 20 people for the DASC was considered excessive.2

In July 1972, COMUSMACTHAI reported to CINCPAC on a visit by a State Department representative who expressed concern that AAT funds were not envisioned to support the RTAF Cambodian operations. It was explained to the U.S. official that such was indeed U.S. policy, but that the use of low-key encouragement was stipulated by State and Embassy guidance. Meanwhile, he was assured that the RTAF operations were "legal," since pre-June 1970 munitions stocks had not yet been exhausted by the RTG.3

On 1 August, the Secretary of State authorized the use of Cambodian MAP to purchase POL, munitions, and spare parts to support RTAF operations in Cambodia for a six-month period. This authorization was intended to allow the U.S. Ambassador in Thailand to continue negotiations, and to clarify with the RTG that AAT-generated funds were intended to support operations of this type. By early September, the RTG Supreme Command had approved the basing of RTAF aircraft at Ream Air Base, and upgrading of living quarters, ramp space, and perimeter security had begun under MEDTC auspices. By 5 October it was

2. Ibid.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 070425Z Jul 72.
apparent that the bilateral negotiations were not smooth. Further discussions relating to the terms of in-country RTAF basing had stalled, but Cambodia had drafted new terms of reference for future discussion. As the year ended, the temporary use of Cambodian MAP funds for RTAF operations continued, and low-key persuasion of the RTG to use AAT for Cambodian support remained the policy.¹

**STOL Aircraft for Thailand**

(§) Tests by the U.S. Air Force failed to qualify two candidates for the U.S. MAP STOL aircraft; these were the AU-23 Hillar Peacemaker and the AU-24 Helio Stallions. The aircraft (14 AU-24 and 13 AU-23) were then declared excess to U.S. requirements. The aircraft were offered to the RTG, at no cost to MAP, with the stipulation that one T-28 be released for use in Laos and Cambodia for each STOL aircraft accepted. On 27 October 1972, the RTG offered 10 T-28s for 13 AU-23s, and declined the AU-24s. The DOD accepted the RTG offer, and, on 14 November, the AU-23s were airlifted to Thailand. Five T-28s were released to Cambodia and five to Laos on 10 November. At the end of the year, a mobile training team was being assembled for in-country AU-23 training of RTAF personnel.²

**Republic of Vietnam**

(§) The program to provide security assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) continued, during 1972, to be interwoven with the active war effort. Administration of MASF and other assistance to RVN was accomplished within the COMUSMACV command structure under a framework specified in the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan (CRIMP). The Easter offensive by North Vietnam engendered an intensification of combat activity, while the withdrawal of U.S. forces continued. As negotiations in Paris for a cease-fire progressed, projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS were initiated to accelerate the delivery of MASF-supplied equipment.³

**CRIMP**

(¶) At the beginning of calendar year 1972, the CRIMP was on schedule. The goal of a force structure ceiling for the RVNAF of 1.1 million personnel

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2. J837 Point Paper, 10 Nov 72, Subj: STOL Aircraft for Thailand; J838 HistSum Nov 72; MACTHAI 130049Z Nov 72; for disposition of the AU-24s, see Cambodia discussion.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, p. 444; See also Logistics Chapter, this history.
## Republic of Vietnam

### Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>320,000 SQ KM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>18.6 MILLION</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANNUAL GROWTH</td>
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<td>AGRICULTURAL LAND PER CAPITA</td>
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<td>LITERACY RATE</td>
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<td>LIFE EXPECTANCY</td>
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<td>PER CAPITA</td>
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<td>DEFENSE BUDGET: SELF-FINANCED (1972)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PER CAPITA</td>
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### Major Force Objectives FY72

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY (RVN)</td>
<td>11 INF DIV, 1 ARMD DIV, 18 ARMD CN SQ, 3 TD BNS, 61 ARTY BNS, 4 ADA BNS, 21 RMP BNS, 33 KMP BORDER DEF BNS, 10 HP BNS, 34 ENG BNS, 14 SIG BNS, 9 POLMAR BN, STRENGTH: 450,367.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY (VNN)</td>
<td>PATROL CRAFT 450, HUE MARINE WARFARE 20, ABDUH SHIPS AND CRAFT 672, SENTRY CRAFT 240 (EXCLUDES 242 JUNKS). TOTAL STRENGTH 43,470.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE (VNAF)</td>
<td>6 TAP FTR SQN, 8 LI SQN, 2 RECON SQN, 9 TRANS SQN, 26 RECON SQN, SPEC MISSION SQDN, 63,500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>1 INF DIV (9 INF BNS, 3 ARTY BNS, 1 ENG BN, 1 COMO BN) 14,200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERROR/BANDIT FORCES</td>
<td>360 RF BN W/O RF RIFLE CO 1810 STRENGTH: 112,000.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Major Country Forces

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Component</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>TOTAL STRENGTH: 450,367.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>TOTAL STRENGTH: 43,470.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>TOTAL STRENGTH: 17,100.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TERROR/BANDIT FORCES</td>
<td>TOTAL STRENGTH: 112,000.</td>
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</table>

### Combat Capability

- **CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND PRINCIPAL FOSSIL AND OFFERING EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES. PROLONDED RESISTANCE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY US AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORTS.**

- **CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS.**

- **CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS, PROVIDING CLOSER TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN GNRS.**

- **MARINE DIVISION PROVIDES STRATEGIC RESERVE.**

- **CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST LOCAL FORCES TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HAMLETS AND VILLAGES AND SECURE LOCUS.**

### Source

Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 110.
had been accelerated from FY 73 to FY 72, and the firepower of the RVNAF had doubled in 2-1/2 years. A force structure review was scheduled which would improve RVNAF interdiction capabilities and strengthen the combat forces in Military Regions 1 and 2.¹

(TS) By the end of FY 72, the actual strength of the RVNAF was 457,000 Army; 43,000 Navy; 17,000 Marines; 50,000 Air Force; 295,000 Regional Forces (RF); and 235,000 Popular Forces (PF). The Army possessed 12 divisions; the Navy, 1,622 craft; the Marines, 1 division; the Air Force, 56 squadrons; the RF, 1,679 companies; and the PF, 7,958 Platoons. For FY 73, the deletion of 411 PF Platoons and the formation of 131 RF companies was scheduled to increase local security and LOC protection. Some RF companies were scheduled to be formed into battalion units.²

(TS) In late 1972, an assessment of the impact of U.S. withdrawals, assuming a continuing threat by North Vietnam forces, was made. Many U.S. support functions, not compatible with contract administration or transfer outside RVN, would no longer be available. Because of CRIMP, ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS, many new units were formed without advisory guidance for inexperienced middle management. Although depot level maintenance would continue to be performed off-shore, and in-country maintenance training would continue under contract, the new equipment provided under ENHANCE PLUS would need contract maintenance for a prolonged period. It would be necessary to continue sealift contracts, and add air transport contracts until the lift requirement was reduced or the C-130s could be operated by the VNAF. There were fewer than 20 FACs in the Vietnam Air Force who were certified to direct U.S. aircraft on combat strikes, because of language deficiencies. Any resurgence of the air war would require the reintroduction of U.S. FACs. The same statement was true for naval gunfire adjustment. Lastly, although ENHANCE PLUS had added substantial numbers of fighter aircraft to the VNAF inventory, they would not be combat-ready for at least two years. Out-of-country air interdiction would not be possible; moreover, cross-border ground interdiction was limited by the combat support and LOC security available to the ARVN.³

1. J5523 Point Paper, 6 Jan 72, Subj: CRIMP.
2. J5523 Point Papers, 7 Aug 72 and 10 Oct 72, Subj: CRIMP.
Of the countries in the PACOM eligible only for FMS consideration, the programs for Australia and New Zealand remained the same for FY 71 and FY 72. The FY 72 program for Australia was estimated at $89 million, and for New Zealand at $10 million.

Japan

As Japan attained economic self-sufficiency, grant aid military assistance decreased and more FMS and licensed production programs ensued. This provided reverse gold flow and tended to standardize Japanese military equipment in consonance with U.S. equipment. Grant aid terminated in 1964, and the last deliveries were made in 1967. The FMS program was under the supervision of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO), the chief of which was subordinate to CINCPAC. The Chief, MDAO managed the sale of materiel, training, services, and publications. In April 1972, the Japanese Diet passed the Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 72 national budget, and, on 9 October, the National Defense Council approved the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). The JDA Fourth DBP covered the period JFY 72 - JFY 76.

Analysis of both the budget and the DBP revealed a continuing trend toward research and development expenditures. This was indicative of a maturing military defense technological capability. The DBP was oriented toward maximum domestic design, with licensed production and direct import of FMS only when the item was beyond Japanese industrial capability. The estimated potential returns to the U.S. over the five-year period included $446.4 million from major equipment and $184.7 million from other parts, equipment, and training, for a total potential return of $631.1 million.

Malaysia

On 10 February 1972, the Secretary of State notified the U.S. Ambassador at Kuala Lumpur that the U.S. was prepared to fund either FMS credit or private commercial credit for 16 F-5 aircraft. The Malaysian

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Ministry of Defense requested a Letter of Offer for FMS credit amounting to $40 million; 14 F-5Es and 2 F-5B two-seat fighters were desired with CY 74 delivery and CY 75 operational readiness as the goal.¹

(3) On 1 July, the Ambassador advised the State Department that a sales contract was signed on 30 June for FY 74 and FY 75 delivery of the F-5s at a total cost of $39.24 million. In November, a conference was scheduled between Malaysian and U.S. Air Force technicians to determine the requirements for spare parts, AGE, facilities, and other support needs for the F-5 package, nicknamed PEACE STRIKE.²

Singapore

(3) In January 1972, in response to a CNO offer of excess A-4B aircraft, the Government of Singapore (GOS) signed Letters of Offer for a total of 40 aircraft. The cost per unit was $40,000 plus about $254,000 for rehabilitation. Delivery of 16 aircraft was to be expedited, with the balance placed on storage pending rehabilitation. Also in January, the Department of the Army reported that arrangements had been completed for the sale of 12 175mm M107 guns, 66 quarter-ton vehicles, and 200 M113 armored personnel carriers. Also, the GOS received approval for an export license to sell M-16 rifles to Thailand. In June the number of 1/4-ton vehicles had been increased to 394, and, in July, the GOS signed an agreement with Lockheed to rehabilitate the 40 A-4s at a cost of $25.5 million.³

SECTION VII--PACOM MAP EVALUATIONS

(U) Department of Defense Directive 5132.3 charged the Commander in Chief Pacific with specific responsibilities for the security assistance program in the Pacific Command. Discharge of these responsibilities required a system for evaluation of the security assistance program in each country on a scheduled basis. These evaluations were to provide CINCPAC, his component commanders, and chiefs of the several U.S. assistance groups with information and guidance to assist them in the effective planning and efficient execution of the security assistance program.1

(U) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Security Assistance had staff responsibility for the evaluation of country security assistance programs in the PACOM. The Chief, Performance Evaluation Group (PEG), assisted by other CINCPAC staff members and service representatives made available by the component commanders, was charged with the coordination, scheduling, and implementation of this evaluation program. Component commanders and chiefs of Military Assistance groups were directed to assist in achieving the mission and objectives.2

(U) During CY 72, the CINCPAC PEG evaluated the MAP programs in three countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Evaluation of Indonesian MAP3

U.S. Defense Liaison Group Activities

(S) The U.S. Defense Liaison Group was effective in discharging its responsibilities to the execution of the Military Assistance Program for the Republic of Indonesia. Despite the limited number of personnel assigned and the overburdening workload generated by a continuous flow of visitors, the USDLG was meeting pressing deadlines for program changes, data for reports, etc., imposed by higher authority.

2. Ibid.
3. Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 001510, dated 10 Jul 72, Subj: Evaluation of the Military Assistance Program in Indonesia, with 1 encl: Final Rpt, CINCPAC FY 72 Evaluation of the MAP in Indonesia.
The Army Branch was effectively accomplishing its mission despite a major shortage of assigned personnel which included three field grade officers (the Branch Chief, a Logistics Staff Officer, and a Depot Maintenance Advisor), an enlisted clerk typist, and a U.S. civilian (general equipment specialist). Only the assistance of TDY personnel to fill in some otherwise gaping holes, and the working of extended hours over an extended week by the acting branch chief and several other PCS and TDY personnel, kept the advisory effort effective. The personnel of the Army Branch were well qualified in a general military sense, but none had received formal training specifically for MAP duty prior to arrival in the command. Since their arrival, all personnel had either attended formal training in MAP at various western Pacific sites or had received sufficient on-the-job training to enable them to contribute to the advisory effort.

Personnel of the Navy/Marine Branch appeared to be highly effective performers, especially in view of the constraints under which they must operate. The planning, advice, and assistance provided to the Indonesian Navy and Marine Corps appeared uniquely well-suited to prevailing conditions. The only situation within the Branch which appeared to need remedy was that of the incumbent Marine Advisor who did not have the qualifications needed by the Indonesian Marine Corps and whose possessed qualifications were not susceptible to being exploited. The rapport between the Navy/Marine Branch personnel and their Indonesian counterparts appeared exemplary. The U.S. Navy Technical Assistance Team (TAT) was particularly effective and was making notable progress at the Indonesian Naval Shipyard, which badly needed all the assistance it could get.

The Air Force Branch was an effective unit in discharging its responsibilities and performing its mission. Although faced with personnel problems resulting from the State Department "low profile" policy, extensive progress had been and was being made in upgrading the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) and promoting self-sufficiency. This was a result of the professional and dedicated efforts of all members of the Branch. Of particular note was the excellent rapport established with AURI personnel at all levels of command. Its effort in putting the Indonesian Air Force back on its feet has had a favorable political impact.

Indonesian Armed Forces Activities

An increasingly predominant role was being taken by the Indonesian Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) toward more centralized direction of the Government including the Armed Forces. This was evidenced by more emphasis being placed on joint planning, and priorities being assigned by HANKAM to those most urgent projects designed for the benefit of the country as a whole rather than just the Armed Forces.
The Indonesian Army remained the dominant force in Indonesia and was primarily responsible for defense and security of the country. Although exact figures were not furnished to the PEG Team (and probably not known to the Indonesians), the total Indonesian Army strength, according to the best estimate available, was 256,000 personnel, 150,000 of these appearing in the current MAPEL descriptions as MAP-supported personnel. A poor personnel accounting system, however, made both figures suspect. Thirty-three major Army units or activities were the primary recipients of U.S. MAP support.

As with the other services, the Indonesian Army was greatly hindered by complications resulting from the nation's austere budget situation. The recent emphasis which had been placed on improved training as the primary vehicle by which the Army and the nation could attain an increasing degree of self-sufficiency had been reduced. General overall logistics operations of the Army had apparently been considerably improved since the last report.

The Indonesian Navy (ALRI) was not capable of performing its self-generated operational mission, but was marginally effective in performing its HANKAM-assigned mission of supporting nation-building projects. The Indonesian Marine Corps (KKO) was the most effective combat force in the Indonesian Armed Forces. The Indonesian Navy was beset with so many problem areas that it was unlikely that an effective naval force could emerge before the 1980s. Because their present fleet consisted of heterogeneous ship types of many national origins, there was no way for a responsive logistic base to be developed to support this mixed bag of ships. Resource management by ALRI had been practically nonexistent; this lack was responsible for the existing personnel problems, as well as having contributed to the abysmal material condition of their ships and supporting equipment. The KKO had performed somewhat better in the management of its resources. Not of prime importance, but indicative of the way the Indonesian Navy was operated and maintained was the general overall appearance of fleet units at the Surabaja Naval Base. No fewer than five different colors of paint were being used on hulls and superstructure. If paint color could not be standardized, there could be little hope for other more important items. It was reported that the Indonesian Navy was divesting itself of some of its older ships; for example the Russian-built Sverdlov Cruiser had been sold for scrap.

Although ALRI received very austere funding support from the HANKAM, much of such support was wasted on support or partial support of unmanageable and unmaintainable ships. The Indonesian Navy was also faced with a personnel problem of formidable proportions. There had been no recruiting for the past three or four years, and still the ALRI was about 50 percent overmanned. Because the HANKAM was apprehensive over the prospect of releasing a large number of service personnel into civilian life with few jobs available, all personnel, excess or otherwise, competent or incompetent, were being retained.
Training of the ALRI had to begin with the fundamentals of technical, logistic, and language subjects when the U.S. MAP equipment began arriving. Significant progress had been made, but training of naval personnel was expected to continue as a major problem within ALRI until the nation's educational system could provide personnel with sufficient preparation to be trained in the operation and support of a modern naval force. The training situation of the KKO was better than ALRI due to the relatively simpler needs of the KKO. Indonesian Navy logistics presented almost insurmountable problems. The large number of ships of different national origins, the large number of different caliber weapons, the ever-present shortage of funds, the determination of HANKAM not to purchase any spare parts from Soviet Bloc Nations were but a few of the factors that degraded Navy logistics to the point of utter chaos.

Communications and electronics in ALRI had degenerated to ineffectiveness. ALRI did not have reliable ship-to-shore, ship-to-ship communications. The communications and electronics posture of KKO was directly related to ALRI, since all supplies for the KKO come from ALRI.

The Indonesian Naval Shipyard located in Surabaja was another disaster area. This shipyard at one time was capable of providing complete repair and overhaul support for the Indonesian Fleet. However, due to the lack of a preventive maintenance system and inadequate funding, the shipyard had deteriorated to the point where the Indonesian Navy took ninety percent of its work to civilian shipyards. The only bright spot in an otherwise very bleak picture was the work being done and assistance being rendered by the U.S. Navy Technical Assistance Team. Although the shipyard was absolutely vital to the proper operation of the Indonesian Navy, it was doubtful that upgrading would commence before 1974 nor be completed until the 1980s. In short, the Indonesian Navy was an ineffective force and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Indonesian Air Force was considered marginally effective to perform its assigned mission. Resources to accomplish its varied tasks on a sustained basis were lacking. Although the Air Force had a relatively large number of aircraft, the majority were of Soviet origin and were nonoperational because of lack of support and spare parts. The AURI's greatest assets were:

First, its intense desire to pull itself up by its own bootstrap—i.e., a desire to do things on its own, given appropriate advice and assistance where required. This attitude was quite prevalent throughout the various units visited by the PEG Team.
Second, the AURI's transport fleet of C-130s and C-47s represented a capability which was needed to provide logistic support to the widely scattered units of the Indonesian Armed Forces throughout the Archipelago, and to fulfill national security aims.

Third, and this relates to the first point, there was a great potential for increased effectiveness and general uplifting of the entire force. In this connection, it was clear to the PEG Team that there was great unit pride among the individuals in the units visited.

(C) There appeared to be a general need for the establishment of a formalized on-the-job training program in the AURI in order to provide positive direction in the progressive upgrading of skills required.

(C) There was a need for a central repository and distribution point for technical orders, manuals, and publications, as well as a central film library for training film requirements of all units, including training institutions, in the AURI.

(C) The Indonesian National Police force was capable of performing its mission on land, but was severely hampered in its enforcement through its sea and air arm. The ability to modernize the force was dependent upon MAP support and support from the Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM).

Philippines

(U) The U.S. Military Security Assistance planning and programming functions within the JUSMAG were being performed in a very effective manner. Marked improvement was noted in the extent to which planning and programming to meet AFP requirements were jointly discussed and reviewed by both the JUSMAG and the AFP.

(C) The JUSMAG had been successful in establishing arrangements and agreements for shifting an increasing level of AFP operating costs from MAP fundings to AFP funding. The AFP had recognized the need for more realistic planning, programming and budgeting to meet defense needs and displayed a sincere interest in developing increased military self-sufficiency.

(C) Although broad national military objectives had been established, they were not clearly defined. The major AFP objectives of internal,

socio-economic, and collective security need specific elaboration in relation to security assistance planning and programming. A hierarchy of objectives and goals stemming from these broad general objectives is required, and development of a number of chains of objectives and goals for each organizational level would prevent misunderstanding and facilitate integrated efforts toward total system objectives. It was difficult for leaders and individuals at the various levels to see how their jobs and system levels contribute to the whole, and plans of action which defined ways of accomplishing command objectives and goals were poorly construed at the middle and lower echelons.

There was a lack of realism and political responsibility in determining valid security assistance requirements. The development by the AFP of a five-year balanced and integrated program was a major step forward, but it was not yet a wholly viable program. It contained excessive amounts of weapons and such exotic weapons systems as fourteen F-4 C/D fighter aircraft, seven C-130 cargo aircraft, five minesweepers and five destroyer escorts. The document contained materiel well beyond the capabilities of the U.S. and the ROP to furnish. It did not appear to take into account manning and training requirements or force structure implications.

The lack of crystallized long-range objectives and goals, combined with the need of political expediency, often distorted the objectivity of decisions. Internal politics commanded the center of attention in decision-making; concessions for political purposes were a constant reality, and the frequency of elections kept political consideration at a high level. These real or imagined political requirements sometimes had a severe impact upon existing or developing plans and programs. The rapid turnover of personnel in key positions prevented the incumbents from gaining the requisite experience necessary for proper planning and programming. The results were short-range; few questions of importance could be solved at middle or lower levels but had to go to the top for resolution.

The Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) was effective in the administration of the Military Assistance Program for Thailand. Significant progress had been made in the improvement of Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) capabilities to meet the internal insurgency threat and the attainment of self-sufficiency goals since the previous CINCPAC evaluation. Excellent rapport continued to exist between U.S.-Thai counterparts

which contributed to mutually supportive efforts in the development of joint JUSMAG/RTARF projects designed to further the uplift of RTARF capabilities.

(5) The divergence in U.S. and Thai assessment of the threat to Thailand, which was indicated in the last PEG report as a complicating problem in planning and programming, no longer appeared to exist—at least to any significant extent. There was no doubt that the RTARF was still genuinely concerned about the external threat, but recent CI operations (and perhaps Sir Robert Thompson's assessment) had apparently provided RTG a better perspective of the magnitude of the internal threat.

(5) The planning and programming functions and responsibilities of JUSMAG/THAI were being effectively accomplished within the limits of guidance provided from higher authority. Personnel were responsive to program changes (such as AAT, munitions reallocations, and Hawk tradeoff) and the switchover from MASF to MAP, which in effect accelerated certain planning and programming actions. However, the U.S. restriction on disclosing out-year planning information continued to prevent the interchange of planning information with the Thais, and ultimately detracted from program effectiveness. A full exchange of programming and budgeting information was still considered essential. On the more positive side, completion of the 3rd revision of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Structure Plan (Project 33) was considered a milestone in Thai progress towards assuming planning and budgeting responsibility and attaining self-sufficiency in this area. Although U.S. representation was present throughout the planning of the P-33, assistance was advisory in nature only, and the action was essentially a unilateral Thai effort in which U.S. commitment was studiously avoided.

(5) With respect to resource management, considerable advisory effort was being concentrated in the personnel procurement area and in improving personnel procedures; however, complete self-sufficiency in personnel and manpower management was considered a long-term advisory effort, particularly in the Royal Thai Army. Although hindered by Embassy guidance which restricted direct monitoring of ongoing counterinsurgency operations, Army Advisory Group (ARAG) personnel, at all levels observed, demonstrated a high degree of professional competence and mutual understanding of the mission requirements.

(5) Through noteworthy Navy Advisory Group (NAG) effort, there had been an increased utilization of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force training capabilities in-country which had allowed the Royal Thai Navy to obtain first-rate training in technical areas no longer available to them through MAP training. For example, during FY 72, over 65 RTN/RTMC personnel had undergone training at U.S. bases in Thailand, primarily in the fields of avionics and port facilities, at no cost to the U.S. Significant effort had been expended by the NAG to
upgrade the RTN logistics system. For example, a more sophisticated automated requisition status and follow-up system (than that maintained by MACHAI ADP) had been outlined and accepted by the RTN, which was reported to become operational soon. Additionally, an RTN Supply Department reorganization study had been developed, and approval by the CINCRTN was expected.

(S) The Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) was continuing its effort to maximize use of USAF in-country training capabilities, and was working with the RTAF to develop a single manager concept for the control and direction of on-the-job training (OJT). Other areas wherein AFAG assistance was noteworthy included the following: assisting the RTAF in the development of procedures whereby the Logistic Control Center (LCC) would effectively perform the mission for which it was designed; improvement and expansion of the RTAF wing/field maintenance aircraft/component repair capability; encouraging the RTAF to adopt an equipment management system; promoting joint AFAG/RTAF evaluation of aircraft condition and quality of maintenance at each tactical support unit; and the formation of a Configuration Control Board (CCB) to review all TCTOs/modifications affecting MAP equipment.
CHAPTER VIII
PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--THE DRUG ABUSE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

CINCPAC continued to be vitally concerned over the actual and potential detrimental effect of drug abuse on the ability of the PACOM to accomplish its mission. The drug abuse problem warranted strong countermeasures by CINCPAC, and included guidance and assistance to sub-unified commands and the coordination of interdepartmental and interservice efforts. Drug abuse control consisted primarily of three functional areas--education, suppression, and identification-treatment. Coordination of these three areas was essential to the success of the overall program.

Interdepartmental/interagency coordination was the keynote to success in attacking the drug problem, and CINCPAC took the initiative by requesting that sub-unified commands offer assistance to U.S. Mission Chiefs in the development of their country plans. The PACOM fostered close military coordination with the State Department, Bureau of Customs (BOC), Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and CINCPAC representatives attended two regional and one sub-regional meeting on drug abuse in Bangkok. CINCPAC had been concerned for some time by the lack of interagency drug intelligence coordination; he made several proposals for the establishment of a Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center (RIIOC) which would act as a field agency for the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC) in the WESTPAC area. CINCPAC consistently emphasized that the first and foremost tool available to the military commander for use in drug abuse prevention was an effective education program. The primary focal points of interest at CINCPAC were media information, educational materials, service and area programs, and national level developments. Through the end of 1972, three high intensity multi-media educational campaigns had been waged in the PACOM--"Cold Turkey I," "Cold Turkey II," and the "Come Home Clean" campaign.

In a continuing endeavor to eliminate sources and production, CINCPAC collected, collated, and disseminated intelligence available on drug sources, production, and traffic. The entire military intelligence community became involved in this effort. Three programs in 1972 exemplified CINCPAC's role in the suppression field: the surveillance and interdiction of Thai fishing trawlers smuggling narcotics to Vietnam and Hong Kong; a program to provide an aerial photographic system to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to identify marihuana growth; and the Customs Inspection Program within the PACOM. Recognizing that national policy, as well as military and humanitarian considerations,
required the development and management of effective armed forces drug abuse treatment procedures, CINCPAC took the initiative to establish the closest coordination and the maximum exchange of information on lessons learned between the component Service programs in the PACOM. ¹

Regional Interagency Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Center

⁵ CINCPAC was a strong advocate of the establishment of an organization which would be capable of an interagency exchange of narcotics intelligence and would coordinate and control enforcement activities on a regional basis. On 13 October 1971, CINCPAC summarized earlier proposals on this subject and recommended to the CJCS a concept for a Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center (RIIOC). The CINCPAC proposal was subsequently referred by the DOD to the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control (CCINC) where it was staffed by its intelligence subcommittee.

⁵ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) notified CINCPAC in January 1972 that the intelligence subcommittee had considered the RIIOC concept and had concluded that Europe represented the principal supply of hard narcotics entering the United States. Due to the emphasis on the European problem, action on a regional interagency organization for the PACOM was deferred. In March, the American Embassy in Bangkok reinitiated the discussion of a regional intelligence exchange and proposed to the Secretary of State the establishment of a Regional Intelligence Unit (RIU) responsible to the BNDD Regional Director which would collect, collate, and analyze narcotics trafficking intelligence. The RIU proposal was limited to three intelligence research analysts and other clerical support within the Country Team personnel ceilings.

⁵ DIA, on 23 May, restated a Washington BNDD proposal which requested that DIA nominate two operational intelligence analysts. The BNDD proposal indicated that the military analysts would be assigned on six-month temporary duty basis under the specific supervision of the BNDD, Bangkok. COMUSMACTHAI indicated a willingness to provide one officer, grade 0-5, who was excess to the current Joint Table of Distribution, for temporary duty with BNDD.

⁵ On 10 June, CINCPAC reiterated support for the regional intelligence concept but indicated to DIA that:

-The regional interagency organization must be concerned with all of the Western Pacific area and not limit its purview to a few selected nations in Southeast Asia, and the narcotics intelligence collection effort must encompass the entire spectrum of the distribution system. This program should

¹ J14 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: Drug Abuse.
utilize centralized collection and machine processing with subsequent refined intelligence being distributed to all concerned addressees on a real-time basis.

-A "total intelligence community project" should enhance interagency exchange of narcotics intelligence. The provision of DOD personnel to this project should stipulate that the military intelligence community be provided feedback narcotics intelligence on a continuing basis.

-The provision of DOD personnel from operating commands in a temporary duty capacity should not be considered as a general modus operandi. The long-term solution should include provision for permanent manpower authorization in the manning documents of the appropriate embassy organizations.

-The original CINCPAC proposal for a regional interagency intelligence and operations center (RIIOC) should be reviewed.

On 16 June 1972, DIA stated that it was improbable that the RIIOC proposal would gain any substantial support from the intelligence subcommittee since the current effort was directed at establishing the analytical capability on a national level.1

Drug Education Field Teams

(U) The Drug Education Field Team Program (DEFT) was developed by MACV in July 1971; it was designed to bring the drug abuse control problem down to the small-unit level. Initially consisting of one officer, two enlisted instructors, and one GVN service official, the composition of each DEFT was changed in September 1971 by adding two civilians who were ex-addicts and deleting one enlisted instructor. The ex-addicts were made available by the National Council for Prevention of Drug Abuse.2

(U) The DEFT concept was proposed by CINCPAC for consideration and evaluation by other PACOM sub-unified commands with a view toward possibly incorporating it into existing local drug education programs. Preliminary indications revealed the possibility that a requirement might exist for a limited number of civilian ex-addict drug education specialists for use on a trial basis in those areas where DEFT was considered a feasible and beneficial adjunct to local programs. COMUS Korea, COMUSTDC, COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPACREP Ryukyus, and CINCPACREP Guam-TPPI were requested in January 1972 to provide CINCPAC with their initial evaluation of the applicability of the DEFT concept within local drug education programs, and if appropriate, to include an estimate of their require-

1. J141 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: CINCPAC Support of Regional Interagency Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Center.
ments for civilian specialist support and attendance at the MACV training course for prospective team leaders.¹

(U) As a result of these evaluations, a pilot DEFT program of about six months duration was planned for the Philippines. A message to the JCS requested that arrangements be made with DASD (H&E)/DAA to provide two civilian ex-addicts for the program in accordance with the procedures in being for the support of MACV DEFTs. Personnel were requested to be in-country by 1 April 1972.²

(U) CINCPAC subsequently was notified that the proposed pilot project to evaluate the MACV DEFT concept in the Philippines had been cancelled. Arrangements had been made for the ex-addicts; however, the Navy declined the request to fund the project in preference to its structured education and rehabilitation CARE centers.³ In a JCS message on 11 April 1972, it was stated that the Navy did not desire to employ civilian education specialists sponsored by the National Council for the Prevention of Drug Abuse.⁴

(U) In November, COMUSMACV announced that the two DEFTs in RVN would be disbanded in December. MACV recommended retention of the DEFT capability within PACOM and indicated a high regard for the DEFT concept.

(U) A CINCPAC message on 8 November requested JCS to authorize the transfer of the two MACV DEFTs to COMUSMACTHAI for use in Thailand and other commands in PACOM as required. The message further requested that OSD negotiate a one year contract with Teen Challenge to provide the civilian ex-addict membership to the teams.⁵ The JCS approved the CINCPAC request and DASD (H&E) obtained funds for the first six months of 1973 to provide the four civilian ex-addicts. Funds for the remaining six months of 1973 were requested by DOD.⁶ The teams in Thailand were each composed of one officer, two enlisted instructors, and two civilians.⁷

Drug Abuse Problem Among Dependents in Bangkok

(U) Between September 1971 and April 1972, U.S. Mission elements in Bangkok became increasingly aware that the misuse of drugs by students at the Intern-

1. CINCPAC 220332Z Jan 72.
2. CINCPAC 170325Z Feb 72.
4. JCS 5990/112223Z Apr 72.
5. J14 HistSum Nov 72, citing COMUSMACV 060810Z Nov 72 and CINCPAC 082027Z Nov 72.
6. J14 HistSum Nov 72, citing JCS 222111Z Nov 72 and SECDEF 242258Z Nov 72.
national School Bangkok (ISB) had taken a serious turn for the worse. During this period, clinical psychiatrists from the 5th Field Hospital saw approximately 125 students from the junior and senior high schools for various emotional problems. From January to April 1972, psychiatrists saw approximately 90 students; more than half had used heroin.

The situation received considerable local publicity, spurred by the death of a 16 year old girl (MACTHAI dependent) in April 1972, which probably occurred from a drug overdose. In FY 72, there were four other unexplained student deaths; three were USG dependents.

All agencies adopted a firm approach where heroin was involved; this resulted in removal of the user from Thailand in most cases where evidence of usage of the drug was confirmed. The Mission policy was based on the concept of the individual's welfare and best interest—not as a disciplinary measure.

ISB recognized the gravity of the problem and believed that their procedure combining education and counseling and disciplinary action when necessary to be the best approach. The school used the curriculum guide by Stanford which was nationally recognized in the U.S. for its practical approach to the problem. There were frequent briefings by experts at meetings attended by both students and parents. There was close collaboration between the ISB and both the U.S. Army Hospital and the psychiatrist at the SEATO Laboratory in Bangkok.

On 23 June, CINCPAC sent a letter to all commands highlighting the findings of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse concerning drug abuse among teenagers and recommending a community involvement approach to the problem.

On 5 August, CINCPAC recommended that the Service Departments establish procedures to screen personnel and their families prior to selection for an accompanied tour in Thailand. CINCPAC also recommended that each family selected for assignment be provided with facts on the pitfalls that await them in Thailand. COMUSMACV was tasked to provide the Service Departments with an appropriate information pamphlet to satisfy this requirement. A pamphlet, "The Drug Abuse Problem Among Dependents in Thailand," was subsequently prepared by COMUSMACV to alert Thailand bound military personnel of environmental hazards.

A COMUSMACV Drug Education Field Team (DEFT) was utilized by MACTHAI during 15-21 August and 5-18 September 1972. The team made presentations to groups from all Services, and to numerous dependent youth and adult groups. The DEFT was met with overwhelming enthusiasm in each case.

A Teen Involvement Program (TIP) training session was conducted at Clark AFB in September 1972. ISB sent senior high school students to this...
training as did other international schools in Manila, Taipei, and Hong Kong. The TIP consisted of training selected teachers and senior high school students to be counselors and discussion leaders for elementary and intermediate school student groups.

(Ê) On 7 October 1972, the Secretary of State forwarded a message to the American Embassy in Bangkok outlining guidelines for voluntary dependent urinalysis testing at four schools (Bangkok, Clark AFB, Subic Naval Station, and Frankfurt, Germany). The message requested the American Embassy in Bangkok to forward a formal application for institution of the program.¹

Thai Trawlers Involved in Narcotics Smuggling (S)

"Vagabond Clipper" (U)

(S) Thai fishing trawlers are used by international narcotics traffickers for smuggling opium, morphine base, and heroin. Morphine base and opium are carried in these trawlers from Thailand to Hong Kong. Heroin and prepared opium destined for Saigon are transported to a point off the west coast of RVN for transfer to Vietnamese fishing vessels.²

(S) Since January 1971, CINCPAC had supported the surveillance of suspect Thai trawlers as an adjunct of MARKET TIME operations. On occasion, COMSEVENTHFLT had initiated dedicated search missions; however, over a period of time, visual acquisition and surveillance procedures had not been remunerative; i.e., only one confirmed sighting resulted from 16 requests for surveillance during CY 72.

(S) The program's progress was hindered by a lack of centralized direction and control. For example, the BNDD headquarters in Washington, D.C. requested CINCPAC assistance in obtaining information about coastal surveillance radars in Southeast Asia. After providing the requested information through COMUSMACTHAI and requesting that MACTHAI effect liaison with the BNDD office in Bangkok, CINCPAC was informed in COMUSMACTHAI 010420Z May 72 that the "Local BNDD agent was not fully informed concerning subject project."³

(S) On 12 June 1972, the Secretary of State promulgated a joint interdictory plan which designated the American Embassy in Bangkok as the overall

2. J14 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: Thai Trawlers Involved in Narcotics Smuggling (S), "Vagabond Clipper" (U).
coordinator of the effort and indicated that CINCPAC, or his designated representative, would make the final decision as to whether U.S. military assets would be used in the tracking operation. Implementation of the plan was heavily dependent upon the installation of an electrical transmitter on the trawler.

CINCPAC recommended, several times, that the American Embassy in Bangkok convene a meeting of all concerned commands and agencies to develop a detailed implementing plan. These recommendations were ignored.

On 5 August, CINCPAC was advised by the Embassy that the S. Pitak Charoen (a known smuggling trawler) was expected to depart Thailand on 9 August
with a BNDD installed transmitter. CINCPAC requested that MACV conduct sur-
veillance to track this trawler and requested that CINCPACFLT be prepared to
assist. After expending many flying hours to locate the S. Pitak Charoen
along the south coast of Vietnam, CINCPAC was advised that the vessel had
never left the Gulf of Siam. The vessel had broken down and had been towed
to an anchorage on the Isthmus of Kra.

(S) Subsequent to the unsuccessful attempt to locate and interdict the
S. Pitak Charoen, CINCPAC dispatched a message to the American Embassy in
Bangkok reviewing previous CINCPAC recommendations and indicating that CINCPAC
was not willing to continue support of the Thai trawler interdiction effort
until a detailed surveillance and interdiction plan was developed and fully
coordinated with CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV. In response to this
message, the American Embassy in Saigon indicated that future coordination of
the effort would be accomplished by its staff and COMUSMACV, and agreed that
a meeting of all concerned commands and agencies to develop detailed plans
would be beneficial. One meeting with partial representation was held on 31
August, and a meeting of all concerned commands and agencies was scheduled
for mid-September. In the interim, prior to development of a formal operations
plan, CINCPAC, in response to a COMUSMACV request, authorized MACV to support
Vagabond Clipper missions.¹

(S) During the September meeting held by the Embassy in Saigon and COMUS-
MACV, Deputy Ambassador Whitehouse assumed responsibility for coordination of
all future efforts to track and interdict Thai vessels smuggling narcotics. A
detailed surveillance plan was developed during the meeting.

(S) However, the plan was limited geographically by the range of the EC-47
aircraft and the assets of the VNN. In addition, when MACV EC-47 assets were
turned over to the VNAF, other reconnaissance platforms would be required.
Conferees at the meeting believed the most desirable platform would be the
Navy P-3 aircraft, but problems of radio frequencies and operational priorities
had to be resolved.²

(S) On 2 November, the American Embassy in Bangkok advised CINCPAC that
the BNDD, Bangkok had an electronic device ready for testing by P-3 aircraft.
CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to select a site and date for testing the device.
On 25 November, CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to provide on a priority basis
a concept plan for interdiction of Thai trawlers carrying narcotics.³

1. J14 HistSum Sep 72.
2. J14 HistSum Sep 72 and J381 Memorandum 0084-72, 18 Sep 72, Subj: Vagabond
   Clipper Conference Trip Report.

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Aerial Photographic Detection of Marihuana Growing Areas

(1) In response to a request by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC started an investigation of the feasibility of detecting large marihuana growths using black and white infrared film in a multispectral camera.

(2) On 26 November 1971, COMUSMACV requested deployment of the 12S multiband camera to RVN for use as a marihuana aerial detection system to aid in the drug suppression program. This action was a direct result of contact between the MACV Provost Marshal, Drug Suppression Division, and Dr. Joseph Lintz, Geology Department, University of Nevada. Dr. Lintz had previously used the 12S equipment in aerial detection of marihuana for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in California.

(3) CINCPAC representatives subsequently visited the International Imaging Systems Company, Mountain View, California for a briefing and demonstration of the capabilities of the 12S multiband camera and the associated 12S viewers. It was CINCPAC and Dr. Lintz's opinion that the project was feasible and that it might also be possible to develop a photo interpretation key and procedure for military photo interpreters using the 12S viewers.

(4) From 12-18 February 1972, test film was flown by Fleet Air Recon Squadron One (VQ-1), covering areas in RVN, using an 12S camera on loan from the Naval Research Laboratory. In order to obtain ground truth confirmation, CINCPAC requested that MACV provide grid coordinates; however, the tactical situation in Military Region 4 precluded obtaining this information, and the growth cycle was completed during the first week in May.

(5) Despite these temporary setbacks, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV continued the project, due primarily to the potential suppression application to other areas within the PACOM, e.g., Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. COMUSMACV agreed to continue the funding, and military representatives met with Dr. Lintz at the NASA/AMES Research Facility, Moffett Naval Air Station during the period 5-9 June to continue the study.

(6) The results of the film evaluation were limited due to under-exposure and the small scale of the VQ-1 film; however, sufficient results were obtained during the evaluation to indicate that the applicability of this equipment in locating marihuana or opium crops was greater than that of color, infra-red, or black and white film systems in existence. Specifically, several probable marihuana growths were identified on the film using physical plant characteristics as a guide. Lack of ground truth before or after the evaluation seriously hampered any clear-cut identification of marihuana. However, the feasibility of
using the multi-spectral system to identify marihuana was demonstrated within the limitations imposed by the underexposed film and the lack of ground truth.

(3) On 8 August 1972, CINCPAC forwarded a letter to the JCS advising them of the status of this project and requesting approval for continuing efforts. Upon JCS approval on 9 September, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to develop a marihuana field for aerial photography/ground truth evaluation. On 26 September, COMUSMACV stated that marihuana growths were at the lowest ebb of the past five years and that development of a field was considered counterproductive. MACV recommended that other PACOM or CONUS areas be considered for the ongoing study.1

(3) In December the CSAF advised CINCPAC that the USAF was conducting a project to photograph and identify marihuana fields. The USAF was to obtain ground truth data and attempt to determine the spectral signature of the crop for the BND. The USAF was requested to provide CINCPAC with a copy of the test results.2

Drug Traffic in Burma

(3) Of the opium producing countries of Southeast Asia, Burma is the most formidable opium traffic threat. More opium is produced in Burma than in her neighbors to the east. It has only been recently that the Burmese government has shown a willingness or capability to counter the threat. The problem centers on the relative impunity with which raw and cooked opium and morphine are moved to and across the border into Thailand and Laos. The mountainous terrain and jungles of northeastern Burma make control and suppression extremely difficult. Approaching the border, lines of communication (LOC) reduce to mountain paths, and Burmese regular forces are so thinly deployed that they can hardly protect the LOCs of the area.

(3) Burmese officials have admitted openly that the government has no effective control over the area east of the Salween River. Added to the terrain problem is the fact that several well-led and well-armed insurgent and Chinese ethnic groups protect the opium-bearing mule caravans. Involvement of these groups brings money which buys their arms.3

(3) In January 1972, Mr. Nelson Gross, State Department Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, suggested providing Burma with armed U.S. helicopters, photographic equipment, and weapons to interdict narcotics

2. J14 HistSum Dec 72; CSAF 182244Z Dec 72.
smugglers. CINCPAC supported the proposal and made several recommendations concerning equipment and funding.¹

During the period 1-8 April a team of U.S. personnel visited Burma to evaluate and discuss equipment for narcotics suppression with the Burmese. The team included a representative from the State Department, one from BNDD, one from CINCPAC, and one from USARV. At the first meeting on 3 April, it was evident that the Burmese expected much more equipment than the USG was willing to provide. The Burmese presentations at the meeting brought out that the narcotics traffic is controlled by seven to nine groups which also constitute the principal insurgent forces. The Burmese indicated vital concern with the narcotics traffic because the profits provide arms for the insurgents. However, the Burmese had never tasked the Air Force to interdict the narcotics traffic. The U.S. team determined after the meeting that a two-pronged approach was most appropriate: to convince the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) that initially it should improve the capabilities of its present fleet of aircraft and to request greater flexibility from Washington concerning the funds to be allocated to the program.

On 4 April the two military members of the U.S. team met with Burmese Air Force personnel and the next day visited two Air Force facilities to determine the status of maintenance and the operational considerations. It was determined that the Burmese possessed sufficient aviation assets to devote at least some aircraft to the detection and interdiction of narcotics traffic.

At the 5 and 7 April meetings with the Burmese, the U.S. team stressed the value of increasing the utilization of existing Burmese aircraft through the provisions of U.S. spare parts, minor items of equipment, and ammunition. The team pointedly inferred that the Burmese must take action against the narcotics traffic before the provision of new U.S. aircraft could be seriously considered. However, planning and preparation for the receipt of new aircraft should begin concurrent with the receipt of spare parts.

From the initial to the final discussions, the Burmese maintained that they could not afford to divert their available air assets to interdict narcotics traffic, and even after receiving additional spare parts for the existing fleet they still might not be able to divert assets. However, they would primarily use any new aircraft to suppress the narcotics traffic. At the close of the discussion, no compromise position had been reached.²

2. J14 HistSum Apr 72; J1/Memo 6065-72, 11 Apr 72, Subj: Report on Visit to Burma.
SECRET

(§) The CINCPAC representative of the team, J14, attended an inter-agency meeting in mid-April at the State Department in Washington, D.C., and assisted in drafting a message which would establish a U.S. position on equipment for the Burma narcotics program. The agreed position, submitted in draft, was that the USG would initially provide maximum assistance to the Burmese in obtaining repair parts for their current inventory of aircraft, and if the Burmese then seriously indicated an intent to interdict the narcotics trafficking, the U.S. would provide six new Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft. However, this recommended position was subsequently overridden by the Secretary of State in an apparent attempt to get a positive reaction from the Burmese.¹

(§) The USG program to provide Burma assistance progressed in May to the point of preliminary binding negotiations. The American Ambassador to Burma set the stage for presentation of the Secretary's proposal for six STOL aircraft and waited for proper authority prior to formally forwarding the USG proposal.²

(§) On 2 June, the JCS advised CINCPAC that DOD concurrence had been obtained to release all H-13 parts in storage on Okinawa to authorized customers. These parts had been identified by CINCPAC as potential assets to assist the GUB in upgrading its air assets.

(§) On 22 June, the American Embassy in Rangoon reported that the GUB had rejected the USG offer of equipment to assist in the interdiction of narcotics smuggling. The GUB did request that the Embassy continue to provide it with intelligence reports on narcotics trafficking. On 26 June, Mr. Gross visited GUB officials and asked that their decision be reconsidered. The Burmese Deputy Foreign Minister agreed to raise the issue with higher authority, but he personally felt it unlikely that the GUB would reverse its decision.³

(§) After a visit to Burma in August, United Nations International Narcotics Control Board President Sir Harry Greenfield reported that the government was increasingly aware of the need to act responsibly in the eyes of the international community and was making an effort in the areas of the country it controlled. He added, however, that the Burmese were extremely sensitive to foreign intervention of any kind, and particularly to American or seemingly American-inspired pressure. Burmese officials told the UN Board President that internally they were trying to combat actual and potential addiction by an educational effort, focusing on health, social, and morale rationale.⁴

¹ J14 HistSum May 72; SECSTATE 075611/012330Z May 72.
² J14 HistSum May 72; AMEMB Rangoon 1124/090522 Z May 72.
³ J14 HistSum Jun 72.
⁴ J14 HistSum Oct 72; J22/Memo/0489-72, 2 Oct 72, Subj: Drug Traffic.
Military Customs Activities

(U) As a means to reduce the threat of military personnel smuggling drugs into the United States from Southeast Asia and between countries within PACOM, CINCPAC initiated a military customs program in May 1971. The training portion of the program was completed on 30 September 1971 after more than 1,200 military customs officers had been trained and deployed to Thailand, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, Korea, Guam, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Philippines. On 23 March 1972, DOD Directive 5030.49R on customs inspection was promulgated. This directive gave the unified commands responsibility for implementing and enforcing the DOD customs program. CINCPAC extended the scope of the DOD Directive with CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3 which made provisions for intra-theater and inter-theater customs inspections of passengers, accompanied baggage, DOD sponsored cargo, mail, ships, aircraft, and personal property. Its purpose was to suppress the movement of contraband and controlled substances within the PACOM and to the United States. The CINCPAC instruction, titled "Customs Inspection Within the PACOM" was mailed to appropriate agencies in late April. It required PACOM Service commanders to develop information programs, enforce and implement appropriate customs inspection procedures, establish standards of performance, and promulgate implementing instructions by 21 June. Subordinate unified commanders and CINCPAC SSMRs were required to develop country-oriented civil/military customs programs, conduct training programs for military customs inspectors, coordinate in-country Service programs, fix a minimum percentage of personal property examinations, and publish implementing instructions by 21 July.¹

(Conf) A military customs training concept was proposed in April by CINCPAC to the JCS which envisioned the assignment of two full time Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents to PACOM. Operating on an area basis, the agents were to provide training assistance and advice to CINCPAC and subordinate commands. One would operate from Japan covering Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan. The other, based in Thailand, would cover Thailand, Guam, and the Philippines. The RVN would continue to be covered by the BOC advisors assigned to support the Joint Customs Group (JCG) and the Joint Narcotics Investigative Detachment.² On 19 May, OSD approved the CINCPAC proposal for BOC agents to be assigned to the PACOM and forwarded the proposal to the Commissioner of Customs.³ By the middle of August, after considerable discussion, a general agreement between the BOC, DA, and CINCPAC was reached on the assignment of three BOC advisors to the PACOM. One was assigned to Thailand, one to the Philippines, and one to Japan to assist

¹ J141 Point Paper, 6 Oct 72, Subj: Military Customs Activities Within the PACOM.
² J14 HistSum May 72.
³ J14 HistSum Jun 72.
and advise CINCPAC and subordinate commands. Pending final approval for the permanent assignment of these agents to PACOM, advisors were assigned on a temporary basis for a period of 90 days. 

A letter was sent on 7 July to Department of the Army, DOD executive agent for customs, recommending that COMUSMACV be authorized to continue the frisk search of all personnel departing the RVN. This search constituted an exception to the DOD regulation which authorized an examination of personnel only when there was probable cause that contraband might be concealed on a person. As part of the same action, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to continue the "wallet check" of departing personnel to insure compliance with command directives. The wallet check was considered outside the purview of a customs examination.

A team of four BOC operations officers and a CINCPAC representative conducted a joint survey training project at 39 PACOM installations during the period 1 September-24 October. The team evaluated customs procedures being used and conducted an intensified two-day training course for customs inspectors in each area visited. Upon conclusion of the project, on 10 November, a briefing at the Pentagon was presented to representatives of OSD, JCS, and the Services. The briefing reviewed the development of the PACOM military customs program, discussed the drug threat throughout the Pacific, and provided significant conclusions by customs functional areas as follows:

a. Postal. Service postal elements must increase the actual examination of parcel mail and insist on parcel mail identification procedures. It was recommended that postal workers be subjected to surprise urinalysis testing to reduce the chance of mail conspiracies to smuggle.

b. Passengers and accompanied baggage. The single biggest problem was the wide variance between air bases on the authority of security police to conduct frisk searches. At one base, security police were prohibited from conducting frisk searches. Other areas mentioned included the lack of "sterile" personnel processing areas and inadequate security of examined baggage.

c. Personal Property (unaccompanied hold baggage, household goods, private automobiles). Due to the magnitude of the inspection requirement, increased selectivity of inspection with respect to personnel and property, i.e., coordination with local service investigative elements and other drug intelligence sources, was recommended. A 100 percent examination of unaccompanied

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2. J14 HistSum Sep 72.
hold baggage was recommended because the majority of these shipments were being made by the drug susceptible population. Private automobiles were not receiving customs inspections anywhere in the Pacific.

d. Port Operations. Security, police, and inspection of personnel in DOD port areas in the Pacific was nonexistent. This was especially critical in source country ports (Newport, RVN; Sattahip, Thailand; Bangkok) and consumer areas such as Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Military Sealift Command should be particularly suspect of vessels in the nucleus fleet whose routing takes them repetitively into source areas. CINCPAC again recommended that Military Sealift Command crews and vessels, as a part of the Defense Transportation System, be susceptible to military customs inspection.

e. Operational Naval Vessels and Aircraft. Although regulations required customs inspection procedures for operational naval vessels and aircraft, naval station commanders had not taken steps to inspect naval crews as they transmitted onshore port areas. Shore-based inspection of crews was complicated in several areas: local national jurisdiction (Thailand), split port responsibility (Korea), and local national customs requirements (Japan). Several of the naval air stations were completely unaware of the intra-theater customs requirements.

f. Operational USAF Aircraft and Crews. Based on the available drug trafficking intelligence, hard drugs were being moved within the Pacific primarily by USAF crews and aircraft. A contributing factor was the lack of inspection procedures from departure air bases in source areas. Of the 10 air bases visited, only one had any type of aircraft/crew inspection procedure.

(U) The briefing also included general recommendations. First, for the military customs program to deter the would-be drug trafficker requires a centralized, multi-service, multi-functional approach. Therefore, sub-unified commands/SSMRs should have a customs officer with coordination authority. This staff officer must analyze the drug trafficking threat and direct the customs program to meet that threat. Second, the customs inspections which are most credible are those conducted by military customs inspecting officers with enforcement training under centralized direction and supervision such as the Joint Customs Group in RVN or Customs and Border Clearance Unit in Taiwan. Third, hard-hitting area-based information campaigns are an integral part of the customs program. These campaigns should be aimed at deterring the would-be amateur Service trafficker. Lastly, the three BOC advisors stationed in the Pacific are essential to the PACOM Military Customs Program.

Smuggling Drugs Into Korea

(U) COMUS Korea and OSD were particularly concerned about the potential threat of ROK forces importing drugs into Korea when returning from RVN. COMUSMACV received a request from COMUS Korea to establish customs procedures in coordination with ROK officials to provide for a customs inspection of ROK forces departing RVN. CINCPAC concurred with COMUS Korea's concern and requested COMUS Korea and COMUSMACV to keep him advised.1

Heroin Smuggling in Human Remains

(U) On 17 December 1972 the press reported that heroin had been sewn into human remains and the lining of caskets prior to departure from Southeast Asia. Some information regarding this specific case of narcotics smuggling was obtained from the Bureau of Customs in Washington and Honolulu. Although the news article may have exaggerated the smuggling attempt, the potential did exist and CINCPAC requested component commands to provide information on processing, preparation for transportation, and evacuation of military human remains. The requested information pertained to accountability, security, and customs inspection/certification procedures.2

Urinalysis Testing in RVN

(U) In May, COMUSMACV announced that a planned modification of the MACV urinalysis testing program would discontinue testing for individuals in grade E-6 and above except during surprise unit tests. This modification of the DERS (date eligible for return from overseas) testing policy in RVN was contrary to established DOD requirements; therefore, on 21 May, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to continue DERS testing for all military personnel pending the establishment of a date for revised DERS testing procedures for both RVN and Thailand.

(U) Comments from COMUSMACTHAI and component commanders were requested in a message on 24 May concerning a CINCPAC recommendation to support the MACV modification of DERS testing procedures after the 1 July implementation of the DOD random testing program. Based on statistics and the fact that all military personnel in RVN and Thailand would receive at least three random tests per year, the proposed recommendation restricted DERS testing in those countries to grade E-5 and below.3

2. J14 HistSum Dec 72, citing CINCPAC 222240Z Dec 72.
(U) After receiving replies to the aforementioned message, a recommendation to limit DEROS urine testing to grade E-5 and below was made to the JCS. On 20 June a JCS message to CINCPAC stated that OSD was actively considering an early reduction of DEROS testing on the basis of age and requested that no action be taken to reduce testing pending the OSD decision.1

(U) A 10 July memorandum from OASD (H&E) gave the Service Secretaries authority to direct the cessation of mandatory urinalysis testing after 1 August 1972 for military personnel 29 years of age or older.2

(5) The MACV withdrawal plan called for testing of all personnel under 29 years of age to cease at X + 20 days and the remainder would be tested at their new duty station. The CINCPAC position was that every effort be made to test all personnel under age 29 before departing RVN and that medical facilities should retain the capability to process this workload.3

Urinalysis Testing in Australia

(5) A request was received by CINCPAC on 30 June from the United States State Sending Office (USSSO) in Australia requesting that the requirement for urinalysis testing in Australia be held in abeyance pending an agreement with the Government of Australia (GOA). The request traced the efforts to obtain a GOA informal agreement to accommodate the drug amnesty/exemption programs and said that the Australian Attorney General was unwilling to enter into such an agreement. CINCPAC in a message to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF on 12 July outlined Australia's position, requested that pertinent Service implementing directives be reviewed in light of the situation, and requested comments/recommendations. Both commands concurred that testing should be postponed pending a USG-GOA agreement.4

(5) CINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense on 1 August that the random urinalysis program be held in abeyance in Australia pending an understanding with the GOA to accommodate the amnesty/exemption programs under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's recommendation in August 1972. The USSSO Canberra was notified of this decision and was requested to keep CINCPAC advised on the progress of negotiations.5

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2. J14 HistSum Aug 72 and OASD (H&E) Memo of 10 Jul 72, Subj: Change to Department of Defense Urinalysis Test Policy.
Criminal Activities of U.S. Retired Military Personnel

(8) In a message to the State Department on 17 December 1971, the American Embassy in Thailand addressed the problem of retired U.S. military personnel in Thailand being involved in activities which violated local laws. The Embassy stated that the number of such cases was increasing with the expanded activities of the BNDD and other drug traffic suppression measures of U.S. law enforcement units. The BNDD in Bangkok proposed to provide Thai police with evidence obtained by USG agencies for use in prosecuting drug offenders who were not active duty military personnel.

(8) The Embassy pointed out that the Thais were following a hard-line attitude toward narcotic offenders. The message said that even though the Uniform Code of Military Justice provided for court-martial jurisdiction over some retired military personnel, it was rarely exercised. Therefore, under this practice, offenses by retired personnel would apparently be handled by local courts. The Embassy did not feel it was consistent to ask Military Services in Thailand to provide bail, counsel, trial observers, and logistic services required by Service directives when the retired personnel were being prosecuted by local authorities at the instigation and with support of other USG agencies.

(8) The Embassy recommended that "retired military personnel be treated as other non-USG American citizens subject to local criminal prosecution receiving assistance and protection normally provided by consular officers." Further, retired personnel not members of U.S. military forces regularly stationed in Thailand should not be afforded the special benefits and safeguards sought for active duty personnel unless entitled to this assistance on a basis other than as a retired military member. The Embassy sought comments of the State Department and DOD. 1

(8) A joint State/DOD message concurred in the Embassy's recommendation and said that they would cooperate in exchanging information pertinent to alleged offenses by retired military personnel. The reply went on to say that State/DOD reserved the right to provide assistance or safeguards such as attorney fees, trial observer, etc. to such personnel in particular cases which State/DOD considered of extraordinary interest to the U.S. 2

Experimentation in Education and Identification Programs

(8) Briefings on drug abuse were presented to Dr. Jaffe, Director, Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention, and Dr. Brill, Special Assistant to

1. AMEMB Bangkok 16932/171054Z Dec 71.
2. SECSTATE 232 529/292158Z Dec 71.

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Dr. Jaffe, on 17 August by CINCPAC and the component commands. During the discussion period, Dr. Jaffe encouraged the component commands to experiment in their education and identification programs. The Chairman of the PACOM Drug Abuse Control Subcommittee explained to Dr. Jaffe that the Services were still reaching out and searching for new and improved procedures. Further, the point had not been reached where the Services could afford to evaluate the success of their programs by experimentation with various groups and procedures. ¹

(§) The Chairman's response to Dr. Jaffe's proposal was supported by Dr. Wilbur, ASD (H&E), during a visit to PACOM on 28 August. Dr. Wilbur discussed Dr. Jaffe's desire that military commands experiment with various modalities in the prevention and treatment of drug abuse and thereby assist in the development of programs that could benefit the civilian society. Dr. Wilbur said that although DOD was cooperating with Dr. Jaffe's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, Secretary Laird would not allow any experimentation with U.S. service personnel. ²

Aeromedical Evacuation of Drug Abuse Patients

(§) The Military Airlift Command (MAC) required drug abuse medical evacuation patients to have a negative urinalysis before departure for CONUS. CINCPACAF advised MAC that the negative urine test requirement created a hardship in PACOM because of the time involved in obtaining test results. In a message on 8 December 1972 to MAC, CINCPACAF said that the attending physician was responsible for determining the need for and the adequacy of patient detoxification. CINCPACAF proposed that originating medical facilities be authorized to medically evacuate detoxified patients based on a clinical observation, or a negative urinalysis test, and if other factors dictated movement of the patient prior to adequate detoxification, the patient should be classified and moved as an IB-litter case and sedated. MAC concurred with CINCPACAF's proposal. ³

2. J14 HistSum Sep 72.
3. J14 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPACAF 080054Z Dec 72; MAC 112115Z Dec 72.
SECTION II--REST AND RECUPERATION (R&R) AND LEAVE PROGRAMS

Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program

(5) The PACOM R&R program began in February 1962 when the JCS requested CINCPAC to develop a program of rest and recuperation for personnel stationed in the RVN. Initially conducted at in-country sites, the program progressed to out-of-country locations, using military aircraft, on a leave basis. In 1964, one R&R period not charged as leave during each 12-month RVN tour was authorized. The program reached its peak at the end of 1967, with military personnel in the RVN and other nearby areas being offered R&R in Hong Kong, Bangkok, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei, Tokyo, Manila, Sydney, Honolulu and, for servicemen of Guamanian origin, Guam. With the cutback of U.S. troop strength in the RVN, certain R&R sites were closed. By the end of 1971, the sites remaining were Hawaii, Bangkok, Taipei, and Sydney. For the month of December 1971, a total of 9,804 U.S. and 917 Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) personnel participated in the R&R program. In December 1970, the totals were 20,645 U.S. and 1,768 FWMAF.

(U) As a result of the reduced R&R program, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS on 28 August 1971 that the Sydney R&R site be closed on or about 1 January 1972. Approval of the proposal was received from JCS on 26 October. The last R&R flight departed Sydney on 6 January 1972. In recognition of the Australian support of the R&R program, an awards ceremony was conducted on 21 January in Sydney. The ceremony was attended by the CINCPAC Chief of Staff and J1, the U.S. Ambassador, a representative of COMUSMACV, CINCPACREP PHIL, American Counsel in Sydney, officials and dignitaries of the Government of Australia (GOA), and individuals receiving awards. The awards presented to individuals and organizations were Certificates of Merit by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, CINCPAC plaques, letters to individual families throughout Australia and a letter signed by CINCPAC and the American Ambassador to the people of Australia. Following the ceremony, a reception was given by the U.S. for the recipients of awards and officials of Australia. The final audit, close out of records, and transfer of detachment personnel were completed on 12 February 1972, officially closing the R&R Center after four years of operation.

2. J312 HistSum Jan 72.
5. J312 HistSum Jan 72.
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Closing of the Bangkok and Taipei R&R sites by 1 April 1972 was proposed by COMUSMACV in August 1971. In January 1972, COMUSMACV said that experience had proven that optimum participation to R&R sites had been achieved after official announcement of that particular site's impending closure and requested of CINCPAC an early determination of closure dates for the Bangkok and Taipei sites.

While CINCPAC concurred with the continued planning for R&R site closures, it deferred concurrence in closing additional sites until U.S. troop strength in Southeast Asia did not support the R&R site or until the economic feasibility of site operations and flights to and from the site dictated closing. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that necessary action be set in motion to secure approval for closing the sites at Taipei and Bangkok, and that CINCPAC be delegated the authority for selection and announcement of the exact closing dates.

A CINCPAC message on 19 January informed the JCS that CINCPAC and MACV had concluded that the date for closing the Taipei site should be no later than 1 April based on the low utilization of R&R aircraft seats. During the period 1 October 1971 - 15 January 1972 the utilization rate was only 53.6 percent. The predicted impact of the redeployment was also a factor in arriving at this position. CINCPAC also recommended that negotiations for obtaining approval for closing the Bangkok site be completed by 1 April, and again requested CINCPAC be delegated authority to establish the exact date. The JCS notified CINCPAC in late February of OSD's approval for closing the Taipei site on 1 April, and delegated authority to CINCPAC to establish the closing date for Bangkok. Taipei was officially closed as an R&R site on 5 April.

In January 1972, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that an R&R program from RVN to the Philippines be established for approximately 40 persons a month. Those eligible for the Philippines R&R would consist of U.S. military and civilian DOD/State Department personnel stationed in the RVN who were either Philippine nationals or who had dependents residing in the Philippines. CINCPAC concurred in the proposal and requested the American Embassy in Manila to secure the Philippines' approval. The reaction of the Embassy to the proposal was strongly negative; among reasons cited for the Embassy's reaction was that it objected to arrangements intended to facilitate regular trips to the Philippines by Service members for the purpose of visiting unsponsored dependents. The Embassy said that large numbers of unsponsored dependents

1. J112 HistSum Jan 72; CINCPAC 140442Z Jan 72.
2. J112 HistSum Jan 72; CINCPAC 190414Z Jan 72.
created problems for all elements of the USG, particularly the U.S. military commanders which cannot support them; therefore, the Embassy wished to continue to discourage the travel of such persons to the Philippines.1

(U) In anticipation of a possible cease-fire in RVN, CINCPAC queried COMUSMACV in early December for recommendations regarding the R&R program for post X Day. An answer was requested by 2 January 1973.2

Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML)

(U) In 1967 CINCPAC established a general policy, implementing Service directives, for a program of Environmental and Morale Leave (E&ML) under which eligible DOD military and civilian personnel and their dependents stationed at designated PACOM overseas bases could be provided space available transportation on military aircraft for leave purposes. This program did not apply to personnel stationed in RVN who were covered by the R&R and similar programs.3

(U) The ODRP/Islamabad recommended to CINCPAC on 31 January 1972 that personnel in Pakistan eligible for E&ML be authorized to visit those locations contained in paragraph 6 of STRICOM Directive 600-3, 15 April 1968 and in addition, Bangkok and the Philippines.4 CINCPAC's response to the ODRPs in Islamabad and New Delhi was that travel is authorized to specified places rather than countries, and that travel for other than E&ML purposes via military aircraft was covered in departmental directives of the Services. Authority was granted to issue E&ML orders to eligible personnel for travel to Bangkok, Manila, Taipei, and Torrejon, Spain.5

(U) CINCPACREP Philippines recommended to CINCPAC in February that Singapore be approved as an E&ML destination based upon the possibility of a limited number of space available seats on a newly established Clark Air Base-Singapore channel. The new MAC channel had been established primarily for cargo hauling and it was expected that space available seats would be infrequent and extremely limited. In view of the lack of seats and the implied intent of Service directives to provide a reasonable possibility for E&ML travel to designated locations, CINCPAC disapproved the request.6

2. J112 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 090219Z Dec 72.
5. J112 HistSum Feb 72; CINCPAC 292023Z Feb 72.

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(U) In March 1972, COMUS Japan forwarded correspondence to CINCPAC recommending approval of a request to authorize E&ML travel to Taipei and Okinawa for personnel stationed at Misawa Air Base, Chitose Air Station, and Wakkani Air Station, Japan. The request pointed out that Hong Kong was the only authorized E&ML site, and since the mission flights to Hong Kong had been deleted, personnel from these bases were unable to realize the benefits of travel under the E&ML Program. CINCPAC approved the request on 21 March.¹

(U) In response to a JCS request for data to be used in evaluating a space-required versus a space-available E&ML Program, CINCPAC provided to the JCS a recommended list of qualifying E&ML origin points, proposed cities to which E&ML travel would be authorized, and the estimated travel costs by service. A summary of annual estimated costs by Service was:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$197,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2,884,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,011,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,018,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,217,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) A review of the principles and practice of the E&ML Program by CINCPAC revealed an apparent need to modify the travel entitlements to serve the DOD population more equitably. In September, it was recommended to the JCS that the existing E&ML policy be changed to authorize, as originating stations, only those locations which qualified as "adverse environments" by virtue of qualification for post differential payments to U.S. civilian employees. Additionally, it was recommended that a priority system be established to allocate space-available aircraft seats first to military personnel and their dependents, second to DOD civilian employees and their dependents, and third to USG (non-DOD) civilian employees and their dependents.³

1. J112 HistSum Mar 72; COMUS JAPAN ltr of 10 Mar 72 w/attachments, Subj: Environmental and Morale Leave Program; CINCPAC 211927Z Mar 72.
2. J112 HistSum Apr 72; JCS 8781/092015Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 160001Z Apr 72.
3. J113 HistSum Sep 72; CINCPAC 230409Z Sep 72.

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SECTION III--PRISONERS OF WAR

Enemy Prisoners of War

(ο) A DOD message to CINCPAC on 18 February 1972 expressed the Secretary of Defense's concern that the failure of the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) to accord prisoner of war status to NVA/VC personnel captured by the Cambodians could seriously jeopardize the welfare of American prisoners held by the enemy in Cambodia and other areas of Southeast Asia. CINCPAC was requested to stress in contacts with the GKR military and other officials the importance to Cambodians and the U.S. that the GKR comply with the Geneva Conventions. As a result of the DOD message, CINCPAC sent a message to COMUSMACV and CHMEDTC, where he pointed out that the impact of GKR non-application of the Geneva Conventions concerning PWs to enemy personnel could have wide effects in view of precedents established in the RVN. COMUSMACV was requested to assist CHMEDTC, through military contacts with Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK), in explaining the background and rationale behind the U.S. and GVN approach to granting PW status to NVA and VC personnel captured in the RVN.

(ο) On 29 February, a message to CINCPAC from the MEDTC in Phnom Penh said that the Embassy also shared the concern on PW status, and to obtain a clearer picture of GKR policies and actions, the Ambassador through the vehicle of the weekly FANK/Embassy Briefing Conference (FEBC) had requested specifics on PW status. The agenda items scheduled for the 1 March FEBC meeting included: (a) a list of war prisoners--VC/NVA, KVC, (b) measures taken at their capture, and (c) their present condition. The message said that the Embassy was pursuing with the GKR the question of applicability of the Geneva Convention to Cambodia, and that MAJ GEN Sak Sutsakhan had indicated that the two prisoners who had recently been condemned to death would not be executed.1

(ο) In mid-March the Chairman of the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense desired that he personally intervene with Premier Lon Nol concerning the GKR non-adherence with the Geneva PW Convention.2 In response to the message, CINCPAC dispatched a personal message to Premier Lon Nol via the American Ambassador in Phnom Penh.3 In addition, the Chief MEDTC was requested to advise CINCPAC of progress in the efforts to convince FANK of the

2. CJCS 190213Z Mar 72 (EX).
3. CINCPAC Airborne 200710Z Mar 72 (EX).
importance of compliance with the Geneva PW Convention. A message from the State Department on 27 March said that Ambassador Swank had delivered CINCPAC's personal message to Premier Lon Nol and that it had produced positive results.1

An attempted suicide by a NVN PW was reported by COMUSMACV on 28 May. This behavior was attributed to disillusionment by the PW when he learned that as an NVN PW he could not be released within the RVN. CINCPAC drafted a proposed message to the JCS in which he proposed that the policy of advising the GVN to reject NVN PW candidates for New Life release be broached with the Secretary of Defense for possible reconsideration. The rationale was that since the Geneva Conventions were based upon humanitarian considerations to include concern for alleviating the plight of individuals made victims of war, the continued incarceration of prisoners after the need for such action no longer existed appeared to be contrary to the basic thrust of the Geneva PW Convention. In the case of the subject PW, he could not be released in the South and, because of his cooperation with the GVN, could not safely return to NVN. This situation could not be characterized as humanitarian. The draft message also discussed the custodial problem inherent in this situation. The custodial problems at Phu Quoc were already sufficiently acute without exacerbating them with the exclusion of NVN PWs from the humanitarian release possibilities which were fully available to VC PW held in the same camps. The draft message was sent to COMUSMACV for comment.2

The response from COMUSMACV agreed that the current policy was damaging from a custodial and humanitarian standpoint; however, higher level considerations were advanced. Since the COMUSMACV response was not positive enough to support a message to the JCS proposing a policy change the action was held in abeyance for possible future action.3

U.S. Prisoners of War

Until late in 1969, the Services had called their processing programs for recovered U.S. PWs and other detained personnel by different names. On 17 December 1969, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the nickname EGRESS RECAP had been assigned to the repatriation program and would be used for all material associated with the processing of U.S. military personnel. This nickname was to be changed to COMING on 8 January 1973.4

CINCPAC representatives participated in a DOD EGRESS RECAP Conference.

1. CINCPAC 210340Z Mar 72; SECSTATE 051639/270404Z Mar 72.
2. J111 HistSum May 72; COMUSMACV 200341Z May 72; CINCPAC 032233Z Jun 72.
at the Pentagon 19-21 January 1972. A CINCPAC EGRESS RECAP Conference of PACOM representatives was held at CINCPAC on 14-17 January just prior to the DOD Conference. The CINCPAC presentation at the DOD reflected the detailed planning and the complete outline summary of significant problem areas to be resolved. A major issue which arose at the conference was a proposal by Dr. Wilbur, ASD (H&E), to extend in-theater EGRESS RECAP processing to 14 days versus the 36-72 hour DOD guideline policy. CINCPAC representatives understood that the 14-day in-theater processing time was fixed and provided for few exceptions. They were asked to comment on the proposal on several occasions, and in each case the response was the same. CINCPAC plans were centered on the 36-72 hour DOD policy, and commanders were prepared to live with this policy, believing that it had sufficient built-in flexibility to expand or compress the time required for processing as dictated by personal or medical considerations. Further, significantly changing the DOD time guideline would require a complete revision of all PACOM plans. This would take several months for planning lead time. Also, since other DOD policies were predicated on the 36-72 hour guideline, every policy would have to be considered for possible amendment. This might take months to complete.

(U) As a result of the CINCPAC and DOD EGRESS RECAP Conferences in January, additional EGRESS RECAP planning/policy guidance was issued pending a revision of CINCPACINST C3461.1B. The DOD Conference also revealed a problem concerning significant differences in personnel files maintained by PACOM Service component commanders for use in processing returnees under EGRESS RECAP procedures. The JCS were taking action to develop uniform content requirements for Service files. A CINCPAC message on 11 February pointed out the concern of CINCPAC and PACOM component commanders regarding EGRESS RECAP personnel files being up-to-date and of a prescribed format. Since plans could not be formulated for any necessary restructuring and ongoing maintenance of files without specific guidance as to a uniform content, CINCPAC stated that it was a matter of great urgency to get the JCS guidance, and that to meet CINCPAC's goal to have personnel processing files up-to-date by 1 May a resolution at the Washington level should be completed by the end of February.

(U) On 7 March, the JCS notified CINCPAC and the Services that a review had been conducted of EGRESS RECAP personnel processing files and that a standardized content had been established. Processing files were to contain two sections, the personal section which would be given to the returnee for his information, and the personnel section which would be used by the parent

1. J111 HistSum Jan 72; J1/Memo/026-72, COL Sapp, J1, to Admiral McCain, 26 Jan 72, Subj: DOD Conference on Processing of Formerly Captured U.S. Personnel (EGRESS RECAP).
2. J111 HistSum Feb 72; CINCPAC 110321Z Feb 72.
Service personnel responsible for processing their respective returnees at the processing site. As a minimum, contents of the files were to be reviewed each quarter. Files were to be standardized on a priority basis for known PWs followed by standardization of files for MIA personnel.

(U) In March, CINCPAC addressed a potential problem of the initial report of recovery of captured or missing U.S. personnel. A substantial release or repatriation of captured or missing U.S. personnel might unnecessarily burden communications from the initial point of recovery or the initial processing point because of reports required in both unified and Service casualty channels which tended to overlap. The intense interest of higher authorities and the U.S. public dictated a need for a consistent and unified approach toward initial reporting. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that concurrence and/or comments be obtained from the Services concerning a format for an initial FLASH precedence report of recovery of captured/missing U.S. personnel. The JCS informed CINCPAC on 22 March that the Services and the DOD PW/MIA Task Force concurred with the proposed message format with only minor modifications.

(5) Since a requirement might exist to process a large number of returnees concurrently with a resulting heavy load of electrical message traffic, particularly with regard to IMMEDIATE or higher precedence debriefing reports, CINCPAC promulgated Address Indicator Group (AIG) 7819 for this purpose. Authority to originate messages to AIG 7819 was restricted to CINCPAC; Commanding General, U.S. Army Base Command Okinawa (USARBCO); Commander 13th AF; and CINCPACREP Guam/TTP. Use of AIG 7819 was restricted to EGRESS RECAP debriefing reports and was not to be used for EGRESS RECAP messages on other subjects. The casualty related aspects of the contents of reports under the AIG would make them extremely sensitive and required close control of the contents pending appropriate action by Service casualty and other agencies in Washington.

(6) A change in CINCPAC's policy guidance on EGRESS RECAP, CINCPACINST 3461.1B, was proposed by CINCPACFLT on 25 March. CINCPACFLT recommended that each returnee be evaluated by a psychiatrist prior to his return to CONUS. CINCPAC's instruction called for the physician who performed the physical examination to make the initial psychological condition evaluation, and to request consultations with a psychiatrist when he deemed it appropriate. CINCPACFLT's rationale was that a review of the psychological condition of previous returnees from Oriental PW camps and current medical intelligence indicated a high incidence of psychological morbidity in EGRESS RECAP. Further,

1. JCS 6711/072346Z Mar 72.
such mental conditions probably would not be readily recognized by a non-psychiatric-oriented physician. CINCPACFLT stated that an evaluation would be required to determine to what extent and at what rate each returnee could once again accept social pressures, and that every effort should be made for a more complete psychiatric evaluation at the Central Processing Center prior to the entry of the returnee into the CONUS Medevac System. The proposal also recommended that if there was concurrence of the concept of psychiatric assessment, that a ratio of one psychiatrist per 15 returnees would be more realistic than one per 50 returnees called for in the CINCPAC Instruction.¹

(U) CINCPAC requested the other PACOM component commanders to comment on CINCPACFLT's proposal. CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACREP Ryukyu expressed support for CINCPAC's policy guidance while the Commanding General FMFPAC supported the ratio proposed by CINCPACFLT. On 8 April, CINCPAC notified component commanders that the previous CINCPAC guidance on psychiatric evaluations would pertain. Rationale for this decision was that CINCPAC EGRESS RECAP guidance was based on established DOD policy that medical processing of returnees outside of CONUS should be limited to determining whether the returnee could be promptly aeromedically evacuated to CONUS. Under this policy, CINCPAC did not consider it appropriate to subject each returnee to a formal psychiatric evaluation prior to his onward movement unless such attention was deemed advisable in individual cases. Recognizing that a psychiatric evaluation was desirable before releasing returnees from medical channels, CINCPAC, as a general policy, felt it would seem more appropriate for this evaluation to be conducted at the appropriate Service hospital in CONUS. There the evaluation could be conducted over a longer time as an integral part of the overall adjustment of the individual.²

(E) On 24 April, Rear Admiral Epes, Director of the Pw/MIA Task Force in ASD/ISA, indicated, during a call on Admiral McCain, that issuance of a new medical processing policy for EGRESS RECAP was a distinct possibility. The medical requirements being contemplated would require at least two weeks of hospitalization in the PACOM in the case of each returnee. Because of the unsettling effect that such news could have on the effectiveness of planning, Admiral McCain released a message to the CJCS asking that the matter be resolved on a definitive basis and recommending that medical processing in PACOM permit the prompt evacuation of returnees to CONUS. The CJCS subsequently signalled his agreement with CINCPAC and indicated that the Secretary of Defense would be asked for resolution in the near future.³

1. J111 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPACFLT NO 3461/252237Z Mar 72.
2. J114 Hist Sum Apr 72; CINCPAC 080446Z Apr 72.
3. J11 HistSum Apr 72, citing CINCPAC 270259Z Apr 72 (EX) and JCS 8169/011320Z May 72 (EX).
CONCERNING

New policy guidance concerning medical processing of returnees was outlined in a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense on 16 May. The new policy was further amplified by a message from the JCS. CINCPAC's initial estimate of the time required for processing at the PACOM Joint Central Processing Center (JCPC) complying with the new guidance was a median of about six days. The increase in processing time caused a decrease in the maximum number of returnees who could be concurrently accommodated and processed by any one JCPC (from 400 to about 200). Based upon the processing time estimates where 93 percent of the returnees would be evacuated to CONUS between arrival plus four days to arrival plus eight days, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that family members be discouraged by the services from traveling to the JCPC unless compelling circumstances prevailed or unless the JCPC reported that a specific returnee would be in processing/treatment for 10 or more days and the presence of the family member was considered desirable. This precluded the possibility that the family member might arrive at the JCPC too late to be reunited with the returnee before his onward evacuation.

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that three phases for EGRESS RECAP be officially recognized:
- Phase I - Initial recovery/reception.
- Phase II - Unified processing at PACOM JCPC including processing outlined by Secretary of Defense memorandum of 16 May.
- Phase III - Service processing at designated hospitals in the USA.

Using this phasing, CINCPAC policy/procedural guidance was restricted to Phase I and II processing with the necessary interfaces into Phase III. Service publications were restricted largely to Phase III considerations. CINCPAC was prepared to accommodate Service requirements in Phase I and II via direct coordination or through the PACOM Service component commands. This concept was designed to reduce excessive duplication, overlap, and confusion in the various levels of EGRESS RECAP plans and guidance.

The expanded requirements for medical and psychiatric evaluation and treatment prompted the CG, USARBCO to send CINCPAC an impact statement. Included among the points raised was that medical facilities would only accommodate 200 returnees at one time versus the 400 or more that might be expected with the extended period of time. Two of the new tests required the laboratory services at Camp Zama, Japan; telephonic results provided results within seven days. Additionally, an augmentation of 40 military policemen was required to provide security. CGUSARBCO recommended that planning be reoriented along Service lines since an activation of more than one site was highly probable.

The recommendation envisioned processing Army and Marine returnees on Okinawa, Air Force returnees at Clark Air Base, and Navy returnees on Guam. CGUSARBCO cited that such a decision eliminated the requirement for duplicating processing teams, escorts, records, stockpiles of uniforms and insignia, and put the returnee back into a Service oriented environment at the earliest opportunity.¹

(5) In answer to CGUSARBCO’s impact statement, CINCPAC replied that the new maximum planning capacity of each JCP was 250 returnees, and that aero-medical evacuation of returnees otherwise ready for departure would not be delayed pending laboratory results. Direct coordination with CG III MAF was recommended concerning security augmentation requirements. Since CGUSARBCO’s recommended action for processing along Service lines was predicated on the mass return of more than 250 persons in a six or seven day period, CINCPAC’s response advised that in the event of such a large release it was anticipated that he would receive sufficient advance notice to implement alternate procedures, if required.²

(6) On 18 June, CINCPAC directed the Commander, 13th Air Force, Clark Air Base and the CG, USARBCO, acting as CINCPAC unified agents, to be prepared to dispatch a Quick Reaction Returnee Reception Team to a point of anticipated recovery in PACOM within four hours of alert notification by CINCPAC. The minimum composition of the team included a team chief, flight surgeon, one escort per Service, returnees and attendants (if possible), public affairs officer, aeromedical evacuation operations officer, and an optional small airlift control element (ALCE). The ALCE would be provided by PACAF or MAC. The CINCPAC unified agents were advised to make plans to augment the team within eight hours after dispatching the original team. The augmentation plans were to include one or two debriefing liaison officers and assistant team chiefs in addition to the specialists of the original team. The function of the team would be to assist the responsible military commander or other USG official in receiving, rapidly processing, reporting, executing prompt aeromedical evacuation, and escorting the returnees to the CINCPAC designated JCP. The CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI was advised to prepare preliminary plans to provide an austere backup returnee reception team capable of being dispatched on 12 hours notice.³

(U) Notification on 1 September from the DOD PW/MIA Task Force in Washington that North Vietnam’s delegation to the Paris Peace Talks had advised Senator Edward Kennedy that “a few captured U.S. personnel would be released tomorrow” started the PACOM EGRESS RECAP procedures in motion. Key personnel were notified, all PACOM Senior Service Command Centers were placed on standby alert, one C-9 aeromedical evacuation aircraft was placed on strip alert at Clark Air Base.  
UNCLASSIFIED

Base, and a message was relayed to the American Embassy in Vientiane with the available information and a request for details on incoming flights from Hanoi. The return call from Vientiane advised CINC PAC that the weekly Soviet Aeroflot flight from Hanoi was scheduled to arrive in Vientiane at 1530 hours local time on 2 September (9 1/2 hours later). Confirming messages were received from the State and Defense Departments regarding the impending release and a CINC PAC standby alert notice was dispatched.

(U) After the names of the prisoners to be released were announced by Hanoi radio, planning was based on the returnees being on the Aeroflot flight from Hanoi. Returnees were identified as Major Elias, USAF, and Lieutenants Gartley and Charles, USN. The following action was taken:

-The Commander, 13th Air Force, Clark Air Base, was tasked to provide a quick reaction returnee reception team to assist the Ambassador in Vientiane and the 7/13th Air Force at Udorn, Thailand.

-The 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group was ordered to launch for Udorn with the quick reaction reception team on board. (The Ambassador in Vientiane had advised CINC PAC that he would fly returnees to Udorn by Air America).

-Clark Air Base was determined to be the best choice for the PACOM JCPC.

-One special returnee call home telephone circuit was installed at Clark Air Base and tested to CONUS.

-Two special off-hook (one FLASH and one IMMEDIATE) circuits were installed from Clark Air Base to the CINCPAC Operations Center CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) console.

-CINCPACFLT directed movement of necessary processing personnel and returnee personnel records/uniforms to the JCPC.

-A CINCPAC public affairs officer visiting Guam was dispatched to Clark Air Base.

(U) The Aeroflot flight from Hanoi was delayed by weather. Two hours before it arrived, David Dellinger and Cora Weiss held a press conference in Paris and announced that the three men would not actually be released for several weeks. However, the alert remained in effect until after Ambassador Godley had met the aircraft and confirmed that no returnees were on board. Ambassador Godley ordered the C-9 aircraft from Udorn to Vientiane just prior to the arrival of the Aeroflot aircraft. The CINCPAC Representative was aboard. After receiving the Ambassador's report in the CINCPAC Command Center, the EGRESS
RECAP alert was cancelled, and the Ambassador released the C-9 to return to Clark Air Base.

(U) Certain problems were noted during the alert:

- Arrangements for air transportation of processing personnel and returnee records/uniforms were cumbersome, confusing, and time consuming. Subsequent to the alert CINCPAC requested a JCS IAZ priority for EGRESS RECAP air movements. Also, a meeting with PACOM Senior Service Commands and CINCPAC action officers was held to resolve internal problems.

- Relatively minor problems were encountered during the installation of special communications lines. Most were corrected on the spot. Other problems revealed were resolved during a J623 visit to the three JCPCs.

- The CINCPAC Operations Center became too congested during EGRESS RECAP actions. This problem had been anticipated and another room was selected for use of the EGRESS RECAP Battle Staff Augmentation Team.

- Receipt of a message from the 7/13th Air Force Judge Advocate General at Udorn requesting confirmation of answers provided in response to questions by the Udorn Team Chief indicated a lack of understanding of basic EGRESS RECAP guidance. This was corrected by the CINCPAC J11 while on a visit to Udorn.

(U) Overall, the alert was highly successful and fewer problems were encountered than had been anticipated. Basic CINCPAC plans/procedures and those of subordinate elements were determined to be sound. BGEN R.G. Ogan, Director, DOD PW/MIA Task Force, on a visit to CINCPAC on 5 September, advised that Washington level agencies were highly pleased with the actions taken and the flow of reports by CINCPAC.

(6) On 22 September, the day of the expected departure of the PWs from Hanoi, the CINCPAC EGRESS RECAP Battle Staff Augmentation Watch Team reported for duty. In addition, one CINCPAC J1 representative was located at Udorn, Thailand to assist or provide guidance to military or State Department authorities in Southeast Asia. The actual release did not take place until 24 September. CINCPAC was prepared to receive the returnees throughout this period. The JCPC at Clark Air Base was prepared for accelerated processing, and if the medical condition of the returnees permitted to expedite the onward movement to Travis Air Force Base via C-141 medical evacuation aircraft. A C-9 medical evacuation aircraft was positioned at Udorn with an EGRESS RECAP processing

1. J11 HistSum Sep 72; J1/Memo/670-72, COL Sapp, J1, to Admiral Gayler, 8 Sep 72, Subj: EGRESS RECAP ALERT-1 and 2 September 1972.
team embarked and a C-141 was positioned at Clark Air Base. The released prisoners did not land at airports in the PACOM.

(5) In a message to the JCS and COMUSMACV in November, CINCPAC addressed the possibility that a few persons carried in a deserter or AWOL status might surface as bona fide returnees from PW status, and others would be AWOLs detained by enemy forces incident or subsequent to misbehavior. In the absence of positive guidance to the contrary (normally provided in advance by the Service concerned), CINCPAC advised that all returnees would be processed in accordance with current instructions. Returnees accused of misbehavior would only be removed from PACOM EGRESS RECAP channels on request of the Service concerned and with the concurrence of DOD/JCS. Along this same line, CINCPAC advised that reporting of returnees' names would not be delayed by attempts to verify identities revealed by the returnees. Greeting and processing personnel should, as a general rule, accept the identity provided by returnees without question. If the identity of a returnee should later appear questionable, for any reason, addressees listed in CINCPACINST C3461.1C were to be advised by FLASH message.

(U) BGEN Ogan visited all potential PACOM EGRESS RECAP processing centers during the period 29 November-4 December. He was accompanied by RADM L. Heyworth, Jr., CINCPAC DCS for Security Assistance, Logistics and Administration, and COL B.B. Sapp, CINCPAC J1. BGEN Ogan expressed total satisfaction with the preparedness of all sites.

(5) As a result of BGEN Ogan's visit, CINCPAC designated a primary JCPC, directed pre-positioning of necessary equipment and records, advised of a possible release scenario, and clarified customs clearance procedures. CINCPAC designated Clark Air Base as the Primary PACOM JCPC, and Guam and Okinawa as alternate JCPCs to be activated in that sequence if unforeseen developments ruled out Clark Air Base, or if the number of returnees to be processed at one time exceeded 250 persons.

(6) The release scenario advised Service component commanders of the JCPC augmentation packages that would be required if about 10 percent of captured U.S. personnel were released per week for 60 days (about 50-60 returnees per week). This scenario estimated that probably no more than 150 returnees would be at the JCPC at any one time. Service component commanders were advised to be prepared to augment packages on order, and that if the 10 percent or similar

1. J111 HistSum Sep 72; J1/Memo/0188-72, COL Sapp, J1, to Admiral Gayler; 22 Sep 72, Subj: EGRESS RECAP - Pending Release of Three PW's from RVN.
2. J111 HistSum Nov 72; CINCPAC 180113Z Nov 72.
3. CINCPAC 090416Z Dec 72.
5. J111 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 060441Z Dec 72.
scenario developed, the augmentation would be ordered 48 hours or more in advance of a possible release. The escort/returnee ration from Phase II to Phase III was to be 1:1.1

(6) The plan for customs clearance provided that upon activation of the EGRESS RECAP JCPC, U.S. Customs pre-clearance of returnees, escorts, and aeromedical evacuation aircraft crews would be accomplished at the JCPC before departure. No clearance would be necessary at Hickam AFB, Travis AFB, or other stops en route to Phase III hospitals. To facilitate this clearance, one U.S. Customs agent would be dispatched to the designated JCPC within 24 hours of activation. JCPC commanders were to be responsible for providing support and assistance to the U.S. Customs representative to assure pre-clearance of all personnel departing on each aeromedical evacuation flight to the U.S.2

(FUO) A proposed EGRESS RECAP press briefing on the ground rules was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 8 December. Slight modifications to the briefing were made by ASD(PA); the approved briefing to be given after activation of the Joint Central Processing Center (JCPC) and Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was sent to the three JCPC sites on 11 December:

The objective of the EGRESS RECAP Operation here is to provide returnees with the necessary medical attention in an absolute minimum of time so that they may return to the United States and be reunited with their families. In all EGRESS RECAP activities the welfare and the best interests of the men is of primary concern.

Within the parameters of the philosophy, and to the maximum extent of the facilities and personnel available to us, we will provide the press the best possible support, so long as the media requirements do not interfere with the privacy and processing of the returnee.

We have worked out in advance some ground rules for the press:

1. You will be issued a press badge which we request you wear at all times while on base. This badge is your accreditation and identification as a bona-fide newsman. It authorizes you access to the base, transportation and mess facilities.

1. J111 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 090218Z Dec 72.
2. J111 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 220150Z Dec 72.

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2. JIB personnel will be pleased to assist in obtaining off-base quarters, JIB office space and contacts with local telephone personnel for commercial phones, telex or wire photo lines as you desire.

3. No interviews with returnees will be possible while they are processing through the Pacific theater.

4. Media may photograph and observe arrivals and departures of returnees at designated press areas. Identity of returnees will not be made until next-of-kin have been notified. Photographing seriously ill or wounded so they can be identified will not be permitted. We particularly need the full cooperation of the media in this regard. We believe the media fully appreciates the humanitarian aspects involved.

5. Media will not be permitted aboard aircraft or busses carrying returnees while on-loading, off-loading or in transit.

6. Access to the hospital will be strictly controlled. The press will not have access to returnees while they are in the hospital.

7. Press transportation will be provided on an as-available basis to assist the press in covering returnee activities at designated press areas on the flight line. Newsmen will be escorted while in these press areas.

8. Requests for interviews with military personnel involved in returnee processing will be made through the JIB.

9. Press briefings will be held at the JIB on a daily basis or as necessary.

10. Press and photo releases will be made at the JIB.1

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1. CINCPAC 080319Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 111935Z Dec 72.
SECTION IV--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Revised Wage Schedules for
U.S. Forces' Local National Employees

Japan

(U) Long standing U.S. Forces Japan wage policy has provided pay increases for LN employees at the same time and in the same proportion as wage increases made by the Government of Japan (GOJ) for National Public Service employees. On 15 August 1972, the National Personnel Authority of the GOJ reported to the GOJ and the Diet on its latest annual survey of prevailing wages and allowances in private industry in Japan. The wage and benefit increase was 10.68 percent. On 24 November, agreement between COMUS Japan and the GOJ was reached on a 10.68 percent increase for 46,000 Japanese employed by U.S. Forces; the increase was retroactive to 1 April 1972. The increase in 1971 was 11.74 percent.1

Republic of Korea

(U) Based on a survey conducted of 91 private sector firms in October and November 1972, revised wage rates for LN employees of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea went into effect 1 January 1973. The increase averaged 13.6 percent for the 24,000 employees paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds.2

Republic of the Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces LN employees in the Republic of the Philippines were jointly approved and issued by the PACOM Service component commands on 8 June 1972. The revisions were based on data obtained during a survey of private-sector employees in April-May 1972. The new wage rates, which were effective on 11 June 1972, resulted in an average pay increase of 10 percent for some 23,000 employees in the Republic of the Philippines who were paid from appropriated and non-appropriated funds.3

Thailand

(U) A wage increase was granted during 1972 for approximately 14,000 Thais

1. J121 HistSum Dec 72; COMUS Japan ltr J51 of 1 Sep 72, Subj: Prospective Increases in Wages of Japanese Employees of USFJ; COMUS Japan 240655Z Nov 72.
2. J121 HistSum Dec 72.
employed by U.S. Forces. Effective on 12 November 1972, the increase was jointly approved by the PACOM Service component commands. The raise averaged 6.24 percent for appropriated fund employees and 3.9 percent for non-appropriated fund employees.1

Republic of Vietnam

A general wage increase for U.S. Forces local national employees in the RVN was jointly approved by the PACOM Service component commands on 18 July 1972 under authority delegated by the SECDEF. The July-August 1970 wage survey noted that USG wages lagged behind the private sector by 35 percent. On 1 October 1972, a 15 percent across-the-board pay increase went into effect for some 35,000 LN appropriated and non-appropriated fund employees. Past increases and the 15 percent raise brought USG wages 43 percent above the August 1970 level, or 8 percent above that validated in 1970. The U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Mission had previously recommended and approved this increase for all USG agencies in RVN.2

Labor Relations at U.S. Bases

Okinawa

Leaders of the Okinawa All Military Employees Union (Zengunro) called a 10-day strike of the 21,000 U.S. Forces employees on 7 March 1972. The strike, the longest in Okinawa's labor movement history, lasted until 11 April when all but the Machinato Service Area (who stayed out until 13 April) and the Milk Plant employees returned to their jobs. The stated purpose of the strike was opposition of a reduction in force (RIF) and a demand for improved benefits when the indirect-hire system was instituted upon reversion to Japan.3

All essential base activities continued to operate during the strike including DOD Dependent Schools. About 1,000 dependents were hired on a temporary basis to assist in operating commissaries, open messes, etc., and the school busses were operated by military drivers. Absenteeism averaged 75-80 percent. The great majority of pickets were peaceful and orderly, appearing not to wish physical encounters with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands police or the U.S.

2. J12 HistSum Oct 72; ASD (M&RA)/Memo, 18 Jul 72, Subj: Coordination of Personnel Administration Affecting Local Nationals and Other Non-U.S. Citizens in USEUCOM and PACOM; COMUSMACV 080210Z Sep 72; CINCUSARPAC 150214Z Sep 72; AMEMB Saigon 12567/25115OZ Aug 72.
3. J12 HistSum Apr 72; CG USARYIS 020900Z Mar 72; CG USARYIS 071035Z Mar 72; HICOMRYUKUS 140945Z Mar 72; HICOMRY 210700Z Mar 72.
Forces. Certain elements, however, including students and militants from outside organizations, perpetrated increasingly frequent disorderly activities and acts of violence as the strike continued. Despite this, no serious incidents occurred.

The U.S. made it clear to the union that the RIF problem was insoluble except for the reduction of total numbers to be released through normal attrition and placement in other U.S. base jobs. The GOJ Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) agreed to assume the negotiator role and developed a compromise "package" which involved "saved" language allowances and night shift differential for six months and two years, respectively, and broadened provisions for longevity step increases. In all, the "package" was estimated to cost the USF about $500,000 the first year, a small figure compared to the 30 percent additional cost for the Okinawa labor force on reversion.

DFAA Director General Shimada met personally with Zengunro leaders and assured the USF in Japan that acceptance of the compromise package would end the strike. CINCPAC prompted COMUS Japan's early acceptance of the GOJ proposal in line with recommendations of the High Commissioner and American Embassy in Tokyo. General Shimada then went to Okinawa to meet with both U.S. Forces and union officials. The Zengunro top leadership agreed to end the strike but Central Executive Committee and Central Struggle Committee approval could not be obtained because each time these groups tried to meet, dissident elements broke up the proceedings. Finally on 9 April, Zengunro Chairman Yoshida and three top officers issued a back-to-work order on their own responsibility. Except for the Machinato Service Area Chapter, the employees returned to work on 11 April. The Machinato group ended their strike on 13 April. At the end of April, some 80 employees of the Milk Plant (USF contractor) were still out on strike in the hope of obtaining pre-reversion agreement for post-reversion indirect-hire status.

On balance, it appears that the union lost more than it gained by the strike. For the rank and file, monetary losses far exceeded monetary gains. The top leadership, particularly, suffered when they lost control of the strike's momentum.

In response to a CINCPAC request for guidance/decision on U.S. income tax jurisdiction over Filipino citizens employed in Okinawa and who had resident alien status in Guam, Hawaii, or California, the Secretary of Defense obtained an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opinion which was forwarded to COMUS Japan for dissemination and application.

1. J12 HistSum Apr 72; COMUS Japan 120810Z Apr 72.
2. J12 HistSum Apr 72.
(U) The IRS opinion exempted from U.S. income tax laws those employees who, under certain conditions, obtained residency status in Guam or one of the United States and then returned to their jobs with U.S. Forces on Okinawa. This determination applied to 45 employees. As a result, the U.S. Forces discontinued withholding U.S. taxes and the employees were subject to host country tax provisions.

Republic of the Philippines

(U) The Bases Labor Agreement (BLA), concluded with the Government of the Philippines in May 1968, provided that a collective bargaining agreement would be negotiated when the employee unions attained sufficient membership for recognition. The Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Associations in U.S. Bases in the Philippines was accorded recognition on 6 January 1969 as the exclusive bargaining representative for the 25,000 Filipinos employed by U.S. Forces. Collective bargaining agreement negotiations began in February and concluded with the signing of a three year agreement on 28 July 1969.

(U) Preparations for renegotiation began in June 1971. A pre-negotiating session and a three-day planning conference were held in December 1971. A two-day negotiations seminar was conducted in February 1972 and preliminary meetings with the Federation also began that month. The Federation presented proposed agreement changes, the terms and conditions of which far exceeded the current practice. The U.S. Bases panel presented a set of employer proposals and at the same time sought CINCPAC and PACOM Service component command guidance on the negotiations.

(U) Formal negotiations began on 20 March 1972 and the CINCPACREP Philippines submitted a series of status reports to keep CINCPAC and Service component commands apprised. The PACOM Joint Labor Policy Committee (JLPC) and its subcommittees held a series of meetings and, based on the decisions made, CINCPAC-FLT provided joint-Service guidance to the CINCPACREP on the role and authority of the U.S. Bases panel, and on individual Federation and management proposals.

(U) When the U.S. Bases and Federation panels had achieved agreement on most issues, with only the economic issues remaining, the CINCPACREP Philippines recommended approval of increases in the following economic benefits based on a review of wage and benefits survey data obtained from the 28 firms which had

CONCENPAC identified two areas of concern. First, the phrasing on the

1. J12 HistSum Sep 72; CINCPACREPPHIL 221000Z Mar 72; CINCPACFLT 070221Z
   Apr 72; CINCPACREPPHIL 030516Z Oct 72.
2. J12 HistSum Jun 72; COMUSTDC ltr Ser 027 of 18 Feb 72, Subj: Statement of
   Earnings of Local National Employees of U.S. Military Activities on Taiwan.
form-statement of earnings strongly implied the amount listed to be the total earnings. Second, there was a need to have this practice sanctioned in some way by GRC authorities. This concern centered on the need to avoid possible embarrassment to the US if the GRC challenged this practice as one to assist employees in deceiving the GRC Tax Bureau.

Following a review of the background material, CINCPAC authorized the reinstitution of earnings statement procedures on an interim basis with phrasing modifications considered to be more accurate and justifiable. CINCPAC also reported this action to the Secretary of Defense, recommending that the matter be raised with the Secretary of State with the objective of presenting it to the GRC at a politically propitious time.

The Secretary of Defense concurred in the interim earning statements procedure and said that both OSD and the State Department believed that the matter could be raised with GRC by the Embassy at a time which the Ambassador, in consultation with COMUSTDC, deemed to be politically propitious. COMUSTDC was requested to initiate contact with the Embassy on this matter.

1. J12 HistSum Jun 72; CINCPAC 250255Z Mar 72; CINCPAC ltr Ser 0409 of 22 Apr 72, Subj: Statement of Earnings of Local National Employees of U.S. Military Activities on Taiwan; SECDEF 3353/152153Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 210504Z Jun 72.
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SECTION V--MORALE AND WELFARE MATTERS

Overseas Combined Federal Campaign-Pacific

(U) CINCPAC notified the Department of Defense Combined Fund Raising Coordinator on 14 June 1972 of the results of the 1972 Combined Federal Fund Raising Campaign-Pacific. Deemed highly successful and reflecting a high order of planning and organization at all levels, contributions for the campaign totaled $623,427. In addition, although a campaign was not conducted in RVN, $1,576 was collected as a result of voluntary, non-solicited contributions. This increased the PACOM total to $625,003. Dollar goals were not established; however, the success of the campaign was reflected by an increase of 67 cents in the per capita gift and 76 cents in the average gift over 1971. These increases were shown despite a reduction of approximately 33,000 in personnel solicited. ¹

Designation of Vietnam Campaigns

(U) Although the designation of military campaigns is a prerogative of the Service Secretaries, a procedure was established in 1966 whereby recommendations for Vietnam campaigns were initiated by COMUSMACV and forwarded through joint Service channels (including the JCS) to the Service Secretaries for simultaneous and coordinated consideration. On 7 December 1971, the Department of the Army (DA) announced a campaign which was not in consonance with a proposal submitted by COMUSMACV. In light of the independent action by the DA, CINCPACAF recommended to Department of the Air Force that the Air Force designate Vietnam campaigns unilaterally effective 1 July 1970. Since the independent Service actions negated, at least temporarily, the joint Service procedure established in 1966, CINCPAC requested that recommendations initiated by component commanders in RVN be submitted through COMUSMACV to the PACOM component commander with the provision that if COMUSMACV did not concur, or if two or more Services were involved, the recommendation would be submitted to CINCPAC. Further, if PACOM component commanders submitted a recommendation, CINCPAC should be furnished copies of pertinent messages or correspondence. ²

(U) On 28 July 1972, COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that the joint campaign system would be reinstated with the 17th Campaign which was effective 30 March 1972. ³ COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval on 18 September for the 15th

2. J114 HistSum May 72; DA 071450Z Dec 71; CINCPACAF 080121Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 130345Z May 72.
and 16th Vietnam Campaigns for the Army and Navy. CINCPAC recommended approval to the JCS on 2 October. This action established a uniform termination date of the 16th Campaign for all Services, which would permit a joint designation for future campaigns.

Tour Length for Personnel of Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand

(5) The Secretary of Defense in June 1971 directed the relocation of the Office of the Deputy Chief (DEPCH), Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) from Bangkok to Udorn, Thailand. In connection with the relocation, the DEPCH proposed that key personnel operating from Udorn be assigned for 24-month tours. CINCPAC concurred and recommended a 24-month tour to the JCS. On 8 March 1972, the JCS notified CINCPAC that OSD had approved a 24-month tour either on an accompanied or unaccompanied basis for 28 key personnel assigned to DEPCH billets. Orders assigning personnel to the 28 positions were to contain the stipulation that dependent facilities at Udorn were austere and should dependents decide to accompany their sponsors, they would have to be prepared for minimal living standards.

(5) The strong justification presented to the JCS by CINCPAC outlined how critical it was to increase the tour to 24-months. The OSD decision, possibly as a result of this strong justification, precluded exercise of an option to serve a 12-month tour without dependents.

Tour Lengths of JUSMAGTHAI Advisors

(U) The DOD policy established an overseas tour of 12 months for military personnel stationed in Thailand outside the Bangkok/Don Muang area. In the Bangkok/Don Muang area, personnel with dependents served 24 months and "all others" 18 months. In February 1972, COMUSMACTHAI requested an exception to the tour policy for 87 advisor positions outside the Bangkok/Don Muang area. Persons occupying these positions would be authorized command sponsorship of dependents and serve a 24-month accompanied tour or an 18-month "all others" tour. Dependents were to be authorized to live in Bangkok, or, with specific permission of COMUSMACTHAI, at the sponsor's duty station. The primary benefit to be gained from this proposal was an overall more effective performance since the experience gained the first year would enhance the advisor's performance for the remaining 6 or 12 months.


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(U) CINCPAC forwarded the request to the JCS on 19 June recommending approval. On 4 October the JCS approved the long tour option but restricted command sponsored dependents to residence in the Bangkok/Don Muang area.1

Designation of Korea as a Restricted Area

(U) A request to rescind the Department of the Army's (DA) designation of Korea as a restricted area in February 1972 was submitted by COMUS Korea to DOD. A restricted area is defined in AR 55-46 as "any area into which the entry of dependents has been prohibited, temporarily or permanently, by order of competent authority." The apparent objective of the request was to eliminate the condition which prohibited the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army from granting command sponsored status to dependents subsequent to their arrival in Korea on an earlier individual sponsored status. CINCPAC requested a JCS evaluation of the consistency of the DA designation of Korea as a restricted area with the provisions outlined in DOD Directive 1315.7 which listed Korea as an authorized area for accompanied tours.2

(U) The JCS response to CINCPAC's request said that the DOD directive established tour lengths throughout the world, and that within the directive, the Services were responsible for defining those areas where tours would be with or without dependents. Up to 1969, Korea was designated by the DA as a restricted area. In 1969, an Eighth U.S. Army request that travel be authorized for dependents of certain key military and civilian positions was approved, and in accordance with the DOD directive, the tour lengths for those positions became 24 months. The JCS position said that the DA designation of Korea as a restricted area remained consistent with the DOD directive and that requests for changes in restricted area designations would have to be submitted through Service channels.

(U) CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea by message that any further action concerning the request to rescind the designation of Korea as a restricted area would have to be pursued through Army channels. The message also recommended to the DA that the restricted area designation applicable to Korea be rescinded.3

Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

\(\text{\textcopyright\textsuperscript{3}}\) In response to a query by DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, a decision was rendered by

2. J115 HistSum Mar 72; COMUS Korea ltr of 7 Feb 72, Subj: Designation of Korea as a Restricted Area; CINCPAC 280029Z Mar 72.
3. J115 HistSum Apr 72; JCS 9603/142125Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 220445Z Apr 72.
the Department of the Army Finance Center that combat zone tax exclusions could not be granted to personnel serving in Laos or Cambodia since neither area had been declared a combat zone by executive order. Since CINCPAC's views ran contrary to the Army decision, the following points were contained in a September 1972 message to the JCS:

- The income tax exclusion for personnel with permanent duty stations in Laos or Cambodia is valid.
- Personnel with duty stations other than Laos or Cambodia, who perform official temporary duty in Laos or Cambodia, must be qualified for hazardous fire pay as a prerequisite to entitlement for tax exclusion.
- The ultimate determination of entitlement for tax exclusion rests with the Internal Revenue Service.

(U) A reply from the ASD (M&RA) clarified the issue:

1. CINCPAC interpretation is correct. That part stating that ultimate determination rests with internal revenue is correct but misleading. Section 1.112-1 of Treasury Regulations clearly entitles members serving outside the combat zone in direct support of military operations under conditions which qualify such members to hostile fire pay (Chapter 10, DODPM) to combat zone tax exclusion.

2. Appropriate clarification will be provided the military departments.

Personnel Benefits Affecting Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia

(U) The Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) Chief asked CINCPAC in April 1972 to determine the probable impact on eligibility for certain special personnel benefits as a result of moving his headquarters from Saigon to Phnom Penh. The CINCPAC answer to the query pointed out that the entitlement of MEDTC personnel to Southeast Asia benefits was based on duty assignment in Cambodia and the fact that their service was in direct support of military operations in a combat zone. Therefore, the relocation would not affect the provisions or intent of operating directives, and it was not expected to alter the interpretation of directives which in the past had provided MEDTC personnel,

1. J113 HistSum Sep 72; DEPCJUSMAGTHAI 080807Z Sep 72.
2. J113 HistSum Sep 72; CINCPAC 150205Z Sep 72.
3. SECDEF 212147Z Sep 72.
physically located in Cambodia, entitlement for Southeast Asia benefits. The
reply also said that three of the benefits, although valid within CINCPAC's
interpretation of policy, would be subject to further considerations. The
income tax exclusion and the $50. customs exemption in mailing gifts were
based on the premise that MEDTC personnel in Cambodia were serving in direct
support of military operations in the Vietnam combat zone. Entitlement to
these benefits would ultimately be a matter of determination by the Internal
Revenue Service. Also, the free mailing privilege would be contingent upon
the mail being entered into the military postal system in the RVN.1

Mail Service in the PACOM

(U) An inspection of the U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service (USAFPCS)
Taiwan District in July 1972 by its headquarters in Washington revealed several
apparent discrepancies in postal service being rendered to its patrons. The re-
port of discrepancies included the "unrestricted" use of the APO by unaccompanied
dependents of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) per-
sonnel whose sponsors were serving in the RVN and the "restricted" use of the
APO by unaccompanied dependents of military personnel serving in the RVN.
COMUSTDC's endorsement to the report explained that the U.S. Ambassador had ex-
pressed his view that the clear intent of the various exchanges of diplomatic
notes with the GOC providing privileged residence in Taiwan for these two groups
logically carried authorization for use of the APO. Since there was an inequity
of treatment between the two groups, COMUSTDC's instruction was being changed
to provide "restricted" use for both categories. CINCPAC's endorsement con-
curred with the interpretation of the U.S. Ambassador and COMUSTDC regarding
host country approval of APO support for specified unaccompanied dependents.
However, CINCPAC proposed continued "unrestricted" APO support for USAID depen-
dents and upgrading the support from "restricted" to "unrestricted" for military
dependents whose sponsors were serving in the RVN.2

(C) In connection with the withdrawal of military personnel under the pro-
posed ceasefire agreement, the American Ambassador in the RVN asked that arrange-
ments be made to retain a U.S. Postal Service system for the RVN. COMUSMACV
stated that the continuation of mail service in the form of a Mail Address Only
(MAO) was justified by the proposed establishment of DOD Contract Administration
and Defense Attaché Offices and the presence of a large number of USG employees
and DOD contractor personnel. COMUSMACV requested the establishment of an MAO/
APO for the American Embassy which would be staffed by U.S. civilians. CINCPAC
subsequently recommended to the JCS that a single APO be operated under the

1. J113 HistSum Jun 72; MEDTC FWD 150211Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 160406Z Jun 72.
2. J113 HistSum Aug 72; Headquarters USAF Postal and Courier Service (Hq Comd
USAF) ltr of 17 Jul 72 with two endorsements, Subj: Military Postal Service
on Taiwan.
jurisdiction of the Embassy and that the Department of the Army be tasked to coordinate the required actions.1

Temporary Lodging Allowances

(U) Joint determination number 63-72 of 21 June 1972, by the Joint Per Diem and Travel Allowances Committee, provided amendments to existing rules which included a requirement for senior area commanders, or their designees, to issue instructions designated to insure uniform granting of Temporary Lodging Allowances to all eligible members. CINCPAC delegated the responsibility to the Single Senior Military Representatives for countries or areas concerned in PACOM and directed that the local components coordinate their TLA directives with the Hawaii Area Joint Committee to insure uniformity.2

Awards

(U) Subordinate unified commands and activities were informed in July that a review of recommendations for noncombat decorations processed by CINCPAC indicated that the established criteria for such decorations were not being observed in all cases. The CINCPAC message requested a review of procedures regarding the processing and evaluation of award recommendations with a view toward restoring the unique and distinct recognition conveyed by the awards system.3

Special Benefits for Employees in Hawaii

(U) Administrative procedures were promulgated in October 1971 by an ASD (M&RA) memorandum to terminate certain benefits for U.S. citizen employees who were originally recruited outside the geographic areas of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam and whose positions could be filled by local recruitment. The benefits in question for employees in Hawaii included roundtrip travel expenses for employee, spouse and immediate family to the official place of CONUS residence (or hire) upon completion of each tour; shipment of private automobiles; non-temporary storage of household goods and personal effects; and return transportation of employee, dependents and household effects upon termination.

(U) As the designated coordinator for implementation of the procedures directed by the memorandum for DOD activities in Hawaii, CINCPAC transmitted

1. J113 HistSum Dec 72 citing CINCPAC 022000Z Dec 72 and CINCPAC 042131Z Dec 72; COMUSMACV 200030Z Nov 72; CINCUSARPAC 230233Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 260246Z Nov 72.
the memorandum to commands and agencies with instructions for initial review
and identification of positions which could be filled by local recruitment.1

(U) After a series of meetings and discussions with PACOM Service component
representatives, CINCPAC submitted a joint position to the DOD on 18 February.
It recommended that early legislation be sought which would permit an early
termination of the special benefits. The rationale cited to DOD included:

- Amending the law which provided the extra benefits would be better
than trying to accomplish the same objective by administrative directives
which would have significant disadvantages, i.e., disruptive to management and
employees, detrimental to DOD's image as a fair and responsible employer.

- Actions affecting DOD employees would not limit benefits of other
government employees in the same geographical area.

- The DOD memorandum would result in a potential non-uniform imple-
mentation by the Services because of the apparent disparity of their directives.

- The seeming unfairness of the memorandum to the employee who resigned,
in lieu of directed reassignment, and was subsequently retained as a local hire.

- In making the prescribed determinations as to local hire availability,
management might be unable to consider those best qualified.

(U) CINCPAC recommended the legislation be proposed along lines which:

- Provided a cut-off of special benefits on a specified date for em-
ployees who had served five consecutive years in a designated area. These em-
ployees would be entitled to return transportation to point of hire for one
year following the effective date of the legislation.

- Provided government departments the authority to continue special
benefits to employees recruited for the four geographical areas for specific
jobs identified as part of a department's career program or as a local skill
shortage. Agreements would be limited to one reemployment travel instance, and
eligibility for special benefits terminated after five consecutive years ser-
vice in the area.

- Provided the departments' authority to extend, using stringent cri-

1. J12 HistSum Feb 72; ASD(M&RA)/Memo of 4 Oct 71, Subj: Termination of
Special Benefits for Employees in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam
Under Certain Circumstances.
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terion, an employee's eligibility for special benefits on a year-by-year basis, but not to include additional reemployment travel.

- Provided that CONUS recruitment other than for a departments' career program or where there was a skill shortage would be accomplished on a regular permanent change of station with no transportation agreement.1

(U) CINCPAC's recommended plan for accomplishing a termination of benefits by legislation was approved by the DOD. In withdrawing the earlier enunciated administrative procedures, however, the ASD (M&RA) directed a continued review of competitive levels of positions occupied by persons who, solely because of residence outside the area in which stationed, were entitled to special benefits; the continued certification as to whether qualified local residents were available for such employment or replacement; and the filling by locally available qualified residents such vacancies as occur, to the maximum extent, consistent with staffing needs.2

Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EO&T)

(U) Mr. Curtis R. Smothers, Director of Equal Opportunity (Military) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), in June 1972, made an intensive three week tour of Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. He was accompanied by CINCPAC and Service component equal opportunity representatives. Mr. Smothers' observations upon conclusion of the trip included:

- Much improvement had been made during the preceding year.

- Commanders should be the primary EO&T officers and should be aware, concerned, active, and visible.

- Emphasis was lacking in the area of awards and honors for individuals who performed well in EO&T assignments.

- Better tools were needed to manage the EO&T program and to determine the effectiveness of the effort.

- More specific objectives, with identifiable goals, were required.

1. CINCPAC 180239Z Feb 72.

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- The most active and effective programs appeared to exist at Clark, Ching Chuan Kang, and Osan Air Bases and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station. The weakest programs were on ships afloat.¹

(U) In messages to subordinate unified commanders, CINCPAC expressed his pleasure over the race relations progress made in PACOM areas visited by Mr. Smothers. However, CINCPAC cautioned that "Despite an encouraging year, we still have a long way to go to routinely insure that discrimination is eliminated, in whatever form it may exist, within the Military Services." He pointed out that success must be attained "not only because discrimination is fundamentally intolerable but because effectiveness of military operations is directly and dramatically dependent upon harmonious relations among all people in uniform." CINCPAC listed actions to improve EO&T which he encouraged the commanders to follow in order to capitalize on Mr. Smothers' findings and to continue the progress made during the past year.²

(U) On 8 December, CINCPAC Instruction 5350.2 was published to require formal establishment of EO&T coordinating committees at subordinate unified commands to complement the PACOM Committee which was established in January 1971. The primary purpose of the joint committees was to provide forums for the exchange of views to promote improved race relations.³

Temporary Changes in Administrative Workweeks of CINCPAC Staff

(U) Three-day holidays were observed by members of the CINCPAC staff, on the same basis as other government agencies working a normal five-day workweek, in conjunction with the following occasions falling on Monday during 1972:

- Washington's Birthday 21 February
- Memorial Day 29 May
- Labor Day 4 September
- Columbus Day 9 October
- Veterans' Day 23 October
- Christmas 25 December

(U) For the holidays listed, the CINCPAC authorized a temporary change in the administrative workweek from the normal schedule of 0800-1700 hours on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, and 0800-1200 hours on Wednesday and Saturday, to 0800-1700 hours Monday through Friday.⁴

1. J113 Point Paper, 27 Jan 73, Subj: Race Relations in the PACOM.
2. CINCPAC 150148Z Jul 72.
3. J113 Point Paper, 27 Jan 73, Subj: Race Relations in the PACOM; CINCPAC Instruction 5350.5 of 8 Dec 72, Subj: Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EO&T) Coordinating Committees.

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CHAPTER IX
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

PACOM Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS)

The Defense Department's Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) consisted of the facilities, computer equipment, special data communications, doctrine, procedures, and personnel required to support the intelligence data processing requirements of both theater and national levels of command. The IDHS had been established in the early 1960's. Phasedown and withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the RVN resulted in several actions to achieve more efficient and economical use of IDHS assets in 1972. Transfer of an IBM 360/20 system from the 1st Signal Brigade to the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) was effected on 12 June and installed on 20 June. This computer was operated by the RVN Armed Forces IDHS with an advisory effort by COMUSMACV IDHS personnel. The IBM 360/20 replaced a Government owned IBM 360/30 that was declared excess. The IBM 360/30 Central Processing Unit (CPU) was shipped to the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC) in July to replace an IBM 360/30 CPU that had been leased by FICPAC. Savings realized approximated $175,000 a year.

In August CINCPAC addressed the matter of COMUSMACV's data processing facilities. A letter from COMUSMACV in May had indicated that collocation of the COMUSMACV Data Management Agency (DMA) and IDHS automatic data processing (ADP) facilities was impractical under existing circumstances. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV on 29 August that as U.S. Force deployment continued it was reasonable to assume that the MACV intelligence ADP support requirements would decline and machine utilization might decrease to a point where a dedicated MACV IDHS ADP could not be justified. Therefore, other means of providing IDHS ADP support were being examined with the objective of developing a phasedown/support plan for the MACV IDHS ADP facility. CINCPAC, therefore, requested that COMUSMACV document existing ADP workload in a monthly report. This data was used by CINCPAC to develop a phasedown/support plan. The plan addressed contingency support for the event in which the IDHS was reduced in manning or equipment utilization to the point that maintaining the facility was neither efficient nor economical.

2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3312, 29 Aug 72, Subj: COMUSMACV (IBM 360/40) Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Phasedown/Support Plan.
PACOM IDHS Command File Management System (PICFMS)

(U) The objectives of the PACOM IDHS Command File Management System (PICFMS) were to promote an effective utilization of PACOM IDHS resources and achieve economies by eliminating duplication of effort. In August CINCPAC designated the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) as executive agent for the PACOM Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF). This action was taken in accordance with established PICFMS and FY 73 CINCPAC Intelligence Plan objectives. As executive agent, FICPAC was tasked to support CINCPAC's AIF processing requirements. Previous PICFMS executive agent assignments were listed in CINCPAC Command History 1971, Volume II, page 525. 1

PACOM intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Network

(C) The IDHSC Communications Network (IDHSC) had been designed to provide the intelligence community with Special Intelligence (SI)-level, high-speed communications media for on-line file query/response and bulk data exchange using interneted IDHS computers. It was envisioned that the IDHSC Network would stem the proliferation of computerized intelligence bases, promote a more effective division of labor, and provide worldwide, timely access to intelligence data bases. Implementation in the PACOM had been designed in a three-phase plan. Phase I was completed in 1971. In this phase the Defense Intelligence Agency-Community On-line Intelligence Network Systems (DIA-COINS) software had been installed and the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (COMNAVINTCOM)-appropriated high-speed data link from Washington to Oahu was activated. Concurrently a local loop terminal was activated at the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific (FICPAC). Phase II commenced in 1971 and continued into 1972. In this phase all terminals were to be ASR/KSR Model 37 teletype devices as recommended by the DIA. Training, development of bulk data exchange capabilities, and local on-line queries against Washington area data bases were emphasized during this phase. 2

(B) Bulk data exchange testing was in progress as 1972 began. During tests between the PACOM and DIA switches on 24 January a magnetic tape containing test data was transmitted while a similar test tape was being received. Subsequent testing later that month and in early February demonstrated that the FICPAC-developed Bulk Data Transfer Program was worthy of implementation at DIA as an interim capability. The DIA had indicated certain reservations, however, about the amount of time required, and testing continued. In the middle of February the store and forward switch computer software (developed by the DIA) began to malfunction. DIA assistance was sought. The DIA sent

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001697, 2 Aug 72, Subj: Installation Files, consolidation of.

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a switch programmer for a week; technical questions were resolved and programming personnel at FICPAC were given some insight into the workings of the switch software, which was deficient in documentation. Some of the problems that had been encountered were found to be caused by insufficient information available in the DIA On-line System (DIAOLS) query language. CINCPAC had requested that the DIA provide a training course in the DIAOLS language, but the DIA had responded that there were no plans for on-site training; such training was given at the Defense Intelligence School.¹

(Ç) CINCPAC had also asked for increased file access. In reply, the DIA identified 11 DIAOLS files that would be available for remote query by means of the IDHSC data terminals in the PACOM. In addition, several periodic data exchange magnetic tape files were identified for transfer over the network using the bulk data exchange program.²

(Ç) On 30 March CINCPAC received a reply from the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) stating that procedures for interfacing unified and specified commands to the COINS had been complied with by CINCPAC.³

(U) A team from the DIA visited the PACOM 8–11 May. Tentative agreement was reached at that time on the tapes and files to be exchanged using the bulk data exchange feature of the IDHSC. Agreement was also reached on the DIAOLS files to be accessed by PACOM IDHSC data terminals. By 10 May all files that had been specified by the DIA in their letter of 24 March had been made available for PACOM query.

(U) DIAOLS query language training was conducted in the PACOM during the period 15–25 May. Two qualified instructors were sent to provide orientation and training on the use of IDHSC data terminals for 46 PACOM intelligence analysts.

(U) Also during May, the CINCPAC MOD 37 Data Terminal was moved from the Special Intelligence Communications Center (SPINTCOMM) to the Intelligence Division’s Intelligence Indications Center to make room for urgently needed space in the SPINTCOMM.⁴

¹ J21 HistSum Feb 72; FICPAC 190233Z Feb 72; DIA 4591/252031Z; CINCPAC 270023Z Feb 72; FICPAC 040237Z Mar 72; DIA 9678/012228Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 292229Z Feb 72; DIA 9951/101833Z Mar 72.
² DIA ltr S–2844/DP/2C, 24 Mar 72, Subj: Consolidation of Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Data Exchange (U).
³ J214 HistSum Mar 72, which cited DIRNSA C-193-72/301809Z Mar 72 (BOM).
⁴ J214 HistSum May 72.
(U) On 1 August the DIA-PACOM IDHSC interim operating capability test period began. It was scheduled to run six months. Monthly statistical reports were submitted with an additional qualitative summary of analyst file utilization.

(U) The test period continued through December and was expected to be concluded on 1 February 1973. Meanwhile, planning was underway to extend the network to COMUS Korea and COMUSTDC. In one other matter, action had been initiated to acquire and install a multiplexing capability at the FICPAC IDHSC switch that would permit PACOM users to query DIA files in an interactive mode. This multiplexor capability would also give PACOM users the capability to perform on-line remote update and maintenance of files at the DIA.

PACOM Counterintelligence Advisory Committee

(U) The PACOM Counterintelligence Advisory Committee continued to conduct quarterly meetings in 1972; the meetings were attended by representatives of CINCPAC's component commands and on some occasions by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Coast Guard, and the new Defense Investigative Service. Dissident and anti-military activities came under discussion throughout the year.

(U) During the 21 November meeting the principal topic was the possible duplication of counterintelligence efforts in the PACOM in an effort to identify and eliminate unwanted duplication. At that meeting a representative of the Defense Investigative Service briefed committee members on the new organization's mission and functions and how they affected the counterintelligence assets and missions of Service elements.

Disclosure of Information to Foreign Governments

(U) In June 1965 CINCPAC had delegated authority to COMUSMACV to disclose to foreign governments such classified U.S. military information, through Top Secret, as was determined by COMUSMACV to be essential to those nations' support of combined military combat operations in the RVN. Subsequent guidance from the JCS and DIA pertained to the release of classified intelligence information. The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) had approved the release of such information to Free World Military Assistance Forces, provided that it was related to...

1. CINCPAC Itr Ser 0896, 29 Aug 72, Subj: Monthly Interim Operational Capability (IOC) Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) Utilization Reports; CINCPAC 120436Z Aug 72.
hostile activity in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and did not bear special control markings.
(U) Also in April CINCPAC published and disseminated Instruction 5510.5, Implementation of the Defense Department Foreign Disclosure Automated Data (FORDAD) System, to provide guidance and procedures for implementation of the FORDAD.2

Procedures for Handling Defectors

(S) On 5 May CINCPAC forwarded to the Defense Intelligence Agency for review and comment his proposed CINCPAC instruction concerning procedures for handling requests for political asylum and temporary refuge. The instruction, S3B21.58, had been prepared in implementation of Defense Department Directive 2000.11 of 3 March 1972. CINCPAC's draft was forwarded to DIA for comment because of high level interest in this topic.3 The instruction was promulgated by CINCPAC on 24 July with the title "Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge."

(S) On 6 June CINCPAC provided to his component and subordinate unified commands, his representatives, and national level intelligence collection units

1. CINCPAC 2922592 Apr 72.
2. J23 HistSum Apr 72.
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001056, 5 May 72, Subj: Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge.

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in the PACOM the latest guidance received from the Interagency Defector Committee concerning policy and guidance for the handling of Chinese defectors. This supplemented formal guidance that had been provided by the DIA in February 1972 and CINCPAC Instruction S3821.54.1

PACOM Defense Analysis Center (PADAC)

In March 1969 the JCS had concluded that after the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, there would be a requirement for a PACOM-wide air defense analysis capability that would be able to focus on those areas that might pose a threat to PACOM forces during contingencies. CINCPAC's subsequent study of the matter encompassed the practicability and feasibility of integrating the PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility (PADAF), which CINCPACAF had established in Japan to fulfill a CINCPAC requirement, and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (PEC), attached to CINCPAC Headquarters and located in Hawaii. The study concluded that the merger was feasible, but CINCPAC recommended that integration should be deferred until the conclusion of hostilities in Southeast Asia.2

In 1971 CINCPAC had convened an ad hoc committee composed of representatives of the agencies involved and CINCPAC component commands to plan the merger. A plan was conceived and circulated at that time. Later that year an audit report from the Office of the Secretary of Defense concerning PACOM intelligence production management reiterated the desirability of merging the PADAF and PEC in the interests of effective utilization of resources and eliminating duplication.3

In March 1972 the Defense Intelligence Agency requested CINCPAC's views concerning the creation of a PACOM Defense Analysis Center (PADAC) in the near future. CINCPAC again recommended deferral of the creation of the PADAC until substantial savings in manpower and funds could be realized. The DIA concurred and the subject was not raised again in 1972.4

Service Attache Conferences

On 3 May 1972 the Defense Intelligence Agency announced a proposed schedule for Army and Air Force regional attache conferences to be held in Bangkok, Thailand during September for Army attaches and in March 1973 for

4. Ibid., which cited DIA DRO2537/172311Z Mar 72 (BOM), CINCPAC 142305Z Apr 72 (EX), and DIA 6803/202145Z Apr 72 (EX).
Air Force attaches. The DIA had been sponsoring a series of such conferences hosted by unified and specified commands. Bangkok, the DIA pointed out, was centrally located and required a minimum amount of travel for the majority of the attaches. On 17 May CINCPAC advised that he fully supported the conference concept, but he believed that greater benefit could be derived if the conference were held at the headquarters of the appropriate PACOM Service component to permit greater participation by appropriate staff elements of both of the components and CINCPAC.1

(U) The Air Attaches conference was held 11-15 September, and as CINCPAC had recommended, at Hickam Air Force Base. Attending, in addition to attaches from all PACOM countries, were representatives of the DIA, CINCPACAF, and CINCPAC. Presentations by CINCPAC staff personnel concerned PACOM Intelligence Collection Operations and the PACOM Drug Abuse Program.2

Relocation of Naval Attache in Pakistan

(Down) On 14 June the Defense Intelligence Agency advised CINCPAC that the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad had received a note of 3 June from the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting that the American Legation, U.S. Naval Attache (ALUSNA), Defense Attache Office (DAO) Karachi, transfer to Islamabad not later than 30 June 1972. Although no reason was cited, it was believed that the request resulted from a recent Pakistani decision to move Pakistan Navy headquarters to Islamabad as soon as possible. The DIA was concerned that the representational mission to Karachi would be degraded if the ALUSNA and a proposed Assistant ALUSNA (A/ALUSNA) augmentation were required to reside in Islamabad. The DIA expressed a preference that as a minimum the A/ALUSNA reside in Karachi. CINCPAC's views and comments were requested.3

(Up) CINCPAC replied on 28 June. He said, "A move of the ALUSNA from Karachi to Islamabad will significantly degrade the U.S. capability to collect [data concerning] ship activity and movements." While it was difficult to assess the degree of degradation, CINCPAC believed that an estimate of 50 to 75 percent was reasonable. Further, the move would impose considerable inconvenience in coordinating U.S. ship visits and the conduct of representational activities. On the other hand, CINCPAC pointed out, to separate ALUSNA from the Pakistan Naval Headquarters was considered unacceptable, inasmuch as this would remove him from important intelligence sources. The ALUSNA moved to Islamabad.4

1. DIA 1452/031429Z May 72; CINCPAC 170423Z May 72.
2. J23 HistSum Sep 72, which included agenda of conference.
3. DIA 1735/141623Z Jun 72.
4. CINCPAC 280633Z Jun 72.
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SECTION II--SOUTHEAST ASIA

LINEBACKER Targeting

(U) During the LINEBACKER campaign against North Vietnam, which lasted 251 days (from 10 May 1972 to 15 January 1973), approximately 10,000 air strikes were carried out against 1,689 B.E. numbered targets. As the agency responsible for managing all tactical target intelligence activities for the Pacific Command, the CINCPAC Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/I) played a very active and important role in operation LINEBACKER.

(U) With the resumption of air strikes in the NVN heartland, a Tactical Targeting Section was formed within the Target Intelligence Branch. Manning for the new section came, primarily, from a reorganization of the Branch which provided seven officers and one civilian GS-13 for the Section. Enlisted manpower was provided from throughout the ACS/I. Additionally, USARPAC provided two warrant officers for a short period.

(U) During the last week in July, 1972, another reorganization took place which eliminated the new Tactical Targeting Section and integrated its personnel and functions into the Tactical Analysis Section. The prolonged air operations in North Vietnam had made a more permanent organizational structure highly desirable, and the revamped section answered this need.

(U) Providing for responsive targeting support to the JCS, DIA, SAC, CINCPAC Service components, field commanders, and the CINCPAC staff necessitated a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week operation. The dynamics of the LINEBACKER campaign required around-the-clock "Immediate/Flash" message traffic which frequently had to be coordinated through senior staff officers. Daily briefing requirements on target status and BDA produced an additional workload, as did various joint committees and staff working groups which required targeting representation. The majority of the routine work, however, was confined to strike validation of targets nominated by components, analysis of the enemy's targetable military capability, production of Significant Targeting Intelligence Summaries (STIS) and development of PACOM targeting priorities.

(U) As the office managing all Pacific Command tactical targeting efforts, the Tactical Targeting Section was extensively involved in coordination,


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primarily with the working level personnel, at CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, COMUSMACV, CINCSAC, DIA, and JCS. Coordination took many forms, including formal and informal meetings, staff visits, messages, and secure phone calls. There was a constant exchange of information on selection and validation of targets, on analytical assessments, on contingency planning, BDA, and on various other problems.

Authority

(TS) The initial LINEBACKER authority message announced the start "of an air campaign against enemy transportation and supply distribution system" in "NVN South of Chinese buffer zone," and validated 12 targets in the Hanoi/ Haiphong areas for strike. A follow-up message by JCS authorized a continuing effort "to destroy and disrupt POL and transportation resources and Lines of Communication (LOC) in NVN." This message established four guidelines which influenced targeting activities throughout the LINEBACKER campaign. These guidelines were implemented in a CINCPAC LINEBACKER Operation Order which delineated these authorities in more detail.

(TS) A subsequent CINCPAC message effected two major changes in the authorities framework within which the Targets Analysis Section worked, by authorizing:

a. Strikes against all rail and highway bridges, including bypasses, throughout North Vietnam outside the three restricted areas.

b. Armed reconnaissance against all choke points and fleeting transportation/interdiction targets outside the three restricted areas.

(TS) This JCS and CINCPAC guidance constituted the basic authority throughout LINEBACKER. New authority messages were issued by JCS at the end of each month for the coming month. None of these messages substantially altered the authorities issued earlier. Such authority changes were temporary and, generally, fell into four main categories: changes of policy regarding strikes in the Chinese buffer zone; changes in restrictions regarding strikes in the Hanoi and Haiphong buffer zones; temporary changes in policy regarding air strikes elsewhere in NVN; and changes regarding the employment of B-52s. Only two of these changes, those regarding strikes in the Chinese buffer zone and those regarding employment of B-52s, directly

1. For the operational view and initial guidelines, see Chapter IV--Operations, pp. 158-160; CINCPAC 032315Z Jun 72.
2. CINCPAC 040425Z Jun 72 (EX).
affected targeting activities. The cumulative effect of these authority changes, however, had a major impact on the Tactical Analysis Section. For example, the final major authorities change authorized around-the-clock tactical air and B-52 strikes in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, in what became known as LINEBACKER II.¹

Priorities

(TS) Initially, the priorities for Operation LINEBACKER were quite general. The CINCPAC message which authorized a continuing air campaign against NVN stated that:²

Initial efforts should give first priority to POL storage facilities as well as rail LOC in area between Chinese Buffer Zone and Hanoi, Hanoi and Haiphong areas, and LOC leading out of Hanoi/Haiphong complex to South. Also, strike remaining POL and LOC targets in route packages one, two, three and four.

(TS) Within two weeks, however, a CINCPAC message to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT pointed out that:³

(1) In the current interdiction campaign against NVN, we have been given a significant advantage with the closing of Haiphong Port. I consider it imperative that we fully exploit this advantage by concentrating our strike efforts against targets that will impede the enemy's offensive to the greatest extent possible.

(2) With the closing of Haiphong Port, the roads and rail lines from China become NVN's most viable alternate method of resupply. DIA estimates that if NVN conducts unrestricted, around-the-clock operations employing adequate trucks and rolling stock, these roads and rail lines can handle almost double the amount of supplies that previously have been moved through Haiphong. Thus interdiction of these LOC's must be given highest priority.

1. JCS 261720Z Jun 72, 301946Z Jul 72, 310056Z Aug 72, 301528Z Sep 72, 301619Z Oct 72, and 292353Z Nov 72; JCS 150147Z Dec 72, as amended (EX).
2. CINCPAC 100734Z May 72 (EX).
3. CINCPAC 240403Z May 72 (EX).
(3) Accordingly, to insure that proper weight is applied to key interdiction points plus selected major war supporting resources, the following general priorities are established within existing authorities:

(a) Interdiction of the Northeast rail line from the Red River to the Chinese border.

(b) Interdiction of the Northwest rail line.

(c) Interdiction of the rail and road nets between China and the Hanoi/Haiphong area and from route packages V, VI-A, and VI-B to the DMZ (to include highways 1, 4, 12, 15 and 16).

(d) Destruction of important POL targets.

(e) Destruction of important power targets.

(f) Destruction of all other approved target categories, particularly rolling stock and other mobile assets as well as supplies, by means of Armed Recce.

(TS) CINCPAC messages in June 1972, continued to emphasize the necessity for concentrating strike efforts on route packages 5 and 6. By July 1972, concern over alternate means of moving supplies resulted in a reformulation of the priorities. On 1 July, another CINCPAC message established these amended priorities:

Priority I: LOC's outside of designated restricted areas with particular emphasis on rail and highway bridges and choke points between Hanoi/Haiphong and the Chinese buffer zone. In addition to strike efforts against logistical throughput routes from China to NVN and to NVA forces in RVN, particular attention must be given to strikes against feeder routes and transshipment points.

Priority II: POL facilities and systems with emphasis on areas from Hai Duong to Kep, thence North and Northeast to the PRC buffer zone (the POL pipeline).

1. CINCPAC 110354Z Jun 72, 230222Z Jun 72, 012119Z Jul 72, (all EX).

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Priority III: Motorized vehicles, rail rolling stock, and waterborne logistics craft involved in movement of supplies into NVN and from NVN to the RVN battlefield.

(75) In August 1972, these priorities were further elaborated upon in an attempt to attain more effective utilization of air assets. LINEBACKER target priorities were realigned to include appropriate sub-categories and to classify war supporting systems.

(75) Despite the reiterated emphasis on route packages 5 and 6, there was continuing high-level concern during August over the low number of strikes in the upper route packages. The Chairman, JCS observed:

You should note that the picture as seen from here is that a disproportionate share of the air effort is programmed in the NVN panhandle at the expense of targets in the Northern route packages. To illustrate my point, less than 25 percent of the validated targets in RP V and VI have been struck. I recognize that many validated targets may never be struck for excellent reasons. Nonetheless, only 74 new targets were struck during July. The July totals including re-strikes show only 5 targets were struck in RP V, 48 in RP VI-A and 172 in RP VI-B. While the need for strong interdiction operations in the lower route packages is certainly appreciated, the limited weight of effort against key targets in the Northern area of NVN raised questions as to whether we are holding our priorities.

(75) Two later CINC PAC messages in August restated this concern and suggested measures to help resolve the situation, and, on 25 September 1972, the CINC PAC ACS/I recommended that the priorities be changed as follows:

(1) In order to stress the importance of Priority One targets in route packages 5, 6A, and 6B, recommend inland/waterlines of communications be expanded as follows:

(a) Rail and highway bridges (authorized for strike) in route packages 5, 6A, 6B.

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1. CINC PAC 022217Z Aug 72 (EX); For a description of the realigned priorities, see Chapter IV—Operations, pp. 160-163.
2. JCS 062018Z Aug 72 (EX).
3. CINC PAC 090225Z Aug 72, 232250Z Aug 72, (both EX).
(b) Choke points, transshipment points (authorized for strike) in route packages 5, 6A, 6B.

(c) Concentrations of locomotive and/or rolling stock between PRC buffer zone and Hanoi/Haiphong restricted zones.

(2) Priority Two is transportation targets in route packages 4 and below:

(a) Rail and highway bridges.

(b) Choke points, transshipment points.

(c) LOC construction vehicles/equipment, other locomotives and rolling stock, watercraft, and concentrations of trucks and other vehicles.

(3) The current Priority Two (POL) should be moved to Priority Three.

(4) Priority Three should be changed to Priority Four.

(5) Priority Four consists of war supporting systems; within this priority move electric power from H to D and relabel present Priorities D through G accordingly.

(TS) The change in priority for electric power reflected CINCPAC tactical target analysts' belief that the NVN power grid, formerly heavily damaged, was being regenerated. The change in POL emphasis reflected the general lack of success of air strikes against this system.

(TS) Subsequently, in still another effort to emphasize the high priority of the Northern route packages, a triangular "Heartland" area was established and a series of Air Intentions Messages (AIMS) was issued by CINCPAC to this end. Targeting priorities, however, as opposed to operational priorities, remained unchanged until operation LINEBACKER II, which started in December.

(TS) Except for command and control facilities, no categorical priorities were established for LINEBACKER II, the emphasis being instead on geographic

1. The Heartland coordinates were VK 130883 to XK 882348 to XH 257302; CINCPAC 120208Z Oct 72 (EX); also see Chapter IV--Operations, p. 163.
priorities: lucrative targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. This new approach to targeting worked extremely well, but it later became clear that the category, or systems, approach to priorities could not be entirely abandoned. As BGEN Eugene F. Tighe, CINCPAC ACS/I, put it in a 16 January 1973 memorandum:

The JCS directives which kicked off LINEBACKER II put a premium on quickly bringing falling bombs to targets close to the center of North Vietnam's government. No similar undertaking should be made before first assuring, also, as high safety/low risk conditions for our forces as possible.... as a first order of business for a LINEBACKER III operation, it would appear prudent to deal with NVN defenses as a priority 1 target system, a defense target system which must be blunted at the onset of new operations. These attacks require a substantial portion of our all-weather F111, A7, and B-52 fleet operating against SAM sites, GCI sites, EW facilities, radio facilities, air fields, SAM support facilities. These attacks must continue on a coordinated basis prior to and during all subsequent strikes against "Heartlands" targets. It is also important that our tactical forces conduct a methodical presuppression of defense, in order to create defense corridors for follow-on strike forces.

(TS) The history of LINEBACKER priorities was marked by two key trends. The first was a trend toward progressively more explicit categorical, or systems, priorities, complete with subsystems. This trend, backed by development of a systems approach to target analysis, served to effectively focus strike activity on the most lucrative systems. This trend, however, could not focus strike efforts geographically, and from June through October a series of operational messages addressing geographic priorities was issued. Thus the second trend was toward increasingly restrictive geographic priorities in order to prevent dissipation of force applications. Force applications were first concentrated in route packages 5 and 6, then the more compact heartland area, then just the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. In retrospect, a strictly systems approach to priorities appeared to be inadequate; except for defenses and small but vital target systems, precedence should be given to focusing strike efforts against a combination of key target systems and geographic areas.

1. For an operational recapitulation of LINEBACKER effectiveness, see Chapter IV--Operations, pp. 165, 166.
Target Selection/Validation

From a targeting view, there were two key factors bearing on the successful completion of any modern air campaign. First, the selection of the most lucrative targets, whose destruction would have an immediate and hopefully lasting effect on the enemy's war making potential. Second, the correct application of forces (in strength and frequency) to achieve the desired level of damage to the selected targets.

During the early stages of LINEBACKER I, the prime objective was to achieve maximum interdiction of supplies in North Vietnam. To support this objective, the initial priorities were POL and LOC. The initial POL targets were the large POL storage areas in and around Hanoi. The LOC most heavily targeted were those rail yards and bridges on the Northeast and Northwest rail lines, the Thai Nguyen loop, and large storage areas in the Hanoi/Haiphong areas.

Initially, the Targeting Section selected and validated lucrative targets as rapidly as possible, in order to give field commanders the operational flexibility they needed. During the first three to four weeks of Operation LINEBACKER, virtually all target selections and validations were initiated by the Section. By the end of May, 590 targets had been validated; by early June, the Components were submitting validation requests regularly, and targeting personnel began spending more time on pure validation work than on the basic target selections.

Of the 1,138 targets validated during all of LINEBACKER, over half were validated in the first three weeks, and almost all of these were selected, researched, and validated by CINCPAC personnel. By the end of June 1972, the list of validated targets numbered approximately 900. Although a total of 1,138 targets were validated during LINEBACKER, there were only 721 currently valid targets at the end of the campaign. This net decrease in the number of validated targets was the result of an extensive refining of the target list after June 1972. As a result of the refining, the 238 additions to the validated list after June 1972 were offset by the removal of 417 targets from the validated list to other appendices of the CINCPAC LINEBACKER master target list (due to target destruction, unsuitability, or JCS restrictions).

1. CINCPAC 100427Z May 72 (EX); JCS 092356Z May 72 (EX).
2. Did not include bridges validated under blanket authority provided by CINCPAC 040425Z Jun 72 (EX).
After this initial period, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT nominated targets that they considered lucrative in their assigned areas of operations north of 20 degrees North. As CINCPAC received these nominations they were screened for duplication, location inside of any restricted areas, and relationship to known or suspected POW camps. If the targets satisfied these screening criteria they were either added to the CINCPAC master target list or, if they were located within a restricted zone, the nominations were forwarded to the JCS for their approval. When JCS approved the restricted zone targets, they were then added to the CINCPAC master target list and validated for strike. To cope with the rapidly fluctuating targeting requirements, the CINCPAC master target list was broken down into five basic appendices:

- Appendix I included all targets presently authorized for strike. All targets were assigned a CINCPAC target number as they were added to Appendix I and this numbering system helped to account for all targets that had ever been authorized for strike. This appendix was used by the component commands for all strike planning in NVN.

- Appendix II was used to list all targets that had been nominated to the JCS for validation but as yet had not been validated. As JCS validation was received, these targets were then placed in Appendix I.

- Appendix III was used to list all targets that were awaiting CINCPAC approval. This list contained targets that CINCPAC questioned, either because they might be duplicative (i.e., two basic encyclopedia numbers (BEN) assigned to the same target), not military, or in a restricted category. As the status of these targets was clarified, they were moved to the appropriate appendix in the list.

- Appendix IV was used to list those targets no longer considered lucrative, either because they had been destroyed or abandoned. The main purpose of this appendix was to keep in sight those targets with possible regeneration potential. As these targets were regenerated they were added to the appropriate appendix.

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1. Restricted zones were: 10NM from the center of Hanoi (210137N/1064110E), 25NM from the PRC border in route package 5 and 30 NM from the PRC border in route package 6.
Appendix V, the last appendix of the target list, contained those targets to which JCS had applied permanent or semi-permanent restrictions.

(TS) As the LINEBACKER campaign continued, it became apparent that a more positive and rapid method of target selection and validation was required. Priorities were changing to include targets of high visibility and psychological impact. In order to accomplish this, three major steps were taken by CINCPAC. First, the CINCPAC Joint Targeting Committee was formed (1 Jun 72). Second, a CINCPACINST S3885.2 was promulgated, and thirdly, new procedures for target nominations were developed.

(TS) The CINCPAC Joint Targeting Committee was an ad hoc committee which contained representatives from CINCPAC and each Service component, and provided the medium for disseminating additional guidance for the management, production, and distribution of the CINCPAC LINEBACKER master target list and related products. This committee initially met twice each week, but later only on an "as required" basis. One immediate advantage of the committee was the ability to communicate changes in targeting priorities and CINCPAC requirements to the components who were making the target nominations. Additional tangible results were the exchange of ideas on targeting and weaponeering between CINCPAC and the components, and the establishment of smoother and better working relations between the various analysts.

(TS) The publication of CINCPACINST S3885.2, "Pacific Command LINEBACKER Target Management Program," was another major step in tactical targeting. This instruction established the concept, policy, guidance, and Service component responsibilities in support of all PACOM LINEBACKER targeting. As a result of this instruction, confusion as to the responsibilities and priorities amongst the components was virtually eliminated.

(TS) The third and probably most important step taken was the development of new target nominations procedures. Prior to these procedures, targets were nominated by the components by message to CINCPAC. This message would usually only list the target name, BEN, and coordinates. This required CINCPAC to establish the worth of the target, any restrictions on the target, latest bomb damage assessment, and effect of damage of this target to the overall effort of the North Vietnamese. CINCPAC had neither the personnel nor basic data (i.e., latest photography, etc.) to accomplish this in a timely manner. These new target nomination procedures tasked the components to:
(1) Maintain status of targets in assigned areas.

(2) Conduct intelligence analysis of assigned areas.

(3) Submit target nominations to CINCPAC in their LINEBACKER area of cognizance in accordance with established procedures.

(4) Recommend changes to targets as desired damage levels or other target status changes were achieved or detected. (BDA review.)

(5) Insure coordination of targeting matters through the CINCPAC Joint Targeting Committee.

(6) Provide status reports as required.

[TS] In addition, the components were later tasked to do a detailed analysis of each target nominated and to submit these nominations in a format used by the JCS.

Reconnaissance Collection Requirements

1. CINCPAC 090341Z May 72; CINCPAC 160351Z May 72.
1. CINCPAC 01225Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 070327Z Jul 72.
2. CINCPAC 172134Z Jul 72; 7AF/IN/260320Z Jul 72; CINCPAC 272345Z Jul 72.
1. J23 HistSum Sep 72; CINCPAC 232351Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 270736Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPACAF 161900Z Sep 72; CINCPAC 302327Z Sep 72.
1. CINCPAC 010152Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 030702Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 080315Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 100205Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 300920Z Nov 72.
2. CINCPAC 182245Z Nov 72.
3. JCS 3285/111652Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 112323Z Nov 72; CINCPACAF 300318Z Nov 72.
4. 99 SRS 221005Z Nov 72; J23 HistSum Nov 72.
Aerial Photographs of Southeast Asia Crash Sites

On 7 December COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC's assistance in tasking an appropriate agency to screen past and current photography in support of crash site inspection planning. COMUSMACV anticipated that one of the most difficult tasks facing the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in its attempt to resolve the status of those missing in action and to recover the remains of those killed in action whose bodies had not yet been recovered was in actually locating the crash site. Past experience had shown that the accumulation of jungle growth made it extremely difficult to find accurately reported sites by either air or ground search. In a relatively few incidents, COMUSMACV continued, aerial photographs of the site made at the time of the incident had proved extremely beneficial in relocating the site. Although MACV photo interpretation personnel continuously screened aerial photography for crash sites, film was only maintained for from 90 to 120 days, depending on the type of mission that had been flown. He asked that CINCPAC task an appropriate agency to screen photography in support of crash site inspection planning. CINCPAC asked his components for their comments.\(^2\)

CINCPACAF indicated that high-level strategic imagery was available from January 1972 and medium/low-level tactical reconnaissance imagery back through October 1972. He indicated it might be possible for the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group to provide imagery of 1972 crash sites (51 of them). He recommended that 1971 and earlier crash sites be researched in Washington where photography was available.\(^3\)

CINCPACFLT replied that the coverage held was primarily of the command's area of interest and only for the last year. As less than 10 of the crashes had occurred in that time, he recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency be requested to do the research.\(^4\)

1. J23 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 230242Z Dec 72.
2. COMUSMACV 070230Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 120418Z Dec 72.
3. CINCPACAF 190233Z Dec 72.
4. CINCPACFLT 262153Z Dec 72.
CINCPAC provided specific guidance to each of the three commands to search commensurate with their holdings and capabilities. He requested that DIA research appropriate and available film holdings prior to 1972 for crash site locations.²

Capture and Exploitation of Soviet Missiles

In April 1972 the SA-7 missile (STRELLA) was employed by North Vietnam for the first time. This was a ground-launched infrared homing missile (for which no U.S. countermeasures had yet been developed). There was high interest in securing one or more of the new weapons for exploitation in the Continental United States to develop effective countermeasures. On 21 May COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that a controlled source had offered to sell a complete SA-7 missile for $50,000, payable upon receipt of the weapon in U.S. hands. The Department of the Army, speaking for the Defense Intelligence Agency, provided approval to COMUSMACV for the purchase, providing a fund cite and shipping instructions.³

On 24 May, however, the Commander Seventh Fleet revealed that two SA-7s had been captured intact by the 39th Rangers (Army of the RVN) south of the My Chanh River during operations the day before. The DIA, therefore, requested that COMUSMACV delay the operation to purchase the missile from the controlled source.⁴

On 26 May the DIA revealed that only one of the two captured missiles was enroute to the CONUS; the other had been detained in the RVN, apparently by officials of the government or military forces. The DIA requested that COMUSMACV take all possible action to secure and forward for exploitation the

1. CINCUSARPAC 292133Z Dec 72.
2. CINCPAC 032215Z Jan 73.
3. J23 HistSum May 72, which cited COMUSMACV 210940Z May 72 (RODCA) and DAMI-D00-H 222115Z May 72 (RODCA).
4. COMSEVENTHFLT 240836Z May 72; J23 HistSum May 72, which cited DIA DC-4B 7186/242016Z May 72 (RODCA).
remaining missile as well as any secured in the future, emphasizing the importance of early exploitation to allied military operations. CINCPAC strongly concurred on 27 May, advising COMUSMACV to place special emphasis when dealing with appropriate RVN authorities on the immediate benefit to U.S. and RVN military forces. 1

(5) On 29 May CINCPACFLT revealed the capture of another SA-7, this time on 27 May. 2

(5) The initial evaluation of the SA-7 was provided by the U.S. Army Missile Intelligence Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama on 29 May. The missile had been examined by representatives of that agency, the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Facility at Indian Head, Maryland, and the Central Intelligence Agency at Indian Head. This report contained a detailed description of the missile and its components. 3

(5) On 10 June the JCS emphasized the continuing need for additional missiles for testing purposes and requested that all steps be taken to forward immediately all captured SA-7s, including one captured by the Vietnamese that was being retained by them for display purposes. The JCS proposed forwarding to COMUSMACV facsimiles suitable for display purposes to replace the authentic missile. On 13 June CINCPAC forwarded to COMUSMACV the JCS concern for immediate forwarding of available missiles, to include the missile that COMUSMACV had indicated could be purchased. 4

(5) On 10 June COMUSMACV reported the capture of another missile; this one was forwarded immediately to the CONUS. 5

(5) On 15 June COMUSMACV requested four full-scale models, to be constructed by national level agencies and forwarded to Vietnam, to replace the captured missiles for display purposes. That same day he reported the release of a third missile by the Vietnamese, which was shipped immediately to the CONUS. Also on 15 June, he reported that he had received the first model SA-7, which he later described as "outstanding." At the end of 1972 the SA-7

1. DIA 261944Z May 72; CINCPAC 270245Z May 72.
2. J23 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPACFLT 291115Z May 72 (RODCA).
3. CG USAHICOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL 011800Z Jun 72.
4. J23 HistSum Jun 72, which cited JCS 7107/101804Z Jun 72 (EX) and CINCPAC 130302Z Jun 72 (EX).
remained formidable against low performance aircraft not equipped with infrared countermeasures equipment.¹

North Vietnam Radar Study

(§) The PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (PEC) conducted a continuing study in 1972 to locate and identify all radars in North Vietnam in order to neutralize the enemy defenses against U.S. air and surface operations, particularly those associated with LINEBACKER I and POCKET MONEY operations. (LINEBACKER was the massive air campaign against North Vietnam's supply and distribution systems, POCKET MONEY the campaign to mine principal harbors and rivers of North Vietnam.) In view of the lack of precise fixing of the radar locations by monitoring radar emissions, however, it became necessary to confirm the radar locations by other means. CINCPAC, therefore, proposed to CINCUSARPAC that a study be conducted using all recent photography to correlate and confirm all ELINT information. Inasmuch as CINCPAC's PEC had no photo exploitation capability, the study would require CINCUSARPAC's support with the temporary assignment of photo interpreters and their equipment in support of the PEC, to begin about 1 August.²

(§) CINCUSARPAC agreed to provide support, utilizing in-place personnel and facilities at AR PAC, and proposed a plan for implementing the study. The requirement to "read out" film at the PEC, however, resulted in modification of the plan, and two USARPAC image interpreters with their equipment were provided by CINCUSARPAC to the PEC on 1 August.³

(§) During August, imagery obtained by GIANT SCALE, BLUE TREE, and BUFFALO HUNTER reconnaissance programs was exploited by the interpreters. Progress was made toward isolating an unidentified T-8209 signal. Research was also conducted on an unidentified missile and GUN DISH radar deployed to North Vietnam. In addition, exploitation for unlocated radars listed in the Electronic Order of Battle continued.⁴

(§) On 29 September CINCPAC advised CINCUSARPAC of study results to that time. CINCPAC noted, "A candidate for the unidentified, high-interest T-8209

1. Ibid., which cited COMUSMACV 151015Z Jun 72 and 250930Z Jun 72 (both EX); COMUSMACV 261354Z Jun 72.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001558, 17 Jul 72, Subj: North Vietnam Radar Study (U).
3. CINCUSARPAC ltr, GPIN-TI, 25 Jul 72, Subj: North Vietnam Radar Study (U); J23 HistSum Jul 72.
4. PACOM PEC ltr PE-72-1933, 6 Sep 72, Subj: North Vietnam Radar Study; interim report (U).
emitter as a radome/environmental cover, similar to the FIRE CAN, and mounted on a GAZ-63 vehicle has been identified." He advised that work continue on the other matters under study and requested that three additional image interpreters be assigned to assist.¹

(U) The study was still under way at the end of the year.

Activation of SAC Mobile Processing Center

CINCPAC recommended that the MPC exploit only photography of high interest NVN offensive areas in the RVN in MR I and in southern NVN. He advised that previously used processing/exploitation procedures should be reimplemented as soon as support for the offensive was no longer required, in view of the greater exploitation capability of the Sentinel Aids data base and the sophisticated film processing quality control capability available at the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (at Hickam AFB, Hawaii). He recommended that reversion to permanent procedures should be accomplished as soon as the crisis had passed or whenever it was determined that utilization of the MPC was not an optimum arrangement.²

(S) The DIA provided all concerned with processing and duplication procedures and established the requirement for MPC preparation of Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (IPIR) covering objectives in the high interest area. The 548th was to exploit imagery from other areas.)³

(S) The SAC Reconnaissance Center announced that the MPC was operationally ready on 8 April. CINCPAC promulgated additional handling procedures on 14 April to insure that high interest mission products, which by this time included

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1. CINCPAC 1tr Ser 002134, 29 Sep 72, Subj: North Vietnam Radar Study at PEC (U). See also Chapter IV--Military Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations in Southeast Asia.
2. CINCPAC 080001Z Apr 72; J23 HistSum Apr 72.
3. J23 HistSum Apr 72, which cited SSO DIA 082240Z Apr 72.
bomb damage assessment in North Vietnam, were available in Southeast Asia for use there and for transmission via COMPASS LINK if necessary.  

(§) On 22 April CINCPAC recommended that the CINCSAC dedicated aircraft, tasked to transport selected imagery of B-52 bomb damage assessment in North Vietnam to the DIA for immediate use, also deliver the MPC-produced original negatives to Hawaii. While the SAC crew rested, the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron would produce duplicate positives for Washington customers, after which the SAC aircraft would carry all Washington area destined mission products to the DIa. The DIA non-concurred, however, in view of SAC routing from Kadena via Alaska instead of Hawaii.  

COMPASS LINK

(§) COMPASS LINK was a system for transmitting imagery by military satellite. Transmission was from Vietnam/Southeast Asia through Hawaii to Washington. In 1972 work was completed to modify the Oahu COMPASS LINK facility to achieve a capability to transmit from it. Installation of the KG-34 encryption/decryption device at the Hickam Air Force Base facility was completed on 24 May, but CINCPAC's Air Force and Navy components were still acquiring additional required items. The cables, plugs, etc., required for the COMPASS LINK van and interconnect facility were acquired by CINCPACAF. The CINCPACFLT requirements for splitting units for Waiala and Helemano were funded by the Naval Communications Station. (Costs had risen from an estimated $750 to $4,700 in about a year and a half; this was because of the increased cost of Lenkurk Modules ($1,800 each) and labor.) The installation was completed and on 28 November the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group initiated a test transmission of imagery to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The test proved successful and CINCPAC authorized the 548th to transmit operational COMPASS LINK imagery beginning 1 December.  

(§) As a result of renewed planning involving changes in configuration to the COMPASS LINK system, the DIA tasked the commanders of all unified and specified commands to reconsider their requirements for rapid transmission of imagery. The DIA advised that changes involved modification of each terminal to permit a transmit and receive (half duplex) capability, and noted that the Hawaii terminal had been so modified. Modification of the Washington

1. CINCPAC 140422Z Apr 72.
2. CINCPAC 220425Z Apr 72; DIA 242323Z Apr 72.
and Southeast Asia terminals was given high priority in view of the limitations on future reconnaissance operations in Southeast Asia. The DIA further asked the CINC's to explore their requirements, to include transmission of All-Source material. CINCPAC responded with his previously stated position that a high-mode, receive and transmit capability for the Oahu terminal, and a receive as well as a transmit capability for the other PACOM terminals was the minimum to employ fully the COMPASS LINK potential. In addition, CINCPAC promulgated procedures pertaining to the use of sanitized All-Source imagery received by the COMPASS LINK system.¹

(²) The 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron (RITS) at Tan Son Nhut operated the COMPASS LINK facility in the RVN. In February 1972 the JCS directed that the COMPASS LINK terminal at Tan Son Nhut be deactivated. CINCPAC recommended relocation to Udorn, Thailand in conjunction with the remaining Southeast Asia reconnaissance assets. The most favorable time for the relocation would have been the end of the 1972 dry season. Downtime could have been limited to 5 - 7 days by using a mobile terminal capable of supporting COMPASS LINK until the terminal was moved, about 2 or 3 months. The 12th RITS had been expected to deactivate on 1 June 1972, and tactical reconnaissance and BUFFALO HUNTER (drones) processing and exploitation were to have been assumed by the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn on 1 May 1972. These actions were delayed indefinitely following the commencement of the major North Vietnamese offensive in the spring of 1972.²

(³) By December, the operational activity in Cambodia had intensified in almost direct proportion to the reports of an imminent cease-fire in Vietnam. In accordance with a request from DIA, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to provide expeditious processing and read-out of tactical reconnaissance flown for ARC LIGHT (B-52) BDA in four primary areas of Cambodia. Also requested were special IPIRs for three additional Cambodian areas of interest on a specific GIANT NAIL mission flown on 7 December 1972. All significant, positive BDA was transmitted to the Washington area via COMPASS LINK because of the high-level interest in Cambodia ARC LIGHT BDA. Thereafter, CINCPAC directed that BDA of all ARC LIGHT strikes in Cambodia be expeditiously processed, exploited, reported, and forwarded via COMPASS LINK. These expedited procedures applied to FACE VALUE, GIANT NAIL, and GIANT SCALE reconnaissance programs.³

3. J23 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 08/23/46Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 13/03/38Z Dec 72.
### BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

**STEEL TIGER - Laos**  
(Destroyed/Damaged)

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<tr>
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<td>11/4</td>
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Source: J24-MISSA Recurring Requests 52.
### BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

**BARREL ROLL - Laos**

(Destroyed/Damaged)

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|    | KBA |    |    |    |    | 0  | 1  | 11 | 11 | 37 | 51 |
|----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Sorties | 2,219 | 1,798 | 1,712 | 609 | 231 | 66 | 43 | 225 | 688 | 696 | 957 | 1,143 |

Source: J24-MISSA Recurring Requests 52.
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<th>POL Areas/Drums</th>
<th>Staging/Supply Areas</th>
<th>Buildings</th>
<th>LOC</th>
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</table>

Source: J24-MISSA Recurring Requests 52.
Post-Hostilities Intelligence Planning for Vietnam

(5) On 28 January 1972 CINCPAC reminded COMUSMACV of the need for increased efforts to complete planning for continuity of intelligence collection following U.S. withdrawal from the RVN. CINCPAC stressed the need for increased emphasis toward establishing intelligence stay-behind operations. He asked for early identification of outside assistance that would be needed and requested that CINCPAC be kept advised regarding progress to permit him to estimate a date by which a viable continuity capability would be established. CINCPAC's efforts in this matter had begun in 1968 to secure a complete, viable continuity plan. COMUSMACV had initiated planning, but had not yet completed the mechanism necessary to control a stay-behind apparatus in the event of a complete U.S. withdrawal.

(5) On 4 February COMUSMACV provided a status report on overall planning, but indicated reservations concerning two objectives of the CINCPAC post-hostilities intelligence planning. CINCPAC replied on 23 February, stating pleasure at the progress attained thus far, but reaffirming the need for insuring fulfillment of long-term objectives by immediate and careful stay-behind planning. CINCPAC reaffirmed the need for a post-hostilities Human Resources Collection Directive and indicated that action had been taken already to develop such a directive through contacts with the Defense Intelligence Agency.²

(5) CINCPAC's Intelligence Plan 2-72 (Relocation) was promulgated on 17 November. This was the CINCPAC plan for relocation of intelligence activities from the RVN and continuation of support of Southeast Asia operations. The plan was revised late in December to reflect changes based on comments and recommendations from the DIA. Also in December, CINCPAC published Annex G to the plan, Counterintelligence and Security, dealing with contingency planning for the RVN and post-hostilities organization.³

(5) In one specific planning matter based on U.S. Force withdrawals, on 27 June the Air Force had indicated intent to return operational control of Detachment 6 of the 7602d USAF Air Intelligence Group to the Headquarters of that group at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia because of reduced U.S. strength in

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1. J23 HistSum Jan 72, which cited CINCPAC 280311Z Jan 72 (RODCA).
2. J23 HistSum Feb 72, which cited CINCPAC 230254Z Feb 72 (RODCA).
3. J21 HistSum Dec 72, which cited CINCPAC 1tr Ser 000299, 17 Nov 72, Subj: Intelligence Relocation Planning, and CINCPAC 1tr Ser 000328, 26 Dec 72, Subj: Change #5 to CINCPAC Intelligence Plan 2-72; J23 HistSum Dec 72, which included a copy of the annex.
Vietnam (reduced 7th Air Force strength) and the need for establishment of
closer operational control in that situation. The Air Force Chief of Staff
asked for CINCPAC's concurrence. CINCPAC, however, did not concur. On 26
July he informed the Air Force Chief of Staff that he considered that as long
as COMUSMACV's mission remained as then constituted, operational control over
in-country intelligence units must remain with COMUSMACV/7th Air Force.¹

Estimates of Infiltration into the RVN

The CINCPAC Intelligence Coordination Group continued to estimate
North Vietnamese infiltration into the RVN. These estimates were revised as
additional information became available, but the following table lists the
estimates held at the end of 1972 for the period from 1 January 1968:²

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<td>2,800</td>
<td>900</td>
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Total | 241,700 | 100,100 | 57,000 | 70,300 | 147,000 |

Grand Total: 616,100

1. CSAF 271745Z Jun 72; CINCPAC 260225Z Jul 72.
Organizational Assets and Assignments

(C) (S) CINCPAC was advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency that it recommended disestablishment of Detachment H of the 500th Military Intelligence Group and Detachment 4 of the 1021st USAF Field Activities Squadron, as soon as practicable but not later than 1 July 1972. Strongly recommended that the detachments not be deactivated.

(S) (U) On 1 April the Air Force Chief of Staff advised CINCPAC that Detachment 4 would be deactivated before the end of FY 72.

(U) Both detachments continued in operation throughout 1972.

2. J23 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CSAF INFPA 010116Z Apr 72 and CINCPAC 122032Z Apr 72 (both RODCA).
(S). In another matter, on 5 June CINCPAC was advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency that the Department of the Army intended to discontinue controlled collection operations of the U.S. Army Field Activities Command (USAFC) worldwide. The DIA requested an impact statement concerning the effect of this announcement on intelligence activities within the PACOM. CINCPAC, on 20 June, advised that there were no anticipated major problems.

1. J2333 HistSum May 72, which cited CINCPAC 161901Z May 72.
2. J2333 HistSum May 72; CINCPAC 122102Z May 72; CINCPAC 200303Z May 72.
3. J23 HistSum Jun 72, which cited DIA DR 1348/052149Z Jun 72 and CINCPAC 200300Z Jun 72 (both RODCA).
Management Review

The HUMINT program was continually evaluated throughout the year by CINCPAC, both through routine operations evaluation and analysis reports and through special studies conducted from time to time. The evaluation and analysis reports were prepared semi-annually with various organizations on different schedules to report; following review at CINCPAC the reports were forwarded to the Defense Intelligence Agency with CINCPAC's comments.2

Early in April the DIA advised that it had determined the existence of security weaknesses in HUMINT operational techniques in certain operational areas. As a result, CINCPAC conducted a comprehensive review of HUMINT collection activity in the PACOM. He advised each of his component and subordinate unified commands and certain other agencies on the methods to be used in their reviews. On 19 April CINCPAC forwarded a comprehensive analysis of HUMINT collection activity in the PACOM, including specific assessments in each operational area of interest, to the DIA. CINCPAC's conclusions included:3

a. The comprehensive review was an especially valuable requirement to force evaluation of potentially embarrassing operational techniques and to require review of existing regulations, directives, and guidance documents.

b. No operationally dangerous/unwarranted risks were discovered during conduct of the review.

c. There were no instances of failure to coordinate properly HUMINT collection activity with CAS or with DOD representatives.

d. CINCPAC has an existing program for continuous, periodic and on call review of all HUMINT activity within PACOM. The program continues to be effective as it is refined and improved.

1. DA/DAMI-D00/H/2318422 Aug 72; CINCPAC 260131Z Sep 72.
3. J2333 HistSum Apr 72, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 009044, 19 Apr 72 (RODCA).
(S) Another April request from the DIA concerned HUMINT. The DIA requested a report of significant HUMINT achievements during FY 72. The purpose of the request was to secure information to increase the visibility of the Defense Department's HUMINT activities within the decision making levels of government, and specifically to provide the DIA with information for briefings, studies, and papers designed for Congressional hearings and for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). CINCPAC forwarded the requested report on 5 July.

(S) On 12 September representatives of the PFIAB visited CINCPAC headquarters. The purpose of the visit was to gather data pertaining to a study underway by the board on the effectiveness of HUMINT, to include both Defense Department and CIA activities. The Representatives stated that the PFIAB was concerned that the progress in HUMINT collection had not kept pace with the progress achieved in technical collection. They recognized that the sums of money expended for technical collection were huge in relation to those expended for HUMINT. The PFIAB believed, however, that only HUMINT could supply certain types of intelligence, such as intentions and long-range plans. The thrust of their position was very positive. Beginning with the premise that HUMINT was essential, they attempted to formulate specific proposals for improving the entire HUMINT collection system and removing any barriers to efficient collection. Budgetary constraints, cost effectiveness, and personnel policies were scrutinized to determine the alignment of HUMINT capabilities with existing mission requirements, and in the process to determine the extent of changes needed to effect a truly responsive capability.

( ) The representatives asked if the shifting political situation was affecting the operational environment, particularly in relations with host country personnel. Army representatives at the meetings explained that they had experienced no problem in this regard and attributed this to contact with host country military personnel who were not as susceptible to political changes of their respective countries.

In discussions with representatives of CINCPACAF and the 7602d Air Intelligence Group, the PFIAB representatives indicated that existing sophisticated sensor systems were not providing the detailed information needed for Presidential policy decisions. Enemy intent, research and development capabilities, and other forms of non-sensor detecting information

1. J23 HistSum Apr 72, which cited DIA S/NFD-41160/DC-4A, 3 Apr 73; CINCPAC ltr 212B, Ser TS-23, 5 Jul 73.
could and should be obtained by HUMINT. In one specific recommendation, PACAF members suggested that the need was great for an all-source intelligence center that could fuse the results of collection production from each collection discipline and thereby provide knowledgeable requirements guidance to HUMINT collection agencies. Too often, it was explained, HUMINT collection requirements did not consider information already gathered by other means. In this same context, many HUMINT operatives lacked access to Special Intelligence and were therefore denied knowledge that could change HUMINT priority emphasis.

A representative of Commander Task Group 157.4 explained that CINCPACFLT had no theater level HUMINT collectors and that the CTF 157 was the national level collector directly under Commander, Naval Intelligence Command supporting PACFLT requirements. He discussed the size, location, and mission of the four PACOM based units and the relative smallness and newness of the organization. He stressed the need for centralized control and direction dictated by the worldwide maritime collection concept. The Navy representative advised that guidance in the form of Controlled Collection Objectives could be improved because they were too broad in scope.

During November CINCPAC published and distributed two HUMINT instructions: S3821.32A, Maintenance of HUMINT Project Files and S3821.63A, HUMINT Collection Objectives and Requirements in the PACOM.

Other HUMINT Activities

In March CINCUSARPAC queried CINCPAC concerning procedures for processing Knowledgeability Brief (KB) Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR). He advised that KB SICR sometimes remained in effect even after the KB source had been exploited and was no longer available. He questioned whether there was a need for additional administrative procedures to cancel promptly those unserviceable SICR. CINCPAC reemphasized existing guidance concerning those procedures, which was adequate, he said, if collectors, control authorities, and SICR originators acted promptly to process requirements and frame appropriate responses.

1. J23 HistSum Sep 72 which included an undated Memorandum for Record, Subj: Visit of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) [9].
3. CINCPAC 280002Z Apr 72.
On 5 May CINCPAC forwarded to the DIA his proposed revision to Part Four of the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 58-2, as requested. He noted that the establishment of a dedicated requirements procedure for human-source collection, which was the goal of the part of the manual under study, was supported by CINCPAC. He offered a number of specific recommendations.

Monthly meetings were held throughout the year by the CINCPAC HUMINT Board. At a 9 November meeting the board discussed duplication and overlapping collection requirements and activities. The board discussed whether or not unnecessary duplication of effort was occurring in the PACOM and means to correct any such condition. The distinction was drawn between duplication, which was undesirable and should be eliminated, and useful redundancy, which was introduced to eliminate ambiguity in tasking and prevention of overlapping or incomplete collection coverage of requirements. The consensus of attendees was that the checks and balances built into the HUMINT system prevented duplication. If duplicative requirements were received by collection units, because of money and manpower restraints they would certainly inform higher authority. Recent and continuing reductions in PACOM HUMINT personnel and funding resources without corresponding reductions in tasking were also addressed. The board agreed that reductions had reached the critical point while tasking was increasing and would continue to do so as sophisticated collection means were withdrawn from Southeast Asia.

In July CINCPAC had received an extensive study by the DIA and the U.S. Navy Ocean Surveillance Information Center concerning whether the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were using Free World merchant ships calling at Cambodian ports as a means of military supply. The evidence presented by the study had been inconclusive but the subject was of such importance that CINCPAC determined that it warranted further investigation. On 2 September CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV initiate collection action to prove or disprove the suspicions. COMUSMACV recommended against such efforts as he had no collection capability and since inspection of Free World shipping was prohibited. On 21 October CINCPAC requested that the DIA prepare and validate a Controlled

1. CINCPAC 050021Z May 72.
Collection Objective to authorize the development of a collection capability against commercial surface carriers suspected of shipping arms and munitions to Cambodia under the pretext of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

Transshipment of Cargo Destined for North Vietnam through Hong Kong/Canton

On 24 May CINCPAC advised that since the President's announcement of the mining of harbors in North Vietnam, five merchant ships carrying cargo destined for NVN had entered the port of Hong Kong and five others were enroute. Some of the ships had indicated the port of Canton as their destination and others listed Hong Kong. CINCPACFLT, indicating his concern to maintain an accurate disposition of all cargo bound ultimately for NVN, requested information on a number of specific areas, such as notification when a ship arrived with cargo declared for NVN; if it continued on to Canton or remained in Hong Kong; if it remained, was it off-loaded, and if so, the identity of the cargo, tonnage, and ultimate destination; any information pertaining to possible modes of shipment; and reports of sightings of any NVN ships arriving or leaving Hong Kong.

1. DIA ltr SSI-6963/DI-6E, 27 Jul 72, Subj: Sea Infiltration of Supplies via Flags of Convenience in Support of the VC/NVA (S); CINCPAC 022357Z Sep 72; COMUSMACV 140400Z Oct 72; CINCPAC 210345Z Oct 72.
On 25 May CINCPAC requested compliance with CINCPACFLT's request. He requested the Defense Intelligence Agency to task the Central Intelligence Agency to provide information concerning transshipment of cargo bound for NVN, in Hong Kong. He added the suggestion that consideration be given to the United Kingdom as a possible source of information.

Scientific and Technical Collection in the PACOM
Sec. 1.5. (e): how to use information

Scientific and technical collection agencies were organic to different organizations in each of the Services—the organizations that were their principal consumers.

On 22 April CINCPAC requested that his component commands and COMUS Japan provide comments and recommendations concerning the DIA observations; he advised of the forthcoming visit by the DIA representative. Upon receipt of the comments, CINCPAC advised that they would be used as background data with the DIA representative.

1. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 240607Z May 72; CINCPAC 250149Z May 72.
2. DIA 3061/172233Z Apr 72.
3. CINCPAC 220427Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 292339Z Apr 72.
CINCPAC took the position that the unified command was the proper coordination authority for these matters, under JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces and DIA Manual 58-11.

The DIA representative visited Hawaii from 1 to 3 May, meeting with CINCPAC and his component commanders to discuss with appropriate personnel his reasons for the visit and the manner in which he hoped to accomplish his purpose. CINCPAC and the component commands restated their positions that the unified command was properly the coordination authority.

On 24 July the DIA Director provided CINCPAC with the results of the field study. He agreed that the requirements tasking procedures should be designed to minimize the possibility of duplication in the collection effort. This, he acknowledged, was largely a DIA problem and he said he had directed his staff to take appropriate corrective action in that regard. He believed that collection resources should be realigned within the Services; HUMINT collection, for example, would be grouped with other basic collection elements, rather than with elements it supported, such as scientific and technical production. It followed that control and direction of those collection resources within the Military Departments should be vested in the Service Intelligence Chiefs, as was the case already in the Navy. He believed this would preclude duplication of effort, reduce undesirable visibility created by the large number of separate collection elements overseas, and also obtain the most mileage from dwindling resources.

3. DIA ltr S-46,052/DC-4B, 24 Jul 72, Subj: Coordination of S&T Collection Activities in PACOM (U).
Nothing further was heard on this matter during 1972.  

Two other matters arose in 1972 regarding scientific and technical collection agencies. COMUSMACV requested this contact to offset the withdrawal of the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) in Vietnam as part of the overall RVN drawdown. CINCPAC concurred in the matter of direct coordination and liaison with the Center, subject to the concurrence of the Center's commanding officer. He also agreed with COMUSMACV's recommendation that COMUSMACVTHAI continue to contact the CMEC for assistance in fragment identification, publications support, and technical exploitation until the CMEC was withdrawn.  

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 002052, 21 Sep 72, Subj: Coordination of Scientific and Technical (S&T) Collection Activities in PACOM (U).  
2. COMUSMACVTHAI 310828Z Mar 72; COMUSMACV 130155Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 191806Z Apr 72.
The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) on Taiwan was operated jointly by the Air Force and Army, with the Air Force as executive agent. Specific agencies involved were the Air Force 7602d Air Intelligence Group's Detachment 3 (formerly the 1127th USAF Field Activities Group) and the Army's 500th Military Intelligence Group. A number of management problems had surfaced and on 30 June CINCPAC announced a conference among those agencies and CINCPAC's Air Force and Army component commands to resolve them.2

1. J23 HistSum Sep 72, which included a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding.
2. J23 HistSum Jun 72, which cited CINCPAC 301835Z Jun 72 (RODCA).
1. J23 HistSum Jul 72, which contained J233 Memorandum for Record, 9 Aug 72, Subj: CINCPAC JIDC Conference.
CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I--OVERVIEW FOR 72

(U) Many events on the world scene during 1972 had the potential to influence the politico-military relationships of the United States in the Pacific Command. Chief among these--and the ones with the most profound implications--were the visits by President Nixon to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. In his annual report to Congress on U.S. Foreign policy, Secretary of State William Rogers acknowledged the importance of these visits:

The profound transformation the United States brought about during 1972 in our relations with the People's Republic of China is opening new opportunities for an Asia at peace....

Firm foundations for a new era of cooperative efforts between the world's two most powerful nations now exist in the aftermath of the Moscow Summit....

(U) The announcements of the visits, made in 1971, had created consternation in Japan and prompted reappraisals of Pacific power relationships among other U.S. allies. On 6-7 January 1972, President Nixon met with Japanese Prime Minister Sato at San Clemente to discuss the Peking and Moscow trips. Mutual expressions of continuing cooperation and trust ensued, and the 15 May 1972 date was set for reversion of Okinawa to Japan. After the visit to the PRC on 21-28 February, the President dispatched the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Marshall Green, on a round of consultations with high officials of Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. 2

(U) On 29 March 1972, North Vietnam began its full-scale offensive against the South, and bombing in the North was resumed. On 8 May, President Nixon


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announced the mining of North Vietnam ports and intensification of bombing. By October, cease-fire negotiations in Paris had apparently been completed, but, on 26 October, the purported terms were prematurely released by Hanoi. The final agreement had not yet been achieved by the end of 1972. Nevertheless, the implications of a cease-fire, combined with the continuing withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, engendered much speculation among the littoral nations of the Pacific regarding the future policy of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Two weeks after the mining of North Vietnam ports, President Nixon visited Russia, from 22 to 30 May 1972.¹

(U) The President met with the new Japanese Premier, Kakuei Tanaka, in Hawaii on 31 August - 1 September, where they issued a statement that, "...both leaders reaffirmed the intention of the two Governments to maintain the treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the two countries..." From 25-30 September, Premier Tanaka imitated the U.S. initiative by visiting the PRC.²

(U) Two of the staunchest U.S. allies in the Pacific, New Zealand and Australia, experienced changes in their Governments during 1972. Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk was elected in New Zealand, and Prime Minister Edward Gough Whitlam in Australia. Both were leaders of political parties considered to be critical of their countries' close alliance with the United States. Two days after his landslide victory, Kirk was quoted by the Associated Press on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO):³

SEATO is not an effective body—if it ever was. It is atrophied. The Nixon Doctrine has declared a much lower United States involvement, and countries like Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia want to be part of an organization to link up countries.

We need an organization which brings countries together rather than separate them as SEATO does.

Pakistan had filed notice of withdrawal from SEATO on 8 November, and if New Zealand and Australia withdrew, only four active members would remain—the U.S., Thailand, the Philippines, and Britain.


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(U) There were indications that both Australia and New Zealand would continue a close relationship with the U.S. Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia stated, shortly after his 2 December 1972 election, that, "...ANZUS is a legal embodiment of the common interests of the people of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These interests remain constant beyond changes of administration in Washington, Wellington, or Canberra." However, Whitlam also said, in connection with his Government's views on regional alliances:¹

The guidelines of the regional community that I foresee will be an organization genuinely representative of the region, without ideological overtones, conceived as an initiative to help free the region of great power rivalries that have bedevilled its progress for decades....

(U) In the Philippines, violence continued in Mindanao during 1972, and the Re-established Communist Party of the Philippines was supported by its insurgent military arm, the New People's Army. In June, July, and August typhoons and floods ravaged the island of Luzon. Regardless of the deteriorating internal situation, however, it came as a shock to the U.S. and other Pacific countries when President Marcos declared Martial Law on 23 September 1972. The martial law declaration was preceded, on 7 July, by a constitutional convention vote to change the governmental structure from a presidential to a parliamentary system. In mid-October, a transitory provisions article legitimized the declaration of martial law, and authorized Marcos to remain in office until a new national election had been held, the timing of which was at Marcos' discretion. On 29 November, a new constitution was approved by the convention.²

(U) Less than three weeks after martial law was decreed in the Philippines, President Park Chung Hee declared martial law in South Korea on 17 October 1972. This move prompted some acerbic comments in a Far Eastern Economic Review editorial:³

The price for kissing and making up now seems to be a direct imitation by President Park of his former arch enemy, Premier Kim Il Sung....

1. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Jan 73, pp. 30-34.

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Korea is but a pimple jutting out from the Asian mainland, of strategic importance today only to China and Japan, and of limited economic interest to the world economy. In a sense, Korean developments hardly justify more than passing interest by other Asian states....

President Park has been encouraged to return to the rule of the gun by the failure of Washington to denounce President Marcos' overthrow of democracy in the Philippines.

(U) In other parts of the Pacific, real change was less evident. On 22 May 1972, Ceylon announced that the name of the country would henceforth be the Republic of Sri Lanka. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met in July to reaffirm its support for a zone of peace and neutrality in Indochina. This was followed in October by a meeting to devise a means to enforce drug traffic controls. The Governments of Australia and Indonesia announced the signing, on 9 October, of a supplemental Seabed Agreement which delineated boundaries for the territorial waters between the two countries.

(U) In Indochina, peace talks were resumed in July 1972 between the Government of Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and representatives of the Pathet Lao Leader, Souphanouvong. As with the Paris negotiations on Vietnam, no settlement had been reported by the end of 1972. Cambodia continued to fight against Khmer Rouge and North Vietnam forces under the Lon Nol Government, and Thailand promulgated its ninth constitution in 40 years on 15 December. Thus ended the longest period—13 months—in modern Thai history without a constitution. The National Executive Council had seized power in a bloodless coup on 17 November 1971. 2

(U) Concurrently with the major expansion of the air war by the U.S. following the communist Easter offensive, and the consequent massive additions to U.S. bases in Thailand, the Thai Government tried to open communications with Peking. In August a Thai ping-pong team visited the PRC, and later in the year, a trade mission went to China. The result of these overtures was not apparent. 3

2. Ibid., Vol. 43, No. 8, Aug 72, p. 409; Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 44, No. 1, Jan 73, p. 24.
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(U) As the year 1972 became history, the imminent cease-fire in Vietnam, the withdrawals of U.S. Forces from Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, as well as from Vietnam, and the Nixon Doctrine emphasis on self-help and self-reliance for our allies—all of these had caused the divergent views of those allies to surface. Malaysia was sponsoring a plan for guaranteed neutrality in Southeast Asia, supported by Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The continuing presence and strength of U.S. military forces in Asia was considered vital to security and stability by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Singapore, allied with Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom in the Five Power Defense Agreement, nevertheless supported the bolstering of Thailand by the U.S. as a buffer against southward expansion of communism toward Malaysia and Singapore. And finally, Australia and New Zealand, while openly denigring SEATO and supporting the neutrality plan of ASEAN, nevertheless, maintained that the mutual security treaty of ANZUS was a strengthening influence in the Pacific Ocean area. An apt summation of the Asian country attitudes was advanced by U.S. News and World Report in December 1972:

- Soviet Union: Moving to become the dominant military power in Asia if U.S. pull-back creates a vacuum.
- China: Nervous about the Russian threat, wants U.S. to stay as a moderating influence.
- Japan: Worried about withdrawal of American military presence, seen as essential to Japanese security.
- Taiwan: Some Asians look for U.S. to end ties with Nationalist China - but not in the immediate future.
- South Korea: Still fears Communist take-over and urges that U.S. troops not be pulled out.
- Philippines: Rising nationalism and economic disputes imperil American bases and business interests.
- South Vietnam: Demands to know what U.S. will do if Communist guerillas fight on after a cease-fire.
- Thailand: Edging away from close relationship with U.S., seeking better contacts with Peking.


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• Malaysia: Promoting a plan for regional neutrality to be guaranteed by U.S., Russia, and China.

• Australia: No longer puts so much stock in defense alliances. Trend now is toward neutralism.

(U) Meanwhile, Russia resumed, in 1972, an effort to align Asian countries in a collective security pact. The idea of a Moscow-inspired and led collective security pact for Asia was first officially raised by Leonid I. Brezhnev in late 1969 and early 1970. The new initiative was believed to be partially prompted by the prospects of a Vietnam settlement and an expected scramble for decisive influence in the subsequently emerging new Southeast Asian power blocs. Other analysts considered the move to be largely motivated by the Kremlin's fear of China's growing influence and weight in Asia. The Chinese had accused Russia, at the United Nations, of attempts to infiltrate South Asian and Indian Ocean areas to expand its sphere of influence. The initial Russian proposal had met with a cool reception from most Asian nations, and China's outright hostility made it unlikely that smaller Asian nations would accept it in the foreseeable future. In October 1972, nevertheless, the London publication of the Soviet Embassy spoke of the "pressing need to create a system of collective security in Asia."

Military Resumé - PACOM

(U) Various subjects with political, military, and legal overtones were addressed by the office of the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate during 1972. The following narrative concerns subjects which either affected the entire Pacific Command or were primarily of interest to the U.S. military community.

POW Repatriation

(U) The plan for repatriation of prisoners of war (POW) was called EGRESS-RECAP during 1972. The Department of Defense had tasked the U.S. Services with investigatory and/or disciplinary actions concerning alleged misconduct of returning POWs. Legal assistance was also the responsibility of the Service of which the POW was a member. In January 1972, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) commented on the proposed Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) implementing plan to EGRESS-RECAP. The SJA stressed the potential importance of intelligence information which could be obtained from former POWs. Ergo, the warnings regarding self-incrimination and right to counsel, specified in Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), should

be given only when an offense had been charged under the UCMJ; when previously acquired reliable information clearly indicated that such an offense had been committed; or, when responses to the debriefer led to a reasonable belief that such an offense had been committed and an investigation was warranted. If, before or during processing, there was reason to suspect a returnee of having violated the UCMJ during his absence from U.S. control, all legal rights and privileges, including the right to counsel, would be afforded. These precautions regarding the Article 31 stipulations would minimize the likelihood of inhibited debriefing information.  

(6) In June, the SJA noted that revised DOD guidance on EGRESS-RECAP procedures would tend to avoid delving into possible misconduct during the intelligence debriefings in the PACOM. Although such debriefings would take place in the theater, they would not be designed to collect evidence of misconduct. Moreover, the fact that returnees would be evacuated to the U.S. shortly after repatriation would militate against any action of a legal nature being taken against them while in the PACOM.  

Marking of Military Aircraft

(5) In January, the SJA was requested to furnish an opinion regarding international rules for the marking of aircraft. The question had been posed by the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (DEPCHJUSMAG), Udorn, Thailand, who postulated four categories of aircraft: Air America helicopters flown "in a combat support role"; Air America helicopters flown on Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions; gunships flown by Thai pilots, under the control of U.S. military officers, in support of MEDEVAC operations; and, gunships which had expended munitions and then were used "to respond to MEDEVAC requirements."

(U) The International Civil Aviation Convention was not applicable to military aircraft, the SJA responded, and, contrary to the existence of international rules of land and sea warfare, there was no international law of air warfare. A 1923 Hague Convention produced some rules pertaining to the external markings of military and civil aircraft, but no documentation

1. J73 HistSum Jan 72; J73/Memo/6-72 of 14 Jan 72, Subj: DOD EGRESS RECAP Conference; J73/Memo/18-72 of 20 Jan 72, Subj: Proposed COMUSMACV OPLAN J190 of 1 Feb 72.
2. J73 HistSum Jun 72; J73/Memo/138-72 of 8 Jun 72, Subj: Legal Matters and EGRESS RECAP.
was available as to U.S. Government subscription to those rules. The U.S. Air Force had drafted a manual on the subject in 1956, but it was not published. Neither the Air Force nor the Army had instructions pertaining to "international" rules; however, both had instructions specifying how aircraft were to be marked, but not why. A U.S. Navy instruction on international "Law of Naval Warfare" specifically stated that "military aircraft...must bear the military markings of their state...". Additionally, a May 1941 Navy pamphlet entitled "Tentative Instructions" governing "Maritime and Aerial Warfare" cited the "Report of the Commission of Jurists, the Hague, 1923" as the background of the pamphlet. These tentative instructions included, as military aircraft, "any...aircraft engaging in or intended to engage in any warlike operation or service."

(5) The foregoing pamphlet definition of military aircraft was sufficiently broad to include the Air America helicopters utilized as stated by the DEPCJUSMAG; however, the "Law of Naval Warfare" definition was not. The exemption of "State aircraft" from the Civil Aviation Convention was so phrased that it could not be determined whether the Air America helicopters would be covered or exempted from the Convention.

(U) Concerning medical aircraft, both the Army and Navy subscribed to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which required the red cross or equivalent marking on aircraft used for the transporting of medical personnel and equipment.

(5) The conclusions reached by the CINCPAC SJA, based on the foregoing, were firstly, there were no "international" rules governing the marking of military aircraft; secondly, the International Civil Aviation Convention could cover the Air America helicopters, but the SJA did not believe so; thirdly, if the Naval publication citation of international law regarding military aircraft markings was correct, the gunships should bear the appropriate State markings, and logically, also, the Air America aircraft utilized as stated; fourthly, aircraft used for the transportation of medical personnel and equipment are required to be distinctively marked by the red cross specified by the Geneva Convention.

Designated Commanding Officers

(U) The Defense Department, in DOD Directive 5525.1, required unified commanders to appoint, within their geographical areas, a Designated Commanding Officer (DCO) to administer foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) matters within each country where U.S. military forces were regularly stationed. The enlargement of the PACOM as a result of the reorganization of unified commands on 1 January 1972 added several countries to CINCPAC's cognizance for FCJ matters. Also, matters were raised for resolution by CINCPAC concerning previously appointed DCOs.
(U) In February, the Judge Advocate of the Seventh Fleet queried CINCPAC as to whether other required reports, such as the OPREP-3 or reports to the National Military Command Center could not be substituted for the FCJ reports provided by the Seventh Fleet to the DCO in Hong Kong. CINCPAC replied that the philosophy underlying the CINCPAC instruction for DCO guidance was to insure the orderly administration of FCJ matters within Hong Kong, and to assure that higher authorities concerned with such administration were fully informed. CINCPAC acknowledged that certain FCJ incidents could also, but for other reasons, be reported under other directives. However, reporting under the DCO Instruction was not to be subordinated to the administrative requirements or reports of other agencies. CINCPAC also stressed the importance of assuring that an information copy of FCJ reports to the DCO be properly addressed to the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate.

(U) The CINCPAC SJA noted that the joint regulation tasked Service elements with the preparation of quarterly confinement reports. Although CINCPAC had tasked DCOs (usually commanders of sub-unified commands, CINCPAC Representatives, DAOs, or other positions with joint Service connotations) in each country to assure that copies of the quarterly confinement reports be forwarded to CINCPAC, many had not been received. The service reporting system was complicated by the fact that, in a number of instances, the Service unit responsible for preparing the report was located a considerable distance from several countries for which the report was prepared. For example, the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) and the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) were CINCPAC DCOs. However, the reports for Air Force and Navy personnel confined in those countries were prepared by Thirteenth Air Force and the Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines. While COMUSTDC was the responsible DCO for Taiwan, reports were prepared by Service commands not subject to his coordinating authority. Since all CINCPAC component commands received copies of the report from their reporting elements regularly, CINCPAC requested his component commanders to forward copies of each report received. At the same time, CINCPAC relieved DCOs of the responsibility to provide copies.

(U) Also in February, the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kabul, Afghanistan queried CINCPAC regarding DCO guidance. CINCPAC replied that, in countries where U.S. military forces were not regularly stationed, the Defense Attaché would perform the duties of DCO. A copy of CINCPAC Instruction 5820.1D was

1. J73 HistSum Feb 72; Ltr, CINCPAC to 7th Fleet, 22 Feb 72, n.s., personal from CAPT Douglas to CMDR Zitani.
2. J73 HistSum Apr 72; CINCPAC 140238Z Apr 72; J73/Memo/101-72 of 13 Apr 72, Subj: Quarterly Confinement Reports.
sent to the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Afghanistan, and the DAO was
requested to advise CINCPAC whether any U.S. Forces were regularly stationed
in Afghanistan.  

(U) Meanwhile, the Services had determined that none of their members
were considered to be regularly stationed in any of the countries for which
CINCPAC had recently acquired FCJ responsibility. These included India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The latter two
did not have U.S. DAOs. While CINCPAC was collecting data regarding the
Service affiliation, numbers, ranks, and diplomatic status of personnel in
each country, the Pacific Air Forces component of CINCPAC noted that FCJ
reporting for the Air Force would devolve, in accordance with the joint
regulation, upon the DAOs in each country. CINCPAC agreed that, until
definite information from each country had been analyzed, the DAOs would
act as DCOs. Although some changes in DCO appointments were forthcoming
in 1973, the DAOs continued to act in the DCO capacity for the balance of
1972.  

(U) One other area for which CINCPAC assumed U.S. responsibility
under the Unified Command Plan was the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT),
which included the island of Diego Garcia. U.S. military personnel were
regularly stationed on Diego Garcia. On 28 April, CINCPAC appointed the
Island Commander (U.S. Navy) as DCO for the BIOT, noting that United Kingdom
military personnel would also be stationed on the island, which could give
rise to FCJ incidents.  

Indian Ocean Policy

1. Ltr, CINCPAC Ser. 1008 of 24 Feb 72, Subj: Designated Commanding Officer
Duties and Responsibilities.
2. J74 HistSums Feb, Mar 72; CINCPACAF 180225Z Feb 72; CINCPACAF 241910Z
Feb 72; J73/Memo/61-72 of 2 Mar 72, Subj: Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
and U.S. Military Forces in Countries Recently Transferred to CINCPAC
Responsibility by the UCP.
3. J73 HistSums Mar, Apr 72; J73/Memo/61-72 of 24 Mar 72, Subj: Designated
Commanding Officer for British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT); CINCPAC
252244Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 280223Z Apr 72.
The development of a joint U.S. military facility on the island of Diego Garcia had been proposed to the Secretary of Defense in April 1968. The JCS-proposed facility would have consisted of an austere communications facility, 515,000 barrels of POL storage, a refueling pier, a dredged harbor for turnaround basing of ships, a 12,500-foot airfield runway, personnel support facilities, maintenance and utility systems, warehouses and open storage areas, and a bivouac area for 9,500 personnel. The estimated cost was $45 million. In 1970, the Secretary of Defense approved a three-phase construction program at a total cost of $19 million. The approval was for an austere communications facility rather than a modest logistic base; the extent of the dredging was reduced, POL storage was reduced to 60,000 barrels, a fuel buoy-mooring-pontoon causeway was substituted for the pier, and an 8,000-foot runway was authorized. First increment funds were approved by Congress in the fiscal year 1971 military construction bill on 25 November 1970.

Law of the Sea

The adoption of world-wide conventions governing seabed exploration was complicated by existing territorial sea boundaries ranging from the three miles recognized by the U.S. to 200 miles claimed by several nations. Questions regarding off-shore mineral resource exploration, fishery grounds, and environmental controls were raised by conflicting claims pertaining to the continental shelves and to free passage through, over, and under the straits of the world. On 17 December 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution which established a Law of the Sea Conference for 1973.²

The topics which were most important from the U.S. strategic point of view were the maximum breadth of territorial seas, and the right of free transit through, over, and under international straits. These two subjects were considered as one question by the U.S., since an extension of territorial sea limits to even 12 miles would result in overlapping territorial claims in more than 100 of the world's straits. The fourth preparatory meeting for the 1973 conference took place from 17 July 1972 to 18 August. This Geneva meeting saw the emergence of a coalition of 56 lesser developed countries and straits nations in the formation of an agenda of subjects and issues. The coalition resisted the inclusion of the U.S.-sponsored topic, "Free transit through straits," insisting on the nomenclature, "innocent passage." A last-minute compromise resulted in the inclusion of, "question of right of transit" in addition to "innocent passage." Although the eventual result could not be predicted, a U.S. compromise on the economic issues to the coastal emerging nations could be necessary in order to save the straits transit issue.³


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On 14 March 1972, the JCS requested CINCPAC to reply to a series of questions, the answers to which could reinforce the U.S. position on the right to unimpeded transit through, over, and under international straits. In his reply, CINCPAC named five straits considered to be essential to U.S. interests: Tsuguru, La Perouse, San Bernardino, Malacca, and Sunda. Tsuguru Strait provided direct northern passage between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. La Perouse Strait provided a passage between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. San Bernardino Strait/Verde Island Passage provided the most direct sea route between Guam and Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Malacca/Singapore Strait was the primary sea route to the Indian Ocean. The Sunda Strait was the primary sea route to the southern Indian Ocean and the northwest coast of Australia.

CINCPAC noted that, even with the three-mile territorial limit espoused by the U.S., three of the five essential straits were already territorial straits because their breadth at the narrowest point was less than six miles—the San Bernardino, Sunda, and Malacca/Singapore Straits. However, the right of free passage had not yet been challenged by the contiguous countries—the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. CINCPAC concluded his assessment by providing four principal reasons why the retention of the right of free passage was of vital concern in the PACOM:

1. Inability to utilize straits which provide the most direct routing to contingency areas could increase significantly the time required to introduce, reinforce, and support logistically U.S. Forces committed in the execution of contingency and other operations plans. In addition, a requirement to effect prior consultation with foreign governments to acquire concurrence in transit through and over straits subjects contingency planning to adverse political factors and indeterminate timing factors which degrade the validity of time phased deployment planning.

2. Political trends throughout the Asian-Pacific area indicate that U.S. military presence is and will be required for the foreseeable future to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet and PRC expansionism. This presence cannot be


2. Ibid.
projected effectively into the Sea of Japan, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean without free passage through straits with a breadth of 24 or less nautical miles. Denial of this free transit would result in degradation in reaction time, endurance, and flexibility of U.S. forces in responding to contingencies and advancing U.S. interests in the PACOM.

c. Inability to utilize essential and important straits within the PACOM would reduce significantly transit route options, thus affording a potential enemy a much less complex problem in locating and intercepting U.S. forces. Concurrently, U.S. surveillance of the activities of potential enemy forces would become more costly, less extensive, and less effective if transit and/or overflight of straits by U.S. warships and military aircraft were to be denied.

d. Operations against the USSR or the PRC would be affected directly by strait transit restrictions in the case of submarines acting in a supporting role for SIOP forces.

National Election Voting/Hawaii Residence Law

(U) In August 1972, a representative of the CINCPAC SJA requested clarification from the State of Hawaii regarding state residency laws. Specifically, the question was whether the act of voting in a political election established automatic residency for state income tax purposes. CINCPAC's objective was to prevent unnecessary disenfranchisement for military personnel on the one hand, and to prevent loss of domiciliary rights in other states on the other hand.

(U) The reply from the office of the Hawaii Attorney General expressed the interpretation that casting a ballot for president-vice president would not establish state residency for tax purposes. In other words, persons who had been in the State of Hawaii for less than one year prior to a presidential election were allowed to cast a Presidential Short Ballot without being subject to state income taxes as a resident. CINCPAC so informed the component commands in Hawaii, warning also that this privilege extended only to those who had been in the state less than one year and only for voting in the presidential-vice presidential election.

SECTION II--REGIONAL COOPERATION

(U) During 1972, the U.S. continued to participate in the activities of two formal, multi-lateral, military security alliances in the Pacific Command area—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty. Continuing in force also were four bilateral mutual defense agreements—with Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines. In the Middle East, the U.S. supported the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and also had defense agreements with Iran and Turkey. Other regional alliances strongly supported and encouraged by the U.S. included the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) among Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

SEATO

The Future of SEATO

(TS) SEATO was formed on 8 September 1954 in Manila. Member nations included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. As an example of regional cooperation, and as an instrument to stimulate among Asian nations an awareness of the need for common action, SEATO served the national interests of the U.S. It involved the member nations, to some extent, in the U.S. national policy of containment, and had been of some value as a deterrent to overt aggression by the People's Republic of China. It was the principal legal instrument for U.S. security commitments in Southeast Asia and for Thailand's participation in the Vietnam war. SEATO was also a legal instrument by which Thailand justified the prosecution of the air war by U.S. aircraft from bases in Thailand.²

(TS) The first of the SEATO nations to disengage from active participation in SEATO activities was France. The last time a French Military Advisor (MILAD) attended a meeting was in 1964. In 1965, France withdrew its forces from Exercise SEA HORSE, and had not participated in an exercise since. All French personnel were withdrawn from the Military Planning Office (MPO) in June 1965, and since that time, France had failed to respond to correspondence requiring comment or approval.³

SEATO ORGANIZATION

SEATO COUNCIL

MILITARY ADVISERS

SPECIALIST COMMITTEES

CHIEF, SNMP
DEP. CHIEF, SNMP

HEAD OF MILITARY SECRETARIAT
MILITARY SECRETARIAT

HEAD OF PLANNING
PLANNING BRANCH

HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

OPD (INFO)

NATIONAL ADVISERS REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE

LOGISTICS PLANNING DIVISION
OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIVISION
COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE COLLATION DIVISION
ORGANIZATION TRAINING AND STANDARDIZATION DIVISION

ADOC STUDY GROUPS

INTELLIGENCE ASSESS COMMITTEE

COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT WORKING GROUP
SECRETARY GENERAL

DEP. SECT. GEN

BUDGET SUB-COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF SECT. GEN

OCS

ADMIN
RESEARCH
E/C&A
SECURITY

PIO

SCOA

NOTE: DIVISION NON MANAGING STAFF HAVE 23/24 HR

WORK TEMPORARILY RELOCATED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) ORG DIV TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIV
(2) STANDARDIZATION TO LOGISTICS PLANNING DIV

AS INDICATED, THE MILITARY ADVISERS’ REPRESENTATIVES ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY ADVISERS.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 3.
(U) As discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, Pakistan gave notice of withdrawal from SEATO on 8 November 1972 after a long period of inactive membership. Also in November, Prime Minister-elect Kirk of New Zealand implied, in a press conference, that New Zealand would withdraw from SEATO, which he stated was, "...not an effective body...." Subsequent to Kirk's alleged remarks, the U.S. Secretary of State reiterated U.S. support of SEATO; on 11 December, the New Zealand Ambassador to the U.S. informed the State Department that he expected no precipitate change in any area of New Zealand's foreign affairs involvement.

(5) With a change in the Australian Government corresponding to that of New Zealand, the two countries had, by the end of 1972, expressed their intention to de-emphasize the military aspects of SEATO, and to emphasize social and economic activities. The State Department had stated that less than full support of SEATO by the U.S. could be interpreted as a deterioration of our commitments to our other alliances as well as SEATO. Nevertheless, since the primary interest of the U.S. lay in maintaining the Treaty, the U.S. was prepared to abandon large, formal meetings, so long as SEATO remained in being.2

(TS) While the officially expressed view of the U.S. Government was that SEATO was necessary and useful, its future insofar as the U.S. Congress was concerned was debatable. One of the originally major supporters of the pact which created SEATO, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, was reported to be in favor of U.S. withdrawal. He was reported to feel that the treaty had been misused to justify intervention in Vietnam. If Mansfield's reported position were to receive Congressional support, some alternative to SEATO would probably be sought. An acceptable military alternative would be a bilateral defense treaty with Thailand, but U.S. Congressional approval would be unlikely. An alternative for the civil and economic side of SEATO was considered by the JCS in 1968. The postulated organization, called Pacific Asian Treaty Organization (PATO), was rejected as a feasible alternative for SEATO because the countries needed to enhance the success of a regional alternative were unlikely to join; i.e., France, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps the U.S. Moreover, the existing all-Asian regional organizations, such as ASEAN, were constrained by divisive national interests and had been unable to attract new members. No acceptable alternative to SEATO was apparent at the end of the year. This conclusion was supported in

2. J527 Point Paper, 27 Dec 72, Subj: Future of SEATO.
principle by CINCPAC, with the proviso that future plans for SEATO be realistic, credible, and practical in the current political-military environment.

SEATO Council Meeting

(C) The seventeenth annual meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers was held at Canberra, Australia on 27-28 June 1972. The meeting was chaired by N.H. Bowen, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Australia. Following U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' address to the Council, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, delivered a presentation on the military aspects of the Communist threat to the Treaty area and the Pacific region.  

(U) The SEATO Council reaffirmed its continuing support and confidence in SEATO. The Minister from the Philippines, Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo, called attention to the need for change in SEATO to adapt to changing political relationships in the world. His remarks were subsequently reported in the Philippine press as demands for either transformation or abolition of SEATO.

36th Military Advisors' (MILAD) Conference

(U) The thirty-sixth MILAD Conference (MA36C) was held in Canberra, Australia on 22-23 June 1972, just prior to the seventeenth Council meeting. The conference was chaired by Admiral Sir Victor Smith, the Australian MILAD. Admiral McCain attended as the U.S. MILAD.

(C) In his opening remarks to the Council, Secretary General Jesus Vargas of the Philippines noted that the past nine months had been most eventful, referring in particular to the Nixon visits to China and Russia, the proposed Asian declaration of neutrality and the Asia Collective Security Proposal by the Soviets. He followed these thoughts with a review of the political/military situation in Cambodia, RVN and Laos. Of particular note was his suggestion that Pakistan be urged to resume full participation in the Intelligence Assessment Committee.

1. Newsweek, 8 Jan 73, p. 22, "A Treaty in Trouble"; J5272 Point Paper, 27 Dec 72, Subj: Alternate to SEATO (C), with handwritten comment by Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC.
2. J5142 HistSum, Jun 72; CINCPAC 142306Z Apr 72 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 5629/240751Z Apr 72.
3. J5142 Point Paper, 5 Sep 72, Subj: SEATO.
(C) Agenda Item A was the Progress Report by Major General Hay, Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO). He reviewed each agenda item in general terms and reported on the work that had been accomplished by the MPO since MA35C. He was most concerned with the future prospects for SEATO communications in view of the U.S. phase-out of its system in Thailand. He advised that the MPO had been directed to study the matter. He also strongly recommended that the Deputy CMPO Designate (07/USN) arrive in Bangkok in time to observe MA37C, otherwise both the CMPO and DCMP would be new for MA38C.

(C) Agenda Item B was the routine update of MPO Plan 4, and approval of the model plan format. The Military Advisors considered that it was preferable to direct the CMPO to review those aspects of the plan which contained references to East Pakistan, rather than to delete them from the plan at this meeting. Deletion at this time could generate undesirable political repercussions. Consequently, the CMPO was directed to submit findings of the review to the MILADs. The MILADs considered that the new model plan format was acceptable and directed the CMPO to adopt the format when revising other plans. Change 4 to MPO Plan 4/70 was approved but would not be issued until the East Pakistan aspects had been resolved and agreed upon by the MILADs.

(C) Agenda Item C was the approval of the SEATO Planning Guide. The MILADs approved the revised SEATO Planning Guide, which incorporated the procedures for the development of SEATO plans. All U.S. recommendations were accepted. The MILADs directed the CMPO to issue the document as a SEATO publication (SEAP).

(C) Agenda Item D was the review of SEATO Exercise Schedule 1972-74 and Exercise Forecast 1974-77. The schedules and forecasts, with minor amendments and adjustments in player/planner participation, were acceptable; minor adjustments and changes in player/planner personnel were made by the United Kingdom and New Zealand to provide more balanced combined staffs during the preparation and conduct phases of the exercises.

(TS) Agenda Item E was the review of force requirements for the Eastern Region, MPO Plan 4. The Military Advisors agreed that the ground force requirements for the protection of SEATO bases in the Eastern Region under MPO Plan 4 should consist of eleven battalion groups. They considered the present air and inshore naval force requirements to be an adequate minimum. The Chief, Military Planning Office was directed to make appropriate changes to the Force Requirement Appendices in MPO Plan 4.

(C) Agenda Item F was a review of Draft SEAP on Intelligence for SEATO Plans. The MILADs agreed to the concept and format of the Draft SEAP and directed the CMPO to complete the document and have it ready for their final
approval of MA37C. The point was made that future updates would be accomplished annually (or as directed by the MILADs) by the MPO using only approved SEATO intelligence.

(A) Agenda Item G was the Progress Report to the SEATO Council from the Military Advisors. The report summarized the work accomplished by the Military Advisors since the Council's last meeting in London in April 1971, including the detailed planning accomplished for the defense of the Treaty Area, and was approved by the MILADs.

(B) Agenda Item H was the Program of Future Work. The Military Advisors approved the proposed agenda for MA37C after deleting "SEAP 2 (SEATO Glossary)" and adding "SEAP 4 (Principles and Procedures for Staging SEATO Military Exercises)." The MILADs added a policy discussion for "Relief of CMPO, DCMPO and Head of Plans" to the list of items for tentative inclusion on the agenda for MA38C.

(C) Agenda Item J was the chairmanship and date of MA37C. It was agreed to hold MA37C in Bangkok on 19-20 October 1972, under the chairmanship of the Philippine MILAD.

(C) Agenda Item K, Other Business, included formal presentations by Thailand and Australia. Air Chief Marshall Dawee, the Thailand MILAD, reported that the insurgents were receiving better weapons and making progress in expanding their influence in the north and northeast. He described Operation Phu Kwang, reporting that due to the terrain, company-sized units were more effective than battalion units in the particular area of interest; intelligence information was not received soon enough for effective exploitation; and, that lack of adequate helicopter and communications support was a major limitation. Dawee estimated the total strength of armed communist terrorists in Thailand to be 4,725. Mr. Greenwell, First Assistant Secretary in the Australian Department of External Territories, gave a presentation on Papua, New Guinea. His talk centered on Australian progress in preparing the area for self-government.

(U) CINCPAC considered MA36C to be extremely productive and successful. All MILADs and delegates were exceptionally well prepared, which contributed to an orderly and effective accomplishment of agenda items.

37th MILAD Conference (MA37C)

(U) MA37C was held in Bangkok, Thailand on 19-20 October 1972 at SEATO Headquarters. The conference was chaired by General Romeo C. Espino, the


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 Philippine MILAD. Attending for the first time as U.S. MILAD was Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC.

(4) The newly-designated Secretary General Sunthorn Hongladarom of Thailand opened the meeting by emphasizing that the most important problem facing SEATO was effective action against subversion and insurgency. At the same time, he cautioned that the alliance must remain a deterrent to overt aggression through military preparedness. He stressed that counter subversion and insurgency (CSI) was a national responsibility and that SEATO could act only if invited by the affected country.

(5) The Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO), in his progress report, spoke of measures recently taken within the MPO to improve its contribution in the CSI field. In that connection, he recommended that replacement MPO officers be experienced in CSI to meet the growing demands in this area.

(5) The conference agenda included approving various Plan revisions; review of the SEATO exercise schedule and forecast; and setting the date and chairmanship of the next (MA38C) meeting. All agenda items were approved without controversy, and Admiral Gayler agreed to host the next conference at Washington, D.C. on dates compatible with those set for the next Council meeting.

(5) Air Chief Marshal Dawee, the Thailand MILAD, addressed the meeting on the status of insurgency in Thailand, including data on enemy strength and enemy-friendly casualties during the past year. In partial response to a question from Admiral Gayler, Dawee stated that his figures were accurate, and that most hard-core communist terrorists (CT) had been identified and many photographs were available.

(55) In private session, the MILADs:

- Agreed that a major review of SEATO Plans should be deferred pending stabilization of the current political situation.

- Reaffirmed that the defense of Thailand, especially against insurgency, remained a continuing objective.

- Agreed that the MPO should assume increased planning responsibility in the CSI effort.

- Requested the MILADs for the Philippines and Thailand submit to the MPO a statement defining the CSI assistance
needed from either the MPO or member nations.

- Directed the MPO to prepare a statement defining the CSI actions which could be taken by the MPO to assist regional members.

- Noted that the provision of equipment to regional members should be arranged bilaterally.

- Directed the CMPO to inform the Secretary General that the MILADs considered that all CSI studies within SEATO should be undertaken jointly (i.e., SEATO Civil/Military).

- Directed the CMPO to produce a paper defining means to improve public information assistance to regional members.

- Agreed that the revised MPO Plan 4/72 not be issued because of the "unresolved sensitive issue of East Pakistan."

The final point, regarding Plan 4, had surfaced prior to the conference. SEATO Plan 4 concerned the defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan. The revision of the plan had been on the agenda of MA36C, but no decision had been made because of repeated references to East Pakistan in the plan:

*   *   *   *   *

2. Embassy is of opinion that preferable action is to shelve reissuance Plan 4 at this time and will so inform U.S. MILAD Admiral Gayler. To reissue plan in new format with continued references to East Pakistan would be unrealistic. On other hand, to reissue Plan 4 deleting all references to East Pakistan could conceivably cause Pakistan to take formal step of officially withdrawing from SEATO, i.e., notifying Philippine Government. Although, as in previous years, Pakistani MILAD will not attend and, furthermore, Pakistani MILADREP will not attend this conference as observer as had been the practice, the GOP would be on distribution for Plan 4 in new format. We believe it advisable let this sleeping dog lie for time being and think that other MILADs, who are aware of political sensitivities involved, would go along, in fact, we have been informed that U.K. definitely would favor shelving.
Apparently, the concern expressed regarding Pakistan sensitivity was misplaced, considering the 8 November notice of withdrawal from SEATO.

**SEATO Communications in Thailand**

(3) In 1969, a concept for post-hostilities communications-electronics (C-E) systems in Thailand was forwarded to the JCS. The concept envisioned the establishment of a single integrated military telecommunications system to serve all Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) communications requirements. The JCS forwarded the concept plan to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The DOD disagreed with the proposed development of a RTARF integrated communications system, stating that a long haul communications system under RTG civil control should be the U.S. objective. The JCS directed CINCPAC to revise the concept, and to include a schedule for the retention, phaseout, or turnover of U.S.-owned C-E facilities in Thailand.1

(3) The revised plan was resubmitted in June 1970, and subsequently revised in December 1970, June 1971, and December 1971. The document was approved as the basis for further planning, but additional changes were made in 1972. Basic to the revised concept was the use of the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) facilities to satisfy residual U.S., allied and RTARF military requirements.2

(3) Concurrently with the foregoing, the SEATO C-E working committee assessed the extent to which SEATO common user and dedicated channel requirements could be met by in-country C-E systems. The committee determined that the SEATO Communications Network (SCN) requirements could be met by the Integrated Communications System-Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA) to the following extent: 29 percent for Plan 4; 34 percent for Plan 6; 68 percent for Plan 8; and 60 percent for Plan 9. However, the C-E systems available within the RTARF could not be used to support the SCN. In 1971, the U.S. MILAD forwarded a position paper to the MPO which noted the incipient phase-down of U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, which would, in turn, diminish the availability of the ICS to SEATO. However, the U.S. would consider leasing some TOT longline circuitry after tests to determine the adaptability of that circuitry to military use.

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1. J611 Point Paper, 14 Jun 72, Subj: SEATO Communications; JCS SM 572-69 of Sep 69; Ltr, CINCPAC 002713 of 29 Sep 69, Subj: Post-hostilities Communications-Electronics Concept for Thailand; JCSM-702-69 of 6 Nov 69; JCS 2469/506-11 of 26 Jan 70; MJCS-55-70 of 12 Feb 70.
2. COMUSMACTHAI Communications-Electronics Phaseout/Turnover Schedule Thailand; MJCS 32-71 of 3 Feb 71; CINCPAC 140035Z Dec 71; MJCS 133-72 of 21 Apr 72; MJCS 150-72 of 4 May 72.
Also, the U.S. would consider providing excess ICS equipment to expand or extend the TOT civil system. The U.S. MILAD recommended that SEATO give first consideration to the TOT to provide supplementary backbone communications.¹

(S) At the fourteenth meeting of the SEATO C-E committee (CE-14M) in January 1972, the committee recommended that SEATO retain the concept of an ICS to satisfy the main route or backbone portion of the SCN. The committee also concluded that SEATO military plans should not rely on existing in-country communications, but measures should be taken to expand the RTARF C-E system to provide the minimum essential communications needed by the SCN during a buildup phase. The U.S. MILAD did not concur with that portion of the CE-14M report. He noted that representatives of the RTG and the U.S., both civil and military, had concluded that military use of TOT longline facilities was both technically and economically feasible. However, the heightened U.S. activity in Thailand during the year, previously discussed in this history, rendered the dismantling of the ICS-SEA moot. Therefore, the DOD directed that no further consideration be given to leasing communications circuits in Thailand until the actual reduction of U.S. force levels was imminent. Later in the year, as discussed in the Communications chapter, CINCPAC recommended a shift in U.S. policy toward an RTARF-controlled ICS.²

SEATO Orientation Course

(²) The SEATO MPO sponsored three SEATO Orientation Courses during 1972. The courses were attended by approximately 60 senior officers from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. In May 1972, CINCPAC reaffirmed his support of these courses, noting that SEATO would remain the primary multi-national shield of security in Indochina when the U.S. was no longer actively engaged. Three CINCPAC staff representatives participated in each eight-day course in March, July, and October 1972.³

SEATO Budget

(U) The SEATO budget was prepared by the CMO for the military portion, and by the Budget Subcommittee for the civil portion. The allocation of fund support from member nations for fiscal year 1973 was prorated at 25 percent for the U.S.; 16 percent for United Kingdom; 13.5 percent for Australia and France; and 8 percent for New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Although the U.S. was the largest contributor, the return in status and

2. Ibid.; CINCPAC 262235Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 072320Z Sep 72.
influence in the Treaty area made this one of the most fruitful, and least costly, of many world-wide financial obligations. The SEATO FY 73 budget was about $1.45 million--$1.2 million for the civil budget and about $25 million for the military. The U.S. share was about $360,977.

Manning of the MPO

(Ç) The CMPO during 1972 was Major General Robert A. Hay of Australia. General Hay was to rotate in January or February 1973 and be replaced by an appointee of the Philippines. In April 1971, the U.S. MILAD had agreed to fill the Deputy CMPO position, when vacated in November 1972, with a lower half U.S. rear admiral. In August 1972, the Philippine MILAD requested that the U.S. supply a senior U.S. Navy captain instead of a rear admiral. The reason was that, pending Philippine congressional action, the Philippines could only appoint a brigadier general to the CMPO position. There were no major generals available, and seniority complications were possible if the Deputy CMPO were an admiral. The SEATO MILADs approved the Philippine proposal, and, on 16 November 1972, Captain F.T. Rooney, U.S. Navy, assumed the post of Deputy CMPO.²

(Ç) The U.S. MILAD Representative to SEATO headquarters in 1972 was Colonel Joseph F. DeRienzo, U.S. Air Force. The MPO Head of Plans until June 1972 was Colonel Ronald F. Fraser, U.S. Army. He was relieved, on 4 June, by Captain M.D. Marshall, Royal Air Force, for a two-year tour. At the end of 1972, there were 13 U.S. military personnel assigned to the MPO--nine officers and four enlisted personnel. The U.S. sector was also authorized two local national employees.³

Transfer of SEATO Planning Functions

(Ç) In 1971, the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) had recommended the transfer of SEATO contingency planning functions from MACV because of the continuing reduction in U.S. forces and concomitant reduction in MACV planning capability. After coordination with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), CINCPAC disapproved the transfer in December 1971.⁴

(Ç) Almost one year later, the imminent cease-fire in Vietnam and prospective disestablishment of MACV necessitated further action. On 25

2. J5141 HistSums Sep, Dec 72.
3. J5141 HistSums May, Jul 72; CINCPAC 160345Z Apr 72; CINCPAC 162155Z Jan 73.
November 1972, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to assume SEATO Field Force planning responsibilities for Plans 4 and 6, as well as approval authority for associated SEATO supporting plans. CINCPAC also requested the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to designate an appropriate naval command to assume SEATO planning responsibilities for naval component commanders, vice the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. On 30 November, CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that the Commander, U.S. Naval Force, Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL) had been designated to assume naval component planning responsibilities. CINCPAC authorized the U.S. MILAD Representative to advise the CMPO that, effective 15 December 1972, CINCUSARPAC had assumed planning responsibilities for the Field Forces under Plan 6, and for the Central Region Field Forces under Plan 4. Effective the same date, COMUSNAVPHIL had assumed the Commander, Naval Component Command (Designate) responsibility for planning under both SEATO Plans 4 and 6.  

While the transfer of planning functions for MACV and the naval components was delayed as long as possible, transfers were directed earlier in the year for U.S. Army and U.S. Marine forces involved in the SEATO plans. In April, CINCPAC was advised that, effective 20 April, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CGRMFPAC) had delegated his responsibility as Commander of SEATO Task Force Whiskey (Designate) for planning under Plans 4 and 6 to the Commander, Marine Amphibious Force Three (III MAF). Effective 1 July 1972, CINCUSARPAC relieved the Commander, U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand (USARUSTHAI) of duties as Commander (Designate) of Task Force Sierra for Plans 4 and 6, and for Task Force Bravo in Plan 9. He also relieved the Commander, U.S. Army Vietnam of duties as Commander (Designate) of Task Force Victor in Plans 4 and 6. These responsibilities were reassigned to the Commander, IX Corps for Task Forces Sierra and Bravo, and to the Chief of Staff, IX Corps (Augmented) for Task Force Victor. These commanders were located at Camp Zama in Japan and Fort DeRussy in Hawaii, respectively. On 15 July, CINCPAC authorized the U.S. MILAD Representative to inform the CMPO of the transfer of SEATO planning responsibilities.  

Various Planning Actions  

In October, the U.S. MILAD Representative recommended that the yearly designation be deleted from SEATO plans. CINCPAC, as U.S. MILAD, replied that  

1. J527 HistSum Dec 72; CINCPAC 252055Z Nov 72; COMUSMACV 301103Z Nov 72; CINCPACFLT 3120/300503Z Nov 72; CINCPAC 152347Z Dec 72; for a detailed review of SEATO contingency plans, commanders, and forces, see CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 18-23.  
2. CINCUSARPAC 252300Z Feb 72; J5142 HistSum Jul 72; CGRMFPAC 3010/150502Z Apr 72; CINCUSARPAC 060303Z May 72; CINCPAC 152257Z Jul 72.
the U.S. delegation to MA37C would be prepared to discuss the subject. However, when the proposal was presented for discussion by Australia, the consensus was that the year designation be retained. Deletion would have complicated an already complex change procedure for the MPO and those nations—the U.S., Thailand, and the Philippines—which had responsibility for writing subordinate commanders' plans.1

(5) The SEATO Force Standing Orders (SFSO) had been developed over a period of several months (formerly called Standard Operating Procedures), and the final sections had been approved at MA35C. The SFSOs were published in two volumes. Volume I contained a series of annexes, coinciding with the annexes in the basic SEATO plans, which provided information common to and applicable to all the plans. Volume II contained the organization and functions of the SEATO force headquarters under the different plans. CINCPAC reviewed the published SFSO in March 1972, and submitted minor changes for inclusion in future revisions. In the course of the CINCPAC staff review, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) brought into focus the question of whether the SEATO plans were, indeed, realistic, practical, and credible (see The Future of SEATO, this section). The SJA noted that each of the military contingency plans provided for a member nation to be designated as the "Appointed Nation." Thus, under certain plans, U.S. Forces could be placed under the "operational control" of a SEATO commander other than a U.S. military officer. This provision raised fundamental legal issues from the U.S. point of view. These were: by what legal authority U.S. Forces could be placed under a commander of an alien armed force; by what legal authority could U.S. commanders execute orders from a foreign commander; and, by what legal authority could U.S. Forces execute military operations directed by a foreign commander. The SJA could find no basic legal authority for such actions in either the SEATO Treaty or U.S. Statutes.2

(6) As an outgrowth of the SFSO publication, the MPO recommended that SEATO Field Force standard operating procedures (SOP) be developed which would enable the task force and component supporting plans to be scaled down and standardized, as had been done with the basic plans. CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV, as the Central Region SEATO Field Forces Commander (Designate) to prepare a draft SOP, which, after several revisions, was approved by CINCPAC on 14 June 1972.3

SEATO Exercise PX-42

(S) SEATO Exercise PX-42 was a ground/air Command Post Exercise, the objectives of which were to test selected aspects of initial deployment, defensive operations, and logistic support of SEATO Plan 4 in Thailand. The PX-42 Exercise Director was Major General Gibbons, Deputy Commander, USMACTHAI. The U.S. provided 287 personnel from Thirteenth Air Force and from the IX Corps (Aug). This exercise, held in June 1972, marked the first use of the IX Corps (Aug) in a SEATO exercise. This organization was a unique U.S. Army Reserve unit with the mission of reinforcing the active Headquarters IX Corps in the event of mobilization. Headquarters IX Corps was programmed against the force requirements of a number of Pacific Command contingency plans and SEATO Plans. The use of these Hawaii-based U.S. Army Reserve personnel enabled them to acquire a first-hand appreciation of their role in the SEATO force structure. An additional benefit was related to U.S. national defense policy which placed increasing reliance on the availability of reserve forces.1

ANZUS

(U) The ANZUS Security Treaty was signed by the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand on 1 September 1951, and entered into force on 29 April 1952. ANZUS was the only other multi-lateral treaty to which the U.S. was committed, and signatories to this treaty were also SEATO allies. During the years since the treaty became effective, the Australians and New Zealanders had pressed for more frequent meetings, and especially for more military consultation. The U.S. had resisted the pressure on the basis that such could detract from SEATO, or, more significantly, have been considered by Asian nations as a new "white man's club" in the Pacific. Likewise, the U.S. position was against the establishment of a formal framework of command arrangements, treaty headquarters, or defense plans.2

ANZUS 22nd Council Meeting

(C) The ANZUS Council, composed of the chief foreign affairs officers of the three parties, met in Canberra, Australia on 29 June 1972, one day after the close of the 17th SEATO Council of Ministers meeting. This 22nd meeting was attended by Secretary Rogers and Admiral McCain, CINCPAC, as the U.S. Military Representative (MILREP). The major items for discussion included the

2. J5141 Point Paper, 4 Jan 72, Subj: ANZUS Background, with 1 attch., Copy of ANZUS Treaty.

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SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 2.
visits to China and Russia by President Nixon; the emerging stature of Japan; the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam; mutual security interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; and, the French atmospheric nuclear explosions. In a departure from the norm for ANZUS meetings, the Council adopted a proposal to study the ramifications of Southeast Asian neutrality—the first commitment to an activity outside an actual meeting in many years.\(^1\)

ANZUS Official Talks

\(^*(\ast)*\) Although the U.S. policy had discouraged the approaches by the other parties for more substantive discussions, some concessions were made. When the subject of more frequent talks was broached once more in 1968, the State Department requested the views of the Ambassadors concerned and CINCPAC. CINCPAC concurred in the concept, which involved assistant secretary level discussions of mutual security matters. CINCPAC, however, had cautioned against leading Australia and New Zealand to believe the U.S. was willing to begin joint military planning. The first meeting, initially called an ANZUS Security Consultation, was held in Washington on 17-18 November 1968. The agenda was very broad, and the meeting consisted mostly of general, speech-type statements. A second meeting was on 23-24 October 1969, also in Washington. The third such meeting, then called ANZUS Official Talks, was held in Canberra on 1-2 March 1971. At the third meeting, attended by CINCPAC, JCS, DOD, and State Department representatives, it was agreed to hold annual meetings, about six months after the ANZUS Council meetings.\(^2\)

\(^*(\ast)*\) The fourth in the series of ANZUS Official Talks was held in Washington on 13-14 September 1972. CINCPAC was represented by a Plans staff officer and the Deputy Political Advisor to CINCPAC. Topics for discussion included the foreign policy trend of Japan and China; the outlook for Indochina; Southeast Asian neutralization; political developments in Micronesia and Papua, New Guinea; and, aspects of the situation in Korea.\(^3\)

ANZUS MILREP Meeting

\(^*(\ast)*\) While attending the 21st ANZUS Council Meeting in New York on 2 October 1971, CINCPAC decided that it would be worthwhile to resume periodic meetings of ANZUS MILREPs, the last of which had been held in 1956. CINCPAC requested the approval of the JCS, noting that changes in the U.S. force posture in Asia had caused Australia, in particular, to re-examine its defense

2. J5141 Point Paper, 4 Jan 72, Subj: ANZUS Background.
policies. He considered it important to maintain a suitable level of interest in the ANZUS Treaty, to reassure the treaty partners, and to inject new vitality into the organization. The JCS approved the MILREP meeting, with the proviso that no suggestion be implied that the U.S. Government was willing to extend its current commitments under the treaty. In December 1971, CINCPAC extended invitations to the two MILREPs to meet in Hawaii early in 1972.¹

(C) The ANZUS MILREP meeting was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii on 27-28 March 1972. Australia was represented by Admiral Sir Victor Smith, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee; Air Vice Marshal D.L.G. Douglas, Head, Defense Staff, Washington, D.C.; and Mr. R.N. Hamilton, Assistant Defense Secretary for Plans and Policy. The New Zealand representatives were LGEN Richard J.H. Webb, Chief, Defense Staff; BGEN A.H. Sutton, New Zealand Embassy, Washington; and Mr. Paul Edmonds, Assistant Defense Secretary for Policy. The discussion topics, with the identity of the country which proposed each subject were:²

*   *   *   *   *

A. Military prospects in Indo-China and Thailand for next two/three years (from New Zealand).

B. Methods by which ANZUS countries might coordinate their efforts further for the collective defense for the preservation of peace and security in the Pacific area (from Australia).

C. The outlook for Malaysia/Singapore and Indonesia and the Five Power Defense Arrangements (from New Zealand).

D. Southwest Pacific. Future military interest by ANZUS countries (from Australia).

E. Security role for Japan in the Pacific for the next five years (from New Zealand).

F. Possible future changes in force deployments by ANZUS countries (from Australia).

G. Indian Ocean. Likely pressure on ANZUS Forces, surveillance, use of facilities and exercises (from Australia).

² J5142 HistSum Mar 72; CINCPAC 140224Z Mar 72.
H. The Nixon Doctrine and its application over the next five years (from New Zealand).

I. Desirability of conducting low key combined exercises in relatively uninhabited ANZUS areas (from United States).

J. Frequency and timing of meetings (from Australia).

(U) The meeting was considered highly successful and productive, and believed to have achieved the dual purposes of establishing informal military/defense relationships and reassurance that the U.S. would remain a Pacific power. CINCPAC advised the JCS that continued informal, low-key meetings between MILREPS could prove to be worthwhile supplements to the formal Council meetings.

Five Power Defense Arrangement

($) On 1 November 1971, the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Arrangement was superseded by the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA); the countries in the FPDA included the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The FPDA stipulated continuing cooperation in the field of defense, and consultation among the parties in the event of any form of armed attack organized and supported externally. The remaining British forces, together with Australia and New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore were placed under the Commander, ANZUK Force, who was responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of those three nations. At the end of 1972, the ANZUK force numbered about 6,400 men. The basic principles of the FPDA were recognized by CINCPAC as the type of regional security arrangement which warranted active interest and encouragement by the U.S., but without specific commitments for support.

ASEAN

($) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development of the member nations. These were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. On 25 November 1971, the ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia approved a declaration of neutrality for Southeast Asia. CINCPAC supported the apparent ASEAN initiatives toward regional cooperation, but questioned whether the declaration would help or hinder the attainment of security and stability for Southeast Asia.

1. Ibid.; CINCPAC 010404Z Apr 72 (EX).
On 13-14 April 1972, the Fifth Ministerial Conference of ASEAN was held in Singapore. The joint communique and other reports indicated a new stress on ASEAN solidarity and political-economic cooperation. On 13-14 July 1972, another ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in Manila. From this meeting came a public announcement that ASEAN nations should explore the possibility of making some concrete contribution toward the final settlement of the Indochina conflict. ASEAN did in fact convey a cease-fire proposal to the U.S., South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front refused to accept it. Neither the proposal nor the responses were made public. The proposals bore some resemblance to the negotiating position of the U.S., but did not specifically include Laos and Cambodia, nor did the ASEAN proposal specify an international supervisory body to enforce the cease-fire. The reaction of South Vietnam and Cambodia was essentially the same as that of the U.S. By August, the ASEAN courier (Foreign Minister Malik of Indonesia) had informed the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia that neither the proposal nor the responses would be made public. CINCPAC's official position remained that such regional cooperative efforts were in consonance with the Nixon Doctrine. However, they could also be detrimental to certain U.S. objectives. For example, a future ASEAN bloc vote could be cast against the U.S. position on free passage through and over international straits during the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference.¹

Central Treaty Organization

Prior to 1 January 1972, CINCPAC had no direct interest in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the members of which were the U.S., United Kingdom, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. On that date, CINCPAC's area of responsibility was moved eastward to the 62nd degree of east longitude, thus officially including Pakistan, but not Iran or Turkey. In March, CINCPAC advised the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) that he desired the CENTO desk officer position in the ODRP to be continued as a central point of contact with CENTO activities.²

In January 1972, the Chief, U.S. Element, CENTO proposed to the JCS that CINCPAC be represented at the CENTO 5th Naval Coordination Conference in London on 13-15 June. The JCS approved, and a CINCPAC Plans representative attended the meeting. From a political-military point of view, the most significant development was that the Pakistan Navy was represented for the first time. Both the Pakistan conference delegate and the Pakistan naval

attache in London advised the CINCPAC representative, in private, that the Pakistan Navy was willing to cooperate not only with CENTO, but also with the U.S. Navy in bilateral training exercises. The Pakistan also indicated that visits from CINCPAC staff officers would be welcome in Pakistan.

Indochina Coordinating Mechanisms

(¶s) CINCPAC and other U.S. military and civilian agencies had long encouraged cooperation among the nations of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Effective operations oriented toward defeat of the entire enemy system transcended the capabilities of the RVNAF alone. Free World efforts had been exercised by a variety of agencies under the overall guidance and influence of CINCPAC. The thrust of CINCPAC's effort to promote regionalism had been to foster the realization that the conflict in Indochina was essentially a single conflict, and that success must feature coordinated, mutually supporting operations. Serious impact on prosecution of strategy had stemmed from the compartmentation of the battlefield into separate political entities. The U.S., and for the most part, the mainland Southeast Asian nations, had observed self-imposed restraints, while the enemy, with unanimity and continuity of effort and purpose, had maneuvered freely across political boundaries. Several mechanisms of cooperation had developed prior to 1972; among them, the Combined Interdiction Coordinating Committee; the Tripartite Planning Group among the U.S., Cambodia, and Vietnam; a Thailand liaison team in Phnom Penh; and special coordination between Laos and Vietnam.

1. J5125 HistSum Jun 72; CHUSELEMENT CENTO 171305Z Jan 72; JCS 5530/282330Z Jan 72; CINCPAC 020121Z Jun 72; It would appear that Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO was not anti-U.S. motivated, but could have been a pragmatic decision based upon geographical separation.
SECTION III--COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS

Republic of China

(5) Changes in U.S. policy toward Asia, especially moves toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), caused the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to question the future value of its historic close alliance with the U.S. The ROC officials were particularly apprehensive about secret U.S.-PRC agreements relative to Taiwan independence which may have resulted from President Nixon's visit in February 1972. The Shanghai Communique, summarizing the visit, stated that the U.S. Government:1

...acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

(U) The Shanghai Communique left the ultimate resolution of the Taiwan problem in Chinese hands. Nevertheless, the ROC was given many assurances that the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 remained in force. Upon his return to the U.S. from the PRC, President Nixon stated, "...We have agreed that we will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs, and we did not do so at Peking. We have done all this without giving up any United States commitment to any other country." In response to a question from a journalist in Shanghai, Dr. Henry Kissinger stated, "...this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed..." Secretary Rogers in a March 1972 interview, stated, "...We've made it quite clear....that we were going to continue our treaty obligations in the area...." Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, on "Meet The Press," stated, "...All I know is that we have a situation now where we retain our commitments to the Republic of China, we maintain our diplomatic

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SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Feb 73, p. 98.

* As to these Specific Programs
  OPERATIONS IN ANTARCTICA
  AEROSPACE DISTURBANCES
  AND TRACKING STATION
relationships, we continue trade and investments, but at the same time we have an expanding dialogue and communications and exchanges with the People's Republic of China."

(TS) During 1972, there were about 9,000 U.S. military personnel on Taiwan. The progressive reduction of U.S. military forces and installations referred to in the Shanghai Communique included the redeployment of one C-130 air wing from Taiwan in fiscal year 1973/1974, which would reduce the military population about 40 percent, or 3,300 personnel. Analysis by the Country Team indicated that ROC officials were prepared to accept withdrawals of U.S. Forces used in direct support of South East Asian operations, such as the C-130's at Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base. However, the ROC was sensitive to implications of change in U.S. resolve to honor the Mutual Defense Treaty. 2

(C) As the world political scene evolved in the context of U.S. national strategy and foreign policy, certain military problems on the local level were also politically oriented. These problems were primarily in connection with various provisions and interpretations of the U.S.-ROC Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Chief among these was the provision for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the ROC over U.S. military personnel. The intention of the ROC to exercise such jurisdiction was signaled by a notice from ROC officials that the waiver, agreed to in the SOFA for certain specified offenses, would be recalled. Most cases involving waiver recall involved either crimes of violence, such as robbery, murder, etc., or the possession, use, and sale of narcotics. In December 1971, for the first time, members of the U.S. military were imprisoned by the ROC, which surfaced the question of adequate confinement facilities. Also, disagreement between the U.S. and the ROC had arisen regarding the application of Chinese martial law to U.S. Forces personnel. The question of whether possession or use of marijuana was recallable as a narcotics offense was unresolved at the end of 1971. The CINCPAC SJA had occasion to state, in May 1972, that, "...with respect to complexity of problems related to foreign criminal jurisdiction, COMUSTDC SJA's workload is second only to the Philippines." 3

Baio-Tipton, 1969-1971

(C) During 1972, several cases wherein the ROC had exercised jurisdiction in previous years continued to claim considerable attention and to generate

1. Ibid.

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voluminous correspondence. The case known as Baio-Tipton was originally recalled for alleged robbery in 1969. While robbery was a recallable offense under the SOFA, Chinese law placed robbery under the criminal law of the armed forces. This conflicted with the U.S. position that such law could not be applied to personnel under the SOFA. Under martial law, conviction for robbery could carry the death penalty. The men were eventually tried for attempted homicide, which was not under martial law, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment, which was appealed. In October 1971, the sentence was reduced to 18 months by amnesty decree, and, on 17 December 1971, Baio and Tipton were taken into custody by ROC officials to begin serving their sentences.

Starks-Sweat-Eaton, 1970-1971

Starks, Sweat, and Eaton were apprehended in May 1970 at their off-base house where marihuana and opium were allegedly found. Narcotics offenses were recallable under the SOFA, except when the offense was "directed against" U.S. military personnel, civilians, or dependents. The case raised questions regarding the definition of narcotics under the SOFA (i.e., was marihuana a narcotic) and various interpretations of the term "directed against" and the inter se provision of the SOFA. A preliminary hearing was held in September 1970 in the Taichung District Court on charges of possession of narcotics. Sweat was not present at the hearing, having been evacuated to Clark Air Base in the Philippines for psychiatric examination. In January 1971, Starks and Eaton were formally indicted (for possession of opium only); Sweat was excused until he was returned to Taiwan. In February 1971, Starks and Eaton were sentenced to two years' imprisonment; meanwhile, and continuing through 1971, Starks' parents had generated political pressure to prevent the U.S. Air Force from releasing him to ROC custody. In December 1971, the sentences for the two men were reduced to one year, and, on 16 December, the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei was advised that a restraining order had been issued by U.S. District Court prohibiting Starks' release to ROC custody. On 17 December, Eaton was imprisoned, along with Baio and Tipton. Before the year ended, the restraining order was withdrawn; Supreme Court Justice Marshall had denied a petition for further relief, and Starks was remanded to the custody of the warden of Taipei prison.

1. The narrative discussion of all FCJ cases is condensed from complete documentation provided by the CINCPAC SJA, all of which is filed in the CINCPAC History Archives. For details of the Baio-Tipton and Starks-Sweat-Eaton charges and proceedings, see CINCPAC Command Histories 1969, 1970, 1971.
2. Ibid.; 374 CSG 040700Z Jan 72.
Baio-Tipton-Starks-Sweat-Eaton 1972

(C) In August 1971, Sweat had departed Clark Air Base to the U.S. on forged emergency leave orders. Upon apprehension, he had been confined at Malcom Grow Hospital, Andrews Air Force Base for psychiatric examination. He was found mentally unfit for further military service, and COMUSTDC approached the ROC for agreement in releasing Sweat from active military duty. In January 1972, COMUSTDC was informed that the ROC had concluded that Sweat could be allowed to remain in the U.S. be discharged from the U.S. Air Force, and not return to Taiwan for trial. The ROC specified that a letter be sent to the ROC SOFA representative stating a U.S. guarantee to use all means to induce Sweat to return when he was capable of standing trial; that periodic reports would be sent regarding Sweat's condition; and, that this concession not be considered a precedent. The disposition of this case was to be kept in strictest confidence between the parties, and the ROC would not reply to the U.S. Government letter, but, "...an understanding that this disposed of SGT Sweat's amenability to GRC criminal jurisdiction at this time would exist." An appropriate letter was sent and informally acknowledged by ROC authorities. COMUSTDC confirmed the understanding of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) that, "...as a practical matter after his discharge no action by AF with respect to Sweat will be expected." On 25 February 1972, Sweat was medically separated from the U.S. Air Force.1

(C) Meanwhile, political pressure for action on Starks' behalf continued to build. Starks' parents, congressmen, judges, and attorneys continued to bombard the Air Force and Defense Department for action. This insistence was redoubled when Stark became ill with what was tentatively diagnosed as pulmonary edema and was taken from the prison to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Taipei on 17 January 1972. To lessen the chance of a U.S. court order preventing Starks' return to ROC prison, a Chinese guard, symbolizing ROC custody, was assigned at the hospital as well as an American guard. On 27 January, his health apparently restored, Starks was returned to the Taipei prison under Chinese guard.2

(C) In February, a request for clemency submitted by letter from Starks' parents to the ROC was denied by the Executive Yuan. In March, the CSAF informed COMUSTDC that Starks' attorney and his mother, along with Eaton's mother, planned to visit Taipei to pursue the granting of clemency. The

1. J73 HistSums Jan, Feb 72; COMUSTDC 220216Z Jan 72; CSAF 252056Z Jan 72; COMUSTDC 260331Z Jan 72; CSAF 281945Z Feb 72.
2. J73 HistSum Jan 72; CSAF 141803Z Jan 72; COMUSTDC 170140Z Jan 72; CSAF 192105Z Jan 72; SECDEF 6675/202231Z Jan 72; SECDEF 3910/271834Z Jan 72; J73 Memo for Record, 20 Jan 72, Subj: Sergeant Jan R. Starks, USAF.

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attorney and parents were not under the sponsorship of the U.S. Government.¹

(Confidential) After discussions between Starks' and Eaton's American civilian attorney, their mothers, and ROC officials, Starks was released from Taipei prison, and on 25 April, was permitted to return to the U.S. for discharge. His release was based on his documented record of recent serious illness. Eaton, whose case and sentence were identical to those of Starks, was not released in spite of urgent representations by U.S. military medical authorities, the civilian attorney, and a personal letter from Senator John Tunney of California to the ROC Minister of Justice.²

(U) Baio, Tipton, and Eaton remained in prison until December 1972. They were released to Air Force authorities from Taipei District prison on 17 December and departed Taiwan on 20 December. Eaton had completed his sentence for possession of heroin. Baio and Tipton were paroled six months prior to completion of their sentences for attempted homicide, and received permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to leave the country.³

Rhoades Case

(U) On 22 May 1972, Airman First Class Melvin L. Rhoades was indicted by the Taichung District Court for possession of heroin with intent to sell in violation of Paragraph 1, Article VII of the Statute for the Purge of Narcotics During the Communist Rebellion. Punishment could be ten years to life imprisonment, with a possible fine of $250 maximum. He was tried on 20 June, and oral judgment was rendered on 26 June. Rhoades was sentenced to twelve years' confinement for transportation of narcotics, a more serious offense which carried a possible death sentence under the Chinese Purge Statute. This was possible because, under the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure, the charge brought by the prosecution could be changed in the judgment. The sentence was subsequently confirmed in writing.⁴

1. J73 HistSums Feb, Mar 72; CSAF 032053Z Feb 72; COMUSTDC 120520Z Feb 72; CSAF 161535Z Mar 72.
2. J73 HistSum Apr 72; COMUSTDC 220545Z Apr 72; AMEMB Taipei 2023/251019Z Apr 72; CSAF 271334Z Apr 72.
3. J73 HistSum Dec 72; COMUSTDC 180605Z Dec 72; 327AD 180020Z Dec 72; COMUSTDC 200620Z Dec 72. (Note to J73--Thank God).
(U) Rhoades appealed his drug conviction to the Taiwan High Court, which had been known to convict on a more serious offense level than that upon which the appeal was based. In this case, however, the court found him guilty of possession with intent to sell—the original lesser charge—and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.

(G) On the day, 2 October, that the last written judgment was served on Rhoades, he was discovered in his on-base room in possession of additional heroin. Two other airmen were also involved. No court-martial action was taken against Rhoades because of his impending imprisonment by the ROC; appropriate action was taken against the other two men. After various communications between CINCPAC and COMUSTDC, it was decided that no notice of this incident would be given to ROC authorities, primarily because SOFA negotiations were pending regarding interpretations of the inter se and "directed against" stipulations, and the definition of marihuana as a narcotic. Subsequent to this incident, Rhoades decided against an appeal of his five-year sentence.2

(U) On 7 November, Rhoades' sentence was affirmed in a post-trial hearing, and he was remanded to Chinese authority to begin serving his sentence.3

Snow Case

(G) Parallel to the Rhoades case was the apprehension of Airman First Class Samuel L. Snow for possession of opiates. On 11 June 1972, Snow entrusted what later proved to be narcotics to a Chinese female in an off-base bar. The female contacted a special agent of the Office of Special Investigation (OSI). After a test of the items proved positive for opiates, they were returned to the female, who, on 12 June 1972, gave them back to Snow. He then left the bar, was apprehended by OSI and Chinese authorities, and taken into U.S. custody. A notice of serious incident was delivered to the office of the procurator, Taichung District Court, on 15 June, and Snow was placed on international hold. A subsequent search of Snow's on-base quarters revealed one oriental-style pipe with a black, gummy substance in the bowl which tested positive for opiates. Also found was a film canister containing a green substance believed to be marihuana, and a cardboard box containing numerous 35mm color slides. This box was found to contain two plastic bags of white
powder. The OSI informed the procurator about the two packages of heroin and the canister of marihuana.¹

(6) When the procurator requested that the items found be turned over to him, another lengthy debate ensued between COMUSTDC, CINCPAC, the 374th Combat Support Group, and finally, the Defense Department. At issue was the advisability of advising the ROC authorities of on-base contraband, and whether the discovery of this contraband was an integral part of the original off-base apprehension or a separate inter se incident. COMUSTDC initially took the position that the contraband found in Snow's on-base quarters was not within the jurisdiction of the ROC based on the "directed against" exclusion of Article XIV of the SOFA. On 5 July, the ROC recalled its waiver and assumed jurisdiction, even though no reply had been made to the procurator's request for the on-base items. After the recall notification, CINCPAC advised COMUSTDC of his assumption that the contraband would be turned over to the procurator, and that the inter se argument would not be pursued. COMUSTDC, citing the CINCPAC message, instructed the 374th Combat Support Group to provide the procurator with "results of on-base search," and to insure that a letter "concerning inter se offenses" included a statement that this action should not be considered a precedent. At this point the 374th requested clarification as to exact procedure, taking the position that the inter se on-base discovery and the SOFA recall should be kept separate; that the items seized on-base should not be released to the ROC; but that a list of those items should be provided to the Chinese.²

(6) On 15 July, CINCPAC summarized the correspondence to date. COMUSTDC, on 12 July, had requested the 374th Combat Support Group to provide the procurator with the results of the on-base search, with an accompanying letter concerning inter se offenses. A statement that "this action" should not be considered a precedent was also to be included. The 374th had expressed reservations to that course of action based on the apparent theory that on-base offenses were inter se. CINCPAC had assumed that, if the ROC recalled the waiver, the results of the on-base search would be furnished, but that the accompanying letter would not mention inter se. CINCPAC had also disapproved of a statement proposed by COMUSTDC indicating a desire to try "all known offenses at the same time." Based on the foregoing previous communications, CINCPAC noted that the use of inter se in this case was confusing. The theory of inter se was not concerned with geographical areas, such as on-base versus

off-base, but applied to those situations where the offenses were directed solely against members of the visiting forces or their property. Possession of drugs, standing alone, was not inter se.

(5) On 19 July, the General Counsel of the Defense Department entered the discussion. Firstly, the message stated that, on the basis of the facts and the involvement off-base of a local national, this case was not considered to be inter se nor a case not subject to recall. Moreover, since the on-base search was related to the off-base apprehension of the accused, and since it revealed narcotics, the procurator's request for information and results of the on-base search was properly within his scope of authority. There was little basis for a denial or delay in releasing the information. Secondly, there was considerable precedent under other U.S. SOFAs for the primary right to exercise jurisdiction by local authorities over cases involving the on-base use and possession of drugs by members of U.S. Forces. Aside from issues of public health and morality, the very nature of drug offenses would necessarily involve facets of the local economy, trafficking in drugs, or smuggling. In the Snow case, a local Chinese female was involved in the development of the investigation, and the transaction which resulted in Snow's apprehension occurred off-base. Here, the predominant Chinese interest would be one of controlling its own nationals as well as to stamp out drug trafficking and smuggling. The DOD opinion was that the search of Snow's on-base quarters was an integral part of the entire transaction. The inquiry of Chinese authorities regarding the on-base search by the OSI was part of their processing of the off-base offense. The DOD conceded that, if no local nationals were involved, and no evidence suggested direct connection with local sources, the ROC interest would not be so great. In such cases, it would be appropriate for the U.S., on the basis of a major interest, to claim that there was no recallable offense. However, because of the "high and continuing interest of both U.S. and host country" in controlling the use and trafficking of drugs, the fullest cooperation should exist between U.S. Forces and local authorities.

(5) The foregoing Defense Department view appeared to settle the concern of all parties about the inter se interpretation of the on-base search and seizure of drugs. On 21 July, COMUSTDC informed CINCPAC that the, "...TDC position to provide info and turn over evidence..." was believed to be in consonance with the DOD guidance, and that inferences drawn by the 374th Combat Support Group to the contrary were unfounded. Accordingly, COMUSTDC recommended that the information and evidence be "simply" made available, but with no encouragement regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by the ROC. CINCPAC's

1. CINCPAC 15213Z Jul 72.
2. SECDEF 1072/190019Z Jul 72.
concurrency was requested for the text of a letter from the 374th to the procurator offering the evidence seized in the on-base search. The caveat was included that the release of the contraband should not be considered a precedent.

(6) In response to the Defense Department request, COMUSTDC reviewed the bidding on the undefined "directed against" portion of the SOFA inter se provision. He advised the DOD, on 10 August, that the joint Embassy-Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) interpretation of the term "directed against" was unilaterally strict. The intent of this interpretation was to retain U.S. jurisdiction over as many SOFA defendants as possible. Both the Embassy and TDC were reluctant to concede that, even if one U.S. individual sold narcotics to another in the Chinese community, that offense was not inter se. On 1 September, the judicial subcommittee of the SOFA Joint Committee was to attempt to reach an agreed definition for the phrase "directed against." Also to be discussed was the definition of marihuana as a narcotic and jurisdiction over marihuana offenses. The marihuana issue had first surfaced as a secondary issue in the Starks-Sweat-Eaton case of 1970, when both opium and marihuana had been found in their possession. The U.S. position at the judicial subcommittee was to concede that marihuana was a narcotic, based on the U.S. Government having signed the International Narcotics Agreement which so defined marihuana. However, regarding the "directed against" phrase, the U.S. would maintain that mere possession of narcotics involved no offense directed against anyone other than the U.S. Government. The offense of narcotic possession had no victim, in contrast to rape or murder, and such cases should remain under U.S. jurisdiction. Offenses such as the sale of marihuana to Chinese would be conceded as recallable.2

(6) While the weightier questions were being debated, Snow was indicted and charged with possession of heroin. The indictment mentioned both the heroin found off-base and the heroin and opium pipe found on-base. Snow was tried in the Taichung District Court on 8 September, and orally sentenced on 15 September to two-and-one-half years in prison. He elected not to appeal, received written judgment on 27 October, and, on 24 November, was remanded to the custody of Chinese authorities to begin serving his sentence.3

1. COMUSTDC 210152Z Jul 72.
3. 374CSG 240345Z Aug 72; J73 HistSum Sep 72; 374CSG 080710Z Sep 72; 374CSG 150810Z Sep 72; J73 HistSum Oct 72; 374CSG 310300Z Oct 72; J73 HistSum Nov 72; 374CSG 180300Z Nov 72; 374CSG 210435Z Nov 72; 374CSG 250215Z Nov 72.
Miscellaneous Drug Cases

(U) The ROC recalled the waiver of criminal jurisdiction in several other cases during 1972 which involved the off-base sale, use, or possession of heroin. SGTs Raymond E. Booker and Joseph A. Owens, USAF, were arrested, along with female local nationals, when narcotics, money, and records of sales were found in their off-base apartment. Jurisdiction was recalled on 28 November 1972.¹

(U) SGT Robert J. Blackwell, USAF, was indicted in December for possession of heroin, found in his off-base apartment on 28 August. Blackwell was subject to a maximum sentence of imprisonment for five years.²

(G) Several cases kept the question of Chinese jurisdiction in marihuana cases alive. In ten cases of record at CINCPAC, the jurisdictional waiver was not recalled. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had indicated informally its agreement that the U.S. Government would exercise primary jurisdiction over on-base drug cases with no local national involvement, provided the amount of drugs did not indicate the likelihood of local community involvement. By the end of the year, however, a trend appeared in which the ROC declared individuals involved in marihuana cases persona non grata on Taiwan. Several offenders had been transferred from Taiwan to U.S. units elsewhere at ROC request.³

(U) In addition to the cases involving drugs, several acts of violence perpetrated by U.S. military personnel on Taiwan were reported to CINCPAC in 1972. From the SOFA standpoint, these acts tended to raise the question of whether the ROC would cite the Chinese criminal code or martial law when exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. position was to attempt to keep the judicial process of the ROC within the provisions of the criminal code rather than martial law. The following cases were not especially helpful insofar as precedents were concerned, but they were illustrative of the potential problems.⁴

Lutz Case

(U) In a case involving the death by strangulation of a Chinese bar girl in April 1972, the Executive Yuan recalled its waiver of jurisdiction in regard

1. J73 HistSum Nov 72; 374CSG 060540Z Nov 72; 374CSG 100800Z Nov 72; 374CSG 280920Z Nov 72.
4. COMUSTDC 280803Z Aug 72.
to SGT Ronald A. Lutz, USAF. The procurator held preliminary hearings in May, and Lutz was examined by an Air Force psychiatrist. On 5 June, Lutz was indicted for murder, and the trial began on 28 June. During the trial, a Chinese expert testified that a comparison of pubic hair found in the victim's vagina with a sample of Lutz's hair showed similarity. The defense counsel requested that the hair be reexamined, and the U.S. Air Force agreed to conduct the test at the U.S. Armed Forces Laboratory, Camp Zama, Japan. The Chinese expert would be allowed to participate in the test. In August, the court formally requested that the laboratory test be made.1

(U) In early December, the laboratory report from Camp Zama was received. In essence, the report stated that the hair found in the victim's vagina could not be identified with Lutz's to the exclusion of all other persons, but the presence of the same "uncommon" features in both enhanced the probability that the two samples had a common origin. During closing arguments, Lutz reiterated his innocence, but, on 19 December, an oral judgment of guilty of negligent homicide was rendered. The sentence was 18 months' imprisonment, and, at the end of 1972, the written judgment had yet to be received.2

Scott Case

(U) In April, MAJ John L. Scott, USAF, shot and seriously injured a burglar fleeing from the Scott home. The thief was hospitalized. Although U.S. authorities had not formally notified the ROC of the incident, the Taichung District Court advised the 374th Combat Support Group on 24 May that waiver of jurisdiction would not be recalled. The court requested the 374th to handle the case under American legal procedure for the "criminal liability" of Scott, and to assure that Scott paid for the thief's medical expenses. By July, Scott and his insurance company had reached a settlement with the burglar of $3,250. In October, the burglar was released from the hospital and sentenced by the Chinese court to one-year imprisonment. Scott received a letter of reprimand.3

Fuller Case

(U) On 12 August 1972, Airman Daniel D. Fuller, USAF, pulled a Chinese taxi driver out of his cab, assaulted him, pursued the fleeing taxi driver on foot, and attacked a bicyclist. He then gave chase in the abandoned taxi and

1. J73 HistSums May, Jun, Jul, Aug 72, with 19 attached documents.
2. J73 HistSum Dec 72; 374CSG 060440Z Dec 72; 374CSG 130610Z Dec 72; 374CSG 190820Z Dec 72.
collided with a car driven by another U.S. military man. He fled the scene and, when apprehended, was staggering, had blood-shot eyes, and his speech was blurred. He refused to take a blood alcohol test. There were indications that the Chinese Foreign Affairs Police considered the assault on the taxi driver and the taking of his cab as severable offenses. As previously discussed, robbery of the taxi was punishable under Chinese martial law, with a possible death penalty. The ROC criminal code provided for a "forceful taking" penalty of six months to five years.\(^1\)

On 19 August, a civil settlement was reached with the taxi driver and the taxi company, and, on 6 September, the Taichung District Court advised that the ROC waived jurisdiction "in accordance with the SOFA." Once again, the court requested that appropriate action be taken by U.S. authorities against Fuller, who had paid $609 of $620 in claims by 22 September. Except to notify the procurator of the disposition of the case, it was considered closed for FCJ reporting purposes.\(^2\)

**Japan**

In his annual foreign policy report to Congress, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated:\(^3\)

\[*\ *\ *\ *\ *\ *\ *\ *

Our relations with Japan entered a new era on May 15, 1972. On that date Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands were returned to Japan after 27 years of U.S. administration.

The reversion did not fundamentally affect our security interests in Japan. The U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to serve the needs of both our countries in this era of change. The military cooperation and deterrent effect provided for in the treaty, including the presence of U.S. Forces in Japan, has made a significant contribution toward the recent reduction in tensions in East Asia....

**CINCPAC's political-military relationships with Japan were carried out within the framework of the mutual security treaty; the U.S.-Japan Security**

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2. 374CSG 190450Z Aug 72; COMUSTDC 280803Z Aug 72; J73 HistSum Sep 72; 374CSG 050917Z Sep 72; 374CSG 220807Z Sep 72.
Consultative Committee (SCC); the Security Consultative Subcommittee (SSC) and the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) pertaining to U.S. personnel and United Nations forces.

Security Consultative Committee

(§) The U.S.-Japan SCC was established on 19 January 1960, and normally met annually to discuss the implementation of the mutual security treaty. The agenda usually included such matters as the security of Japan; major changes in the deployment of U.S. armed forces into Japan; the use of facilities and areas in Japan for military combat operations; and, "any matters underlying and relative to security affairs." The U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs were co-chairmen of the SCC. CINCPAC and the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency were the principal military advisors. In CINCPAC's absence, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSJAPAN) served as the military advisor.¹

(§) The SCC was established in 1967 as a working group under the umbrella of the SCC. It was designed to provide a more frequent and less formal exchange of ideas without the high degree of visibility associated with the SCC. Neither the SCC nor the SSC met during 1972; the U.S. did not press for meetings because the delay allowed time to develop a better picture of base requirements and possible releases of bases.²

(§) Late in 1972, the two governments began plans for the 14th meeting of the SCC, to be held on 23 January 1973, with an SSC meeting to follow in April 1973. Japanese officials voiced their desire for more substantive discussions on mutual security interests. Toward that end, CINCPAC recommended that the SCC discuss an agreement on a strategic concept for security which embodied the requirements for total defense. This agreement would also lead to assumption by Japan of a defined share of the security responsibility and to Japanese support of the American share. On 8 December 1972, the State Department had approved an SCC agenda which included a review of the East Asia situation; a discussion of base consolidation plans; and the interpretation of the phrase "prior consultation."³

2. Ibid.
Both governments agreed that the basic pro-forma character of the SCC should remain unchanged, but Japan proposed that a new consultative group be established to meet quarterly for more in-depth discussion of the security issues. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS, on 23 December 1972, that an informal meeting of the key SCC participants be held to stimulate thinking toward the development of a realistic, supportable, and mutually agreeable joint strategy for mutual protection of interests in the Western Pacific. From this informal meeting of top level people, CINCPAC postulated an SCC-sanctioned group comprised of in-country agency representatives from the Japanese military and foreign affairs departments, the U.S. Embassy, and COMUSJAPAN personnel. This group would address such subjects as:

- U.S. and Japan military requirements for regional security.
- Assessment of risks and consequences for various levels of U.S.-Japanese strength.
- Recommendations for realistic military capabilities.
- Recommendations for a division of effort between the U.S. and Japan.
- A planning mechanism and operating procedures for joint military action.
- Practical and realistic exercises to test joint planning and procedures.

U.S.-Japan Prior Consultation

Part of the U.S. response to the invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, and the resumption of bombing in the north, had come from Japan. Marine F-4 squadrons were deployed from Iwakuni, Seventh Fleet elements departed from Yokosuka, and M-48 tanks were airlifted by C-5 transports from Yokota to Vietnam. These movements, combined with Japanese speculation on the possible return of B-52s to Okinawa, generated a flurry of opposition party and press attacks against the validity of the prior consultation requirements of the mutual security treaty. The treaty specified that major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. armed forces or major changes in their equipment were subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan (GOJ). Also, the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for combat operations to be undertaken from Japan were so subject.

1. Ibid.
On 7 June 1972, a GOJ unified view was presented in the Japanese Diet which distinguished between combat operations and supply/support operations, and linked the prior consultation requirement to the former only. Subsequently, the GOJ requested a meeting, under the continuing consultation provisions of Article IV of the treaty, at which an explanation would be given as to how U.S. military requirements in Vietnam affected U.S. Force levels and logistics/repair activities at facilities in Japan and Okinawa. The U.S. Ambassador acquiesced, and tasked COMUSJAPAN to provide information related to U.S. Force levels in Japan, Okinawa, and other selected installations; aircraft basing and levels of activity; logistics support from Japan to Okinawa bases; and, the percentage of logistics support devoted to Southeast Asia.1

CINCPAC expressed concern to the Chairman, JCS that the apparent intent of the GOJ to formalize "consultations" beyond treaty requirements, and to learn the specific levels of support being provided from Japan to Southeast Asia, was contrary to U.S. interests. He recommended that, should the meeting be held, the information should be sufficiently generalized to preclude additional restrictions on U.S. operational flexibility. The State Department and DOD jointly supported the CINCPAC recommendation, and COMUSJAPAN was so informed.2

Related to the prior consultation provision of the U.S.-Japan treaty was the question of launching and supporting combat operations from U.S. bases and facilities in Japan for United Nations operations in South Korea. The SOFA governing the stationing of UN Forces in Japan did not specify U.S. Forces, but rather the utilization of bases by third country UN military forces should the UN command be required to react to a resumption of hostilities in Korea. Both before and after the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty was signed, secret exchanges of notes had recognized, however, that the U.S. could take certain actions in launching and supporting combat operations from U.S. bases in Japan, in support of UN contingencies, without prior consultation. There were, therefore, two separate and distinct situations regarding prior consultation: the requirement for prior consultation if the U.S. unilaterally launched combat operations not associated with UN actions; and the absence of a prior consultation requirement if U.S. Forces were committed under the auspices of the UN Command in Korea.3

Japan/UN SOFA and Third Country Troops

The SOFA between the United Nations Command and Japan provided that the SOFA would terminate if all UN forces were withdrawn from either Korea or

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

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Japan. An agreed minute to the UN SOFA excluded U.S. Forces as a determinant, since they were covered by the separate U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In February 1972, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok reported the intention of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to withdraw the Thai infantry company attached to the UN Command in Korea, and to terminate the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) C-123 flights between Korea and Japan. The implication was that the Thai flight detachment in Japan was needed to bring the RTAF C-123 squadron up to strength in Thailand. The Embassy stated that the question of Thai military presence in Korea was essentially for the RTG and Republic of Korea (ROK) to decide, and that the U.S. should not become involved.¹

(C) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that appropriate steps be taken to discourage the RTG plans to withdraw the C-123 detachment pending formal assurances from the GOJ that the withdrawal would not result in termination of the UN SOFA in Japan. CINCPAC conceded that the presence of Thai troops in Korea was essentially a ROK/RTG matter; however, the concurrent removal of the C-123 detachment had implications bearing on the UN SOFA tenure. The Thai C-123 detachment was the last residual third country UN force in Japan. Continuation of the UN SOFA was considered by CINCPAC to be an essential element in the maintenance of peace and stability in Korea and North Asia, and the use of facilities in Japan was essential to third country support of the UN Command in Korea.²

(C) In June, because the RTG had proceeded with plans to withdraw the Thai company from Korea, the UN SOFA was again in possible jeopardy. The State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo became concerned that, after the Thai troops were withdrawn, the UN units remaining in Korea, performing mainly guard duty, would not be accepted for SOFA purposes by the GOJ. The State Department authorized low-key, informal discussions with the Japanese Foreign Office, stressing the U.S. Government view that the Thai redeployment in no way affected the status of the UN SOFA. The remaining squad-size Thai contingent would retain its current unit designation, remain armed, perform sentry duty, and be prepared to undertake combat operations if necessary. Like units of Filipino and British Forces also remained in Korea. The response from the Japanese Foreign Office concurred that, so long as identifiable third country forces remained in Korea, this was sufficient to constitute the basis for continuation of the UN SOFA.³

1. J5124 HistSum Feb 72; AMEMB Bangkok 2375/181015Z Feb 72; Interview with LCOL C.M. Stewart, CINCPAC SJA Office, 2 Aug 73.
2. CINCPAC 200125Z Feb 72.
M48 Tank/APC Shipment Stoppage

(5) On 4 August 1972, demonstrators blocked the movement of M48 tanks intended for Vietnam and their transporters from Sagami Depot to the Yokohama North Pier, on the grounds that prefectural officials had not issued permits to move these heavy shipments. The U.S. maintained that, under the mutual security treaty and the SOFA, U.S. Forces were guaranteed the right to use the streets and highways to travel to and between U.S. facilities. COMUSJAPAN urged the Embassy to support the position that the rights granted under the SOFA were overriding, and that the GOJ should act to resolve the problem at the lower political levels. After lengthy discussions with local officials, the tanks were returned to Sagami on 7 August.

(5) The legal issue involved was an interpretation of SOFA Article V, which accorded, "...United States Government-owned vehicles including armor... access to and movement between facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces and between such facilities and areas and the ports...of Japan." This provision was complicated by an Agreed Minute to Article V which read, "The laws and regulations of Japan will be applicable except as specifically provided otherwise in this Article." On 7 August, a joint DOD/State Department message stated the U.S. Government position:

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...that GOJ, under SOFA, must insure that US military vehicles (including armor) are accorded access to and movement between US facilities and ports in Japan. We will continue, of course, to exercise these rights in accordance with all reasonable safety procedures.

While we recognize applicability of local law in accordance with Para. 4, Article V of Agreed Minute, we consider that this should not allow restriction that in effect would prevent the access to port facilities provided for under Article V of the SOFA....

(5) CINCPAC strongly supported the initiation of negotiations with the GOJ to insure that guarantees for U.S. access to and between facilities in

Japan, as agreed in the SOFA, were adhered to. The reluctance of the GOJ to exert pressure on the local officials represented a serious deterioration of past cooperative relationships which could lead to further restrictions contrary to U.S. national interests.1

(6) Because of the critical situation in Vietnam, and the need for tank and armored personnel carrier (APCs) reinforcement, COMUSJAPAN suggested alternate routes and ports as a temporary solution. These were ruled out to avoid the spread of demonstrations to other locations. In order to allow U.S. negotiations to focus on the basic SOFA issues, arrangements were made to provide the needed tanks from continental U.S. sources. Meanwhile, CINCPAC instructed COMUSJAPAN to encourage continued efforts to focus high level attention on the fundamental issues.2

(6) The impasse continued during the week of 14 August with the demonstrators at Sagami becoming more emboldened in their harassment activities. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan (CGUSARJ) expressed concern over the gravity of the situation and the potential danger to life and property, and stressed the need for decisive action. In view of the chance for serious violence, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the subject be broached during the 30 August meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka in Hawaii. CINCPAC also instructed COMUSJAPAN to exercise the utmost restraint to preclude the use of U.S. personnel to protect life and property except as a last resort. The JCS agreed with CINCPAC's assessment of the potential for serious incident, and a memorandum was forwarded from DOD to the President recommending discussion of the U.S.-Japan security relationship at the Hawaii talks. The JCS also directed that no further consideration be given to the use of alternate routes for the movement of tanks and APCs to avoid the conveyance to the GOJ of a weakening position on free access.3

(6) In the final stages of preparation for the Hawaii Talks, CINCPAC sought the views of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan on a positive approach to the subject of the free access impasse. However, the Ambassador did not consider the issue a proper subject for the President to discuss with Tanaka. Rather he felt that the U.S. should allow the established forums and procedures more time either to bear fruit or to demonstrate GOJ inability to remedy the situation. CINCPAC accepted the judgment of the Ambassador, but continued to urge pressure for a solution at high levels in Japan.4

1. CINCPAC 090149Z Aug 72 (EX).
2. CINCPAC 110406Z Aug 72.
3. CGUSARJ 190348Z Aug 72 (EX); CINCPAC 221045Z Aug 72 (EX); CINCPAC 222044Z Aug 72 (EX); JCS 5537/252241Z Aug 72 (EX).
4. CINCPAC 271943Z Aug 72 (EX); AMEMB Tokyo 9176/281105Z Aug 72 (EX); CINCPAC 300428Z Aug 72 (EX).
(S) Discussions between GOJ and Embassy officials concerning the movement of tanks and APCs from Sagami continued during September. U.S. military authorities applied for movement permits, and two movements of APCs were actually accomplished. However, toward the end of the month, the mayor of Yokohama again moved to frustrate the movement of APCs. There was little or no progress upon the issue of movement of tanks. Meanwhile, in the Diet, the Japanese Foreign Minister announced the GOJ legal position in regard to the destination of tanks repaired at Sagami Depot. In summary, the position recognized that, in accordance with the security treaty, the tanks could be shipped to Vietnam or to U.S. Forces stationed in other areas.1

(6) On 17 October, the Japanese Cabinet issued an order exempting U.S. Forces from the requirement to apply for permits to move oversized and overweight vehicles. Prior to such movement, however, the U.S. would be obligated to take necessary measures for the maintenance of road structures. This order precipitated renewed protests, protest rallies, and an attempted fire bombing of tanks at the Sagami Depot.2

(6) At a regular biweekly meeting of the Tokyo Embassy staff, attended by COMUSJAPAN and other senior military representatives, the Counsellor for Political-Military Affairs commented on the events leading to the "successful movement of tanks" from Sagami to the Yokohama North Pier:3

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A. Great personal courage (was) demonstrated by several individual Japanese, and outstanding personal conduct and restraint (were) shown by individual U.S. soldiers placed in an extremely difficult situation of physical threats and emotional stress.

B. Timing of essentially operational actions was sensitive to current political events: Honolulu Summit; Tanaka's visit to Peking; Ohira's visit to Washington; Termination of Diet budget debate. Military operations had to await developments on the political scene.

1. J73 HistSum Sep 72; AMEMB Tokyo 9871/150400Z Sep 72, 9876/160310Z Sep 72, 9994/191005Z Sep 72, 10175/221010Z Sep 72, 10340/271410Z Sep 72, 10388/280934Z Sep 72; SECSTATE 175602/261955Z Sep 72.
3. COMUSJAPAN 171107Z Nov 72.
C. The real meaning of the events related to the movement seems to be the acute Japanese sensitivity to base presence and base-related problems. The recent strong Diet stand in support of the MST indicates that the treaty is not in question, although Country Team will have to pay increased attention to the presence of bases and activities of the military in Japan in the light of the sensitivity.

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

(U) A review of the FCJ cases for Japan and Okinawa during 1972 revealed no significant problems connected with SOFA jurisdictional provisions. The most prominent case, from the standpoint of publicity adverse to the U.S., was that of Lance Corporal James S. Benjamin, a U.S. Marine stationed at Camp Hansen, Okinawa. He was indicted for the murder of a Japanese national male in a Marine barracks. The shooting occurred on 20 September, and Benjamin was indicted on 3 October, at which time he was released to Japanese authority. The investigation of the case prior to indictment was accompanied by intense anti-American protests, demonstrations, and publicity. The main thrust of the media and reformist groups was a demand for immediate release of Benjamin to Japanese authorities. The SOFA provided that such release not be made until an indictment be returned.

Republic of Korea

(U) The major development with an impact on political-military relationships in Korea was the declaration of martial law by President Park on 17 October 1972. In his annual report to Congress, Secretary of State Rogers said:

President Park was re-elected in December 1972 for a six year term under a revised constitution which had been approved in a national referendum in November. The constitutional revisions in effect concentrate power in the presidency. Martial law, which was imposed by the government in October 1972, was rescinded following the referendum. These changes, which President Park said were necessary to "revitalize" Korean democracy, are an internal matter and the responsibility of the Korean people. They are of interest to the United States, however, insofar as they may affect the security situation in the peninsula and because of our close association with and concern for the Korean people.

1. J73 HistSums Sep thru Dec 72, with 35 attached documents.
Security Consultative Conference

(U) On 20 April 1972, the Minister of National Defense (MND) accepted the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to attend the fifth U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Conference (SCC). The ROK agreed to host the meeting on 26, 27 June at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. Past SCCs had been held to discuss defense matters of mutual interest. CINCPAC was represented by a team of five observers, headed by MGEn Milton Adams, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.1

(U) As at previous meetings, there was no formal agenda, and discussions were conducted in open meetings and in a special closed session between the ROK MND and Secretary Laird. On 28 June, the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in Seoul provided CINCPAC with a resume of the Korean press reaction to the SCC. The dominant theme was the final joint statement of the two governments, which stressed the mutual understanding that the U.S. would provide effective and prompt support to the ROK in event of an armed attack. Also, both sides had agreed that satisfactory fulfillment of the ROK military modernization program was important to ROK security. The ROK MND was reported to have commented on the consensus reached on the assessment of the Korean situation; on the joint development of a munitions industry and co-production of communications equipment; and on the U.S. promise to deliver the new international fighter aircraft to the ROK. This same press report, however, also noted that there had been some conflicting announcements on the readjustment of ROK troop levels. Another newspaper carried an editorial entitled, "The ROK-US Defense Ministers' Conference," and sub-titled, "The U.S. Must Stop Talking about the Reduction of Korean Troops." The editorial focused on "the fact" that the question of Korean troop reduction was raised during the conference, but was tabled in the face of strong objections from "our side." The editorial continued:2

* * * * *

We again want to warn here that the U.S. must not under rate or ignore the danger of a brushfire war in Korea, nor must it be deluded by mood of peaceful coexistence prevailing among the big powers. We want to make clear our objection to the discussion of the issue proposed by Secretary Laird. It is quite absurd to talk about reduction

in Korean troops if the U.S. is to faithfully honor its defense commitment to its allies, or if it wants to fill the power vacuum generated by the withdrawal of its own troops from this nation.

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

(6) The declaration of martial law by President Park on 17 October changed the terms of reference for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA. Per Article XXII, the U.S. had the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the U.S. armed forces, the civilian component, and dependents until martial law ended. The Embassy and COMUSKOREA immediately established informal contact with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) which recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. during martial law. The MOJ expressed the view that custody of U.S. personnel convicted by Korean courts and serving sentences would be retained. There were six U.S. prisoners in Suwon prison on 17 October. The MOJ also stated its position that cases over which the ROK had assumed jurisdiction, and in which trials and appeals had begun but had not been completed, should be temporarily suspended. The ROK would continue these trials (involving 20 cases) upon termination of martial law. Cases over which the ROK had not assumed jurisdiction prior to 1900 hours on 17 October would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. The State Department concurred in the MOJ position.

(6) After receiving the official MOJ instructions to Korean prosecutors, the Embassy informed the State Department that the ROK intended to exercise jurisdiction over all cases in which notification of recall had been given prior to 17 October. These cases, too, would be temporarily suspended, along with the cases already before the courts. The Embassy also advised that the ROK civil courts remained open, but were operating under the supervision of the martial law commander.2

(6) In November, the Embassy and COMUSKOREA noted a potential problem in the proposed revision to the ROK constitution. The new constitution generally diminished individual rights and gave the president greatly expanded power, including the suspension of civil rights and control of the judiciary under some circumstances. The most serious problem in terms of the impact on the SOFA was posed by Article 53 of the new constitution. That article gave

2. AMEMB Seoul 6153/251000Z Oct 72 and 6155/251000Z Oct 72; these msgs had identical DTG, but differed in content.
the president the right to suspend "freedom and rights of the people" and to
"enforce emergency measures with regard to the rights and powers of the
executive and judiciary" when an emergency existed or was anticipated. While
the SOFA gave protection against court martial trials, Article 53 was so broad
that the executive branch could invoke courts martial and/or suspend civil
rights, and use the judiciary as an instrument of the government's will,
without resorting to a martial law declaration. This could lead to a situation
where the rights of an individual before the courts would be substantially
inferior to those assured under the SOFA.1

(C) The Embassy and COMUSKOREA, therefore, jointly proposed that the ROK
be informed that invocation of Article 53 could create a situation analogous
to that of martial law. It would be proposed to the ROK that, if Article 53
were invoked, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA would be
suspended during the period Article 53 was in force. If both parties could
agree that the measures taken did not restrict the operation of the judiciary
or impair the safeguards written into the SOFA, the U.S. could waive its right
to suspend the operation of SOFA Article XXII.2

(C) Other amendments to the ROK constitution provided that treaties in
force at the time the new constitution was promulgated would retain their
validity unless they "contradict the provisions of the constitution."
Assurances would be sought, in a SOFA Joint Committee statement for the record,
that the SOFA did not "contradict" the constitution.3

(C) The State Department concurred in the proposed low-key approach to
the ROK on the implications of Article 53, so long as any instrument embodying
this understanding was interpretive of the SOFA and not an amendment thereto.
Also, a statement should be sought in the Joint Committee that the SOFA did
not contradict the ROK constitution. When martial law was terminated as of
2400 hours on 13 December, the SJA of U.S. Forces, Korea conferred with the
MOJ concerning the status of the ROK judiciary. The MOJ stated categorically
that the ROK courts were no longer under executive or military supervision.
The SJA was assured that the ROK courts would afford accused U.S. personnel
full rights and privileges under the SOFA. Accepting these assurances,
COMUSKOREA intended to reinstate the provisions of SOFA Article XXII and make
defendants in suspended and new cases available for trial. The questions of
Article 53 invocation by the ROK and the interpretation of SOFA contradiction
of the new constitution were deferred for later discussion.4

1. AMEMB Seoul 6705/200909Z Nov 72.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. J73 HistSum Dec 72; SECSTATE 224776/130006Z Dec 72; AMEMB Seoul 7214/150302Z
Dec 72.
Republic of the Philippines

Martial Law

(U) On 23 September 1972, almost one month before President Park of South Korea declared martial law, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines addressed the nation on television:¹

My Countrymen:

As of the 21st of this month (September), I signed Proclamation #1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law. This proclamation was to be implemented upon my clearance, and clearance was granted at 9 o'clock of the evening of the 22nd, last night.

(¶) President Marcos issued a series of general orders, decrees, and letters of instruction which vested all powers of government in himself. He ordered the arrest of certain persons, established military tribunals, delineated the jurisdiction of civilian courts and military tribunals, restricted the possession of firearms, reorganized the Executive Branch, ordered land reform, imposed a curfew, and imposed travel restrictions upon Philippine citizens. The U.S. Ambassador advised the State Department that General Order No. 3, issued pursuant to the martial law declaration, deprived the civil courts of jurisdiction over certain types of criminal offenses which could affect U.S. Forces personnel under the Military Bases Agreement. Also, because many procedural safeguards had been suspended, such as the requirement for search warrants, the number of regular offenses involving U.S. personnel could increase.²

(¶) On 24 and 25 September, the two days following Marcos' announcement that martial law had been invoked, 33 U.S. sailors were apprehended in Olongapo and charged with drug offenses by Philippine authorities. All were returned to U.S. custody and placed on international hold. According to reliable information obtained by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL), the reason for this dramatic increase in the apprehension of U.S. military

¹ AMEMB Manila 9013/231417Z Sep 72.
² J73 HistSum Sep 72; AMEMB Manila 9025/240845Z Sep 72, 9028/240941Z Sep 72, 9034/250251Z Sep 72, 9252/280926Z Sep 72, 9253/280943Z Sep 72, 9196/271010Z Sep 72, 9024/240835Z Sep 72, 9154/270300Z Sep 72, 9178/270840Z Sep 72, 9336/020813Z Oct 72, 9436/040812Z Oct 72; CINCAPCREP PHIL 270553Z Sep 72; COMUSNAVPHIL 280052Z Sep 72; CINCAPCREP PHIL 271050Z Sep 72.
personnel on drug charges in Olongapo was the establishment of martial law. Search warrants, which had been difficult for the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and local police to obtain, were no longer necessary. In a meeting on 27 September between COMUSNAVPHIL and Olongapo officials, the Filipinos maintained that the campaign against drug users and pushers would continue; however, the fiscal (prosecutor) would attempt to expedite the processing of the cases against U.S. servicemen.  

(U) Although the arrest of 33 sailors in two days was a surge over previous figures, the concerted campaign against drug offenders by Philippine authorities had begun earlier in the year. On 30 March 1972, President Marcos signed into law a bill which imposed stiff penalties, including the death sentence, on drug pushers, smugglers, manufacturers, and operators of drug dens. The new Dangerous Drugs Act was lenient on drug users confirmed as first offenders, willing to identify sources, and submit to treatment. However, even those penalties had been increased over previous penalties.  

(C) In July, COMUSNAVPHIL advised the Embassy that the international hold situation had become serious since the advent of the new drug law, the refusal of the Philippine Justice Department to grant waivers, unfilled posts in the Olongapo fiscal's office, and inaction on the drug cases. The legal hold list, as of 6 July, was 713, of which 50 were alleged possession or use offenders. Some of the cases dated back to February 1972, but not one case had been filed in court since March 1971. This constituted a serious loss of personnel from Fleet units. The Embassy agreed that a meeting with representatives of the Justice Department to discuss the situation was desirable, but noted the likelihood of many convictions which, under the new drug act, carried severe mandatory prison sentences or long periods of medical rehabilitation under court supervision. By 27 July, the number of drug cases on legal hold had risen to 65, but still none had been filed in court.  

(C) After the surge of arrests immediately following the martial law proclamation and the 27 September meeting in Olongapo City, the U.S. officials at Subic Bay were notified that only the Secretary of National Defense could order the release or disposition of accused law violators. This included U.S. servicemen and would apply to 80-90 percent of Subic's 135 legal hold cases, including those for all drug offenses. The Ambassador requested another

1. J73 HistSum Sep 72; COMUSNAVPHIL 2611342Z Sep 72; AMEMB Manila 9197/271011Z Sep 72; COMUSNAVPHIL 280743Z Sep 72.  
2. COMUSNAVPHIL 310622Z Mar 72.  
meeting with Justice Department officials to clarify the new administrative procedures.

6. While U.S. Navy officials at Subic Bay were attempting to resolve the martial law-induced inertia at Olongapo City, another case involving a U.S. Air Force (USAF) member developed at Clark Air Base near Angeles City. TSgt Charles B. Coley along with MSGT (Retired) O.J. Kippenbrock, were arrested by the PC on 19 October for possession of unregistered firearms. Their off-base dwelling was searched, and six revolvers were found, together with various calibres of ammunition, none of which matched the revolvers. Coley admitted to a base legal officer that the ammunition was his; the weapons belonged to Kippenbrock. The custody receipt executed by base officials was refused, and the men were retained in Philippine custody. Coley was finally released to the custody of Clark Air Base authorities, having been held for 39 hours despite Justice Department assurances to the Ambassador that the MBA would be observed even under martial law. On 25 October, the base legal office received a subpoena and complaint for violation of martial law prohibitions against firearms possession. The case was set for preliminary investigation in the office of the Angeles City fiscal on 31 October.2

7. Shortly after the Embassy had been advised of the new impediments, under martial law, to timely disposition of the U.S. Navy cases, and subsequent to the PC refusal to accept a custody receipt for Coley, the Ambassador provided an optimistic assessment of the impact of martial law on the MBA to the State Department. Philippine officials had assured the Embassy that the provisions of the MBA were not affected by martial law, and that it was not intended that any U.S. serviceman be brought before a military tribunal. The Undersecretary of Justice had shown Embassy officers an advance copy of an amendment to a martial law general order which provided for civil investigation and trial of MBA cases, except for the offenses of subversion, rebellion, or sedition. The Ambassador noted, however, that the intent of high Filipino officials to adhere to the MBA apparently had not yet been properly conveyed to local fiscals, judges, and military authorities. Nevertheless:3

...Without appearing unduly optimistic and with full appreciation of past USG-GOP history in the criminal jurisdiction area, it (is) Embassy's judgment that we are in as good a position re impact of martial law on MBA as could reasonably be expected.

Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee

On 9 August 1972, a meeting was held in Manila between Philippine officials, Embassy officials, and U.S. military representatives. The meeting agenda included a definition of dependents under the MBA; a definition of inter se crimes under the MBA; use of official duty certificates; and the delays relating to the processing of drug cases. Substantive progress was made on the specifics of the agenda, with the exception of the inter se definition. It was suggested by the Chief State Prosecutor, Emilio Gancayco, that a Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee (CJIC) be formed, as provided by Agreed Implementing Arrangement 4 of the 1965 Amendment to the MBA. The suggestion was accepted by all present at the meeting. On 18 August, the Embassy provided the names tentatively selected as the first CJIC members. The Philippine members were: Department of Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Jose Plana; Angeles City Fiscal Torres; Olongapo City Fiscal Badaria, and Gancayco. The U.S. would appoint the Embassy Political-Military Officer; the Thirteenth Air Force SJA; the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines (CINCPACREP PHIL) SJA; and the Embassy Legal Officer.

On 25 August, the Embassy submitted the U.S. nominations to the CJIC by diplomatic note (number 516); before the Philippine representatives were formally nominated, martial law had been declared. When the response was received from the Department of Foreign Affairs on 10 October, the Embassy pressed for a CJIC meeting as soon as possible in order to discuss the problems of reconciliation between martial law and MBA provisions.

On 14 November, the State Department conveyed its concern that 74 of the approximately 140 legal hold cases at Subic, as of 28 October, involved personnel from Fleet units. State urged the Embassy to assure that this subject be included on the agenda of the first CJIC meeting, scheduled for 28 November 1972. CINCPACREP PHIL also recommended that the need to expedite cases filed with the Olongapo fiscal be placed on the agenda. He also anticipated that the subject of inter se definition would be raised by the Philippine representatives, and recommended that the U.S. not accede to the Philippine position on inter se. The Philippines defined "crimes against chastity, crimes against domicile" etc. as something other than the U.S. definition of "offenses solely against the person or property." If, as the Filipinos had once postulated, sex crimes and breaking and entering were defined as crimes against the State, the whole concept of inter se, for all crimes, would be null and void.

The CJIC met for the first time on 28 November, as scheduled. The agenda items were: procedures for the committee; drug cases at Olongapo; appeals of determinations by fiscals; waivers for victimless crimes; abuse of criminal process for civil matters; inter se difficulties; and the Godwin case. The discussions, as summarized by the CINCPAC SJA were:

Procedure: Each side can invite technical representatives in addition to its four regular members. Meetings would be quarterly or at the call of either co-chairman and minutes would be kept.

Drug Cases at Olongapo: Philippine authorities indicated replacement of certain personnel and procedures in future cases would preclude preliminary charges based on inadequate evidence. Further, the fiscal would be dismissing approximately 18 to 20 cases within the next few weeks.

Time Standards and Decisions to Appeal Non-Prosecution Determinations: Presently, there are no time standards within which complainants must perfect appeals of fiscal's determinations not to prosecute. Thus, sometimes military accused remain on lengthy periods of legal hold after complainants have merely indicated their intention to appeal. The Committee agreed that (1) complainants would be given only five days to file such appeals, and (2) the Department of Justice would decide the appeals within 30 days.

Waivers of Jurisdiction: The U.S. side urged that a fresh look be taken at the waiver situations (the GOP has not been granting waivers). The Philippine side replied that a further review of waiver practices might be useful.

Inter Se: The U.S. side informally suggested a procedure to resolve inter se disputes. (1) The U.S. would assert inter se jurisdiction, (2) Philippine authorities would have 15 days to disagree in writing, (3) in case of disagreement the CJIC would have 30 days to consider the problem, and (4) if the CJIC could not resolve it, the case would be referred to a three-man advisory or arbitration panel.

The basic disagreement in application of the "inter se" principle between the U.S. and the Philippines was highlighted in the cases of SSGT Charles Porter, USAF, and SGTs Artee Ponder, Jr., Eugene Ward, and David T. Goldson, USAF. Porter was accused of serious oral defamation by the Filipino wife of another USAF member. The incident took place on Clark Air Base. Despite objections of Clark authorities, the fiscal referred the case to trial. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, took the opportunity to comment upon the "inter se" proposal outlined in the first meeting of the CJJC. It was his view that all "inter se" cases should not be brought to the attention of Philippine authorities and that arbitration was inappropriate. CSAF believed discussion in the CJJC and additional consideration of the use of waiver might solve problems and avoid confrontation. As concerns the procedure proposed in the CJJC, CINCPACREP PHIL generally agreed with CSAF. The Porter case was resolved before the month was out when the complaining witness stated she was no longer interested in prosecuting and the judge thereupon dismissed the case. This seemingly simple solution was probably the result of extensive behind-the-scenes maneuvering of Philippine authorities. Ponder, Ward, and Goldson had been involved in the death of another USAF member due to an overdose of drugs. The fiscal advised that a complaint for "administration of a prohibited drug resulting to murder" had been filed against Ponder, Ward, and "John Doe." Clark Air Base authorities delivered a letter to the fiscal asserting U.S. jurisdiction. The fiscal did not concur, but stated the letter would be forwarded through channels with a recommendation that the matter be resolved in the CJJC.

Airmen Testify Before Philippine Senate Committee

In May 1972, another episode in the sometimes incredible saga of U.S.-Philippines relations occurred which was historically unique. On 17 May, two Clark Air Base airmen, SSGT Wayne B. Evans and SGT Thomas M. Andric, appeared before an executive session of the Philippine Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The airmen were brought to the hearing by opposition Senator Benigno Aquino after having held a press conference at the National Press Club in Manila. Following the press conference, the spokesman for the self-styled "GI Movement" proceeded to the Senate and amplified their accusations that the U.S. had violated U.S.-Philippines agreements by mounting combat operations from the Philippines to Vietnam.

1. J73 HistSum Dec 72; 405 CSG 080742Z Dec 72; CSAF 151350Z Dec 72; CINCPAC 162139Z Dec 72; CINCPACREP PHIL 190842Z Dec 72; 405 CSG 211444Z Dec 72; AMEMB Manila 12527/260853Z Dec 72; 405 CSG 150907Z Dec 72 and 180844Z Dec 72.
Press reports of the statements attributed to Evans and Andric included the assertions that Clark Air Base was deeply involved in the escalated Vietnam war operations; a B-57 squadron was on the flight line at Clark ready to take off and go to war; the core of the Seventh Fleet was home-based at Subic; and the naval magazine at Subic was the largest supplier of ammunition for the war. Evans claimed to have loaded bombs and missiles on F-4s, according to the press reports, for launch from Clark to Vietnam. According to an unedited transcript of the testimony obtained by the Embassy, however, neither airman directly and unequivocably claimed direct knowledge of combat missions being flown from Clark Air Base. Evans stated that one F-4 squadron previously assigned to Clark was in Thailand, and that squadrons were transiting Clark on their way to the war. Both airmen admitted that they were conscientious objectors and feared disciplinary action upon their return to Clark Air Base.¹

The day after the two airmen testified before the Committee, the Philippine Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs asserted that his department had had no advance notice of their appearance. The chairman of the committee also claimed to have been out-maneuvered by Senator Aquino, who had personally but informally accompanied the two men into the hearing room. Finally, the Foreign Secretary, Carlos P. Romulo, remarked to the Ambassador after a Mutual Defense Board meeting on 18 May, that, "Something should be done about those GIs. What they have done is treasonous. It's causing great trouble."²

By the morning of 19 May, the morning press had dropped the incident with the exception of the Chronicle, which carried editorial challenges to the veracity of U.S. officials in dealing with Philippine officials, "...for the testimony of the two GIs exposed the gullibility of President Marcos and Secretary Romulo." On the other side of the coin, the Evening News accused the Foreign Relations Committee of dishonoring Congress and the nation by listening to the testimony of Evans and Andric. The editorial stated that a friendly government did not provide a forum for derogatory opinions against another government by citizens of the latter. The News also stated that the testimony was based largely on hearsay and failed to substantiate claims that the bases were being used directly for combat operations in Vietnam. In fact, the editorial stated, the testimony tended to reinforce statements by responsible U.S. and Filipino officials on the logistical and support nature of the bases. Evans and Andric returned to Clark Air Base, where both were processed for discharge from the Air Force.³

¹ AMEMB Manila 4592/180933Z May 72 and 4640/191038Z May 72.
² J73 HistSum May 72; AMEMB Manila 4547/180127Z May 72 and 4592/180933Z May 72.
³ J73 HistSum May 72; AMEMB Manila 4640/191038Z May 72.
The National Lawyers Guild (NLG), an association of American lawyers, had sent attorneys to the Philippines purportedly to represent U.S. servicemen without charge before U.S. military courts-martial and other on-base tribunals. The right of NLG attorneys to practice law without being members of the Philippine Supreme Court was questioned by the Philippine Bureau of Immigration, but was upheld by the Secretary of Justice on the grounds that U.S. courts-martial were not courts of the Philippines.

On 15 March 1972, a raid was conducted by the PC on a business establishment in Angeles City, adjacent to Clark Air Base, known as the "GI Coffee House." The coffee house was the headquarters for the Pacific Counseling Service, through which the NLG provided legal services to U.S. military personnel. Literature was found which linked the NLG to a Filipino Communist Youth Organization. Anti-war and communist literature and illicit drugs were also found. On 27 April, the 405th Fighter Wing at Clark Air Base notified the CSAF, the Embassy, and CINCPAC that a message had been received from U.S. Representative Ronald V. Dellums questioning the raid by the PC, "...and the OSI at Clark Air Base..." He requested an expeditious explanation as to its nature and justification.

The 405th replied that the OSI had not participated in the raid, which was conducted by the PC pursuant to a warrant issued by a local (Filipino) judge. Some of the literature seized included "Selected Readings from the Works of Mao"; "The Cultural Revolution in China"; Why Lt Victor Corpuz left the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Join the New Peoples' Army." An open letter was also found criticizing a plan to outlaw the Kabataang Makabayan, a youth organization reported to be a front for the Communist Party of the Philippines. The building was unoccupied at the time of the raid (1030 hours), and no arrests were made.

In May, the 405th legal office reported that NLG attorneys had used their attorney-client relationship with Air Force members at Clark to gain entry to the base, and while there, had actively promoted dissent among other Air Force members. Moreover, the Pacific Counseling Service published an underground newspaper called "Cry Out" which regularly carried articles.

2. J73 HistSum Apr 72; 13AF 160137Z Mar 72; AMEMB Manila 2457/170822Z Mar 72; 405FW 270804Z Apr 72.
3. Ibid.
and notices urging members of the U.S. military to seek legal counsel through
the GI Center (Coffee House).  

(§) After the September declaration of martial law, an NLG attorney was
arrested at Subic Naval Base by the PC. He allegedly possessed documents
showing a connection with international and Filipino communist organizations.
U.S. military authorities assisted in the arrest, as stipulated in the MBA.
In related arrests, two other U.S. citizens, not attorneys but assisting the
NLG member in the defense of an accused military member at Subic, were taken
into custody in Olongapo. These arrests of U.S. citizens after the invocation
of martial law generated considerable congressional and press interest in the
U.S. Through the intercession of the Embassy, the three were released by the
Philippine authorities and allowed to leave the country on 27 October 1972.  

Renegotiation of the MBA

(§) In the volatile political climate of the Philippines, the presence
of U.S. military bases as "sovereign enclaves" had long been a political
football. During 1971, Philippine and U.S. negotiating panels had worked
toward a renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement. By the end of 1971,
considerable progress toward agreement had been made at the working level,
but some key issues had not been resolved. Among those were shipping and
navigation, immigration, tax exemption, criminal jurisdiction, base lands
relinquishment, and the term of agreement. It was little wonder that the
final item—the term of agreement—had not been settled, because the State
Department, DOD, CINCPAC, and the Ambassador had not arrived at an agreed
position after many months of discussion. President Marcos had proposed
to the Ambassador, in December 1971, that the MBA be co-terminous with the
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The MDT had an indefinite tenure, but could be
terminated within one year after notice by either party. CINCPAC had
cautionsed that more than one year would be needed to reposition U.S. forces
and facilities from the Philippine bases if the MBA and MDT were co-terminated.
CINCPAC agreed that co-termination could be accepted, but only on condition
that there be a separate, concurrent exchange of notes (possibly classified)
stating that a reasonable period for withdrawal of up to four years would
be allowed. The Ambassador did not concur, maintaining that the additional
withdrawal period should be left for future determination.  

1. J73 HistSum May 72; 405 CSG 230909Z May 72.
2. J73 HistSum Oct 72; AMEMB Manila 9950/181030Z Oct 72, 10047/200947Z Oct 72,
10066/210622Z Oct 72, 10077/221002Z Oct 72; CINCPACREP PHIL 230548Z Oct 72;
AMEMB Manila 10082/230845Z Oct 72; SECSTATE 192855/231636Z Oct 72; AMEMB
Manila 10260/270801Z Oct 72.
1972, Subj: MBA Renegotiations: Article XXIX (Term of Agreement); J5125 Point
The last formal meeting during 1972 of the negotiating panels took place on 24 January. No significant progress was reported. On 5 June, President Marcos publicly handed Ambassador Byroade a note which asked how long the U.S. intended to use its Philippine bases and whether the U.S. intended to install long-range missiles on the bases. On 9 June, a press release from the presidential residence (Malacanang Palace) reported a vote by the Philippine National Security Council to renegotiate the MDT and the Laurel-Langley (economic) Agreement, as well as the MBA. The release also stated that MBA negotiations would be raised from the technical level to the policy level.

On 15 November, the final working draft of the new Philippine Constitution was completed. Its main thrust, under a parliamentary government, was to increase and strengthen the power of the prime minister at the expense of the president, cabinet, assembly, and supreme court. One section negated the claims made by anti-U.S. elements that the MBA was not a valid, Senate-ratified treaty. Section 12 declared that, "All treaties, executive agreements, and contracts entered into by the government are hereby recognized as final, conclusive, and binding." At the end of 1972, the MBA still had not been renegotiated, but observations made by CINCPAC at the beginning of negotiations and again in July 1972, appeared to remain cogent.

* * * * *

There are indications that the PHILs will approach these negotiations with outlandish initial positions and attempt to whipsaw our negotiators between demands for increased military assistance and for increased economic/trade preferences.

Criminal Jurisdiction

During 1971, the format used in U.S. Government custody receipts for U.S. military personnel arrested by Philippine authorities became a serious political and military issue. The problem was centered at Clark Air Base and in the Angeles City Court of First Instance, Judge Ceferino Gaddi presiding. Judge Gaddi objected to the wording of the custody receipt which was issued in the name of the U.S. Government, and considered the base commander personally

liable for the appearance of an accused before his court. During 1970 and 1971, he had declared the Thirteenth Air Force Commander, the Clark Air Base Commander, and several other officers in contempt for failure to appear in his court to explain nonappearances of other defendants. He had, in fact, ordered the arrest of the base commander and a base legal officer.

The first half of 1972 saw a continuation of Gaddi's refusal to accept custody receipts. In every case brought before him, he ordered that bail be posted or the accused would be jailed. Such a position directly contravened the MBA, and caused a flurry of correspondence between the Embassy, CINCPACREP PHIL, the State Department, the CSAF, and the Air Force units at Clark Air Base. The Embassy maintained that the Philippine Department of Justice had exerted all efforts to remove Gaddi, but that the judicial system was a separate entity not responsive to executive department guidance. Formal diplomatic notes were exchanged at the highest levels of both governments to no avail. Gaddi continued to require the posting of bail. In 1971, the Philippine Government had appointed Gaddi to another post, but he had refused to move on the grounds that his caseload at Angeles City needed to be reduced. Finally, the Secretary of Justice notified the Embassy that Gaddi had been sworn to his new post on 21 June 1972. At that time, approximately $20,000 had been posted in bail for accused U.S. servicemen. The new judge, after one case in which bail was posted, granted a motion to reconsider, withdrew the bail order, and accepted a custody receipt. Subsequent cases were also handled with custody receipts; thus, the one-man defiance of two governments appeared to have ended.

In November, the Embassy was informed that, under martial law, the forfeiture of bail by Filipinos would allow trial in absentia, and U.S. Government consent was requested to modify criminal jurisdiction custody receipts accordingly. If an accused U.S. serviceman did not appear for trial, he also could be tried in absentia. The Embassy, CINCPACREP PHIL, and Thirteenth Air Force did not object, so the Embassy recommended to the State Department that the Philippine proposal be adopted. In December, the State Department informed the Embassy that "serious difficulties" had developed in Washington which precluded immediate acceptance. There was no indication, as of the end of the year, as to what action would be taken.

Continuing FCJ Cases

As a result of Judge Gaddi's refusal to accept custody receipts, his challenge of official duty certificates, and his insistence upon the jurisdiction of his court over the Clark Air Base commander and other officers, several actions had been filed with the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Geyer-Brown (originally Bobbit-Brown) case had been filed enjoining Gaddi from executing contempt charges and fining or jailing the principals. In the Stevens-Ramsey case, the relief requested was revocation of arrest warrants and acceptance of custody receipts. Late in 1971, another accused, Chavis, was ordered to jail when his custody receipt was refused. While these cases of MBA violation had been handled separately in petitions to the Supreme Court, they had come to be considered as one in correspondence between various U.S. agencies. Thus, the Geyer, Brown, Stephens, Ramsey and Geyer, Brown, Chavis labels were used in coordinating U.S. legal action. On 12 January 1972, Gaddi sentenced Brown to six months' imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 pesos; Geyer was given a three-month sentence and 500-peso fine for contempt of court. These orders were forwarded to Manila for immediate appeal and consolidation with the Geyer-Brown and Stephens-Ramsey cases.

Meanwhile, in late 1971, the 6200th Air Base Wing at Clark was disestablished and the 405th Combat Support Group commander was designated Clark Air Base commander. It was therefore proposed that the name of the new base commander be substituted for Geyer (who had, in turn, been substituted for Bobbit) in the Supreme Court case. This would emphasize the U.S. position that the base commander's obligation was not personal, but incurred as an official duty of an agent of the U.S. Government. The CSAF, Thirteenth Air Force, and 405th all agreed that this move should be made. The 405th forwarded to the Embassy a copy of special order G-1 (assumption of command by COL Truesdell) and special order G-283 of Pacific Air Forces which redesignated the 6200th Air Base Wing to the 405th Combat Support Group.

As it became evident that Gaddi's replacement in the Angeles City Court of First Instance would honor custody receipts, Philippine authorities suggested that the custody receipt cases pending before the Supreme Court be removed. These cases involved petitioners La Rosa, Harvey, Burkett, Taft, Sanchez, Geyer, Brown, and Whipkey, all USAF personnel. The Philippine Solicitor General believed that the interests of both countries would be

2. J73 HistSum Jan 72; AMEMB Manila 0180/0707002 Jan 72; CSAF 071849Z Jan 72; 405 CSG 080354Z Jan 72.
served by having the cases removed from the Supreme Court. He recognized
that it was desirable to have a favorable ruling on the custody receipt
issue, but he was not sanguine about a favorable ruling considering the
nationalistic flavor of the Court. He stated that Supreme Court rules
permitted dismissal when the government official involved (Gaddi) had been
replaced and the successor had corrected the grounds for action. The Embassy
and the Air Force units at Clark agreed with this proposal, and State
Department approval was requested. State concurred provided that the new
judge inform the Supreme Court of his views on the legal issue.¹

Two other cases, begun in 1969, claimed the attention of CINCPAC and
the U.S. authorities in the Philippines during 1972. SSGT James E. Horne,
stationed at John Hay Air Base near Baguio City, had been accused of rape by
a local Filipina. The case had been characterized by many delays; at one
point, when the plaintiff wished to withdraw and both attorneys had moved
for dismissal, the judge refused to dismiss. Finally, in March 1972, Horne
was found guilty as charged, sentenced to life imprisonment, and fined 40,000
pesos for moral and exemplary damages. Although offered the prospect of a
pardon, Horne elected to appeal on the grounds that the 1965 MBA amendment
was invalid, and that the Philippines did not have jurisdiction because the
charged offense had taken place on the U.S. base. At the end of the year,
the Solicitor General had not yet filed a brief in reply to Horne’s appeal;
the prospect was that adoption of the new Philippine constitution would moot
the issue of the validity of the 1965 criminal jurisdiction amendment to the
MBA.²

The second case was labelled Williams-McDaniel-Lane, interchanged
depending on the circumstances being discussed. SSGT Bernard Williams,
SGT Ronald McDaniel, and TSGT Hiawatha Lane had been accused of abduction
and rape in 1969. Through administrative error, Williams was reassigned
and allowed to leave Clark. Thus began the sequence of events in which a
base legal officer and base commander were first cited for contempt in 1970,
and the Thirteenth Air Force commander was censured by the court. Williams
filed suit in U.S. Federal Court to enjoin the Air Force from returning him
to the Philippines. After several delays, Judge Gaddi agreed to hear the
evidence with just McDaniel and Lane present in the court. The trial ended
in March 1971, but Gaddi announced that no judgment would be rendered until
Williams was present in Court.³

1. J73 HistSum Dec 72; AMEMB Manila 11594/010730Z Dec 72; SECSTATE 227419/
   160041Z Dec 72.

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(S) On 22 February 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Williams' petition for a Writ of Certiorari, hence vacating the stay previously imposed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and allowing the Air Force to return Williams to the Philippines. He was returned on 28 February, which news was greeted with jubilation by the Embassy, the Philippine officials in Manila, and the Philippine press.1

(C) On 1 March, Gaddi called the court to order for promulgation of judgment on Williams, McDaniel, and Lane. The courtroom was jammed with approximately 100 spectators, most of whom were press representatives and television camera crews. The defendants were found guilty of forcible abduction, the court ruling that attempted rape was part of that offense. McDaniel, as principal, was sentenced to confinement of from 10 to 17 years. Lane and Williams, as accomplices, each received sentences of from 4 years and two months to 10 years. Bail was required (again violating the MBA) and posted pending appeal. The Embassy called the sentences clearly unwarranted and unduly severe, and protested strongly through diplomatic channels.2

(C) In August, the Solicitor General informed the Embassy that the Secretary of Justice had approved his brief recommending acquittal for all three defendants. On 28 November, after Embassy requests for a decision, the Court of Appeals acquitted all three airmen on the grounds that their guilt had not been established "to a moral and legal certainty."3

Thailand

The Thailand Buildup

(U) In his annual foreign policy report to the Congress, Secretary of State Rogers noted the close cooperation on the part of Thailand which enabled the U.S. to reverse the downward trend of U.S. Forces in Thailand:4

Military cooperation loomed large in our relationship in 1972. As part of our response to the North Vietnamese spring offensive, additional U.S. Forces were assigned, with Thai government agreement, to Thai air bases, raising the number of military personnel from 32,200 to about 45,000.

1. J73 HistSum Feb 72 with 17 attached documents.
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The number of combat missions flown was correspondingly increased. These forces will be reduced as circumstances permit.

(5) While Secretary Rogers' report was accurate it did not address the political problems inherent in the Thai support of the U.S. response. On 12 May 1972, the Ambassador in Bangkok reviewed the sensitive implications of the U.S. deployments. The Ambassador recalled that the RTG had readily acquiesced to the deployments, intended to meet the emergency situation in Vietnam. While the RTG leaders recognized the risk of heightened exposure to the hostility of their communist neighbors, they accepted it because they realized that future Thai security depended on denying Hanoi's objective of dominating Indochina. Nonetheless, the redeployments, as a reversal of the withdrawal trend begun in 1969, had revived and raised Thai expectations of future U.S. policy and actions. The RTG would expect, as a faithful ally, to receive preferential treatment in aid and military assistance; would be sensitive to criticism of Thailand from U.S. officials; and would be even more sensitive than before about U.S. willingness to consult with them before any significant change in our negotiating position.

(5) About six weeks later, on 21 June, the Ambassador noted evidence of heightened sensitivity to U.S. deployments. The reaction of the Thai leaders to a suggestion that the press be allowed to visit Thai bases was negative. They felt that it was impossible to get favorable stories about the U.S. use of Thai bases, and permitting journalists to visit the bases simply enabled them, "...more effectively to damn the RTG for its role." Moreover, the Thai objected to publicity concerning the movement of forces to Thailand from Vietnam, which created the impression that Thailand was "a wastebasket" for units which could not remain in another country. Among the deployments causing the most adverse comment was the location of 13 KC-135 tankers at Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) just outside Bangkok, which created a noise level problem in a densely populated area.²

(5) When, in September, the deployment of F-111 tactical aircraft from Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada to Takhli RTAFB was contemplated, the Ambassador warned that extensive press interest and queries could be expected. He urged that the announcement of the deployment emphasize that it was made after full consultation with the RTG, and that there would be no increase in U.S. military personnel in Thailand as a result.³

1. AMEMB Bangkok 6605/121035Z May 72.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 8690/210215Z Jun 72.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 13546/221144Z Sep 72.
On 25 September, the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Office advised CINCPAC that the JCS had ordered the deployment of the F-111s to Thailand, and provided advance notice of the public announcement to be made on 26 September. The RTG made a simultaneous release in Bangkok, announcing the arrival of the F-111s, the deployment to the U.S. of the F-4s stationed at Takhli; and the removal of the KC-135s from Don Muang. The Thai announcement was carried on radio and television, and prominently covered on the front page of Bangkok newspapers. Illustrative of the importance ascribed to the public affairs aspects of the deployment was the fact that Field Marshal Thanom personally approved the release.1

In October, the RTG approved a visit to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB by the information media. CINCPAC approved the visit, and provided specific guidance to COMUSMACVTHAI as to certain restrictions to be observed during the visit to protect classified operations. Two months later, Nakhon Phanom was again in the headlines. The still classified move of the U.S. Military Command and Seventh Air Force headquarters from Saigon to Nakhon Phanom had been leaked in Saigon. The Ambassador noted the political implications for Thai-American relations of these stories emanating from Saigon, and requested concerted effort to stop the leaks.2

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

No SOFA or other formal agreement existed between the U.S. Government and the RTG relating to the jurisdiction of U.S. military and civilian personnel. In practice, the Thai did not exercise jurisdiction over duty or inter se cases, but regularly exercised jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in off-duty cases. The case of MSGT Eugene M. Walker was the oldest case not yet resolved at the start of 1972. Thai police had arrested Walker on 1 January 1969 on suspicion of murdering his 16-month-old adopted daughter of Thai nationality. Walker was initially found guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the offense was reduced to causing death without intent and the sentence changed by five years' imprisonment. The Thai Supreme Court upheld the appellate court sentence on 28 October and Walker was imprisoned the same day.3

On 15 February 1972, a petition for royal pardon was filed with the Udorn prison warden, according to a message of that date from the judge advocate's office of the Deputy Commander, Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces

1. SECDEF 3586/252348Z Sep 72; AMEMB Bangkok 13740/271043Z Sep 72.
2. CINCPAC 201106Z Oct 72; AMEMB Bangkok 17706/160634Z Dec 72.
(7/13AF) at Udorn RTAFB. A subsequent message on 24 February, however, stated that a draft of the petition to the King of Thailand was under study by Embassy and MACTHAI officials. On 23 February, a board hearing at Udorn RTAFB under Air Force Regulation 39-12 recommended a general discharge for Walker, with rehabilitation procedures and conditional suspension of discharge.¹

(§) On 6 June, the Embassy was informed that Walker's petition for pardon, which apparently had been cleared by the Embassy, had been granted by the King. Walker's immediate departure from Thailand was mandatory and the RTG stipulated that publicity should be avoided. Walker departed Thailand on 8 June 1972.²

(Ç) SP4 Richard Breedlove was charged with the knife slaying of a Thai woman on 9 May 1971. On 7 February 1972, Breedlove was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Bail for Breedlove had been refused at the time of his arrest, and he was kept in custody pending appeal of the verdict. On 28 March, the CINCPAC SJA concurred in the report of the Trial Observer that Breedlove had not received a fair trial. He recommended that renewed attempts be made to secure Breedlove's release on bail.³

(U) On 29 June, the Thai appellate court reversed Breedlove's conviction for murder based upon discrepancies in testimony and general insufficiency of evidence. The State was given 30 days to file an appeal with the Supreme Court of Thailand. The State appealed the acquittal, and bail was set at $10,000, which also required confirmation by the Supreme Court. Bail was approved in the amount of $28,811.53 (600,000 baht), and supplied by U.S. Army authorities on 2 November 1972. To insure Breedlove's presence and safety, he was restricted to his company area, accompanied by an unarmed military policeman at all times, and billeted in a private room adjacent to his company's orderly room.⁴

(Ç) Other cases of comparatively lesser importance reported by the CINCPAC SJA included SSGT Victor L. Laws, convicted of possessing unregistered

1. J73 HistSum Feb 72; 7/13AF 150923Z Feb 72, 240300Z Feb 72, 250245Z Feb 72.
firearms; SSGTs Ralph L. Thomas and Raymond G. Villarreal, convicted of purchasing and drinking alcoholic beverages after the martial law curfew; and SSGT Clayton H. Murphy, who injured a Thai national while driving a U.S. vehicle on official business. The injured Thai filed a criminal complaint, and this case was pending at the end of the year.  

Vietnam

(TS) The most significant development relating to political-military relationships in Vietnam during 1972 was the establishment of the new, combined Defense Attache Office/Defense Resources Support and Termination Office (DAO/DRSTO). This organization, discussed in detail in the Logistics chapter of this history, was to replace the MACV organization when a cease-fire agreement was signed. On 13 December 1972, the CINCPAC SJA outlined a tentative provision for the conduct of legal affairs. The SJA paper stated that legal support for military personnel should be provided by DRSTO to the extent practicable, with backup support provided by the appropriate out-of-country Service activity. The SJA advised that a SOFA was not necessary because the Pentalateral Agreement granted immunity from Vietnamese civil and criminal jurisdiction and provided other diplomatic privileges to U.S. military, DOD civilian, and other civilian direct-hire employees.  

(TS) The SJA also advised that the delegation of court-martial authority to the Chief, DAO/DRSTO was not acceptable. The power to authorize a commander of a joint command to convene courts-martial was delegated by the President only to the Secretary of Defense. It was therefore recommended that the Services should process military justice matters involving DRSTO military personnel in the same manner as these matters were handled for DAO personnel world-wide.

2. J73/Memo/000290-72 of 13 Dec 72, Subj: Organization of Southeast Asia.
3. Ibid.
Medical Materiel Excesses in PACOM

(U) In March 1972 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health & Environment) advised CINCPAC by message that the rapid phasedown in the RVN would produce additional medical long supply and excess at the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency Pacific (USAMMARPAC) with a potential value of $8 to $10 million. The message stated that utilization of this materiel by U.S. Forces in the PACOM was urgent for reasons of economy and efficiency and suggested the expanded use of the Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA).

(U) After several meetings of medical and PURA staff representatives of CINCPAC and Service components, it was determined that the following on-going actions were being accomplished:

-USAMMARPAC was reporting all excess to PURA in accordance with established procedures.

-Services were submitting routine requisitions to PURA.

-CINCUSARPAC had requested augmentation personnel for 120 days to assist in overcoming the physical problem of screening retrograde materiel.

In addition, representatives at the meetings agreed to the following actions:

-CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF would advise USAMMARPAC of those activities which were considered to be authorized recipients of potency dated items (Code P); narcotics, precious metals, alcohol and alcoholic beverages (Code R); controlled drug items (Code K); and nonstandard supplies which had been previously excluded from reporting to PURA.

-USAMMARPAC would circularize these items by intensive merchandizing messages to the aforementioned activities.

-USAMMARPAC would advise CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF by intensive merchandizing messages of excess nonstandard equipment items which had been previously excluded from reporting to PURA.
These actions together with a recommended procedure for utilizing permissive overstock materials were included in a 15 April message to the Secretary of Defense. After a number of phone discussions and exchanges of messages between DOD, CINCPAC and the Service components, the Secretary of Defense in July approved the procedures recommended in the 15 April message and directed their implementation.

Regionalization of Peacetime

Military Health Services Support

On 11 May 1972 the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to conduct tests in four areas of the concept of Regionalization of Peacetime Military Health Services Support of the Continental United States. On 19 August 1972 he expanded the concept to include two overseas areas, one in Germany and the other in Japan. The Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, consequently directed the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan, to implement this concept in Japan.

When made aware of these actions in early September, CINCPAC sent a message to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concurring in the concept but strongly objecting to bypassing the Unified Command chain of command. He also invited the CJCS's attention to the fact that the test in Japan duplicated tasks already assigned to and implemented by the COMUS Japan Surgeon under authority of Chapter 4, JCS Pub 3. As directed, the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan, advised the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, of the conceptual plan agreed to by each of the Service components in Japan.

On 2 October 1972 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment) advised the Joint Chiefs by memorandum that his office did not consider the earlier memoranda had disturbed the CINCPAC's command relationship and interposed no objection to the Unified Commanders monitoring the tests. The earlier memoranda did not, in fact, disturb command relationship because it directed actions that completely bypassed CINCPAC and duplicated existing missions.

As a result, CINCPAC directed COMUS Japan to refer problem areas to him for possible resolution prior to being referred to the Military Medical Regions Coordinating Office.

1. J76A HistSum Jul 72; SECDEF 8548/072121Z Mar 72; CINCPAC 150250Z Apr 72; SECDEF 5951/171501Z Jul 72.
2. J761 HistSum Oct 72; SECDEF/Memo, 11 May 72, Subj: Regionalization of Peacetime Military Health Services Support; SECDEF/Memo, 19 Aug 72, Subj: Regionalization of Peacetime Military Health Services Support; BUMED NO3010/312000Z Aug 72; CINCPAC 152330Z Sep 72; USAIH 1tr Ser 01.1tn 3010 of 26 Sep 72, Subj: Regionalization of Peacetime Military Health Services Report; ASD (H&E)/Memo, 2 Oct 72, Subj: Medical Care Regionalization Test in Japan and Europe; CINCPAC 140224Z Oct 72.
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Pacific Command Health Services

(U) CINCPAC Instruction 6320.2A, Pacific Command Health Services, was promulgated on 21 November 1972. The revision updated a previous instruction by deleting all references to medical reporting requirements such as Beds and Patients reports. It was determined that these reports were no longer required. The revision also included a new section formalizing the regional hospital concept within PACOM. The objective of the joint utilization of military health services in the PACOM was to provide the most efficient and economical use of medical resources. The revision was the result of more than two years of coordination with the Service components.1

Military Provincial Health Assistance Program in South Vietnam

(U) The Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP) was officially terminated on 30 June 1972 with the phase out of the Air Force team covering Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces.2 This program provided medical support to the Ministry of Health patient care system that served most of the civilian population of the RVN, the paramilitary forces and, under a joint utilization program, military personnel and their dependents at 26 province hospitals and more than 200 district dispensaries. Cost of the program was shared by the DOD and the U.S. Agency for International Development.3

Reduction in Medical Support

(U) During 1972, the total U.S. hospital beds within the PACOM available for area support or dedicated to support of Southeast Asia was reduced 865 beds, from 3,937 to 3,072. This was made possible by continuing troop withdrawals, a general reduction in the U.S. level of hostilities, and continuation of the CINCPAC directed policies of joint utilization and direct evacuation from the RVN to CONUS when return to duty within a reasonable period of time was unlikely.4

4. J76 HistSums Jan-Sep 72.

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SECTION II--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Funding Conditions

(U) The administrative requirements of the PACOM were fully supported during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1972 (FY 72) with funds from both the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) and the Military Assistance Program (MAP) appropri-ations. The funding set up earlier for these requirements proved to be more than adequate. The drawdown in RVN permitted a FY 72 reduction in CINCPAC O&M, N spending from a programmed $42,433,400 in January 1972 to $32,153,400 in recorded obligations on 30 June 1972. Reduced manpower ceilings in the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in the Republics of Korea and China were the principal reasons for reductions in MAP support spending from a January program of $6,434,400 to $5,709,200 on 30 June 1972. A comparison of CINCPAC budget programs for FY 72 and FY 73 is as follows (amounts in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>FY 72 Obligations</th>
<th>FY 73 Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>O&amp;M (N)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 2 General Purpose Forces</td>
<td>$17,424.6</td>
<td>$18,285.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program 3 Intelligence &amp; Communications</td>
<td>1,449.2</td>
<td>1,235.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program 10 Support of Other Nations</td>
<td>13,279.6</td>
<td>21,889.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total O&amp;M (N):</strong></td>
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<td>$41,409.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military Assistance Executive</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-30 Housing JUSMAGKOREA</td>
<td>$ 546.5</td>
<td>$ 525.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>L-60 Logistics Management Expense</td>
<td>179.9</td>
<td>284.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-50 Training, U.S. MAP Personnel</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-10 Administrative Expenses</td>
<td>205.1</td>
<td>238.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-20 Military Mission Expense</td>
<td>1,628.6</td>
<td>5,597.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-40 MAAG and Command Training Expense</td>
<td>3,128.4</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MAE:</strong></td>
<td>$ 5,709.2</td>
<td>$ 6,687.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total:</strong></td>
<td>$37,862.6</td>
<td>$48,096.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(U) Of significance in these figures was the transfer of the U.S. Military Assistance Program in Thailand from MASF to MAP funding effective 1 July 1972, the deletion of the N-40 MAAG and Command Training Expense budget program and its combination with the T-20 Administrative Expense program, and increasing
Headquarters MACV O&M,N costs due to the transfer of approximately 700 local nationals from previous Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funding support and approximately 10 U.S. civilians employed by Civil Operations and Rural Development Support from Army to O&M,N funding.

(U) These figures represented funds provided directly to CINCPAC. They excluded military pay and related costs of the components and the Shared Administrative Support (SAS) provided CINCPAC subordinates by the U.S. Embassies. These military pay and related costs were programmed for FY 73 at $67,006,700. This was $8,768,900 lower than the prior year. The SAS costs, billed to the Department of Defense by the State Department, were programmed at $1,621,200, a slight decrease from the prior year.¹

Net Additional Costs for Koreans

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Devaluation of Vietnamese Piasters

(U) The RVN piaster continued to be devalued periodically. New rates per dollar were established as follows: 430:1 on 29 July 1972, 435:1 on 22 August 1972, 445:1 on 31 October 1972, 455:1 on 11 December 1972, and 465:1 on 31 December 1972. Piaster expenditure and projection reporting requirements were changed from monthly to quarterly beginning with the last quarter of calendar year 1972. Piaster expenditures continued to decline and ended at a monthly rate of about $14 million in December 1972.³

Recurring Reports

(U) During the period 1 October 1971 to 1 November 1972, 175 PACOM recurring reports were cancelled and 52 new ones created or surfaced. This was the result of a staff review conducted by the Comptroller's Management/Programs Branch in October 1972. The reduced reporting requirement represented net savings of over $2 million in manpower and material resources involved in the preparation and processing of reports.⁴

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SECTION III--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) Washington Trip, 21-25 January: Admiral McCain flew to Washington for his annual physical examination at Bethesda Naval Hospital and for a round of talks with Government and Defense officials. On 25 January he briefed a group of 60 congressmen and staff assistants on collective security in Asia. The briefing was arranged by Representative Phillip Crane (R-Ill.) and held in the Rayburn Building. While in Washington, the Admiral called on Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Issac C. Kidd, Jr., Chief of Naval Materiel; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.); Vice Admiral Frederic A. Bardshar, USN, Director, Tactical Electromagnetic Programs; Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs; and General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.1

(U) Japan-Korea-Saigon Trip, 30 January-8 February:

1 February--Admiral McCain met with Ambassador Armin K. Meyer at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo where he was briefed on the Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan and the ship repair facilities and the Naha flying activity relocation problem. In the afternoon he met with General Hayao Kinugasa, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency.

2-3 February--The Admiral flew to Sapporo, on the island of Hokkaido, where he attended opening day ceremonies of the Winter Olympic Games as guest of the Japanese Government.

4-5 February--Admiral McCain spent two days in Saigon conferring with General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and other military and government officials.

6-7 February--Admiral McCain's next stop was Seoul, Korea, where he called on Minister of National Defense Yu Chae Hung. While in Korea he was also briefed by U.S. Government and military officials.

8 February--Before returning to Hawaii, Admiral McCain stopped over in Tokyo for meetings with the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Masumi Esaki and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda.

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1. All entries in this section are based on J74 HistSums Jan-Dec 72.
WASHINGTON-MIAMI TRIP, 27 February-1 March: Admiral McCain appeared before the House Armed Services Committee where he presented a strategic appraisal of the Pacific Command and answered questions. During his two-day stay in Washington, the Admiral conferred with Rady A. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs); Senator John C. Stennis (D-Miss.); Senator Milton R. Young (R-N.D.); Vice Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare); G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations; and Dr. D.O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration). While en route to Washington, Admiral McCain logged his millionth mile of air travel since becoming Pacific Commander.

29 February--Admiral McCain flew to Miami, Florida, where he addressed the Committee of One Hundred, an organization comprised of leading industrialists and civic leaders of Florida. He told the group that a Chinese capability of launching missiles against the U.S. is not likely before 1975. A large portion of the address, which touched on almost every nation in the Pacific Command, dealt with growing Soviet naval power.

CEYLON-DIEGO GARCIA-VIETNAM TRIP, 6-10 March: Admiral McCain arrived in Colombo, Ceylon, 6 March, for a three-day visit which included calls on the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials. He was briefed by the Country Team at the U.S. Embassy and met with U.S. officials there. On 9 March the Admiral flew to Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, where he inspected the construction of a communications station and a landing strip to be operated jointly by Great Britain and the U.S. It was the Admiral's first visit to the site. Before returning to Hawaii, the Admiral stopped in Saigon for one day to call on U.S. officials.

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 16 March: Admiral McCain addressed 200 members of the World Affairs Council at Newport Beach, California. The group consisted of business and civic leaders of Los Angeles who were interested in world problems.

WASHINGTON-NORFOLK-NEW YORK CITY TRIP, 20-25 March: Admiral McCain attended a two-day conference of the commanders of the U.S. Unified and Specified Commands at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, on 21 and 22 March. While in the Washington area he also called on Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and other Pentagon officials. On 24 March, speaking before 274 students of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Admiral McCain affirmed that the U.S. will maintain a presence in Southeast Asia as long as it is required. In the evening, the Admiral flew to New York City to attend a reception and dinner hosted by the Air Force Association to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Air Force.
(U) **Australia-Hong Kong Trip, 20-29 June:** Admiral McCain flew to Canberra, Australia on 20 June to attend the 36th annual conference of SEATO military advisers. Following the meeting on 22 June, he flew to Hong Kong where he attended a three-day meeting of top American diplomats based in Asia. Discussion topics included the Indo-China conflict, changing Sino-U.S. relations, India-U.S. relations, and economics and drug problems. Admiral McCain presented a briefing on the Strategic Island Concept to the group. On 26 June, the Admiral returned to Canberra to attend the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting. On 29 June he attended a meeting of the military representatives of the ANZUS treaty countries.

(U) **Taiwan-Korea-Japan Trip, 26-31 July:**

26 July—Admiral McCain arrived in Taipei for a two-day visit to bid farewell to the Chinese Government leaders prior to his retirement. During the stay he called on Vice President C.K. Yen; Premier Chiang Ching-kuo; and General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff. While in Taiwan, the Admiral was awarded the Cloud and Banner Medal with Special Grand Cordon by Premier Chiang.

28 July—Admiral McCain arrived in Seoul for a farewell tour of U.S. Forces facilities and to say good-bye to the people of Korea. During the visit, he paid courtesy calls on President Park Chung-hee and Defense Minister Yu Chae Hung.

31 July—The Admiral arrived in Tokyo for a farewell visit. During his stay he was presented with the First Class Order of the Rising Sun conferred upon him by the Emperor of Japan. The award was presented by Keikichi Mashuhara, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. It is the highest decoration given to a foreign military leader.

(U) **Saigon-Phnom Penh-Bangkok Trip, 12-17 August:**

13 August—While visiting President Nguyen Van Thieu at Independence Palace in Saigon, the Admiral was awarded the Republic of Vietnam's highest military award for foreigners, the Grand Officer of National Order and the Gallantry Cross with Palm. While in Saigon, Bud Merritt of U.S. News and World Report called on the Admiral.

14 August—During a seven-hour stopover in Phnom Penh, Admiral McCain was presented a medal by President Lon Nol symbolizing the Order of National Defense, the highest award that can be presented to a foreigner by the Cambodian Government.

15 August—The Admiral arrived in Bangkok for a three-day visit. While there, he called on Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and other Thai dignitaries, as well as U.S. and SEATO officials.

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Southeast Asia Trip, 9-21 September: Admiral Gayler paid a 12-day visit to Southeast Asia to meet with U.S. and foreign officials and inspect military units and installations. It was the Admiral's first tour of the Pacific Command since becoming Commander in Chief on 1 September. He spent 10-13 September in the Republic of Vietnam where he met with General Frederick C. Weyand, Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam; U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; and President Nguyen Van Thieu. On 13 September the Admiral flew to Bangkok where he talked with U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger; Air Chief Marshal Dawee; Sunthorn Hongladarom, SEATO Secretary General; and MACTHAI officials. On 14 September he arrived in Cambodia for an audience with Marshal Lon Nol. He then returned to Bangkok for continued briefings and tours of military units and facilities. On 18 September Admiral Gayler flew to the attack carrier USS KITTY HAWK for a tour of Seventh Fleet ships operating in the Tonkin Gulf. He met with Seventh Fleet Commander Admiral James L. Holloway and spent the next two days visiting 10 different fleet units including the flagship USS PROVIDENCE. Admiral Gayler returned to the Republic of Vietnam on 20 September for continued briefings and tours of units in the DaNang and Saigon areas.

Far East Trip, 16-28 October:

17 October—Admiral Gayler arrived in Guam on the first stop of his second trip to the Western Pacific after becoming the Commander in Chief Pacific. During a short stopover, he met with Rear Admiral George C. Morrison, Commander Naval Forces Marianas/Commander Submarine Squadron ONE on board the nuclear submarine USS JAMES MONROE. He then proceeded to Saigon where he talked with General Frederick C. Weyand and General John W. Vogt, Jr., Commander of the Seventh Air Force.

18 October—The Admiral flew to Bangkok to attend the 37th SEATO Military Adviser's Conference on 19-20 October. While in Thailand, the Admiral also called on U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces.

21 October—Admiral Gayler arrived in Taipei for his first official visit to Taiwan. While in Taiwan, the Admiral visited Chinese and American officials, including Vice President C.K. Yen; Premier Chiang Ching-kuo; General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff; and Minister of National Defense, Chen Ta-ching. He was also given an audience with Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Before leaving Taiwan, Admiral Gayler reassured the Chinese of American defense commitments in the Taiwan Strait.

25 October—The Admiral flew to Japan for a four-day visit that included a stopover at Misawa Air Base in Northern Honshu. While in Japan, Admiral Gayler met with U.S. Ambassador Robert Ingersoll; Lieutenant General Gordon
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Graham, Commander U.S. Forces, Japan; and Rear Admiral Julian T. Burke, Jr., Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Japan. His itinerary also included talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masayoshi Ohira; Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Keikichi Masuhara; and General Hayao Kinugasa, Chairman of the Joint Staff.

(U) Washington Trip, 6-14 November: Admiral Gayler arrived in Washington 6 November for an eight-day visit that included calls on Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and guest speaking engagements at several military staff colleges.

While in Washington, the Admiral also talked with Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush; Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms; Navy Secretary John W. Warner; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations; and Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke.

On 6 November the Admiral addressed a joint session of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D. C.

On 10 November, he flew to Norfolk where he spoke to 274 students of the Armed Forces Staff College. After the speech, he held a press conference.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) Admiral and Mrs. McCain joined Governor John Burns of Hawaii, Senator Hiram Fong (R-Hawaii), Mayor Frank Fasi of Honolulu, and other Hawaii dignitaries on 17 February in greeting President and Mrs. Nixon on their arrival at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station. The President stopped over in Hawaii for two days en route to his historic visit to Peking, China.

(U) On 23 February, Admiral McCain welcomed 75 U.S. military and government officials from 12 Asian countries to Camp Smith for a three-day conference of U.S. Military Assistance Advisers. He opened the meeting with a presentation on the security situation in the Pacific Command area.

(U) Admiral McCain attended a show on 2 March at the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station given by entertainer Sammy Davis, Jr. During the show, which concluded a tour of military bases in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Admiral McCain presented a plaque on behalf of the Marine Corps in appreciation for efforts by Mr. Davis in entertaining the troops.

(U) Admiral McCain opened a two-day closed conference on 27 March at Camp Smith with military leaders from Australia and New Zealand. Admiral Victor

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Smith, Chairman of Australia's Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Lieutenant General Richard J.H. Webb, New Zealand's Chief of Defense Staff, attended the meetings. Discussions centered on military matters of common interest in the Pacific area.

(U) Senator Mike Mansfield and Senator Hugh Scott were greeted at Hickam Air Force Base on 15 April by Admiral McCain during a brief stopover by the two Senate leaders en route to Mainland China.

(U) Admiral McCain joined Governor John A. Burns and other local dignitaries on 29 April in extending official greetings to the APOLLO 16 crew on their safe return from the moon. The three astronauts arrived at Hickam Air Force Base by helicopter from the recovery ship USS TICONDEROGA and after a brief ceremony left for Houston.

(U) On 6 June Admiral McCain flew to Los Angeles, California, where he delivered a luncheon speech to the Town Hall of California in which he praised the mining of Haiphong Harbor as one of the finest things President Nixon had done.

Admiral McCain and the APOLLO 16 astronauts.
Admiral McCain greets President Nixon on his arrival in Hawaii.

(U) John B. Connally, former Secretary of the Treasury, stopped over in Honolulu on 15 June and was the guest of Admiral McCain. Mr. Connally was on a 15-nation tour for President Nixon, briefing heads of state on recent U.S. diplomatic and economic moves.

(U) Admiral McCain conferred briefly with Presidential Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger on 18 June at the Kahala-Hilton Hotel. Mr. Kissinger was in Honolulu for a brief rest-stop before continuing to Peking where he met with Premier Chou En-lai.

(U) Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, accompanied by Admiral McCain announced at a press conference on 20 July at the Hawaiian Village Hotel that 1 September would be the date of the Pacific Command change of command ceremony.

(U) Admiral McCain joined Governor John Burns and other government and military officials on 30 August at Hickam Air Force Base to welcome President
Nixon to Hawaii. The President was in Hawaii for a two-day summit conference with Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan. Admiral McCain was also on hand at Hickam Air Force Base, with the President and other dignitaries, when Prime Minister Tanaka arrived.

(U) Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird arrived on 27 December at Barbers Point Naval Air Station for a seven-day farewell visit to military commands in Hawaii. During the visit he conferred with Admiral Gayler and other PACOM officials. On 29 December Secretary Laird hosted a farewell luncheon at the Pearl Harbor Enlisted Club for a cross section of about 80 military men and women in Hawaii, including Admiral Gayler. Prior to the luncheon, a press conference was held for local media representatives.

Other important visitors to the Command who called on the Commander in Chief during 1972 included the following:

(U) 3 January--Senator Barry Goldwater, (R-Ariz.) and Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R-Calif.).


5 January--Representative William Nichols (D-Ala.).

6 January--Henry I. Loomis, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency; Senator James L. Buckley (R-N.Y.); William F. Buckley, syndicated columnist.

7 January--Representatives Joseph M. McDade (R-Pa.) and William Bray (R-Ind.).

10 January--Lieutenant General Robert G. Ruegg, USAF, Commander in Chief, Alaska; Kent Crane, Assistant Director, East Asia and the Pacific, U.S. Information Agency.

11 January--Representative William Mailliard (R-Calif.).

18 January--Lieutenant General Richard Stilwell, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

20 January--Robert Froehlke, Secretary of the Army; Representative David Henderson (D-N.C.); Carl Clewlow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel); Rady A. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).

27 January--Tamio Kora, Consul General of Japan; Major General Pok Sam An, Chief, Cambodian Military Liaison to Republic of Vietnam.

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28 January--Lieutenant General Toshikata Mai, Director, Joint Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency.

11 February--General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

14 February--Rear Admiral William Kotsch, USN, Deputy Director of Operations (Environmental Services), Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

24 February--Major General John R. Dean, USA, Director, Defense Special Projects Group; Stanley S. Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior (Territorial Affairs).

25 February--Grant Mouser, Political-Military Advisor, U.S. Embassy, New Delhi, India.

4 April--Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations.

6 April--Representative H. Allen Smith (R-Calif.).

12 April--Lieutenant General James B. Lampert, High Commissioner, Ryukyus.

14 April--Ambassador Iyalla. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, Nigeria.


19 April--Major General Alexander N. Haig, Presidential Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs; General Harold K. Johnson, USA (Ret.).

26 April--Ambassador Franklin Hayden Williams, President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.

28 April--Lieutenant General Jusof, Minister of Industries, Indonesia.

4 May--P.E. Carr, Vice Commander, Veterans of Foreign Wars.

6 May--Arthur W. Hummell, Assistant Secretary of State.

9 May--Vice Admiral James Holloway, III, Prospective Commander, Seventh Fleet.

12 May--Clare Boothe Luce.
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25 May--General Byung Moon, Commandant, Republic of Korea Marine Corps.

26 May--Dr. John McLaughlin, White House Staff.

30 May--Vice Admiral William Mack, Prospective Superintendent, Naval Academy.

2 June--Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army.

3 June--Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, USN (Ret.), Vice President, General Dynamics.

8 June--Richard King, President, Center for International Business.

9 June--Major General Yoshio Takenaka, Japan Self Defense Force Attache.

15 June--John H. Geiger, National Commander, American Legion.

16 June--Raymond Schafer, Chairman, President's Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse.


1 July--John Lehman, Member, National Security Council; Major General Vang Pao, Royal Laotian Army.

3 July--J. Fred Buzhart, General Counsel, Department of Defense.

11 July--General Han Sin, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea.

13 July--Congressman Floyd D. Spence (R.-S.C.); Vice Admiral Mou, Republic of China Navy.

8 August--Te-chieh Poo, Consul General, Republic of China.

22 August--Ambassador Franklin Hayden Williams, President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.

26 August--Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations.

28 August--Vice Admiral Lundvall, Commander in Chief, Swedish Navy.

29 August--Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba of Japan.
8 September--Philip Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

22 September--Dr. Curtis Tarr, Under Secretary of State (Security Assistance).

26 September--Admiral Harry D. Felt, USN (Ret.).


2 October--Vice Admiral Walter H. Baumberger, Departing Commander, Taiwan Defense Command.

12 October--Lieutenant General Glen W. Martin, Vice Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command; Consul General Te-chieh Poo, Republic of China.

13 October--M.P. Chapman, Consul General (Los Angeles), New Zealand; Major General Sak Sutsakhan, Minister of National Defense, Khmer Republic (visited by Admiral Gayler at Tripler Army Medical Center).

31 October--Major General Marion E. Carl, Inspector General, USMC.

2 November--Emory C. Swank, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia.
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16 November--Rolf S. Pauls, West German Ambassador to the U.S.

29 November--Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force.

4 December--Congressman Burt L. Talcott, (R. Calif.).

7 December--Stanley S. Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

12 December--Senator Milton Young, (R-N.D.).

15 December--General Hayao Kinugasa, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency.

15 December--Senator Barry Goldwater, (R-Ariz.).

26 December--Lieutenant General Robert E. Pursley, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan.

Media Visitors to CINCPAC

(U) The following media representatives called on the Commander in Chief during the year:


11 January--David Devoss, Time Magazine.

11 February--Mr. and Mrs. Holmes Alexander, syndicated columnists; John Chamberlain, King Features; Hugh Newton, free lance writer.

23 February--Joseph Kroesen, Overseas Weekly; Richard Horton, Overseas Weekly.

24 February--Nine journalists from Asia who were recipients of 1972 Jefferson Fellowships.


14 March--John A. Scott--Publisher, Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Porter Dickinson, Publisher Emeritus.

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17 March—Kip Cooper, Military Editor of the San Diego Union, interviewed Admiral McCain by telephone.

23 March—Jack Norris, Seapower Magazine, called on Admiral McCain at the Pentagon.

3 April—Colonel William Koch accepted the Meritorious Unit Citation presented by Admiral McCain to Pacific Stars and Stripes. Colonel Koch was the editor.

14 April—Creighton Burns, Assistant Editor, Melbourne Age.

28 April—Clyde Hess, Chief of News, Voice of America.

8 May—Charles L. Gould, Publisher, San Francisco Examiner.

19 May—10 media executives representing local newspapers, television and radio stations, and wire services.

26 May—Robert Morris, Publisher, Twin Circle.

2 June—A crew from KGMB-TV in Honolulu filmed scenes of Admiral McCain for a news feature "A Day in the Life of Admiral McCain." The feature, shown on 10 June, included an interview by Bob Wernet.

13 June—Robert Miller, United Press International, Honolulu Bureau Manager.

8 August—Noel Bush, Reader's Digest magazine.


25 August—Admiral McCain held his final press conference meeting at Camp Smith with Honolulu newsmen.

25 September—Admiral Gaylor held his first press conference meeting at Camp Smith with representatives of the Honolulu press and local radio and television stations.


10 October—Dick Paulicka, Honolulu Advertiser.
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31 October--John Manniello, CBS News.

29 December--Lloyd Norman, Newsweek, Saigon Bureau Chief.
### GLOSSARY

#### A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAT</td>
<td>Additional Assistance to Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
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<td>ABNCP</td>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Indonesian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFG</td>
<td>Alternate Command Facility, Guam</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACofS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACS/I</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Agency for Defense Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automatic Data Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSCC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Communications Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Associated Ground Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Automated Installation Intelligence File</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>Address Indicator Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIK</td>
<td>Assistance in Kind</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>Air Intentions Message</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRA</td>
<td>Air Attache</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCE</td>
<td>Airlift Control Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCOM</td>
<td>Alaskan Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALOC</td>
<td>Air Lines of Communication</td>
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<td>ALRI</td>
<td>Indonesian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALUSNA</td>
<td>American Legation, U.S. Naval Attache</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMCM</td>
<td>Airborne Mine Countermeasures</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMEMB</td>
<td>American Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMPCEN</td>
<td>Automatic Message Processing Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARPA</td>
<td>Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Automatic Switching Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIC</td>
<td>All-Source Information Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASICOM</td>
<td>All-Source Information Center Communications Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare</td>
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</table>
A-TACC  Alternate Tactical Air Control Center
AURI  Indonesian Air Force
AUTODIN  Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM  Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON  Automatic Voice Network

BADGE  Base Air Defense Ground Environment (Japan)
BDA  Bomb Damage Assessment
BDP  Base Development Plan
BEN  Basic Encyclopedia Number
BIOT  British Indian Ocean Territory
BLA  Base Labor Agreement
BLT  battalion landing team
BNDD  Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
BOA  Broad Ocean Area
BOC  Bureau of Customs
BOM  By Other Means

C  Confidential
CAS  Controlled American Source
CATO  CINCPAC Ammunition Transfer Order
CBU  Cluster Bomb Unit
CCINC  Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control
CCK  Ching Chuan Kang
CPTDC  Combat Development Test Center
C-E  Communications-Electronics
CEIMP  Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program
CENTO  Central Treaty Organization
CGFMFPAC  Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
CGUSARYIS  Commanding General, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands
CHUSDLG  Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CICV  Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CINC  Commander in Chief
CINCAL  Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCLANT  Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD  Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC  Commander in Chief Pacific
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACINST</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACREP</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACREPHIL</td>
<td>CINCPAC Representative, Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSARPAC</td>
<td>CINCPAC Display and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINDIS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Criminal Jurisdiction Implementation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEO</td>
<td>Combined Material Exploitation Center (Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPO</td>
<td>Chief, Military Planning Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Communications Security Material System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLOGS</td>
<td>Consolidated Logistics System</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMNAVINTCOM</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Intelligence Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUS</td>
<td>Commander, United States Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSARJ</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Army Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUS Japan</td>
<td>Commander U.S. Forces, Japan</td>
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<td>COMUS Korea</td>
<td>Commander U.S. Forces, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSNAVPHIL</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSTDC</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTCO</td>
<td>Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Closest Point of Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAF</td>
<td>Cost Plus Award Fee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Processing Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Continuing Resolution Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIMP</td>
<td>Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSJ</td>
<td>Crash Site Inspection; Countersubversion and Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Communist Terrorist</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWCP</td>
<td>Civilian War Casualty Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Calendar Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>DASC</td>
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<td>DBP</td>
<td>Defense Buildup Plan (Japan)</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
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<td>DEFCN</td>
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<td>DEPCH</td>
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<td>DFSC</td>
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<td>DIAOINS</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency--Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems</td>
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<td>DIAOLS</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
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<td>Defense Resources Support and Termination Office</td>
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<td>Defense Satellite Communications System</td>
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Government of India; Government of Indonesia
Government of Japan
Government of the Philippines
Government of Singapore
Government of the Republic of China
Government of Sri Lanka
Government of the Union of Burma

Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
Historical Summary
Human Resources Intelligence

Integrated Communications System
Intelligence Data Handling System
Intelligence Data Handling Systems Communications
International fighter aircraft
Identification, Friend or Foe
Immediate Photo Interpretation Report
Infra-red
Inspect and Repair as Necessary
Internal Revenue Service
Intelligence Service, Armed Forces Philippines
International School Bangkok
Interservice Support Agreement
Inshore Undersea Warfare

Joint Army, Navy, Air Force
Joint Air Operations Center Korea
Japan Air Self-Defense Force
Joint Central Processing Center (PACOM)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Japan Defense Agency
Joint Force Memorandum
Joint/Frequency Panel
Japan Fiscal Year
Joint General Staff (Vietnam)
Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (Taiwan)
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<td>JOPS</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning System</td>
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<td>JPO</td>
<td>Joint Petroleum Office</td>
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<td>JPRC</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Center</td>
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<td>JPRTF</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force</td>
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<td>JRCC</td>
<td>Joint Rescue Coordination Center</td>
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<td>JRDOD</td>
<td>Joint Research and Development Objectives Document</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<td>JTRG</td>
<td>Joint Target Review Group</td>
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<td>Khmer Air Force (Cambodia)</td>
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<td>Knowledgeability Brief</td>
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<td>Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>LDMX</td>
<td>Local Digital Message Exchange</td>
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<td>LF</td>
<td>Low Frequency</td>
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<td>LN</td>
<td>Local National</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line(s) of Communication</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>Laos Peoples' Force</td>
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<td>LSS</td>
<td>Logistic Support System</td>
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<td>MAAB</td>
<td>Military Assistance Activities Bulletin</td>
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<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>MACSOG</td>
<td>MACV's Studies and Observation Group</td>
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<td>MACTHAI</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED
MAF  Marine Amphibious Force
MAP  Military Assistance Program
MAPEL  Military Assistance Program Equipment List
MAPT  Military Assistance Program Training
MASF  Military Assistance Service Funded
MASL  Military Assistance Program Articles & Services List
MAU  Marine Amphibious Unit
MBA  Military Base Agreement
MCA  Military Construction, Army
MCD-P  Management Control Detachment-Pacific
MCM  Mine Countermeasures
MDAO  Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDT  Mutual Defense Treaty
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation
MEDTC  Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MIA  Missing in Action; Missile Intelligence Agency
MIJI  Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion
MILAD  Military Advisor
MILCON  Military Construction
MILREP  Military Representative
MIMEX  Major Item Excess Program
MIRV  Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle
MND  Ministry of National Defense
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOJ  Ministry of Justice
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MPC  Mobile Processing Center
MR  Military Region
M&RA  Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MSC  Military Sealift Command; Medical Service Corps
MSCFE  Military Sealift Command Far East
MTA  Military Telecommunications Agency (Thailand)
MTMTS  Military Transportation Management Terminal Service
MTT  Mobile Training Team

NAC  Net Additional Costs
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCOSSACT  Naval Command Systems Support Activity
NCPAC  National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Pacific
NEMVAC  Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation
NGFS  Naval Gunfire Support
NLG  National Lawyers Guild
NSA
NSD
NUCAP
NVA
NVN

OAC
OASD(H&E)
OASD(ISA)
ODMA
ODRI
ODRP
OICC
O&M
O&MA
O&MN
OPCON
OPREP
OPSEC
ORRCP
ORTC
OSD
OSI

PA
PACAF
PACFLT
PACOM
PADAC
PADAIF
PAF
PAL
PARA
PARPRO
PATMA
PAX
PC
PCA

National Security Agency
Naval Supply Depot
Nuclear Capability Report
North Vietnamese Army
North Vietnam

Okinawa Area Coordinator
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Office of the Director of Military Assistance
Office of the Defense Representative, India
Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan
Officer-in-Charge of Construction
Operations and Maintenance
Operations and Maintenance, Army
Operations and Maintenance, Navy
Operational Control
Operational Report
Operations Security
Okinawa Reversion-Related Construction Projects
Overseas Replacement Training Center
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of Special Investigations

Penetration Authority
Pacific Air Forces
United States Pacific Fleet
Pacific Command
PACOM Defense Analysis Center
PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility
Philippine Air Force
Permissive Action Link
Policy Analysis Resource Allocation
Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
Pacific Command Transportation Management Agency
Private Auxiliary Exchange
Philippine Constabulary
Positive Control Area; Pacific Communications Area
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PCH&amp;T</td>
<td>Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation</td>
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<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decisions Memorandum</td>
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<td>PDO</td>
<td>Property Disposal Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLAB</td>
<td>President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICFMS</td>
<td>PACOM IDHS Command File Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Communist Party of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMDL</td>
<td>Provisional Military Demarcation Line</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>Philippine Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>Port of Debarkation</td>
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<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of Embarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants</td>
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<td>POLO</td>
<td>PACOM Operations and Liaison Office</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objectives Memorandum</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting System</td>
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<td>PPOG</td>
<td>Psychological Pressure Operations Group</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>PR/CSI</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery/ Crash Site Inspection</td>
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<td>PRERECPAC</td>
<td>Preplanned Reconnaissance Pacific</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>PURA</td>
<td>Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency</td>
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<td>PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<td>PWRR</td>
<td>Pre-positioned War Reserve Requirements</td>
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<td>Research and Engineering Consultant</td>
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<td>RDFU-V</td>
<td>Research and Development Field Unit-Vietnam</td>
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<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation</td>
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<td>REAL</td>
<td>Routine Economic Airlift</td>
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<td>REDCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Readiness Command</td>
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<td>REMAN</td>
<td>Resources Management</td>
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<td>Regional Forces</td>
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<td>RIF</td>
<td>Reduction in Force</td>
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<td>RIIOC</td>
<td>Regional Interagency Intelligence and Operations Center</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron</td>
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<td>RIU</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLAF</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Air Force</td>
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<td>RLG</td>
<td>Royal Laotian Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>RO/AID</td>
<td>Requirements Office/Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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</table>
UNCLASSIFIED

ROE
Rules of Engagement

ROK
Republic of Korea

ROKVF
Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam

ROP
Republic of the Philippines

RP
Route Package

RPS
Registered Publication System

R&R
Rest and Recuperation

RRA
Radio Relay Aircraft

RTA
Royal Thai Army

RTAF
Royal Thai Air Force

RTAFB
Royal Thai Air Force Base

RTAFV
Royal Thai Armed Forces, Vietnam

RTARF
Royal Thai Armed Forces

RTG
Royal Thai Government; Reconnaissance Technical Group

RTN
Royal Thai Navy

RVN
Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S
Secret

SA
Security Assistance

SAC
Strategic Air Command

SAILS
Standard Army Intermediate Level System

SALS
Single Ammunition Logistic System

SAM
Surface-to-Air Missile

SAPO
Sub-Area Petroleum Office

SAR
Search and Rescue

SAS
Sealed Authenticator System; Shared Administrative Support

SCAMP
Study of Control Agencies for Movement in the PACOM

SCC
Security Consultative Committee (Japan)

SCHQ
Supreme Command Headquarters (Thailand)

SCN
SEATO Communications Network

SCOOT
Support Cambodia Out of Thailand

SCU
Special Commando Unit

SEAL
Sea, Air, Land (Team)

SEAP
SEATO Publication

SEASIA
Southeast Asia

SEATO
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SECDEF
Secretary of Defense

SECSTATE
Secretary of State

SF
Special Forces

SFSO
SEATO Force Standing Orders

SGU
Special Guerrilla Units

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SI
Special Intelligence

SICR
Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement

SIGINT
Signal Intelligence

SIOP
Single Integrated Operation Plan

SITRA
Situation and Incident Report

SITS-K
Single Integrated Telecommunications System-Korea

SJA
Staff Judge Advocate

SMF/CRF
Special Mission Force/Coastal Recovery Force

SOFA
Status of Forces Agreement

SOP
Standing Operating Procedure

SOS
Special Operations Squadron

SPECAT
Special Category

SPINTCOMM
Special Intelligence Communications

SPTF
Saigon PSYOP Task Force

SRF
Ship Repair Facility

SSC
Security Consultative Subcommittee

SSMR
Single Senior Military Representative

STD
Strategic Technical Directorate

STDAT
Strategic Technical Directorate Advisory Team

STFD
Strengthening Thailand for Defense

STIS
Significant Targeting Intelligence Summaries

STOL
Short Take-Off and Landing

SUSLAK
Special U.S. Liaison Advisor Korea

TACAMO
Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting

TACC
Tactical Air Control Center

TAS
Tactical Airlift Squadron

TDC
Taiwan Defense Command

TDCC
Tactical Data Control Center

TDS
Tactical Data Systems

TDY/TAD
Temporary Duty/Temporary Additional Duty

TEWS
Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

TFS
Tactical Fighter Squadron

TLA
Temporary Lodging Allowance

TMA
Transportation Management Agency; Taiwan Materiel Agency

TOR
Terms of Reference

TOT
Telephone Organization of Thailand

TPFDL
Time Phased Force and Deployment Lists

TS
Top Secret

TTPI
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

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